BR  100  .M46  1886 
Mendenhall,  J.  W. 
Plato  and  Paul 


1844-1892. 


\/ 


PLATO  AND  PAUL; 


OR, 


Philosophy  and  Christianity. 


AN   BXANIINATION 


TWO    FUNDAMENTAL    FORCES    OF    COSMIC    AND    HUMAN 

HISTORY.  WITH  THEIR  CONTENTS,  METHODS, 

FUNCTIONS,  RELATIONS,  AND 

RESULTS  COMPARED. 


J.  W.iiENDENHALL.  PH.  D.,  D.  D.. 

Author  of  "Echoes  from  Palestine,"  Etc. 


•Plato  is  philosophy,  and  philosophy,  Plato." — R.  W.  Emerson. 
•Christianity  is  the  philosophy  of  the  people." — Victor  Cousin. 
ndvra  doKC/id^ETE-  to  kuTmv  mTExere." — THE  Apostle  Paul. 


CINCINNATI: 
CRANSTON   &  STOWE 

NEW  YORK : 
HUNT  >VND    BA.TON. 


COPYRIOHT    BV 

CRA.NSTON    &   STOWE, 

1886. 


IFntrobuction  to  fll^cmolial  IEmUou, 


DR.  MENDENHALL  has  been  iu  heaven  two  years.  We  would 
not  have  him  back  ;  but  sometimes  we  ahnost  expect  to  see 
him  coming  as  of  yore,  and  to  hear  his  thrilling,  throbbing  sentences 
again.  Now  that  we  know  how  frail  he  was,  we  wonder  that  he  was 
spared  so  long,  and  marvel  that  he  accomplished  so  much.  His 
great  soul  shook  the  light  framework  of  the  body  that  housed  it.  He 
generated  the  light  he  worked  by.  Power  he  had  abundantly,  but 
the  combustion  which  supplied  it  was  that  of  his  body.  The  zeal  of 
the  Lord's  house  consumed  him. 

To  meet  him  socially  was  to  be  drawn  to  him  as  by  a  magnet. 

To  hear  him  preach  was  to  be  awed  by  the  sublimity  of  his 
thought,  and  charmed  by  the  grace  and  purity  of  his  diction. 

To  read  after  him  was  to  behold  his  soul  in  the  multiple  mirrors 
which  reflected  its  radiant  powers. 

He  knew  his  strength.  Jonah  was  not  his  model.  The  Nineveh 
call  resounded  within  him,  and  he  fell  his  length  toward  the  city's 
portals.  Archimedes  wanted  a  fulcrum.  So  did  he.  When  the 
Church  believed  he  had  a  lever,  she  furnished  it.  Men  who  scorn- 
fully asked,  "What  can  this  boaster  do?"  found  out,  when  the  rout 
of  the  Philistines  spread  from  the  valley  even  unto  the  gates  of 
Ekron. 

In  the  best  sense  he  was  a  "higher  critic  "  himself.  "The  de- 
fense of  Christianity  on  the  sole  ground  of  its  impiration"  he  said, 
"  however  justifiable  in  theology,  is  not  resorted  to  here  [in  his  Plato 
and  Paul],  since  the  doctrine  of  inspiration  itself  is  undergoing  a 
change  of  meaning  and  a  modification  of  expression  in  Christian  cir- 
cles that  forbid  its  employment  as  a  philosophical  instrument  in  the  sup- 
port of  the  highest  truth.  Dogmatic  inspiration,  or  that  inspiration 
which  theology  maintains,  has  now  all  it  can  do  to  maintain  itself; 
philosophical  inspiration,  or  that  inspiration  which  is  inherent  in  truth 
aiid  logically  afiirms  itself,  is  potent  in  the  strengthening  of  one's 
faith  in  such  truth,"  This  does  not  mean  that  he  relinquished  his 
faith  in  inspiration,  but  that  the  content  of  the  term  was  not  yet  de- 
termined ;  and  that  the  Christian  believer  and  the  believing  philoso- 
pher had  something  in  common. 

But,  wild  with  its  own  successes.  Higher  Criticism,  not  content 
with  cutting  down  idolatrous  groves  and  destroying  idolatrous  altars. 


II  INTRODUCTION  TO  MEMORIAL  EDITION. 

seemed  bent  on  profaning  the  temple  itself.  It  was  then  and  there  that, 
fresh  from  tending  his  few  Ohio  Sheep,  the  stripling  with  his  sling 
laid  low  the  giant  terror  of  our  Israel,  the  Goliath  of  Destructive 
Criticism. 

That  was  the  time  to  battle,  not  to  compromise ;  to  conquer,  not 
to  make  treaties.  Some  misunderstood  him.  Eliab  was  so  much 
older,  and  had  been  to  war  so  much  longer,  that  he  reckoned  little 
worth  the  bear  and  the  lion  episodes,  and  even  counted  the  throw 
that  killed  Goliath  a  chance  shot. 

But  David  had  just  come  to  his  kingdom,  and  was  preparing  to 
quadrate  I'aith  with  philosophy,  and  zeal  with  highest  learning,  when 
he  was  called  away,  leaving  that  most  important  part  of  his  unfinished 
work  to  be  done  by  his  successor  on  the  Review  throne. 

He  died  misjudged,  because  misunderstood.  His  plan  was  perfect, 
but  his  building  incomplete. 

Even  now  those  of  our  ripest  scholars  who  were  almost  in  revolt 
against  what  seemed  his  ignorant  dogmatism,  have  come  to  cherish  a 
kindlier  judgment.  By  and  by,  understanding  the  kingly  lineage  of 
his  letters,  they  will,  with  loving  sadness,  say:  "  He  came  to  his  own, 
and  his  own  received  him  not." 

Whilst  we  live  who  knew  him,  he  will  need  no  memorial.  Mem- 
ory lifts  a  starry  dome  in  our  hearts.  But  we  would  have  our  chil- 
dren and  strangers  learn  the  greatness  of  his  soul,  and  come  under 
the  spell  of  his  genius. 

Ilhiminated  window  in  holy  fane,  mural  tablet  in  classic  hall,  high- 
builded  mausoleum  in  sacred  shades, — these  are  local  and  inadequate. 
His  books  are  his  noblest  monuments.  In  these,  though  he  be  dead, 
yet  he  speaketh.  They  are  his  reincarnation.  As  the  phonograph 
gives  tone,  inflection,  word,  and  thought,  when  he  who  spoke  has 
passed  away,  so,  as  we  turn  the  pages  of  Meudenhall's  "Plato  and 
Paul,"  the  book  reveals  to  us  all  the  myriad  qualities  of  his  noblest 
self— student,  devotee,  doubter,  believer,  philosopher  and  saint,  man 
and  master.     This  is  his  true  memorial,  his  worthiest  monument. 

It  is  with  this  thought  that  Cranston  &  Curts  have  prepared  a 
limited  memorial  edition  of  this  royal  octavo  volume,  with  its  777 
pages,  a  mine  of  Christian  learning.  They  rightly  conjecture  that, 
not  only  in  the  North  Ohio  Conference,  whence  he  sprang,  but 
throughout  Ohio  and  the  Church,  there  will  be  many  who  would  de- 
light to  lay  such  a  volume,  fitly  bound  and  inscribed,  on  the  library 
table,  that,  as  often  as  they  see  it,  they  may  think  of  him,  and  when 
they  read  it,  commune  with  his  princely  spirit. 

r>AVID  H.  MOORE,  D.  D. 
Cincinnati,  Ohio. 

March,  IK'M. 


INTRODUCTION. 


PHILOSOPHY  is  Speculation ;  Christianity  is  Truth.  So  far  forth 
as  the  subject-matter  of  the  one  is  related  to,  or  is  identical  with, 
the  subject-matter  of  the  other,  the  range  of  the  one  is  equal  to  the 
range  of  the  other.  The  realm  of  speculation  is  in  the  philosophic 
sense  illimitable  because  the  realm  of  truth  is  without  bounds.  Spec- 
ulation concerns  itself  with  truth,  not  as  knowing  it,  but  as  seeking 
it,  and  as  being  ready  to  investigate  it  when  found,  or  when  it  is 
assumed  that  it  has  been  found.  Both  are  engaged  with  the  same 
problems,  employing  different  and  sometimes  opposite  methods  in 
the  attempt  to  solve  them,  but  anticipating  in  their  final  rehearsal 
a  vindication  of  the  same  truths,  or  the  same  forms  of  truth. 

Philosophy,  self-guided  and  self-reliant,  speculates  with  enthusias- 
tic purpose  on  the  accepted  or  assumed  verities  of  Christianity. 
Without  knowledge,  or  waiving  the  use  of  Revelation  as  a  source  of 
knowledge,  it  can  do  nothing  but  speculate.  It  can  assume  nothing, 
it  must  prove  every  thing  ;  it  knows  nothing,  it  must  inquire  as  it 
goes  along.  It  not  infrequently  happens  that,  dazed  by  the  magni- 
tude of  its  tasks,  or  discouraged  by  reason  of  the  incompleteness  of 
its  discoveries,  philosophy  merely  drifts  along  the  routes  of  inquiry, 
marking  the  distances  traveled  by  the  mile-posts  of  its  successive 
leaders,  seemingly  unconscious  of  the  fact  that  the  ages  have  waited 
for  a  settlement  of  the  highest  problems,  and  that  it  should  promote 
a  settlement  or  abandon  its  position  as  guide  to  truth.  It  often  lags 
in  its  self-burdened  efforts,  and  sometimes  despairs  of  reaching  the 
goal.  From  this  uncertain  and  paralyzing  condition,  however,  it 
usually  recovers,  apparently  inspired  with  a  conviction  of  duty  it 
can  not  shake  off,  and  proceeds  with  patient  steps  to  the  development 
of  issues  closely  akin  to  those  that  have  their  life  and  power  in  the 
bosom  of  Christianity. 

In  the  nature  of  the  case  philosophy  is  under  restraint  in  the 
prosecution  of  its  endeavors,  but  there  is  no  help  for  it  so  long  as 
its   fundamental   idea    is   in   opposition  to  the   idea   of  Revelation. 


4  INTRODUCTION. 

Dealing  with  data,  whose  explanation  is  impossible  without  the  recog- 
nition of  the  supernatural  as  the  initial  force  of  all  things,  it  aims  to 
establish  the  all-sufficiency  of  things  themselves,  which,  however  ab- 
surd in  appearance,  engages  its  loftiest  efforts,  and  constitutes  a  con- 
cept of  modern  philosophic  thought.  The  beginning  of  speculation 
is  a  simple  interrogation ;  its  intermediate  stage  is  an  anxious  and 
complex  inquiry,  looking  to  final  results ;  its  end  is  sometimes  doubt, 
sometimes  knowledge,  sometimes  faith,  sometimes  the  theistic  notion. 
Whatever  the  outcome  or  emergence  philosophy  is  a  wanderer  in  the 
wilderness  of  thought,  piloting  itself  by  its  own  compass,  anxious  all 
the  while  for  rescue,  but  uncertain  all  the  time  as  to  the  issfte. 

On  the  other  hand,  Christianity,  designating  the  supernatural  as 
its  starting-point,  and  accepting  revelation  as  the  constituent  idea  of 
religion,  descends  to  the  natural  realm,  with  an  explanation  of  its 
phenomena  by  the  laws  of  the  higher  realm,  thereby  reversing  the 
method  of  inquiry  adopted  by  philosophy,  and  illuminates  all  truth  by 
its  self-enkindled  light,  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  reason,  and  the  com- 
fort of  the  doubting  and  perplexed  inquirer.  The  immediate  effect 
of  Revelation  is  knowledge,  which  philosophy,  unaided  and  rejecting 
the  auxiliaries  of  religion,  fails  to  impart. 

The  extent  and  limitations  of  metaphysical  research  are  defined, 
not  so  much  by  the  principles  it  seeks  to  maintain,  which  are  iden- 
tical with  the  ultimate  facts  of  religion,  as  by  the  methods  of  investi- 
gation it  voluntarily  and  in  the  end  necessarily  adopts.  Empirical, 
or  absolutely  logical  methods,  adequate  enough  in  the  pursuit  of  sci- 
entific facts,  are  lamentably  inadequate  to  the  ascertainment  of  truth 
in  the  higher  realms  of  thought ;  but  other  methods  are  unknown  to 
the  philosopher,  or  if  known  are  by  the  terms  of  his  purpose  un- 
available. He  undertakes  to  pronounce  the  reason  of  things,  or  ex- 
plain them  by  themselves,  than  which  in  the  lower  realm  no  higher 
pursuit  is  possible  or  more  profitable ;  but  as  he  attempts  to  reason 
concerning  the  reason  of  things  he  suddenly  discovers  his  instrument  de- 
fective and  insufficient.  The  instrument  is  by  no  means  valueless, 
but  it  is  imperfect,  and  serves  him  only  in  primary  investigation. 
Reason  is  the  ratio  of  truths  or  things,  and  the  discovery  of  reason  is 
the  discovery  of  the  'hidden  ratio  of  truths,  or  the  exposition  of 
truth  in  its  relation  to  the  source  of  final  truth.  The  discovery  of 
reason,  bound   up   in  things,  or  secreted   in  the  highest  truth,  is  the 


INTRODUCTION.  5 

key  to  the  universe,  which  philosophy  is  persistently  striving  to  find. 
That  its  seeking  has  been  in  vain  it  were  injudicious  to  assert;  but 
that  it  has  been  successful  no  one  acquainted  with  its  history  of  failure 
will  claim.  No  disparagement  of  philosophical  labor,  no  ridicule  of 
scientific  discoveries,  no  misrepresentations  of  materialistic  thinkers, 
but  a  justifiable  depreciation  of  philosophical  results  in  the  field  of 
ultimate  inquiry  and  the  evident  embarrassments  of  all  classes  of 
speculatists  in  the  realm  of  higher  thought,  will  be  exhibited  in  this 
treatise.  The  limitations  of  philosophic  inquiries,  and  the  weaknesses 
of  philosophic  methods  for  the  determination  of  final,  that  is,  absolute, 
truth,  as  contrasted  with  the  defensible  and  transparent  methods  of 
Christianity  and  the  adequacy  of  its  truths  to  the  accomplishment  of 
the  divine  ideals  respecting  man  and  the  universe,  constitute  the  pri- 
mary and  pregnant  thought  of  this  volume. 

In  comparing  the  two  methods  and  the  results  obtained  by  their 
use,  the  radical  contents,  both  of  philosophy  and  Christianity,  as  sys- 
tems of  truth,  must  not  only  be  submitted,  but  they  must  be  analyzed 
and  tested  by  the  methods  themselves,  and  as  thoroughly  as  the  pur- 
poses of  the  investigation  require.  A  superficial  reference  to  these 
systems  would  not  enable  the  reader  to  discover  the  failure  of  the 
one  or  the  success  of  the  other,  and,  what  is  more  important,  it  would 
not  enable  him  to  understand  the  reason  of  failure  in  the  one  in- 
stance or  the  reason  of  success  in  the  other.  Hence,  a  full  schedule 
of  the  systems  themselves,  both  as  to  what  each  is  in  itself,  and  what 
they  contain  in  common,  we  have  undertaken  to  furnish,  and  trust 
the  result  will  be  satisfactory  to  the  students  of  speculative  forms. 
Beginning  with  Brucker,  the  father  of  historians  of  philosophy, 
and  wandering  among  the  nations  and  following  the  footsteps  of  the 
thinkers  in  search  of  answers  to  fundamental  questions,  we  have 
sought  to  ascertain  the  original  ideas  of  philosophic  leaders,  and  al- 
ways to  compare  their  judgments  and  indoctrinations  with  the  en- 
grossed revelations  of  the  Sacred  Teacher,  in  the  belief  that  the 
superiority  of  the  latter  wil]  be  clearly  manifest.  The  extent  to 
which  this  has  been  done  the  reader  must  determine  for  himself. 

Evidently  enfeebled  as  philosophy  is  by  its  necessary  and  consti- 
tutional methods,  it  may  surprise  the  reader  to  be  informed  that  the 
author's  aim  is  in  part  to  establish  that  Christianity  may  be  amply 
justified  by  the  philosophical  method,  and  that  its  philosophical  basis 


6  INTRODUCTION. 

is  as  impregnable  as  the  more  common  historical  basis  on  which  it 
supposedly  and  safely  rests.-  It  is  altogether  probable,  therefore,  that 
it  will  be  inferred  that  if  the  philosophical  method  is  insufficient  for 
philosophical  purposes,  it  must  also  be  inadequate  in  the  hands  of 
the  Christian  investigator  for  his  purposes.  Such  a  conclusion  must 
not  be  hastily  drawn.  Christianity  has  its  Theological  argument — an 
argument  strong,  robust,  granitic ;  its  argument  from  Experience,  the 
more  decisive  because  in  form  the  more  philosophical ;  its  argument 
from  History,  a  running  fire  burning  up  the  wild  guesses  of  material- 
ism in  its  path,  and  illuminating  the  heavens  as  it  spreads  over  the 
earth,  its  latest  work  the  best  because  the  most  destructive  and  the 
most  complete.  While  the  Theological,  the  Experiential,  and  the 
Historical  arguments  are  involved  one  in  another,  and  constitute  an 
all-sufficient  defense  of  religious  truth,  the  Philosophical  Argument  for 
Christianity  is  as  important  as  these,  and  as  unanswerable,  because 
Christianity  is  true  philosophy,  or  the  philosophy  of  truth  in  a  religious 
form ;  and,  to  meet  the  demands  of  the  present  day,  this  argument 
is  emphasized  in  this  volume  more  than  any  other,  being  rendered 
in  such  form  as  to  make  Christianity  appear  quite  as  much  a  philoso- 
phy as  a  religion,  or  that  the  two  are  inseparable  in  Christianity. 
On  this  basis — the  scientific  comiplexion  of  the  highest  religion — we  hold 
that  Christianity  may  successfully  assail  the  naive  materialism  and 
popular  agnosticism  of  the  times.  Th.e  conflict  now  raging  is  not  so 
much  a  conflict  between  Christianity  and  another  phase  of  religion, 
as  it  is  a  conflict  between  Christianity  and  some  form  of  philosophy. 
Even  in  India  and  in  pagan  lands  generally  a  contest  of  religions  is 
rarely  witnessed,  but  a  contest  of  primordial  religious  truth  with  a 
current  philosophic  idea  is  constantly  going  on.  In  appearance  the 
contest  is  exclusively  religious,  but  at  bottom  it  is  the  striving  of 
religious  truth  with  philosophic  error.  In  Christian  lands  little  or 
no  attention  has  been  given  to. the  philosophical  character  of  Chtis- 
tianity,  its  defense  being  largely  historical  or  in  form  theological; 
hence,  the  philosophic  thinker,  finding  his  method  abjured,  has  been 
led  to  conclude  against  the  philosophical  value  of  religion,  and  has 
pronounced  it  a  superstition.  To  acquaint  him  with  the  primordial 
ideas  of  religion,  vindicating  them  from  the  philosophical  stand- 
point, and  to  re-impress  the  image  of  truth  upon  the  mind  of  man, 
the  mistakes  of  materialism,  and  the  insufficiency  and  frigidity  of  a 


INTRODUCTION.  7 

godless  philosophy,  and  the  deep,  pervasive,  and  unquenchable  spirit 
of  Christianity,  with  the  authority  of  its  truths,  and  the  sufficiency 
of  its  revelations,  must  be  fully  and  comprehensively  shown,  and  this  is 
attempted  in  the  volume  here  presented. 

In  theological  treatises  a  distinction  is  observed  between  mathe- 
matical certainty  and  moral  certainty,  or  evidence  of  a  mathematical 
cast  or  force  and  evidence  moral  in  its  content  and  conditional  in  its 
power  of  persuasion,  and  this  distinction  is  applied  in  the  enforce- 
ment of  religious  truth,  not  only  to  the  discredit  of  the  Christian 
stand-point,  but  also  to  the  weakening  of  the  supports  of  faith 
in  such  truth.  That  the  distinction  itself  is  correct  must  be  ad- 
mitted, for  evidence  differs  in  its  degree  of  certainty,  the  positive 
and  demonstrative  being  properly  styled  "mathematical,"  and  the 
probable  or  conjectural,  but  undemonstrative,  being  called  "moral." 
Moralj  evidence  may  be  as  convincing  to  the  unprejudiced  intel- 
lect as  the  mathematical,  and  the  truth  supported  by  it  may  be  as  trans- 
parent as  an  axiom,  but  many  minds,  unaccustomed  to  the  balancing 
of  probabilities  or  the  weighing  of  evidence  in  other  than  the  scales 
of  exact  mathematical  dimensions,  hesitate  to  receive  for  truth  that 
which  the  theologian  offers,  because  he  urges  in  its  behalf  only 
a  moral  argument,  and  that  in  an  apologetic  form  and  without  data  to 
confirm  it.  It  is  time  to  consider  if  a  mistake  has  not  been  made  in 
advancing  Christianity  as  probably,  but  not  positively,  true,  in  con- 
ceding that  its  truths  are  not  demonstrations,  and  can  not  be  demon- 
strated, in  granting  that  its  evidences  are  not  mathematical  in  spirit 
or  form,  and  can  not  assume  a  more  precise  and  satisfactory  charac- 
ter, and  in  insisting  that  it  must  be  received  from  a  moral  conviction 
of  its  verity,  and  alone  on  moral  grounds  of  its  absolute  sufficiency 
and  truthfulness.  The  mistake  appears  all  the  greater  when  it  is  re- 
membered that  the  theologian  is  willing  to  concede  that  physical 
science  and  philosophic  truth  appeal  with  mathematical  force  to  hu- 
man judgment,  and  encircle  themselves  with  evidences  indisputable 
and  of  universal  authority.  In  his  view  it  is  enough  if  Christianity, 
inasmuch  as  it  is  a  system  of  moral  truth,  is  urged  as  a  moral  cer- 
tainty, and  accepted  on  moral  evidence,  however  uncertain  the  cer- 
tainty and  unsatisfactory  the  evidence.  To  be  sure,  he  will  not  accept 
physical  truth  on  moral  grounds,  or  subscribe  to  a  system  of  philo- 
sophic thought,  because  moral  arguments  alone  support  it ;  he  can  not 


8  INTRODUCTION. 

be  persuaded  to  accept  gravitation,  or  chemical  affinity  on  moral  evi- 
dence; but  he  accepts  monotheism,  incarnation,  atonement,  regen- 
eration, resurrection,  and  the  doctrines  of  heaven  and  hell  on 
grounds  of  moral  certainty,  as  if  incapable  of  a  mathematical  demon- 
stration. The  philosopher,  seeing  the  theologian  repudiate  moral 
evidence  as  applied  to  physical  facts,  and  mathematical  evidence  as 
applied  to  moral  facts,  translates  the  certainties  of  religion  into  un- 
certainties, regarding  his  own  stand-point  as  preferable  because  posi- 
tive and  assuring. 

In  this  way  theology  unwittingly  surrenders  the  argument  that 
belongs  to  it,  loses  its  hold  upon  the  intellectual  truth-seeker,  and  in- 
validates nearly  all  that  it  has  gained  in  its  conflict  with  error.  Verily, 
we  are  inclined  to  reverse  the  order  of  tJw  argument.  Philosophy  is  the 
uncertain,  because  only  morally  certain,  if  at  all  certain,  system  of  truth ; 
Christiantity  is  the  mathematically  certain  form  of  the  highest  truth,  the 
GEOMETRICAL  PROOF  OF  ETERNAL  RATIOS.  Spiuoza  ventured  to  af- 
firm that  theological  truth  can  be  proved  from  a  mathematical  stand- 
point, but  this  canon  was  in  the  interest  of  pantheism.  We  subsidize 
the  thought  in  the  interest  of  Christianity,  declaring  that,  as  a  sys- 
tem of  truth,  it  is  susceptible  of  mathematical  demonstration ;  that 
is,  that  its  truths  may  be  as  authentically  and  as  satisfactorily  vindi- 
cated as  any  truth  in  geology,  chemistry,  geometry,  astronomy,  biology, 
or  psychology,  and  by  precisely  those  methods  which  science  regards 
inalienable  and  conclusive.  The  old  way  was  to  enforce  the  Gos- 
pel by  the  exercise  of  authority — not  the  authority  of  truth,  but  the 
authority  of  force.  In  those  days  the  fagot,  the  dungeon,  the  thumb- 
screw, and  the  sword  were  fashioned  into  arguments  that  seldom  ap- 
pealed in  vain.  Behold,  there  is  a  more  excellent  way,  and  that  is, 
to  present  Christianity  in  its  wholeness,  and  as  inherently,  and,  there- 
fore, philosophically,  true. 

The  defense  of  Christianity  on  the  sole  ground  of  its  inspiration, 
however  justifiable  in  theology,  is  not  resorted  to  here,  since  the  doc- 
trine of  inspiration  itself  is  undergoing  a  change  of  meaning  and  a 
modification  of  expression  in  Christian  circles  that  forbid  its  employ- 
ment as  a  philosophical  instrument  in  the  support  of  the  highest 
truth.  Dogmatic  Inspiration,  or  that  inspiration  which  Theology 
maintains,  has  now  all  it  can  do  to  maintain  itself,  while  Philosoph- 
ical Inspiration,  or  that  inspiration  which  is  inherent  in  Truth  and 


INTRODUCTION.  9 

logically  affirms  itself,  is  potent  in  the  strengthening  of  one's  faith  in 
such  truth.  The  integrity  of  truth  is  not  determined  by  its  so-called 
inspiration,  for  truth  is  truth,  inspired  or  uninspired.  Christianity  as 
truth,  not  as  inspired  but  as  philosophical  truth,  is  the  object  of  our 
inquiry.  Conceding  only  a  conditional  value  to  the  dogmatic  doc- 
trine of  inspiration,  at  the  same  time  it  must  be  affirmed  that  in  an 
unquestionable  sense  Christianity  is  an  inspiration,  and  by  so  much  as 
it  is  an  inspiration  its  truth  must  be  larger  than  that  truth  whose 
source  is  natural  or  uninspired.  Inspired  truth,  however,  is  not  7nore 
reliable  than  uninspired — that  is,  philosophical  truth.  An  algebraic 
equation  is  as  complete  and  reliable  as  the  doctrine  of  the  Incarnation 
of  Jesus  Christ,  but  it  is  all-important  to  show  that  the  doctrine  of 
the  incarnation  is  as  authoritative  and  self-luminous  as  the  algebraic 
equation.  This  can  not  be  done  on  the  ground  of  its  alleged  inspira- 
tion, because  that  is  a  matter  of  faith,  but  it  can  be  done  on  the 
ground  of  its  philosophical  inherency  and  perfection,  because  such 
perfection  is  a  matter  of  demonstration.  Inspiration  itself  is  philo- 
sophical, quite  as  philosophical  as  incarnation,  atonement,  or  any 
other  Biblical  truth,  and  so  far  as  it  is  considered  at  all  in  these 
pages,  it  is  considered  in  its  philosophical  value  and  aspects.  As  a 
theological  dogma  it  has  provoked  criticism  ;  as  a  philosophical  doc- 
trine it  will  stand  any  test  applied  to  it.  Thus  Christianity  is  pre- 
sented rather  as  the  philosophy  than  the  inspiration  of  truth. 

Plato  and  Paul  are  the  exponents  of  the  two  antagonistic  systems 
of  thought,  and  of  the  two  methods  of  demonstration.  Each  stands 
first  in  his  relation  to  his  system,  the  one  to  philosophy,  the  other  to 
Christianity.  From  the  one  we  trace  the  stream  of  philosophic  in- 
quiry through  its  tortuous  course  along  the  ages,  developing  as 
it  goes  into  cataracts,  lakes,  and  oceans,  to  its  present  bubbling 
currents  in  materialism,  evolution,  and  agnosticism,  at  last  losing 
sight  of  Plato  in  the  mysterious  depths  of  metaphysical  seas,  and 
hearing  only  the  tumultuous  roar  of  many  waters.  Than  Plato  no 
one  better  represents  the  philosophic  spirit  in  man.  From  the 
other  we  trace  the  historic  march  of  truth  from  the  first  morning's 
dawn,  through  the  intervening  periods  of  progress  and  opposition, 
noting  its  administration  in  all  lands  and  among  all  peoples,  recount- 
ing its  long  and  patient  struggles  with  ignorant  and  embittered  foes, 
and  observing  its  quaint  and  unfortunate  embarrassments  with  sin- 


10  INTRODUCTION. 

cere  and  undisciplined  friends,  tarrying  often  to  point  out  its  internal 
deficiencies  and  external  advantages,  acknowledging  meanwhile  its 
evident  defeats  and  positive  successes,  and  finally  prefiguring  the  joy 
with  which  it  surveys  the  Past  and  the  calmness  with  which  it  omnis- 
ciently  contemplates  the  Future.  Paul  introduces  Christianity  in  its 
completeness,  but  soon  disappears  in  the  richer  history  of  Christian- 
ity itself. 

Holding  fast  to  the  conviction  that  religion  will  demonstrate  its 
superiority  to  metaphysics,  and  on  grounds  occupied  by  the  latter, 
and  anticipating  the  final  triumph  of  Christianity  in  our  growing 
world,  both  through  philosophic  and  religious  methods  of  activity, 
this  volume  is  sent  forth  on  an  independent  errand,  and  as  an  aid  to 
the  consummation. 

J.  W.  MENDENHALL. 

Delaware,  Ohio,  April  15,  1886. 


CONTKNTS 


CHAPTER  I. 

PAGE. 

PLATO,  .   .       15 


CHAPTER  II. 
THE  CORNER-STONES  OF  PHILOSOPHY, 70 

CHAPTER  III. 
THE  PROVINCE  OF  PHILOSOPHY,       108 

CHAPTER  IV. 

NATURE,  OR  AN  EXEGESIS  OF  IMATTER, 128 

CHAPTER  V. 
THE  DANCE  OF  THE  ATOMS, 143 

CHAPTER  VI. 
THE  GROUND  OF  LIFE, 155 

CHAPTER  VH. 
MAN,  OR  ANTHROPOLOGY, 168 

CHAPTER  VIH. 
MIND  AN  INTEGER, 189 

CHAPTER  IX. 

THE  AREA  OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE, :   ....  210 


12  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  X. 

PAGE. 

THE  LAW  OF  CAUSALITY,  OR  EFFICIENT  CAUSE 234 

CHAPTER  XI.   • 

THE  CONTENT  OF  FORCE, 247 

CHAPTER  XII. 

THE  FIRST  CAUSE, 255 

CHAPTER  XIII. 
THE  FINAL  CAUSE, 286 


CHAPTER  XIV. 
THE  BREAK-DOWN  OF  PHILOSOPHY,  .    . 


CHAPTER  XV. 

THE  RELATION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  TO  CHRISTIANITY,    ....    328 

CHAPTER  XVI. 
THE  RELIGIOUS  CONCEPT, 343 

CHAPTER  XVII. 
THE  APOSTLE  PAUL, 355 

CHAPTER  XVIII. 
THE  PROVINCE  OF  CHRISTIANITY, 408 

CHAPTER  XIX. 
THE  TWO  CHRISTIANITIES, 425 

CHAPTER  XX. 
PHILOSOPHICAL  GERMS  IN  CHRISTIANITY, 438 


CONTENTS.  13 

CHAPTER  XXI. 

PAGE. 

CHRISTIANITY  THE  KEY  TO  THE  PHENOMENAL  WORLD,  .    456 

CHAPTER  XXn. 
THE  THEODICY  OF  CHRISTIANITY, 478 

CHAPTER  XXIII. 

THE  IDEAL  SOCIETY,  OR  THE  RELATION  OF  CHRISTIANITY 

TO  SOCIETY, 493 

CHAPTER  XXIV. 

THE  PERFECTION  OF  MAN  THE  IDEAL  OF  CHRISTIANITY, .  519 

CHAPTER  XXV. 
THE  FRUITS  OF  CHRISTIANITY, 535 

CHAPTER  XXVI. 
THE  NEW  IN  CHRISTIANITY, 557 

CHAPTER  XXVn. 

THE  ESCHATOLOGY  OF  CHRISTIANITY, 577 

CHAPTER  XXVIII. 
THE  DYNAMICS  OF  CHRISTIANITY, 619 

CHAPTER  XXIX. 
THE  MAGNETISM  OF  CHRISTIANITY, 636 

CHAPTER  XXX. 
THE  PSEUDODOX  IN  CHRISTIANITY, 652 


14  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  XXXI. 

PAGE. 

THE  DIAGNOSTIC  OF  CHRISTIANITY,  OR  EXPERIENCE  THE 

PHILOSOPHIC  TEST  OF  RELIGION, 670 

CHAPTER  XXXII. 
COMMON  GROUNDS  OF  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY,  .   687 

CHAPTER  XXXni. 
THE  PROSPECTUS  OF  THE  FUTURE  OF  CHRISTIANITY,  ...    707 

CHAPTER  XXXIV. 

CHRISTIANITY  A  PHILOSOPHIC  AND  RELIGIOUS  FINALITY,   725 

CHAPTER  XXXV. 
PRESENT  TASKS  OF  CHRISTIANITY, 741 


Philosophy  and  Christianity. 


CHAPTER  I. 


MYTHOLOGY  ascribes  to  Plato  a  human  and  divine  parentage; 
human,  in  that  Perictione,  a  lady  of  culture  and  relative  of 
Solon,  was  his  mother;  divine,  in  that  the  god  Apollo  was  his  father. 
The  story  of  his  birth  is  very  like  that  recorded  of  the  birth  of  One 
greater  than  Plato  in  the  first  chapter  of  the  Gospel  according  to 
Matthew. 

Does  philosophy  begin  with  an  incarnation?  Must  Plato  be  re- 
garded as  a  divine  man?  Was  the  greatest  philosopher,  like  the 
greatest  religionist,  a  divine  teacher,  manifesting  a  divine  idea  to  the 
world?  The  background  of  Christianity  is  incarnation,  inspiration; 
the  sole  figure  is  Christ.  The  background  of  philosophy — does  it 
glow  with  inspiration  ?  Does  it  flash  an  incarnate  figure  on  our  vision  ? 
Is  the  one  altogether  the  product  of  inspiration,  and  the  other  wholly 
the  product  of  human  reason?  or  does  the  latter  share  somewhat  the 
munificent  equipment  and  impelling  force  of  the  former?  Is  phi- 
losophy an  inert,  phlegmatic,  uninspired  mass  of  crudities,  and  are 
its  representatives  equally  impassive  and  impenetrable? 

Is  there  no  inspiration  outside  of  the  Bible  ?  Aristotle  asserts  that 
God  governs  all  things  on  earth  in  proportion  to  their  sympathy  with 
the  heavenly  bodies.  Inspiration  in  its  final  form  is  the  measure  of 
human  sympathy  with  God,  or  human  sympathy  with  things  divine, 
intelligent,  beautiful,  good,  and  true,  is  the  measure  of  the  inspiring 
force  received.  By  this  rule  there  is  more  than  one  kind  of  inspira- 
tion, which,  differentiating  itself  in  many  forms,  is  actualized  in  the 
strifes,  industries,  aspirations,  and  activities  of  men,  and  gives  tone 
and  direction  to  human  history.  The  lowest  inspiration  is  physical, 
exhibited  in  Jael,  Samson,  and  David,  as  they  overcome  men  or 
beasts;  in  Joshua,  Cyrus,  and  Nehemiah,  resisting  national  foes;  in 
the  world's  armies,  battling  for  human  liberty  ;  and  in  earth's  grim 
toilers,  awakening  the  secret  hope  of  deliverance  and  victory.     The 

(15) 


16  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

pioneer,  the  sailor,  the  mechanic,  the  victim  of  circumstance,  possessed 
at  times  by  a  strange  spirit,  suddenly  accomplishes  that  which  is  not 
possible  in  his  ordinary  sphere,  and  illustrates  endurance,  integrity,  and 
the  power  of  performance  that  puts  to  shame  the  routine  of  existence. 
Usually  the  unexpected  achievauces  in  human  life  are  ascribed  to 
patriotism,  bravery,  stoicism,  love  of  fame;  rather  are  they  the  result 
of  heroic  latencies  divinely  incited  to  activity. 

In  like  manner  there  is  an  intellectual  inspiration,  of  which 
Wilberforce,  Webster,  Newton,  Franklin,  Angelo,  Stevenson,  and 
Stanley  ai'e  good  examples.  Inventions,  discoveries,  the  products  of 
genius,  literature,  oratory,  art,  and  music  are  instances  of  the  results 
of  an  intellectual  afflatus,  not  always  native  to  the  human  mind. 
Intellectual  triumphs  we  are  prone  to  attribute  to  native  genius; 
but  God  is  in  the  world  governing  its  history,  marking  out  its  lines 
of  progress,  endowing  and  calling  men  to  loftiest  endeavor  and  highest 
service.  Hence,  it  is  true  to  say,  God  is  in  the  genius  of  the  world ; 
he  is  in  music,  art,  poetry,  and  literature ;  he  is  in  every  invention, 
every  discovery  ;•  he  is  the  presiding  Spirit,  the  informing  Noh^  of 
the  universe. 

These  inspirations,  physical  and  intellectual,  are  not  the  highest, 
because  they  are  not  redemptive,  and  they,  therefore,  are  not  re- 
ligious in  their  content  or  purpose.  Even  wicked  men  are  moved 
physically  and  intellectually,  that  is,  to  physical  deeds  of  grandeur 
and  intellectual  achievements  of  permanent  value,  by  the  divine 
Spirit ;  but  such  inspiration  is  for  temporal  ends,  and  is  not  religiously 
redemptive.  A  spiritual  inspiration,  begetting  reformation,  repent- 
ance, regeneration,  raising  up  reformers,  martyrs,  ministers.  Chris- 
tians— this  is  the  highest,  this  is  redemptive.  Christianity,  so  far 
forth  as  it  is  a  revelation  of  truth,  is  the  product  of  the  spiritual 
inspiration  of  the  writers  of  the  sacred  books. 

Conceding  inspiration  to  philosophy,  the  word  must  be  used  in  a 
very  guarded,  or  qualified,  sense.  The  inspiration  of  Socrates,  Plato, 
Descartes,  and  Locke  can  only  be  of  an  intellectual  type,  of  a  kind 
like  that  which  attaches  to  art,  music,  oratory,  invention,  and  dis- 
covery. God  was  in  Angelo,  Beethoven,  Irving,  and  Shakespeare  as 
much  as  in  Anaxagoras,  Parmeuides,  and  Plato.  The  fruits  of  an 
intellectual  inspiration  are  visible  in  the  intellectual  realm  of  life; 
they  can  be  only  approximately  or  relatively  spiritual. 

Philosophic  truth,  it  may  be  said,  is  in  its  content  similar  to  re- 
ligious truth;  the  philosophic  purpose  also  is  a  religious  purpose; 
hence  philosophy,  unlike  art,  music,  poetry,  and  invention,  is  related 
to  religion.  The  inspiration  of  the  one  is  like  that  of  the  inspiration 
of  the  other  ;    Plato  is  on  a  level  with  Paul.     The  relation  of  philo- 


BIOGRAPHICAL  FACTS.  17 

Sophie  ideas  to  revealed  truths,  because  similar  in  contents,  may  be 
acknowledged  without  involving  the  admission  of  the  spiritual  inspira- 
tion of  both.  All  truth,  scientific,  physical,  aesthetic,  artistic,  poetic, 
is  related  to  revealed  truth,  is  to  some  extent  an  illustration,  or  fore- 
shadowing of  it,  and  has  back  of  it  the  restraining  or  stimulating  in- 
fluence of  inspiration.  Philosophic  truth  supposedly  sustains  only  a 
closer  relation  because  it  deals  specifically  with  the  same  problems  of 
religion,  Seneca,  Confucius,  Socrates,  and  Plato  stand  out  more  like 
theologians  than  Angelo,  Charlemagne,  Palissy,  and  Bacon,  because 
they  deal  with  the  truths  that  had  expansion  in  Moses,  Christ,  and 
Paul.  Handling  the  same  truths,  they  appear  like  similar  teachers; 
but  the  point  of  divergence  is  in  the  source  and  method  of  teaching. 
Inspiration  relates  not  alone  to  the  nature  of  truth  to  be  taught,  but 
to  the  method  by  which  the  truth  is  communicated.  In  general,  the 
method  of  philosophy  is  rationalistic  ;  the  method  of  religion  is  super- 
naturalistic.  One  is  the  product  of  the  human  mind,  the  other  the 
product  of  the  divine  Spirit.  Greek  philosophy  was  the  rational  ad- 
umbration of  Christianity,  reflecting  incarnation,  atonement,  resurrec- 
tion, eternal  judgment,  prayer,  and  the  rites  of  worship.  It  was  a 
reflection,  not  a  revelation  ;  it  was  a  prototype,  not  a  fulfillment. 

Plato  can  not  be  enrolled  among  the  prophets  or  apostles ;  philosophy 
is  not  revelation,  as  it  is  not  inspiration.  Like  some  distant  towering 
peak,  Plato  rises  from  the  obscurity  of  the  past,  dim  by  reason  of  the 
distance,  yet  evidently  visible  by  reason  of  his  greatness.  He  is 
more  than  the  figure-head  of  his  age,  more  than  a  teacher  of  phi- 
losophy. He  is  the  representative  of  the  culture  of  his  times,  of  the 
aristocratic  sense  of  the  higher  classes,  of  the  best  philosophical  ele- 
ments possible  among  a  people  given  to  inquiry ;  he  stands  for  gov- 
ernment, for  social  ideas,  for  ethical  education,  for  religious  teaching. 
In  him  whatever  is  good  in  his  age  reaches  high-water  mark ;  educa- 
tion, the  governmental  idea,  the  philosophic  purpose,  ascends  to  a 
height  beyond  which,  among  the  Greeks,  it  never  went.  In  some 
things  even  our  modern  life  has  not  superseded  Plato. 

The  outward  history  or  the  biographical  facts  of  Plato  may  be 
briefly  given.  Of  leaders  in  religion  or  philosophy,  the  biography  is 
often  obscure  or  the  data  incomplete.  Like  Elijah  they  come,  and 
like  him  they  go,  mysterious  heralds  of  Providence,  giving  little  ac- 
count of  themselves  to  history,  save  as  they  report  truth,  unfurl  an 
idea,  or  reveal  law.  Several  biographies  of  Plato,  of  which  Zenocrates's 
was  the  best,  but  which  has  disappeared,  have  been  written ;  but  the 
details  as  given  are  contradictory,  or  written  evidently  in  a  spirit  of 
unfairness  or  without  reference  to  the  truth.  As  to  his  birth,  it 
is  agreed  that  it  occurred  about  the  time  of  the  death  of  Pericles, 


18  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

Grote  fixing  it  at  B.  C.  427.  Athens  was  then  in  its  glory  as  respects 
art,  architecture,  literature,  and  general  culture.  Pericles  had  beau- 
tified it  with  the  products  of  art,  expending  his  wealth  in  its  orna- 
mentation ;  orators,  rhetoricians,  grammarians,  mathematicians,  poets, 
dramatists,  and  philosophers  made  the  city  their  home  or  rendezvous; 
academies,  the  sites  of  which  are  still  known,  flourished ;  the  govern- 
ment was  aristocratic  and  tyrannical ;  the  military  spirit  was  intense, 
and  the  people  were  ambitious  for  all  the  glory  that  success  in  arms 
could  give  them.  To  be  born  then  was  a  privilege ;  it  brought  oppor- 
tunity ;  it  almost  conferred  honor.  Plato's  parents  were  Athenians. 
Born  on  the  island  of  J^gina,  he  was  reared  amid  Athenian  culture, 
inheriting  the  polish,  improving  the  advantages,  and  sharing  the  lite- 
rary spirit  of  the  city,  returning  to  it  in  later  life  more  than  he  had 
received  in  the  fruits  of  a  philosophic  spirit  and  the  products  of  vast 
literary  labor.  The  reports  of  his  genius,  of  the  alighting  of  bees  on 
his  lips,  his  aptitude  to  learning,  his  versatile  talents,  his  delight  in 
athletic  sports,  his  fondness  for  music,  his  love  of  poetry,  his  prefer- 
ence for  political  affairs,  and  finally,  his  taste  for  philosophy,  are 
doubtless  authentic,  showing  how  broad  his  intellectual  basis,  how 
great  'his  possibilities,  how  high  his  aspirations,  and  indicating  the 
achievements  of  his  future.  First  named  Aristocles,  his  parents  soon 
substituted  Plato,  a  word  signifying  "broad,"  but  whether  it  meant 
broad-browed,  or  broad-shouldered,  or  a  broad  style,  the  critics  have 
not  settled.  If  Plato  stood  for  the  broad  thinker,  the  broad  observer, 
the  broad  scholar,  the  broad  man,  it  will  aptly  represent  the  philosopher 
of  whom  we  are  now  writing,  who  was  indeed  the  broadest  of  men  in 
the  qualities  of  mind,  insight,  and  love  of  truth. 

In  moral  character  he  was  comparatively  blameless,  for  no  blem- 
ishes, no  vices,  are  reported  against  him.  This  can  not  be  said  of  the 
Cynics,  Sophists,  or  Stoics  of  his  time.  He  was  of  a  melancholy  dispo- 
sition, perhaps  the  outgrowth  of  a  pensive  habit  of  mind.  Lewes 
charges  him  with  a  want  of  amiability.  If  he  means  the  coldness  of 
greatness,  perhaps  he  is  correct ;  but  if  he  means  that  Plato  was  a 
misanthrope,  he  does  him  injustice.  Gifted  with  an  aristocratic  sense, 
accustomed  to  refinement,  disgusted  with  political  affairs,  he  retired  to 
the  academy,  where,  undisturbed  by  politics  or  the  multitude,  he  solaced 
himself  with  those  investigations  of  truth  which  place  him  above  his 
times  and  give  him  rank  among  the  thinkers  of  all  ages.  Of  his 
childhood  life  little  is  known,  save  that  in  its  intellectual  graspings  it 
was  prophetic  of  the  life  that  grew  out  of  it.  He  is  introduced  to 
the  world  at  the  age  of  twenty  years,  when,  exhibiting  an  eagerness 
for  knowledge  and  an  investigating  spirit,  he  became  the  pupil  of 
Socrates,  an  arrangement  that  proved  advantageous  to  both  master 


PLA  TO'S  SOCIAL  E  EL  A  TIONS.  ^  19 

and  disciple.  Socrates  was  the  conversing  philosopher  of  Athens — a 
thinker  on  ethical  subjects,  roaming  about,  talking  and  disputing  with 
individuals  as  he  might  meet  them  ;  a  man  who  never  wrote  a  book 
or  a  line,  but  whose  method  of  reasoning,  and  whose  conversations 
embodying  his  principles,  have  been  transmitted  to  us  by  Plato;  a 
man  who  never  addressed  a  public  assembly  save  when  on  trial  for 
his  life,  but  whose  auditor  was  the  single  individual ;  a  man  who 
never  traveled,  so  given  was  he  to  reflection  rather  than  observation. 
Quaint  in  dress,  ugly  in  face,  his  nose  having  been  broken  when  he 
was  nine  years  old,  and  going  about  pretending  to  know  nothing, 
but  inquiring  of  every  body  what  he  knew,  how  he  knew,  and 
testing  his  answers  by  the  most  skillful  dialectical  analysis,  he  be- 
came a  well-known  figure  in  the  literary  and  social  circles  of  Athens. 
Young  men  were  amused  at  his  appearance  and  enjoyed  his  irony, 
while  the  elders  dreaded  or  respected  him,  as  he  had  taught  them  or 
overwhelmed  them  with  his  satire. 

Instinctively,  young  Plato  comprehended  the  motive  of  Socrates, 
and,  inquiring  for  his  method  of  reasoning,  soon  discerned  its  ade- 
quacy, and  began  himself  to  apply  it  to  the  great  questions  which 
philosophy  superinduced.  Socrates  bequeathed  to  Plato  more  than 
the  dialectical  spirit ;  he  awakened  in  him  a  philosophic  conception 
of  the  universe  which,  in  its  developed  form,  eclipsed  the  conceptions 
of  Socrates.  Logical,  he  became  philosophical ;  logical  in  method, 
philosophical  in  subject.  Socrates's  dream  of  the  swan  was  fulfilled 
in  Plato.  A  swan  flies  from  the  altar  in  the  academy,  alighting  on  ' 
Socrates's  breast ;  then,  spreading  its  wings,  it  flies  toward  heaven, 
enticing  by  its  voice  gods  and  men.  Plato  appearing  in  his  presence,/ 
Socrates  pronounced  him  the  swan  of  the  dream. 

Thus  an  unbroken  and  profitable  friendship  was  the  result  of  the 
mutual  faith  of  tutor  and  pupil,  the  latter  true  to  the  former  even 
unto  death,  and  advancing  his  philosophic  teachings  by  still  broader 
inquiries  and  deeper  answers.  Plato  and  Socrates,  says  Emerson, 
were  a  "double  star,"  certainly  a  fine  putting  of  their  relations. 
This  relationship  continued  for  eight  years,  when  Socrates  drank  the 
hemlock,  and  Plato  was  left  alone,  ripening  into  the  independent 
philosopher,  and  standing  for  truth  as  if  it  were  all  his  own. 

Plato  never  married.  Like  Adam  Smith,  Swedenborg,  Macaulay, 
Washington  Irving,  and  Humboldt,  he  lived  without  knowing  any 
thing  of  the  conjugal  relation.  His  appreciation  of  woman  was  not 
remarkable;  he  advocated  the  "community"  idea  with  earnestness, 
supporting  it  by  exclusive  philosophical  considerations.  This  makes 
against  him — if  not  against  him,  then  against  his  philosophy.  He 
was  not  wanting  in  genuine   patriotism  ;  he  enlisted  in  the  military 


20  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

service  of  his  country  in  the  time  of  her  danger ;  in  peace  he  sought 
to  serve  the  state  by  devotion  to  public  interests.  He  was  a  patriot 
as  well  as  philosopher.  Political  rather  than  military  affairs  he  pre- 
ferred;  and,  when  the  Thirty  Tyrants  came  into  power,  Plato, 
through  the  courtesy  of  one  of  them,  who  was  his  cousin,  obtained  a 
civil  position,  which  enabled  him  to  study  the  science  of  government, 
the  necessity  of  reforms,  and  the  relation  of  laws  to  civil  progress 
and  individual  happiness.  This  fitted  him  for  a  philosophic  contem- 
plation of  government,  which  found  expression  afterward  in  two 
volumes,  entitled  the  Republic  and  the  Laws.  Plato  was  a  tyrant 
himself,  the  result  of  his  surroundings,  education,  and  position. 
Thoroughly  opposed  to  democracy,  he  welcomed  the  change  to 
tyranny,  advocating  severe  governmental  discipline ;  he  also  advo- 
cated caste,  and  secluded  himself  from  the  crowd  as  beneath  him. 
Naturally,  he  became  obnoxious  to  the  people,  sometimes  because  he 
was  the  friend  of  Socrates,  sometimes  because  of  his  aristocracy, 
sometimes  because  of  his  socialism,  sometimes  because  of  his  politics. 
During  his  early  years  he  was  in  and  out  of  Athens,  as  public  feeling 
was  hostile  or  friendly  to  him. 

Unlike  Socrates,  he  became  a  traveler,  driven  abroad  by  the  hos- 
tilities he  himself  had  invoked ;  but  it  proved  to  be  providential,  as 
it  broadened  him  still  more,  and  prepared  him,  as  he  was  not  pre- 
pared when  Socrates  vanished,  for  the  vindication  of  the  philosophic 
pursuit.  He  visited  Megara,  absorbing  mathematics  and  philosophy ; 
he  saw  Italy,  and  drafted  its  sunshine  into  his  meditations ;  he  jour- 
neyed into  Egypt,  plucking  religious  ideas  from  temples  and  priests ; 
it  is  said  he  visited  Palestine,  and  extended  his  travels  eastward  as 
far  as  Persia,  taking  knowledge  of  religion,  history,  art,  science,  and 
philosophy.  Nearly  ten  years  were  given  to  travel.  He  returned  to 
Athens  at  forty  years  of  age  with  mind  richly  stored,  intellectual  im- 
pulses quickened,  personal  hostilities  extinct,  and  with  disciples  from 
many  lands  ready  to  receive  instruction.  Having  studied  mathe- 
matics, poetry,  music,  grammar,  logic,  religions,  and  philosophies; 
having  been  a  soldier,  a  politician,  and  a  civil  officer;  having  been  a 
traveler,  a  reformer,  a  statesman;  he  settles  down,  thus  equipped 
and  experienced,  into  his  life-work,  founding  an  academy,  and  mak- 
ing his  name  imperishable  by  the  imperishable  truths  he  communicates 
to  men.  For  forty  years  he  teaches  in  this  academy,  dying,  as  some 
assert,  at  the  advanced  age  of  eighty-one  years,  with  pen  in  hand 
and  writing.  The  academy  building  was  located  one  mile  north  of 
the  city,  on  a  level  spot  just  beyond  a  ridge  which  now  separates  the 
modern  city  from  the  country.  Over  the  doorway  was  the^  inscrip- 
tion, "  Let  none  but  geometricians  enter  here."     This  is  the  dialectical 


A  SYSTEMLESS  PHILOSOPHY.  21 

spirit  in  a  mathematical  form,  and  the  key  to  Plato's  mind.  All 
that  remains  of  the  ancient  academy  are  a  few  marble  pillars,  which 
our  own  eyes  looked  upon  a  few  years  since.  A  modern  house  oc- 
cupies the  grounds,  but  the  family  within  is  without  the  spirit  of 
Plato.  Not  far  away  is  the  famous,  well-worn  path  of  the  Peripatetics. 
Here  Plato  builded  better  than  he  knew.  In  the  atmosphere  of  the 
academy  let  us  study  its  founder,  his  teachings,  and  the  far-reaching 
effects  of  what  he  taught.  As  an  academician  must  Plato  be  esti- 
mated ;  all  else  is  preliminary,  preparatory. 

Plato,  the  philosopher  !  Plato,  the  coefficient  of  universal  thought ! 
Such  he  is ;  as  such  he  must  be  contemplated,  namely,  as  an  indi- 
vidual philosopher  and  the  representative  of  all  philosophy.  As 
Emerson  says,  "he  is  the  arrival  of  accuracy  and  intelligence," 
speaking  with  that  self-command  which  profound  insight  inspires. 
He  follows  his  inner  light  sufficiently  to  be  original.  Little  is  found 
in  outside  philosophies  not  found  in  him ;  he  is  philosophy,  as  Christ 
is  Christianity. 

At  the  very  threshold  of  this  study  a  question  presents  itself  for 
settlement  which  Plato  himself  ought  to  have  disposed  of,  but  he  did 
not,  leaving  to  his  admirers  and  the  students  of  his  works  a  per- 
plexing and  never-ceasing  mystery.  The  ability,  genius,  and  educa- 
tion of  Plato  are  conceded ;  that  he  founded  an  academy  and  taught 
philosophy  are  accepted  as  facts ;  that  his  literary  labors  were  im- 
mense is  established  by  the  works  attributed  to  him  ;  but  it  is  not 
yet  determined  just  what  Plato  believed  and  taught  respecting  the 
great  problems  of  philosophy.  It  is  not  clear  that  Plato,  while  he 
founded  a  school  of  philosophy,  instituted  a  system  of  philosophy,  or 
that  Platonism  definitely  means  any  philosophic  truth.  This  implies 
mysticism  in  thought,  ambiguity  in  teaching,  poetic  drifting?,  imagina- 
tive musings,  and  unsettled  opinions,  the  value  of  which  is  uncertain 
and  obscure.  Emerson,  a  competent  and  an  admiring  critic,  declares 
that  Plato  is  without  system,  and  that  no  one  can  define  Platonism. 
The  same  may  be  said  of  Aristotle,  also.  Of  modern  philosophy  this 
certainly  is  true.  It  lacks  system  ;  it  abounds  in  contradictions ;  it 
is  a  house  divided  against  itself.  This,  then,  would  appear  to  be  the 
beginning  of  high-toned,  reverential  philosophy— a  systemless  system 
of  thought ;  a  miscellany  of  discussions,  without  regard  to  order,  con- 
sistency, or  harmony.  Schleiermacher  is  not  alone  in  affirming  a 
philosophic  scheme  in  Plato,  but  when  he  attempts  to  point  it  out  it 
is  more  of  the  German's  scheme  than  the  Athenian's.  Grote  assails 
the  idea  of  scheme ;  the  majority  of  students  reject  the  German  con- 
ception of  a  system  in  Plato. 

A  kindred  difficulty  arises  with  every  attempt  to  classify  his  writ- 


22  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

ings,  which  furnish  few  traces  of  a  chronological  order,  or  an  order 
of  thought.  Not  even  Aristophanes  was  able  to  arrange  the  books 
of  Plato  in  a  satisfactory  manner.  Some  critics  assume  that  the 
Phcedrus  was  the  earliest  written  dialogue  and  the  Laws  the  latest, 
basing  the  conclusion  on  internal  evidence  ;  but  the  maturity  or  im- 
maturity of  thought  in  these  dialogues  will  not  assist  in  determining 
the  historical  order  of  their  composition,  inasmuch  as  both  exhibit 
the  mature  and  the  immature  intellect  of  the  philosopher.  One 
reader  will  refer  the  Laws  to  an  early  period  in  Plato's  life  ;  another 
sees  the  signs  of  superannuation  in  the  book.  Many  German  critics 
are  of  the  opinion  that  Plato  wrote  all  of  his  books  before  he  estab- 
lished the  academy,  but  this  is  a  wild  conjecture,  for  it  leaves  him 
nothing  to  do  in  the  academy  but  repeat  what  he  had  written.  At 
times  Plato  is  thoroughly  dialectical  in  method  and  subject,  as  in  the 
Sophist  and  Statesman,  teaching  the  art  of  reasoning  or  thinking ;  at 
another  ethical  subjects,  as  in  the  Meno,  engross  his  attention  ;  at  an- 
other cosmogony  and  physical  themes,  as  in  the  Thmmis,  are  supreme. 
Hence,  it  is  natural  to  divide  his  philosophy  into  dialectics,  ethics, 
and  physics.  But  this  is  not  comprehensive  enough,  as  all  readers 
agree.  Schleiermacher,  insisting  upon  an  inner  connection  among  the 
dialogues,  divides  them  according  to  their  subject-matter  into  three 
classes :  1.  Elementary  Dialogues,  embracing  the  Apology,  Crito, 
Phsedrus,  Parmenides,  Protagoras,  Ion,  Lysis,  Hippias  Minor,  Laches, 
Euthyphron,  and  Charmides;  2.  Progressive  Dialogues,  embracing 
the  Cratylus,  Theeetetus,  Menon,  Gorgias,  Sophistes,  Politicus,  Euthy- 
demus,  Philebus,  Phaedo,  the  Symposium,  the  first  Alcibiades,  Menex- 
enus,  and  the  Hippias  Major ;  3.  Constructive  Dialogues,  embracing  the 
Timseus,  the  Republic,  the  Critias,  the  Laws,  and  the  thirteen 
Epistles. 

Henry  Davis,  a  modern  translator  of  Plato,  arranges  the  books 
into  three  classes,  according  to  their  relation  to  the  period  the  philos- 
opher spent  in  travel :  1.  About  thirteen  books  w^ere  written  before 
he  traveled ;  2.  About  ten  books  were  written  on  his  return  to  Athens ; 
3.  The  others  were  written  in  advanced  life. 

Thrasyllus  simplified  the  subject  by  dividing  the  treatises  into  two 
classes:  1.  Inquisitory;  2.  Expository.  Some  writers  style  some  of 
the  books  dramatic,  others  narrative,  others  mixed ;  but  Diogenes 
Laertius  says  this  is  a  theatrical  rather  than  a  philosophical  division. 
Laertius  speaks  oi  his  dialogues  as  logical,  ethical,  political,  "mid- 
wife description,"  tentative,  and  demonstrative. 

From  the  analysis  of  Plato's  writings,  as  made  by  both  ancient 
and  modern  writers,  the  difficulty  of  interpreting  them  as  expressive 
of  a  single  thought  or  of  but  few  ideas,  and  of  building  out  of  them  a 


THE  DIALOGISTIC  STYLE.  23 

philosophic  system,  becomes  apparent.  Had  he  left  a  system,  complete 
in  outline  or  in  parts,  the  historians  of  philosophy  had  found  it  long 
before  now.  The  failure  to  find  the  system  raises  the  suspicion  that 
he  did  not  intend  to  suggest  any  ;  but  our  conjecture  must  rest  upon 
something  more  than  our  own  failure  in  investigation.  Perhaps  an 
explanation  of  this  unfortunate  omission  of  Plato  lies  along  the  path 
we  are  traveling. 

In  his  seventh  Epistle  he  expresses  an  aversion  to  writing  as  a 
means  of  communicating  or  preserving  philosophy,  declaring  that 
there  never  shall  be  a  treatise  of  Plato ;  and  in  the  Phcedms  he  explains 
at  great  length  his  contempt  for  the  written  argument,  or  what  we 
would  call  a  printed  book.  He  says  a  published  argument,  like  a  paint- 
ing, will  be  criticised  without  any  power  to  answer  back  ;  it  must  be  sub- 
ject to  ridicule  and  injury  without  the  means  of  defense  or  explanation. 
Hence  he  undoubtedly  opposed  the  publication  of  his  philosophy  in 
the  sense  of  committing  it  to  the  world.  This  has  given  rise  to  the 
opinion  which  Tennemaun  adopts,  that  his  real  philosophy  was  esoteric, 
or  confined  to  the  academy,  and  that  it  is  impossible  to  conjecture  the 
whole  of  it.  If,  however,  he  meant  not  his  philosophy  for  the  public,  he 
did  mean  it  for  his  disciples,  one  of  whom — Aristotle — makes  so  many 
allusions  to  the  printed  works  which  pass  for  Plato's  that  it  is  impos- 
sible not  to  believe  that  they  are  the  products  of  his  academic  teach- 
ing. We  scarcely  believe  that  Plato's  philosophy  was  esoteric,  but  if 
it  was,  he  formulated  it  in  his  books,  which,  without  doubt,  have 
come  down  to  us.  He  may  have  held  to  speculations  which  do  not 
appear  in  the  books.  Aristotle  admits  as  much  ;  but  they  were  not 
fundamental.  To  the  books  we  must,  therefore,  look  for  his  philos- 
ophy ;  we  shall  not,  perhaps,  find  a  system  of  philosophy,  but  philo- 
sophic truth,  more  or  less,  accurately  expressed,  is  in  them. 

The  books,  as  Plato's  readers  know,  are  written  in  the  form  of 
dialogues,  in  which  Plato  hides  himself  under  the  names  of  the  dis- 
putants ;  so  that  it  is  not  always  easy  to  detect  his  own  opinion,  or 
whether  he  expresses  any  at  all  or  not.  The  impersonal  form  of  dis- 
course which  Plato  adopts,  besides  relieving  him  of  personal  responsi- 
bility, accounts  for  the  difficulty  of  interpreting  him.  In  this  imper- 
sonal way  Plato  is  an  esoteric  philosopher.  The  chief  interlocutor  in 
these  dialogues  is  Socrates,  who  at  times  appears  to  be  Plato's  master, 
and  at  other  times  it  is  evident  that  he  is  an  imaginary  person,  leav- 
ing us  in  doubt  whether  Plato  is  reporting  Socrates's  opinion  or  ex- 
pressing his  own.  Is  Plato  Socrates's  correspondent  or  an  original 
author  ? 

If  he  hides  himself  in  his  dialogues,  does  he  hide  his  teaching? 
Some  there  are  who  assert  that  Plato  is  dogmatic,  but  this  is  incapable 


24  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

of  proof,  for  the  affirmations  of  Plato  are  in  the  form  of  inferences, 
sometimes  expressed,  but  often  implied.  Borrowing  the  dialogistic 
style  from  Socrates,  he  wrote  the  thirty-six  works  attributed  to  him 
in  this  form,  save  the  Apology,  which  is  a  single  discourse.  He  ques- 
tions the  Eleatic  stranger,  the  Athenian  poet,  or  Alcibiades  or  Theo- 
dorus  or  Meuo ;  he  reasons  by  interrogation  ;  he  is  an  inquirer  after 
truth  ;  he  seeks ;  he  is  painfully  anxious  for  knowledge.  He  assumes 
the  duty  of  a  midwife,  ready  to  deliver  the  new-born  thought  of  the 
pregnant  mind;  he  stands  ready  to  nurse  the  infant  into  life  and  form. 
He  enounces  little  ;  he  does  not  demonstrate,  like  Aristotle  ;  it  is  not 
demonstration  that  Plato  wants  ;  it  is  discovery.  This  may  be  phil- 
osophic, but  it  is  misleading  and  evasive,  showing  that  the  philoso- 
pher, feeling  his  way,  is  not  certain  of  the  ground  under  his  feet. 
On  great  problems,  therefore,  he  is  often  obscure  ;  mysteries  are  mys- 
teries still ;  doctrines  are  unexplained  ;  as  in  the  Euthyphron,  he  leaves 
holiness  undefined,  and  often  he  contradicts  himself,  as  his  discussion 
of  fortitude  in  the  Laches  does  not  harmonize  with  allusions  to  it  in 
the  Reptiblic.  Either  because  of  incertitude  and  ambiguity,  or  be- 
cause of  direct  espousal  of  error,  both  Christians  and  pagans  have 
alternately  claimed  Plato,  and  it  is  confessed  that  at  times  it  is  diffi- 
cult to  assign  him  his  true  place. 

With  obscurities  and  ambiguities  attaching  to  Plato,  Schwegler 
insists  "that  the  Platonic  philosophy  is  essentially  a  development;" 
that  viewed  in  reference  to  the  influence  which  at  different  stages 
controlled  in  its  expression,  it  might  be  divided  iyto  three  periods, 
viz.  :  the  Socratic,  the  Heraclitic-Eleatic,  and  the  Pythagorean  ;  or 
viewed  with  reference  to  its  substance,  it  might  be  divided  into  the 
antisophistic-ethic,  the  dialectic  or  mediating,  and  the  systematic  or 
constructive  periods.  The  development  proposed  by  Schwegler  is 
open  to  the  objection  that  lies  against  all  suggested  schemes;  it  is 
artificial,  not  natural,  exhibiting  a  mixed  and  not  an  orderly  or  pro- 
gressive arrangement.  The  Socratic  element  in  Plato's  philosophy 
belongs  to  all  its  periods  of  development,  and  the  Pythagorean  influ- 
ence was  felt  even  before  the  establishment  of  the  academy.  In 
truth,  Plato  had  entered  upon  the  philosophical  inheritance,  appro- 
priating such  teachings  from  the  masters  as  commended  themselves  to 
his  judgment,  and  rejecting  those  inconsistent  with  his  preferences, 
before  his  return  to  Athens  from  his  extensive  travels  in  other  lands. 
His  acquisitions  from  the  philosophers  were  made  prior  to  the  endow- 
ment of  the  academy.  The  itinerant  period  of  Plato's  life  represents  his 
accumulation  of  philosophic  material ;  the  academy  represents  his  use 
of  the  material  or  his  own  personal  philosophic  development.  During 
the  forty  years  of  academic  teaching,  the  influence  of  Socrates,  He- 


THE  DIALECTICAL  METHOD.  25 

raclitus,  the  Eleatics,  and  Pythagoras  was  simultaneously  effective, 
and  can  not  be  divided  into  periods. 

Equally  unsatisfactory  is  Schwegler's  second  classification  of  the 
contents  of  Plato's  philosophy.  In  the  beginning  the  dialectic  spirit 
is  manifest  in  Plato,  and  he  never  parts  with  it.  It  permeates  his 
ethics,  and  aids  in  systematic  apprehension  of  the  truth.  It  occupies 
no  subordinate  place;  Plato  stands  as  the  dialectician,  rigidly  employ- 
ing the  analvtic  method  in  the  search  for  truth.  If  there  is  any  de- 
velopment in  Plato,  it  is  a  dialectical  development,  which,  however, 
is  witliout  historical  inherence ;  it  can  not  be  traced ;  it  is  without 
beginning ;  it  is  without  stages ;  it  is  without  a  specific  end. 

Others  have  ventured  to  suggest  that  Plato's  work  was  critical  and 
not  creative;  that  he  had  in  view  the  refutation  of  error,  and  not  the 
establishment  of  truth.  In  such  dialogues  as  the  So2yhist  and  the  Gor- 
gias  it  is  apparent  that  the  motive  of  Plato  is  the  annihilation  of  sophis- 
tical methods,  and  the  extinction  of  sophistical  conclusions,  which  passed 
for  philosophic  truths.  In  these,  however,  it  must  be  noted  that  the 
conflict  in  Plato's  mind  is  the  conflict  of  method  rather  than  the  conflict 
of  truth  and  error.  The  Socratic  method  is  pitched  against  the  Sophistic 
method  ;  the  latter  succumbs.  The  result  is  the  overthrow  of  method, 
not  the  establishment  of  truth.  Without  doubt  such  encounters  have 
led  students  to  estimate  Plato  as  a  critical  jDhilosopher,  a  refuter  of 
error ;  but  the  basis  of  the  estimate  is  insufficient,  for  he  was  rather 
a  refuter  of  method.  In  other  dialogues,  however,  as  in  the  Phcedo, 
he  appears  as  the  creative  philosopher,  establishing  the  truth,  or  at 
least  pointing  to  it  with  the  finger  of  faith.  He  confutes  ignorant 
opinion  ;  he  analyzes  scientific  notions;  he  reaches  out  after  the  beau- 
tiful, as  in  the  Phaxlrm,  and  declares  for  science,  as  in  the  Thecetetus. 
Still,  one  feels,  as  he  reads  him,  that  Plato  is  a  groper,  a  seeker,  a 
devout  inquirer,  but  not  altogether  a  revealer.  He  is  a  pathfinder, 
but  not  a  truth-finder.  Plato  abounds  in  investigations,  thinkings, 
inquirings,  but  falls  short  of  positive  revelation.  He  stood  on  the 
threshold  of  truth,  as  Eusebius  observes,  but  the  temple-door  did  not 
swing  open  at  his  touch.  This  is  the  secret  of  his  systemless  philos- 
ophy. Affirmations,  not  interrogations  ;  results,  not  inquiries  ;  truths, 
not  refuted  errors,  constitute  the  elements  of  a  system.  Results,  he 
cautiously  declared  ;  his  whole  system  is  an  interrogation  point. 

Not  a  system-maker,  Plato  nevertheless  was  a  thinker,  an  original 
thinker,  heralding  thoughts  or  throwing  out  signs  of  truths  that  were 
new  to  his  generation,  whose  value  the  retreating  centuries  have  not 
impaired.  Borrowing  from  other  philosophers,  he  went  beyond  them 
in  the  use  of  their  own  theories,  applying  logic  with  a  dexterous  hand 
to  the  tearing  down  of  the  false  and  the  building  of  the  true,  as  he 


26  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

understood  it.  In  his  theologic  conceptions  of  the  universe,  in  his 
representation  of  the  divine  being,  in  his  ethical  data,  he  surpassed 
his  contemporaries,  and  trenched  on  a  true  Biblical  revelation.  In 
some  particulars  he  so  harmonizes  with  the  Old  Testament,  as  in  allu- 
sions to  the  deluge,  that  his  familiarity  with  it  must  almost  be  ac- 
cepted ;  and  yet  he  never  alludes  to  Moses  or  the  Jewish  cosmogony. 
No,  Plato  was  not  inspired  ;  but  these  high  intellectual  Teachings  indicate 
original  power,  original  thought,  which  gives  him  the  right  to  be  heard. 

Lewes  is  emphatic  in  the  belief  that  Plato's  philosophy  consists 
wholly  in  its  method,  not  in  its  results,  not  in  its  relation  to  truth  ; 
that  he  sacrificed  all  subjects  to  method  ;  that  method  of  thinking,  or 
the  true  process  of  thought,  is  the  only  valuable  product  of  Plato's 
labors.  This  is  a  too  confined  interpretation,  for,  rigidly  dialectical  as 
is  Plato,  he  had  in  view  more  than  the  establishment  of  the  art  of 
reasoning.  If  not,  he  is  little  more  than  a  rhetorician ;  but  he  is  a 
theologian,  a  psychologist,  an  ethical  teacher,  a  cosmogonist,  a  scien- 
tist. Surely  he  sacrificed  not  all  these  problems  to  the  art  of  rheto- 
ric or  a  style  of  logic.  Method  was  the  instrument,  not  the  end,  of 
investigation.     Plato  was  an  investigator,  not  a  mere  method-maker. 

His  method  must  not  be  depreciated.  Essentially  Socratic,  he 
improved  it,  but  it  was  left  to  Aristotle  to  perfect  it,  showing  that 
Plato  gave  more  attention  to  the  subjects  of  investigation  than  to  the 
method  of  investigation.  Socrates  initiated  a  new  style  of  thinking, 
which  led  to  far-reaching  results  in  his  day.  He  was  the  first  to  in- 
sist on  definitions,  and  then,  as  Aristotle  reports,  he  introduced  induc- 
tive or  analogical  reasoning,  which  gave  order  to  thought.  Definition 
and  Induction  constitute  the  Socratic  system.  Plato  finding  it  inad- 
equate added  Analysis  or  Classification,  or  "  Seeing  the  One  in  the 
Many."  Aristotle  added  Demonstration,  or  the  Syllogism.  Defini- 
tion, Induction,  Analysis,  and  Demonstration  constitute  a  perfect 
method  of  thinking  or  reasoning.  Evidently  Plato's  method,  an  im- 
provement on  Socrates,  was  behind  that  of  Aristotle  ;  it  lacked  com- 
pleteness. A  faulty  method  of  reasoning  and  an  unknown  system  of 
philosophy  we  discover  in  Plato,  but  this  does  not  compel  a  with- 
drawal of  admiration  for  his  dialectical  atte'mpts,  or  of  faith  in  the 
trend  of  his  philosophy. 

Lewes  also  depreciates  Plato  by  asserting  that  he  introduced  no 
new  elements  into  the  philosophy  of  his  age,  making  him  a  tinker  of 
other  men's  ideas.  Why  not  call  him  a  compiler,  a  plagiarist,  a  his- 
torian, any  thing  but  a  philosopher  ?  Lewes  is  an  extremist,  an  icon^ 
oclast,  an  antagonist  of  philosophy,  purposing  to  undermine  the  whole 
by  dethroning  Plato.  Plato  did  introduce  analysis  into  the  philo- 
sophical method  of  reasoning ;  he  did  originate  the  theory  of  ideas  in 


PLATO'S  THEOLOGY.  27 

explanation  of  the  creation  of  the  universe  ;  his  theory  of  being  was 
entirely  foreign  to  the  conceptions  of  his  day ;  his  psychology,  So- 
cratic  in  spirit,  was  a  development,  a  reduction  to  scientific  form,  of 
what  his  master  taught ;  his  theology  bears  the  marks  of  intellectual 
bravery;  and  his  ethics,  bating  the  self-evident  frailties  in  it,  was 
superior  to  his  age. 

These  different  departments  of  his  philosophy  we  shall  now  undertake 
to  examine,  without  reference  to  any  classification  proposed  by  other 
writers.  The  order  we  here  follow  grows  out  of  a  careful  reading  of 
all  the  works  attributed  to  Plato,  the  spurious  as  well  as  the  genuine, 
and  the  inferences  drawn  are  based  on  the  verified  texts  of  the  various 
editions  and  translations  of  Plato. 

Pre-eminently  attractive  in  Plato  is  what  properly  may  be  styled 
his  theology.  He  is  not  a  dogmatic  theologian,  nor  a  dogmatist  in  any 
sense ;  but  he  discusses  theological  problems,  aiding  the  theologians, 
and  serving  his  own  purpose  as  well.  He  is  more  conservative  than 
radical,  except  in  the  application  of  certain  principles  to  certain  ends, 
as  explanatory  of  fundamental  facts  and  teachings.  In  this  de- 
partment the  dogmatism,  if  any,  is  concealed;  it  is  not  offensive. 
Without  a  thought  of  becoming  a  theologian,  like  Homer  he  has  set 
forth  a  theology  or  opinions  relative  to  the  formation  of  the  world,  the 
existence  of  God,  and  the  character  of  man,  which,  organized  into  an 
orderly  system,  would  relieve  Plato  somewhat  of  the  charge  of  iudefi- 
niteness  and  obscurity.  He  has  something  to  say  on  ontology,  cos- 
mology, and  psychology,  which,  whether  re-said  by  others  or  not,  is 
worth  hearing.  The  fundamental  truth  of  philosophy,  as  of  the- 
ology, is  God.  Philosophy  searches,  religion  reveals.  Plato  posits  the 
divine  existence  as  the  essential  of  the  universe,  differing  from  those 
who  posit  the  divine  existence  as  essential  to  philosophy,  and  proving 
that  he  was  more  anxious  to  find  the  truth  than  to  establish  a  method 
of  finding  it.  Not  philosophy,  but  philosophic  truth,  Plato  sought. 
Hence  no  system,  hence  adumbrations  of  truth. 

As  to  the  substance  of  his  teaching,  he  is  a  theologian ;  as  to  the 
method  of  teaching,  he  is  a  philosopher.  There  are  two  revelations 
of  God — the  one  written,  the  other  unwritten  ;  the  latter  only  was 
open  to  the  searching  gaze  of  Plato.  The  written  revelation  is  the 
subject  of  interpretation  ;  it  contains  truths,  the  explanation  of  which 
rests  with  the  theologian.  Dealing  in  truths  furnished,  he  is  not  a 
discoverer  of  truth  ;  he  is  only  an  interpreter.  The  unwritten  reve- 
lation of  God  is  nature,  or  the  physical  universe,  from  whose  forms 
of  matter  and  systems  of  operating  forces  flash  the  suggestions  of  in- 
finite power  and  wisdom,  the  keys  to  the  nature  of  the  absolute  God. 
The  theologian  of  nature  is  more  than  an  interpreter ;  he  is  a  discov- 


28  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

erer  of  truth  hidden  in  the  shell  of  the  universe.  Nature  is  a  product ; 
the  producer  must  be  found.  Thus  the  task  of  the  theologian  merges 
into  that  of  the  philosopher,  and  Plato,  double-winged,  was  both  the- 
ologian and  philosopher.  Seems  not  his  task  greater  than  that  of 
Paul,  who  only  interpreted  revealed  truth,  and  was  aided  in  inter- 
pretation by  inspiration?  Plato  was  a  Columbus  seeking  a  new  con- 
tinent ;  Paul  stood  still  and  the  continent  came  to  him,  and  then 
he  described  it.  Plato  was  a  seeker,  Paul  a  finder.  Influenced,  as 
we  have  seen,  by  the  Eleatics  and  Pythagoreans,  there  came  an  hour 
in  his  mental  journeyings  when,  saying  farewell  to  his  guides,  he 
piloted  himself  into  the  regions  of  the  unknown,  returning  with  the 
evidences  of  a  new  discovery.  This  was  brave,  but  it  was  imperative, 
the  measure  of  success  attending  Plato  demonstrating  not  merely  his 
greatness,  but  the  possibility  of  the  human  mind  evolving  the  highest 
truth  without  the  aid  of  inspiration. 

The  theology  of  Plato,  in  its  fragmentary  form,  scattered  through 
his  various  works,  resembles  the  theology  of  the  Bible.  The  Bible 
writers  were  not  system-makers ;  they  were  truth-tellers,  writing 
without  order,  and  with  no  thought  of  unity ;  they  were  unconscious 
of  theological  harmonies,  and  never  framed  a  creed.  Plato  precipitates 
thoughts  in  the  same  disorderly,  systemless  way,  trusting  to  the  skill 
of  others  to  classify,  formulate,  and  build  them  into  a  system.  But 
this  carelessness  of  method  is  not  a  sign  of  inspiration  ;  it  is  a  sign 
that  method  is  not  the  chief  ambition  of  Plato. 

However,  many  of  his  dialogues  are  devoted  to  the  elucidation  of 
special  subjects,  as  the  Second  Alcibiades  to  prayer,  the  Charmides  to 
temperance,  the  Phcedo  to  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  the  Euthyphron 
to  holiness,  the  Banquet  to  love,  the  Thecdetvs  to  science,  the  Meno  to 
virtue,  and  the  Parmenides  to  idealities.  In  the  treatment  of  any 
single  subject,  he  is  sure  to  make  observations  on  other  subjects  quite 
as  valuable  as  those  that  pertain  to  the  subject  under  discussion ; 
hence,  every  dialogue  emits  more  than  a  single  ray  of  light. 

The  theism  of  Plato  is  not  always  on  the  surface,  but  sometimes 
is  vague  and  indefinite,  reaching  back  into  or  beginning  with  the 
mysterious  conception  of  being  as  the  ground  of  all  that  is  or  appears. 
Here  is  the  influence  of  the  Eleatics  on  Plato.  He  distinguished  be- 
tween the  being  and  the  non-being,  avoiding  the  mistake  of  Zeno 
by  recognizing  the  reality  of  non-being,  or  the  phenomenal  world. 
In  the  Sophist  he  clearly  defines  the  separation  between  entity  and 
non-entity,  asserting  that  entity  is  the  "one",  and  that  existences  are 
to  be  regarded  as  powers.  This  hint  modern  philosophy  has  appropri- 
ated in  its  definition  of  being  as  "activity."  In  the  Cratylm  Plato  af- 
firms that  some  things  have  a  "certain  firm  existence  of  their  own," 


MONOTHEISTIC  TEACHINGS.  29 

attributing  to  them  the  distinguishing  mark  of  power,  stability, 
eternity.  Groping  forward,  but  declaring  a  little  more  with  each 
step,  he  enounces  the  doctrine  of  "the  one"  in  its  fullness,  establish- 
ing it  with  consummate  dialectical  skill  in  the  Pannenides,  a  dialogue 
surpassing  all  others  in  metaphysical  subtlety  and  intrinsic  develop- 
ment of  a  single  idea.  Plato  is  not  particular  as  to  "the  many,"  but 
holds  to  "  the  one,"  averring  an  "  essence  existing  itself  by  itself," 
and  pronouncing  it  "infinite."  Accidents  of  time  do  not  belong  to 
it;  it  does  not  participate  in  "the  many,"  but  in  being;  it  is  being. 
If  being,  it  always  was,  it  always  will  be;  hence,  Plato  defines  "the 
one"  to  be  that  which  "was,  is,  and  will  be,"  language  like  unto 
John's  in  his  praise  of  the  Almighty.  "If  one  is  not,"  says  Plato 
summarily,  "nothing  is."  Thus  the  philosopher,  establishing  the  idea 
of  being  as  separate  from  non-being,  prepares  the  way  for  the  final 
assertion  of  God  as  the  centralization  of  being,  or  the  essence  of  "the 
one."  Being,  undefined,  vague,  infinite,  is  the  foundation-stone  upon 
which  rises  faith  in  a  personal  God.  Being  is  not  one  thing  and 
God  another;  God  is  being,  being  is  God. 

In  a  compromising  spirit  the  philosopher  conceded  the  existence 
of  gods,  thus  ministering  to  the  polytheistic  faith  of  the  people,  and 
sustaining  the  old  religion.  He  speaks  of  the  gods  and  their  quarrel- 
some dispositions  in  the  Euthyphron,  but  more  especially  in  the  Laws, 
where  he  eulogizes  them,  encouraging  festivals  in  their  honor  and  the 
oiFering  of  prayers  and  sacrifices  in  the  temples.  He  even  attributes  to 
them  creative  powers,  and  assigns  them  a  share  in  the  government  of  the 
World.  Man  is  the  creation  of  one  of  these  subordinate  gods.  Two 
explanations  of  this  mythological  corruption  of  his  theism  may  be 
given:  1.  Such  mythology  was  prevalent  in  his  day;  he  must  recog- 
nize it.  2.  He  may  have  believed  in  the  gods.  The  latter  supposi- 
tion we  reject,  for  the  philosophers  were  not,  as  a  class,  believers  in  the 
accepted  religion,  and  Plato  in  the  Republic  traces  faith  in  the  gods  "  to 
tradition"  alone.  One  of  the  accusations  against  Socrates  was  that  he 
denied  the  gods,  and  Plato  must  have  shared  the  opinion  of  his  mas- 
ter, but  through  fear  of  popular  tumult  he  spoke  reverently  of  the 
popular  faith,  always  counseling  obedience  and  holiness. 

Out  of  mythology  he  quickly  arose  into  the  clearer  faith  of  the 
existence  of  a  personal  God,  the  Creator,  Preserver,  and  Governor  of 
the  universe,  affirming  it  repeatedly,  sometimes  inquiringly,  but 
rarely  doubtfully.  Monotheism  is  a  Platonic  doctrine,  asserted  dimly 
in  the  Philebu,s,  where  Plato  refers  to  the  "really  existing,"  and  to 
the  science  of  the  Eternal;  but  openly  in  the  Republic,  where  God's  good- 
ness and  God's  reality  are  the  subjects  of  thought ;  clearly  in  the  first 
Alcibiades,  where  the  Deity  is  spoken  of  as  a  guide  ;  discriminatingly 


30  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

in  the  Thecetetus,  where  God's  attributes  are  proclaimed ;  personally 
in  the  Minos,  where  Zeus  converses  with  men  ;  and  positively  in  the 
Laws,  where  God  is  declared  as  "having  the  beginning,  the  end,  and 
middle  of  all  things."  In  addition  to  these  fragmentary  proofs  of  the 
monotheism  of  Plato,  we  find  a  comprehensive  theistic  conception, 
especially  in  the  Republic,  the  Timmis,  and  the  Laivs,  forever  reliev- 
ing him  of  the  suspicion  of  inconsistency  and  of  a  wavering  faith  in 
God.  In  the  Laivs  he  insists  that  the  Deity  is  "worthy  of  blessed 
attention,"  and,  resisting  the  dictum  of  Protagoras  that  "man  is  the 
measure  of  all  things,"  he  enounces  that  the  Deity  is  the  measure  of 
all  things,  a  sublime  doctrine,  elevating  and  true.  To  measure  the 
universe  from  the  divine  standpoint,  to  measure  man  from  God,  not 
God  from  man,  is  a  very  high  conception,  first  promulgated  by  Plato. 
In  the  Repiiblic  God  is  represented  as  good,  the  author  of  good,  and 
not  the  author  of  evil ;  his  immutability  is  also  fairly  taught ;  and  as 
in  the  Timceus,  here  also  he  declares  retribution  for  the  wicked  and 
reward  for  the  virtuous,  both  administered  by  the  justice-loving  God. 
Between  appearance  and  reality  he  draws  a  definite  distinction,  re- 
garding the  phenomenal  world  as  an  appearance  and  God  as  the  great 
reality.  In  the  Cratylm  he  avows  that  Zeus  is  rightly  named,  since 
he  is  the  cause  of  the  living. 

Judged  by  themselves,  these  Platonic  or  monotheistic  representa- 
tions of  God,  incomplete  as  they  are,  but  unaccompanied  with  tradi- 
tion or  superstition,  are  more  satisfactory  than  the  uninspired  theologies 
of  the  East,  and  justify  the  theistic  hypothesis  from  the  rationalistic 
base.  Incomplete,  they  show  the  necessity  of  revelation ;  they  pre- 
pare the  way  for  revelation  ;  they  help  to  comprehend  revelation, 
St.  Augustine  said,  "Plato  made  me  know  the  true  God."  Plato 
declared  God  ;  Christ  revealed  him.  Plato  assures  us  that  God  exists; 
Christ  showeth  us  the  Father.  Plato  believes;  Christ  knows.  Phi- 
losophy is  faith  ;  Christianity  is  truth. 

Closely  associated  with  the  monotheistic  conception  of  God  is 
Plato's  cosmological  account  of  the  universe,  which,  excepting  the 
Mosaic  revelation  of  world-building,  is  superior  to  any  thing  ever 
framed  by  theology  or  philosophy.  His  theology  and  cosmogony  are 
inseparable,  as  they  involve  each  other ;  an  understanding  of  one 
requires  an  understanding  of  the  other.  Plato,  in  the  Timceus,  says : 
"Let  us  declare  on  what  account  the  framing  Artificer  settled 
the  formation  of  this  universe."  He  also  says:  "Let  us  consider 
respecting  it  whether  it  always  existed,  having  no  beginning,  or 
was  generated,  beginning  from  some  certain  commencement.  It  is 
generated  :  for  this  universe  is  palpable  and  has  a  body."  Here  is 
the  recognition   of  a  difference   between   the   maker  and   the   thing 


DOCTRINE  OF  CAUSATION  AFFIRMED.  31 

made,  a  discrimination  between  subject  and  object,  or  mind  and  mat- 
ter ;  hence  Plato  is  not  a  pantheist,  or  an  Eleatic.  Spinoza  did  not 
borrow  his  doctrine  of  one  substance  from  Plato.  There  are  two  sub- 
stances, which  a  wise  philosophy  will  recognize.  Plato's  starting-point 
is  the  difference  between,  and  not  the  identity  of,  being  and  non- 
being.  This  starting-point,  fundamental  to  a  correct  theological  or 
philosophical  representation,  both  of  God  and  the  universe,  Plato 
consistently  maintains  in  all  his  works,  as  if,  whether  in  doubt  re- 
specting other  things,  he  entertained  no  doubt  jespecting  this  truth. 
In  the  Parmenides  he  di-aws  the  line  between  the  two  substances  when 
he  affirms,  "all  is  said  when  'the  one'  and  'the  others'  are  said." 
"The  one,"  and  "the  others" — between  them  there  is  nothing  in 
common.  In  like  manner  the  Eleatic  guest  in  the  Sophist  reports  ad- 
versely the  opinion  of  the  multitude  that  "nature  generates  from 
some  self-acting  fortuitous  cause,  and  without  a  generating  intellect," 
signifying  the  impossibility  of  a  self-producing  universe;  and  in  the 
Laws  he  condemns  materialism  as  a  "  stupid  opinion."  Plato  charac- 
terizes creation  in  the  Banquet  as  "a  thing  of  extensive  meaning," 
but  the  meaning  is  not  fully  interpreted  in  this  dialogue ;  we  find  it 
elsewhere,  as  in  the  Philebus,  where  he  discusses  the  presence  of 
mind  in  nature,  "  arranging  things  and  governing  throughout,"  and 
in  the  Thecetetus,.  where  he  insists  that  no  one  must  be  allowed  to  say 
"  that  any  thing  exists"  or  "  is  produced  of  itself"  Here,  as  elsewhere, 
the  doctriue  of  causation,  or  a  created  universe,  he  accepts  and 
maintains  as  a  first  principle,  without  which  a  true  cosmogony  is 
impossible.  In'  the  Philebus  he  defines  the  "  limitless,"  and  "  the 
limit,"  representing  God  and  the  universe  by  these  singularly  ex- 
pressive words,  and  insisting  that  the  "limit"  is  the  product  of  the 
"limitless." 

Plato's  idea  of  the  universe  was  a  growth,  not  a  suddenly  devel- 
oped conception,  as  he  himself  tells  in  the  Phmdo.  It  seems  that, 
attracted  by  the  theory  of  Anaxagoras,  which  attributed  the  cause 
of  things  to  intelligence,  he  became  dissatisfied  with  it,  owing  to  its 
superficial  application  of  intelligence  in  the  creation  of  worlds,  and 
its  explanation  or  "final  cause"  of  things,  and  he  rejected  it;  or, 
rather,  advanced  bevond  it.  Real,  self-operating  cause,  Plato  sought; 
and  this,  he  afiirmed,  the  senses  could  not  grasp  or  apprehend  ;  only 
the  soul  may  know  the  "limitless,"  the  "producing,"  the  "regulat- 
ing" cause.  Likewise  in  the  Laws  he  insists  on  searching  for  the 
cause,  as  not  at  all  impious  but  in  the  direction  of  intelligence ;  and 
in  his  sixth  Epistle  he  teaches  that  the  "cause"  may  be  "clearly 
known."  Most  emphatically  he  shows  in  the  Hippias  Major  that 
"  the  produced  is  one  thing,  and  the  producer  is  another;"  while  in 


32  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

the  Phcedrus  he  teaches  that  ' '  every  thing  that  is  created  must  neces- 
sarily be  created  from  a  begiuniDg,"  but  the  beginning  force  or  creator 
is  ""uncreate  ; "  that  is,  the  initial  moving  force,  or  mover,  is  without 
beginning,  or  eternal. 

Summarizing  these  teachings  from  Plato,  it  is  easy  to  see  that  he 
accepts  the  difference  bekveen  being  and  non-heing;  that  he  holds  to  the 
idea  of  causality,  as  afterward  expanded  by  Aristotle  into  efficient  and 
final  caiises,  as  the  underlying  doctrine  of  cosmology,  and  implying  rad- 
ical discriminatioiis  betiveen  God  and  tJie  universe;  that  he  embraces  tlie 
thought  tlmt  tliere  ivas  a  time  wJien  the  universe  teas  not,  and  it,  therefore, 
had  a  beginning;  that  he  discourages  the  theory  of  a  self -originating  uni- 
verse; and  that  he  declares  that  the  originating  mind  or  cause  may 
he  hioivn. 

This  is  an  upheaval  of  ideas,  and  goes  far  toward  the  vindication 
of  philosophic  inquiry  ;  whatever  is  charged  against  modern  philos- 
ophy, Plato  can  not  be  charged  in  his  cosmological  starting-point 
with  puerility,  intellectual  weakness,  or  materialistic  tendency. 

Gladly  granting  the  above,  Plato  seems  uncertain  at  a  very  vital 
point  in  the  unwritten  history  of  creation,  which  no  one  since  his 
time  has  adequately  settled.  The  co-eternity  of  matter  is  foreshad- 
owed in  the  discussions  in  the  Theoetetxis,  and  really  declared  in  the 
Timcexis;  but  the  co-eternity  of  the  universe  he  rejects.  Matter  he 
regards  in  its  original  condition  as  something  rude,  unformed,  law- 
less, roaming  aimlessly  in  space  when  it  is  arrested  and  organized  into 
the  universe.  Given  the  four  elements,  earth,  air,  fire,  and  water, 
God  built  the  worlds,  according  to  the  Timceus,  using  fire  and  earth 
at  first,  but  adding  air  and  water  afterward ;  fire  made  it  visible, 
earth  gave  it  solidity,  air  and  water  "are  indispensable  to  keep  the 
solid  bodies  in  due  proportion  to  one  another,"  and  secure  unity.  He 
is  obscure,  however,  as  to  the  origin  of  the  elements,  really  does  not 
account  for  them.  Prior  to  the  formation  of  the  universe,  "  three 
distinct  things  existed,  being,  place,  and  generation,"  or  God,  space,  and 
the  generating  process,  or  the  idea  of  world-building.  The  actual 
generation  of  the  universe  was  the  product  of  the  mutual  motion  of 
the  elements,  a  mechanical  sifting  and  combination  under  divine  di- 
rection— a  sentiment  that  suggests  the  dance  of  the  atoms,  or  the 
modern  theory  of  world-building.  Singularly,  too,  these  elements 
were  convertible,  air  into  fire,  and  earth  into  water,  a  view  suggest- 
ing the  modern  doctrine  of  the  conservation  of  forces.  Reading  this 
from  Plato,  we  can  indorse  Emerson's  eulogy:  "Great  havoc  makes 
he  among  our  originalities."  His  mathematical  conception  of  the 
universe  ;  his  idea  that  the  proportion  of  original  elements  remained 
ever  the  same;  his  thought  that   ideas  and   numbers   governed   in 


AN  ORGANIZED  UNIVERSE.  33 

world-building,  have  not  been  eclipsed  by  any  modern  discovery  or 
teaching.     In  cosmology  Plato  stands  at  the  head. 

We  characterize,  however,  the  obscurity  or  failure  to  account  for 
the  elements,  and  for  original  matter,  as  a  weakness.  What  original 
matter  was,  or  how  much  there  was,  Plato  does  not  intimate;  but, 
avowing  this  doctrine,  he  furnishes  support  to  the  atomists  and  ma- 
terialists of  our  day,  who,  going  farther  than  he  would  allow,  assert 
the  all-sufficient  potency  of  matter  for  its  own  organization  and  de- 
velopment. If  original  matter  were  uncreated,  the  Creator  turns  out 
to  be  an  organizer  merely ;  but  this  is  fatal  both  to  theology  and  a 
divine  cosmogony,  since  original  matter  may  have  had  the  inherent 
tendency  to  organization,  which  would  displace  the  reign  of  a  crea- 
tive intellect  in  the  universe.  Countenance  is  given  to  the  doctrine 
of  organization,  as  a  substitute  for  creation,  in  the  Statesman,  where 
the  Deity  is  represented  as  changing  "the  heavens  unto  the  present 
figure,"  endowing  the  heavenly  bodies  with  circular  motion;  in  the 
Laivs,  where  he  speaks  of  a  "well-arranged  universe;"  and  in  the 
Phcedo,  where  the  philosopher  indulges  in  a  lengthy  description  of  the 
earth  and  its  assignment  in  the  heavens.  God  an  organizer!  The 
universe  an  organization  !  This  is  Platonism,  yet  not  essentially  in- 
consistent even  with  the  doctrine  of  causation,  or  the  doctrine  of  one 
substance,  for  Plato  conceded  no  power,  no  life,  no  originating  prin- 
ciple, in  unformed  matter. 

However,  he  made  almost  a  redeeming  use  of  the  doctrine  of  the 
co-eternity  of  matter  in  that  he  aflSrmed  that  in  it  was  embedded  the 
antagonistic  principle  of  evil,  now  operating  in  the  universe.  In 
the  Banquet  he  explains  the  presence  of  the  two  principles,  the  ra- 
tional and  the  irrational,  which,  without  doubt,  he  borrowed  from 
the  poets  and  Empedocles,  and  interprets  organization  as  a  triumph 
over  the  antagonistic  principle.  Organization  was  a  reduction  of  an- 
tagonism to  order,  form,  beauty,  energy  ;  it  was  a  resurrection  from 
death  to  life,  it  was  the  impartation  of  "good"  to  matter,  which 
appeai-s  quite  fully  in  the  Oratyhis. 

Somewhat  contradictory  of  the  doctrine  of  the  co-eternity  of  mat- 
ter is  the  Heraclitic  doctrine  of  the  "  becoming,"  or  the  flux  of  nature, 
which  Plato  accepted,  as  may  be  seen  in  the  discussions  in  the  Cratylus, 
where  the  universe  is  spoken  of  as  "marching,"  and  as  having  in  it 
the  spirit  of  going,  which  is  the  organ  of  nature's  motions.  He  fully 
believed  in  the  reality  of  the  phenomenal  world,  confuting  the  doc- 
trine of  Protagoras  in  the  Thecetetns,  that  "  nothing  ever  is  but  always 
becoming."  This  is  the  doctrine  of  Heraclitus,  but  Plato  went  not 
so  far.  Persistently  opposed  to  the  idea  of  permanency  in  nature,  he 
nevertheless  held  to  its  reality,  which  saved  him  from  Eleaticism ;  and, 

3 


34  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

distinguishing  between  the  two  realities,  the  finite  and  the  infinite,  he 
saved  himself  from  pantheism.  The  effect  of  motion  on  nature  he 
discusses  as  "removal"  and  "change,"  the  former  signifying  a  going 
from  one  place  to  another,  and  the  latter  a  transformation  of  quality, 
as  sweet  into  bitter ;  the  former  is  the  substitute  of  place,  the  latter 
the  substitute  of  quality.  But  he  classifies  motion  producing  these 
effects  as  original  and  subsidiary  ;  original  motion  is  self-motion,  the 
highest,  belonging  to  soul,  to  God  ;  subsidiary  motion  is  derived  mo- 
tion, or  dependent  power.  In  the  Laws  he  enumerates  ten  kinds  of 
motions,  as  follows:  "1.  Revolution  around  a  center;  2.  Locomotion 
from  place  to  place ;  3.  Condensation ;  4.  Rarefaction  ;  5.  Increase ; 
6.  Decrease  ;  7.  Generation ;  8.  Destruction ;  9.  Change  pr(xluced  in 
another  by  another;  10.  Change  produced  by  a- thing  itself,  both  in 
itself  and  in  another."  The  tenth  motion  is  the  motion  of  the  soul; 
it  is  the  motion  of  God,  the  power  manifest  in  the  universe.  Through 
self-existent  motion  the  universe  was  begotten  ;  the  motion  of  God 
was  communicated  to  unformed  and  motionless  matter,  which,  as  it 
yielded  to  the  communicating  impulse,  emerged  into  systems  of  worlds, 
such  as  now  occupy  the  heavens ;  and  they  are  as  real  as  he  is  real. 
Call  it  ' '  becoming ;  "  it  is  the  reality  of  becoming. 

The  core  of  Plato's  cosmogonal  conception,  however,  has  not  been 
revealed;  it  remains  for  consideration.  In  his  analytic  observations 
of  nature  Plato  always  proceeded  from  the  inner  to  the  outer ;  from 
the  subjective  to  the  objective  ;  from  himself  to  God ;  from  himself 
to  the  universe.  Mind,  thought,  idea,  constituted  the  chief  corner- 
stone in  every  superstructure.  In  some  way  thought  entered  into  the 
construction  of  the  universe  ;  God  first  thought  the  universe  before 
he  made  it.  It  existed  in  God  in  the  intellectual  sense  before  it 
stood  forth  as  a  completed  physical  fact.  The  idea  of  the  world  pre- 
ceded its  execution.  God  is  a  being  of  ideas  ;  the  divine  mind  is . 
pregnant  with  ideas  ;  it  is  anidea.  Divine  ideas  are  contingent,  rela- 
tive, or  unchangeable  and  necessary.  Ideas  of  truth,  goodness, 
beauty  are  eternal,  governing  divine  movements  in  their  loftiest  man- 
ifestations. According  to  preconceived,  necessary  ideas,  which  served 
as  patterns  or  rules,  God  made  all  things,  impregnating  unformed 
matter  with  them,  and  so  giving  shape  and  comeliness  to  the  universe. 
Nature  is  the  receptacle  of  the  divine  ideas ;  nature  is  the  concreted 
idea  ;  nature  is  an  idea,  the  idea  of  God.  The  universe  is  a  congre- 
gation of  ideas  in  visible  forms ;  it  is  little  else  than  God  going  out 
of  himself  and  crystallizing  in  the  universe. 

An  admirable  conception  of  the  universe  is  this,  but  marked  by 
weaknesses  which  show  the  marvelous  struggles  of  the  great  thinker 
in  his  search  for  the  truth.     One  of  the  objections  to  this  theory  of 


SYSTEM  OF  IDEAS.  35 

ideas  is  its  ambiguity,  for  it  is  not  certain  whether  Plato  held  that 
these  ideas  were  abstract  merely,  or  that  they  had  a  separate,  indi- 
vidual existence.  Were  they  real  existences  which  the  divine  mind 
appropriated,  and  according  to  which  he  formed  the  universe,  or  were 
they  the  products  of  the  divine  intelligence,  native  to  it  as  the  idea 
of  causation  is  native  to  the  human  mind?  Cousin,  in  defending 
Plato,  insists  that  he  did  not  assume  for  ideas  an  independent  exist- 
ence ;  but  Aristotle  assailed  him  on  the  ground  that  he  did  maintain 
the  independent  vitality  of  the  idea,  and  annihilated  the  Platonic 
system  by  clearly  showing  that  while  the  idea  had  a  subjective,  it  had 
not  an  objective,  existence.  Aristotle  ridicules  them  as  "  immortalized 
things  of  sense ;"  but  in  so  doing  he  leaves  room  for  the  play  of 
' '  ideas  "  in  the  universe.  But  did  even  Aristotle  assail  the  Platonic 
idea  by  the  strongest  argument  ?  The  argument  was  effective,  but  it 
was  not  comprehensive  of  the  idea  itself.  Aristotle's  idea  is  correct, 
but  he  admits  the  existence  of  Plato's  idea  by  making  it  subjective 
instead  of  objective.  Plato  located  it  without,  giving  it  independence  ; 
Aristotle  located  it  within,  making  it  dependent  on  the  originating 
mind.  In  this  way  only  did  Aristotle  annihilate  the  Platonic  system 
of  ideas  ;  he  did  not  annihilate  the  ideas. 

The  value  of  the  ideas  is  a  separate  question  ;  the  system  goes, 
the  ideas  remain.  But  the  ideas  are  not  vital,  sovereign  existences ; 
they  remain  as  abstract  patterns  and  guides.  An  abstract  idea  has 
no  being,  no  life,  no  form.  Malebranche  says  ideas  are  little  beings 
not  to  be  despised,  but  this  can  not  be  allowed  ;  otherwise  the  Pla- 
tonic system  must  be  accepted.  An  idea  is  as  lifeless  or  beingless  as 
a  grain  of  sand.  It  derives  its  existence  only  from  the  being  that 
originates  it.  Aristotle  did  not  assail  the  idea  itself;  but  it  is  assail- 
able on  the  ground  that  possibly  Plato,  in  advocating  its  existence, 
also  intended  to  signify  that  it  had  being.  He  leaves  us  in  doubt  as 
to  the  origin  of  the  ideas,  whether  they  are  eternal  or  derivative  ; 
whether  they  governed  God  as  vitally  eternalizing  forces  or  God  gov- 
erned them.  Plato  likewise  involves  the  subject  in  mystery  by  the 
manner  in  which  he  presents  it.  In  creation  he  conceives  that  the 
idea  "participated"  in  matter,  as  a  vital  force,  as  the  inspiration  of 
matter,  instead  of  the  model  of  material  forms.  The  fact  is,  Plato's 
ideas  are  of  three  kinds  :  (a)  subjective,  or  the  divine  idea  in  the 
mind  of  God ;  (6)  objective,  or  independent  ideas,  either  as  ab- 
stract or  as  having  being  ;  (c)  material,  i.  e. ,  the  participating  idea. 
The  last  introduces  a  troublesome  element  in  the  classification,  for 
it  is  difficult  to  separate  the  notion  of  a  participating  idea  from  a 
pantheistic  conception  of  the  universe,  which  Plato  himself  repudiates. 

The  Platonic   idea   has  another  signification  which  involves  it  in 


36  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

trouble.  The  philosopher,  drawing  a  distinction  between  the  univer- 
sal and  the  particular,  conceived  that  the  universal  is  general,  invis- 
ible, abstract,  and  the  particular  is  individual,  visible,  and  concrete, 
and  that  the  particular  is  modeled  after  the  universal.  Pointing  to  a 
table,  he  speaks  of  it  as  the  "  particular,"  back  of  which  is  the  uni- 
versal, table  or  general  idea  of  tables.  So  horse  is  particular,  but 
back  of  horses  there  is  a  universal  horse.  This  distinction  is  a  phil- 
osophical hallucination,  for  there  is  no  such  thing  as  a  universal 
table,  or  a  universal  tree,  or  a  universal  horse.  Such  universals  do 
not  exist ;  they  do  not  exist  as  ideas  even.  The  idea  of  a  table  can 
not  be  universal  in  any  rational  sense.  It  is  particular  if  it  exist 
both  in  the  divine  mind  and  in  its  actual  form.  This  is  the  weakness 
of  rationalism,  that  it  abstracts  the  particular  reason  of  the  human 
mind,  converting  it  into  an  independent  reality,  segregated  from  all 
mind,  human  and  divine,  and  making  it  the  universal  reason.  There 
is  no  such  reason.  This  is  the  weakness  of  Schopenhauer's  idealistic 
notion  of  God,  that  he  is  impersonal,  universal  will.  There  is  no 
such  will.  Will,  reason,  thought,  idea  can  not  be  impersonal,  uni- 
versal, abstract ;  they  all  imply  personality  or  mind.  Plato's  idea 
points  to  mind  ;  Plato  himself  delivered  it  from  all  relation,  and 
endowed  it  with  independence,  which  is  absurdity. 

These  are  some  of  the  weaknesses  of  the  Platonic  system  of  ideas, 
but  the  great  Platonic  idea  that  God  built  the  universe  according  to 
a  preconceived  pattern  is  not  only  beautiful,  but  also  imperishable ; 
theology  can  not  improve  it,  philosophy  should  be  content  with  it. 
This  is  Platonic  idealism. 

From  his  cosmogony  we  pass  to  the  consideration  of  Plato's  psy- 
chology, a  department  of  study  abounding  in  discoveries,  teachings, 
and  suppositions  as  wonderful  and  instructive  as  any  to  be  found  in 
the  philosopher's  writings.  At  the  same  time  he  equally  abounds  in 
errors,  fragments  of  thought,  and  great  misconceptions  in  the  treat- 
ment of  some  of  the  psychological  problems  which  he  investigated  and 
discussed.  His  psychology,  as  a  whole,  marks  the  rising  and  falling 
of  intellectual  apprehension,  the  fluctuation  of  the  dialectical  force 
of  Plato. 

Beginning  with  the  question,  What  is  man  ?  Plato  answers  it  with 
extreme  caution,  considering  his  physical  origin  first,  and  his  spir- 
itual character  and  intellectual  framework  afterward.  Usually  free 
from  the  mythological  spirit,  he  rehearses  the  tales  of  the  ancients  re- 
specting an  early  race  of  gods  and  heroes  on  the  earth,  from  which 
descended  the  human  race  to  which  we  belong.  The  early  race, 
according  to  the  Statesman,  was  "  earth-born,  and  not  begotten  from 
each  other  ;"  the  people  lived  a   spontaneous  life,  guarded  by   the 


IMAGINATIVE  PHYSIOLOGY.  37 

Deity,  nature  offering  to  them  her  fruits  without  toil,  and  a  spirit 
of  sedition  was  absent  from  them.  It  was  a  golden  period,  not  des- 
tined to  continue,  for  revolution  is  the  order  of  progress  on  the  earth. 
The  generations  died ;  nature  itself  became  cold  and  unproductive, 
and  an  uninhabited  planet  was  the  result.  In  due  time  the  Deity  is 
moved  to  re-people  the  abandoned  world,  which  is  easily  done  by  res- 
urrections, transmigrations,  or  creations  ;  and  after  many  revolutions 
of  this  kind,  man  as  we  know  hira  appeared,  the  lord  of  creation. 
These  old  tales  Plato  abandons  in  the  Banquet  for  another,  which 
recites  that  at  one  time  there  were  three  kinds  of  hi>man  beings  on 
the  earth — man,  woman,  and  a  man-woman,  a  being  partaking  of  the 
character  of  both.  At  length  Jupiter  devised  a  plan  for  the  forma- 
tion of  a  race  which  should  consist  of  two  sexes,  the  third  disappear- 
ing. The  surgical  process  by  which  this  was  accomplished  Plato 
relates  in  its  disgusting  details,  showing  at  once  the  need  of  a  true 
account  of  man's  creation.  In  the  Philebus  reference  is  made  to  the 
superiority  of  the  ancestors  of  the  present  race,  a  fiction  in  which  the 
Greek  mind  was  wont  to  indulge. 

Respecting  the  present  man,  Plato,  in  the  Protagoras,  recalls  the 
fable  of  his  creation  by  the  gods,  who  fashioned  the  race  within  the 
earth,  "composing  them  of  earth  and  fire,"  and  "  commanded  Prome- 
theus and  Epimetheus  to  adorn  them,  and  to  distribute  to  each  such 
faculties  as  were  proper  for  them  ;"  Prometheus,  stealing  "  the  artifi- 
cial wisdom  of  Vulcan  and  Minerva,"  confers  it  upon  the  mortal  race, 
and  man  is  thus  equipped  for  an  earth-life. 

Fables  in  Plato :  is  it  any  wonder  that,  as  in  the  Phcedrns,  he 
should  inquire  whether  man  is  a  beast,  "  with  more  folds  and  more 
furious  than  Typhon,"  or  "  a  more  mild  and  simple  animal,  naturally 
partaking  of  a  certain  divine  and  modest  condition  ?"  An  expounder 
of  the  degeneracy  of  the  races,  a  believer  in  the  greatness  of  ances- 
tors, he  yet  afiirms  a  god-like  origin  of  the  present  man.  But  gods, 
not  God,  created  him. 

As  to  the  physical  body  of  man,  Plato  writes  elaborately,  showing, 
however,  little  knowledge  of  its  construction,  or  the  uses  of  its  prom- 
inent organs.  He  is  not  much  of  a  physiologist.  He  discourses  on 
pathology,  describes  fevers,  and  their  antidote,  and  even  reveals  the 
fact  of  the  circulation  of  the  blood ;  but,  after  reading  the  Timceus, 
the  physician  will  prefer  modern  medical  science  to  its  suggestions. 
Of  the  liver  Plato  knows  nothing  more  than  that  it  is  the  seat  of  the 
mortal  part  of  the  soul !  The  bile  is  .a  "  vicious  secretion."  Of  the 
difference  between  veins  and  arteries,  of  the  relation  of  the  lungs  and 
viscera,  he  has  no  true  conception,  and  of  the  formation  of  bones  and 
flesh  he  is  only  approximately  satisfactory. 


88  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

Of  the  soul,  which  is  "  glued"  to  the  body,  he  is  specific  ;  specific 
as  to  its  origin,  its  character,  its  possibilities,  its  immortality,  its  des- 
tiny ;  he  is  a  theologian,  a  psychologist,  a  great  teacher.  The  duty 
of  self-knowledge  he  emphasizes  and  explains  in  the  Charmides,  and 
in  other  dialogues  he  insists  on  the  s'tudy  of  the  soul  as  the  only  con- 
dition of  progress  from  depravity  to  purity,  and  as  a  preparation  for 
the  highest  immortality. 

The  first  or  initial  doctrine  in  Plato's  psychology  is  the  pre-existence 
of  the  soul,  supported  and  enforced  by  reasonings  the  most  plausible, 
and  by  arguments  singularly  eflfective  and  difficult  to  overthrow  iu  the 
absence  of  Scripture  truth,  which  some,  however,  have  afiSrmed  does 
not  absolutely  determine  the  question  of  the  origin  of  souls.  Adam's 
soul  was  the  breath  of  God  which  pre-existed,  but  it  pre-existed  as 
breath,  not  as  a  soul.  The  breathing  into  Adam's  nostrils  was  the 
creation  of  the  soul ;  and  if  a  creation,  its  pre-existence  is  im- 
peached. Modern  theology  rejects  the  doctrine  of  pre-existence,  and 
wisely. 

To  Plato's  arguments,  however.  In  the  Phcedo  the  philosopher  dem- 
onstrates that  knowledge  is  reminiscence  ;  an  act  of  memory  is  the 
recalling  of  knowledge  in  a  previous  state ;  the  memory  is  a  waxen 
tablet,  containing  eternal  impressions ;  what  modern  psychology  styles 
"innate  ideas"  is  proof  of  previous  knowledge  ;  the  soul  knows  some 
things  on  its  own  account,  and  by  itself,  which  is  evidence  of  its  pre- 
existent  state.  These  arguments  are  expanded  in  the  Thecetetus,  and 
repeated  in  the  Phoedrus  and  the  Meno ;  in  the  former,  rejecting  the 
theory  of  sense-knowledge,  he  interprets  soul-knowledge  as  reminis- 
cence, and  reminiscence  is  the  sign  of  pre-existence  ;  in  the  latter  he 
insists  on  the  purity  of  soul-knowledge,  and  a  like  interpretation  is 
irresistible.  He  even  goes  further,  and  describes  the  process  of 
soul-knowledge,  or  the  acquisition  of  beauty  and  truth,  as  the  swell- 
ing of  the  wings  of  the  soul;  "  the  whole  boils  and  throbs  violently" 
in  the  eagerness  to  recall  "  the  most  blessed  of  all  mysteries,"  a  knowl- 
edge of  the  truth  it  lost  by  union  with  the  body. 

The  error  of  this  psychology  is  the  confounding  of  reminiscence 
and  the  intuitional  facte  of  consciousness,  which,  instead  of  supporting 
the  doctrine  of  pre-existence,  supports  the  doctrine  of  immortality, 
pointing  forward  instead  of  backward.  Aristotle  opposed  the  doctrine 
of  reminiscence.  The  soul,  Plato  divides,  iu  the  JRepublie,  into  three 
parts ;  viz. ,  the  rational,  the  concupiscent,  and  the  irascible.  The  rational 
or  reasoning  part,  which  is  immortal,  he  locates  in  the  head ;  the 
concupiscent  or  affectional  part,  and  the  irascible  or  passionate  part, 
both  of  which  are  mortal,  he  locates  in  the  heart  and  liver.  Aristotle 
located  the  mortal  part  in   the   heart   only.     Repugnant  as   is  this 


MORAL  CHARACTER  OF  THE  SOUL.  39 

division  to  our  Christian  sense,  and  self-contradictory  in  its  contents  as 
it  is,  for  it  is  subversive  of  the  idea  of  the  unity  of  the  soul,  Plato 
nevertheless  holds  to  the  doctrine  of  immortality  for  the  intellectual 
part  of  the  soul.  The  intellect  is  immortal ;  the  intellect,  therefore, 
alone  pre-existed,  if  the  doctrine  of  pre-existence  be  true.  The  af- 
fectional  and  passionate  elements  of  the  soul  must  be  the  products  of 
the  bodily  organization,  or,  at  the  least,  the  results  of  the  intellectual 
and  physical  union,  either  of  which  being  true,  the  modern  theory 
of  life  as  the  product  of  organization  has  some  justification.  It  has 
a  foothold  in  Plato.  The  soul  is  either  immortal  or  mortal,  not  both ; 
if  immortal,  then  it  is  not  the  product  of  the  bodily  organization ;  if 
mortal,  it  may  be  the  result  of  organized  matter,  as  is  the  eye. 

More  of  the  immortality  of  the  soul  a  little  later ;  just  now  let  us 
listen  to  Plato  concerning  its  nature.  "  What  it  is" — see  the  PhcB- 
drus — "would  in  every  way  require  a  divine  and  lengthened  exposi- 
tion to  tell,  but  what  it  is  like,  a  human  and  a  shorter  one."  From 
this  he  proceeds  to  liken  it  "to  the  combined  power  of  a  pair  of 
winged  steeds  and  a  charioteer,"  describing  its  activities  by  the  con- 
duct of  the  steeds,  and  its  government  by  the  wisdom  of  the  charioteer. 
Sometimes  the  steeds  are  of  noble  extraction — then  the  soul  is  virtu- 
ous, good;  sometimes  they  are  of  the  "opposite  extraction,"  and  drag 
the  soul  down  to  the  earth.  In  this  metaphorical  way  Plato  repre- 
sents the  moral  character  of  the  soul,  confessing  that  it  has  suffered 
loss  by  union  with  the  body,  which  loads  it  with  corruptions,  and 
clips  its  wings  so  that  it  falls  to  the  ground.  In  the  Laws  he  affirms 
that  the  soul  is  "most  divine;"  that  it  is  a  leader  in  the  heavens; 
that  it  has  received  some  of  the  properties  of  the  gods;  that  it  is 
"altogether  superior  to  the  body  ;"  and  that  it  is  the  "  oldest"  of  all 
things,  and  "  rules  over  all  bodies."  Magnificent  conjectures,  equal 
to  revelations,  are  these. 

Conceding  greatness  to  the  soul,  and  affirming  its  godlike  character, 
Plato  preaches  depravity  as  emphatically  as  John  Calvin  or  Paul.  In 
the  Cratylus  the  body  is  spoken  of  as  the  sepulcher  of  the  soul,  and 
the  "mark"  of  the  soul.  The  soul  makes  its  mark  with  the  body. 
It  is  in  the  Repnblic,  however,  that  he  dilates  upon  the  "four  de- 
pravities," dividing  the  soul  into  mortal  and  immortal,  and  assigning 
to  the  mortal  part  the  lusts,  affections,  appetites,  and  angers  of  human 
nature.  Its  degradation  is  affirmed  as  the  result  of  the  union  of  body 
and  intellect.  Plato  declares  his  conviction  that  very  many  men  are 
"  profoundly  wicked,"  and  in  representing  ours  as  an  iron  race,  he 
means  that  it  is  a  fallen  race  ;  fallen  from  the  golden  period ;  fallen 
from  purity ;  fallen  from  knowledge.  In  the  Laws  he  affirms  that, 
"of  all  evils,  the  greatest  is  implanted  in  the  souls  of  a  major  part 


40  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

of  mankind,"  and  pitifully  exclaims  that,  while  each  one  is  anxious 
for  a  pardon,  no  one  devises  a  plan  for  avoiding  evil.  The  soul  of  a 
slave,  he  asserts,  is  unhealthy,  and  the  soul  of  a  woman  is  more  vi- 
cious than  that  of  a  man.  Speaking  of  the  pains  of  the  soul,  he 
enumerates  in  the  Philebus  "auger,  fear,  desire,  lamentation,  love, 
emulation,  envy,  and  all  other  such  passions;"  and  argues  in  the 
Me7io  that  virtue  must  be  communicated,  if  at  all,  by  a  certain 
"  divine  fate,"  or  the  favor  of  the  deity. 

Depravity  implies  something  more  than  positive  impulses  to  evil; 
it  implies  what  is  more  serious,  what  Plato  is  constantly  teaching  and 
in  manifold  ways  striving  to  impress  upon  his  disciples,  and  that  is, 
that  the  soul  is  ignorant  of  itself.     Ignorance  is  the  greatest  depravity. 

Of  this  ignorance  he  speaks  in  the  Laws  thus:  "Almost  all  men 
appear  to  have  been  nearly  ignorant  of  what  the  soul  happens  to  be, 
and  what  power  it  possesses  Avith  respect  to  other  things  belonging  to 
it,  and  its  generation  besides — how  that  it  is  amongst  the  first  of  sub- 
stances and  before  all,  and  that  more  than  any  thing  else  it  rules  over 
the  change  and  altered  arrangement  of  bodies."  Elsewhere  he  re- 
peats the  sentiment  wheh  he  says  that,  whether  man  is  a  "plaything 
of  the  gods"  or  the  result  of  a  "  serious  act,"  we  can  not  tell. 

In  these  statements  concerning  the  soul,  especially  the  references 
to  depravity,  we  recognize  familiar  truth ;  not  the  truth  in  a  Scrip- 
tural form,  but  the  truth  to  which  all  men  bear  witness.  Plato  wrote 
from  observation,  experience,  history,  reflection— sources  of  knowledge 
always  to  be  respected.  Re^jectiug  the  mythology  woven  with  the 
study  of  the  origin  of  the  soul,  it  must  be  allowed  that  he  has  repre- 
sented its  character  as  a  whole  in  a  masterful  manner  ;  and,  rejecting 
his  three-fold  classification  of  soul,  it  is  granted  that  it  almost  accu- 
rately represents  the  manifestations  of  soul  life.  He  was  ever  on  the 
border  of  truth  ;  in  these  instances  he  well-nigh  expressed  experi- 
mental facts. 

Remembering  that,  according  to  Plato,  the  intellect  alone  is  immor- 
tal, it  will  be  profitable  to  note  his  explanations  of  intellect,  or  the 
mental  processes,  and  the  limits  he  assigns  to  intellectual  inquiry  ;  for 
he  considers  all  these  questions,  furnishing  in  his  conclusions  many 
psychological  hints  which  modern  philosophy  might  appropriate  to  its 
advantage.  The  ancients  compared  intellect  to  water,  because  it  is 
"sober;"  but  Plato  in  the  Philebus  observes  that,  "mind  is  either 
the  same  thing  as  truth,  or  of  all  things  the  most  like  to  it."  No 
material  thing  resembles  or  suggests  the  nature  of  mind.  It  is  truth, 
or,  as  in  the  Cratylus,  it  is  power,  unmixed  power,  which  is  a  better 
definition  than  the  other,  in  that  it  is  not  so  abstract,  nor  so  inde- 
finable.    Mind  is  power,  or  as  again  in  the  Philehis,  it  "  is  a  relation 


SOURCES  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  41 

to  cause,  and  is  nearly  of  that  genus;"  that  is,  mind  is  cause  or 
catisal  power,  an  exact  definition,  a  true  conception  of  its  opera- 
tions ;  mind  an  unmixed,  independent,  originating,  truth-inspiring,  causal 

POWER. 

This  is  Plato's  starting-point,  from  which  he  advances  to  the  study 
of  the  sources  of  knowledge,  or  how  it  is  obtained ;  and  here  he  is 
explicit,  counteracting  the  empiricism  of  his  day  by  defending  the 
mind  against  all  attacks,  by  exhibiting  its  power  to  know  some  things 
on  its  own  account,  by  examining  the  theory  of  sensuous  knowledge, 
and  by  insisting  on  the  superior  value  of  moral  and  philosophical 
truth.  Whence  is  knowledge  ?  From  within,  or  from  without,  or 
from  both  within  and  without?  There  is  room  here  for  extremes — 
the  extreme  of  empiricism,  the  extreme  of  subjective  idealism,  or 
Eleaticism.  In  its  answers  philosophy  has  vibrated  to  the  one  or  the 
other,  whereas  a  true  psychology  will  recognize  the  double  source  of 
knowledge,  a  mixed  or  empirico-idealistic  source  pf  seusations  appropri- 
ated by  and  intermingled  with  the  facts  of  consciousness,  thus  giving 
employment  in  the  acquisition  of  knowledge  to  both  senses  and  intel- 
lect. Plato  avoided  the  extreme  of  empiricism;  he  did  not  entirely 
avoid  the  extreme  of  idealism.  He  was  an  idealist ;  he  was  a  ration- 
alist; his  psychology  was  a  reaction  from  the  Sophists,  who  insisted 
that  man  could  not  know  any  thing,  and  from  the  floating  sensualism 
of  the  materialists.  He  defined  the  mind,  explained  and  vindicated 
its  processes,  justified  its  deductions,  and  announced  its  empire  to  be 
the  universe  of  being.  He  enthroned  mind,  and  dethroned  the 
senses,  making  them  subordinate  and  tributary  to  intellect. 

He  relates  in  the  PhoidrHS  the  temple  tale  that  "  the  first  prophetic 
words  issued  from  an  oak,"  and  remarks  that  men  in  the  ancient 
days,  in  their  simplicity,  listened  to  an  oak  and  a  stone,  "if  only 
they  spoke  the  truth ;"  but,  evidently,  this  is  an  ironical  swording  of 
empiricism.  Knowledge  is  not  in  the  oak  or  stone.  In  the  same 
dialogue  Plato  also  considers  the  fable  that  traces  the  sciences  to  the 
revelations  of  the  gods,  but  this  is  unsatisfactory.  If  knowledge 
springs  neither  from  nature  nor  the  gods,  what  is  its  source?  Let  it 
be  conceded  that  the  senses  are  avenues  of  communication  between 
the  outer  world  of  matter  and  the  inner  world  of  mind  ;  what  of 
sense-knowledge?  What  is  its  character?  What  its  value?  In  the 
Philebus  Plato  represents  the  sciences  as  rushing  into  the  mind  through 
the  senses,  and  in  the  Theoetetus,  that  they  possess  it,  or  the  science- 
possessed  mind  is  like  an  "aviary  of  birds."  But  the  crowding  of 
the  mind  with  the  sciences  is  not  true  knowledge;  it  is  not  ample 
knowledge;  it  is  not  satisfying  knowledge.  All  such  knowledge 
Plato  underrated  and  in  a  sense  rejected,  compelled  so  to  do  by  the 


42  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

lofty  view  he  entertained  of  mind.  The  mind  is  not  sense-bound ;  it 
is  not  dependent  on  the  senses.  Sight  and  hearing,  he  affirms  in  the 
Phcedo,  do  not  convey  truth  to  men,  and  "if  these  bodily  senses  are 
neither  accurate  nor  clear,  much  less  can  the  others  be  so,  for  they 
are  all  inferior  to  these."  Again,  he  writes  that  the  soul,  "when  it 
employs  the  body  to  examine  any  thing,  is  drawn  by  the  body  to 
things  that  never  continue  the  same,  and  wanders,  and  is  confused, 
and  reels  as  if  intoxicated  through  coming  into  contact  with  things  of 
this  kind."  In  the  Thecetetus  he  defines  the  senses  as  instruments  of 
the  mind,  but  imperfect;  and  again,  in  the  Fhcedo,  characterizes 
them  as  "full  of  deception,"  and  cautions  against  a  great  reliance 
upon  them.  Gorgias  having  taught,  in  vindication  of  sense-knowl- 
edge, that  the  qualities  of  things  might  be  perceived  by  the  senses, 
Plato  annihilates  the  position  in  the  Meno,  and  in  the  Thecetetus  he 
shows  that  sight  and  science  are  by  no  means  the  same. 

Without  referring  further,  it  is  clear  that  Plato  uprooted  empiric 
cism,  and  prepared  the  way  for  a  very  radical  but  rational  psychology. 
His  primary  question- in  the  Thecetetus  is,  what  is  it  to  Jcnowf  Is  it  to 
"have"  science?  This  he  repudiates,  as  also  many  other  things 
which  the  parties  in  the  dialogue  submit  as  answers.  Unfortunately, 
the  dialogue  closes  without  a  satisfactory  settlement  of  the  question ; 
but  fortunately,  in  the  Cratylus,  he  defines  thought  as  the  "  looking- 
into  and  agitating  a  begetting,"  or  a  bringing  forth  of  ideas  and 
truths,  and  that  the  "soul  marches  along  with  things;"  and  here  he 
defines  man  as  "contemplating  what  he  sees."  In  the  Philebus  the 
soul's  act  in  the  acquisition  of  knowledge  is  represented  as  the  writing 
of  a  speech ;  the  soul  produces  speeches  within  itself  From  these 
fragments  we  learn  that  Plato's  idea  of  man  is  that  he  is  a  contem- 
plator,  a  reflector,  a  thinker ;  a  begetter  of  thoughts ;  an  inquirer,  a 
marcher;  a  speech-maker.  Knowledge  is  not  science,  but  thought. 
Knowledge  is  acquired,  not  through  the  senses,  but  by  the  mind. 

Easily  and  consistently  Plato  passes  from  the  nature  of  knowledge 
to  the  power  of  mind  itself,  asserting,  as  in  the  Theceteifiis,  that  the 
soul  in  thinking  discourses  with  itself ;  that  it  beholds  things  by  itself; 
and,  as  in  the  Phcedrus,  that  it  is  nourished  by  and  thrives  upon  the 
truth.  Truth,  not  nature,  is  the  food  of  the  soul.  The  soul  can 
shut  itself  up  with  truth,  or  be  content  with  its  own  facts,  not  re- 
garding the  outer  world  at  all.  He  asserts  in  the  Phcedo  that  if  one 
should  "  approach  a  subject  by  means  of  the  mental  faculties,  neither 
employing  the  sight  in  conjunction  with  the  reflective  faculty,  nor  in- 
troducing any  other  sense  together  with  reasoning,"  but,  "  using  pure 
reflection  by  itself"  in  the  search  of  pure  essence,  he  "will  arrive, 
if  any  one  can,  at  the  knowledge  of  that  which  is."     Expanding  this 


LIMITS  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  43 

proposition,  he  concludes  that  "  if  we  are  ever  to  know  any  thing 
purely,  we  must  be  separated  from  the  body,  and  contemplate  the 
things  themselves  by  the  mere  soul."  Surely  this  is  a  revelation  of 
soul-power  which  empirical  psychology  has  not  understood,  and  against 
which  it  has  virtually  arrayed  itself  by  the  emphasis  with  which  it 
defends  the  theory  of  sensuous  knowledge.  According  to  Plato,  the 
bodily  senses  are  hindrances  to  pure  knowledge ;  according  to  the 
empiricists,  knowledge  is  impossible  without  their  aid — they  are  the 
only  sources  or  avenues  of  knowledge.  Between  the  two,  the  differ- 
ence is  that  between  the  highest  idealism  and  the  grossest  ma- 
terialism •  as  between  the  Platonic  conception  of  mind,  and  the 
associationalist's  conception,  one  must  accept  the  former,  since 
it  dignifies  the  soul,  gives  it  independence,  and  foreshadows  its  im- 
n^rtality. 

Announcing  the  independent,  truth-acquiring  propensity  of  the 
soul,  Plato  foresees  certain  limits  to  human  knowledge,  arising  out 
of  the  combination  of  soul  and  body,  which  suffocates  aspiration  and 
blockades  advance.  Self-stimulating  as  the  mind  is,  it  gropes  amid 
outward  things,  seeing  and  knowing  them  at  first  only  superficially, 
and  grows  slowly  into  correct  apprehension  of  phenomena.  He  illus- 
trates in  the  Thecetetns  the  gradual  process  of  mind-opening  by  the 
fact  that  one  sees  letters  without  knowing  their  meaning,  and  hears 
the  language  of  a  barbarian  without  understanding  it ;  he  sees  and 
hears  without  knowing;  sense-perception,  sense-knowledge,  must  be 
followed  by  mind-perception  and  mind-knowledge.  As  if  relating  a 
dream,  Plato  then  teaches  that  the  first  elements  can  not  be  explained 
by  reason  ;  that  an  element  can  not  be  defined  ;  but  things  com- 
pounded of  them  may  be  explained  and  understood.  He  illustrates 
by  the  following  example  :  the  word  Socrates  is  composed  of  syllables, 
and  the  syllables  of  elements,  or  sounds  ;  so,  a  syllable,  is  composed 
of  s  and  o ;  but  s  is  a  consonant,  a  sound,  and  can  not  be  defined. 
Compounds,  therefore,  we  may  understand  ;  elements  are  indefinable. 
Applying  this  to  nature,  or  the  universe,  it  is  clear  that  it  may  be 
understood  only  in  its  component  relations  ;  as  a  product  of  elemental 
principles,  forces,  or  facts,  it  may  be  analyzed  ;  but  the  original  ele- 
ments, named,  pointed  out,  discovered,  yet  elude  significant  interpre- 
tation. In  the  Statesman  it  is  shown  that  the  soul,  suflTering  thus 
respecting  the  elements,  fluctuates  sometimes  respecting  all  things, 
even  the  "  comminglings,"  or  the  combinations  of  the  elements,  and 
that  it  arrives  only  at  a  small  portion  of  truth.  Catching  up  the 
Heraclitic  idea  of  "the  "becoming,"  he  applies  it  in  the  Cratylus  to 
our  knowledge  of  beauty,  saying  it  is  always  "  secretly  going  away," 
that  even  "  while  we  are  speaking  about  it,  it  becomes  immediately 


44  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

something  else ;  "  so  that  it  can  not  be  known  by  any  one.  This  is  a 
leaning  toward  the  Eleatic  principle  of  the  "one,"  which,  however, 
Plato  guarded  aguiust  by  asserting  the  reality  of  the  "manifold,"  a 
knowledge  of  which  is  limited  to  compounds. 

Coni'essing  the  limitations  of  knowledge,  how  ju§t  the  rebuke  he 
administers  in  the  Euihydemus  to  Dionysiodorus,  who  held  that  if  one 
knew  any  thing  he  knew  all  things  !  Man  is  not  all-ignorant,  nor 
all-knowing  ;  he  knows  some  things ;  the  soul  knows  truth  when  it 
sees  it ;  it  knows  the  outer  world ;  but  it  knows  not  completely  in 
this  present  state. 

The  subject  of  limitation  is  renewed  in  the  Seventh  Ejyistle,  in  the 
discussion  of  the  steps  to  progressive  knowledge,  Plato  stating  the  first 
requisite  to  be  the  name  of  a  thing  ;  second,  its  definition ;  third,  its 
resemblance  ;  fourth,  its  science ;  but,  proceeding  in  this  order  in  the 
analysis  of  a  truth,  or  a  thing,  the  philosopher  adds  that  it  is  of  uncer- 
tain value.  For  there  is  no  fixed  name  for  any  thing,  as  a  round 
thing  might  be  called  straight ;  there  is  nothing  in  a  name  as  men 
use  names;  and  "  the  same  assertion  is  true  of  a  definition."  Human 
knowledge  is  a  speculation. 

From  this  extreme  concession  or  morbid  surrender,  Plato  rebounds 
both  in  the  Philebits  and  the  Banquet,  carrying  us  back  to  the  heights 
of  soul-knowledge,  to  knowledge  of  the  abstract,  of  being,  of  essence, 
and  showing  that  his  compromises  of  the  powers  of  mind  were  inci- 
dental only.  In  the  Philebus  he  declares  the  substance  of  good  to 
consist  of  beauty,  symmetry,  and  truth,  the  "bounds  of  the  intelli- 
gible," a  knowledge  of  which  it  is  in  the  power  of  mind  to  obtain. 
It  must  hunt  for  them  ;  it  may  find  them.  In  a  most  elegant  man- 
ner he  speaks  in  the  Banquet  of  the  process  of  knowledge  as  an 
"ascending,"  a  march  by  one's  self,  going  "from  the  beauty  of  bodies 
(to  the  beauty  of  soul,  and  from  the  beauty  of  soul)  to  that  of  pur- 
suits; from  the  beauty  of  pursuits  to  that  of  doctrines;  until  he 
arrives  at  length  from  the  beauty  of  doctrines  (generally)  to  that  single 
one  relating  to  nothing  else  than  beauty  in  the  abstract  (and  he  knows 
at  last  what  is  the  beautiful  itself)."  The  steps,  please  observe:  body, 
soul,  pursuit,  doctrine,  the  abstract.  This  is  an  intellectual  ascension, 
which  modern  psychology  would  do  well  to  embrace. 

Nor  is  this  all.  Plato  defines  logos  in  the  Theoetetxis  to  be  the 
science  of  the  difference ;  that  is,  it  implies  the  elimination  from  a  thing 
of  all  qualities  common  to  other  things,  and  the  discovery  of  that 
particular  quality,  element,  function,  or  prerogative  which,  remaining, 
separates  it  from  all  other  things,  and  distinguishes  it  as  an  inde- 
pendent and  individual  object.  This  process  of  elimination,  separa- 
tion, winnowing,  or  whatever  it  may  be  called,  is  the  province  of 


HUMAN  DEPRAVITY.  45 

dialectics,  in  which  Plato  was  a  master,  and  which  he  demonstrated 
to  be  possible  in  the  study  of  truth. 

This  is  the  summit  of  Plato's  psychology — a  knowledge  of  the  ab- 
stract, a  knowledge  of  the  logos  of  truth,  of  all  things ;  a  knowledge 
of  soul;  self-knowledge,  truth-knowledge.  Heights,  these;  beyond 
them,  only  the  heights  of  the  eternal. 

With  the  psychological  conception  of  man  the  purely  ethical  branch 
of  Plato's  philosophy  is  closely  related.  Ethics  he  could  not  avoid ; 
.philosophy  can  not  avoid  it.  In  this  department  it  demonstrates  its 
utility  to  the  race,  or  exposes  its  insufficiency,  in  either  case  deter- 
mining the  value  of  philosophy  as  a  practical  pursuit.  In  its  theo- 
logical bearings,  it  may  be  speculative  ;  in  its  psychological  revelations, 
it  may  be  abstract  and  concrete;  in  its  ethics,  it  is  concrete. 

Plato's  Reptihlic  is  a  miniature  of  ethical  principles,  both  as  they 
respect  the  State  and  the  individual,  while  his  Laws  are  the  details  of 
practical,  social,  moral,  and  civil  life.  However,  the  ethical  beliefs, 
sanctions,  and  discriminations  of  Plato  are  reflected,  like  his  psychol- 
ogy, in  all  his  dialogues,  sometimes  as  mere  hints,  then  as  open 
declarations;  sometimes  in  dialectical  form,  then  as  prescriptive  state- 
ments; but  always  sufficiently  transparent  and  sufficiently  positive, 
though  not  always  essentially  sound.  To  his  theory  of  the  origin  of 
evil  we  take  exception  on  philosophic,  historic,  and  religious  grounds. 
it  is  philosophically  erroneous,  historically  contradictory,  religiously 
absurd.  Of  evil,  as  the  antagonistic  principle  in  the  universe,  located 
in  inert  matter,  we  have  already  spoken,  but  we  recall  it  in  this 
connection.     To  this  remote  origin  Plato  traces  it. 

That  man  is  a  partaker  of  vice,  degraded,  contaminated,  Plato  un- 
equivocally asserts ;  that  he  is  not  good  by  nature,  he  teaches  in  the 
Meno;  that  he  is  ignorant  of  virtue,  he  shows  both  in  the  Laches  and 
the  Meno,  and  proves  in  the  latter  that  it  can  neither  be  taught  nor 
acquired  as  science;  that  the  soul  is  burdened  with  baseness  and  in- 
justice, he  declares  and  establishes  in  the  Gorgias,  and  re-affirms  its 
ignorance  and  diseases  in  the  Sophist;  that  evil  is  a  deep  disease  is 
manifest  in  the  Lysis ;  that  the  major  part  of  mankind  are  wrecks, 
and  that,  in  comparison  with  the  gods,  every  man  is  vile,  that  passion 
is  inherent  and  man  the  most  savage  of  animals,  Plato  confesses  in 
the  Laws.     Let  this  testimony  to  "total  depravity"  be  sufficient. 

His  condemnation  of  evil  is  explicit,  strong,  wrathful.  In  the 
Crito  it  is  declared  that  it  is  not  right  to  do  evil ;  in  the  Gorgias,  that 
"  to  act  unjustly  is  the  greatest  of  evils,"  that  intemperance  is  disor- 
der, that  it  is  dreadful  to  be  discordant  with  "myself,"  that  an  "in- 
satiable and  intemperate  "  life  is  reprehensible ;  in  the  Minos,  that  in- 
toxication  must  be  forbidden ;  in  the  Banquet,  that  drunkenness  is  a 


46  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

crime,  and  ' '  shame  for  bad  acts  "  is  the  glory  of  a  man ;  in  the  Laws, 
that  to  live  without  justice  is  not  good,  that  intoxication  is  not  of  a 
"  trifling  nature,"  and  man  drunk  is  again  a  child,  and  that  idleness, 
slander,  theft,  murder,  profane  oaths,  and  human  sacrifices  are  crimes 
in  the  sight  of  gods  and  men. 

Equally  strong  is  he  in  his  encouragements  and  persuasions  to  seek 
the  good  and  avoid  the  evil.  Man,  as  in  the  CVifo,  should  not  be  anxious 
about  living,  but  about  living  well;  an  unjust  person  or  an  unhealthy 
soul,  as  in  the  Gorgias,  is  miserable  ;  good  is  the  end  of  all  actions ; 
the  depraved  soul  should  be  restrained  ;  he  is  happy  who  has  no  vice 
in  his  soul ;  as  in  the  Protagoras,  the  soul  needs  training  and  healing ; 
justice  "  bears  the  nearest  possible  resemblance  to  holiness,"  therefore 
practice  it ;  the  safety  of  life  consists  in  the  right  choice  of  pleasure 
and  pain  ;  as  in  the  Cratyhts,  the  soul  that  moves  badly,  or  in  a 
**  restrained  and  sliackled  manner,"  is  depraved,  it  needs  freedom ;  as 
in  the  Philebiis,  pleasure  is  not  the  chief  good,  nor  even  intellect,  but 
the  mixed  life  of  intellect  and  pleasure ;  as  in  the  Charmides,  "  tem- 
perance is  the  practice  of  things  good ;"  as  in  the  Menexenus,  "knowl- 
edge separated  from  justice  appears  to  be  knavery ;"  as  in  the 
Minos,  "right  is  a  royal  law,"  it  has  science  in  it;  as  in  the  Second 
Epistle,  evil  must  be  removed  if  the  soul  meet  with  truth  ;  as  in  the 
Ninth  Epistle,  "  each  is  not  born  for  himself  alone,"  but  must  recog- 
nize the  claims  of  country,  parents,  and  friends ;  as  in  the  Laws, 
children  should  reverence  parents,  making  images  to  their  memory, 
and  old  men  should  not  do  shameless  things  before  children ;  and 
crystallizes  the  whole  in  these:  virtue  is  the  basis  of  all  honor; 
"  truth  is  the  leader  of  every  good."     What  lofty  instructions  here  ! 

Recognizing  the  depravity  of  soul,  condemning  evil,  and  postulat- 
ing the  necessity  of  virtue,  what  remedy  does  Plato  oflTer  for  depravity? 
What  is  the  impulsive  ethical  force  of  his  philosophy?  Let  us  not 
expect  too  much  from  one  piloting  himself  in  a  new  region.  He 
leads ;  let  us  follow.  He  recognizes  the  difficulty,  wrestling  with  it 
in  no  uncertain,  but,  as  we  shall  find,  in  an  insuflEicient  manner.  In 
the  Protagoras  he  points  out  the  difficulty  of  becoming  a  good  man, 
"  square  as  to  his  hands  and  feet  and  mind,  fashioned  without  fault;" 
but  in  the  Banquet  he  exhorts  to  obtain  the  good,  and  in  the  Eidhyde- 
mus  he  exclaims  with  the  vehemence  of  a  seeker,  "Let  him  destroy  me, 
and,  if  he  will,  boil  me,  or  do  whatever  else  he  pleases  tvith  me,  if  he  does 
but  render  me  a  good  man."     Could  spiritual  yearning  go  farther? 

The  acquisition  of  good,  according  to  Plato,  is  conditional  upon 
self-knowledge  and  a  knowledge  of  good,  both  of  which  may  be  ob- 
tained by  the  pursuit  of  both  in  a  philosophical  manner.  This  is  the 
kernel  of  the  ethical  theory  of  Plato.     In  the  First  Alcibiades  he  in- 


V^'SOUND  ETHICAL  PRINCIPLES.  47 

sists  that  we  must  know  ourselves  before  we  can  make  ourselves  bet- 
ter, illustrating  it  in  this  way,  that  if  one  does  not  know  what  a  finger- 
ring  is,  he  can  not  make  better  finger-rings.  Self-knowledge  is  the 
primary  condition  of  improvement ;  this  results  in  the  exposure  of 
the  concujoiscent  soul,  and  all  the  depravMes  of  the  irascible  nature. 
No  one  will  dispute  Plato  at  this  point ;  but  when,  as  in  the  Protagoras, 
he  undertakes  to  show  that  "no  man  errs  willingly,"  and,  as  in  the 
Banquet,  that  all  men  desire  good  to  be  jireseiit,  we  suspend  judgment 
a  moment  to  inquire  what  he  means.  He  reveals  the  depravity  of 
the  soul,  but  are  we  to  understand  that  it  is  an  involuntary  depravity  f 
If  so,  he  is  in  perfect  accord  with  the  Biblical  representation  of  man's 
original  corruption;  but  he  departs  from  it  if  he  means  that  evil,  as 
a  manifested  product  in  the  life,  is  equally  involuntary.  The  inner 
man  may  be  involuntarily  depraved,  the  outer  man  is  voluntarily 
depraved.  Nature  is  involuntary  in  its  contents;  conduct  is  wholly 
voluntary.  Plato  is  not  discerning  at  this  point,  or.  he  is  too  lenient 
in  the  interpretation  of  wrong  in  man's  history.  Self-knowledge  leads 
to  the  discovery  of  the  voluntary  as  well  as  the  involuntary  in  human 
history,  and  one  can  not  be  ignored  any  more  than  the  other.  Strong 
as  the  involuntary  principle  of  evil  is,  the  world  suffers  more  from 
voluntary  evils,  or  the  free  exercise  of  the  involuntary  principle. 
Crime  is  the  voluntary  manifestation  of  the  involuntary  principle; 
sin  is  the  voluntary  disturbance  of  God's  order  in  the  universe.  The 
involuntary  excites  sympathy  ;  tl^e  voluntary,  approval  or  condemna- 
tion, as  it  embraces  right  or  wrong.  The  one  is  authoritative ;  the 
other  is  within  control,  and  may  be  directed  or  suppressed.  Plato's 
sentiment  is  an  apology  for  evil,  internal  and  external ;  it  is,  there- 
fore, ethically  unsound. 

The  knowledge  of  good  precedes  the  acquisition  of  good.  This 
Platonic  condition  we  accept.  What  is  the  good?  What  are  its  es- 
sentials, its  signs,  its  functions  ?  With  these  questions  Plato  struggles 
in  the  Philebus,  announcing  that  beauty,  symmetry,  and  truth  prevail 
in  the  form  of  good ;  in  the  Laches,  teaching  that  fortitude  is  related 
to  the  good ;  in  the  Laivs,  showing  the  difference  between  divine  and 
human  good,  mentioning  as  elements  of  the  latter  the  four  virtues, 
prudence,  temperance,  fortitude,  and  justice.  As  if  not  quite  satisfied 
with  these  attempts  at  definition,  he  adds  in  the  Laws  that  the  perfect- 
man  is  the  reflective  man,  or  reason  is  a  quality  of  goodness,  and  that 
the  good  man  governs  himself,  or  is  capable  of  self-control ;  in  his 
Seventh  Epistle  he  advises  Dionysius  to  be  in  accord  with  himself,  as 
if  self-harmony  were  the  content  of  goodness ;  and  in  the  Charmides 
he  discusses  the  problem  of  "living  scientifically,"  which  he  finally 
resolves  into  a  knowledge  of  the  science  of  good  and  evil. 


48  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

The  sum  of  these  fragments  is  that  good  is  a  complex  content, 
consisting  of  truth,  symmetry,  beauty,  prudence,  temperance,  forti- 
tude, justice,  reason,  harmony,  and  scientific  order ;  a  catalogue  of 
noble  virtues,  possessing  which,  the  soul  will  not  be  "  barren  nor  un- 
fruitful" in  the  things  that  make  for  righteousness  and  peace. 

How  may  they  be  secured?  How  may  the  good  be  obtained? 
This  is  the  crucial  question  of  theology,  of  philosophy,  of  Plato,  who 
fancies  that  he  has  prescribejj  a  sufficient  remedy  for  evil,  and  sug- 
gested a  way  for  the  attainment  of  good.  His  answer  is  three-fold, 
theological,  religious,  and  philosophical,  the  merits  of  which  will  be 
seen  when  the  answer  is  fully  given.  The  theological  answer  relates 
to  the  infallibility  of  conscience  as  a  guide  into  all  truth,  Plato,  es- 
pecially in  the  First  Alcibiades,  referring  to  it  as  a  sufiicient  monitor 
and  helper.  The  "dsemon"  of  Socrates  has  furnished  a  topic  for 
many  an  essay  and  discussion,  some  writers  finding  it  difficult  to 
reconcile  it  with  the  conscience ;  but  it  seems  to  us  very  difficult  to 
reconcile  it  with  any  thing  else,  unless  we  identify  it  with  the  Holy 
Spirit,  which  we  are  not  prepared  to  do.  The  power  of  conscience, 
as  a  prompting  influence  in  morals,  as  an  inspiration  tOAvard  the  right, 
we  fully  grant ;  but  the  world  needs  something  more  than  a  con- 
science. It  needs  truth,  which  will  enable  the  conscience  properly  to 
act,  for  it  is  an  indisputed  fact  that  the  unenlightened  conscience,  if  it 
does  not  reprove,  does  not  always  restrain  from  wrong-doing,  especially 
if  such  wrong-doing  is  sanctioned  by  religious  teaching.  The  con- 
science may  be  guided  or  become  a  guide,  in  proportion  to  its  knowl- 
edge of  right  and  wrong.  In  itself,  it  is  without  such  knowledge ;  it 
needs  truth,  therefore.  The  Bible  represents  the  need  of  the  Holy 
Spirit  as  a  reprover,  a  teacher,  a  guide,  a  comforter,  inasmuch  as 
man's  conscience  will  not  always  reprove,  or  teach,  or  guide.  Accord- 
ing to  the  Bible,  man  can  not  guide  himself  into  the  truth ;  he  needs 
truth,  and  he  needs  God  to  guide  him  into  the  truth.  Of  the 
"daemon"  of  Socrates  and  Plato,  we  do  not  find  that  it  was  an 
illuminator,  or  guide  into  truth,  but  a  restraining  influence  in  conduct, 
checking  the  disposition  to  evil,  the  purpose  to  do  wrong.  In  the 
Theages  Plato  clearly  distinguishes  between  the  conscience  as  a  re- 
straining and  inciting  power,  affirming  that  it  "dissuades  and  does 
not  suffer  me  to  do"  wrong,  "but  it  never  at  any  time  incites  me" 
to  do  right.  Evidently,  then,  the  inciting  power,  the  guiding  influ- 
ence to  truth,  is  not  in  the  conscience.  Plato's  theological  answer 
is  incomplete. 

The  religiom  ansioer  relates  to  the  utility  of  prayer  as  an  agency 
in  the  world's  moral  elevation.  Plato  is  a  believer  in  prayer;  he 
prays  to  the  gods;   he   recommends    sacrifices  and   festivals  in  their 


ED  UCA  TION  PLA  TO'S  REM  ED  Y.  49 

honor ;  but  he  records  no  answers  to  his  prayers.  This  has  been  over- 
looked by  the  students  of  Plato ;  its  announcement  is  now  made  for 
the  first  time.  At  the  close  of  the  Phcedrus,  Socrates  is  made  to  offer 
the  following  beautiful  prayer:  "  O,  beloved  Pan,  and  all  ye  other 
gods  of  this  place,  grant  me  to  become  beautiful  in  the  inner  man, 
and  that  whatever  outward  things  I  have  may  be  at  peace  with  those 
within."  What  a  prayer!  Was  it  genuine,  or  a  mere  concession  to 
the  polytheism  of  the  country  ?  A  genuine  heart-yearning  for  good 
Plato  possessed,  but  he  trusted  neither  to  the  restraining  conscience 
nor  unanswered  prayer  for  its  acquisition. 

The  great  remedy  for  evil,  the  chief  agency  in  the  acquisition  of 
good,  is  education ;  this  is  Plato's  philosophical  answer,  it  is  the  answer 
of  modern  philosophy.  Both  in  the  Meno  and  the  Sophist  he  teaches 
the  value  of  correct  opinion,  and  that  confutation  is  the  greatest  of 
purifications.  Both  in  the  Protagoras  and  the  Lysis  he  enforces  the 
duty  of  education.  In  the  Rivals  he  shows  that  to  be  ignorant  of 
one's  self  is  to  be  of  unsound  mind.  He  labors  in  the  Laws  espe- 
cially to  prove  that  ignorance  is  the  cause  of  crime,  which  leads  him 
to  recommend  education  as  a  preventive  ;  but  the  disease  is  not  fairly 
stated,  hence  the  remedy  is  inadequate.  The  principle  that  vice  is  a 
mental  disease  is  erroneous  in  fact,  and  in  contradiction  of  the  natu- 
ral depravity  which  the  philosopher  attributes  to  the  mortal  part  of 
the  soul.  Vice  is  a  spiritual  disease,  to  be  overcome  by  a  spiritual 
remedy  ;  but  Plato  did  not  diagnose  correctly ;  hence  did  not  pre- 
scribe accurately  or  sufficiently.  A  disease  may  be  determined  by  its 
remedy,  and  the  remedy  required  may  be  indicated  by  the  disease. 
Consumption  requires  complicated  treatment ;  a  pin-scratch  scarcely 
any  notice.  If  the  evil  taint  is  interpreted  as  a  misfortune  or  weak- 
ness that  may  easily  be  overcome ;  if  its  deadly  spirit  is  not  recog- 
nized ;  if  it  is  pronounced,  on  the  one  hand,  a  superficial  blemish,  or, 
on  the  other,  an  ineradicable  bent,  the  philosophical  remedies  for  it 
will  be  educational,  social,  legislative,  philanthropic,  but  neither  spirit- 
ual nor  divine.  If,  as  Theodore  Parker  held,  sin  is  but  the  tripping 
of  a  child,  a  blunder,  a  mistake,  an  unfortunate  step,  then,  indeed, 
its  bad  effects  are  within  personal  control.  From  Plato  to  Parker, 
through  all  the  various  evolutions  of  transcendentalism,  there  has  been 
no  adequate  interpretation  of  the  evil  principle,  no  solution  of  the  evil 
germ,  either  as  to  its  origin  or  character,  and  no  discovery  of  a  satis- 
factory antidote.  All  along  the  line  the  failure  has  been  complete. 
Plato's  remedy — education — is  the  best  that  philosophy  has  ever  sug- 
gested, the  best  outside  of  a  divine  religion.  Let  it  be  known  as 
Plato's  patent-right  remedy  for  evil ;  it  is  not  original  with  Herbert 
Spencer,  therefore,  or  with  modern  thought. 

4 


50  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

The  potency  of  culture,  the  civilizing  influence  of  education,  the 
intellectual  improvement  that  man  has  made  within  twenty  centuries, 
justifies  the  establishment  of  schools,  colleges,  the  press,  the  publica- 
tion of  books,  and  all  the  efforts  now  making  to  emancipate  the  race 
from  the  thralldom  of  ignorance.  Education  is  a  universal  necessity, 
but  it  is  not  an  adequate  remedy  for  sin.  Even  Athens,  with  its 
superior  culture,  decayed  ;  and  Greece,  with  philosophers  in  all  its 
cities,  declined  in  morals,  because  there  was  no  impelling  force  behind 
philosophic  teaching.  Valuable  as  is  culture,  it  is  wanting  in  the 
moral  power  to  deliver  from  evil,  especially  to  eradicate  it  from  the 
nature. 

The  education  prescribed  by  Plato  was  not  of  a  character  to  in- 
spire a  love  of  the  beautiful,  or  to  incline  the  soul  to  righteousness. 
He  speaks  often  of  a  "  liberal  education,"  but  the  curriculum  em- 
braced gymnastics,  equestrian  skill,  as  in  the  Laches,  dancing,  music, 
arithmetic,  and  astronomy,  as  in  the  Laws.  He  mourns  over  the 
"  slave-like  cut  of  hair  "  in  the  souls  of  men,  talks  freely  of  popular 
education  among  the  Persians,  as  in  the  First  Alcibiades,  but,  while 
suggesting  philosophy  to  the  few  as  the  cure  for  their  evils,  he  orders 
the  above,  both  for  boys  and  girls,  as  a  sufficient  preparation  for  life, 
and  an  adequate  security  against  depravity.  In  the  Republic  he  pre- 
scribes four  virtues  for  the  ideal  man;  viz.,  wisdom,  temperance, 
fortitude,  and  justice,  the  strong  pillars  of  human  character;  but 
these  are  the  products  of  individual  endeavor,  the  results  of  phil- 
osophic study,  of  a  persevering  purpose,  and  of  the  observance  of  a 
rigid  asceticism.  The  weakness  of  the  educational  method,  consisting 
in  part  in  a  superficial  estimate  of  evil,  is  evident  in  this,  that  it  at- 
tributes the  power  of  moral  change  or  moral  elevation  wholly  to  the 
individual.  He  regenerates  himself  by  the  force  of  education ;  the 
sources  and  agencies  of  moral  change  are  within  himself  This  Plato 
taught ;  this  modern  philosophy  teaches  ;  and  it  all  grows  out  of  the 
theory  of  evil  as  a  superficial  hindrance  to  the  development  of  char- 
acter, to  be  removed  by  self-effort,  by  the  educational  process. 

Of  some  evils  Plato  has  a  deep  abhorrence,  as  drunkenness,  glut- 
tony, unchaste  pleasures,  and  laziness  ;  and  for  this  reason  he  excludes 
the  poets  from  his  Republic,  especially  Homer,  whose  falsehoods,  fables, 
and  immoralities,  as  given  in  the  Iliad,  he  exposes  with  a  merciless 
hand,  insisting  that  the  literature  of  the  poets  excites  the  predisposi- 
tion to  evil,  and  is  contaminating  in  every  respect.  At  the  same 
time,  evil-hater  as  he  was,  he  permits  the  governors  in  his  Republic 
to  lie  under  given  circumstances  ;  and  in  his  Laws  a  person  is  per- 
mitted to  steal  pears,  apples,  and  pomegranates,  if  he  does  it  "se- 
cretly," that  is,  if  not  caught  at  it.     Such  are  some  of  the  inconsist- 


POSITIVE  RELIGIOUS  TEACHINGS.  51 

encies  in  Plato's  educational  method,  involving  a  hatred  of  some  evils, 
but  a  superficial  estimate  of  evil,  as  the  ruining  force  in  the  world. 

In  this  connection  it  is  all-important  to  inquire  what  relation  he 
assigns  to  religion  in  his  ethical  economy.  Has  religion,  as  a  princi- 
ple, as  an  office,  or  prerogative,  any  recognition  in  Plato  ?  The  term 
"  religion  "  embraces  a  multiple  of  ideas,  more  or  less  fundamental,  which 
appear  in  crude  or  developed  forms  in  religious  structures  and  insti- 
tutions, being  prominent  in  permanent  religions  and  obscure  in  the 
transient.  Plato's  religious  conceptions,  lifted  out  of  their  polytheis- 
tic environment,  have  a  fundamental  value,  and  are  the  organic 
ideas,  so  far  as  they  go,  of  the  best  religions,  if  not  of  the  divine. 
The  paganism  of  Plato  is  not  ultra  ;  rather  is  it  the  accidental  glam- 
our of  the  popular  faith. 

Respecting  the  existence  of  God,  having  already  spoken  of  his 
belief,  it  is  enough  now  to  recall  the  fact  that  he  is  a  monotheist; 
but  Plato's  monotheism  included  a  broad,  circumstantial  view  of  a 
divine  government,  manifesting  itself  in  the  providential,  and,  there- 
fore, minutely  careful,  supervision  of  this  world.  This  feature  of  a  di- 
vinely governing  influence  in  human  affairs  Plato  develops  in  the  Laivs, 
discussing  the  origin  of  the  prevailing  doubt  respecting  it,  and  conclu- 
sively establishing  that  the  small  no  less  than  the  great  affairs  in  this 
world  are  under  divine  supervision.  Wonderfully  inspiring  is  the 
thought  that  God  has  a  particular  plan  for  each  individual,  and  that, 
however  small  the  plan,  it  stretches  "its  view  to  the  whole,"  is  re- 
lated to  a  universal  plan ;  and  equally  faith -inspiring  is  the  thought 
that  God  has  a  plan  for  the  ultimate  triumph  of  virtue.  Virtue 
will  gain  the  victory  in  the  universe.  This  is  evangelical  philoso- 
phy;  its  failure  is  in  not  pointing  out  the  "plan."  Just  here,  how- 
ever, the  religion  and  ethics  of  Plato  unite. 

Believing  in  God,  worship,  sacrifices,  temples,  prayers,  Plato 
does  not  hesitate  to  enjoin  religious  duties,  consistently  recognizing  the 
spontaneous  activities  of  the  religious  nature  of  man  in  these  direc- 
tions. In  the  Repnhlic  he  says  temples  should  be  erected  to  the  Del- 
phian Apollo,  and  sacrifices  should  be  offered  to  the  gods  who  know, 
see,  and  hear  all  things  ;  but  this  is  suggested  in  a  faint-hearted  way, 
as  if  some  recognition  must  be  made  to  the  popular  religion.  In  the 
Lmvs,  however,  Plato  is  undisguisedly  an  advocate  of  the  polytheistic 
institutions,  denouncing  impiety,  sacrilege,  and  atheism,  and  pre- 
scribing punishments  therefor.  No.  one,  he  affirms,  should  be  ele- 
vated to  the  position  of  guardian  of  the  laws  who  denies  the  existence 
of  the  gods. 

As  to  prayers,  he  continually  orders  them  in  the  Laws;  in  the 
Eighth   Epistle  he  says  "it  is  meet  to  begin  from  the  gods  in  every 


52  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

thing  ;"  in  the  Philebus  he  speaks  of  the  presence  of  a  favoring  deity, 
and  intimates  the  helpfulness  of  prayer  in  study  ;  and  the  Second  Al- 
cibiades  is  a  dialogue  almost  wholly  devoted  to  the  consideration  of 
the  utility  of  prayer.  Carefulness  in  prayer,  a  study  of  what  the 
gods  are  likely  to  grant,  he  assumes,  will  restrain  the  praying  spirit, 
and  prevent  the  utterance  of  intemperate  requests,  while  a  study  of 
the  prayers  of  the  Lacedsemonians  will  show  that  the  gods  prefer  a 
"  good-omened  address"  to  a  multitude  of  meaningless  sacrifices.  The 
dialogue  leaves  the  impression  that  prayer  is,  on  the  whole,  of  doubt- 
ful value. 

Is  the  doctrine  of  spiritual  influence  recognized  by  Plato  ?  Not 
frequently,  nor  even  thoroughly,  and  yet  somewhat  beautifully,  caus- 
ing us  to  suspect  that  Plato  does  not  record  all  his  experiences,  or 
express  definitely  all  his  convictions  respecting  the  communicating  in- 
fluence of  God's  spirit.  In  the  Apology  Socrates  is  made  to  say  that 
the  Deity  called  him  to  philosophize,  a  call  analogous  to  that  which 
every  evangelical  minister  claims  as  having  been  extended  to  him  ; 
and  in  the  Phcedrus  he  confesses  that  he  is  "  moved  by  some  divine 
influence "  which  envelops  even  the  place  where  he  is  sitting,  and 
makes  it  divine.  This  means  wonderful  illumination,  attributed  by 
Plato  to  a  divine  source.  Discoursing  on  the  prophetic  art,  he  pro- 
nounces it  a  divine  madness,  and  as  to  its  result  he  says  that  which 
comes  from  God  is  nobler  than  that  which  proceeds  from  men. 

In  respect  to  spiritual  living,  Plato  teaches  in  the  Second  Alcibiades 
that  the  mist  must  be  removed  by  the  divine  being  from  the  soul,  as 
Minerva  removed  it  from  the  eyes  of  Diomede,  that  he  might  see 
gods  and  men  ;  and  in  the  Laws  he  strictly  enjoins  that  one  must 
live  after  the  manner  of  the  gods,  saying  that  similarity  to  the  deity 
is  pleasing  in  his  sight.  Depravity  must  be  cured ;  this  he  urges  in 
the  Laws.  He  intimates  the  existence  of  a  cure,  without  describing 
it,  in  the  Charmides,  as  an  incantation  which  restores  body  and  soul 
to  health  and  purity  ;  but,  alas !  where  or  what  is  the  incantation  ? 
Shall  we  turn  to  the  Eidhyphron  and  listen  to  Plato  as  he  discourses 
on  holiness?  What  is  holiness?  asks  the  interlocutor.  This  is  a 
fundamental  question  ;  Plato's  answer  is  not  fundamental,  for  he  does 
not  know.  Definitions,  many  and  bordering  on  a  true  conception  of 
holiness,  are  given,  but  each  is  unsatisfactory,  because  incomplete, 
and  lacking  a  divine  element  or  force.  Holiness  is  the  prosecution 
of  injustice;  "that  which  is  pleasing  to  the  gods  is  holy;"  "that 
which  the  gods  love  is  holy  ;"  holiness  is  a  part  of  justice  ;  it  is  a 
knowledge  of  sacrifice  and  praying.  Such  are  the  humdrum  defini- 
tions in  the  dialogue,  but  all  are  finally  abandoned  by  Plato  himself, 
without  a  settlement  of  the  question.  What  is  holiness  ?     In  the  Phi- 


IMMORTALITY  OF  THE  SOUL.  53 

lebus  he  brings  forward  the  subject  of  purity,  and  really  expands  it 
satisfactorily  in  the  guise  of  an  illustration.  The  purity  of  white, 
says  Plato,  is  that  "  in  which  there  is  no  portion  of  any  other  color." 
Admirable,  but  he  fails  in  the  application  ;  indeed,  he  makes  no  ap- 
plication. '  Holiness  is  that  in  which  there  is  no  portion  of  any  thing 
unlike  it,  but  Plato  does  not  say  this  ;  he  did  not  grasp  it ;  he  had  not 
experienced  it.  His  holiness  was  abstract,  not  concrete— localized,  if 
at  all,  in  matter,  not  in  men. 

The  religion  of  Plato  included  more  than  sacrifices,  prayers,  faith, 
temples,  and  conformity  to  a  god-like  life.  In  some  respects  he  may 
be  viewed  as  a  doctrinal  teacher,  or  expounder  of  certain  eschatolog- 
ical  truths,  fundamental  to  all  religions,  mythological  as  well  as  the 
truly  historical  and  real.  These  truths  Plato  does  not  shun ;  he  seeks 
them,  uses  them  as  the  instrument  of  persuasion  to  a  holy  life,  draw- 
ing arguments  from  heaven  and  hell  to  impress  men  to  follow  the 
deity.  The  question  of  the  future  life  was  then  as  vital,  as  absorb- 
ino-,  as  it  is  now.  Belief  in  it  was  universal.  The  thought  of  the 
immortality  of  the  soul,  vaguely  accepted,  exerted  a  potent  influence 
on  the  conduct,  and  often  subdued  men  into  respect  for  righteousness. 
Plato  was  the  first  to  elaborate  the  doctrine,  to  establish  it  by  unan- 
swerable proof,  succeeding  better  than  our  own  Emerson,  who  reduces 
it  to  a  hope,  or  a  belief  in  it  to  a  guess. 

Of  the  spirituality  of  the  soul,  we  have  suflSciently  spoken  ;  of 
the  proofs  of  its  immortality,  we  may  now  rehearse  those  of  Plato, 
premising  that,  studying  them  in  their  fullness,  they  appear  incontro- 
vertible. Gleaning  the  dialogues,  we  hear  him  say  in  the  Banquet 
that  men  "have  a  yearning  for  immortality;"  in  the  Philebus,  that 
the  soul  is  full  of  expectations,  making  speeches  to  itself  of  the  fu- 
ture ;  in  the  Republic,  that  evil  can  not  destroy  the  soul  as  disease  the 
body,  but  that  it  is  immortal;  in  the  Phmdo,  that  "there  are  two 
species  of  things,  the  one  visible,  the  other  invisible  ;"  the  invisible 
always  continues  the  same,  but  "the  visible  never  the  same;"  and 
the  soul  being  invisible,  must  always  be  the  same,  and  therefore  im- 
mortal. Again,  in  the  Banquet,  that  while  the  body  is  "  being  per- 
petually altered,"  and  even  manners,  morals,  opinions,  and  sciences 
change,  the  soul  abideth  forever ;  in  the  First  Aleibiades,  that  as  the 
user  of  tools  and  the  tools  are  difl^erent,  so  soul  and  body  are  differ- 
ent; in  the  Phcedrus,  declaring  "every  soul  is  immortal;"  in  the 
Pho'do  again,  that  pre-existence,  which  he  taught,  is  the  proof  of  im- 
mortality, and  that  future  punishment,  being  necessary,  could  not  be 
experienced  without  future  existence;  and  also  that  there  are  two 
kinds  of  things,  the  one  compounded,  the  other  simple.  The  com- 
pounded may  be  dissolved,  but  the  simple   is   indissoluble ;  the  soul. 


54  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

being  an  uncompounded  unit,  is  necessarily  immortal.  Again,  that 
the  soul  can  not  admit  the  "  contrary  of  life,"  which  is  death  ;  and 
in  the  Grito,  that  Socrates  dreamed  that  a  beautiful  woman  ap- 
proached him  and  said,  ' '  Three  days  hence  you  will  reach  fertile 
Phthia,"  and  Socrates's  almost  last  words,  "Catch  me,  if  you  can." 
These  are  the  merest  fragments  from  Plato,  but  sufficient  in  their 
amplified  form  to  justify  faith  in  immortality. 

With  the  faith  of  Plato  there  was  mingled  some  doubt,  which  is 
another  weakness  of  a  purely  philosophic  religion.  In  the  Plmdo  the 
parties  to  the  dialogue  appear  dissatisfied  with  Socrates's  argument  for 
immortality,  from  the  fact  that  the  soul  has  pre-existed,  and  Socrates 
does  not  remove  the  doubt.  Again,  the  analogy  between  a  weaver's 
garments  and  the  weaver  existing  long  after  they  have  perished,  and 
the  soul  existing  long  after  the  body  has  rotted,  Socrates  himself  ac^ 
knowledges  inconclusive  ;  and  yet  Plato  is  decidedly  committed  to  the 
doctrine  of  immortality.  The  tenth  book  of  his  Laws  carries  one  far 
tOAvard  a  convincing  and  intelligent  faith  in  the  docti-ine.  Without 
such  a  doctrine  there  is  no  room  for  any  eschatology ;  one  falls  with 
the  other,  it  is  the  other. 

Plato  introduces  the  subject  of  future  rewards  and  punishments  in 
the  Pluedo  by  saying,  ' '  I  entertain  a  good  hope  that  something  awaits 
those  who  die,  and  that,  as  was  said  long  since,  it  will  be  far  better 
for  the  good  than  the  evil."  On  future  rewards  he  is  not  altogether 
definite,  saying  he  hopes  "to  go  amongst  good  men,  though  I  would 
not  positively  assert  it ;  that,  however,  I  shall  go  amongst  gods,  who 
are  perfectly  good  masters,  be  assured  I  can  positively  assert  this,  if 
I  can  any  thing  of  the  kind."  Concerning  future  retributions,  he  is 
decisive ;  he  writes  like  a  divine  judge,  holding  them  over  the  guilty 
as  the  penalty  of  crime,  and  threatening  them  for  inferiority,  base- 
ness, ignorance,  and  stupidity.  Plato  borrows  the  doctrine  of  trans- 
migration from  Pythagoras,  and  incorporates  it  with  his  eschatology. 
He  speaks  of  Hades  and  the  invisible  world,  but  has  a  preference  for 
transmigration  ;  and  in  the  Phcedo  he  writes  of  transmigrated  souls 
loving  impurity  while  in  the  flesh,  wandering  like  shadow}'^  phantoms 
"amongst  monuments  and  tombs,"  and  others,  who  had  given  them- 
selves to  "gluttony  and  drinking,"  are  spoken  of  as  "  clothed  in  the 
form  of  asses  and  brutes."  Both  in  the  Phfedrus  and  Thecetetus  the 
doctrine  of  transmigration  is  clearly  announced,  somewhat  in  detail, 
as  a  soul  passes  into  the  life  of  a  beast,  a  man  passes  into  a  man 
again,  or  into  the  nature  of  woman  ;  and  in  any  event,  whatever  the 
extremely  wicked  soul's  lot  is,  in  beast  or  man,  it  remains  with  wings 
cut  off  for  ten  thousand  years,  and  can  have  no  hope  of  improvement 
until  the   expiration   of  that  period.     Others,  less  wicked  and  with 


SPIRIT  UA  LISM-P  URGA  TOR  Y.  55 

more  aspiration,  may  escape  the  imprisonment  at  the  end  of  three  thou- 
sand or  even  one  thousand  years.  In  the  Laws  he  insists  that  the  wicked 
after  death  "shall  come  back  hither  to  suffer  punishment  according  to 
nature  "  goino-  into  animals  or  men,  as  they  were  beastly  and  depraved. 

Accepting  transmigration  as  a  form  of  retribution,  Plato  logically 
veered  toward  a  most  pernicious  doctrine,  which,  considerably  modified 
or  expanded  in  these  days,  passes  by  the  name  of  spiritualism.  He 
did  not  formulate  Spiritualism,  but  its  germ  is  in  Transmigration, 
and  in  more  than  one  instance  Plato  relates  spiritualistic  phenomena. 
In  the  Second  Epistle  he  declares  that  the  dead  perceive  what  is  going 
on  here,  and  in  the  Seventh  Epistle  he  teaches  that  the  unjust  after 
death  rove  upon  the  earth  and  get  into  animals  and  persons.  In  the 
Eighth  Epistle  he  speaks  the  speech  of  the  departed  Dion,  as  if  in- 
spired by  him  to  speak  it ;  and  the  dialogue  entitled  Menexenm  is 
virtually  a  proclamation  of  Spiritualism.  The  seed  of  the  modern  de- 
lusion is  in  the  Platonic  system. 

In  addition  to  transmigration  Plato  refers  to  the  judgment  of  the 
departed,  especially  in  the  Gorgias,  before  Minos,  Rhadamanthus,  and 
jEacus,  who  sentence  the  good  to  the  "  isles  of  the  blessed,"  and  the 
wicked  to  Tartarus  ;  and  in  the  Phcedo  he  relates  the  old  fable  of  the 
four  rivers  on  the  earth,  among  them  the  River  Styx,  and  alludes  to 
lakes  and  Tartarus  as  the  abode  of  the  incurably  wicked.  Of  those 
whose  wickedness  is  curable  deliverance  from  Tartarus  may  be  ex- 
pected. This  is  the  purgatory  of  Plato,  the  seed  of  the  Catholic  doc- 
trine, and  the  germ  of  the  "  second-probation  "  idea  mooted  in  certain 
quarters  in  these  days.  Transmigration  and  Tartarus — these  are  the 
sign-words  of  the  eschatology  of  Plato. 

In  view  of  the  future  Plato  exhorts  in  the  Gorgias  to  holy  living 
while  on  the  earth  with  an  emphasis,  a  persuasion,  an  enthusiasm 
equal  to  any  thing  the  pulpit  ever  uttered,  and  not  less  earnest  is  he 
in  the  Phcedo  in  urging  an  immediate  care  of  the  soul.  The  doctrine 
that  the  future  life  will  be  determined  by  the  life  here  is  also  an- 
nounced in  the  Republic.  Plato  was  a  great  preacher,  an  exhorter  to 
righteousness,  as  necessary  to  a  happy  future. 

To  what  a  banquet  of  religious  ideas  Plato  invites  us !  Provi- 
dence, sacrifices,  prayers,  worships,  holiness,  spiritual  influence,  im- 
mortality— there  is  inspiration  in  these,  the  trend  thereof  is  upward ; 
transmigration,  spiritualism,  purgatory,  second  probation,  Tartarus — 
these  are  the  attenuated  extremes  of  philosophical  dreaming,  a  mix- 
ture of  fable,  superstition,  and  invention,  to  be  banished  both  from 
religion  and  philosophy.  The  ethical  system  of  Plato,  in  its  -concep- 
tions, provisions,  and  suggestions,  is  a  combination  of  truth  and  error ; 
the  religious  system  is  akin  to  it. 


66  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

Plato's  socialism,  or  the  governmental  idea,  is  as  distinct  and  well 
articulated  as  his  psychology  and  religion,  and  as  it  is  referred  to 
oftener  than  either,  it  deserves  more  than  a  passing  notice.  Full 
credit  has  not  been  given  to  all  his  teachings  on  a  subject  of 
such  vast  importance  ;  he  has  been  censured  because  misunderstood, 
and  not  condemned  sufficiently  when  understood.  This  department 
of  his  philosophy,  unlike  all  others,  is  eminently  practical;  it  is  a 
reduction  of  the  abstract  to  the  concrete,  or  an  application  of 
principles  to  common  life  ;  it  is  the  framework  of  a  new  system  of 
sociology.  He  rises  high  enough  to  say  in  the  First  Alcibiades  that 
States  possessing  virtue  do  not  need  walls,  ships,  and  docks,  a  senti- 
ment almost  parallel  with  that  more  ancient  one,  that  "righteous- 
ness exalte th  a  nation,  but  sin  is  a  reproach  to  any  people."  Sim- 
ilar is  his  utterance  in  the  Laws,  that  virtue  should  be  the  end  of 
law ;  and  emphatic  is  his  opposition  to  foreign  war,  and  that  more 
deadly  internal  contagion — sedition.  Order,  harmony,  obedience  to 
law,  philosophical  truth,  education,  and  virtue  he  considers  essential 
to  good  government,  subordinating  every  thing  to  their  attainment. 
Such  is  his  notion  of  the  importance  of  the  State  that  he  exalts  it 
above  individual  right,  regulating  human  liberty,  personal  aims  and 
ambitions,  and  all  things  belonging  to  the  individual,  in  the  interest 
of  the  government,  submerging  individualism  in  the  governmental 
purpose.  He  says  in  the  Laws,  "  Neither  yourselves  are  your  own 
property,  nor  this  substance  of  yours,"  but  yourselves,  substance  and 
families  belong  to  the  State.  Paul  echoes  Plato's  sentiment  so  far  as 
to  say,  "  Ye  are  not  your  own,"  but  he  differs  in  placing  the  owner's 
life  of  man  not  in  the  State,  but  in  God.  God  owns  every  man  ;  the 
State  owns  nobody.  This  is  the  difference  between  them,  a  difference 
that  will  strikingly  manifest  itself  in  the  elucidation  of  socialistic  phil- 
osophy and  Christianity,  for  it  is  the  key-note  of  both. 

Plato's  Republic  is  interpreted  as  an  ideal  State,  in  contrast  with 
the  then  existing  government  of  Athens,  which  the  philosopher  con- 
ceived to  be  corrupt,  and  which  he  thoroughly  hated.  Discovering 
the  weaknesses  of  popular  government,  whether  as  a  tyranny  or  de- 
mocracy, he  assigned  himself  the  task  of  framing  a  government  which 
should  embody  the  best  political  conceptions,  and  be  a  model  to  the 
nations  after  him.  The  Republic  was  accordingly  written,  ostensibly 
as  an  ideal  conception,  but  as  a  covert  rebuke  of  the  prevailing  city 
government.  Later  in  life  the  Laws  appeared,  as  a  supplemental  de- 
velopment of  the  Re-public.  The  Republic  is  ideal ;  the  Laws  are 
concrete,  practical.  The  one  deals  in  moral  principles ;  the  other  in 
legal  forms  and  penalties.  The  one  is  the  constitution  ;  the  other 
the    statute-book.      To    these    we    must   look    for    principles,    laws, 


POLITICAL  GOVERNMENT.  57 

and  expositions  of  the  governmental  idea,  which  in  Plato  is  a  singu- 
lar conglomeration  of  ethical  virtues  and  social  aberrations,  a  mix- 
ture of  health  and  disease  in  the  body  politic. 

Of  first  importance  is  the  form  of  political  government.  He 
enumerates  in  the  Statesman  three  definite  polities — monarchy,  aris- 
tocracy, and  democracy — out  of  which,  bisecting,  he  produces  six  ; 
but,  whatever  the  bisected  form,  he  leans  in  his  preferences  toward 
monarchy  "  as  the  best  of  the  six  polities."  The  same  preference  is 
expressed  in  his  Fifth  Epistle,  in  which  he  says:  "There  is  a  voice 
from  each  form  of  polity,  as  it  were  from  certain  animals,  one  from 
a  democracy,  another  from  an  oligarchy,  and  another  again  from  a 
monarchy.  Veiy  many  persons  assert  that  they  understand  these 
voices ;  but  except  a  few,  they  are  very  far  from  understanding 
them."  The  "voice"  of  the  monarchy  is  pleasant  in  his  ears. 
"  There  are,"  he  says  in  the  Laws,  "  two  mothers  of  polities,"  from 
which  all  others  are  produced,  monarchy  and  democracy  ;  but  he 
criticises  the  extreme  form  of  each,  adding  that  a  mixture  of  both 
forms  is  preferable.  Notwithstanding  this  advocacy  of  a  milder  mon- 
archy than  appears  in  the  Statesman  and  Republic,  certain  it  is  his 
leanings  were  toward  a  high-toned  government,  either  as  an  aris- 
tocracy or  monarchy  ;  for  it  was  his  repudiation  of  democracy  in 
Athens,  and  the  indorsement  of  the  reign  of  the  Tyrants,  that  made 
him  unpopular  and  compelled  his  exile. 

It  is  in  the  Republic  that,  quoting  an  old  fable,  he  intimates  that 
in  the  forming  of  men  the  Deity  mixed  gold  with  some,  fitting  them 
for  governors :  silver  with  others,  intending  them  to  be  soldiers ;  iron 
and  brass  with  others,  designing  them  to  be  craftsmen  and  husband- 
men. This  is  a  square  affiirmation  of  the  natural  inequality  of  men, 
on  which  is  predicated  the  righteousness  of  caste,  which  Plato  empha- 
sized with  earnestness,  and  introduced  into  the  ideal  State.  The 
higher  and  the  lower  must  be  recognized  in  humanity  ;  society  must 
be  organized,  not  on  the  unities  or  resemblances  even,  but  on  the 
differences  in  men.  Inequality  in  a  sense  is  admitted,  but  in  Plato's 
sense  it  is  the  essence  of  inextinguishable  social  dissonance,  the  fixing 
of  permanent  barriers  or  walls  of  partition,  that  ought  to  be  broken 
down.  In  the  Menexenus,  relaxing  the  caste  spix'it,  Plato  espouses  the 
thought  of  equality  in  a  masterly  manner,  aflSrming  that  all  are  born 
as  brethren,  having  "one  mother,"  and  that  they  are  "neither  the 
slaves  nor  the  lords  of  each  other."  But  he  was  in  a  tender  mood  while 
writing  this  humane  sentiment,  for  he  was  thinking  of  the  dead,  and 
the  shadow  of  the  sepulcher  was  upon  him.  The  grave  always  hal- 
lows the  doctrine  of  equality.  He  is  in  another  mood  while  fram- 
ing laws. 


58  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

Holding  to  caste,  it  is  not  surprising  that  he  excludes  diseased 
men  from  his  ideal  State ;  he  insists  that  they  ought  to  die.  Chris- 
tianity would  introduce  the  physician,  the  nurse,  the  hospital,  the 
asylum,  but  none  of  these  auxiliaries  to  human  comfort  are  wanted 
in  his  republic.  Herodicus  he  censures  for  propping  himself  with 
drugs,  lengthening  out  his  life,  and  procuring  a  lingering  death. 
Healthy  men,  who  die  of  extreme  old  age,  are  wanted  in  his  repub- 
lic. This  offends  the  sympathetic  spirit  in  man,  paralyzes  philan- 
thropy, suppresses  aspiration,  and  strikes  at  a  majority  of  man- 
kind. The  doctrine  is  as  odious  as  it  is  un fraternal,  and  pernicious 
as  it  is  unkind. 

Neither  aristocracy  nor  caste  is  the  worst  feature  in  the  socialism  of 
Plato ;  neither  constitutes  the  esprit  de  corps  of  socialism.  Both,  however, 
are  preparatory  steps  to  it.  Plato  locates  the  ideal  republic  outside 
of  Athens,  in  a  beautiful  country,  with  a  single  city  at  its  center,  the 
whole  being  walled,  and  safe  from  attack,  both  from  without  and  within. 
The  number  of  families  within  the  walls  must  not  exceed  five  thou- 
sand and  forty,  all  of  whom  shall  be  loyal  to  the  governmental  pur- 
pose, and  in  sympathy  with  ideal  ends.  In  view  of  death  and 
immigration,  the  exact  number  of  families  may  be  difficult  to  pre- 
serve, but  it  must  be  attempted  at  all  hazards,  as  Plato  considers  a 
small  republic  more  likely  to  fulfill  its  mission  than  a  large  one.  In 
this  protected  city  certain  governmental  conditions,  primary  to  all 
governments,  must  be  observed ;  as  the  conditions  of  suffrage,  the 
tenure  of  office-holding,  the  number  of  offices,  the  duties  of  officers, 
which  Plato  enumerates  with  appropriate  circumstantiality.  As  the 
subject  of  foreign  relations  can  not  be  ignored,  since  other  nations 
exist,  and  some  are  contiguous,  Plato  establishes  laws  relating  to 
naturalization,  and  the  surceasing  of  citizenship,  and  enacts  free  trade 
in  extenso  by  forbidding  the  payment  of  duty  on  imports  and  exports; 
that  is,  no  revenue  whatever  shall  be  obtained  from  international 
trade. 

Touching  internal  social  relations,  the  core  of  the  socialistic  spirit, 
he  advocates  compulsory  marriage  for  the  sake  of  the  immortality  of 
the  race,  a  not  inconsequential  consideration  ;  but  in  the  ideal  society 
marriage  is  abandoned  for  the  good  of  the  State.  What  is  called 
free-loveism  in  these  days  supersedes  the  sacred  idea  of  marriage ; 
home  is  blotted  out;  parental  and  filial  relations  are  unknown; 
children  are  foundlings,  handed  over  to  the  care  of  the  State ;  and 
the  family  perishes.  Plato  quotes  the  communism  of  birds  and  ani- 
mals, as  chaste  and  safe,  in  defense  of  the  idea  as  applied  to  human 
society,  and  insists  that  it  will  result  in  the  procreation  of  a  higher- 
generation  of  men  and  women. 


PLATO  ESTIMATED.  59 

The  advocacy  of  the  communism  of  property  naturally  follows. 
The  assignment  of  land  to  the  individual  is  by  the  government,  for 
the  sake  of  the  government ;  title  to  land  is  not  acquired ;  shares  in 
profits  are  forbidden;  each  lives,  labors,  sutlers,  and  dies  for  the 
whole.  Abnegation  of  proprietary  rights  is  the  imperative  condition 
of  mutual  support  and  general  prosperity.  Without  further  elucida- 
tion, this  is  Plato's  social  idealism.  Among  its  best  elements,  it  in- 
cludes order,  education,  virtue  ;  on  the  other  side  are  state-ownership, 
monarchy,  caste,  free  trade,  community  of  women,  and  community 
of  property.  Both  elements  can  not  co-exist;  education  and  caste 
are  antagonistic,  virtue  and  extinct  homes  do  not  abide  together. 
The  socialism  of  Plato  means  the  dismemberment  of  society  ;  the  ideal 
State  means  the  degradation  of  man. 

In  Athens  his  governmental  ideas  were  never  enforced  ;  in  Sicily 
he  undertook  a  reformation  of  the  government,  but  failed. 

Having  considered  Plato's  philosophy  in  its  details,  it  remains  to 
consider  his  relation  to  philosophy  in  general,  or  to  estimate  Plato's 
place  in  history  and  his  services  to  mankind.  What  is  permanent  in 
Plato  and  what  transient,  what  superior  or  imperishable,  and  what 
inferior  or  evanescent,  whether  he  was  born  for  his  age  or  all  ages ; 
this  is  an  inquiry  that  can  not  be  omitted.  Without  controversy,  he 
was  abundant  in  labor,  and  lived  to  propagate  ideas  that  are  funda- 
mental, and  which  have  entered  into  the  philosophies  and  religions 
of  the  world.  To  understand  these  ideas,  it  is  not  absolutely  neces- 
sary to  understand  the  times  in  which  he  lived,  or  the  philosophies 
that  prevailed,  or  the  religions  that  held  sway  over  the  common  mind, 
for  they  are  not  the  product  of  his  age,  but  belong  to  all  ages.  Other 
ideas,  not  fundamental  or  universal,  take  their  coloring  from  his  age, 
and  belong  to  it.  To  understand  these  the  age  must  be  understood. 
That  is  to  say,  what  is  accidental,  inferior,  evanescent,  in  Plato,  is  the 
result  of  the  influence  of  the  age  on  Plato ;  what  is  permanent  and  im- 
perishable is  outside  of  that  influence.  In  many  respects  he  stood  out 
from  his  age,  because  he  stood  against  it  and  condemned  it. 

Asa  man,  he  had  his  weaknesses;  he  lacked  the  fortitude  w^ith 
which  he  clothes  the  ideal  man  ;  he  authorized  the  worship  of  the 
gods  without  having  a  personal  faith  in  them  ;  he  was  aristocratic  in 
instinct ;  he  hated  democracy ;  he  retired  from  public  affairs,  and 
virtually  abjured  his  citizenship. 

His  philosophy  is  burdened  with  weaknesses,  plain  and  palpable ; 
its  effects  in  some  directions  have  been  injurious,  undermining  the 
order  of  society ;  its  virtues  are  of  definite  value,  and  worthy  of  re- 
nown. To  specify  the  varied  results  of  Plato's  career,  we  shall  con- 
sider, first,  Plato  as  a  wiiter;  second,  Plato  as   a   philosopher;  third, 


60  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

Plato  as  a  moral  teacher;  fourth,  Plato  as  a  socialist;  fifth,  Plato  as 
a  forerunner  of  Christianity ;  sixth,  the  need  of  Christianity  demon- 
strated by  the  Platonic  system. 

As  a  writer,  composer,  and  thinker,  Plato  had  not  an  equal  among 
his  contemporaries,  and  it  is  doubtful  if,  since  his  day,  any  one  has  ap- 
peared who  has  excelled  him  in  the  art  of  composition.  Both  in 
the  art  of  thinking  and  the  art  of  expression  he  certainly  is  a  model. 
For  intensity  of  thought,  subtlety  of  apprehension,  sublimity  of  in- 
quiry, persistence  in  analysis,  accuracy  of  dialectical  statement,  and 
elegance  in  representation,  he  is  both  superior  and  inspiring.  It  is 
not  the  dialogue  form  of  discourse  which  he  preferred  that  is  com- 
mended, but  the  style  itself,  which  is  clear,  definite,  logical,  illustra- 
tive, and  conclusive.  He  wrote  in  Attic  Greek,  the  language  of 
Pericles  and  Demosthenes,  itself  a  pure  and  finished  language,  a  ve- 
hicle for  sublime  thoughts  and  inquiries.  He  was  an  earnest  inquirer 
for  truth,  definitely  expressing  what  he  desired  to  know,  if  he  failed 
in  finding  the  knowledge  itself.  He  asked  questions — he  was  some- 
times slow  to  affirm  until  the  foundations  of  an  answer  had  been  well 
laid  in  investigation  and  comparison.  He  does  not  write,  therefore, 
in  a  positive  and  affirmative  way,  but  as  if  searching  for  a  path  for 
his  feet ;  walking  along,  at  times,  as  if  his  lantern  had  gone  out,  as 
it  had.  Besides  the  perspicuity,  the  elegance,  and  the  logical  strength 
of  his  compositions,  there  is  a  personal  tone  in  every  dialogue  that 
wins  the  sympathy  of  the  reader.  He  does  not  write  as  if  building 
a  system  of  truth  for  others,  but  as  if  in  eager  search  for  the  truth 
for  himself.  He  is  not  a  revealer,  he  is  a  seeker,  and  writes  accord- 
ingly. Understanding  Plato's  purpose,  it  is  easy  to  understand  his 
style. 

Lewes,  always  underrating  Plato,  pronounces  him  a  "  very  diflS- 
cult  and  somewhat  repulsive  writer ; "  and  Jowett,  so  far  as  the 
Timceus  is  concerned,  reiterates  the  criticism.  To  Plato,  as  a  writer, 
the  criticism  does  not  apply ;  it  is  crudely  unjust.  A  paragraph  now 
and  then,  as  in  the  Phmdrm  or  Euthydemus,  may  be  open  to  such 
objection,  but  what  writer  has  not  produced  objectionable  paragraphs? 
Shakespeare  is  not  exempt  from  such  criticism.  Not  Plato's  paragraphs, 
but  Plato's  works,  must  aflTord  the  basis  for  critical  judgment;  and 
on  that  basis  the  critics  must  be  silent.  Lewes  likewise  insinuates 
that  Plato  is  indefinite,  confirming  his  report  by  the  statement  of 
Cicero  that  he  leaves  many  questions  undetermined.  No  one  disputes 
that  many  discussions  in  Plato  are  inconclusive,  that  he  does  not  an- 
SAver  serious  inquiries,  as  that  concerning  holiness ;  but  Plato  failed 
on  such  subjects  because  he  did  not  know  the  truth.  He  is  incon- 
clusive, but  not  indefinite.     He  seeks,  but,  as  Schleiermacher  points 


PLATO  THE  WRITER.  61 

out,  does  not  arrive  at  truth.  When  Diogenes  Laertius  reports  that 
Plato  is  uuiutelligible  to  the  ignorant,  the  statement  can  not  be  con- 
tradicted;  but  Kepler's  astronomical  researches,  Bacon's  scientific 
data,  and  Kant's  rational  criticisms,  are  even  more  unintelligible  to 
the  ignorant  than  Plato's  cosmogony  or  ethics. 

It  may  be  truly  charged  against  Plato  that  he  is  an  inconsistent 
writer,  contradicting  in  one  dialogue  what  he  affirms  in  another, 
thereby  confusing  and  unsettling  the  mind  of  the  reader.  The  fol- 
lowing are  examples  :  in  the  3Ieno  he  holds  that  virtue  can  not  be 
taught,  but  in  the  Clitopho  he  expresses  an  opposite  opinion  ;  in  the 
Phcedo  he  proves  the  doctrine  of  reminiscence,  but  in  the  Statesman 
he  speaks  of  ancestors  who  "had  no  recollection  of  former  events,"  a 
virtual  denial  of  pre-existence ;  again,  in  the  Statesman  he  both  ad- 
vises and  condemns  written  statutes  and  customs,  leaving  it  undeter- 
mined which  is  better  for  the  State ;  in  the  TimcBus  he  vindicates  the 
freedom  of  the  will,  while  in  the  Hippias  Minor  he  appears  like  a 
fatalist.  These,  however,  are  examples  of  inconsistency  in  thinking, 
not  contradictions  in  writing ;  they  are  not  blemishes  of  composition. 

The  same  answer  may  be  made  with  respect  to  the  charge  that 
there  is  a  want  of  method  in  Plato's  literary  work ;  even  if  true,  it 
does  not  apply  to  style  of  expression  or  composition  ;  if  true,  it  ap- 
plies to  Plato's  conception  of  his  work,  not  to  its  execution.  Plato's 
literary  thought  is  one  thing,  the  literary  execution  is  another. 
Moreover,  as  want  of  method,  or  absence  of  system,  has  been  charged 
against  his  philosophy,  it  is  possible  that  the  critic  has  transferred  the 
objection  to  the  literary  work  of  Plato;  but  whatever  objection  is 
made  to  his  philosophy,  or  to  his  literary  plans  and  methods,  it  does 
not  apply  to  Plato  as  a  writer. 

Singularly  enough,  Plato  condemned  writing,  but  only  in  a  philo- 
sophical sense,  saying  that  it  is  the  "grave  of  thought,"  which 
Talleyrand  metamorphosed  into  the  form  that  language  is  employed 
by  men  for  the  purpose  of  concealing  their  ideas.  Practically,  Plato 
believed  in  writing ;  he  wrote — and  died  with  pen  in  hand. 

We  next  estimate  Plato  as  a  philosopher.  Compared  with  the 
philosophers  of  his  own  time,  or  from  the  time  of  Thales  to  that  of 
Christ,  there  was  none  greater.  None  dealt  with  so  many  problems, 
and  none  elaborated  more  fully  or  saw  so  deeply  into  divine  mysteries. 
Of  the  ancient  philosophies,  we  must  accept  Plato's  as  superior  to  all 
others,  whether  we  consider  his  theology,  which  was  in  advance  of 
others ;  or  his  cosmogony,  which  was  clearer  than  any  ;  or  his  ethics, 
which,  however  defective,  partook  of  the  spirit  of  the  times,  and  had 
been  better  had  the  public  religion  been  different.  In  these  particulars 
Plato,  like  Saul  of  old,  is  head  and  shoulders  above  the  academicians. 


62  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

However,  it  is  not  so  much  with  reference  to  the  comparative 
value  of  his  teachings  in  that  day,  as  it  is  with  reference  to  their 
value  compared  with  modern  philosophy,  that  his  philosophy  is  now 
considered.  Is  Plato  of  any  value  now,  or  has  he  been  superseded  by 
philosophers  who,  in  the  light  of  discovery  and  Christianity,  see 
farther  and  deeper  into  divine  mysteries  ?  The  death-knell  of  nearly 
all  the  old  philosophies  Christianity  sounded,  as  soon  as  it  was 
preached,  and  they  were  rolled  up  as  a  scroll,  and  laid  away.  Plato's 
for  the  time  went  the  way  of  all  the  rest.  Epicurus  and  Zeno — the 
philosophy  of  the  porch — superseded  that  of  the  academy,  showing 
that  the  rationalism  of  Plato  had  not  changed  the  public  faith,  or 
rooted  itself  in  civil  affairs.  Mythology  reigned  in  Athens  when 
Paul  visited  the  city,  and  the  Epicurean  philosophy  was  in  the 
ascendant.  The  Stoics  Paul  mentions ;  of  Plato  he  says  nothing. 
Neoplatouism  was  the  attempt  to  unite  Christianity  and  Platonism, 
or  Christ  and  Plato,  but  it  failed. 

Until  the  sixteenth  century  of  our  era  Plato  is  unknown  as  an 
intellectual  force,  his  philosophy  is  without  influence,  idealism  has 
perished.  With  the  revival  of  letters,  he  rallies  from  the  grave,  and 
asks  again  to  be  heard,  and  is  heard.  Whatever  is  good  in  Plato,  as 
well  as  Avhatever  is  evil,  whether  idealism  or  agnosticism,  rationalism 
or  materialism,  theology  or  ethical  science,  is  re-echoed  in  the  circles 
of  modern  thinkers,  modified,  abbreviated,  or  amplified,  as  the  thinkers 
prefer,  but  retaining  the  spirit  of  the  old  academy.  Sometimes  the 
Platonism  in  modern  philosophy  assumes  a  disguised  appearance,  but 
it  is  there,  the  core  of  modern  philosophic  thought,  in  one  form 
or  another.  Nothing  new  has  been  announced  by  the  peripatetics  of 
the  nineteenth  century.  Take  idealism  as  the  highest  type  of 
philosophy.  Neither  Hegel  nor  Kant,  nor  any  philosopher  of 
modern  times,  has  improved  on  Plato,  either  in  beauty  or  originality 
of  idea,  or  clearness  an^  fitness  of  expression.  To  be  sure,  the  ideal- 
ism of  Plato  is  not  without  blemish,  but  with  all  its  weaknesses,  it  car- 
ries unaided  human  thought  up  to  the  heights  of  belief  in  a  personal 
God,  which  is  suflficient  atonement  for  its  mistakes.  Of  modern  ideal- 
ism, not  so  much  can  be  said  in  itsiavor.  Leibnitz  is  not  as  rational 
an  idealist  as  Plato.  Plato  gives  us  a  lofty  idea  of  God.  Kant  tells 
us  that,  by  the  theoretical  reason  alone,  God's  existence  can  not  be 
demonstrated  ;  Plato  annuls  the  Kantian  presumption  by  demonstrat- 
ing the  existence  of  God.  Plato  may  not  have  apprehended  the  two 
reasons  as  Kant  discriminates  them,  but  he  saw  the  way  to  God 
through  the  total  reason  of  the  soul,  and  proclaimed  him.  In  him 
the  idea  of  God  as  a  being  of  goodness,  holiness,  and  immortality  is 
expanded  into  beautiful  proportions,  proving  that  a  rational  philoso- 


ORIGINAL  DISCOVERIES.  63 

pher  may  go  farther  than  to  conclude  that  there  is  a  divine  being ; 
he  may  declare  his  attributes.  The  Eleatics  pronounced  in  favor  of 
being,  but  it  was  left  to  Plato  to  distinguish  between  unchangeable 
being  and  changeable  phenomena  or  non-being.  Separating  the  two, 
Plato  assigned  to  each  a  specific  character ;  the  study  of  being  leading 
him  to  the  thought  of  the  divine  attributes,  of  providence,  of  govern- 
ment, and  of  the  spiritual  sphere;  the  study  of  non-being  leading 
to  the  investigation  of  natural  principles,  and  the  relation  of  God 
and  the  universe.  From  the  thought  of  God,  Plato  passed  to  an  in- 
quiry respecting  the  soul,  which  he  distinguished  from  the  body,  pro- 
nouncing it  both  spiritual  and  immortal.  Plato  was  the  first  philosopher 
to  demonstrate  the  immortality  of  the  soxd,  as  he  was  the  first  to  demonstrate 
the  existence  of  a  personal  God,  or  the  Creator  of  the  universe. 

As  respects  the  Platonic  cosmogony,  what  modern  philosopher  has 
excelled  it?  Some  there  are  who,  like  Comte,  have  denied  the  evi- 
dence of  design  or  final  cause  in  nature,  but  Plato  reduces  the  whole 
subject  to  this  form:  motion  implies  a  mover;  and  all  modern  expres- 
sions, such  as  design  implies  a  designer,  and  contrivance  a  contriver, 
are  built  upon  the  Platonic  apothegm.  Not  half  as  mysterious  as 
Heraclitus,  with  his  theory  of  flux,  which  he  illuminates  and  accepts, 
nor  half  as  confusing  as  the  moderns,  with  their  theories  of  bioplasm 
and  atomic  revolutions,  he  reduces  the  primitive  elements  to  four: 
earth,  air,  fire,  and  water,  with  which  the  Creator  builds  the  uni- 
verse. The  moderns  talk  of  the  convertibility  of  one  thing  into 
another,  as  heat  into  light  and  light  into  heat,  a  theory  that  Plato 
announced  in  the  Tiynceus  with  as  much  clearness  as  it  is  now 
declared. 

The  theory  of  evolution  Plato  anticipates  in  the  Laws,  and  Sweden- 
borg  found  "contraries"  and  "similars,"  or  the  theory  of  corespond- 
ence,  in  the  same  volumes.  In  these  particulars  Plato  is  the  original 
philosopher,  the  discoverer  of  first  cosmological  principles,  which  the 
moderns  have  appropriated  and  wrested  to  their  destruction.  Aristotle 
assailed  the  political  opinions  of  Plato ;  his  ethical  system  we  assail  as 
thoroughly  weak  and  inadequate;  but  his  philosophical  conceptions 
of  God  and  the  universe  are  almost  invulnerable;  as  speculations, 
they  are  apparently  divine.  As  I'espects  philosophy  itself,  Plato 
divided  it  into  dialectics,  metaphysics,  and  ethics,  a  division  com- 
prehending all  the  subjects  which  should  engage  the  philosopher's 
attention. 

He  was  the  first  to  make  such  a  classification ;  it  is  not  clear  that 
it  has  been  improved  by  any  subsequent  attempt.  It  assigned  special 
tasks  and  definite  limits  to  the  philosophical  pursuit,  having  illustra- 
tion in  Plato  himself 


64  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

Prior  to  Plato,  philosophy  was  without  a  language  of  its  own; 
but  it  needs  a  language  as  much  as  chemistry  or  physiology,  and  he 
was  the  first  to  suggest  a  form  of  sound  words,  to  which  the  ages 
have  contributed  their  stock,  and  a  philosophical  language  is  the  re- 
sult. In  the  Cratylus  he  discusses  the  propriety  of  names,  answering 
that  common  question,  what  is  in  a  name?  He  shows  that  the  name 
must  be  the  sign  of  the  idea,  that  the  name  should  have  value,  and 
that  great  truths  must  have  proper  expression.  In  this  respect  he  is 
both  a  nominalist  and  a  realist,  believing  in  realities  and  in  names 
suited  to  them.  He  is  not  a  nominalist  in  the  sense  that  there  is 
nothing  in  a  name,  but  that  it  represents  value,  or  truth,  or  fact,  in 
this  way  showing  the  importance  of  a  philosophical  language  and 
laying  the  foundations  for  such  a  language. 

As  a  psychologist  he  was  the  first  to  announce  the  spirit  of  iden- 
tity and  contradiction  as  a  law  of  thought,  than  which  a  more  im- 
portant discovery  he  did  not  make ;  he  also  distinguished  between 
sensation  and  perception,  sensation  and  cognition,  sensation  and  vo- 
lition, regarding  sensation  as  an  external  preliminary  to  internal 
intellectual  movement,  but  not  as  absolutely  essential ;  he  distinguished, 
likewise,  between  analysis  and  synthesis  as  modes  of  investigation, 
employing  both  himself,  but  evidently  preferring  the  former ;  he  dis- 
tinguished between  the  universal  and  the  particular,  the  contingent 
and  the  necessary,  applying  these  especially  in  cosmological  and  theo- 
logical discussions.  The  elder  Mill  was  captivated  by  these  classifica- 
tions, and  Bacon  was  aided  in  scientific  pursuit  by  observing  them. 
He  is  a  rational,  in  opposition  to  the  empirical,  psychologist.  In  this 
sense  he  is  a  rationalist:  he  believes  in  the  dominion  of  the  reason; 
he  reasons,  but  the  idea  is  the  product  of  the  reason.  Hence,  he  is 
an  ideologist.  Psychology  is  the  mother  of  ideology.  Coleridge  was 
inspired  by  the  idealities  of  Plato,  and  Hegel  became  fanatical  over 
them.  From  Plato,  psychology,  rationalism,  and  idealism  emerged, 
as  the  necessary  products  of  his  system. 

Plato  was  a  sincere  investigator  of  truth.  Sometimes  spoken  of  as 
an  "ironical  philosopher,"  since  he  employed  irony  in  the  refutation  of 
an  error,  one  of  his  chief  characteristics  was  the  intense  sincerity  of 
his  purpose  to  find  the  truth.  With  Plato,  sophistry  in  reasoning 
ended.  He  brought  the  Sophists  to  a  stand-still ;  more,  he  annihilated 
the  brood.  He  compelled  seriousness  in  investigation,  and  made 
truth  the  object  of  investigation.  He  gave  aim  to  philosophy. 
Earnest,  sensitive  to  knowledge,  acutely  anxious  for  truth  himself,  he 
stimulated  others  to  inquiry ;  he  excited  thought,  and  then  directed  it 
into  proper  channels.  Sincerity  and  stimulation  are  among  the  effects 
of  Plato's  teaching. 


DATA  OF  ETHICS.  65 

The  philosophical  Plato,  whether  studied  as  a  theologian  or  cos- 
mologist,  as  a  classifier  of  philosophy,  as  an  originator  of  philo- 
sophical language,  as  a  psychologist,  or  as  a  sincere  and  stimulating 
investigator,  is  reproducing  himself  in  the  philosophies  of  modern 
times,  affecting  the  speculative  spirit,  and  stimulating  inquiry  more 
than  all  the  ancients  combined.  In  him  is  the  root  of  philosophical 
truth.  Along  with  the  truths  he  announced,  half-truths  and  errors 
also  made  an  appearauce,  and  these  also  are  bearing  fruit  in  the 
speculative  systems  of  the  thinkers.  Thus  both  the  weakness  and  the 
strength  of  Plato  have  shared  the  immortality  which  properly  be- 
longs to  truth  alone. 

Next,  his  influence  as  an  ethical  teacher  must  be  considered. 
His  data  of  ethics  are  clearly  insufiicient  for  a  system  of  ethics.  He 
advocates  the  principles  of  justice,  denounces  the  poets  for  their 
falsehoods,  and  forbids  drunkenness  in  his  republic ;  but,  notwithstand- 
ing the  high  ethical  aim  of  some  of  his  teachings,  he  holds  to  views 
that  in  their  very  nature  prevent  the  attainment  of  good,  and  so  the 
whole  system  falls  to  the  ground.  In  a  spirit  of  self-flattery,  he  con- 
cedes to  man  a  voluntary  love  of  good  and  a  natural  abhorrence  of 
evil,  and  appoints  education  as  the  remedy  for  the  world's  evil.  The 
unfitness  of  the  remedy  grows  out  of  an  ignorance  of  the  disease. 
The  disease  is  spiritual ;  the  remedy  must  be  spiritual  also,  but  Plato's 
is  intellectual.  It  is  as  if  a  remedy  for  defective  hearing  were  pre- 
scribed for  defective  eyes.  Plato  regarded  vice  as  an  intellectual 
aberration,  and  ignorance  as  the  great  disease,  for  the  cure  of  which 
intellectual  development  is  sufficient. 

Without  discussing  this  further,  and  yet  insisting  that  in  any  sys- 
tem of  ethics  the  remedy  must  be  proportioned  to  the  disease,  we  are 
warranted  in  saying  that  Plato's  voice  is  still  heard  in  the  modern 
systems  of  philosophic  ethics.  The  remedy  for  evil  is  edtication. 
Herbert  Spencer  has  not  advanced  beyond  Plato  in  his  ethical 
teaching.  Spencer  is  in  favor  of  scientific,  in  opposition  to  super- 
naturalistic,  morality ;  he  advocates  a  rational,  not  a  religious,  basis, 
for  ethics.  Plato's  scheme  failed,  and  Spencer's  is  the  stupendous 
failure  of  the  nineteenth  century. 

As  a  social  teacher,  or  a  socialist,  Plato  stands  in  a  condemnatory 
attitude,  having  given  birth  to  theories  and  proclaimed  ideas  which 
are  re-appearing  in  the  socialism,  nihilism,  and  communism  that  now 
threaten  the  existence  of  public  order,  if  not  of  society  itself.  All 
the  dangerous  social  doctrines  impregnating  and  agitating  modern 
society  are  the  echoes  of  the  Platonic  system,  which,  however,  was 
ideal  and  never  put  into  practice.  One  would  scarcely  believe  that 
a  philosopher  like  Plato  would  be  found  on  the  side  of  what  is  evi- 

5 


66  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

dently  corrupting,  disintegrating,  and  abhorrent ;  but  it  is  so.  In 
the  Republic  he  is  the  open  advocate  of  a  community  of  women, 
guarded  by  certain  restrictions  and  established  for  ideal  or  philosophic 
ends.  To  these  ends  we  call  special  attention.  He  holds  that  the 
guardians  or  rulers  in  his  ref)ublic  are  the  best  men  in  it ;  physically 
they  are  without  a  blemish,  having  subjected  themselves  to  hygienic 
discipline;  intellectually,  they  are  scholars,  statesmen,  philosophers, 
and  represent  the  highest  manhood.  It  is  equally  ira2:)ortant  that 
certain  women,  well-endowed  and  handsome,  shall  pass  through  the 
same  preparatory  experiences  and  discipline,  becoming  healthy,  in- 
tellectual, and  the  fit  associates  for  the  best  men.  These  two  best 
classes  he  would  throw  together  promiscuously  for  the  procreation  of 
the  bed  children  in  the  republic,  securing  a  generation  of  noblest 
men  and  women,  but  at  the  expense  of  conjugal  and  filial  relations. 
He  would  permit  marriage  between  the  upper  classes,  but  not  as  a 
necessity,  and,  when  a  marriage  has  been  celebrated,  the  children  of 
such  parents  are  not  to  know  their  parents,  nor  the  parents  the 
children.  It  is  a  community  organized  for  the  State,  in  which  person- 
ality is  undefined  and  relationship  obscured. 

Now,  the  end  may  appear  good,  but  the  means  are  too  expensive. 
It  is  the  end  that  controls  in  the  breeding  of  sporting  dogs,  birds,  and 
horses,  just  as  Plato  cites ;  and  he  would  establish  society  upon  a  similar — 
that  is,  an  animal — basis.     The  following  facts  we  quote  against  it : 

1.  In  Europe  royal  families  have  confined  marriages  within  their 
limits,  or  if  the  high  contracting  parties  go  outside,  and  a  morganatic 
marriage  is  established,  it  is  held  in  disrepute,  and  the  royal  descend- 
ant suffers  disinheritance  and  social  penalty.  What  has  been  the 
consequence  ?  Are  the  children  of  kings  any  better  than  others  ? 
Lunacy  and  imbecility,  the  dreadful  fruits  of  violated  consanguinity 
and  intemperance  and  crime,  make  up  a  not  inconsiderable  portion 
of  the  history  of  royal  families,  overthrowing  the  royal  principle  of 
Plato,  which,  carried  out  in  its  details  as  he  has  prescribed,  is  only 
another  name  for  free-loveism. 

2.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  best  men  and  women  may  be  found 
outside  the  royal  lines.  Reformers,  poets,  philosophers,  physicians, 
theologians,  and  statesmen,  eminent  and  useful,  have  emerged  from 
poverty,  obscurity,  and  degradation.  Often  the  jewel  is  found  in  a 
pig-sty.  God  lifts  one  from  the  dunghill  to  the  throne.  In  the 
round-about  way  of  marriage  between  lower  and  higher  classes  the 
world's  gradual  elevation  will  be  secured  ;  if  at  times  the  blood  of  the 
best  is  vitiated  by  this  method,  the  blood  of  the  base  is  purified.  Al- 
ready the  signs  of  a  race-improvement  are  visible ;  it  is  a  historic  fact 
that  the  man  of  the  nineteenth  century  is  in  advance  of  the  man  of 


PLATONIC  SOCIALISM.  67 

the  first  century.  Ours  is  not  a  race  of  prize-fighters  or  Olympic  run- 
ners, but  in  longevity,  beauty  of  form,  health,  physical  skill,  and  all 
the  essentials  of  physical  nobleness,  the  race  is  far  in  advance  of  what 
it  was  in  Plato's  time  ;  and  this  improvement  and  prophecy  of  still 
larger  development  is  the  result  of  evolution,  through  the  intermin- 
gling and  wedding  of  all  classes,  rather  than  their  separation.  Plato's 
plan  must  result  in  the  fixed  division  of  the  race  into  upper  and  lower 
classes,  the  best  and  the  worst,  with  no  hope  of  advance  for  the  latter, 
but  rather  a  continuous  decline,  while  the  providential,  historically 
working  plan  is  resulting  in  the  perceptible  elevation  of  the  whole  race. 
Plato  was  legislating  for  the  few  ;  God  has  his  eye  upon  all. 

Besides  the  unwisdom  of  Plato's  plan — a  plan  that  must  fail  in 
itself — what  mischief  has  it  wrought  in  modern  society !  With  the 
revival  of  interest  in  Plato  all  his  theories,  socialistic  as  well  as  phil- 
osophical, were  reannounced  and  found  supporters,  to  the  discredit 
of  the  age  in  which  they  lived. 

The  laxity  of  the  marriage  bond  in  civilized  states ;  the  reign  of 
the  doctrine  of  ' '  Platonic  affinity  "  in  higher  circles  ;  the  relation  of 
spiritualism  and  free-loveism  in  this  country ;  the  multiplication 
of  divorces  and  the  assaults  upon  the  home — are  directly  or  indirectly 
the  offspring  of  the  Platonic  philosophy.  It  strikes,  therefore,  at  the 
foundations  of  society ;  it  impairs  faith  in  the  most  sacred  relations, 
and  turns  the  family  into  a  nest  of  harlots  ;  it  abrogates  the  social 
tie,  and  converts  government  into  anarchy.  Besides  these  direful  re- 
sults, it  is  the  parent  of  those  socialistic  theories  which  are  endan- 
gering social  order  and  mocking  civil  law  throughout  the  world. 
Carried  out  to  its  full  extent,  socialism  will  subvert  human  society. 
It  is  not  believed  that  Plato  contemplated  such  far-reaching  and  rev- 
olutionary catastrophes,  but  they  logically  follow  his  teachings,  and 
are  already  actualized  in  organized  attempts  against  society.  A  com- 
munity of  goods,  or  communism,  nihilism,  socialism,  and  a  community 
of  women,  or  abrogation  of  the  family  idea,  Plato  advocated  with  not 
a  little  conviction  and  enthusiasm  ;  but  in  all  fairness  it  must  be  ad- 
mitted that  he  estimated  the  theories  he  advocated  as  purely  philo- 
sophical, and  never  attempted  to  organize  a  society  with  these  theories 
as  a  basis.  The  modern  socialist  is  not  a  philosopher,  but  the  admin- 
istrator of  the  philosophical  idea,  which  reduces  him  to  a  destruction- 
ist,  who  goes  forth  with  dynamite  or  the  dagger  to  execute  the  plan 
and  reorganize  society.  Socialism  as  a  philosophical  idea  is  absurd, 
and,  put  into  practical  operation,  it  is  ruinous  to  both  the  family  and 
the  state.     As  the  exponent  of  the  idea,  Plato  must  be  condemned. 

The  task  is  not  unpleasant  to  estimate  Plato  in  his  relations  to 
Christianity ;  that   is,  to   ask   and   attempt  to  answer   the   question. 


68  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

What  were  his  services  to  religion,  and  did  he  to  any  degree  prepare 
the  way  for  the  introduction  of  Christianity  to  the  East  ?  Too  much 
must  not  be  allowed  to  philosophy  in  general  or  to  Plato  in  particu- 
lar ;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  the  preliminary  work  of  each  should  be 
recognized,  and  the  points  of  union  and  departure,  or  resemblance 
and  dissimilarity,  between  philosophy  and  Christianity  should  be  de- 
clared. The  advent  of  the  divine  religion  was  preceded  by  a  long- 
continued  series  of  preparation — religious,  philosophical,  moral,  and 
political  preparations — without  which  its  appearance  would  have  been 
attended  with  withering  resistances  and  retrograding  revolutions.  An 
example  of  precedent  steps  to  the  sway  of  the  Gospel  India  furnishe;^ 
in  her  long  history.  First,  Brahminism  looms  large,  spreading  all 
over  the  land,  and  ruling  with  exclusive  authority  ;  then  Buddhism 
protests  and  stalks  like  a  reformer  from  the  mountains  to  the  sea ; 
then  Mohammedanism  penetrates  the  two  colossal  creeds,  dividing 
again  the  thinking  of  the  people ;  then  Christianity  shoots  a  solitary 
ray  across  the  religious  horizon,  and  India  wonders  and  pauses  ;  then 
the  English  occupation  involves  the  old  faiths  in  restraint ;  then  the 
universities  of  India  beget  in  thousands  of  young  men  a  doubt  of  the 
old  religion ;  then  Rationalism  invades  the  land,  and  superstition 
trembles ;  then  Protestantism  plants  churches,  and  echoes  Calvary  in 
the  ears  of  the  millions ;  then  Chunder  Sen  preaches  Christ,  and 
mysticism  takes  the  place  of  tradition  ;  and  at  last  India  opens  her 
gates  to  the  dawn  of  the  Gospel  day.  A  slow  process,  involving  cen- 
turies of  time  and  the  burdens  of  ages,  but  it  illustrates  the  prepara- 
tion needed  for  the  admission  and  appreciation  of  Gospel  truth.  In 
like  manner  philosophy,  in  its  manifold  phases,  had  something  to  do 
in  preparing  the  public  mind  for  the  new  religion  ;  it  was  related  to 
the  religious  idea,  and  portended  its  development.  Paganism,  cor- 
rupt and  insufficient,  was  a  religious  idea,  and  as  such  demonsti-ated 
the  necessity  of  another  religion,  in  which  the  idea  might  have  com- 
plete development.  Philosophy,  weak,  anxious,  and  helpless,  made 
the  same  demonstration  ;  it  was  the  prophecy  of  religion.  If  Plato's 
voice  is  still  ringing  in  the  socialism  of  modern  times ;  if  his  ethical 
system  has  been  reproduced  in  Herbert  Spencer  ;  if  his  rationalism 
reappears  in  modern  idealism — surely  the  whole  philosophy  of  Plato 
must  have  had  a  potent  influence  in  his  day  in  preparing  the  people 
for  a  religion  higher  than  his  philosophy,  and  infinitely  better  than 
paganism. 

The  specific  work  of  philosophy  as  a  service  to  or  preparation  for 
Christianity  may  be  indicated  as  follows : 

1.  The  undermining  of  faith  in  mythology  was  the  sign  of  the 
reign  of  reason  in  religion.     The  fable  withered  under  the  exegetical 


SERVICES  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  69 

analysis  of  the  academy.  The  gods  of  Plato  are  the  gods  of  tradition, 
not  the  gods  of  the  reason.  Plato  says  he  had  a  "searching  spirit" 
which  prompted  him  to  inquire  into  the  reasonableness  of  the  popular 
religion,  which  he  secretly  rejected.  Philosophy  broke  with  mythol- 
ogy— this  was  a  step  toward  religious  freedom  and  the  annihilation 
of  error. 

2.  The  monotheism  of  Plato  was  an  antecedent  sign  of  the  mono- 
theism of  Christianity.  The  origin  of  philosophic  monotheism  is  to 
many  a  mystery,  inasmuch  as  theology  has  insisted  that  the  theistic 
hypothesis  can  not  be  a  product  of  the  reason,  but  must  be  a  matter 
of  revelation.  Richard  Watson  holds  that  the  ground  of  revelation 
is  the  inability  of  the  human  intellect  to  discover  God  in  his  charac- 
ter and  relations  ;  but  the  theological  basis  is  no  longer  tenable.  The 
facts  are  against  it.  The  power  of  the  reason  in  concluding  for  the 
existence  of  God,  and  in  apprehending  him  in  part,  is  exemplified  in 
the  monotheism  of  Plato ;  either  this  must  be  allowed  or  Plato  was 
inspired.  To  make  known  the  will,  purposes,  and  plans  of  God,  a  _ 
revelation  is  .a  necessity.  Plato  announces  the  existence  of  God,  as- 
sociating certain  necessary  attributes  as  belonging  to  him ;  but  he 
does  not  unfold  divine  plans,  though  he  hints  their  existence.  These 
plans  the  Scriptures  unfold  ;  to  a  Scriptural  revelation  Plato  un- 
doubtedly pointed. 

3.  Respecting  man,  Plato  taught  his  immortality  and  the  doctrine 
of  responsibility,  which  involved  the  two-fold  idea  of  future  rewards 
and  retributions.  Obscure  and  even  repulsive  as  is  his  eschatology,  it 
has  its  value  as  a  prefigureraent  of  the  clearer  and  more  rational 
eschatology  of  the  New  Testament.  The  eschatological  idea  of  Plato 
is  the  antecedent  sign  of  the  eschatological  details  of  Christianity. 

4.  The  incompleteness  of  the  Platonic  system,  the  essential  emas- 
culation of  philosophy,  was  an  indirect  demonstration  of  the  necessity 
of  religious  truth  as  a  substitute  for  speculation  ;  in  this  respect  it  ren- 
dered unintended  service  to  Christianity,  and  prepared  the  public  mind 
to  receive  it.  Had  Plato  taught  all  that  Christ  taught,  or  anticipated 
every  truth  of  the  Gospel,  what  need  of  the  Master?  It  was  because  his 
pen  lagged,  his  reason  faltered,  his  eye  grew  dim,  and  error  appeared 
like  truth,  that  the  divine  teacher  must  appear  and  reveal  the  truth. 
Plato  was  the  morning-star  ;  Christ  the  noonday  sun.  Plato  was  the 
forerunner  of  Christ ;  philosophy  was  the  preparation  for  Christian- 
ity. With  its  defects  it  had  virtues :  with  its  falsehoods,  celestial 
truths  ;  with  its  aberrations,  it  was  a  steady,  rational  blaze ;  with  its 
puerilities,  it  had  enduring  substance;  walking  with  the  staff  of 
reason,  it  climbed  the  stairway  to  the  stars.  Christianity,  beginning 
with  the  stars,  ascended  to  the  eternal  throne.  / 


70  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

The  total  impression  that  Plato  makes  is  that  of  an  appointed  inquirer 
for  truth,  a  searcher  of  the  deep  things  of  God.  In  all  the  wander- 
ings, questionings,  and  conclusions  of  Plato,  embracing  all  tlie  prob- 
lems of  being  and  non-being,  with  their  innumerable  relations,  he 
exhibits  the  humble,  patient,  and  teachable  spirit  of  a  ti-uth-seeker. 
Nowhere  does  he  assume  to  be  a  final  teacher;  at  no  time  does  he 
offer  his  philosophy  as  the  panacea  for  the  world's  angry  ills  ;  never 
does  he  pronounce  the  limit  reached.  Beyond  the  philosopher,  be- 
yond the  rationalism,  the  idealism,  the  ethical  system,  the  eschatology 
of  the  academician,  must  the  world  go  ;  and  upon  another  system  of 
thought,  even  the  truth,  as  it  is  in  Jesus,  must  the  heart  of  man  lean 
for  comfort  in  sorrow,  knowledge  in  ignorance,  light  in  darkness. 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE   CORNER-STONES  OE  FHIIiOSOPHY. 

EMPEDOCLES,  a  disciple  of  Pythagoras,  and  an  apologist  of  the 
doctrine  of  transmigration,  delighted  in  declainug  that,  before 
becoming  a  man,  he  had  been  a  boy,  a  girl,  a  bird,  a  fish,  and  a 
shrub,  and  that  he  had  a  complete  remembrance  of  all  his  pre- 
existent  experiences. 

Viewed  in  its  historical  stages  and  connections,  philosophy  furnishes 
a  transparent  illustration  of  the  Pythagorean  doctrine,  for  it  has  passed 
through  many  transformations,  and  is  undergoing  at  the  present  time 
a  many-phased  development.  In  its  vibrations  between  empiricism 
and  idealism,  materialism  and  theism,  it  presents  a  variety  of  forms 
and  beliefs,  theories  and  interpretations,  without,  however,  conducting 
to  well-settled  conclusions,  or  to  the  decision  of  questions  in  which  the 
race  has  been,  is,  and  ever  will  be  permanently  interested.  Now  and 
then  a  philosophical  suggestion,  as  the  idealism  of  Hegel,  has  risen 
like  an  island  out  of  the  sea  of  thought  around  it  and  attracted  atten- 
tion; while  other  ideas,  like  islands  in  the  Pacific  Ocean,  have,  from 
internal  weaknesses,  disappeared  from  sight.  Belonging  to  these  ex- 
tinct philosophies,  however,  there  were  truths,  discovered  by  the 
patient  inquiry  of  genius,  that  were  transferred  to  later  and  more 
vital  economies,  the  perpetuity  of  which  will  be  determined  by  the 
excess  of  truth  over  error  they  contain.  For  twenty-five  centuries, 
this  coming  and  going  of  philosophical  ideas,  this   rising,  and  falling 


A  DAY-BREAKING  EPOCH.  71 

of  philosophical  systems,  this  questioning  and  answering,  only  to  be 
repeated  by  succeeding  generations,  has  been  a  marked  fact  in  human 
progress,  and  a  proof  of  the  instability  of  finite,  and,  consequently, 
imperfect  thought. 

To  trace  the  births  and  deaths  of  philosophies,  to  ascend  the 
heights  and  sink  into  the  depths  of  the  mysteries  of  speculative 
research,  we  deem  necessary,  since  a  knowledge  of  the  attempts  of 
philosophy  will  prepare  us  to  understand  both  the  approximate  truth 
in  it  and  the  causes  of  its  decline,  to  comprehend  both  its  purpose 
and  the  failure  of  its  realization.  The  task  before  us  is  not  small,  for 
in  order  to  understand  one  system  we  must  have  a  knowledge  of  all, 
and  to  comprehend  the  whole  we  must  analyze  its  several  parts. 
Like  all  things  in  human  history,  philosophy  had  its  birthday,  its 
birthplace;  it  had  an  individual  character,  and  also  a  prophetic  des- 
tiny. To  Judea  belongs  the  supreme  honor  of  introducing,  framing, 
and  postulating  a  permanent  religion  ;  from  Rome  emerge  in  perma- 
nent form  the  principles  of  jurisprudence  ;  the  first  alphabetic  language 
acknowledges  its  paternity  in  the  Phoenician  mind  ;  but  none  of  these 
gave  to  the  world  the  first  system  of  philosophy.  We  say  system,  for 
long  before  a  systematic  philosophy  appeared,  there  were  in  existence 
adumbrations  of  doctrines  and  ideas,  the  germs  of  philosophical  thought, 
just  as  before  the  Christian  religion  was  developed  there  were  relig- 
ious ideas  in  the  world,  and  as  before  Roman  law  was  enacted  there 
were  laws  in  human  society,  and  as  before  a  Phoenician  alphabet  was 
constructed  there  were  spoken  languages  among  men.  Our  search  is 
not  for  adumbrations  or  germs,  but  systems,  the  formulated  expression 
of  consecutive  inquiry,  with  definitely  uttered  beliefs,  and  integral 
and  tangible  results. 

In  the  south  of  Europe  is  a  small  country,  with  sides  indented  by 
gulfs  and  bays,  with  its  southern  shore  washed  by  a  sea,  with  its  in- 
terior partly  punctuated  by  mountain  peaks  and  partly  flattened 
into  plains,  a  country  of  classical  renown  and  historic  fame.  To  the 
student  Greece  is  known  as  the  birthplace  of  philosophy.  Twenty-five 
hundred  years  ago,  amid  the  roar  of  the  echoing  sea,  and,  perhaps, 
as  an  indigenous  product  of  sea,  sky,  air,  rock,  mountain,  and  plain, 
the  first  genuine  philosophic  system  was  declared,  from  which,  not 
in  a  regular,  synthetic  series,  have  all  future  systems  sprung,  but 
which  was  the  beginning  of  all  that  followed.  However  far  beyond 
the  crude,  insufficient,  and  materialistic  inquiry  of  that  period  the 
world  may  have  gone,  and  whatever  were  the  originating  influences 
of  the  philosophic  impulse,  certain  it  is  that,  going  back  six  cen- 
turies before  Christ  among  the  Hellenes,  we  reach  a  day-hreaking  epoch 
in  the  history  of  the  race.     Original  questions  were  then  asked  in  a 


72  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY, 

sincere  philosophic  form,  and  original  answers  were  returned  in  an 
equally  sincere  philosophic  manner.  Hellenic  philosophy  was  orig- 
inal philosophy,  the  birth-form  of  the  philosophic  idea,  the  visible 
setting  up  of  an  interrogation  point  on  the  highway  of  thought,  the 
first  exclamation  of  philosophic  formalism.  Brucker's  attempt  to  find 
a  primitive  philosophic  people  before  the  Deluge  is  a  failure.  The 
Grecian  mind  is  the  exponent  of  philosophic  inquiry. 

In  our  inspection  or  analysis  of  these  actual  philosophies,  the  study 
of  which  can  not  fail  to  evoke  special  interest,  we  shall  not  find  sys- 
tems essentially  complete,  or  in  all  cases  exactly  rational,  for  in  its 
experimental  or  rudimentary  stages,  philosophy  assumed  singular  and 
even  grotesque  forms,  often  declaring  for  axiomatic  doctrines  state- 
ments that  afterward  were  abandoned.  Nor  were  the  Hellenic  sys- 
tems of  philosophy,  however  distinct  enough  in  their  enunciations, 
related  to  one  another  by.  sympathetic  bonds ;  that  is,  one  was  not 
necessarily  the  forerunner  of  another.  They  were  not  genealogical 
systems  like  father  and  son,  the  disciple  sometimes  projecting  a  phi- 
losophy from  the  standjioint  of  the  teacher,  as  Parmenides  developed 
the  Eleaticism  of  Zenophanes,  but  sometimes  it  happened  that  the 
disciple  rejected  the  system  of  his  master,  as  Aristotle  was  charged 
with  repudiating  Platonism.  The  pre-Socratic  schools  did  not  follow 
in  regular  order,  but  several  rose  simultaneously,  the  dividing  line 
often  being  indistinct.  A  walk  from  Thales  to  Aristotle,  or  from 
Zeno's  porch  to  Plato's  academy  is  not  the  making  of  perpendicular 
steps  up  a  mountain  side,  getting  nearer  the  summit  with  every  step, 
but  rather  like  a  winding  trail  around  the  slope,  now  evidently  mak- 
ing a  forward  movement,  then  descending  toward  the  bottom  again ; 
now  rising  into  the  clear  atmosphere  that  plays  about  great  heights, 
then  sinking  into  the  shadows  of  cave-like  crevices  or  dull  forests; 
now  seeing  the  philosopher  on  a  run  toward  the  top,  then  turning 
and  gliding  downward  toward  the  abysses. 

Simplicity  characterizes  the  earliest  betrayal  of  the  philosophic 
spirit.  There  are  no  profound  generalizations,  no  laborious  gathering 
of  facts  from  which  inductive  results  issue ;  the  philosophy  is  simple, 
based  on  one  idea,  or  fact,  or  principle,  instead  of  being  an  aggregation 
or  combination  of  ideas  and  principles,  distinguishing  itself  very 
markedly  in  this  respect  from  the  complex  systems  of  Kant,  Hegel, 
and  Hamilton.  However,  complexity  in  philosophy  is  not  a  bad 
sign — it  is  the  sign  of  an  advance,  that  the  shell  is  broken,  and  flight 
has  commenced.  The  naive  simplicities,  the  one-idea  systems  of  the 
Ionic  philosophers,  are  a  mark  of  childhood,  a  beginning,  a  promise 
of  something  to  come. 

The  first  philosophic  inquiries  were  grounded  in  an   attentive  ob- 


SIMPLE  PHILOSOPHIC  INQUIRIES.  73 

servation  of  the  facts  and  forms  of  nature,  or  the  activities,  conditions, 
envelopments,  and  developments  of  the  physical  world.  The  external 
was  the  range  of  observation  ;  the  objective,  therefore,  constituted  the 
limitation  of  speculative  analysis.  Without  doubt,  climate,  geograph- 
ical environment,  nature  in  form  and  force,  subtly  afieots  a  people, 
tinging  their  civilization,  influencing  customs,  institutions,  literature, 
o-overnment,  and  religion.  Buckle  carries  this  to  an  extreme  when 
he  intimates  that  nature  dictates  the  essentials  of  civilization,  and 
that  governments  and  religions  are  the  products  of  physical  suggestion 
and  have  no  independent  source.  Evidently,  however,  the  climatic 
or  physical  influence  was  felt  more  in  earlier  times  than  it  is  now  in 
all  the  spheres  of  life  ;  man  was  in  greater  bondage  to  the  elements, 
to  the  laws  and  changes  of  the  physical  world,  than  he  is  now.  Not 
yet  entirely  free  from  natural  influence,  it  is  patent  that,  as  he  rises 
in  the  scale  of  intelligence,  he  subordinates  nature  to  his  will,  and 
thinks  independently  of  her  presence.  Theories,  philosophies,  and 
religions,  grounded  solely  in  the  phenomena  of  nature,  or  the  result 
of  physical  dictation,  must  be  wanting  in  intellectual  independence 
and  spiritual  tone.  Logically,  the  first  thinking  of  man  would  con- 
cern external  things ;  his  problems  would  be  physical  problems ;  his- 
torically, we  find  the  first  thinking  was  external,  the  first  problems 
were  physical.  Philosophy  is  first  exterual,  afterward  internal ;  first 
material  or  physical,  second  intellectual  or  metaphysical.  Materialism 
is  the  first  product  of  philosophic  thought,  to  be  superseded  by  some- 
thing different  as  the  reflective  faculties  are  opened  and  employed, 
and  philosophic  inquiry  becomes  subjective  or  internal.  Materialism 
is  infantile,  the  sign  of  childhood  philosophy,  a  beginning ;  internal 
thought  is  robust,  the  sign  of  intellectual  emancipation,  the  forerun- 
ner of  the  culmination  of  philosophic  inquiry.  This  distinction  is 
true,  as  applied  to  modern  as  well  as  ancient  philosophy.  Modern 
materialism  may  be  labeled  childish  quite  as  appropriately  as  Ionic 
philosophy,  for  the  former  has  advanced  in  its  logical  conclusion  not 
one  cubit  beyond  the  latter. 

The  naturalness  of  Ionic  materialism,  arising  from  climatic  environ- 
ment and  the  tendency  of  inquiry  into  external  facts,  is  clearly  demon- 
strated. We  can  not  expect  from  the  Grecian  mind,  in  its  incipient 
strugglings  with  original  problems,  any  thing  except  raw  materialism, 
a  philosophy  with  a  physical  basis,  a  thinking  grounded  in  empiri- 
cism, with  corresponding  implied  negations  of  higher  theological  truth. 
Original  philosophy  is  a  climatic,  geographical,  sea-born,  sky-infected, 
mountain-tinged,  speculative  hypothesis ;  a  philosophy,  not  the  result 
of  comparison,  analysis,  reason,  but  of  the  sight  of  the  eyes,  taking 
its  color  from  the  hues  of  the  external  world.     An  external,  not  an 


74  PHIL OSOPH  Y  AND  CHRIS TIANIT  Y. 

internal  philosophy,  it  is  ;  a  sense-philosophy,  not  a  reason-philosophy ; 
a  material,  not  an  intellectual,  philosophy.  If  we  pronounce  it  the 
lowest  grade  of  thought,  a  rudiment,  it  is  because  it  begins  in  earthi. 
ness  and  settles  in  the  supposed  realities  of  natural  phenomena. 

In  order  easily  to  comprehend  the  course  of  philosophy,  and  to 
avoid  burdening  the  mind  with  a  too  minute  classification  of  its  varied 
forms,  or  indulging  in  manifold  divisions  and  subdivisions,  it  may  be 
divided  into  epochs  or  cycles,  as  follows: 

I.  The  Ancient  or  Hellenic  Epoch,  beginning  with  Thales,  and 
ending  with  the  new  academy.  While  some  of  the  early  philosophers 
were  not  born  in  Greece,  among  the  number  Thales  himself,  it  is  be- 
lieved the  generic  title  of  the  epoch  will  be  received  as  sufficiently 
accurate  and  inclusive  of  all  the  sects  and  schools  that  arose  in  Europe 
and  the  islands  in  the  vicinity  of  Greece  prior  to  the  Christian  era. 
During  this  epoch  philosophy  appeared  in  the  phases  of  materialism, 
idealism,  empiricism,  and  skepticism,  four  marked  and  decisive  devel- 
opments that  have  their  counterparts  in  the  modern  systems  of  spec- 
ulative thought. 

Justifiably,  and  according  to  custom,  we  exclude  from  considerax 
tiou  the  mythologies  and  religions  of  the  Roman  Empire  and  the 
Eastern  World,  since  in  no  true  sense  were  they  philosophies.  Ram 
Chandra  Bose,  of  India,  will  challenge  this  statement,  but  Hindu 
metaphysics  are  without  recognition.  Not  even  Grecian  mythology 
is  accorded  a  place  in  the  history  of  Grecian  philosophy.  The  Hindu 
religions,  with  their  philosophical  adumbrations,  may  be  properly  an- 
alyzed and  studied  as  religions;  so  mythologies,  as  such,  may  be 
investigated  and  estimated.  Philosophy,  pure  and  distinct,  neither 
mythology  nor  religion,  interMoven  with  philosophy,  is  the  object  of 
this  chapter. 

For  other  reasons  we  exclude  from  historical  consideration  the 
uprising  of  Roman  philosophy,  which  was  legitimate  enough  in  its 
sphere,  and  exercised  a  powerful  eifect  on  the  public  mind,  under- 
mining the  public  religion  and  aiding  the  introduction  of  Christianity 
into  the  empire.  The  Romans  were  borrowers;  the  poets, 
dramatic  writers,  historians,  mathematicians,  scientists,  rhetoricians, 
sculptors  and  philosophers,  were  indebted  to  4he  Greeks  for  models, 
ideas,  plans,  plots,  systems— every  thing  in  the  literary  sense.  No 
original  philosophy  emerges  from  Roman  history.  What  we  find  is 
a  duplication  of  Grecian  thought,  with  little  variation  and  no 
advanced  suggestions.  Lucretius,  like  Epicurus,  denied  immortality, 
and  was  a  pantheist  in  his  conception  of  nature.  Even  Cicero  was  in 
doubt  as  to  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  and  regarded  God  as  the 
soul   of  the  world.     A   devout  admirer  of  Plato,    he  should  have 


THE  IONIC  SECT.  75 

accepted  immortality  and  God  as  fundamental  truths.  Seneca  is 
noted  as  the  ethical  Roman  philosopher,  but  is  not  in  advance  of 
Socx'ates.  Epictetus  honored  the  conscience  and  taught  the  virtue  of 
suicide;  but  this  was  not  an  improvement  ou  Zeno,  the  Stoic.  M. 
Aurelius  Antoninus  insisted  on  the  purity  of  the  conscience ;  Max- 
imus  Tyrius  inclined  to  Platonism  ;  Galen  was  an  Empiricist,  attribut- 
ing knowledge  to  experience. 

In  none  of  the  Eoman  philosophers  is  there  an  original  philosoj^hic 
suggestion  beyond  what  grew  out  of  the  Grecian  systems.  Separate 
recognition  of  their  labors  is,  therefore,  unnecessary. 

II.  The  Interregnum,  or  Middle  Epoch,  a  period  of  philosophic 
quietism,  disturbed  only  by  the  appearance  of  Neo-Platonism,  and 
still  later  by  the  suicidal  theories  of  Scholasticism. 

III.  The  Modern  Epoch,  embracing  Europpan,  English,  and 
American  endeavors  in  the  fields  of  inquiry. 

As  has  been  intimated,  the  Ionic  sect  of  philosophers,  headed  by 
Thales,  was  the  first  to  grapple  with  the  problem  of  causality, 
applying  the  principle  to  nature  in  the  belief  that  it  .was  either  self- 
caused  or  that  one  element  or  force  of  nature  was  the  primal  cause 
of  all  that  exists.  It  is  scarcely  in  point  to  introduce  the  theology 
of  the  Ionics  who,  believing  in  a  self-centered,  personal,  eternal, 
infinite  and  absolute  God,  the  father  of  all  things,  undertook  to 
solve  nature  by  nature,  as  one  would  explain  history  by  history,  or 
poetry  by  poetry,  Avithout  robbing  the  Deity  of  any  attribute  or 
excellence.  On  being  asked  for  a  definition  of  God,  Thales  answered, 
"That  which* has  neither  beginning  nor  end;"  in  other  words,  he  is 
the  eternal,  uncaused  cause.  Recognizing  a  divine  principle  if  not  a 
divine  personalty,  the  "wise  men"  were  not  intentionally  atheistic, 
though  their  systems  are  sentimentally  atheistic.  What  they  at 
bottom  proposed  to  discover  without  complicating  their  systems  or 
beliefs,  and  without  involving  divine  power  in  the  creative  realm, 
was  a  causal  principle  of  life,  purely  objective  and  material,  in  the 
physical  world  itself;  a  self-creating,  self-propagating  and  self-sus- 
taining power  in,  not  outside  of,  nature.  Committing  themselves,  ah 
initio,  to  this  theory,  they  were  confined  in  their  searchings  to 
physical  origins,  above  which  they  did  not  think  it  important  to  go 
until  a  new  sect  contested  the  integrity  of  their  theories  and  demanded 
another  basis  of  investigation. 

Thales,  born  B.  C.  640,  appears  as  the  founder  of  the  Ionic  sect, 
and  as  such  must  be  accepted  as  the  first  accredited  philosopher  in 
human  history.  Reported  by  Diogenes  Laertius,  he  was  "the  first  to 
converse  about  natural  philosophy,"  or  the  philosophy  of  nature, 
inquiring   into  its   origin.     A  great   traveler,  having  visited  Egypt, 


76  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

Phoenicia,  Crete,  and  many  other  countries,  observing  forms  of 
governments  and  systems  of  religion,  he  was  prepared  to  formulate 
u  philosophical  belief  which,  being  new  and  original  and  supported 
by  his  great  learning,  was  received  with  favor  by  the  multitudes,  and 
made  a  channel  for  itself  among  those  whose  education  was  almost 
as  liberal  as  his  own. 

What  was  the  first  genuine  philosophic,  oracular  utterance? 
Nothing  more,  nothing  less  than  that  water  is  in  some  way  the 
principal  of  life  in  the  natural  world,  the  acting  substitutional  cause 
of  all  existence  or  phenomena.  It  is  the  -prima  materia,  to  use  a 
phrase  of  Lewes,  of  all  things.  In  this  we  see  the  naturalness  of  the 
philosophy  of  Thales ;  it  is  climatic,  maritime,  the  outbirth  of  the 
surrounding  sea  of  gulfs,  bays,  rivers,  mists,  and  rains.  By  what 
processes  this  dogmatic  conclusion  was  reached,  and  with  what  boldness 
it  was  proclaimed  as  the  explanation  of  the  mystery  of  the  universe, 
it  is  not  important  to  inquire.  Perhaps  the  philosopher  discovered  what 
no  observer  will  deny,  that  moisture  is  essential  to,  or  an  accompani- 
ment of,  physical  existence ;  that  without  it  man,  animal,  plant,  and 
leaf  would  perish  ;  and  then  Thales  concluded  that,  as  it  is  a 
condition  of  life,  it  must  therefore  be  the  principle  of  life.  The  inner 
weakness  of  the  philosophy  is  in  the  want  of  discrimination  between 
condition  and  cause,  between  principles  of  life  and  the  necessary 
supports  of  life,  a  failure  that  is  made  by  Spencer  as  well  as  Thales. 
It  is  the  philosophy  of  material  conditions,  not  of  causal  principles; 
it  is  a  loater-born,  not  a  rational,  philosophic  conjecture.  It  is  liquid 
in  antithesis  to  dirt  philosophy,  but  kindred  to  it. 

Equally  materialistic,  equally  earth-born,  a  mere  diversion  from 
the  original  solution  of  Thales,  and  perhaps  an  inhalation  of  it,  was 
the  subsequent  hypothesis  of  Anaximenes,  who,  in  the  calm  of  sincerity, 
proclaimed  air  to  be  the  life-giving  source  of  all  things.  This 
conclusion  was  deduced  from  the  relation  of  the  air  to  life.  That 
which  is  essential  to  life  must  be  the  principle  of  life.  So  reasoned, 
if  they  reasoned  at  all,  the  ancestors  of  philosophy.  Thales's  is  a 
sea-philosophy;  Anaximenes's  is  a  wind-philosophy;  each  was  founded 
on  observation,  and  a  knowledge  of  some  of  the  conditions  of  life ; 
each  was  defective  at  the  same  point  and  in  the  same  mannei-, 
namely :  it  attributed  to  matter  an  omnipotent,  originating  energy, 
the  property  of  creative  force,  the  original  element  of  production. 

The  Ionics  were  led  to  cosmogonies ;  they  interpreted  the  world  by 
physiological  principles,  just  as  Buckle  and  Draper  in  our  day 
interpret  civilization  ;  but  neither  the  universe  nor  civilization  yields 
to  the  interpretation.  Natural  philosophy  alone  is  an  insufficient 
explanation  of   either.     One  century  after  Thales,   Pythagoras,  the 


PYTHAGORAS— ZENOPHANES.  77 

founder  of  the  Italic  sect,  the  forerunner  of  a  new  era,  the  cham- 
pion of  a  new  philosophy,  appeared.  Like  Thales  he  was  an 
extensive  traveler  ;  he  was  also  devoted  to  the  mathematical  sciences 
especially  arithmetic  and  geometry ;  moreover,  he  was  an  ardent 
lover  of  music.  Music  and  mathematics  enter  into  his  mystical 
philosophy.  He  held  that  the  universe  is  the  product  of  the 
harmonious  co-operation  of  forces  and  factors,  the  harmony  which  he 
conceived  to  exist  being  expressed  by  the  word  number,  which  has 
confused  those  who  have  not  inquired  into  its  origin.  Lewes  asserts 
that  Auaximander,  who  held  to  the  abstract  rather  than  the  concrete, 
influenced  Pythagoras;  we  believe  he  was  as  original  as  any  Grecian 
philosopher,  and  a  product  of  all  his  predecessors.  He  held  to  a 
mathematico-musical  theory ;  mathematical  in  that  proportion  is 
strictly  observed  in  the  physical  plan  of  the  universe;  musical  in 
that  concord,  not  antagonism,  is  the  result.  It  differs  from  mate- 
rialism in  that  it  attributes  no  creative  energy  eithei'  to  the  mathe- 
matical or  musical  principle,  but  that  both  principles  were  observed 
in  the  building  of  the  world  ;  it  suggests  a  plan  of  creation,  with  the 
Planner  back  of  it,  and  is  anti-materialistic.  From  this  period  or 
division  in  philosophy  the  real  struggle  for  supremacy  in  speculative 
thought  begins,  and  continues  down  the  ages,  assuming  a  variety  of 
forms,  and  precipitating  schools,  systems,  and  sects,  without  number 
for  investigation  and  analysis.  Henceforth,  philosophy  is  neither 
Thalic,  i.  e,  wholly  and  intrinsically  materialistic  or  physiological,  nor 
Pythagorean,  i.  e.,  mystical,  musical,  mathematical,  but  a  complex, 
self-clasking,  dissolving,  and  surviving  system  or  systems,  bordering  at 
times  on  correct  interpretations,  and  desperate  at  all  times  in  its 
purpose  to  approach  the  truth. 

Back  from  materialism,  or  nature,  as  if  driven  from  it  by  a  su- 
pernatural whirlwind  of  revelation,  the  Eleatics  stood  in  defense  of 
the  one-sided  thought  that  there  is  only  one  reality,  which  is  being, 
and  that  it  is  the  ground  of  all  not-being;  that  the  not-being  is  the 
phenomenal,  without  positive  existence ;  that  it  is  an  appearance 
only,  and  must  be  referred  to  being.  It  is  not  clear  that  Zenophanes, 
the  founder  of  this  sect,  meant  by  "being"  the  one  true  God,  al- 
though he  said,  "all  is  one,"  and  "  God  is  the  one."  He  certainly 
believed  in  one  God,  in  opposition  to  the  popular  polytheism,  which 
owed  its  origin  to  the  theological  poets.  Homer  and  Hesiod,  but  he 
was  more  interested  in  philosophy  than  in  theology,  and  concerned  him- 
self more  with  principles  than  personalities.  The  principle  of  being, 
and  the  non-existence  of  not-being,  or  the  phenomenal  world,  char- 
acterized his  thinking,  and  gave  form  to  his  philosophic  utter- 
ances.    This  was  an  extreme  reaction  from  the  early  materialism,  and 


78  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

a  midway  departure  from  Pythagoreauism,  which  could  not  be  main- 
tained, since  a  denial  of  the  existence  of  the  physical  world  was  sure 
to  subject  the  philosophical  systems  built  upon  the  denial  to  great 
wrenching,  and  the  philosophers  themselves  to  personal  embarrass- 
ment. Yet  was  the  new  philosophy  preferred  to  any  thing  that  pre- 
ceded it,  and  had  it  succeeded  in  reconciling  itself  to  the  not-being, 
or  interpreting  it  in  harmony  with  being,  it  had  not  so  soon  or  readily 
dissolved,  or  lost  its  grip  on  the  Grecian  mind.  Under  Parmeuides 
Eleaticism  reached  its  highest  development ;  and  under  Zeno  it  began 
to  decline. 

As  exhibiting  the  tendency  to  mutation  in  philosophical  study, 
we  now  consider  another  phase  of  materialism  in  the  theory  of 
Heraclitus,  which,  akin  to  the  theories  of  the  physiologists,  did  not 
appear  until  Pythagoreanism  and  Eleaticism  had  expressed  themselves. 
It  is  a  swing  of  the  pendulum  back  to  the  starting-point.  His  fun- 
damental principle  was  that  of  the  becoming,  the  not-being,  the  phe- 
nomenal, which  had  been  rejected  by  the  Eleatics.  "All  is  and  is 
not,"  said  the  philosopher;  "  for  though  in  truth  it  does  come  into 
being,  yet  it  forthwith  ceases  to  be."  Nature  is  a  fiux,  ever  in  mo- 
tion, ever  changing,  like  a  river,  and  hence  never  the  same.  Zeno 
denied  motion ;  Heraclitus  rejected  the  theory  of  rest  or  inertia.  The 
principle  of  nature  is  fire,  self-enkindled  and  self-extinguished.  Na- 
ture is  always  becoming  but  never  is.  From  its  ceaseless  flow,  nature 
is  responsible  to  itself,  and  has  within  itself  an  acting  or  eflficient 
cause  in  fire. 

From  this  epoch  of  inquiry  the  philosophic  struggle  is  simplified, 
being  reduced  to  Eleaticism — alias  idealism — on  the  one  hand,  and 
Heraclitic  formalism,  or  realism,  on  the  other;  it  comprehends  the 
relation  of  the  being  and  the  not-being,  and  the  possibility  of  their 
unity,  or  a  common  ground  of  interpretation.  Whatever  revolutions 
svbsequently  occur  in  ancient  philosophy  are  the  resultant  of  the  conflict 
of  these  tivo  higher  principles  of  speculative  knowledge.  This  is  the  divid- 
ing line,  the  battle-field  of  philosophy,  viz.  :  the  determination  of  the 
existence  of  being  and  non-being,  and  their  relations,  a  modern  as 
well  as  an  ancient  question,  for  Kant,  Hamilton,  Cousin,  Comte,  and 
others,  have  found  the  problem  quite  as  perplexingly  mysterious  as 
did  Parmenides  and  Heraclitus. 

Philosophy,  fastening  its  prongs  in  the  becoming,  i.  e.,  the  phe- 
nomenal, and  returning  to  materialism,  gravitated  to  a  lower  depth 
than  at  any  previous  time  under  the  direction  of  Democritus  (who 
had  imbibed  some  atheistic  conceptions  from  Leucippus),  who  sought 
to  eliminate  the  causal  principle  from  existence  and  the  universe. 
Like  other  philosophers,  he  traveled  extensively,  laughing  at   every 


THE  ATOMIC  THEORY.  79 

thing,  as  Heraclitus  had  wept  over  every  thing,  denying  the  evidence 
of  the  senses,  and  resolving  historic  events  and  natural  phenomena 
into  chance  or  accident.  He  gave  prominence  to  what  is  known  as 
the  atomic  theory,  namely,  that  in  ages  past  there  were  original 
atoms  which  by  their  own  affinities  were  drawn  toward  one  another, 
and  by  combinations,  various  and  singular,  the  earth  and  every  thing 
on  it  appeared.  The  atomic  theory,  though  ancient,  has  tinctured 
the  philosophy  of  the  moderns,  exhibiting  itself  in  the  motion-theory 
of  Hobbes,  and  not  remotely  in  the  nerve-source  of  mental  action,  as 
advocated  by  Bain  and  Spencer.  The  philosophy  entirely  dispenses 
with  an  external  power,  or  supervising  intelligent  force  or  principle ; 
it  banishes  God  from  the  universe,  a  result  that  the  positivism  of 
Comte  announces  with  unhesitating  constancy.  This  sepulchral 
philosophy  came  from  one  who  lived  in  a  tomb,  proving  that  the 
philosophies  of  the  ancients  were  suggested  by,  or  took  their  form 
and  color  from  their  surroundings.  Thales  saw  the  sea,  and  lo ! 
water  is  the  first  cause  ;  Anaximenes  breathed  the  air,  and  it  is  the 
principle  of  life  ;  Heraclitus  lived  in  a  mountain,  and  the  principle 
of  the  becoming,  the  solid,  the  phenomenal,  is  announced ;  De- 
mocritus  inhabited  a  tomb,  and  the  pJiilosophy  of  death  emanated 
and  was  accepted.  This  last  was  Thalism  degenerated  into  atheism ; 
it  was  a  state  philosophy  in  shrouds,  decorated  with  flowers  that 
bloom  only  in  snows.  To  a  greater  depth  philosophic  thinking  could 
not  descend  ;  indeed,  its  next  movement  must  be  upward,  away  from 
tombs,  out  into  the  world,  up  above  the  mountain,  beyond  air,  cloud, 
sea,  sky.  Eleaticism  ventured  into  the  highest  regions,  but  unfortu- 
nately it  had  but  one  wing ;  its  flight  was  therefore  circular,  ill-bal- 
anced, one-sided,  and  it  fell.  Then,  by  a  very  natural  process,  it 
returned  to  original  materialism,  sinking  deeper  than  ever  in  the 
darkness  of  its  contemplations,  until  it  was  evident  that  it  must  have  a 
resurrection  in'to  a  better  form,  or  perish  in  the  tomb  whence  it  came. 
Afflicted,  as  it  were,  with  a  self-remorse  which  included  a  repent- 
ance of  all  past  materialism  and  atheism,  and  weighed  down  with  a 
consciousness  of  failure,  it  threw  off"  its  load,  and  announced  a  new 
career  for  itself.  This  came  in  the  form  of  the  philosophy  of  Anaxag- 
oras,  who,  perceiving  marks  of  design  in  nature,  concluded  that  it 
was  not  self-originative,  but  that  it  had  a  governing  and  order-arrang- 
ing vouc  or  mind,  without  which,  whether  it  was  personal  or  not,  the 
universe  was  impossible.  He  was  not  an  Eleatic  in  that  he  believed 
both  in  the  being  and  the  non-being,  and  associated  them  together, 
not  in  the  act  of  creation  but  in  the  act  of  arrangement,  or  method- 
izing nature.  The  nous  in  philosophy,  whether  it  was  divine,  or  had 
personation  in  being,  or, only  represented  an  unconscious  intellectual 


80  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

process  and  order,  was  so  far  in  advance  of  the  materialism  of  Thales, 
the  number-theory  of  Pythagoras,  the  being  of  Zenophanes,  the  be- 
coming of  Heraclitus,  and  the  chance  theory  of  Democritus,  that  it 
was  the  sign  of  day  in  Greece.  Before  him  no  one  had  discovered  the 
teleological  principle  in  nature,  nor  did  he  himself  carry  it,  as  Paley 
did  centuries  afterward,  to  its  logical  termination  of  establishing  the 
existence  of  a  Designer.  Believing  in  God,  he  did  not  employ  the 
philosophy  of  the  nous  in  the  vindication  of  a  theistic  faith,  but  turned 
it  over  to  his  successors. 

Still,  considering  the  fluctuations  of  philosophic  thought  in  two 
centuries,  the  flowing  and  ebbing  of  inquiry,  the  development  and 
retrogression  of  speculative  truth  from  Thales  to  Anaxagoras,  it  is 
gratifying  that  it  progressed  even  so  far  as  from  water  to  nou»,  from 
matter  to  mind,  as  the  controlling  principle  and  informing  power, 
substance,  and  cause,  in  the  universe.  This  is  the  result  of  the  first 
period,  commonly  called  pre-Socratic,  of  Grecian  philosophy,  which, 
concerning  itself  chiefly  with  nature,  and  yet  with  ultimate  facts  and 
principles,  advanced,  through  mutations  many  and  serious,  to  a  final 
assertion  in  Anaxagoras.  Beginning  in  cosmological  conceptions,  vi- 
brating to  unsafe  forms  of  idealism,  and  then  sinking  into  the  abysses 
of  atheism,  it  rises,  glorified  in  the  principle,  if  not  personality,  of 
mind— this  is  progress,  not  regular,  methodical  progress,  but  in  its 
final  form  an  advance.  And  this  unsettling  and  settling,  this  series 
of  downward  and  upward  step-taking,  occurs  within  two  centuries,  pre- 
paring the  Grecian  mind  for  a  rapid  and  a  still  higher  flight  into  regions 
whose  boundaries  are  not  space  and  time,  and  in  which  philosophy  may 
find  the  sole  center,  the  infinite  substance,  the  first  cause — God. 

But  the  first  period  did  not  close  with  Anaxagoras.  Between  him 
and  those  who  introduced  a  more  decisive  ethical  and  dialectical  form 
of  thought  appeared  the  Sophists,  a  class  of  men  renowned  for  their 
learning,  but  not  exactly  philosophic  in  their  genius  or  attainments ; 
wise,  shrewd,  intellectual,  apparently  discursive,  but  superficial,  after 
all,  in  the  treatment  of  the  grave  problems  of  life.  Protagoras  held 
that  "  man  is  the  measure  of  all  things,"  a  doctrine  that  Plato  anni- 
hilated ;  Gorgias,  an  Eleatic  in  principle,  talked  of  nature  as  the  non- 
existent ;  Hippias  and  Prodicus,  men  of  wonderful  mathematical  and 
grammatical  attainments,  defended  their  master  with  singular  plausi- 
bility, but  were  always  defeated  by  Plato. 

The  Sophists  mark  a  period  in  the  speculative  thought  of  Greece. 
They  influenced  the  culture  and  contributed  to  the  learning  of  the 
age,  preparing  it  for  the  subtle  and  transparent  polemics  of  the  Socratic 
philosophers  who  soon  appeared.  Learned  as  they  were,  they  yet  de- 
nied the  truths  of  physical  science  or  natur^  philosophy,  supporting 


THE  SOCBATIC  SYSTEM.  81 

the  denials  with  evasive  and  sophistical  arguments,  which  enhanced 
their  reputation  for  dialectical  skill  and  wisdom.  But  the  imputa- 
tions they  cast  upon  science  precipitated  a  period  in  which  the  affirma- 
tions of  science  had  a  hearing. 

The  second  period  of  Hellenic  philosophy  signalized  its  advent  by 
an  immediate  break  with  the  first,  making  use  only  of  its  facts,  but 
ignoring  its  conclusions.  Cousin,  setting  aside  the  first  period,  assigns 
to  Socrates  the  position  of  founder  of  ancient  philosophy.  Back  of 
him  he  finds  no  genuine  philosophic  discernment,  no  philosophic 
guidance,  through  the  mysteries  of  thought.  He  dates  ancient  phil- 
osophy with  the  birth  of  Socrates.  In  this  he  forgets  the  history  of 
philosophy,  which  can  not  be  thus  ignored.  However,  the  Socratic 
spirit  is  the  only  genuine  philosophic  spirit  in  the  ancient  world ; 
from  it  alone  has  come  the  highest  philosophic  form. 

Natural  philosophy  preceded  Socrates ;  he  investigated  it,  affirmed 
its  truth,   and  then   went  beyond  ;    he  introduced  moral  philosophy, 
finally  eschewing  astronomy,  geometry,  and  the   whole  brood  of  sci- 
ences, as  sufficient  for  man,  preferring  a  philosophy  that  had  for  its 
base   moral   truth,  rather   than    physical    fact.     The  first  period  was 
essentially  physical,  materialistic,  atheistic  ;  the  second  period  was  eth- 
ical, sentimental,  intellectual.    Neither  the  laws  of  nature  nor  the  or- 
igin of  nature — not  the  facts,  forms,  or  methods  of  nature — did  Socrates 
seek  to  know,  but  moral  ideas,  moral  principles,  which  may  be  applied 
to  civil  government,  the  family  institution,  and  human  society.     Hith- 
erto there  had  been  no  application  of  philosophy  to  society,  the  fam- 
ily, the  State,  partly  because  it  was  in  its  infancy,  but  more  especially 
because  it  was  barren  of  ethical  principles.     Without  moral  ideas  it 
could  suggest  nothing  to  rulers,  legislators,  parents,  or  the  individual. 
This  weakness  of  the  pre-Socratic  schools  Socrates  discovered ;  and, 
abjuring  the  old  scientific  philosophies,  he  invested   inquiry  with  a 
new  and  practical  interest,  going  about  bareheaded  and  barefooted  in 
the  streets  of  Athens,  and  teaching  in  the  shops  and  market-places 
the  highest  moral  duties,  and  man's  relation  to  his  fellow-man.     The 
materialists  spoke   of  nature  ;  Socrates  spoke   of  man.     Cosmogony 
characterizes   the   one;    psychology   the   other.     The    personality  of 
man,  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  human  responsibility,  the  duties  of 
reciprocity,  the  love  of  justice,  the  practice  of  virtue,  outward,  if  not 
inward,  holiness,  constituted  the  tenets  of  the  Socratic  system,  so  far 
forth  as  he  was  the  author  of  a  system.     This  implies  self-knowledge, 
a  knowledge  of  mind,  a  knowledge  of  God,  all  of  which  he  taught  by 
the  dialectic  method  of  question  and  answer,  impressing  moral  truth 
in  its  wholeness  upon  the  conscience  of  his  age,  and  lifting  it  out  of 
the  slough  of  materialism. 


82  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

According  to  Diogenes  Laertius,  Socrates  would  say  there  is  only- 
one  good — namely,  knowledge  ;  and  only  one  evil — namely,  ignorance. 
Socrates  laid  the  foundations;  Plato  built  the  superstructure.  Eth- 
ical was  Plato ;  theological  also.  The  pre-Socratics  studied  nature ; 
Socrates,  man  ;  Plato,  man  and  God.  Progressive  stages,  these,  but 
the  highest  development  is  in  Plato,  as  he  not  only  includes  nature 
and  man,  but  comprehends  to  a  degree  the  divine  character  and  the 
method  of  divine  working.  Platonism,  whether  a  system  or  frag- 
mentary ideas  is  intended,  is  the  summit  of  ancient  philosophy  ;  all 
other  philosophies,  however  related  to  it,  are  beneath  it,  being  less 
comprehensive  and  less  divine. 

Aristotle,  the  pupil  of  Plato,  and  teacher  of  Alexander,  founded 
the  Lyceum,  or  peripatetic  school  of  philosophers,  which  accepted  the 
Platonic  theory  of  ideas  in  outline,  but  obtained  them  differently,  and 
made  a  different  use  of  them.  With  Plato  human  ideas  had  their  source 
in  the  mind's  free  activity  ;  with  Aristotle  they  are  the  product  of 
sensations.  With  the  one  their  origin  is  inward  ;  with  the  other,  their 
origin  is  outward.  Plato  advocated  innate  ideas;  Aristotle,  empirical 
or  sensational  ideas.  Plato  began  with  ideas  and  proceeded  to  facts, 
as  their  symbols  or  exponents,  deducting  and  constructing  systems  or 
principles,  while  Aristotle  gathered  the  facts  and  then  inferred  the 
principles.  By  this  method  of  investigation  Aristotle  finally  devel- 
oped the  method  of  inductive  reasoning,  which  established  his  fame 
forever.  A  trained  mind  will  reason  inductively ;  long  before  Aris- 
totle induction  was  an  intellectual  habit,  but  he  formulated  it  into  a 
system,  declaring  its  laws  and  giving  form  and  direction  to  intellectual 
pursuits.     This  was  the  dialectical  fruit  of  his  study. 

In  the  physical  department  of  philosophy  he  was  quite  as  rigid  as, 
and  perhaps  more  penetrating  than,  Plato,  for  he  reduced  the  universe 
to  four  primary  principles,  viz.:  matter,  form,  efficient  cause,  and  end. 
Ethically,  he  was  not  as  discursive  or  as  rational  as  Plato,  though  he 
regarded  man  as  a  "  political  animal,"  and  taught  that  the  institutions 
of  the  family,  society,  and  government  should  be  maintained  upon  the 
basis  of  righteousness  and  in  the  interest  of  the  race. 

It  would  not  be  unprofitable  to  contrast  these  three  philosophers 
of  the  second  period  of  ancient  philosophy  ;  they  resembled  and  dif- 
fered from  one  another,  and  were  actuated  by  one  purpose,  weaker  in 
Socrates,  stronger  in  Plato,  to  ascertain  the  unascertained  answers  to 
ultimate  inquiry.  Socrates  was  the  street  and  conversational  philos- 
opher ;  Plato  the  academic  and  dialogue  philosopher ;  Aristotle  the  prose- 
writing  and  voluminous  philosopher.  In  the  measure  of  their  influence 
Socrates  and  Plato  were  chiefly  Hellenic  or  national,  being  inspired 
with  a  love  of  country,  while  Aristotle  was  cosmopolitan  or  universal, 


SOCRA  TES—PLA  TO— A  RIS  TO  TLE.  83 

regarding  mankind  as  of  more  consequence  than  the  Grecians  alone. 
Socrates  taught  for  his  age  ;  Plato  for  his  country  ;  Aristotle  for  the 
world.  Socrates  was  the  ethico-practical  philosopher,  the  persuasive 
moralist ;  Plato  was  the  idealist,  not  such  as  Parmenides,  whose  ideal- 
ism, excluding  the  phenomenal,  defeated  itself,  but  such  as  compre- 
hended being  and  not-being  in  their  correlations  and  ultimate  and 
hidden  sources ;  Aristotle  was  the  empirical  philosopher,  seeking 
solutions  by  an  entirely  different  method. 

Plato  and  Aristotle,  bent  on  one  achievement,  so  differed  in 
method  of  procedure,  representation  of  thought,  and  style  of  expres- 
sion that  the  opinion  prevailed  that  Aristotle  was  an  antagonist  of  the 
Platonic  system.  Plato  was  a  poetically  expressing  philosopher ; 
Aristotle,  discarding  and  even  condemning  poetic  dress,  introduced 
passionless  prose  to  his  readers.  Plato  indulged  in  imaginative  flights, 
soaring  toward  the  sun,  while  Aristotle  preferred  to  burrow  toward 
the  center  of  the  earth.  Both  were  sincere,  both  contributed  to  the 
cultivation  of  the  philosophic  spirit. 

Like  the  first,  the  second  period  of  Grecian  philosophy  ends 
better  than  it  began,  though  its  commencement  constitutes  the  bright- 
est epoch  in  Grecian  speculative  endeavor,  none  of  the  succeeding 
philosophers  rivaling  in  genius,  research,  philosophic  acumen  and 
illumination  this  triad  of  teachers — Socrates,  Plato,  and  Aristotle.  In 
truth,  ancient  philosophy  had  in  these  representatives  its  culmination 
of  greatness,  for  they  gave  to  the  world  independently,  and  yet  in  a 
sense  connectedly,  systems  of  logic,  physics,  natural  theology,  juris- 
prudence, and  individual  morality,  that  succeeding  ages  have  not 
improved,  and  which  may  be  studied  to-day  with  no  little  advantage 
by  students  of  humanity  and  worshipers  of  God. 

As  from  the  first  to  the  second  period  of  Grecian  culture  was  an 
ascending  movement,  so  from  the  second  to  the  third  is  a  descending 
movement,  in  respect  both  to  the  character  and  ability  of  the  philo- 
sophic teachers,  and  to  the  vitality  and  duration  of  the  systems  they 
inaugurated.  Stoicism,  the  first  system  of  the  post- Aristotelian  epoch, 
had  for  its  founder  Zeno,  who  was  an  empirical  psychologist,  teach- 
ing the  doctrine,  inherited  from  Aristotle,  that  knowledge  is  derived 
from  the  senses,  and  so  contradicting  the  idea-philosophy  of'Platonism. 
The  Stoics  had  the  reputation  of  being  great  scholars  and  ingenious 
reasoners ;  but,  theologically,  they  taught  that  matter  was  pre-exist- 
ent,  and  God  merely  organized  it  into  worlds;  and,  ethically,  they 
dictated  no  higher  code  than  that  of  mature.  They  had  ideas  of  what 
constituted  the  supreme  good ;  they  believed  in  virtue  in  general, 
were  insensible  to  pain,  and  applauded  heroism,  or  courage  in  bearing 
evil,  as  the  highest  duty  of  man.     Zeno  committed  suicide. 


84  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

Thus  Stoicism  was  a  degeneracy,  compared  dialectically,  ethically, 
and  theologically,  with  Platonism. 

Nor  was  Epicureanism,  a  simultaneous  philosophy,  originated  by 
Epicurus,  any  better ;  rather  has  it  fewer  commendable  features.  It 
is  said  by  Rollin  that  the  Epicureans  were  the  only  natural  philos- 
ophers of  Greece  ;  that  they  pursued  science  methodically,  and  sought 
to  ascertain  the  facts  of  nature  and  systematize  them ;  but  the  his- 
torian's statement  is  too  sweeping.  The  science  of  Epicurus  is  atomic 
and  atheistic.  To  be  sure,  he  avowed  faith  in  God,  but  denied  that 
he  exercised  any  paternal  care  over  men,  or  had  any  interest  in  the 
affairs  of  this  world — a  theological  view  no  better  than  atheism  itself. 
He  revived  the  atomic  theory  of  the  universe,  elaborated  by  Democ- 
ritus,  and  dispensed  with  a  Creator. 

Accepting  the  sensational  philosophy  of  the  Stoics  as  a  correct 
theory  of  knowledge,  he  went  beyond  them  in  the  declaration  that 
men  see  things  as  they  are,  the  senses  in  no  case  deceiving  or  mis- 
representing. For  instance,  the  moon,  he  said,  is  no  larger  than  it 
seems,  and  every  thing  is  as  it  seems  to  us. 

Ethically,  while  Cleanthus,  speaking  for  the  Stoics,  had  said, 
"Pleasure  is  not  an  end  of  nature,"  Epicurus  announced  that  pleas- 
ure is  the  supreme  good,  and  made  it  the  measure  of  human  activity 
and  morality.  He  denied  the  immortality  of  man,  and  rejected  the 
doctrine  of  responsibility. 

Theologically,  philosophically,  ethically,  Epicureanism  descended 
to  the  lowest  depths.  Its  value  has  not  been  demonstrated.  In 
what  the  supreme  good  consisted,  whether  in  virtue,  as  the  Stoics 
chanted,  or  in  pleasure,  as  the  Epicureans  declared,  was  not  only  the 
line  of  difference  between  the  two  sects,  but  it  also  became  the  in- 
quiry, and,  therefore,  the  actual  spirit  of  the  post-Aristotleian  philos- 
ophy. Other  questions,  such  as  man's  nature,  and  his  relation  to  the 
infinite  and  the  phenomenal,  received  occasional  attention,  but  the 
absorbing  theme  was  not  the  ultimate  of  things,  nor  the  ground  of 
existence,  but  how  to  make  existence  comfortable  and  happy. 
Hence,  one  reads. of  the  pleasure-seeking,  the  luxury-loving  spirit, 
and  the  voluptuousness  of  the  Epicureans.  Epicurean  philosophy 
was  the  philosophy  of  pleasure,  amusement,  jollification,  eating  and 
drinking,  and  proposed  to  introduce  an  era  of  good  feeling,  fellow- 
ship, and  hospitality  among  men.  This  being  the  end  of  philosophy, 
it  was  fitting  to  paint  the  scene  of  a  barbecue  at  the  entrance  of  its 
temple,  and  make  it  the  symbol  of  its  purpose.  From  Plato  to  Epi- 
curus is  a  stepping  out  of  the  study  into  the  dining-room,  a  going 
from  the  writing-desk  to  the  table,  an  exchange  of  books  for  vegeta- 
bles and  meats.     This  is  a  supreme  and  fatal  degeneracy. 


DECADENCE  OF  OLD  SYSTEMS.  85 

Nor  is  it  surprising  that,  with  Stoicism  on  the  one  hand,  and  Epi- 
cureanism on  the  other,  mongrel  systems  of  philosophy,  some  based 
on  doubt,  others  without  any  discoverable  basis,  should  arise,  and 
that  the  Athenian  mind,  once  united  on  Plato,  should  now  be  di- 
vided and  shivered  into  fragments.  The  ancient  academy  is  no 
longer  in  the  ascendant,  but  Pyrrho  steps  forth,  announcing  as  a 
leading  principle  of  philosophy  the  necessity  of  indifference  to  all 
things,  to  all  philosophies,  theories,  governments,  and  religions.  Not 
being  certain  of  any  thing,  he  neither  affirmed  nor  denied  ;  he  held 
to  no  opinion,  considering  it  probably,  as  Plato  phrases  it,  a  "sacred 
disease."  This  is  skepticism  reduced  to  a  science.  Pyrrhonism 
passed  for  a  philosophy. 

Skepticism,  or  the  denial  of  certainty  in  knowledge,  was  the  or- 
ganic doctrine  of  the  new  academy,  under  the  leadership  of  Arcesilaus 
and  his  successors.  The  third  period  of  Greek  philosophy,  beginning 
with  sensuous  experience  as  the  capital  doctrine  or  central  fact  of 
both  Stoicism  and  Epicureanism,  descends  into  a  denial  of  sense-knowl- 
edge, then  of  all  knowledge,  and,  finally,  of  all  truth. 

Having  traced  original  philosophic  inquiry  through  its  three 
stages  of  development,  we  find  the  salient  doctrine,  or  esprit  de  corps, 
of  each  to  be:  1.  That  of  the  first  period,  materialism;  2.  That  of  the 
second,  idealism;  3.  That  of  the  third,  empiricism,  ending  in  radical 
skepticism. 

From  this  bird's-eye  view  of  the  ancient  struggle,  the  rise  and  fall 
of  philosophy,  it  is  seen  that  modern  philosophy  has  not  only  com- 
bated the  questions  that  disturbed  the  Hellenic  mind,  but  also  has 
essayed  their  solutid^i  from  the  same  standpoints  of  materialism, 
idealism,  and  empiricism,  and  therefore  has  made  essentially  very 
little  progress. 

What  followed  the  Hellenic  forms  of  philosophic  thought?  In 
other  words,  what  were  the  results  of  that  fermenting  period  of  inquiry 
and  speculation?  What  systems,  if  any,  were  carried  over  into  the 
Christian  era,  and  embodied  themselves  in  the  civilization,  literature, 
and  moral  progress  of  mankind  ?  Or  did  any  survive  the  wreck  of 
the  general  break-up  of  Grecian  life?  To  one  who  has  hoped  for 
permanent  things  from  that  original  period,  the  fact  of  the  decadence 
of  nearly  every  school  of  thouglit  and  every  system  of  philosophy  is 
painful,  and  he  looks  over  the  weary  waste  of  the  great  struggle  with 
a  mournful  interest  and  a  deep  sympathy  of  regret.  Save  the  better 
part  of  Platonism  and  the  dialectics  of  Aristotle,  very  little  of  absolute 
worth  has  been  transmitted  from  that  pre-Christian  epoch  to  our  day. 
Intensely  acute  as  was  the  Grecian  mind,  it  must  also  be  said  that  it 
failed  to  perpetuate  the  philosophic  spirit  in  the  race ;  its  own  philos- 


86  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

ophy  died  without  immediate  succession  or  issue.  It  had  no  heirs 
and  left  its  estate  in  the  tomb.  Cousin  writes  that  the  Socratic  spirit 
survived  for  ten  centuries,  but  it  then  disappeared  in  the  mysticism 
of  Neoplatonism.  For  nearly  sixteen  centuries  the  philosophic  impulse 
was  quiet;  no  great  questions,  save  those  of  religion  and  sectarian 
forms,  agitated  the  public  mind ;  wars  were  numerous,  dividing 
history  into  eras ;  the  people  sank  into  darkness,  and  an  inter- 
regnum, so  to  speak,  prevailed  in  the  philosophic  realm  from  Christ 
to  Bacon. 

Of  this  interregnum,  or  middle  epoch,  we  shall  now  speak.  To  us 
it  seems  a  misfortune  that  during  the  rise  of  the  Church  the  intel- 
lectual giants  of  Southern  Europe,  seizing  the  philosophic  truths  of 
Plato  and  Aristotle,  did  not  appropriate  them  to  the  service  of 
religion  ;  but  the  world  seemed  shut  up  as  in  a  cave,  the  people  were 
like  fishes  without  eyes ;  and  so  the  long  roll  of  centuries  })usse(l  be- 
fore the  philosophic  spirit  returned.  However,  let  us  not  be  uuder- 
stood  as  implying  that  no  attempts  were  made  anywhere  or  by  any 
one  for  the  revival  of  interest  in  the  themes  formerly  discussed  by 
the  Greek  academicians  ;  there  were  inquiries,  but  they  were  sporadic  ; 
speculations,  but  without  majesty  ;  and  an  occasional  philosophy,  but 
it  ended  in  mysticism^  or  religious  eccentricity. 

Neoplatonism,  or  Alexandrian  mysticism,  arising  in  the  third 
century  through  the  dialectical  theology  of  Plotinus,  was  an  attempt 
to  revive  Platonism.  or  to  uuite  Greek  philosophy  and  Christianity ; 
but  it  either  added  or  subtracted  so  much  from  both  that  the  result 
was  a  mystical  religion  and  an  iudefiuable  philosophy.  It  proposed 
visions  and  miracles  on  the  one  side,  and  abstraction  and  Platonic 
platitude  on  the  other.  It  espoused  inspiration  as  a  possible  experi- 
ence; extra  mental  illumination,  spiritual  ecstasy,  and  absorption  for 
the  time  into  the  life  of  the  Deity,  constituted  one  of  its  doctrinal 
points ;  it  was  somewhat  of  a  religion  and  somewhat  of  a  philosophy, 
but  exclusively  neither. 

Cousin  affirms  that  it  was  the  final  assertion  of  Greek  philosophy, 
in  which  form  it  expired,  Justinian  closing  the  schools  of  philosophy 
in  Athens,  A.  D.  529;  but  it  is  not  evident  which  produced  it,  Chris- 
tianity or  Platonism.  In  our  judgment,  Greek  philosophy  terminated, 
not  in  mysticism,  but  in  skepticism,  as  we  have  shown.  It  expired, 
not  by  contact  with  religion,  but  by  descending  into  nothingness. 
For  three  hundred  years  Neoplatonism  swayed  the  East,  but  array- 
ing itself  against  Christianity,  it  at  last  decayed  and  perished. 

Centuries  now  pass  without  mental  quickenijig,  or  illumination  of 
the  grave  Hellenic  problems;  no  one  asks  questions,  no  answers  are 
framed.     Finally  the  sluggish   mind  of  man   is   stirred,  not  to  any 


THE  INTERREGNUM.  87 

great  depth,  but  it  is  stirred.  Scotus  Erigena,  standing  on  the  edge 
of  the  ninth  century  and  looking  backward,  perceived  the  merit 
of  Neoplatonism,  and,  appropriating  it,  he  sought  to  combine  it  with 
Christianity  and  present  to  the  world  both  a  new  religion  and  a 
new  philosophy.  But  Christianity,  true  to  its  inner  life,  refused  to 
enter  into  any  combination,  and  especially  to  suffer  Neoplatoni- 
zation.  Whatever  religious  kinship  there  was  between  them,  the 
one  was  stiff  in  death,  while  the  other  was  the  vital  force  of 
mankind ;  hence,  no  partnership,  no  union,  doctrinal  or  otherwise, 
was  contracted. 

Nearly  two  centuries  pass,  and  Auselm  is  born,  A.  D.  1035.  A 
new  era  is  at  once  apparent.  Philosophical  palpitations  characterize 
the  three  succeeding  centuries.  Scholasticism,  inaugurated  by  Anselm, 
is  perpetuated  by  such  rare  minds  as  Thomas  Aquinas,  Duns  Scotus, 
John  of  Salisbury,  Roger  Bacon,  and  others,  exciting  enthusiasm  in 
the  Church,  and  reviving  the  philosophic  spirit  in  society.  It  was  a 
type  of  Christian  philosophy,  not  a  Platonic  religion.  Hitherto  the 
Church  had  been  engrossed  with  theology,  the  refutation  of  errors, 
the  settlement  of  doctrines,  but  the  time  was  fully  ripe  for  the  con- 
sideration of  analytic  thought.  Intense  as  were  the  schoolmen,  they 
erred  in  the  following  manner:  John  of  Salisbury,  discarding  specu- 
lative thought,  raised  the  standard  of  utility  as  the  measure  of  all 
things;  Thomas  Aquinas,  most  learned  and  devout,  exalted  the 
understanding  above  the  moral  sense;  Duns  Scotus,  a  profound 
reasoner,  exalted  the  will  as  the  instrument  of  character,  and  all 
affirmed  the  explanation  of  divine  truth  by  rational  and  even  dog- 
matic processes.  The  unity  of  faith  and  knowledge,  or  the  scientific 
apprehension  of  supernatural  mysteries,  was  the  backbone  idea  of 
scholasticism ;  but  it  was  not  strong  enough  to  support  either  philoso- 
phy or  religion.  Its  persistence  was  its  destruction.  It  developed 
into  nominalism,  or  the  application  of  names,  denying  realities  and 
realism,  or  the  affirmation  of  objective  realities.  With  William  of 
Occam,  the  latest  and  strongest  schoolman  who  espoused  nominalism 
in  its  most  radical  form,  scholasticism  ceased  to  exist  as  an  indepen- 
dent or  systematic  philosophy. 

Thus  ended  the  interregnum. 

As  great  movements  in  nature,  such  as  earthquakes  and  revolu- 
tions or  reformations  in  history,  are  frequently  preceded  by  outward 
and  anticipatory  signs,  so  the  modern  epoch  of  philosophy,  fruitful 
in  philosophic  experiments,  was  preceded  by  signs  of  preparation, 
and  was  at  length  precipitated  by  an  exhibition  of  the  scientific  spirit. 
Usually,  the  religious  spirit  has  preceded  philosophic  speculation,  and 
has  often  followed  it,  either  in  mysticism  or  some  other  form ;  modern 


88  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

philosophy  was  introduced  by  the  scientific  spirit,  which  has  pervaded, 
and  even  dictated,  the  philosophic  course,  materializing,  corrupting, 
and  undermining  it.  Scholasticism  extinct,  a  love  of  letters  revived, 
America  was  discovered,  and  a  new  interest  in  the  natural  sciences 
was  generated  ;  but  the  intellectual  activity  of  the  period  revived  also 
a  genuine  philosophic  purpose.  Francis  Bacon,  born  A.  D.  1561, 
reported  himself  as  the  apostle  of  a  new  era  by  submitting  new 
methods  of  reasoning  and  inciting  a  spirit  of  investigation  such  as  had 
never  been  felt  by  man.  Partaking  of  the  scientific  spirit  of  Roger 
Bacon,  the  schoolman,  he  plunged  into  the  work  of  original  discovery, 
adopting  as  guiding  principles  the  following:  1.  Abandonment  of  the 
past  in  so  far  as  to  reject  its  influence;  he  declined  to  be  prejudiced 
by  ancient  teachings,  or  enter  upon  investigation  with  preconceived 
views.  2.  He  affirmed  that  knowledge  is  the  result  of  experience. 
3.  He  reinstated  the  inductive  method  of  reasoning  which  had  been 
handed  down  from  Socrates,  Plato,  and  Aristotle,  but  which  had  been 
obscured  and  ignored  by  the  schoolmen. 

An  intellectual  quickening  was  the  result ;  love  of  knowledge  and 
a  scientific  eagerness  dominated  the  public  mind.  In  a  much  less 
degree,  but  with  a  similar  purpose,  Jacob  Boehme  was  arousing  the 
German  mind  from  a  scientific  and  philosophic  lethargy,  preparing  it 
for  an  upheaval,  a  revolution,  indeed ;  yea,  more,  for  that  patient 
study  of  the  greatest  problems  in  philosophy  which  has  distinguished 
that  country  down  to  this  day. 

Let  it  not  be  supposed,  however,  from  their  relation  to  modern 
thought,  that  either  Bacon  or  Boehme  was  the  founder  of  modern 
philosophy.  Lord  Verulam,  it  is  true,  was  the  instrumental  inspirer 
of  the  intellectual  life  of  modern  times,  on  which  account  it  is  almost 
like  robbing  him  of  a  well-earned  glory  to  assign  the  beginning  of  the 
philosophic  epoch  to  a  later  period,  and  to  name  another  thinker  as 
its  founder.  Yet  Bacon  was  not  a  philosopher;  he  was  a  scientist, 
an  investigator  of  physical  facts,  formulating  no  philosophic  system, 
and  leaving  none  to  the  g^ierations  following.  Like  Magellan, 
who,  beholding  the  broad  Pacific,  did  not  venture  to  navigate  it. 
Bacon  may  have  cast  his  eye  over  the  philosophic  sea,  but  he  did 
not  sail  on  its  waters;  he  clung  to  earth,  its  facts,  realities,  laws, 
and  forces. 

Fifty  years  later,  Descartes,  a  Frenchman,  assumed  a  philosophic 
attitude  and  indulged  in  philosophic  utterances  which  history  justly 
acknowledges  as  the  beginning  of  modern  speculative  thought,  the 
tracing  of  which  through  its  manifold  stages  of  development,  its  ob- 
scurities and  transparencies,  its  orthodoxies  and  heterodoxies,  its  ma- 
terialism and  idealism,  must  now  engage  our  attention.     Admitting 


DUALISM  OF  DESCARTES.  89 

that  other  classifications  are  possible,  we  propose  to  consider  modern 
philosophy  under  the  following  general  heads,  without  subdivisions : 
1.  Dualism ;  2.  Spiuozism  ;  3.  Emj)iricism ;  4.  Common-sense  Truism  ; 
5.  Idealism ;  6.  Emotionalism ;  7.  Pessimism ;  8.  Positivism ;  9. 
Rationalism;  10.  Evolution;  11.  Ideal  Kealism  ;  12.  Theologic  Dog- 
matism ;   13.  Christian  Philosophy. 

With  this  outline  before  us,  and  remembering  what  is  beyond  it, 
we  exclaim  with  the  poet,  only  chauging  the  view  to  philosophy — 

"  But  these  attained,  we  tremble  to  survey 
The  growing  labors  of  the  lengthened  way  ; 
The  increasing  prospect  tires  our  wandei'ing  eyes, 
Hills  i)eep  o'er  hills,  and  Alps  on  Alps  arise." 

Descartes,  imbibing  the  Baconian  spirit  of  indifference  to  the  past, 
intensified  it  to  absolute  doubt  of  all  teaching,  a  phase  of  Pyrrhonism 
justified  by  the  solemn  and  sublime  purpose  that  dictated  it.  The 
starting-point  of  investigation  is  cloiiht.  Accept  nothing,  not  for  skep- 
tical ends,  but  for  truth's  sake.  Yet  was  this  rather  an  incidental 
than  an  essential  principle.  It  was  not  the  end,  only  the  beginning 
of  philosophy ;  it  was  not  the  result  of,  but  an  inducement  to,  inquiry. 

Beginning  thus,  Descartes  faithfully  and  laboriously  took  up  the 
great  problems  of  philosophy;  viz.,  matter,  mind,  knowledge,  and 
God,  wrestling  with  the  difficulties  that  inhered  in  the  problems 
themselves,  and  declaring  certain  principles  to  be  fundamental  to 
their  solution.  The  famous  philosophic  apothegm,  "Cogito,  ergo  mm," 
he  originated,  and  insisted  upon  its  sufficiency  and  authority  in  the 
discussion  of  the  problem  of  existence.  From  the  power  to  think, 
from  thinking  as  a  distinct  act,  he  inferred  existence.  He  did  not 
see  that,  reversing  the  proposition,  the  truth  he  meant  to  convey 
would  have  been  declared  in  a  statelier  and  more  logical  form.  Thought 
is  proof  of  existence,  says  Descartes ;  existence  is  proof  of  thought,  say 
we.  He  believed  in  both ;  he  believed  in  matter  and  being,  distin- 
guishing them  as  follows:  the  essence  of  matter  is  extension,  the 
essence  of  mind  is  thought.  The  Cartesian  definitions  and  discrimina- 
tions, subjected  to  keen  analysis,  required  modification  before  they  could 
be  -accepted ;  but  the  destructive  weakness  of  the  system  was  the  in- 
terpretation of  the  relation,  or  rather  non-relation,  of  the  two  sub- 
stances, as  he  designated  mind  and  matter.  They  exist  without  the 
possibility  of  interaction  or  mutual  influence ;  the  mind  does  not  in- 
fluence the  body,  the  body  afl?ects  not  the  mind.  This  is  dualism, 
the  corner-stone  of  modern  philosophy,  the  first  product  of  the  mod- 
ern philosophic  spii'it. 

Himself  undisturbed  by  the  dualistic  conclusion,  the  pupils  and 
successors  of  Descartes,  recognizing  that  mediation   between  the  two 


90  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

distinct,  non-interacting  substances  was  a  necessity,  undertook  to 
affect  it.  Geulinex  and  Malebranche,  especially,  espying  the  incon- 
sistency of  dualism,  were  greatly  exercised  to  bring  about  a  recon- 
ciliation, and  at  last  affirmed  that  the  interacting  union  of  mind 
and  matter  is  possible  with  God. 

Vulnerable  as  is  the  Cartesian  philosophy  from  its  dualism,  it  is 
clear  in  its  enunciation  of  the  difference  between  thought  and  matter, 
or  being  and  not-being;  but,  striking  the  difference,  it  did  not  solve 
the  problem  of  existence,  it  really  added  difficulties  to  the  solution. 

Spinoza  appeared  A,  D.  1632,  a  man  destined  to  exert  a  potential 
influence  in  philosophy,  but  who  did  not  succeed  even  as  well  as  Des- 
cartes, in  the  settlement  of  the  problem  of  being.  He  agreed  with 
Descartes  in  interpreting  God  as  the  infinite  substance,  with  this 
difference :  Descartes  interpreted  God  to  be  a  personal  being ;  Spinoza 
pronounced  God  to  be  the  universe.  Spinozism  is  pantheism,  or  as 
Jacobi  said,  it  is  fatalism  and  atheism.  The  belief  in  one  infinite  sub- 
stance, as  the  source  of  all  things,  is  Christian  in  form,  but  its  inter- 
pretation is  the  essence  of  atheism.  Of  this  one  substance  Spinoza 
affirmed'  that  mind  and  matter  are  mere  accidents ;  that  is,  they  are 
not  the  properties  but  the  emanations  of  the  one  substance,  as 
according  to  the  nebular  hypothesis,  the  worlds  are  the  emanations  of 
one  central  orb.  The  dualism  of  Descartes  was  thus  swallowed  up  in 
the  monism  of  Spinoza,  which  was  unsatisfactory  in  the  extreme. 
Dualism  was  not  a  solution ;  hence,  it  was  unsatisfactory.  Spinozism 
was  a  solution ;  but  it  was  even  more  unsatisfactory  than  dualism, 
for  it  contained  the  worst  elements,  namely,  pantheism,  atheism,  and 
fatalism;  while  dualism  recognized  mind  and  matter  as  essentially 
distinct,  and  God  as  infinite  mind,  as  absolute  personality.  In  the 
hands  of  Spinoza  philosophy  came  to  a  standstill,  if  it  did  not 
retrograde  into  a  barbarism. 

The  year  that  gave  Spinoza  to  the  world  also  witnessed  the  birth 
of  John  Locke,  who  early  appeared  as  an  investigator  and  original 
thinker.  Descartes  incited  him  to  thought ;  Spinoza,  being  contem- 
poraneous, did  not  affect  him.  His  mission  was  to  consider  the  mind, 
its  original  constitution,  the  laAvs  of  thought,  and  the  sources  of 
knowledge,  and,  devoting  himself  most  carefully  to  these  inquiries, 
he  embodied  the  results  in  his  famous  essay  on  the  "Human  Under- 
standing." As  a  starting-point  Mr.  Locke  held,  contrary  to  Plato,  that 
there  are  no  innate  ideas,  that  the  mind  at  birth  is  a  void,  a  blank 
space,  a  tabula  rasa,  containing  nothing,  originating  nothing.  It  is  a 
receiver  of  impressions  and  ideas,  not  an  originator  of  thought.  It 
derives  aU  it  knows  from  without;  it  hioios  nothing  of  itself.  Sen- 
sation is  the  source  of  knowledge.     Subsequently  driven   by   unan- 


EMPIRICISM  OF  LOCKE.  91 

swerable  criticism  into  a  philosophic  relenting,  he  added  reflection, 
as  a  means  of  knowledge,  but  the  materials  for  reflection  he  insisted 
sensation  or  experience  furnished,  so  that  he  drifted  into  an  empirical, 
realistic,  and  materialistic  philosophy. 

Respecting  being,  his  sensationalism  logically  compelled  a  denial 
of  all  knowledge  of  the  divine  substance,  or  the  character  of  God. 
How  different  this  from  the  dualism  of  Descartes  and  the  monism 
of  Spinoza!  Descartes  interprets  mind  and  matter  in  their  differ- 
entiation ;  Spinoza,  in  their  pantheistic  unity ;  Locke  estimates  mind 
as  a  substance  without  quality,  subordinated  in  its  activities  to  foreign 
influence,  i.  e.,  to  external  impression.  Descartes  denies  all  interaction ; 
S])iuoza  merges  interaction  into  unity  of  action;  Locke  denies  to 
mind  independent  action,  but  allows  it  an  externally  forced  activity. 
Both  dualism  and  monism  are  perplexingly  mysterious ;  sensationalism 
is  a  transparent  dogmatism.  While  Locke's  theory  of  mind  has  been 
exploded,  and  although  Morell  characterizes  his  philosophy  as 
ephemeral,  it  is  indisputable  that  it  has  had  a  marked  influence  on 
the  philosophic  thought  of  two  centuries.  Not  upon  dualism  or 
Spinozism,  but  upon  Locke's  empiricism,  philosophic  systems  have 
been  reared  which  exist  to-day,  contaminating  speculative  thought  and 
reducing  all  inquiry  to  the  level  of  materialism.  Hume,  taking  up 
Locke's  theory,  fashioned  a  skeptical  philosophy  whose  influence  has 
been  pernicious  to  the  last  degree.  If  sensation  is  the  source  of  knowl- 
edge, then  knowledge  is  mere  impression,  it  is  not  a  mental  reality; 
and,  reasoning  after  the  manner  of  Berkeley,  who  denied  reality  to 
matter,  he  virtually  denied  reality  to  mind.  This  was  the  outcome  of  the 
philosophy  of  Locke,  a  skepticism  that  was  followed  in  due  time  and 
inevitably  by  all  the  consequences  natural  to  it,  as  looseness  in  morals, 
a  decline  of  the  doctrine  of  human  responsibility,  and  an  abandon- 
ment of  religious  belief  and  rules. 

The  greatest  mischief,  as  the  logical  result  of  empiricism,  occurred 
in  France,  expressing  itself  in  a  variety  of  theories,  but  all  ended  in 
the  maelstrom  of  naked  materialism.  For  instance,  Condillac, 
denying  that  the  sources  of  knowledge  are  sensation  and  reflection, 
reduced  them  to  one  and  became  the  founder  of  the  school  of  sen- 
sualism ;  Helvetius  became  the  apostle  of  altruism  ;  Diderot  disposed 
by  logical  processes  of  morality  and  God;  La  Mettrie  overthrew 
faith  in  the  immortality  of  the  soul ;  and  so  philosophy,  instead  of 
lifting  man  up  to  the  knowledge  of  the  one  substance  which  had 
been  proclaimed  by  Descartes  and  eveii  pantheistically  represented 
by  Spinoza,  degenerated  into  a  skepticism  that  well-nigh  ruined  a  nation 
and  threatened  the  submergence  of  the  Christian  faith  in  its  downfall. 

This   realism,    eventuating  in  skeptical   disaster,  could  not  long 


92  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

prevail.  It  was  a  negativism;  the  mind  requires  affirmation.  Reaction 
was  inevitable. 

Empiricism,  or  Locke's  theory  of  knowledge,  was  formidably- 
antagonized  by  Reid,  a  Scottish  philosopher,  who,  adopting  the 
psychological  method,  not  only  counteracted  the  dangerous  tendencies 
of  sensationalism,  but  prepared  the  way  for  the  idealism  that  followed. 
Locke,  having  declared  that  the  "mind  knows  not  things  immediately, 
but  by  the  intervention  of  the  ideas  it  has  of  them,"  Reid  proceeded 
to  show  the  contrary,  namely,  that  our  perceptions  are  not  depend- 
ent upon  intermediate  ideas,  but  are  immediate.  This  he  established 
by  the  facts  of  consciousness,  or  the  common  sense  of  the  race,  which 
in  his  judgment  Aveighed  more  than  the  most  brilliant  abstraction. 
The  term  "common  sense"  has,  therefore,  been  applied  to  his 
philosophy,  as  embracing  intuitions,  beliefs,  spontaneous  convictions, 
the  universal  judgments  of  men.  Whether  the  philosophy  itself  is 
sound  or  not,  it  was  a  step  in  the  right  direction,  since  it  negatived 
empiricism.  It  was  also  Socratic  in  spirit  in  that  it  rested  on  a 
psychological  birthright  to  authority.  Dugald  Stewart,  possibly 
more  learned  than  Reid,  amplified  and  classified  the  philosophy  of 
"common  sense,"  but  really  originated  no  independent  philosophy. 
Brown  antagonized  Reid,  and  Abercrombie  was  more  of  a  critic  of 
all  philosophic  ideas  than  a  philosopher.  Reid  stands  at  the  head  of 
Scottish  philosophers,  with  weaknesses  that  later  schools  have  detected. 
He  did  not  quite  annihilate  empiricism. 

Another  period  was  at  hand;  it  had  dawned  with  the  dawning 
of  sensationalism  in  the  idealism  of  Leibnitz,  but  did  not  attain 
meridian  strength  until  Kant,  Fitche,  Schelling,  and  Hegel  had 
applied  their  master  forces  to  its  development.  Over  against  the 
empiricism  of  Locke,  Hume,  and  others,  idealism  appeared,  con- 
testing the  right  of  dominion  in  the  realm  of  philosophy.  As  in  the 
past,  so  now,  the  contests  in  philosophy  have  been  chiefly  between 
these  two  schools,  empiricism  and  idealism,  which  will  continue  until 
a  higher  philosophy  appears  which  shall  supersede  both. 

It  is  conceded  that  on  the  whole,  Germany,  beginning  with  Leib- 
nitz, furnishes  for  more  than  one  century  the  leading  philosophic 
minds  of  the  world.  Heine  says  the  English  control  the  sea,  the 
French  the  land,  the  Germans  the  air ;  hence,  metaphysics  and 
moral  philosophy  in  Germany. 

Leibnitz  was  born  A.  D.  1646,  fourteen  years  later  than  Locke  and 
Spinoza,  and,  detecting  the  vulnerability  of  monism,  he  at  once  assailed 
it.  He  held  to  the  individuality  of  mind,  a  vague  conception  of  the 
personality  of  God,  and  tlie  separate  substance  of  matter.  Pantheism 
he  rejected  as  violative  of  faith  in  the  immortality  of  the  soul. 


MONADISM— IDEALISM.  93 

His  cosmological  views  separated  him  still  more  from  Spinoza, 
and  placed  him  upon  the  pedestal  of  an  independent  thinker.  His 
cosmology  was  a  monadology,  the  theory  of  monads  applied  to  the 
interpretation  of  the  universe.  Such  was  the  apparent  resemblance 
between  the  atomic  theory  of  Democritus  and  the  monadology  of 
Leibnitz  that  the  latter  was  compelled  to  frame  a  definition  of  the 
monad,  or  endow  it  with  properties  and  functions  which  did  not  in- 
here in  original  atoms.  Accordingly,  each  monad  is  distinguished 
by  its  individuality,  independence,  and  unlikeness  to  every  other 
monad  :  the  atoms  of  Democritus  were  uniform  in  size,  form,  func- 
tion, and  appearance.  This  is  a  broad  distinction,  but  not  so  broad 
as  that  which,  allowing  the  atom  to  be  potentially  active,  conferred 
on  the  monad  the  properties  of  soul,  making  it  a  self-subsistent,  nor- 
mal substance  and  an  intelligent,  acting  reality.  The  monad  is  a 
soul.  While  this  monadic  idealism  is  not  free  from  objection,  it  ac- 
complished much  toward  the  cancellation  of  Spinozism.  It,  therefore, 
had  a  mission.     Monadism  resisted,  if  it  did  not  overthrow,  monism. 

Monadism,  however,  is  not  the  height  of  idealism.  George 
Berkeley,  an  Irish  philosopher,  reveling  in  the  transcendentalism  of 
his  own  genius,  became  infatuated  with  the  idea  that  he  was  to  reveal 
a  new  principle  in  philosophy,  and,  by  a  singular  dialectic  process, 
plunged  the  theorists  into  the  wildest  antagonisms,  and  imperiled 
some  well-established  conclusions  of  philosophy.  By  a  course  of 
reasoning  plausible,  apposite,  and  captivating,  he  arrived  at  the  con- 
clusion that  the  natural  or  phenomenal  world  does  not  exist,  that  it 
is  an  illusion,  a  mere  appearance — a  doctrine  not  new,  since  the 
Eleatics,  especially  Parmenides,  and  the  Sophists,  had  rejected  the 
existence  of  matter — but  the  argument  was  new,  and  the  world  was 
agitated.  The  other  half  of  his  principle,  that  mind  alone  exists, 
led  to  the  exaltation  of  man's  character,  and  the  glorification  of  the 
eternal  Spirit ;  but,  as  a  principle,  it  is  as  defective  as  that,  of  the 
Eleatics,  and  could  not  be  sustained.  Hume,  employing  Berkeley's 
argument,  soon  demonstrated  the  non-existence  of  mind,  a  conclusion 
more  dangex'ous  than,  but  as  logical  as,  that  of  the  non-existence  of 
matter.  To  such  irrational  conclusions  did  philosophical  speculation 
conduct  the  speculators.  Evidently,  idealism  had  not  reached  its 
culmination,  and  waited  for  a  truer  exponent  and  defender. 

In  the  appearance  of  Kant  idealism  had  a  protagonist  of  pro- 
found wisdom,  a  thinker  of  acute  understanding,  and  a  framer 
of  an  original  philosophical  view  of  existence,  and  its  various 
problems.  Hume's  conclusion  aroused  the  philosophical  spirit  in 
him.  He  began  to  question  the  power  of  reason ;  he  examined 
it   as   one    would    an    instrument,    and    sought   to    ascertain    its  re- 


94  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

lation  to  the  problems  of  Hume,  Berkeley,  and  Descartes.  What 
is  the  range  or  content  of  the  reason  ?  What  are  the  limita- 
tions, if  any,  to  rational  conception?  Fundamentally,  Kant  held 
that  the  world  can  not  be  known,  since  space  and  time  intervene ; 
what  he  calls  the  "  thiug-in-itself,"  i.  e.,  the  substance  or  reality 
of  things,  we  can  not  know,  but  only  phenomena  and  their  relations. 
This  principle  of  necessary  limited  knowledge,  though  fundamental 
to  the  Kantian  creed,  and  its  greatest  weakness,  for  it  virtually 
abandons  the  chief  end  of  philosophy,  namely,  the  search  for  the 
noimienon,  is  not  permitted,  with  evident  inconsistency,  to  interfere 
with  the  successful  attempt  of  the  practical  reason  to  demonstrate  one 
ultimate  cause,  and  all  other  truths  of  theology  or  philosophy. 
Reason  has  two  hemispheres,  or  cerebral  functions ;  the  one  he  calls 
Pure  or  Theoretical  Reason,  which,  subtle,  penetrating,  and  exceed- 
ingly sensitive  to  the  presence  of  thought,  is  yet  unable  to  establish 
the  immortality  of  the  soul,  the  moral  freedom  of  man,  or  the  exist- 
ence of  God.  In  his  "Critique  of  Pure  Reason,"  his  greatest  work, 
after  showing  that  pure  reason  deals  with  three  ideas,  or  the  greatest 
in  philosophy;  viz.,  the  psychological,  the  cosmological,  and  the 
theological,  he  confesses  that  the  ideas  are  unsustained  by  Pure 
Reason ;  that  is,  that  while  the  contents  of  Pure  Reason  are  these 
ideas,  it  will  not  vindicate  them,  because  it  abounds  in  antinomies  and 
paralogisms,  and  the  ideas  themselves  have,  therefore,  not  a  constitu- 
tional authority,  but  only  a  regulative  force.  This  is  not  going  over  to 
Locke's  denial  of  innate  ideas,  but  it  is  in  that  direction,  from  which, 
however,  Kant  himself  recoiled.  His  real  estimate  of  these  ideas  is 
seen  in  the  demonstrating  power  of  the  Practical  Reason,  which  vin- 
dicates them  beyond  successful  assault  from  any  quarter.  The  Pure 
Reason  is  the  "nay"  of  Kant;  the  Practical  reason  the  "yea"  and 
"amen."  By  the  one  the  indemonstrableness  of  the  greatest  truths 
is  apparent;  by  the  other  their  demonstration  is  self-evident,  clear, 
and  convincing.  A  close  examination,  however,  of  the  two  reasons, 
does  not  satisfy  us  that  they  exist,  or,  existing,  that  a  philosophy  can 
possibly  be  maintained  upon  both.  The  universal  consciousness  of 
the  race  furnishes  no  testimony  in  proof  of  their  existence,  nor  is  it 
possible  in  psychological  classification  to  assign  definite  functions  to 
two  kinds  of  reason.  If  two  reasons,  why  not  two  memories,  two 
imaginations,  two  wills,  two  consciences  ?  Besides,  admitting  the  two 
reasons,  the  Pure  ought  to  be  the  stronger,  unfallen,  unbiased  reason, 
while  the  Practical  f)ught  to  be  the  fallen,  imperfect,  and,  therefore, 
unsafe  and  inconclusive  reason.  But  Kant  insists  that  the  Pure,  or 
stronger  reason,  is  the  infirm,  unhealthy,  self-contradicting  reason, 
unable  to  vindicate  its  own  ideas,  while  the  fallen,  Practical  reason  is 


KANT—JACOBL  95 

able  to  demonstrate  the  highest  truth.  This  is  the  essence  of  anti- 
nomy itself.  Far  preferable  is  Cousin's  division  of  the  reason  into 
intuitional  or  spontaneous,  and  reflective  or  voluntary,  the  value  of 
which  for  theological  or  philosophical  purposes  he  defines  clearly  and 
satisfactorily.  By  the  spontaneous  reason  God  is  immediately  and 
universally  recognized,  since  it  is  absolute  reason  which  is  in  harmony 
with  God.  Spontaneous  reason  is  theistic,  concluding  reason.  It  is 
reliable  because  intuitional.     Reflective  reason  is  somewhat  uncertain. 

Guilty  of  bad  and  unwarrantable  distinctions  as  he  was,  Kant 
was  not  one-sided,  as  was  Berkeley  ;  nor  skeptical,  as  was  Hume ;  nor 
monadic,  as  was  Leibnitz ;  nor  dualistic,  as  was  Descartes  ;  nor  pan- 
theistic, as  was  Spinoza  ;  but  his  subjective  idealism  was  orthodoxically 
rational  in  its  intent,  looking  toward  the  infinite  with  the  eye  of  a 
quickened,  rational  judgment,  and  inspired  rational  research  with  the 
promise  of  reward.  Great  was  the  immediate  influence  of  the  Kantian 
philosophy ;  it  is  great  still,  though  its  positions  are  undergoing  mod- 
ification, and  a  gradual  change  of  base  in  inquiry  is  apparent. 

Not  long  after  Kant,  philosophy  assumed  a  new  phase,  not  in  con- 
tradiction of  Kant,  but  in  advance  of  it — a  kind  of  tangent  from  the 
circle  of  thought  in  which  the  thinkers  had  moved,  bringing  them 
to  a  pause,  if  nothing  more.  Jacobi  heralded  a  new  revelation,  and 
claimed  that  he  had  found  the  true  path  to  ultimate  knowledge,  sup- 
porting the  claim  with  learning,  and  dialectic,  not  to  say  metaphysi- 
cal, plausibility ;  and,  had  he  not  weakened  his  conclusions  by 
self-confessions,  he  possibly  had  pioneered  philosophy  through  the 
wilderness  of  doubt  and  darkness  into  the  broad  sunlight  ^f  truth. 
Taking  up  Spinozism,  he  showed  that  it  was  the  result  of  a  demon- 
strative philosophical  attempt ;  that  is,  it  necessarily  followed  from 
certain  accepted  data,  or  the  categories  of  reason,  though  in  its  es- 
sence it  was  atheistic  and  fatalistic.  Considering  the  theoretical 
reason  of  Kant,  he  showed  that  it  must  sustain,  or  at  least  can  not 
contradict,  the  three  ideas  which  constitute  the  estate  of  a  prime 
philosophy.  Rising  from  this  stand-point,  he  pointed  out  that  the 
supersensible  can  be  known  only  by  supersensible  means,  not  by  the 
reason  alone,  but  by  the  principle  of  faith,  or  feeling,  a  "direct  ap- 
prehension, without  proof,  of  the  True,  the  supersensuous,  the 
Eternal."  Thus  "faith-philosophy,"  or  emotionalism,  had  its  intro- 
duction, but  Jacobi  was  ridiculed,  as  preaching  theology  in  disguise, 
and  he  admitted,  from  what  motive  is  not  clear,  that  while  his  heart 
embraced  his  conclusions,  his  head  or  reason  condemned  them. 

Nevertheless,  Emotionalism  anchored  itself  in  the  deep  sea  of 
speculative  thought,  stirring  up  the  waters  of  inquiry,  and  even  in- 
trenching on  the  distant,  rock-rooted  shores  of  the  holiest  truth.     It 


96  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

could  not  be  ignored.  It  was  not  annihilated.  It  still  exists. 
Schleiermacher,  aroused  and  embracing  its  fundamental  conceptions, 
relieved  it  of  its  theological  aspects,  and  endowed  it  with  a  more 
legitimate  or  acceptable  philosophic  form.  Charging  the  Reason  with 
incapacity  to  discover  ultimate  truth,  he  declared  it  could  be  known 
only  through  the  consciousness,  or  the  intuition  of  feeling.  This 
knowing,  truth-searching  consciousness  has  two  sides,  viz. :  there  is 
in  man  a  "God-consciousness,"  from  which  a  feeling  of  dependence 
on  the  Infinite  arises,  and  there  is  a  Christian  consciousness,  which 
inspires  communion  with  God  through  Jesus  Christ.  Out  of  the 
former  arises  the  thought  of  dependence,  which  implies  its  correla- 
tive— a  being  independent,  or  upon  whom  man  depends.  Hence, 
from  the  spiritual  feeling,  rather  than  the  reason,  springs  the  onto- 
logical  conception — long  searched  for  and  believed  in — of  God. 

Mansel,  discovering  in  man  a  sense  of  moral,  obligation  to  the  in- 
dependent being,  conclusively  establishes  the  existence  of  such  a 
being,  carrying  the  faith-philosophy  over  in  still  clearer  form  to  the 
support  of  the  theistic  conception.  However,  contrary  to  Schleier- 
macher, he  does  not  see  in  the  sense  of  dependence  a  conscioxisness  of 
the  Absolute,  but  only  an  implication  of  the  infinite.  The  distinction 
is  clear,  but  the  result  is  the  same. 

But  this  philosophy,  exciting  amusement  on  the  one  hand,  and 
deep  seriousness  on  the  other,  has  not  fully  satisfied  even  Christian 
thinkers,  as  it  seems  to  rely  too  exclusively  upon  the  uncertain  and 
perturbed  emotions  of  consciousness.  The  contents  of  consciousness 
are  prolgptic  of  ultimate  truth,  but  while  philosophy  will  accept  ra- 
tional intuitions,  it  is  slow  to  accept  the  conclusions  of  feeling,  or  to 
be  guided  by  the  various  indexes  of  consciousness.  Evidently  want- 
ing in  some  particulars,  there  may  be  hidden  in  this  new  philosophy 
the  leaven  that  will  leaven  the  Avhole  lump,  ignoring  the  Kantian 
basis,  it  has  perhaps  perpetrated  a  suicidal  act,  but  there  may  be  in 
it  a  guiding  principle  which,  in  other  hands,  will  be  developed  and 
purified. 

Meanwhile,  idealism,  temporarily  eclipsed,  or  rather  suspending 
its  aggressive  purpose,  soon  reappears  in  a  form  kindred  to,  but 
different  from,  the  Kantian  idea.  As  in  Nevada  there  are  streams 
which,  running  for  miles,  suddenly  sink  out  of  sight  and  then  reap- 
pear, so  idealism,  sinking  for  a  brief  time  into  obscurity,  again 
presents  itself  in  the  utterances  of  Fitche,  Schelling,  and  Hegel, 
changing  its  complexion,  but  retaining  its  spirit,  with   each   thinker. 

Fitche  is  the  exponent  of  a  strict  subjective  idealism,  which,  de- 
fined, has  exclusive  respect  to  the  ego  as  the  only  substance.  Between 
the  ego-in-itself  and  the  object-in-itself  we  must  choose ;  one  must  be 


SCEELLING— HEGEL.  97 

rejected.  He  cast  his  vote  in  favor  of  the  ego.  Yet  there  is  a  non- 
ego  which  he  regarded  as  the  limitation  or  hindrance  of  the  ego,  so 
that  the  non-ego  is  a  part  of,  or  the  umbration  of,  the  ego.  The  Ego, 
therefore,  is  all  in  all.  Pu  later  years  he  interpreted  the  ego  as  God, 
which,  including  the  non-ego,  savored  of  Spiuozism,  or  a  mild  and 
unintended  form  of  pantheism.  Hence,  subjective  idealism  was  in 
peril  ;•  it  needed  correction,  purification. 

Schelling,  born  thirteen  years  after  Fitche,  passed  through  many 
mental  vicissitudes,  being  captivated  at  first  with  Fitche  and  becom- 
ing an  idealist,  but,  charmed  by  other  theories,  he  drifted  from  one 
to  another,  until  he  developed  a  form  of  philosophy  known  as  ob- 
jective idealism,  the  contrary  of  Fitche's.  He  began  by  recognizing 
the  same  absolute  in  nature  as  in  mind:  "Nature  is  visible  mind, 
and  mind  is  invisible  nature  ; "  but  this  species  of  subjective  idealism 
did  not  satisfy  him.  '  From  this  point  his  struggles  multiply  and  his 
driftings  commence.  He  is  anxious  to  formulate  the  absolute,  and, 
vibrating  between  subject  and  object,  or  the  ego  and  the  non-ego,  he 
concludes  that  the  Absolute  is  neither  subject  nor  object,  but  the  root 
of  both.  However,  the  spell  of  this  objective  idealism  was  soon 
broken,  and,  imbibing  Spinozism,  he  rejected  both  subjective  and 
objective  idealism,  announcing  as  a  philosophic  dictum  the  indifference 
of  the  real  and  the  ideal,  and  the  reason  as  the  only  Absolute.  With 
this  conclusion  this  restless  thinker  is  soon  dissatisfied,  and  drifts  into 
the  latitude  of  Neo-Platonism,  discarding  nature  and  all  finite  things, 
and  looking  to  the  Absolute  as  the  only  Real.  Being  and  not  the 
"becoming"  (a  touch  of  pure  Eleaticism)  absorbs  his  thought  and 
receives  his  homage.  Even  this  high-toned  conception  brings  him  no 
comfort,  nor  had  philosophy  the  power  to  comfort  him.  In  all  its 
various  stages  philosophy  had  given  to  Schelling  only  an  idea  of  God, 
not  God  himself  He  yearned  for  a  knowledge  of  the  absolute,  and, 
driven  by  intellectual  impulses  and  instructive  entreaties,  he  went  on, 
trying,  testing,  accepting,  and  rejecting  philosophies,  one  after  an- 
other, until  in  despair  of  soul  he  turns  from  philosophy  to  Johannean 
Christianity,  which  reveals  to  him  the  everlasting  God,  and  he  is 
satisfied.     In  passing,  we  note  that  this  is  the  cure  for  all  speculation. 

Idealism  again  appears,  attaining  an  absolute  and  final  character 
in  Hegel  who  affirms  the  existence  of  the  Absolute,  but  the  Absolute 
is  every  thing.  In  his  logic  he  discusses  the  doctrine  of  being,  the 
doctrine  of  essence,  and  the  doctrine  of  notion,  positing  that  being 
is,  per  se,  the  one,  but  the  one  is  the  manifold ;  that  is,  there  are  no 
distinctions  between  thought  and  being,  subject  and  object;  all  are 
one  and  the  one  is  all.  "The  Absolute  is,  with  him,  not  the  infinite 
substance,  as  with  Spinoza ;  nor  the  infinite  subject,  as  with  Fitche ; 

7 


98  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

nor  the  infinite  mind,  as  with  Schelling ;  it  is  a  perpetual  process,  an 
eternal  thinking,  without  beginning  and  without  end."  This  God 
is  the  unity  of  all  things,  the  finite  and  the  infinite,  the  natural  and 
the  supernatural,  the  temporal  and  the  eternal,  involving  |he  stu- 
pendous paralogism  of  the  identity  of  Being  and  Nothing  ;  a  pan- 
theism illogical  for  Hegel's  law  of  logic  is  the  identity  of  contraries 
or  contradictions,  while  from  Aristotle  to  our  day  the  law  of 
contradiction  has  been  considered  unassailable ;  a  pantheism  more 
intense  than  any  Grecian  form  of  it ;  a  pantheism  absurd,  anti- 
Christian,  unphilosophic,  atheistic. 

While  Hegel  threw  up  a  mountain  range  at  the  front,  defending 
his  position  with  force,  his  philosophy,  or  the  philosophy  of  idealism, 
as  he  had  generalized  it,  was  bound  to  decline,  and  with  it  idealism 
in  an  absolute  form.  If  idealism  were  constructively  a  disguised 
pantheism,  or  if  its  final  determinations  were  the  overthrow  of  the 
Kantian  postulates  of  reason,  in  either  case  it  must  be  abandoned ; 
and  Hegel  did  much  to  aggravate  both  of  these  possible  accusations. 
Absolute  idealism,  therefore,  rose  and  fell  with  Hegel.  From  the 
decline  of  Hegelianism  philosophy  degenerates  from  its  lofty  purpose  to 
find  the  ultimate  cause  and  contents  itself  with  becoming  largely  a 
negativism  ;  there  is  a  general  breaking  up ;  there  is  no  uniformity  of 
method  in  investigation  ;  unity  of  purpose  in  pursuit  is  visibly  absent. 

Schopenhauer  is  the  first  representative  of  the  universal  decline, 
for,  espousing  subjective  idealism,  and  accepting  Fitche's  interpretation 
of  the  absolute,  he  reduces  the  subject  to  a  state  of  passivity,  and  so 
transfigures  idealism  into  realism.  He  retains  the  "  thing-in-itself," 
not  with  Kant's  explanations,  but  asserts  that  it  is  the  will,  a  blind, 
necessary  force,  moving  and  regulating  all  existence.  The  world  is 
both  real  and  ideal;  the  Will  is  the  real  world;  the  idgal  is  that 
which  each  person  represents  to  himself.  "The  world  is  my  repre- 
sentation and  I  am  only  when  I  represent,"  says  this  teacher.  Here 
is  idealistic-realism,  or  realistic-idealism,  of  a  beautiful  type,  but 
which  is  singularly  defective  in  its  physical,  not  to  say  psychological 
elements,  for  it  not  only  denies  objectivity  to  the  world,  as  such,  but 
it  locates  the  subject  in  the  object,  a  poetic  confusion  of  distinct  con- 
ceptions rather  than  positive  truth.  Yet  Schopenhauer  admits  the 
existence  of  the  natural  world,  as  the  product  of  will,  which  actualizes 
itself,  (a),  in  the  organic  world;  (b),  in  the  vegetable  kingdom;  (c), 
in  animals.  Its  highest  object-form  is  the  human  brain.  Contending 
that  Will  is  the  thing-in-itself,  the  moving,  universal  force,  he  like- 
wise contends  for  the  contradiction  that  physical  causation  is  identical 
with  matter,  and  causality  itself  is  the  law  of  sufficient  reason.  This 
transfer  of  causation   from  the  will   to  the  substance  or  matter,  pre- 


PESSIMISM— POSITIVISM.  99 

pares  the  way  for  the  ethical  representation  of  the  world,  or  the 
outcome  of  Schopenhauer's  hard  realism.  Logically,  and  emotionally, 
he  is  a  pessimist ;  without  belief  in  a  personal  God,  attributing  so-called 
providential  government  to  an  impersonal  and  necessary  will,  he 
muses  in  despair  over  existence,  sees  in  history  only  the  worst 
regulating  principles,  discovers  nothing  alleviating  or  redemptive  in 
natural  agencies,  and  mingles  his  meditations  with  the  Buddhists, 
accepting  the  doctrine  of  nirvana,  as  the  only  final  relief  from  a  con- 
scious life.  His  philosophy,  so  Schwegler  writes,  is  a  "union  of  the 
transcendentalism  of  Kant  and  Fitche,  the  empiricism  of  Locke,  the 
pantheism  of  Spinoza  and  Schelling,  the  idealism  of  Plato,  and  the 
pessimism  of  the  Buddhists " — a  conglomeration  truly,  with  little 
of  originality  or  independence  of  j)hilosophical  assertion.  Pessimism 
is  the  first  step  downward  from  absolute  idealism. 

,  Its  very  recent  advocate  is  Hartmann,  of  Germany,  who  departed 
from  Schopenhauer  in  the  enlargement  of  philosophic  distinctions, 
and  the  clearness  of  philosophic  definitions.  Hartmann  says  Schopen- 
hauer's Will  can  only  be  an  efticient  cause  ;  there  must  also  be  a  final 
cause,  which  implies  an  act  of  the  reason.  The  Will  is  an  efiicient  but 
not  final  cause ;  Reason  is  a  final  but  not  efficient  cause  ;  therefore, 
the  two,  Will  and  Reason,  constitute  the  substance  and  ground  of  all 
being.  But  the  acting  Reason  is  a  mechanically  acting,  and  there- 
fore, unconscious  reason  ;  hence,  the  Absolute  is  the  union  of  uncon- 
scious intelligence  and  the  will  in  unconscious  force.  With  Schopenhauer, 
God  is  blind,  impersonal  will ;  with  Hartmann,  God  is  the 
unconscious  force  of  reason  and  will ;  hence,  the  world  is  badly 
constructed,  and  man  is  the  victim  of  a  hopeless  government.     • 

How  different  this  from  Platonism !  How  differen.  from  Descartes, 
Leibnitz,  Kant,  Jacobi,  Fitche,  Schelling,  and  Hegel ! 

Comte  introduces  another  retrograding  phase  of  philosophy,  called 
Positivism,  whose  logical  termination  is  atheism.  He  achieved 
notoriety  in  suggesting  that  the  mind  in  its  natural  development 
passes  through  three  successive  stages,  as  follows:  1.  The  theological, 
or  fictitious ;  2.  The  metaphysical,  or  abstract ;  3.  The  positive,  or 
scientific.  Asserting  that  the  mind  unfolded  in  this  order,  it  followed 
that  it  outgrew  the  theological  or  religious,  and  the  metaphysical  or 
philosophical,  and  attained  in  its  higher  development  a  positive  or 
scientific  state.  Psychologists,  however,  immediately  rejected  this 
discrimination,  it  having  been  established  that  the  mind  grows  in  the 
reverse  order,  attaining  to  a  normal  theological  condition  last.  Athe- 
istic as  is  the  spirit  of  positivism,  Comte  admitted  the  necessity  of 
religion,  and  actually  prepared  a  creed  and  ordinances,  but  the  pur- 
pose was  ethical,  not  religious  in  the  highest  sense.     Can   philosophy 


100  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

go  lower  than  pessimism  and  positivism?  Reactions  usually  follow 
extremes.  Comte  has  been  overthrown  ;  Hartmaun  is  without  fol- 
lowers; yet  in  these  days  of  modern  inquiry,  it  can  not  be  said  that 
philosophy  is  recovering  an  idealistic  tone;  or  that  it  is  solving  the 
problem  of  the  ultimate. 

Along  with  the  materialistic  and  self-contradictory  philosophic 
ideas  of  the  early  part  of  the  nineteenth  century  there  appeared  an 
eclectic  spirit  which,  prudently  surveying  the  field,  ventured  to  sug- 
gest a  new  basis  for  philosophic  investigation.  Rejecting  materialism, 
it  also  parted  company  with  theology,  as  such,  and  made  psychology 
or  the  reason  the  starting-point  of  philosophic  endeavor,  a  hopeful 
sign  of  progress  as  well  as  a  barrier  to  the  atheism  of  the  period. 
This  is  Rationalism,  or  Eclecticism,  V.  Cousin,  an  able,  eloquent, 
sincere  investigator  of  the  great  problems  of  life,  being  its  exponent. 
In  insisting  on  the  reason,  or  subjective  experience,  as  the  foundation 
of  all  investigation,  he  coincides  with  Socrates,  who  was  the  first  to 
introduce  the  subjective  method  in  philosophic  pursuits ;  in  insisting 
on  the  infallibility  or  inspiration  of  the  spontaneous  reason  we  find  a 
ground  for  fatal  criticism,  since  even  the  spontaneous  reason  of  man 
is  supposed  to  be  affected  somewhat  by  his  inherited  degeneracy. 
Rationalism  assigns  to  the  reason  hyper-functional  powers.  The  objec- 
tion of  Dr.  B.  F.  Cocker  that  Cousin  does  not  rely  upon  revealed 
truth,  or  the  Scriptures,  is  not  well  taken,  since  philosophy  under- 
takes to  pilot  itself  without  the  aid  of  religion  to  the  shores  of  the 
eternal.  Guided  by  revealed  religion,  philosophy  will  have  no 
trouble,  but  in  that  event  the  strength  or  weakness  of  philosophy,  as 
such,  will  not  be  manifest. 

Rationalism,  without  its  extremes,  occupies  a  right  footing,  being 
preferable  to  idealism,  and  certainly  is  superior  to  the  foggy  atmos- 
phere of  pessimism  or  positivism.  The  starting-point  of  materialism 
is  nature  ;  of  theology,  God  ;  of  rationalism,  man. 

In  historic  order  we  have  reached  the  so-called  Associational 
school  of  psychologists,  who,  sensitive  to  the  charge  of  atheism  and 
quick  to  repel  it,  have  advanced  explanatory  theories  of  the  mind 
and  its  action  which  logically  justify  the  unenviable  accusation  of 
materialism.  The  psychological  principle  of  the  ^school  is  that  the 
laws  of  thought,  which  we  distinguish  by  specific  names,  are  reducible 
to  one  universal  law,  namely,  association,  without  which  the  mind  is 
inert  and  productionless.  To  John  Stuart  Mill  and  Alexander 
Bain,  the  one  dead,  the  other  living,  the  doctrine  is  indebted  for 
advocates.  Mr.  Mill  inherited  the  doctrine  of  utilitarianism  through 
his  father  from  Jeremy  Bentham  ;  he  was  also  most  profoundly  influ- 
enced  by   Dr.   David   Hartley,  whose    physiological   explanation   of 


THE  ASSOCIATIONAL  SCHOOL.  101 

mental  action  deprived  the  mind  of  intuitional  and  original  character. 
It  is  well  known  that  the  elder  Mill  very  early  determined  to  mold  the 
son  according  to  his  philosophical  theories,  to  give  him  no  religious 
education,  to  foster  in  him  no  reverential  sentiments,  to  make  him 
just  what  he  desired  ;  the  son,  therefore,  was  a  singular  character,  a 
machine-made  man ;  and  it  is  no  wonder  that  his  philosophy  is  faulty, 
inadequate,  materialistic,  and  inherited,  i.  e.,  borrowed  rather  than 
orig^al.  In  his  published  works  J.  S.  Mill  holds  that  knowledge  is 
the  product  of  sensation ;  heuce,  phenomena  alone  are  knowable ; 
being  is  unknowable.  Thus  far  he  had  traveled  along  the  familiar 
track  of  philosophy  from  the  days  of  Aristotle,  but  he  took  a  step  in 
advance  in  his  proclamation  of  causation  as  an  example  of  succession 
in  natiire ;  that  is,  that  there  is  no  necessary  connection  between 
cause  and  effect,  but  only  a  sequence.  This  was  destructive  of  all 
jEtiology,  threw  mystery  over  all  the  operations  of  nature,  blotted 
out  accepted  conclusions  of  philosophy,  and  inaugurated  the  drift 
period  in  speculative  thought.  Foundations  were  shaken ;  anchorage 
was  impossible ;  the  ultimate  could  no  longer  be  reached  a  jiosterioriy 
or  by  the  frequented  steps  of  causation. 

In  keeping  with  this  physical  theory,  he  taught  that  the  mind  is  a 
"series  of  feelings,"  or  an  association  of  emotions,  without  causal  con- 
nection. Eliminating  causation  from  the  natural  world,  it  was  easy 
to  eliminate  it  from  mental  activity,  which  conclusion  became  the 
essence  of  associationalism. 

The  step  to  evolution,  or  the  last  type  of  modern  philosophy,  is  a 
short  one.  Herbert  Spencer  is  its  sponsor.  If  one's  education  has 
any  thing  to  do  with  one's  philosophy,  then  in  the  fact  that  Spencer's 
education  was  largely  confined  to  physical  studies  we  find  an  explana- 
tion of  the  mechanical  hypothesis  of  creation  he  finally  adopted  and 
has  to  the  present  hour  emphasized.  Respecting  the  universe,  he 
holds  that  it  is  the  product  of  evolutionary  forces;  respecting  God, 
he  holds  that  he  is  ignoscible,  unthinkable ;  respecting  the  human 
mind,  he  is  an  associationalist,  teaching  that  consciousness  is  a  nervous 
sensation  and  thought  a  product  of  organization.  He  distinguishes 
between  the  nature  of  mind,  Avhich  is  unknowable,  and  the  phenom- 
ena of  mind,  which  are  knowable,  affirming  that  there  is  a  science, 
but  not  a  philosophy,  of  mind.  The  process  of  evolution  is  expressed 
as  the  "redistribution  of  matter  and  motion,"  by  which  mental  states 
are  produced  and  succeed  one  another.  The  nervous  structure  is 
double-faced,  being  objective  and  subjective ;  objective  activity  is  un- 
knowable ;  subjective  experience,  consisting  of  conscious  or  phenom- 
enal states,  is  recognized,  and,  therefore,  knowable.  Intellectual 
activity  is  refined  nervousness. 


102  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

Following  this  reduction  of  mental  phenomena  to  nervous  states, 
Mr.  Spencer  had  little  difficulty  in  pronouncing  the  limitations  of 
human  knowledge.  Conceptions  he  divides  into  three  classes,  viz.: 
1.  Complete;  2.  Symbolic;  3.  Pseud-ideas.  On  the  complete  and 
symbolic  conceptions,  inasmuch  as  they  are  knowable,  positive 
science  may  securely  rest;  but  such  ideas  as  God,  immortality,  or  re- 
ligions, or  necessary  moral  truths,  inasmuch  as  they  are  unknowable, 
are  denominated  pseud-ideas,  to  be  entertained  as  speculations  oi-  ab- 
stractions only.  In  these  conclusions  Spencer  draws  the  curtains  of 
midnight  around  us,  and  turns  the  earth  away  from  the  sun.  To  ig- 
nore necessary  truths,  as  does  Mr.  Spencer,  is  as  if  one  carrying  a 
lighted  lamp  should  forget  about  it  and  let  it  fall,  occasioning  an  ex- 
plosion and  consuming  his  person.  To  this  it  may  be  replied  that 
Mr.  Spencer's  lamp  is  not  lit,  and  there  is  no  danger  if  he  let  it  fall. 
Perhaps  this  is  the  trouble.  Necessary,  religious  truths  ought  to 
flame  in  and  around  heart  and  intellect ;  then  the  notion  of  pseud- 
ideas  would  be  extinguished  in  the  brilliant  blaze  of  truth.  The  ob- 
server will  discover  that  Spencer,  forgetting  necessary  truth,  confines 
himself  to  his  conceptiom  of  truths  in  general ;  but  a  genuine  philos- 
ophy deals  with  the  former  and  ignores  the  latter,  or  considers  them  as 
incidental  forms.  The  philosophy  of  Herbert  Spencer  is  sensational, 
negative ;  phenomenal,  not  ultra-phenomenal ;  dealing  with  appear- 
ances, not  causes ;  with  matter,  not  mind ;  with  physical  activity,  not 
a  personal  God. 

Ethically,  the  philosophy  is  defective  in  contents  and  pernicious  in 
effect,  for  if  intellectual  manifestation  can  be  reduced  to  nervous 
action,  moral  emotions,  convictions,  aspirations,  and  sentiments  may 
be  considered  a  display  of  the  nervous  sensibilities.  And  so  we  find 
it.  The  ethics  of  Spencer  is  the  sum  of  physiological,  psychological, 
and  sociological  influences ;  that  is,  the  result  of  the  suggestions  of 
nature,  the  convenience  and  expediency  of  communities,  the  com- 
parison of  wants,  the  study  of  the  issues  of  virtue  and  vice.  Ethical 
teaching  is  not  grounded  in  philosophical,  religious,  or  ultimate  truth ; 
there  is  no  immutable  standard  of  right  and  wrong ;  so  said  Epicurus ; 
so  said  Aristotle ;  so  echoes  Spencer.  In  the  language  of  Spencer, 
conduct  is  the  adjustment  of  the  inner  relations  of  life  to  the  outer 
relations,  i.  e.,  the  world.  Conduct  is  a  struggle  toward  this  adjust- 
ment ;  if  one  succeed  in  realizing  the  adjustment,  he  has  perfected 
his  conduct ;  otherwise,  he  is  a  wreck.  Success,  then,  or  survival,  is 
the  standard  of  right.  This  is  the  ethical  side  of  the  physical  theory 
of  mind,  the  essence  of  the  philosophy  of  Spencer,  the  latest  expres- 
sion of  the  character  of  man. 

To  omit  all  reference  to  American  philosophers  would   be  unjust 


CHRISTIAN  PHILOSOPHY.  103 

to  them  as  a  class,  and  render  this  survey  incomplete.  Really  there 
is  no  American  philosophy,  j^er  se,  but  the  "Concord  School"  still 
exists,  representing  a  form  of  Hegelianism,  a  phase  of  pantheism, 
and  the  nobler  edition  of  Emersonianism.  Perhaps  the  philosophy 
taught  by  the  school  should  be  characterized  as  ideal  realism,  a  mix- 
ture of  the  high  and  low,  carrying  both  sides  of  the  great  problems, 
and  emphasizing  to-day  what  seems  to  be  in  the  ascendant,  but  at 
liberty  to  change  to-morrow.     In  this  we  do  it  no  injustice. 

Happily,  we  may  now  speak  of  a  philosophy  of  an  entirely  differ- 
ent character  from  any  of  the  preceding,  the  chief  objection  to  it  be- 
ing its  theologic  trend,  or  whether  it  is  philosophic  at  all  in  its  method 
and  spirit.  We  refer  to  theological  dogmatism,  whose  purpose  is 
the  vindication  of  the  very  problems  which  have  exercised  a  control- 
ling influence  on  speculative  thought,  and  whose  solutions  have  not 
yet  been  wrought  out  in  the  name  of  philosophy.  James  Arminius 
and  John  Calvin  properly  represent  the  theologic  school  of  dog- 
matics, who,  assuming  the  Scriptures  to  be  inspired  of  God,  demon- 
strate by  both  a  priori  and  a  posteriori  methods  the  existence  of  God, 
and  interpret  both  nature  and  man  as  an  easy  task.  The  aid  of  rev- 
elation is  not  considered  indispensable  to  philosophy  ;  but  the  day  will 
dawn  when  philosophy  will  be  warranted  in  appropriating  all  the  aids 
at  hand,  religiorf  being  one  of  them.  If  dogmatic  theology  be  re- 
jected as  a  philosophical  conception,  then  surely  there  is  room  for  a 
school  of  Christian  philosophers,  just  as  there  has  been  room  for 
atheistic  and  pessimistic  philosophers ;  that  is,  the  philosopher  may  be 
justified  in  establishing  theistic  conclusions  without  peril  to  his  repu- 
tation. To  this  the  world  is  fast  coming.  Emerging  from  the  philo- 
sophical Avrecks  is,  what  the  ages  have  waited  for,  but  which  is,  as 
yet,  undeveloped,  namely,  a  Christian  philosophy,  or  the  j^hilosophy  of 
being  from  the  Christian  standpoint.  Lotze,  of  Germany,  and  Bowne 
and  McCosh,  of  the  United  States,  may  be  taken  as  the  representa- 
tives of  the  religious  element  in  philosophy,  without  which  there 
is  no  true  philosophy.  Philosophy,  without  the  pilotage  of  religion, 
runs  into  pessimism,  atheism,  materialism  ;  with  it,  there  is  trans- 
parency, because  there  is  revelation.  But,  as  this  phase  of  philos- 
ophy will  hereafter  receive  attention,  we  do  no  more  at  present  than 
mention  it. 

We  have  traveled  a  long  distance  from  Thales  to  Lotze,  having 
gone  over  mountains,  crossed  the  seas,  wandered  through  wildernesses 
of  thought,  tarried  in  schools  and  academies,  looked  up  into  the  sky, 
down  into  the  soul,  and  beyond  all  things,  for  the  face  of  God. 
Philosophy  is  a  weary  and  weird  traveler,  ever  journeying  on  foot, 
provided   only  with   scrip,  crackers,  and  staff;  a  beggar,  asking  of 


104  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

every  thing,  but  receiving  doubtful  answers  and  unsatisfactory  aid. 
During  this  long  period  of  twenty-five  hundred  years,  philosophy  has 
not  found  the  ultimate  ;  the  problem  of  beiiig  is  still  unsolved ;  and 
though  at  times,  as  in  Plato,  it  has  gone  up  to  Pisgah's  heights,  from 
which  the  Holy  Land  of  thought  was  seen,  it  has,  as  in  Mill,  drifted 
toward  the  North  Pole,  and,  as  in  Spencer,  gone  down  to  the  center 
of  the  earth.  In  Plato,  an  eagle ;  in  Mill,  a  bear ;  in  Spencer,  a  mole. 
In  these  twenty-five  centuries  there  have  been  progress  as  well  as 
decline,  approximate  solutions,  lacking  only  the  full  tide  of  inspira- 
tion to  make  them  entirely  correct,  and  give  them  complete  and  au- 
thoritative validity,  as  well  as  self-acknowledged  or  universally  per- 
ceived failures.  It  can  not,  therefore,  be  said  that  the  progress, 
whatever  its  character  and  extent,  has  been  direct  and  methodical,  or 
that  it  can  be  easily  traced  from  system  to  system,  or  school  to  school, 
for  it  has  receded  and  flowed  like  the  tides,  rising  and  falling  with 
no  uniformity,  and  under  no  visible  law  of  development.  Vico 
taught  that  history  repeated  itself,  or  that  life  revolved  in  a  circle; 
Goethe  taught  that  the  world  moved  in  spirals ;  Hegel  taught  that  the 
history  of  philosophy  is  a  "united  process,"  a  gradual  unfolding  of 
principles,  a  constant  advancement  toward  the  truth.  Reviewing  the 
historic  struggles  of  philosophy,  one  is  almost  ready  to  aflirm  that  it 
is  a  repeating  process,  a  circle  of  ideas ;  or,  if  progressive,  that  its 
method  is  spiral ;  but  that  its  progress  has  been  regular,  each  system 
an  improvement  on  the  preceding,  each  age  nearer  the  truth  than  a 
former  age,  seems  inconsistent  with  the  facts.  Progress  is  the  law  of 
nature,  language,  science,  music,  mind;  as  Cocker  says,  "the  present, 
both  in  nature  and  history  and  civilization,  is,  so  to  speak,  the  aggre- 
gate and  sura  total  of  the  past;"  but  philosophy  has  not  followed  the 
law  of  evolution,  either  in  its  general  course  or  in  its  outcome,  for 
idealism  is  superior  to  materialism,  and  Plato  is  a  safer  philosopher 
than  Herbert  Spencer.  There  has  been  no  steady,  uniform  progress 
in  philosophical  discovery,  nor  even  a  gradual  advancement  toward  a 
knowledge  of  the  absolute  and  everlasting  God.  The  line  of  progress, 
if  we  allow  it  at  all,  is  a  zigzag  line,  exceedingly  irregular  and  un- 
satisfactory. Putting  the  eye  on  the  historical  order  of  philosophic 
development,  we  often  see  two  or  more  systems  opposed  in  their 
fundamental  conceptions,  as  the  "fire"  philosophy  of  Heraclitus  and 
the  atomic  theory  of  Democritus  in  ancient  times,  and  the  pantheism 
of  Spinoza  and  the  empiricism  of  Locke  in  modern  times,  arise  almost 
simultaneously,  the  one  not  quenching  the  other,  but  modified  by  a 
future  teacher  and  discoverer.  The  historical  order  is  illogical ;  the 
logical  order  is  unhistorical.  One  system  does  not  grow  out  of 
another.     Each   springs   up  like  Jonah's  gourd  in  the  darkness,  and 


ANCIENT  SYSTEMS. 


105 


withers  away  because  of  its  inner  and  excessive  weaknesses,  abomina- 
tions, and  inaptitudes. 

By  this  we  do  not  mean  that  there  is  no  connection  whatever 
among  the  various  schools  or  systems  of  thought,  for  this  would  be 
to  overlook  the  confessed  relation  of  Socrates  and  Plato,  Locke  and 
Hume,  Spencer  and  Hamilton,  Fitche  and  Schelling,  Schopenhauer 
and  Hartmaun,  Hartley  and  Mill.  But,  adopting  Mill's  interpreta- 
tion of  causation,  we  say  the  connection  of  philosophical  systems  is 
not  causal,  but  formal  and  accidental;  the  history  thereof  is  the  his- 
tory of  succession,  not  of  necessary  relation. 

That  this  interpretation  of  the  historic  order  of  philosophy  is 
correct,  we  place  in  columnar  array  the  names  of  the  principal 
philosophers  of  the  ancient  period,  designating  their  systems,  and  the 
time  of  their  birth,  or  the  period  when  they  flourished — a  schedule 
of  the  entire  history. 


Philosophers. 

Period  or  Birth. 

Philosophy. 

Thales, 

B.  C.  640-550,  . 

Materialism,  or  the  Physical  Principle. 

Anaximander,  . 

B.  C.  610. .    .    . 

Anaxinienes, .   . 

B.  C.  529-480, . 

"                                      «                      u 

Heraclitus,  .  .    . 

B.  C.  503-420,  . 

"                                        a                       u 

Pythagoras,    .    . 

B.  C.  605, .    .    . 

Mathematical  Principle. 

Zenophanes,  .    . 
Parmenides,  .    . 

B.  C.  616-516,  . 
B.  C.  536,  .    .    . 

Idealism,  or  the  Intelligent  Principle. 

Zeno, 

B.  C.  500,  .    .    . 

'<                            li                « 

Anaxagoras,  .    . 

B.  C.  500-428,  . 

Mental  Principle. 

Leucippus, .    .    . 

B.  C.  500-400,  . 

Atomic  Principle. 

Democritus,   .    . 

B.  C.  460-357,  . 

Empedocles,  .    . 

B.  C.  440, .    .    . 

Eclecticism. 

Protagoras, .   .    . 

B.  C.  440,  .    .    . 

Nescience. 

Gorgias,  .... 

B.  C.  427,  .    .    . 

Idealism. 

Socrates 

B.  C.  469-399,  . 

" 

Plato,   

B.  C.  430-347,  . 

" 

Aristotle,.  .    .    . 

B.  C.  384,  .    .    . 

Sensationalism. 

Epicurus,    .    .    . 

B.  C.  342-270,  . 

Epicureanism. 

Zeno, 

B.  C.  340, .    .    . 

Stoicism. 

Arcesilaus, .   .    . 

B.  C.  316-241, . 

Skepticism. 

The  above  is  Grecian  philosophy  in  outline,  a  zigzag  line,  truly, 
its  systems  unconnected,  and  its  last  state  worse  than  the  first. 
Beginning  Avith  a  materialistic  assumption,  which  changes  its  form 
and  phraseology,  but  not  its  spirit,  with  every  succeeding  teacher,  it 
rises  to  an  incipient  or  anticipatory  idealism  in  Pythagoras,  attains 
to  a  one-sided  or  absolute  idealism  in  the  Eleatics,  especially  in  Par- 
menides, assumes  philosophic  dignity  in  the  nous  or  mental  principle 
of  Anaxagoras,  and  then,  with  melted  wings,  sinks  down  into  the 
atomic  theory,  or  another  phase  of  materialism,  of  Democritus — the 


106 


PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 


atheism  and  chance-philosophy  of  Greece.  Materialism,  idealism, 
atheism,  are  the  successive  but  irregular  steps  thus  far  of  the  early- 
philosophy. 

Springing  back  like  the  released  bow,  it  betakes  itself  again  to 
idealism,  reaching  its  profoundest  culmination  in  Socrates  and  Plato, 
Socrates  being  the  flower  and  Plato  the  fruit  of  a  dialectical  system 
that  has  never  been  surpassed.  This  is  the  summit,  the  highest 
water-mark  of  ancient  philosophy,  from  which  it  descends  first  in 
Aristotle  to  empiricism,  then  in  Zeuo  to  spiritualistic  pantheism,  and 
in  Epicurus  to  the  logical  termination  of  the  mechanical  hypothesis — 
atheism.  From  this  is  but  a  single  step  to  skepticism,  which  the 
New  Academy,  in  Arcesilaus,  maintained. 

In  these  successive  movements  of  the  ancient  systems  it  is  impos- 
sible to  discover  an  inner  connection,  or  a  periodic  progress,  or  any 
type  of  evolution.  Reactions,  reformations,  upheavals,  disguises,  inter- 
rogations, summits,  abysses — these  belong  to  the  philosophic  period  of 
four  hundred  years,  but  an  orderly  or  even  final  progress  is  not  visible. 

Passing  through  the  interregnum,  which  furnished  little  genuine 
philosophy,  we  arrive  at  the  modern  period ;  a  period  full  of  inquiry, 
persevering  in  its  research,  teeming  with  results  in  systems  without 
number,  and  opening  new  paths  for  the  feet  of  future  travelers.  Its 
history  may  be  tabulated  about  as  follows : 


Philosophers. 

Birth. 

Philosophy. 

Bacon, » 

A.  D.  1561,  .... 

Science. 

Boehme, 

A.  D.  1575,  . 

Mysticism. 

Descartes,   - 

A.  D.  1596,  . 

Dualism. 

Spinoza,  .    . 

A.  D.   1632,  . 

Pantheism. 

Locke,  .   .    . 

A.  D.  1632,  . 

Sensationalism. 

Leibnitz, .   . 

A.  D.  1646,  . 

Idealism. 

Berkeley, .  . 

A.  D.  1685,  . 

Reid,    .    .    . 

A.  D.  1710,  . 

Common  Sense. 

Hume, .  .    . 

A.  D.  1711,  . 

Skepticism. 

Kant,   .    .    . 

A.  D.  1724,  . 

Idealism. 

Jacobi, .  .    . 

A:  D.  1743,  . 

Faith-philosophy. 

Stewart,  .    . 

A.  D.  1753,  . 

Common  Sense. 

Fitche,.  .   . 

A.  D.  1762,  . 

Subjective  Idealism. 

Schelling,    . 

A.  T>.  1775,  . 

Objective          " 

Herbart,  .  . 

A.  D.  1776,  . 

Sensationalism. 

Hegel,.    .    . 

A.  D.  1770,  . 

Absolute  Idealism. 

Brown,  .  .    . 

A.  D.  1778,  . 

Representationism. 

Hamilton,   . 

A.  D.  1788,  . 

Nescience. 

Schopenhauei 

*, . 

A.  D.  1788,  . 

Pessimism. 

Corate, .   .    . 

A.  D.  1798,  . 

Positivism. 

J.  S.  Mill,    . 

A.  D.  1806, . 

Associationalism. 

Spencer,  .    . 

A.  D.  1820,  . 

Evolution. 

Hartmann,  . 

A.  D.  1842,  . 

Pessimism. 

Lotze,  .    .    . 

A.  D.  1817,  . 

Monotheism. 

MODERN  SYSTEMS.  107 

One  has  only  to  glance  at  this  historic  representation  of  modern 
philosophy  to  be  able  to  decide  whether  it  has  regularly  progressed  or 
declined,  and  what  its  last  state  is  compared  with  the  first.  Begin- 
ning with  Bacon,  it  dealt  chiefly  with  the  facts  and  problems  of  natu- 
ral science,  together  with  a  review  of  the  methods  of  reasoning,  or 
dialectics.  Bacon  was  a  scientist,  a  pioneer,  paving  the  way  for 
philosophy,  and  really  summoned  it  to  its  rightful  tasks.  Following 
him  it  appeared  according  to  the  above  schedule.  In  Descartes  it 
lost  or  did  not  find  the  idea  of  unity  ;  in  Spinoza  it  lost  God ;  in 
Locke  it  declared  for  an  empty  mind ;  over  Leibnitz  the  idealistic 
spirit  broods,  and  monadology  is  the  result ;  in  Berkeley  a  form  of 
Eleaticism  reappears ;  in  Hume  the  mind  is  without  recognition.  Ee- 
actions  follow,  and  Kant  strikes  for  idealism.  There  is  a  rising 
again ;  the  wings  begin  to  grow.  Jacobi  declares  for  faith  in  God ; 
Fitche,  Schelliug,  and  Hegel  wheel  into  the  direct  line  of  idealism, 
ascending  higher  than  their  predecessors,  but  compelled  to  halt  if  not 
beat  a  retreat.     Idealism  broke  its  bow  by  over-straining. 

Idealism  lost  caste,  being  followed  rapidly  by  the  pessimism  of 
Schopenhauer,  the  positivism  of  Comte,  the  associationalism  of  Mill, 
and  the  evolution  of  Spencer,  checked  only  a  trifle  by  the  intermediate 
systems  of  Hamilton,  Stewart,  and  Reid. 

Spanning  the  period  from  the  idealism  of  Descartes  to  the  evolu- 
tion of  Spencer,  and  recollecting  the  manifold  forms  of  pantheism, 
sensationalism,  skepticism,  idealism,  pessimism,  and  atheism,  which  it 
has  assumed,  we  can  not  concede  a  regular  order  in  philosophic  his- 
tory, nor  is  progress  noticeable,  save  in  the  general  results  of  research 
and  the  study  of  mind.  Modern  philosophy  ends  as  did  ancient 
philosophy,  with  sensationalism,  a  physical  conception  of  the  universe, 
and  an  atheistic  sentiment  respecting  its  Maker.  In  these  results 
modern  has  repeated  the  story  of  ancient  philosophy,  only  varying 
the  form.  The  old  philosophy  was  the  archetype  of  the  new,  the 
ancient  of  the  modern  ;  there  is  little  new  in  the  new.  Eleaticism  was 
the  forerunner  of  Idealism  ;  Pythagoras  was  the  Descartes  of  his  age ; 
Parmenides  repeats  himself  in  Spinoza  ;  Zeno  is  transformed  in  Hegel. 
This  is  not  progress. 

But  the  end  is  not  yet.  Such  words  as  pessimism,  atheism,  evo- 
lution, ring  in  our  ears,  disturbing  our  slumber  with  nightmare,  and 
filling  life's  activity  with  anxiety  and  fear  ;  but  the  new  words,  soul, 
God,  immortality,  heaven,  taken  up  by  Lotze,  have  gone  out  into  all 
the  world  to  inspire  the  sons  of  men.  Are  they  deceptions,  or  are 
they  real?     We  shall  see. 


108  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY, 


CHAPTER  III. 

THE     PROVINCE     OK     PHILOSOPHY. 

IN  the  Loggia  of  Raphael,  in  the  Vatican  at  Rome,  are  four  pic- 
tures, which  the  visitor  is  sure  to  observe  with  considerable  inter- 
est, both  because  the  artist  produced  them  at  the  early  age  of  twenty- 
five  years,  and  also  because  they  represent  the  departments  of  theology, 
poetry,  philosophy,  and  justice.  One  has  no  difficulty  in  fiuding 
"philosophy,"  which  rises  as  a  vaulted  hall,  with  outside  marble  steps, 
on  which  sits  lazy  Diogenes,  clothed  in  a  single  garment ;  in  the  hall 
Plato  and  Aristotle  are  conversing,  Plato  pointing  u-pward,  and 
Aristotle  pointing  forward.  Raphael's  conception  of  the  historic 
career  of  philosophy,  and,  equally,  of  its  prophetic  mission,  is  per- 
haps as  correct  as  any  that  has  had  expression,  either  iu  art,  or 
history,  or  philosophy.  Diogenes  represents  the  slow,  plodding 
thinker,  careless  of  this  world,  being  occupied  with  thoughts  that  the 
multitude  do  not  understand,  or  in  which  they  have  invested  but  a 
little  interest ;  Plato  represents  its  highest  aspirations ;  Aristotle,  its 
spirit  of  progress. 

Has  philosophy  a  mission  ?  Is  there  a  field  for  the  philosopher  ? 
Lewes  insists  that  its  mission  has  been  fulfilled,  and  its  reign  in 
thought,  research,  and  history,  is  over.  Acknowledging  that  it  ini- 
tiated positive  science,  he  declares  that  positive  science  has  supplanted 
it,  and  that  philosophy  must  disappear.  Reviewing  the  past,  he  sees 
that  the  one  has  made  no  progress  in  the  study  of  its  problems,  while 
the  other  is  revealing  facts  and  the  laws  that  govern  the  material 
universe.  For  effete,  worn-out  philosophical  speculations,  he  substi- 
tutes the  facts  of  positive  science,  declaring  its  empire  established. 
Prejudging  the  subject  in  this  way,  he  undertakes  to  write  a  history 
of  philosophy,  making  good  use  of  the  facts  as  he  finds  them,  and 
turning  them  against  the  citadel  itself. 

Mr.  Lewes,  however,  is  not  supreme  authority,  notwithstanding 
the  positive  discrimination  he  makes  between  philosophy  and  science, 
and  his  evident  preference  for  the  latter.  When  he  writes  that 
philosophy  initiated  science,  he  forgets  that  Thales  was  a  natural 
philosopher,  i  e.,  a  scientist  before  he  became  a  speculatist.  Physics 
preceded  metaphysics.  So  in  modei-n  times  Bacon,  the  scientist,  pre- 
ceded Descartes,  the  philosopher.  Science  has  given  birth  to 
philosophy,   not  philosophy  to   science.     The   declaration  that  there 


RELATIONS  OF  SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY.  109 

has  been  no  progress  in  speculation  and  that  "philosophy  moves  in 
the  same  endless  circle,"  is  more  than  an  assumption ;  it  is  a  perver- 
sion of  fact.  Mind,  matter,  and  God  are  better  understood  to-day 
because  of  philosophical  inquiry ;  better  understood  negatively, 
perhaps,  than  affirmatively,  but  it  is  Platonic  to  consider  all  sides  of 
a  subject  before  announcing  a  conclusion.  The  final  conclusions  of 
philosophy  have  not  been  reached  ;  the  partial  conclusions  heralded 
are  in  some  respects  unsatisfactory,  disturbing  and  incomplete.  The 
declaration  that  philosophy  is  neglected  and  abandoned  is  about  as 
true  as  would  be  the  assertion  that  science,  poetry,  art,  and  religion  are 
neglected.  England  rarely  produces  a  philosophical  mind ;  Germany 
is  still  able  to  furnish  a  philosophical  thinker.  The  scientific  spirit 
is  always  productive  of  the  philosophic  spirit ;  and  this  inquiring  age 
must  produce  scientists  and  philosophers.  The  facts  of  science  are 
the  materials  of  the  philosopher.  Philosophy  is  impossible  without 
science.  The  universe  is  the  shadow  of  an  infinite  thought,  to  be  de- 
ciphered by  the  slow  process  of  philosophic  inquiry.  Understanding 
the  universe  the  infinite  thinker  is  understood.  This  is  the  process 
of  thought ;  hence,  Cousin  is  correct  in  affirming  that  philosophy  is 
last  in  the  order  of  thought,  overturning  the  assertion  of  Lewes 
that  it  was  historically  first.  Inasmuch  as  philosophy  is  last,  it 
has  a  future,  waiting  for  science  to  do  its  duty  as  an  investigator 
of  facts  and  laws,  and  it  can  not  go  forward  until  science  has  pre- 
pared the  way  for  it.  Its  future,  therefore,  is  a  contingency ;  it  fol- 
lows science. 

Mr.  Lewes  again  contends  that  philosophy  is  engaged  in  a  search 
after  the  impossible!  Essences,  causes  can  never  be  known.  This  is 
the  dictum  of  modern  science ;  but  is  it  not  presumptive  in  a 
scientist  to  declare  that  causes  are  unknowable  because  science  can 
not  and  does  not  undertake  to  demonstrate  them?  It  is  the  old 
spirit  of  scientific  antagonism  to  higher  knowledge,  a  settlement  of 
the  limitations  of  human  inquiry  by  the  ij^se  dixit  of  a  class  whose 
business  it  is  not  to  go  beyond  phenomena,  who  can  not  by  their 
methods  ascertain  causes. 

In  his  statement  that  philosophy  proceeds  altogether  from  a 
priori  premises,  he  asserts  what  can  not  be  maintained,  for  all 
methods  are  open  to  philosophy. 

Schlegel,  having  a  scheme  of  his  own  to  defend,  pronounces  the 
philosophy  of  the  schools  unintelligible,  and  advises  an  abandonment  of 
the  "  fine-spun  webs  of  dialectics  "  for  a  more  practical  philosophy  of  life. 
The  objection  is  not  well  taken,  for,  with  few  exceptions,  such  as  the  ab- 
stract ideas  of  Anaximander  and  the  monadology  of  Leibnitz,  the  stu- 
dent has  no  difficulty  in  separating  one  system  from  another,  or  in  detail- 


110  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

ing  the  tenets  of  the  philosophers  from  the  Ionic  school  to  Emerson. 
Besides,  such  an  objection,  if  fatal  in  its  content,  will  dispense  with 
much  that  passes  for  science,  which  in  these  days  utters  unintelligible 
theories  without  number,  and  is  always  incomplete  in  its  data  and 
uncertain  in  its  conclusions.  That  the  history  of  philosophy  abounds  in 
systems  inharmonious  and  contradictory,  no  one  will  deny  ;  but  science, 
transitional,  progressive,  ever  finding  new  facts,  ever  discovering  new 
laws,  must  be  open  to  the  same  objection.  The  severest  charge  against 
philosophy  is  that  in  its  aberrations  it  resembles  science,  building  up 
and  tearing  down,  enlightening  to-day  but  confusing  to-morrow,  and 
so  leaving  the  world  in  perplexity,  mystery,  and  misery.  Science 
furnishes  the  example,  and  philosophy  imitates  it. 

Antisthenes,  the  Cynic,  in  eulogy  of  philosophy  boasted  that  it 
had  enabled  him  to  live  with  himself,  which  is  the  very  highest  end  of 
life.  The  Cynic  compromised  the  force  of  his  statement  by  leading 
an  impure  and  worthless  life,  but  tn  proportion  as  it  contributes  to 
right  principles  it  lays  the  foundation  for  right  living. 

Schelling  observed  that  the  end  of  philosophy  is  to  make  an  in- 
telligence out  of  nature,  or  a  nature  out  of  intelligence ;  succeeding 
in  doing  either,  and  especially  in  doing  both,  it  will  justify  its  place 
in  history. 

At  all  events,  the  relation  of  philosophical  pursuits  to  the  practical 
life  of  man  and  the  world's  intelligence  is  intimate  enough  to  secure 
them  a  place  in  the  curriculum  of  the  world's  studies  and  activities. 

Some  Christian  thinkers  have  innocently  espoused  the  belief  that 
inspired  truth  is  all-sufficient  in  itself,  and  that  what  is  not  revealed 
can  not  be  known,  and,  therefore,  philosophical  inquiry  touching  the 
unrevealed  is  forbidden  by  the  terms  of  revelation  itself.  Philosophy 
aspires  not  to  the  character  of  a  revelation  ;  but,  like  theology,  it 
does  venture  its  explanations  of  what  is  revealed.  It  deals  with 
revelations,  cosmological,  psychological,  spiritual,  and  written  revela- 
tions, attempting  to  harmonize  them  in  the  unity  of  thought  and  being, 
in  all  of  which  it  goes  no  farther  than  the  revelations  themselves. 
Its  purpose  is  to  understand  revelation.  It  does  not  reveal,  only  as 
explanation  is  revelation. 

This  brings  us  definitely  to  consider  what  is  philosophy  in  its 
generic  spirit  and  function,  without  a  knowledge  of  which  it  will  be 
impossible  to  decide  if  there  is  any  room  for  it.  Dividing  and  sub- 
dividing after  the  manner  of  Plato,  we  should  say  philosophy  is  not 
dialectic;  or  mathematics  ;  or  psychology;  or  metaphysic  ;  or  science; 
or  religion  ;  not  these  taken  singly  or  wholly,  but  embracing  a  not 
inconsiderable  part  of  all.  Aristotle  called  metaphysic  "first  phi- 
losophy," and  physics  "  second  philosophy."    The  "  second  philosophy" 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  METHOD.  Ill 

we  relegate  to  the  physicists.  Prof.  Bowne  assigns  to  psychology 
the  task  of  explaining  the  genesis  of  ideas,  reserving  to  philosophy 
the  duty  of  explaining  the  grounds  of  belief.  It  is  not  clear  that  the 
distinction  is  valid  or  that  the  tasks  of  psychology  and  philosophy  are 
sufficiently  apportioned  ;  for  philosophy  deals  with  origins ;  the  origin 
of  ideas,  not  the  ideas  themselves;  the  origin  of  beliefs,  not  beliefs 
alone.  Psychology  is  an  assistant  to,  not  a  usurper  of,  philosophy. 
The  invalidity  of  the  distinction,  or  the  separateness  of  the  tasks 
Prof.  Bowne  assigns  to  these  departments  •  will  appear  if  the  philo- 
sophical method  of  investigation  be  considered.  Two  methods  obtain 
in  philosophy,  viz.  :  the  psychological  and  the  empirical.  Aristotle, 
Locke,  Condillac,  Hume,  and  the  associationalists,  adojDting  the  em- 
pirical method,  constitute  that  class  of  philosophers  known  as  mate, 
rialists;  while  Socrates,  Plato,  Kant,  Cousin,  Fitche,  and  Hegel, 
adopting  the  psychological  method,  are  known  as  idealists,  rationalists, 
or  metaphysiciaus.  In  recent  years  both  methods  have  been  adopted 
by  the  same  philosopher,  creating  a  school  of  empirical  psychologists, 
represented  by  Alexander  Bain  ;  but  it  is  the  spirit  of  empiricism 
overshadowing  psychology,  and  not  harmonizing  with  it.  Its  pur- 
pose is  the  destruction  of  psychology.  Prof  Bowne  seems  opposed 
to  the  empirico-psychological  method,  as  preliminary  to,  or  an  aid  in, 
metaphysical  inquiry ;  but  while  the  opposition  to  both  methods 
joined  together  is  not  the  same  as  opposition  to  either  method  taken 
by  itself,  he  impresses  the  reader  that  the  psychological  method  is  in- 
sufficient in  itself  for  metaphysics.  Cousin,  however,  has  demon- 
strated the  insufficiency  of  the  empirical  method,  and  exalted  the 
other.  Both  methods,  therefore,  are  deprived  of  application  in 
philosophy. 

But  if  psychology  is  justified  in  undertaking  one  of  the  tasks  of 
philosophy,  the  psychological  method  may  be  properly  appropriated 
by  philosophy,  without  damage  to  the  former,  and  with  some  advantage 
to  the  latter.  The  tasks  and  methods  of  psychology  border  closely  on 
those  of  philosophy  ;  but,  beyond  those  of  the  former,  the  latter 
must  finally  go  if  it  work  out  an  independent  mission.  A  point  of 
separation  must  finally  be  reached. 

In  like  manner,  philosophy  is  not  dialectic,  but  dialectical;  nor  is 
it  science,  but  scientific;  nor  religion,  but  religious.  Its  methods  are 
those  of  religion,  science,  psychology,  and  dialectics;  it  searches  the 
truth,  now  by  a  'priori,  and  then  by  a  posteriori  methods;  like  science, 
it  may  employ  the  empirical  method ;  like  psychology,  the  rational ; 
like  theology,  the  theistic ;  that  is,  it  may  start  from  nature,  mind, 
or  God,  or  from  the  known  or  the  unknown ;  it  has  no  method  of  its 
own,  as  distinguished  from  these.     Hence,  its  alliance  with  all  things. 


112  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

Kindred  to  science  and  religion  in  method,  its  aims  are  specific,  being 
above  the  one  and  alongside  those  of  the  other.  Without  a  difference 
of  aim,  it  is  without  a  reason  for  being.  The  justification  of  philoso- 
phy is  that  it  has  in  hand  a  problem  which  the  scientist  does  not 
admit  into  his  realm,  and  which  the  theologian  can  not  solve  without 
his  aid.  The  specific  task  of  philosophy,  therefore,  remains  to  be  stated. 
Schwegler  says,  to  philosophize  is  to  reflect,  but  the  subject  of 
reflection  should  be  included.  Socrates  insisted  on  the  value  of 
definitions,  and  was  skillful  himself  in  separating  the  accidental  from 
the  essential  elements  of  things.  To  define  philosophy  is  the  first 
duty.  A  variety  of  definitions  the  philosophers  have  made,  each  an 
approximate  statement  of  the  trend  of  philosophical  discovery.  To 
say  that  it  is  the  "science  of  wholes,"  or  the  science  of  the  absolute, 
is  not  a  bad  definition,  save  that  it  reduces  philosophy  to  a  science, 
which,  however,  ought  to  insure  its  favorable  reception  among  the 
scientists ;  to  say  that  it  is  an  inquiry  into  realities,  or  a  search  for 
causes,  or  a  feeling  after  being,  is  an  improved  representation  of  its 
purpose.  Schlegel  defines  philosophy  to  be  the  "  science  of  conscious- 
ness alone,"  which  leads  into  the  rationalism  of  Cousin.  Plato  states 
that  the  "end  of  philosophy  is  the  intuition  of  unity,"  an  abstract 
definition,  which,  thoroughly  analyzed,  Avill  be  found  to  contain  the 
true  idea  of  philosophy ;  but  its  occult  meaning  renders  it  unsatis- 
factory as  a  definition.  The  definition  in  this  case  must  be  defined. 
According  to  Epicurus,  philosophy  is  an  activity  related  to  human 
happiness.  The  definition  is  practical,  not  philosophical.  According 
to  Diogenes  Laertius,  Pythagoras  was  the  "first  person  who  invented 
the  term  philosophy,  and  who  called  himself  a  philosopher."  Dissat- 
isfied with  the  name  loisdom,  which  had  been  applied  to  scientific  and 
metaphysical  pursuits,  he  originated  the  word  philosophy  to  express 
the  love  of  xdsdom,  or  a  state  of  mind  that  delighted  in  philosophic 
speculation.  The  word,  as  thus  used,  is  faulty  in  that  it  does  not 
signify  the  kind  of  wisdom  to  be  loved  or  pursued ;  it  may  include  a 
love  of  lower  or  higher  truth ;  if  the  former,  it  would  be  science ;  if 
the  latter,  philosophy.  As  a  word  for  the  pursuit  of  the  highest 
truth,  it  is  wanting  in  explicitness ;  still,  as  it  has  been  baptized  by 
so  worthy  a  thinker  as  Pythagoras,  it  should  retain  its  place  in  specu- 
lation, and  signify  the  pursuit  of  the  highest  truth. 

What  is  the  highest  truth?  This  must  be  settled  before  the  duty 
of  pursuit  can  be  enforced.  The  aim  of  philosophy  has  been  to  get 
back  to  first  principles,  without  exactly  knowing  what  they  are,  and 
without  knowing  the  shortest  route  to  their  discovery.  The  struggle 
of  every  thinker  since  the  days  of  Plato,  the  mental  travail  of  every 
investigator,    metaphysical    and    scientific,    has    been    to    penetrate 


PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  113 

through  the  visible  into  the  invisible.  The  universal  faith  that  the 
limit  of  knowledge  has  not  been  reached  stimulates  every  seeker  to 
press  on,  in  the  hope  that  he  may  be  able  to  open  a  new  door  into 
the  infinite  mysteries,  and  declare  the  last  secret  solved.  The  effort 
to  reach  original  principles,  powers,  or  personalities,  to  give  them 
name,  describe  their  form,  analyze  their  nature,  is  stupendous  in 
itself,  and,  when  sincerely  made,  is  heroic  and  deserving  of  applause. 
No  easy  task,  it  is  confessed,  is  his  who  in  this  day  takes  up  a  prob- 
lem still  unsolved,  and  which  modern  science  has  the  effrontery  to 
declare  insoluble.  True  philosophy,  embracing  the  fundamentals  in 
the  dark,  sets  its  face  pastward,  depthward,  and  bidding  good-bye  to 
the  visible,  plunges  into  the  invisible  as  the  diver  into  the  Arabian 
Sea,  and  is  lost  in  the  splendors  of  its  own  explorations. 

That  there  are  first  principles,  or  highest  truths,  must  be  con- 
ceded, for  not  only  is  philosophy  impossible  without  such  concession, 
but  also  the  universe  can  neither  be  explained  nor  maintained  with- 
out them.  The  idea  of  substratum,  source,  foundation,  can  not  be 
repudiated  without  danger  to  whatever  is ;  belief  in  originals  is  not 
more  the  imperative  of  consciousness  than  the  imperative  of  science. 
The  existent  has  been  produced  by  another  existent,  or  it  produced 
itself;  from  this  alternative  there  is  no  escape.  Self-existence,  or 
caused  existence — this  is  the  final  form  of  the  philosophical  problem, 

A  cedar  receiving  collateral  support  from  air,  sunshine,  moisture, 
is  yet  dependent  upon  soil,  and  can  not  flourish  without  it.  An  im- 
perfect scheme  will  content  itself  with  an  examination  of  the  collat- 
eral supports  or  adjuncts  of  life,  but  a  genuine  philosophy  seeks  the 
basal  elements,  without  which  the  collateral  elements  would  be  power- 
less. Neither  the  drapery  of  existence,  nor  the  flourishing  and  mag- 
nificent material  forms  about  us,  nor  the  visible  realities  Avhich  attract 
the  eye,  are  the  only  or  chief  objects  of  philosophic  inquiry ;  but 
back  of  all  these,  back  of  all  that  is,  are  the  sources,  the  images,  the 
originating  and  manifesting  forces.  The  uncovering  of  the  founda- 
tions, the  exposing  of  the  olden  mysteries,  the  compelling  the  First 
to  answer  the  Second — this  is  the  first,  the  last,  interrogation  of 
genuine  philosophy.  Plato  more  clearly  than  before  declares  the 
purpose  of  philosophy  to  be,  "that  it  may  ascend  as  far  as  the  un- 
conditioned, and,  having  grasped  this,  may  then  lay  hold  of  the 
principles  next  adjacent  to  it,  and  so  go  down  to  the  end,  termi- 
nating in  forms."  The  unconditioned;  the  conditioned — these  philos- 
ophy must  interrogate  and  examine,  and  then  report  the  results.  If 
it  be  thought  that  the  realm  of  philosophy  is  enlarged  by  this  epitome 
of  its  purpose  beyond  the  possibility  of  a  thorough  survey  of  all  it 
contains  or  proposes,  and  that  to  restrict  it  to  the  sensible  or  phe- 


114  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

nomeual  will  be  iu  keeping  with  the  spirit  of  the  age,  we  reply  that 
we  have  neither  assigned  arbitrary  boundaries  to  it,  nor  broken  down 
old  and  existing  limitations  of  former  philosophic  purposes.  Philoso- 
phy itself,  not  the  writer,  establishes  its  own  boundaries,  expunges 
all  horizons  from  the  mental  vision,  and  points  to  the  illimitable  as 
the  theater  of  the  mind's  free  activity,  as  the  field  of  the  inquiring 
spirit  of  man.  In  the  days  of  Athenian  splendor,  its  chief  purpose 
was  an  exploration  of  the  illimitable ;  but  nineteenth  century  philoso- 
phy has  arrogantly  erected  barriers  around  the  philosophic  spirit, 
muttering,  as  to  oceanic  tides,  "thus  far  and  no  farther."  Beyond 
the  sensible,  the  phenomenal,  the  explainable,  the  modern  investigator 
proposes  not  even  to  attempt  to  go,  and  balustrades  thought  with 
rock  and  ocean  and  sky  and  nerves  and  molecules. 

In  respect  to  boundaries,  modern  thought  contrasts  with  the  phi- 
losophy of  Plato's  day.  The  latter  grasped  the  conception  of  the 
genesis  of  things,  but  could  not  actualize  it  in  a  philosophic  form ; 
the  former  repudiates  the  idea  of  genesis  in  self-subsisting,  original 
creative  spirit,  to  which  both  consciousness  and  religion,  both  nature 
and  history,  most  surely  point.  The  Hellenic  spirit  was  a  pioneer ; 
the  modern  spirit  is  an  heir  to  all  the  revelations  of  the  history  of 
humanity  and  the  developments  of  religion.  One  preceded  inquiry  ; 
the  other  follows  it.  One  fore-glimpsed  the  unknown  God ;  the  other 
refuses  recognition  of  the  known  God.  One,  beginning  at  the  bottom, 
ascended  for  a  moment  the  perilous  heights  of  vision,  only  to  fall 
back  into  darkness  again  ;  the  other,  born  near  the  summits,  descends 
into  abysses  of  doubt  and  shadow,  reversing  the  order  of  the  acade- 
micians. The  one  soared  from  the  earth;  the  other  has  fallen  from 
the  heavens.     Plato  is  the  one ;  Lucifer  is  the  other. 

As  to  its  realm,  philosophy  is  quite  independent  of  the  philosopher, 
just  as  botany  is  quite  independent  of  the  botanist.  His  task  is  to 
explore  the  province  as  he  finds  it ;  he  can  not  construct  boundaries, 
and  define  the  frontier  of  his  inquiry,  for  the  field  is  the  infinite. 
If  he  is  narrow  in  conception  it  is  because  he  has  gone  to  the  tops 
of  the  mountains,  or  planted  himself  in  the  stars,  the  outer  courts  of 
the  invisible.  What  he  must  do  is  to  approach  the  invisible  Center 
of  all  things,  inquiring  for  his  steps  in  the  fields  of  creation,  and 
rising  beyond  all  into  the  very  presence  of  the  power  that  made  all. 
To  that  Center  he  must  go,  and  from  it  he  must  start  in  his  quest  of 
truth.  Neither  ancient  nor  modern  philosophy  fixed  their  point  of 
departure  from  the  great  Center — the  one  jjecause  it  could  not,  the 
other  because  it  would  not — nor  has  the  objective  point  of  the  latter 
been  the  discovery  of  primary  truth,  or  the  foundation  of  existence. 
A  strange  perversion  of  philosophy,  indeed,  which  neither  starts  from 


PURPOSE  OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY.  115 

nor  returns  to  the  first,  the  outlying,  eternal  Cause  of  all  things! 
Yet  to  this  philosophy  must  come  if  it  retain  its  name  and  place  in 
the  esteem  of  mankind. 

The  philosophic  pursuit  implies  a  specific  purpose.  Its  general 
purpose  must  be  absorbed  by  the  special.  Broadly  speaking,  the 
successive  systems  of  philosophic  inquiry,  which  both  ancient  and 
modern  times  have  produced,  may  be  interpreted  as  so  many  attempts 
of  the  human  mind  to  unravel  eternal  mysteries,  to  explore  incom- 
prehensible realities,  and  definitely  to  fix  the  limits  of  human  knowl- 
edge. In  a  narrower  sense,  it  appears  as  if  philosophy  has  had,  for 
its  animating  principle,  the  determination  of  the  infinite,  and  a  study 
of  the  exact  relations  of  the  infinite  and  the  finite,  together  with  the 
cognate  questions  they  suggest.  While  seeking  to  examine  the  foun- 
dations of  the  universe,  it  covets  also  a  knowledge  of  remotest  being, 
or  the  ultimate  facts  of  existence.  This  is  tearing  away  the  veil  that 
separates  the  natural  from  the  supernatural,  and  discovering  the  in- 
visible— a  high  undertaking,  but  not  impious.  From  the  days  of 
Thales  until  now,  philosophy  has  been  characterized  by  a  purpose  to 
ascertain  the  unknown,  exhibiting  in  its  pursuit  no  trifling  or  chaotic 
spirit,  but  an  intellectual  zeal  in  harmony  with  the  high  end  that  in- 
spired it.  Ancient  philosophy  sought  only  in  darkness.  Unaided 
and  alone,  it  sallied  forth  in  quest  of  truth,  but  failed  to  find  it. 

Again,  Plato  says:  "The  problem  of  philosophy  is,  for  all  that 
exists  conditionally,  to  find  a  ground  unconditioned  and  absolute." 
Involved  in  this  search  of  the  unconditioned  is  a  knowledge  of  the 
conditioned,  implying  a  wide  range  of  intellectual  research,  and  a  de- 
vout comprehension  of  the  universe  in  all  its  manifold  relations. 
Plato  understood  the  problem,  therefore.  Among  the  Ionic  philos- 
ophers the  inquiry  was  of  a  similar  nature,  a  seeking  of  the  original 
cause  of  things ;  but,  locating  the  cause  in  the  things  themselves, 
they  sunk  into  materialism.  From  Homer's  theology  of  the  gods  as 
the  originators  of  the  universe,  they  turned  with  dissatisfaction,  and, 
in  a  reactionary  mood,  attributed  to  the  physical  elements,  fire,  air, 
and  water,  certain  creative  powers  and  impulses,  ending  in  their  de- 
personification,  thus  exchanging  mythological  beings  for  visible  forces, 
as  the  first  causes  of  phenomena.  Whether  in  this  there  was  an  ad- 
vance many  may  hesitate  to  allow ;  but  it  was  the  death-knell  of 
mythology  as  a  philosophical  or  religious  explanation  of  the  physical 
universe,  and  rendered  in  this  respect  excellent  service  to  the  cause 
of  truth.  In  this  vibration  from  Platonic  idealism  to  Ionic  material- 
ism, the  extremes  of  ancient  philosophic  research  are  manifest ;  but 
modern  philosophy  swings  between  the  same  extremes,  seemingly  un- 
able to  go  beyond  them. 


116  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

Looking  to  conclusions  alone,  ancient  philosophy  asserts  the  un- 
conditioned, modern  philosophy  the  conditioned ;  in  its  highest  mood 
the  former  was  theistic,  in  its  lowest  mood  the  latter  is  atheistic. 
Between  the  theistic  and  the  atheistic  conception  of  the  universe ; 
between  a  supernaturally-eaused  and  a  self-originating  universe, 
philosophy  must  at  last  decide,  for  the  truth  is  in  one  or  the  other. 
To  creation's  picture  there  is  a  background,  which  is  reflected  in  light 
and  shadow  upon  the  picture  itself.  The  Causer  is  not  in  the  fore- 
ground, but  in  the  background,  blushiug  over  his  works,  and  suffus- 
ing them  with  the  hues  of  his  unseen  face.  To  reveal  the  unseen 
Causer  is  the  manifest  duty  of  philosophy.  It  must  fearlessly  tread 
along  the  boundaries  of  creation,  touching  the  edges  of  the  infinite, 
and  grasping  the  hand  of  the  eternal ;  this  is  its  province,  or  it  has 
nothing  to  do.  Plainly  is  it  seen  that  its  functional  career  is  above 
that  of  science.  Pure  science  concerns  itself  with  facts,  laws,  methods ; 
philosophy  with  causes  and  ends.  Science  is  fact-seeking;  philosophy, 
principle-seeking.  The  one  deals  with  experience ;  the  other,  with 
thought.  Science  embraces  physiology,  psychology,  astronomy,  chem- 
istry, botany,  zoology ;  philosophy  inquires  for  the  originating  prin- 
ciple of  all  things.  The  province  of  the  one  is  the  visible ;  that  of 
the  other,  the  invisible.  Science  may  conclude  that  the  First  Cause 
is  undiscoverable ;  philosophy  must  discover  such  cause. 

In  this  assignment  of  specific  business  to  philosophy,  it  will  be 
observed  that  it  trenches  upon  the  sphere  of  theology,  with  this  dif- 
ference, however:  theology  is  the  concretion  of  divine  truths,  as 
found  in  verbal  revelations ;  philosophy  is  the  concretion  of  similar 
truths,  as  found  in  physical  revelations.  Between  science  and  re- 
ligion it  is  the  bridge.  To  science,  the  Causer  is  unknowable  ;  to 
philosophy,  hioivable;  to  religion,  known. 

Is  it  the  prerogative  of  philosophy  to  doubt,  and  that  of  religion 
to  believe?  Pyrrho  introduced  the  spirit  of  doubt  in  ancient  philos- 
ophy, which  was  rather  a  contamination  than  an  inspiration.  His 
followers  were  called  skeptics,  and  "  ephetics,"  i.  e.,  men  who  sus- 
pended judgment  and  never  reached  a  conclusion.  The  spirit  of 
doubt  dominated  at  the  introduction  of  modern  philosophy,  Bacon 
refusing  to  accept  scientific  data  until  he  had  investigated  them,  and 
Descartes  refusing  all  philosophical  principles  until  he  had  demon- 
strated them.  Hume  created  the  aphorism,  "To  doubt  is  the  sum 
of  knowledge."  Hence,  philosophy  is  branded  as  the  doubter ;  but 
it  is  a  seeker,  also.  It  doubts  in  order  to  seek.  Doubt  is  the  stim- 
ulus of  investigation.  Montaigne's  skepticism  was  intended  to  be  the 
inspiration  of  inquiry.  The  inspiring  doubt  of  Bacon  and  Descartes 
has  given  place  to  the  dead  doubt  of  Spencer,  Bain,  and  the  whole 


THE  INFINITE  INCOGNIZABLE.  117 

brood  of  empiricists  and  materialists.     Under   this  load  philosophy 
staggers. 

Jacobi,  a  "faith-philosopher,"  held  that  Spinozism,  or  a  pantheistic 
conception  of  the  universe,  must  be  the  issue  of  pure  philosophizing; 
but  it  is  clear  that  the  result  may  be  neither  atheism  nor  pantheism,  but 
theism.  In  examining  the  philosophical  contests  of  the  last  three 
centuries,  however,  we  must  confess  that  philosophy  has  been  unsuc- 
cessful in  its  attemps  to  vindicate  the  existence  of  an  original  Causer ; 
and,  instead  of  rising  to  the  religious  height  of  the  known,  it  has 
fallen  down  to  the  scientific  level  of  the  unknowable,  and  declares 
the  Causer  not  only  unknowable  but  unthinkable. 

Is  the  ultimate  incognizable  by  philosophy?  Its  own  melancholy 
answer,  echoing  through  history,  is  that  it  can  not  decipher  the  all- 
mystery,  it  can  not  measure  the  infinite,  its  plumb-line  is  too  short  for 
the  depths  of  being.  Accepting  this  account  of  itself,  it  furnishes  a 
strong  argument  for  the  necessity  of  a  supernatural  revelation  of  God, 
for  if  it  is  not  in  the  power  of  the  human  mind  to  conceive  of  the 
original  Causer,  and  announce  him  in  his  attributes,  if  man  can  not 
predetermine  the  existence  of  a  Creator,  either  ignorance  or  revela- 
tion of  a  Creator  must  ensue.  Relying  upon  itself,  philosophy  gravi- 
tates to  ignorance,  proclaiming  the  idea  of  a  first  cause  speculative 
and  beyond  demonstration.  From  the  declaration  of  an  unknown 
and  unknowable  God,  the  step  is  a  short  one  to  the  declaration  that 
mind  and  matter  are  beyond  the  pale  of  knowledge.  Such  step  it 
has  already  taken,  in  that  it  has  declared  that  phenomena  only  may 
be  known.  It  is  a  question,  however,  if  it  requires  more  mind  to 
know  things  than  phenomena,  to  know  substance  than  qualities,  to  , 
know  being  than  attributes,  for  there  are  no  qualities  without  sub- 
stance, and  no  attributes  without  being.  The  'problem  of  Plato  tJie 
nineteenth  centunj  unhesitatingly  declares  can  not  be  solved.  In  its 
latest  aspects,  philosophy  seems  incapable  of  any  thing  except  to  pull 
down  the  temple  of  truth  on  its  own  head.  Making  the  unproven 
assumption  that  God,  mind,  and  matter  are  unknowable,  it  has  de- 
generated into  a  series  of  ignorant  platitudes,  as  the  apology  for  its 
imbecility,  and  wrestles  no  longer  with  the  inquiry  of  the  ancients. 
INIodern  philosophy  is  the  philosophy  of  ignorance,  intellectual  agnosti- 
cism, nineteenth  century  charlatanry.  The  hint  of  Shakespeare  that 
matter  presents  a  "  false  seeming,"  or  it  is  not  what  it  seems  to  be, 
has  been  converted  into  the  dictum  of  philosophy,  and  all  things,  not 
excepting  the  first  cause,  have  been  clothed  with  masks. 

Kant,  thundering  opinions  that  have  shaken  more  than  one  system 
from  its  pedestal,  originated  the  philosophic  aphorism  that  the  "  thing- 
in-itself,"  which  is  objective,  can  not  be  known,  but  only  phenomena 


118  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

and  their  relations  may  be  known.  Implying  a  noumenon,  an  objective 
somewhat,  it  is  phenomenon  only  we  can  know  ;  it  is  the  noumenon, 
however,  we  are  most  anxious  to  know.  To  limit  knowledge  to  phe- 
nomena is  to  limit  inquiry  to  superficial  ends,  and  to  paralyze  the 
spirit  of  pursuit,  for  it  is  the  somewhat,  and  not  the  manifestations 
thereof,  the  mind  seeks  to  understand.  The  "  thing-in-itself,"  how- 
ever, is  only  a  captious  phrase,  or,  as  Prof.  Bowne  pronounces  it, 
one  of  the  "  insanities  of  idealism." 

As  if  with  a  purpose  to  exceed  Kant  in  absurd  philosophizing, 
Reid  announces  that,  not  only  are  phenomena  alone  known,  but  also 
that  they  are  known  incompletely,  and,  of  necessity,  superficially. 
TJpham  joins  the  philosophers  in  the  general  view  of  the  incompetency 
of  the  human  mind  to  penetrate  the  nature  or  understand  the  sub- 
stance of  matter,  for  he  says,  "we  are  altogether  ignorant  of  the  sub- 
jective or  real  essence  of  matter ;  our  knowledge  embraces  merely  its 
qualities  or  properties,  and  nothing  more."  Here  the  delusion  of 
separateness  between  properties  and  substance,  or  belonging  and  be- 
ing, has  outspoken  representation.  Herbert  Spencer  voices  in  clearest 
tones  the  creed  of  modern  philosophy  in  the  statement  that  hiowledge  is 
relational,  not  absolute.  Agreeing  with  predecessors  and  contemporaries 
that  phenomena  only  are  knowable,  he  imposes  limitation  on  the 
knowledge  of  phenomena  by  reducing  it  to  a  cognition  of  relations. 
The  real  in  matter  and  spirit  is  absolutely  unknowable. 

This  is  modern  philosophy — the  philosophy  of  cultivated  self-com- 
placent, self-atoning  ignorance.  The  effort  of  three  thousand  years 
to  open  a  pathway  for  the  human  mind  toward  the  infinite  results  in 
the  paralyzing  conviction  that  fore-glimpses  of  God,  except  through 
meager  manifestations,  and  these  expressive  only  of  relations,  are  im- 
possible. Forever  closed  to  man's  best  gaze  is  the  infinite.  The 
ascertainment  by  any  philosophical  process,  or  a  demonstration  of  the 
existence  of  a  First  Cause  and  an  acquaintance  with  his  attributes,  is 
declared  null  and  void  by  the  moderns.  To  mankind,  the  colossal 
ultimate  must  be,  if  not  a  myth,  a  stupendous,  unthinkable,  unex- 
plainable  mystery,  to  be  forgotten  as  an  empty  abstraction,  to  be 
eliminated  from  human  history,  and  no  longer  to  constitute  a  force  in 
religion.  To  this  conclusion  does  the  "guarded  or  qualified  material- 
ism" of  modern  thinkers  lead. 

To  reverse  this  conclusion  is  the  specific  business  of  philosophy. 
The  problem  of  ontology  is  its  first  problem,  Avhich,  once  solved,  pre- 
pares the  way  for  the  solution  of  all  other  problems.  To  refuse  to 
grapple  with  the  problem  of  the  unconditioned  is  a  sign  of  cowardice 
or  imbecility ;  to  go  forward  is  neither  irreverence  nor  presumption. 
Just  what  the  philosophic  inquirer  may  finally  discover  by  a  persistent 


CONCEPTIONS  OF  THE  UNCONDITIONED.  119 

search  after  the  infinite,  whether  he  will  find  God  or  merely  find 
proofs  of  God,  it  is  too  soon  to  determine ;  no  one  can  afiirm  in  ad- 
vance of  discovery  what  will  be  discovered.  It  is  a  plunge  into  the 
unknown,  with  a  faith  that  it  will  be  less  unknown,  though  not  com- 
pletely known,  after  the  plunge  than  before.  "The  oflSce  of  philos- 
ophy," says  Mansel,  "is  not  to  give  us  a  knowledge  of  the  absolute 
nature  of  God,  but  to  teach  us  to  know  ourselves  and  the  limits  of 
our  faculties."  This  is  a  specific  limitation  ,of  philosophic  research 
into  humanity,  forbidding  the  higher  inquiry  into  ontology.  The 
"  oflSce  of  philosophy"  is  to  find  out  what  it  can  both  concerning  God 
and  man,  and  to  restrict  it  to  one  is  a  very  incomplete  view  of  what 
ought  to  be  done.  It  is  a  surrender  of  the  question  before  a  begin- 
ning has  been  made.  A  knowledge  of  God  will  lead  to  a  knowledge 
of  man  ;  a  knowledge  of  man  will  be  helpful  to  a  knowledge  of  God ; 
they  are  reciprocal,  not  antagonistic.  Moreover,  the  outside  universe, 
or  the  conditioned  world,  is  a  testimony  to  the  infinite ;  what  the  tes- 
timony is,  to  what  extent  we  can  read  't  and  understand  it,  and 
whether  a  conception  of  the  infinite  based  on  natural  revelations,  the 
oldest  in  point  of  time,  Avill  be  sufficient,  or  at  least  helpful,  in  a  final 
conception  of  the  infinite,  must  in  its  place  and  time  have  due 
consideration. 

The  final  conception  of  the  unconditioned  is,  therefore,  complex, 
partaking  of  a  certain  apriorism,  or  sense  of  the  infinite,  which  is  the 
product  of  the  infinite  itself,  the  testimony  of  human  consciousness, 
and  the  testimony  of  the  physical  universe,  a  trinity  of  proofs  result- 
ing in  a  unity  of  notion,  or  the  abstract  idea  of  an  infinite  and  un- 
conditioned personality.  Surely  such  glimmerings  of  the  infinite  the 
philosophic  spirit  may  observe,  and,  observing,  it  may  decide  some 
things  respecting  the  infinite.  To  know  the  infinite  is  to  know  God. 
Mansel,  discriminating  entirely  too  finely,  says,  "men  may  believe  in 
an  absolute  and  infinite  without  in  any  proper  sense  believing  in 
God ;"  but  such  a  belief  in  an  absolute  is  a  pure  abstraction.  The  idea 
of  the  infinite  is  the  idea  of  God.  It  may  be  an  incomplete  idea,  a 
superstitious  idea,  but  it  is  a  species  of  theism  inseparable  from  the  idea 
itself.  When  the  thought  seizes  the  notion  of  an  absolute,  it  expands 
into  a  theistic  conception,  either  by  virtue  of  the  idea  itself  or  the 
tendency  of  the  mind  to  go  in  that  direction.  A  close  analysis  of  the 
genesis  of  the  idea  of  the  infinite  will  bring  to  light  the  fact  that  the 
idea  itself,  lodged  in  mind,  is  self-expansive.  It  is  not  exactly  the 
"God-consciousness"  of  Schleiermacher,  but  an  a  priori  unfolding  of 
the  idea-divine  in  the  mind,  independently  of  mental  process  or 
rational  deduction.  This  apriorism,  or  primaiy  output  of  the  infinite 
by  its  own  spirit,  is  the  legitimate  demonstration  of  the  existence  of 


120  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

the  infinite,  which  philosophy  is  bound  to  regard.  "The  manifesta- 
tion of  the  Spirit  is  ^iven  to  every  man  to  profit  withal,"  says  Paul. 
He  is  in  the  world,  and  always  has  been.  He  was  in  Socrates ;  he  is 
in  the  heathen.  The  universal  search  is  for  the  infinite  spirit,  which, 
if  found  at  all,  must  first  be  found,  not  in  man,  nor  in  nature,  but 
outside  of  both,  as  inherent,  complete,  absolute,  and  as  only  the  more 
maturely  reflected  by  both.  This  a  priori  conception  of  God  is  extra- 
transcendental,  but  it  i^  required  by  the  philosophic  spirit.  God  in 
man  is  one  mode  of  manifestation;  God  in  nature  is  another;  but 
God  manifest  in  spirit  is  the  highest  manifestation.  To  deal  with  the 
highest  is  the  first  duty.  The  spirit  of  the  infinite  is  abroad  and  may 
be  found.  What  the  infinite  is  becomes  a  secondary  question  in  phi- 
losophy, not  unimportant,  however;  perhaps,  in  practical  life,  it  is 
more  important  even  than  the  first. 

It  is  enough,  however,  that  philosophy  may  detect  the  infinite 
spirit,  since  the  infinite  is  a  self-acting,  self-manifesting  spirit.  In- 
accessible he  is  in  his  own  region,  but  not  without  manifestation  in 
our  sphere.  The  condition  of  spirit  is  activity;  activity  implies 
manifestation  ;  manifestation  may  be  by  direct  methods,  or  indirect, 
that  is,  through  the  forms  of  consciousness,  or  the  forms  of  matter. 

Of  the  scintillations  of  the  infinite  in  human  consciousness,  or  the 
reflection  of  God  in  man,  the  proofs  are  not  wanting,  they  are  not 
obscure.  This  reflection  of  the  infinite  we  denominate  a  maturer  re- 
flection than  that  of  pure  spirit,  since  it  is  within  our  reach,  and 
susceptible  of  a  partial  analysis.  The  aprioristic  proof  of  God  is  a 
sensible  revelation  of  his  spirit ;  but  it  is  not  a  full  revelation  of  his 
character.  This  is  the  next  demand.  The  testimony  of  the  human 
consciousness  to  the  existence  of  the  infinite,  is  at  the  least  assuring, 
and  as  to  the  character  of  God  it  speaks  to  some  purpose.  The 
origin  of  consciousness  is  not  now  in  dispute ;  its  revelations  alone 
concerns  us.  In  the  depths  of  human  consciousness  Cousin  clearly 
foresaw  the  signs  of  the  infinite,  tracing  them  in  those  intuitional 
forms  which  constitute  the  frame-work  of  rational  psychology.  Reason, 
like  the  magnet,  points  in  one  direction  only  ;  unerringly  does  it  in- 
dicate the  infinite.  By  reason,  Cousin  means  the  universal,  untaught, 
primary  race-consciousness  of  God  which  no  degradation  can  smother 
and  no  ignorance  annihilate.  Descartes  projecting  the  psychological 
method  had  an  apt  follower  in  Cousin,  who  emphasized  the  method 
beyond  its  author  in  the  proof  of  the  existence  of  God.  The  sub- 
stratum of  thought  is  the  infinite ;  the  foundations  of  conscious  exist- 
ence are  laid  in  the  absolute.  "  In  him  we  live ;"  in  us  he  lives  also. 
The  contents  of  the  consciousness,  or  of  reason  may  be  embraced  in 
at   least   three    terms,  which    understood  in  their  relations,  may  be 


A  RELATED  INFINITE.  121 

finally  reduced  to  a  single  term.  Without  education,  without 
development,  the  deeply  laid  reason  of  man  concedes,  recognizes,  and 
in  its  spontaneities  operates  with,  the  correlated  ideas  of  the  infinite 
and  the  finite,  unity  and  multiplicity,  causation  and  its  consequence  ; 
with  the  inevitable  relation  of  one  to  the  other ;  and  any  apparent  after- 
acquirement  of  these  ideas  is  but  the  expansion  of  ideas  original  with 
the  human  consciousness.  The  condition  of  consciousness  is  the  con- 
stant but  unstudied  recognition  of  finite  and  infinite,  from  which  may 
be  predicted  the  existence  of  both.  A  dependent  pair  of  ideas  is 
suggestive  of  the  independent  existence  of  the  objective  forms  they 
represent.  So  the  intuitional  thought  of  finite  and  infinite  is  a 
proclamation  of  the  existence  of  both  in  objective  forms  and  relations. 
This  much  the  consciousness  affirms  if  it  affirm  any  thing.  How  it  affirms 
any  thing  is  not  involved  in  the  investigation  ;  that  it  affirms  the  in- 
finite what  is  called  the  race-consciousness  will  allow.  And  in 
affirming  the  infinite,  it  immediately  affirms  it  in  relation  which  is  a 
step  toward  the  solution  of  character.  Pure,  unrelated  spirit, 
manifesting  itself  by  pressure  only,  may  not  be  analyzed ;  but  pure 
related  spirit,  active  and  manifested  in  action,  i.  e.,  in  relation,  the 
mind  may  the  more  clearly  discern,  and  to  a  degree  comprehend. 
Hence,  a  related  infinite  is  preferable  to  an  unrelated  infinite.  An 
tmrelated  infinite  does  not  exist;  it  is  an  abstraction,  and  philosophy 
is  unphiloscphical  in  so  far  as  it  confines  itself  to  the  unconditioned. 
The  related  infinite  is  a  true  philosophical  infinite,  which  the  rational 
spirit  in  man  at  once  recognizes  and  worships.  True,  this  is  an  an- 
thropomorphic infinite,  an  infinite  constructed  by  the  consciousness; 
this  is  the  trend  of  intuitionalism,  but  it  can  not  be  avoided. 
Socrates  drifted  into  anthropomorphism  ;  all  rational,  psychological, 
intuitional  philosophy  is  carried  over  into  a  recognition  of  such  an 
infinite.  The  only  question  is,  is  the  infinite  predicated  by  the 
reason,  the  true  infinite?  To  this  we  reply  that  as  there  can  not  be 
two  infinites,  any  infinite  predicated  on  a  ground  that  can  account 
for  itself  must  be  the  true  infinite.  A  false  infinite  is  never  pred- 
icated by  any  thing.  A  true  infinite  only  is  foreshadowed,  dimly 
it  may  be,  but  not  uncertainly.  Hence,  an  anthropomoi'phic  infinite 
is  as  reliable  as  a  spirit  or  a  priori  infinite,  or  any  other  manifested  or 
unmanifested  infinite.  Prof.  Bowne  seriously  questions  the  force  of 
intuitionalism,  so-called,  in  the  realm  of  ontology.  Styling  innate 
ideas  the  "raw  rudiments  of  consciousness,"  he  makes  vigorous  war 
upon  them  in  order  to  relieve  intuitionalism  from  some  of  its  absurd- 
ities ;  but  it  is  evident  that  in  avoiding  one  extreme  he  has  swung 
over  to  its  opposite.  In  answering  Mill's  allusion  to  the  innate  ideas 
of  children,   he   scorns   the   thought   of  making  a  babe   a  pope   in 


122  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

philosopliy ;  but  he  at  length  accords  to  the  "  latencies"  of  conscious- 
ness which  develop  in  the  reflective  mind  the  value  of  convictions 
respecting  the  infinite.  The  spontaneous  consciousness  is  insignificant 
in  its  determination  of  the  absolute;  the  reflective  consciousness  is 
voiceful  of  the  infinite.  In  outcome,  what  is  the  difference  between 
raw  intuitionalism  and  the  developed  reason  ?  And  if  the  developed 
reason  intimates  the  infinite,  the  spontaneous  reason  must  contain  the 
intimation,  just  as  the  acorn  contains  the  tree.  The  pope  in  phi- 
losophy is  either  a  babe  or  a  man  ;  in  either  case  it  is  consciousness. 
Bowne  is,  therefore,  an  intuitionalist,  vindicating  the  infinite  from 
himself,  an  irresistible  argument,  put  either  in  the  old  way,  or 
the  new. 

Mansel,  examining  the  conditions  of  human  consciousness,  finds  in 
it  no  absolutely  clear  adumbration  of  the  infinite  ;  on  the  contrary,  he 
sees  in  its  conditions  the  contradictions  of  attributes  which  are  allowed 
to  belong  to  the  infinite.  This  is  a  gun  which  in  its  recoil  destroys  the 
man  that  fires  it.  In  an  act  of  consciousness,  one  object  is  distinguished 
from  another  which  implies  limitation  ;  but  limitation  can  not  belong 
to  the  absolute.  Again,  consciousness  implies  relation  between  sub- 
ject and  object ;  but  the  absolute  is  unrelated.  Again,  consciousness 
implies  succession  and  duration  in  time,  or  the  finite  ;  but  the  infinite 
is  not  finite.  Lastly,  consciousness  implies  personality  ;  but  person- 
ality implies  limitation  and  relation  ;  hence,  it  can  not  represent  the 
infinite. 

The  weakness  of  this  representation  is  two- fold  :  1.  Its  implications 
of  consciousness;  2.  Its  assumptions  of  the  infinite.  Initial  or  "raw" 
consciousness  has  but  a  single  term,  the  infinite.  From  the  single 
term  emerges  another  term,  the  finite,  and  from  both  another,  or  re- 
lation. Relations,  succession,  limitations,  are  the  products  of  the 
single  term.  The  only  idea  in -the  consciousness  is  God.  All  others 
are  subordinate  or  correlated.  Mansel,  selecting  the  subordinate  ideas 
of  the  consciousness,  proceeds  to  demolish  the  structure  of  rational 
theology,  thus  aflfbrding  aid  and  comfort  to  materialism. 

His  assumptions  respecting  the  infinite  are  even  more  glaring 
than  his  weak  analysis  of  consciousness.  To  deny  personality  to  the 
infinite  is  to  leave  us  Hartmann's  uncoiiscious  deity,  or  no  deity  at  all. 
To  assert  that  the  absolute  is  unrelated,  is  to  assert  what  a  finite 
mind  can  not  know.  To  assert  that  the  infinite  is  without  any 
limitation  whatever  is  equally  a  matter  beyond  human  knowledge. 
Evidently,  Hansel's  infinite  is  not  anthropomorphic ;  it  is  not  a 
rational,  conscious,  personal  being.  But  this  is  drifting.  God's  found- 
ations are  in  man  as  man's  foundation  is  in  the  dust ;  a  psychological  in- 
finite is  the  demand  of  the  reason,  as  a  physiological  finite  is  the  demand 


A  SUPRA-RATIONAL  INFINITE.  123 

of  the  senses.  To  deny  to  reason  the  power  to  apprehend  the  infinite  from 
its  own  processes  of  thought,  to  deny  to  consciousness  the  power  to 
index  the  absolute  is  to  leave  God  without  a  witness  of  himself  in  his 
greatest  work,  and  will  require  a  theology  on  a  basis  entirely  foreign 
to  human  instincts  and  human  life.  Such  a  theology  the  human 
race  has  not  as  yet  demanded. 

Mansel  asserts  that  "we  have  no  immediate  intuitions  of  the  di- 
vine attributes,  even  as  phenomena ;  "  but  this  is  straining  the  case 
beyond  warrant.  No  intuitioualist  claims  that  through  the  conscious- 
ness alone  a  knowledge  of  the  divine  attributes,  taken  singly,  is 
possible  ;  all  that  he  claims  is  a  satisfactory  assurance  of  the  existence 
of  an  absolute  being,  whose  attributes  are  vaguely  inferred  by  subse- 
quent acts  of  the  reflective  reason.  In  the  subsequent  work  of  attri- 
bute-building there  may  be  mistakes,  but  in  the  original  conception 
of  the  Absolute  there  is  no  mistake.  Discovery  of  the  infinite  pre- 
cedes description.  Theology,  revelation,  psychology,  may  be  nec- 
essary to  the  latter;  apriorism  and  consciousness  are  necessary  to 
the  former. 

Sir  William  Hamilton,'  pi'ior  to  Mansel,  going  over  the  same 
ground,  characterized  the  anthropomorphic  infinite  as  a  mere  abstrac- 
tion, and  rejected  its  identity  with  the  true  infinite.  Breaking  loose 
from  rational  testimony,  he  constructs  an  infinite,  unconditioned,  un- 
related, unknowable,  unthinkable.  His  conclusion  is  logical.  To 
posit  a  rational  infinite,  or  an  unthinkable  infinite,  or  no  infinite  at 
all,  is  the  only  alternative.  An  irrational  infinite  is  inconceivable;  a 
supra-rational  infinite  is  possible,  but  it  is  unthinkable,  because  above 
reason.  Hamilton,  unrestrained  in  imagination,  exalts  the  unthink- 
able infinite,  and  Mansel  echoes  the  baneful  philosophy. 

In  these  flights  to  supra-rationalism  the  ordinary  methods  of  rea- 
soning have  been  abandoned,  and  necessarily  so.  The  psychological 
method,  so  instrumental  in  the  hands  of  Cousin,  is  opposed  to  supra- 
rationalism  ;  the  empirical  method,  in  the  hands  of  the  associational- 
ists,  only  leads  to  an  irrational  infinite,  or  no  infinite  at  all ;  the 
theological  method  conducts  to  a  rational  infinite ;  but  the  supra- 
rational  method  leads  to  a  supra-rational  infinite,  in  which  man  can 
have  no  practical  or  permanent  interest. 

The  answer  to  supra-rationalism  is  the  consciousness  itself,  the 
contents  of  which,  having  been  analyzed,  need  not  be  repeated. 

The  remaining  item  in  our  conception  of  the  infinite  is  the  testi- 
mony of  the  physical  universe,  which  not  only  encourages  belief  in 
the  divine  existence,  but  also  reflects  somewhat  of  the  divine  charac- 
ter, two  points  necessary  to  a  comprehensive  understanding  of  the  in- 
finite.    The  fact  of  God  is  of  primary  importance.     Does  the  natural 


124  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

world  re-declare  him  with  the  emphasis  that  attends  the  declaration 
of  the  human  consciousness?  Clearly,  the  answer  turns  upon  the 
meaning  philosophy  gives  to  the  natural  world.  If,  as  Mill  suggested, 
the  outer  world  is  only  a  projection  of  subjective  elements,  an  argu- 
ment from  it  is  of  the  nature  of  that  drawn  from  the  consciousness, 
and  is  a  reinforcement.  If,  as  Berkeley  insisted,  matter  does  not 
exist,  no  argument  is  possible  from  that  quarter.  If,  as  Fitche  held, 
the  non-ego  is  a  limitation  of  the  ego,  or  a  part  of  the  ego,  then  in- 
deed a  divine  argument  emerges,  but  at  the  expense  of  the  idea  of 
absolute  and  independent  personality.  If,  as  Descartes  taught,  the 
subject  and  object,  or  mind  and  matter,  are  entirely  distinct,  Avith  no 
impulse  to  interaction,  then  it  is  possible  to  frame  an  argument  from 
each  which  shall  join  in  the  general  conclusion.  If  the  implicit 
teaching  of  materialists  that  the  universe  is  eternal  be  correct,  then 
the  question  of  an  infinite  God  is  open  for  discussion.  If  the  im- 
plicit faith  of  humanity  that  the  objective  is  the  result  of  creation  be 
well-founded,  then  an  argument  for  a  Creator  is  irresistible. 

From  these  and  other  standpoints  nature  may  be  viewed  in  its  re- 
lation to  the  problem  of  the  infinite,  adding  its  testimony  to  the  com- 
mon faith,  or  bewildering,  and  possibly  overthrowing  it.  All  idealistic 
views  aside,  the  conflict  in  the  testimony  springs  from  the  empirical 
conception  of  the  universe  as  infinite  or  eternal,  in  contrast  with  the 
rational  conception  that  it  is  finite,  and,  therefore,  a  product  of  the 
infinite.  Between  these  reason  must  decide.  Revelation  apart,  the 
reason  must  spell  the  infinite  in  the  characters  of  the  finite ;  or,  de- 
nying the  finite,  accept  the  pantheistic  conception  of  the  unity  of 
God  and  the  universe — a  conception  which,  failing  to  distinguish  one 
from  the  other,  virtually  destroys  both.  The  "eternity  of  matter" 
is  in  conflict  with  the  eternity  of  God.  In  an  apologetic  spirit,  Leib- 
nitz leaned  toward  the  materialistic  assumption  of  an  eternal  universe, 
yet  so  as  not  to  compromise  the  idea  of  the  absolute  infinity  of  God. 
This  he  did  by  distinguishing  between  a  relative  infinity,  as  applied 
to  the  universe,  and  an  absolute  infinity,  as  applied  to  God ;  but  the 
thought  of  two  kinds  of  infinity  is  not  rational.  If  a  relative  infinity 
is  less  than  infinite,  it  is  not  infinity  at  all ;  if  equal  to  it,  it  is  divine. 
One  or  other  it  is.  Some  there  are  who  say  space  is  infinite  and  time 
eternal,  meaning  a  relative  infinity  as  applied  to  one,  and  a  relative 
eternity  as  applied  to  the  other ;  but  the  language  is  used  in  an  ac- 
commodated sense  to  express  incomputable  vastness,  and  practically 
limitless  duration.  The  philosopher,  however,  rarely  speaks  in  an 
accommodated  sense.  His  business  is  with  absolute  truth,  which  will 
not  admit  an  easy,  or  elastic  phi-aseology.  A  relative  infinity  is 
suggestive  of  a  relative  infinite,  from  which  the  mind  recoils.     The 


PRIMARY  QUESTIONS.  125 

suspicion  that  the  universe  is  in  any  sense  infinite  or  eternal  is  a 
compromise  of  the  basal  idea  of  the  infinity  and  eternity  of  God. 

Hamilton  struggled  with  the  alternative  of  an  infinite  non-com- 
mencement or  an  absolute  commencement  of  the  universe,  deciding 
that  it  is  impossible  to  conceive  of  either,  and  yet  that  he  must 
believe  in  the  latter.  This  is  only  one  of  a  number  of  paralogisms  for 
which  that  philosopher  is  so  eminently  noted.  If  both  are  incon- 
ceivable, then  the  universe  is  inconceivable ;  but,  as  the  universe  is 
conceivable,  an  absolute  commencement  is  conceivable,  since  an  in- 
finite non-commencement  is  in  itself  absurd.  But  absolute  commence- 
ment is  the  logical  basis  of  the  common  faith  in  a  Creator.  Thus, 
from  the  alternative  of  Hamilton  emerges  a  theistic  conclusion  as 
satisfactory  as  theology  would  require;  and  though  he  phrases  the 
unconditioned  and  absolute  as  inconceivable,  he  yet  demands  faith  in 
it,  as  he  finally  does  in  a  finite  universe.  This  is  the  testimony  of  the 
universe:  it  is  finite,  it  reflects  the  infinite;  it  had  a  beginning,  it 
reflects  the  eternal;  it  is  conditioned,  it  reflects  the  unconditioned. 
Beyond  such  testimony  we  need  not  go.  As  to  its  revelations  of  the 
infinite  God,  in  his  character,  government,  and  purposes,  this  is  not 
the  place  for  a  free  estimate ;  in  subsequent  pages  the  divine  character 
will  be  exhibited,  as  it  is  revealed. 

The  primary  question  of  philosojihy  relates  to  the  possibility  of  a 
knowledge  of  the  existence  of  God  by  the  reason.  Evidently,  such 
knowledge  may  be  attained  in  this  way.  Employing  a  priori  con- 
victions, the  sentiments  of  the  consciousness,  and  the  testimony  of 
the  universe,  the  reason  is  able  to  satisfy  itself  as  to  the  existence  of 
a  divine  being;  and  this  justifies  the  philosophic  attempt  at  in- 
vestigation. Philosophy  has  a  mission,  since  God  is  cognizable  by  the 
reason.     The  philosopher's  occupation  is  not  ended ;  it  is  but  begun. 

Nor  is  the  problem  of  the  infinite  the  only  problem  of  philosophy. 
Man  is  a  stupendous  mystery,  and  asks  for  self-explanation.  God 
interpreted,  the  interpretation  of  man  must  follow ;  hence,  God  and 
man  are  one  in  the  solution.  Still,  secondary  as  man  is,  he  is  war- 
ranted in  making  an  independent  self-examination,  in  order  the  more 
completely  to  understand  God  in  his  relations  to  man.  A  knowledge 
of  being  ;  a  knowledge  of  soul ;  a  knowledge  of  relations  ;  enter  into 
the  final  conception  of  man.  The  history  of  humanity  is  as  impera- 
tive as  the  history  o^  the  idea  of  God,  for  the  human  idea  is  as 
patent  in  civilization  and  history  as  the  divine.  Ignoring  not  the 
higher,  it  is  incumbent  on  the  philosopher  carefully  to  inquire  into 
the  lower,  and  beginning  with  God  to  terminate  in  man,  or  begin- 
ning with  man  to  terminate  in  God,  linking  the  two  into  unity. 

The  necessity  for  a  searching  self-examination   or  a  studv  of  the 


126  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

contents  of  human  history,  grows  chiefly  out  of  recent  philosophic 
interpretations  of  man,  both  as  respects  his  physical  origin  and  physical 
character.  The  old  question,  "What  is  man?"  is  as  philosophical  as 
it  is  Scriptural,  to  be  answered  philosophically  as  well  as  Scripturally. 
Evolutionists  like  Hackel  and  Silencer  pronounce  man's  appearance  to 
be  the  result  of  the  animal  development  in  the  world;  and  psycholo- 
gists like  Alexander  Bain,  abrogating  the  essential  diiference  between 
matter  and  spirit,  declare  mental  action  to  be  the  result  of  physical 
orgauization,  and  the  mind,  therefore,  to  be  a  refined  form  of  matter. 
The  common  faith  respecting  man's  creation  and  the  immortality  of 
the  soul  is  iu  direct  conflict  with  evolution  as  expressed  or  formulated 
and  with  psychology  as  perverted  in  the  interest  of  materialism.  The 
conflict  is  fundamental.  It  involves  character,  destiny;  involving 
character,  it  involves  God  ;  involving  destiny,  it  involves  the  highest 
self-iuterest.  Hence,  philosophy  in  its  secondary  work  becomes  phys- 
iological and  psychological,  as  in  its  first  work  it  is  eminently  theolog- 
ical. Nor  can  it  suspend  its  task  until,  sinking  lower,  and  yet 
rationally,  it  undertakes  to  estimate  the  visible  or  phenomenal  world, 
interpreting  it  in  its  essence  and  in  its  relations  to  being.  A  lower 
task,  but  parallel  in  one  sense  with  tlie  higher,  for  the  solution  of  the 
non-ego  will  materially  aid  in  the  understanding  of  the  ego,  as  the 
solution  of  the  ego  will  certainly  result  in  a  comprehension  of  the 
non-ego.  In  a  previous  paragraph  it  is  hinted  that  philosophy  tends 
sometimes  to  pantheism,  or  Spiuozism,  or  Eleaticism,  or  subjective 
idealism,  either  to  an  amalgamation  of  the  finite  and  infinite,  or  a 
total  denial  of  the  finite,  all  of  which  is  subversive  of  true  knowl- 
edge. As  in  the  case  of  man,  the  universe  must  have  a  separate 
and  independent  treatment,  or  confusion  will  follow  in  the  human 
understanding  respecting  things  that  otherwise  might  be  partially 
understood. 

Conceding  separate  treatment,  which  is  conceding  separate  reality 
to  nature,  we  confront  certain  philosophic  theories  respecting  our 
knowledge  of  nature  that  destroys  the  value  not  only  of  separate 
treatment  but  also  of  any  treatment  at  all  of  nature.  For  example : 
Hamilton  precipitates  his  doctrine  of  the  relatvoity  of  hioxvledge,  con- 
fining inquiry  to  mere  relations,  or  phenomena  in  their  relations,  and 
forbidding  any  scrutiny  back  of  forms  or  qualities.  This  is  a  block- 
ade to  intelligent  inquiry,  comi)elling  it  to  cease  at  the  very  point 
where  it  is  anxious  to  press  for  answer.  Superior  to  Hamilton 
in  defining  the  limitations  of  knowledge,  Kant  declares  the  phenome- 
nal alone  knowable,  shrouding  the  "  thing-in-itself,"  or  essence  of 
matter,  with  the  blackness  of  mystery,  and  inculpating  the  intellect 
with  an  inability  to  penetrate  beyond  the  visible.     This  is  in  conflict 


THE  PROVINCE  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  127 

with  the  Christian  conception  of  nature  and  with  a  true  theory  of 
knowledge,  both  of  which  will  be  stated  and  enforced  at  the  proper 
time.  In  its  interpretation  of  the  universe  philosophy  descends  into 
geology  for  facts,  and  roams  over  psychology  for  principles.  Thus  is 
it  a  scientific  seeker,  or  philosophy  with  a  scientific  spirit. 

Philosophy  in  its  search  for  the  unconditioned  is  strictly  theologi- 
cal ;  in  its  study  of  man  it  is  semi-scientific  ;  in  its  estimate  of  the  universe 
it  is  wholly  scientific.  It  embraces  all  knowledge,  outside  of  Revela- 
tion, and  is  itself  a  continual  revelation  of  truth,  combining  the  study 
of  God,  mind,  and  matter,  as  neither  theology  nor  science,  if  corn- 
fined  to  their  specific  tasks,  can  do. 

What  is  the  province  of  philosophy?  Is  it  to  dwell  in  caves,  lit 
up  by  the  feeble  torchlights  of  the  senses  ?  or  is  it  to  seek  the  trans- 
figured heights  of  truth,  and,  discovering  the  long-lost  and  long- 
sought  knowledge,  pilot  the  race  through  the  avenues  of  darkness  to 
the  jeweled  throne  of  God  ? 

The  province  of  philosophy,  as  apprehended  by  philosophers 
themselves,  as  sketched  in  these  pages,  is  the  discovery  or  declara- 
tion of  the  uncaused  personality  in  the  universe,  as  the  cause  of  all 
actuality,  of  the  phenomenal  world.  This  is  its  first  duty.  Per- 
sonality, not  law  ;  being,  not  manifestation  ;  substance,  not  qualities ; 
God,  not  atomic  principles  ;  it  must  seek  to  understand  and  proclaim. 
Philosophy  must  not  discrown  God. 

The  province  of  philosophy  is  to  understand  man  chiefly  as  a 
mind-being.  Psychology  and  physiology,  if  twins,  are  not  Siamese 
twins ;  they  are  not  a  unit ;  they  cling  not  together  ;  they  perish  not 
together.  The  distinction  between  mind  and  matter  must  be  clearly 
drawn,  and  man  must  be  ennobled,  not  degraded,  by  self-knowledge. 
Philosophy  must  not  discrown  man. 

The  province  of  philosophy  is  to  comprehend  the  universe.  This 
it  is  essaying  to  do,  but  its  failure  is  manifest.  Philosophy  must  be 
emancipated  from  the  fiction  that  the  universe  is  a  self-creating,  self- 
preserving,  self-executing  mechanism.  Nor  in  the  emancipation  will 
it  swing  to  a  pantheistic  conception  of  the  universe,  an  equally  dan- 
gerous fiction,  as  it  confuses  personality  with  universality.  Philoso- 
phy, linking  the  phenomenal  to  its  chariot,  as  the  conquering  Roman 
generals  did  their  prisoners,  may  ride  around  the  world  amid  the 
plaudits  of  the  multitudes  ;  but,  clinging  like  Stephen  to  the  divine 
throne,  it  may  ascend  amid  a  mob  of  stones  into  the  presence  of  God. 

The  initial  fact  of  philosophy  is — Nature. 

The  intermediate  term  of  philosophy  is — Man. 

The  ultimate  word  of  philosophy  is — God. 


128  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

NATURE  ;    OR    AN    E^CEGESIS  OK  IVIATTER. 

SO  absorbed  with  rational  inquiry  and  moral  speculation  was 
Socrates  that  he  formed  no  acquaintance  with  nature  ;  he  never 
addressed  her  in  any  form,  and  she  never  impressed  him,  notwith- 
standing her  beauty  and  power.  From  the  trees,  the  rocks,  the  fields, 
he  learned  nothing,  but  drifted  into  an  idealistic  conception  of  things 
that  extinguished  all  interest  in  them.  How  far  the  absence  of  cor- 
dial sympathy  with  the  physical  world  is  a  disqualification  for  philo- 
sophic insight  into  its  contents  may  not  be  pointed  out,  but  if  one 
would  exhaustively  contemplate  phenomenal  appearances  and  ac- 
tivities, one  must  be  en  rappoH  with  the  phenomenal  spirit,  or  the 
essence  of  things.  Sir  Walter  Scott  loved  the  trees;  Cromwell  was 
at  home  in  the  fields ;  Audubon  drew  the  birds  to  his  hand ;  Hugh 
Miller  traced  in  the  rocks  the  hand-marks  of  an  unseen  power  ;  and 
David  shouted,  "  The  heavens  declare  the  glory  of  God."  Rousseau 
was  a  worshiper  of  the  material  universe,  and  Hiickel  proposes  the 
religion  of  nature  as  a  substitute  for  Christianity.  The  philosophic 
indifference  of  Socrates  and  the  philosophic  devotion  of  Hiickel  are 
extremes  to  be  avoided,  for  nature,  as  the  arcanum  of  truth,  should 
be  studied,  probed,  questioned,  and  yet  not  be  regarded  as  supreme, 
since  both  philosophy  and  religion  agree  that  its  existence  is  a  muta- 
tion, and  its  final  fate  a  dissolution.  Nature  is  possessed  of  charms 
that  poets  have  embalmed  in  verse  ;  laws  that  scientists  have  framed 
in  words ;  relationships  that  naturalists  have  reduced  to  systems  ;  in- 
teractions, homologies  and  adaptations  that  have  excited  the  admira- 
tion of  observers  ;  moral  hints  and  suggestions  that  theologians  have 
eagerly  turned  to  account ;  evidences  of  superintending  power  that 
atheists  have  not  overthrown  ;  and  exhibitions  of  divine  wisdom  that 
should  thrill  alike  the  inquirer  and  believer. 

Wide  is  the  field  of  nature  ;  hidden  are  some  of  its  forces ;  oc- 
cult is  its  ultimate  purpose  ;  problematical  is  its  destiny  ;  and  difficult 
is  the  task  of  searching  and  finding  the  spirit  that  dwells  in  it.  Such 
a  task  philosophy  imposes,  such  a  task  the  philosopher  must  assume. 
That  diflSculties  lie  before  the  investigator  of  nature  is  self-evident ; 
that  a  satisfactory  conclusion  touching  all  points  involved  in  the  in- 
vestigation should  not  be  expected  in  our  present  state  of  knowledge 
concerning  matter,  all  must  agree. 


INTERPRETA  TIONS  OF  NA  TURE.  1 29 

To  be  comprehensive,  one's  study  of  nature  should  embrace  three 
points  of  view:  viz.,  the  common  representation,  the  philosophic  in- 
terpretation, and  the  religious  conception,  each  being  distinct  in  itself 
but  taken  together  affording  a  progressive  and  complete  idea  of  the 
physical  universe. 

By  the  common  representation  is  meant  the  uneducated,  universal 
view  of  the  race  which,  gross  in  some  particulars,  and  superstitious 
in  others,  has  in  it  certain  traditional  elements  of  truth  upon  which 
the  race  has  acted  with  singular  uniformity  from  the  beginning.  The 
practical  sagacity  of  mankind,  never  rising  to  the  height  of  a  critical 
or  close  observation,  and  never  going  behind  what  it  sees,  hears,  and 
touches,  has  led  to  the  discovery  of  specific  facts  and  principles  in 
the  economy  of  nature  which  have  been  applied  to  agriculture,  nav- 
igation, architecture,  and  the  general  sphere  of  man's  civil  and  social 
life,  to  his  advantage  and  development.  In  other  words,  nature  has 
been  made  tributary  to  the  race's  history  and  happiness.  The 
appropriation  of  nature's  laws,  facts,  and  forms  in  man's  history  has 
been  superficial  since  man  himself  has  been  slow  to  inquire,  discover, 
adapt,  and  employ  the  resources  of  nature.  However,  out  of  the 
crude  and  artless  utilization  of  nature  in  the  civilization  of  the  world 
have  issued  a  knowledge  of  nature,  and  a  purpose  to  find  out  more 
than  is  now  known. 

To  interpret  nature  according  to  a  religious  creed,  or  in  the  re- 
ligious spirit,  is  the  specific  enterprise  of  those  charged  with  the 
defense  and  propagation  of  Christian  doctrine  ;  but  philosophy  itself 
can  not  proceed  by  entirely  ignoring  the  Biblical  exegesis,  or  even 
the  crude  conceptions  of  the  unlettered  multitude. 

The  philosophic  interpretation  will  appear  to  better  advatage  as  its 
relations  to  the  common  and  the  Christian  couceptions  are  conceded ; 
but  for  the  purposes  of  this  chapter  it  may  be  considered  apart  from  both. 

As  a  preparation  for  a  philosophic  understanding  of  nature,  we 
oblige  ourselves  to  consider  it  in  its  wholeness,  and  not  in  its  parts, 
only  as  they  shall  serve  to  illustrate  the  fundamental  principles  at 
issue.  The  law  of  analysis  binds  us  to  a  descent  from  the  universal 
to  the  particular,  or,  holding  us  to  the  universal  conception  of  na- 
ture, permits  its  application  to  the  individualizations  of  that  concep- 
tion in  the  concrete  forms  of  matter.  As  painting  may  be  studied  in 
its  abstract  principles,  and  no  particular  product  of  an  artist  be  under 
inspection ;  as  music  and  oratory  may  be  historically  contemplated 
without  regard  to  particular  compositions — so  nature  may  be  viewed 
in  its  entirety  without  a  minute  analysis  of  any  particular  form  of  it. 
The  topaz  is  not  the  open  door  into  the  mineral  kingdom  ;  the  gera- 
nium is  not  the  sponsor  for  the  vegetable  world;  the  mastodon,  the 

9 


130  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

lynx,  the  eagle,  or  the  horse  represents  not  the  animal  kingdom ; 
that  is,  the  part  is  not  the  key  to  the  whole,  but  the  v/hole  is  the  key 
to  all  the  parts.  From  the  height  of  the  whole  the  interactions,  the 
relations,  and  the  individuality  of  the  parts  may  be  detected,  ex- 
pressed, and  understood. 

From  this  view  it  is  easy  to  see  that  what  will  explain  one  world 
will  explain  the  universe,  and  what  will  interpret  the  earth  will  in- 
terpret all  that  is  upon  it.  What  will  account  for  the  ocean  will 
account  for  every  drop  in  it.  If  we  can  not  account  for  the  whole, 
we  can  not  account  for  the  parts.     The  whole  includes  the  parts. 

Out  of  the  reduction  of  many  views  to  one,  and  from  this  gaze  in 
the  beginning  at  the  universal  instead  of  the  particular,  arises  the  sus- 
picion that  nature  is  one,  and  is  to  be  philosophically  interpreted  from 
the  standpoint  of  unity.  The  conclusion  of  a  unity  in  nature  is  not 
new  to  the  religious  mind,  for  it  is  a  Biblical  doctrine,  but  philosophy 
has  slowly  advanced  toward  it,  and  is  now  compelled  to  embrace  it. 
Plato  was  on  the  right  track  when  he  said,  "The  end  of  all  philoso- 
phy is  the  intuition  of  unity,"  but  his  was  a  unity  of  cause  rather 
than  a  unity  of  effect — a  unity  of  the  infinite  intelligence  rather  than 
a  unity  of  the  manifested  universe.  Both  conceptions — the  unity  of 
God  and  the  unity  of  nature — are  legitimate  philosoj^hic  deductions, 
with  only  the  latter  of  which  we  are  at  present  concerned. 

Worshipers  of  the  idea  of  the  unity  of  nature  are  not  confined 
to  theologians ;  the  most  eminent  scientists  and  philosophers  bow 
down  before  it,  as  they  are  affected  by  the  religious  spirit,  or  as  pure 
science  compels  its  acknowledgment,  or  as  they  discover  that  it  ap- 
parently contributes  to  the  support  of  their  particular  hypothesis. 
Whatever  the  motive,  the  unity  of  nature  is  now  accepted  by  all 
classes  of  thinkers  as  a  demonstrated  fact.  Hackel  is  very  loud  in  its 
praise,  but  with  evident  purpose  to  rob  nature  of  a  teleological  au- 
thorship, and  to  honor  it  as  a  self-made  product.  Humboldt  was 
firmly  persuaded  that  "  one  indissoluble  chain  of  affinity  binds  together 
all  nature."  Sir  W.  R.  Grove  refers  the  causation  of  all  "  material 
affections,"  such  as  light,  heat,  electricity,  magnetism,  and  motion  to 
"one  omnipresent  influence;"  while  Hume  admits  that  "one  design 
prevails  throughout  the  whole  "  universe,  and  that  all  things  in  it  are 
"  evidently  of  a  piece."  Linnffius  urged  that  the  animal  world  sprang 
from  a  single  pair,  and  that  the  spirit  of  oneness  is  in  nature.  Her- 
mann Lotze  intimates  that  the  essence  of  "  things"  is  unity;  hence 
the  essence  of  nature  is  the  spirit  of  unity  that  pervades  it. 

Without  qualifying  the  opinions  of  the  scientists  and  philosophers, 
or  attempting  to  separate  the  true  from  the  false,  it  is  clear  that  the 
conviction  that  nature  is,  in  an  extraordinary  sense,  a  unit,  is  univer- 


SIMPLICITY  OF  MATTER.  131 

sal.  Materialists,  evolutionists,  associationalists,  psychologists,  physiol- 
ogists, naturalists,  have  at  last  surrendered  to  the  Biblical  conception 
of  the  unity  of  the  universe.  The  scientific  dogma  of  unity  may  be 
expressed  in  phrases  different  from  the  form  of  the  Biblical  dogma, 
but  the  two  agree  in  one.  The  basis  of  the  former  is  scientific  dem- 
onstration ;  the  basis  of  the  latter  is  revealed  truth.  In  what  the 
unity  consists — whether  of  substance,  form,  origin,  use,  or  destiny — 
is  a  primary  question ;  but  it  is  gratifying  that  the  scientific  dogma 
and  the  Biblical  representation  are  almost  identical  on  all  these 
points.     Whatever  difference  exists  is  incidental. 

Respecting  the  substance  of  matter,  it  has  been  demonstrated  that 
the  same  gross  constituents  enter  the  composition  of  all  planetary 
bodies,  and  that  matter  is,  so  far  as  determined,  the  same  everywhere. 
By  means  of  the  spectroscope  it  has  been  ascertained  that  the  sun  and 
the  earth  are  composed  of  the  same  materials,  from  which  it  is  in- 
ferred that  the  planetary  bodies  constitute  a  brotherhood,  bearing  the 
same  image,  made  in  the  same  way,  and  appointed  to  the  same  des- 
tiny. The  unity  of  substance  is  therefore  the  first  declaration  of  the 
scientific  dogma  establishing  the  unity  of  the  authorship  of  the  phys- 
ical universe. 

Quite  as  expository  of  the  scientific  dogma  is  the  admitted  fact  of 
the  simplicity  of  matter,  by  which  is  meant  that  nature  is  a  com- 
pound reducible  in  the  last  analysis  to  a  few  essential  elements.  The 
chemist  is  bold  enough  to  announce  that  at  the  most  there  are  not 
more  than  seventy  elements  that  compose  the  earth,  but  of  these  only 
thirteen  are  prominent,  or  used  freely  in  the  forms  and  combinations 
of  nature.  Of  the  thirteen  elements,  only  three  or  four,  namely, 
oxygen,  carbon,  silicon,  and  nitrogen,  are  universally  active,  and  of 
these  oxygen  constitutes  about  one-half.  Professor  Huxley  reduces 
every  material  substance  to  water,  ammonia,  and  carbonic  acid,  but 
this  is  a  complex  reduction,  susceptible  to  a  more  minute  subdivision. 
Oxygen  is  the  great  world-builder — a  single  element.  Back  of 
oxygen,  however,  it  may  finally  be  possible  to  go,  for  as  a  simple 
element,  it  may  be  ascertained  to  be  compound  ;  and  so  of  all  other 
so-called  simple  elements.  Under  a  more  incisive  and  penetrating  analy- 
sis, the  simple  may  appear  compound  and  the  compound  simple,  until, 
going  back  to  the  final  limit,  all  matter  may  be  reduced  to  one  ele- 
ment, of  which  the  others  are  but  diversified  manifestations.  In  the 
immature  stages  of  Physics  voltaic  electricity,  thermo-electricity,  and 
animal  electricity  were  designated  as  different  hinds  of  electricity,  but 
electricity  is  a  unit  divisible  into  these  diflferent  forms.  So  the  sev- 
enty elements  may  be  the  metamorphosis  of  one  element.  Indeed,  Dr. 
Prout,  attributing  a  certain  numerical  value  to  chemical  substances, 


132  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

which  he  called  the  atomic  weight  of  the  substance,  found  in  nearly- 
all  cases  that  it  was  an  exact  multiple  of  the  atomic  weight  of  hydro- 
gen, and  was  disposed,  therefore,  to  regard  hydrogen  as  unity,  or  tJie 
stariing-point  of  the  material  universe.  To  be  sure,  oxygen  or  carbon, 
or  any  other  element,  might  be  taken  as  the  unit  of  weight,  but  in 
such  a  case  it  would  be  arbitrary,  whereas  hydrogen  appears  like 
naJture^  own  unit,  and  chemists  generally  now  recognize  it  as  the 
standard  of  atomic  measurement.  This  system  of  weights  or  values 
has  been  assailed,  but  it  is  remarkable  that  it  has  not  been  overthrown. 

With  slight  variations  in  the  system  to  meet  certain  exceptions,  it 
may  be  used  to  prove  that  all  substances  are  but  multiples  or  mani- 
festations of  primary  substances,  or  a  single  original  element,  leading 
back  to  a  unit  never  before  dreamed  of  in  philosophy.  Thales  traced 
all  things  to  water  ;  but  modern  chemistry  traces  the  atomic  unit  to 
hydrogen.  If  the  worlds  are  but  multiples  of  the  atomic  unit,  how 
simple  the  whole  universe,  and  what  a  demonstration  of  its  unity  ! 
The  diversity  of  nature-forms  in  no  sense  stands  in  the  way  of,  or 
qualifies  the  objective  oneness  of,  world-life,  for,  given  the  single  ele- 
ment, it  is  possible  to  explain  all  nature  from  it.  An  endless  num- 
ber of  forms  do  not  perplex  any  more  than  a  limited  number.  Three 
thousand  stars  do  not  introduce  any  more  new  problems  than  a  single 
orb  ;  the  explanation  of  one  is  the  explanation  of  all.  We  are  not, 
then,  at  the  mercy  of  diversity ;  it  has  its  explanation. 

Vast  is  the  animal  kingdom,  including  more  than  twenty  thousand 
species,  and  yet  the  whole  is  comprehended  in  the  usual  zoological 
system,  which  divides  them  into  Vertebi-ata,  Articulata,  Mollusca, 
and  Kadiata,  four  great  divisions,  suggestive  of  the  four  elements 
which  prominently  appear  in  the  inorganic  world  ;  and,  as  the  four 
elements  have  been  reduced  to  an  atomic  unit,  so  the  four  zoological 
branches  may  be  reduced  to  a  single  beginning.  This  is,  indeed,  the 
theory  of  "  descent,"  a  contribution  to  the  doctrine  of  the  world's 
unity,  but  warped  in  the -support  of  a  materialistic  hypothesis  of  the 
world's  origin  and  development. 

Scientists  have  been  troubled  not  a  little  over  the  subject  of  species, 
Linnseus  insisting  that  the  animal  kingdom  originated  from  a  single  pair, 
while  nearly  all  the  later  scientists  have  consented  to  a  limited  number 
of  fixed  types  or  original  species  in  the  beginning.  Even  granting 
that  the  theory  of  Linnseus  is  unacceptable,  the  doctrine  of  fixed 
types  is  sufficiently  efficient  in  its  support  of  the  doctrine  of  unity. 

Moreover,  from  the  homological  principle  which  seems  to  pervade 
the  animal  kingdom,  a  singularly  striking  proof  of  the  scientific 
dogma  of  unity  may  be  obtained.  Zoologists  agree  that  there  is  a 
correspondence,  not,  perhaps,  complete,  but  sufficiently   close  to  be 


FALSE  IDEAS  OF  NATURE.  133 

observable,  among  the  vertebrates  in  the  general  construction  of  their 
organs  and  the  arrangement  of  their  parts,  pointing  to  a  general  plan 
in  their  history  and  development.  For  instance,  the  hands  and  feet 
of  a  man,  the  paAvs  of  a  lion,  the  feet  of  a  horse,  and  the  fins  of  a 
whale,  are  homologous,  demonstrating  a  common  idea,  and  really  es- 
tablishing an  animalic  relationship.  The  parallelism  is  by  no  means 
incidental ;  its  prominence  in  nature  materialists  employ  as  the  proof 
of  the  unity  of  the  world,  or  that  one  general  idea  pervades  the  one 
kingdom.  Accepting  the  scientific  discovery  of  the  homological 
principle,  it  furnishes  irresistible  proof  of  the  philosophic  and  theistic 
notion  of  a  world-wide  unity,  centering  in  a  common  divine  authorship. 

In  like  manner  the  vegetable  world  may  be  divided  and  subdi- 
vided, and,  under  the  homological  principle,  reduced  to  a  single  plan, 
and  possibly  to  a  single  element.  The  inorganic  world  likewise  sub- 
mits to  a  similar  reduction,  pointing  unmistakably  to  one  plan  and  to 
one  source.  Evidently,  science  is  pushing  back  toward  the  fewest  ele- 
ments in  the  process  of  world-building,  and  is  priding  itself  on  the  discov- 
ery of  the  law  of  atomic  unity  in  nature,  grounding  all  its  forms  into 
multiples  of  a  unit,  invested  with  the  capabilities  of  a  manifold  life. 

Philosophy  may  readily  embrace  the  doctrine  of  unity  when  so 
thoroughly  supported  by  facts;  yet,  if  Hilckel's  view  of  nature  be 
sustained,  namely,  that  it  is  a  physico-chemical  process,  without  a 
personal  author,  and  that  it  is  a  history  of  false  suggestions,  then  de- 
ductions are  unreliable  ;  but,  on  the  whole,  science  gravitates  to  the 
view  of  the  unity  of  nature  in  the  sense  explained.  Hiickel  applies 
the  word  "  cenogeny  "  to  nature,  meaning  by  it  a  "  history  of  falsifi- 
cations," as  if  nature  were  untrue  to  itself  or  its  own  laws ;  but  this 
is  in  the  interest  of  the  grossest  materialism.  The  scientific  presenta- 
tion of  the  hypothesis  of  unity  is  not  always  what  a  philosopher  may 
approve,  and  the  philosophic  elaboration  of  a  scientific  fact  may  be 
repugnant  to  a  true  or  theistic  conception  of  unity ;  nevertheless,  the 
idea  of  unity  is  congenial  to  science,  philosophy,  and  religion. 

Planck  undertakes  to  solve  the  unity  of  nature  by  a  principle  of 
"  inner  concentration,"  which  is  impulsive  enough  to  reach  out  in  all 
directions,  producing  in  its  activity  the  great  and  the  small,  and  man 
as  well  as  the  insect.  Just  what  the  principle  is,  beyond  its  ideal 
character,  it  is  a  little  difficult  to  gather,  but,  rationalizing  it  into  a 
practical  force,  he  attributes  to  it  more  than  it  actually  possesses. 
St.  George  Mivart  hints  of  an  innate  force,  or  internal  powers,  but 
his  is  a  scientific  utterance,  while  Planck's  is  a  metaphysical  illusion 
that  really  accounts  for  nothing.  Its  break-down  is  in  its  application 
to  man,  who,  instead  of  being  the  product  of  an  inner  impulse  of 
nature,  is  verily  the  image  of  a  power  outside  of  nature.     The  attempt 


134  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

of  Planck,  however  inconclusive  and  unsatisfactory,  is  yet  in  harmony 
with  the  general  idea;  it  presupposes  that  idea,  and  undertakes  its 
solution. 

That  mystical  religious  teacher,  Swedeuborg,  was  charmed  with 
the  scientific  idea  of  unity,  but  went  entirely  beyond  the  limits  of 
science  for  an  explanation,  and  so  his  theory  has  suffered  the  usual 
fate  of  such  adventures.  Reduced  to  an  aphoristic  form,  "nature  is 
always  self-similar."  This  is  another  phrase  for  the  homology  of  na- 
ture extended  to  plants  as  well  as  animals.  In  the  botanical  realm  the 
plant  proceeds  from  leaf  to  leaf,  ascending  to  something  higher,  but 
always  carrying  the  mark  of  the  lower ;  it  is  a  process  of  repetition 
as  the  condition  of  enlargement.  The  great  is  the  repetition  of  the 
small.  In  the  animal  kingdom  the  same  law  has  constant  illustra- 
tion, as  in  vertebrates,  beginning  with  the  spine,  hands,  feet,  and 
spines  multiply,  and  at  last  man  emerges.  Man  is  a  spine !  Nature 
is  an  ascending  scale  of  unities  and  homologies,  or  a  series  of  repeti- 
tions and  enlargements,  working  along  a  line  of  anticipations  of  some- 
thing higher,  a  foreshadowing  of  evolution,  mystically,  rather  than 
scientifically,  presented. 

Concentrating  his  thought  upon  the  doctrine  of  unity,  Swedenborg 
surmised  that  each  unity,  so  to  speak,  is  a  compound  of  unities,  the 
simple  is  the  sign  of  the  complex,  as  the  unity  of  the  heart  is  made 
up  of  the  unities  of  small  hearts,  and  the  unity  of  the  eye  consists 
of  the  unities  of  small  eyes.  A  rational  scientific  order  proceeds 
from  the  complex  to  the  simple,  but  Swedenborg's  mystical  order 
ascends  from  the  simple  to  the  complex,  rising  from  the  finite  to  the 
infinite ;  but  it  is  confusing,  because  it  is  not  transparent.  Besides, 
its  scientific  accuracy  may  well  be  doubted.  The  eye  is  not  a  com- 
bination of  eyes ;  the  hand  is  not  a  combination  of  hands ;  a  leaf  is 
not  a  combination  of  leaves.-  At  least  the  scientific  proof  is  wanting. 
Notwithstanding  the  mystical  idea  of  Swedenborg  is  mythical,  and 
the  theory  of  unity  within  unities  is  untenable,  he  held  to  the  primary 
thought  of  wholeness  in  nature  that  pointed  to  a  single  governmental 
administration,  having  all  power  and  all  wisdom,  and  therefore  suf- 
ficient for  all  things. 

Ge^ethe  speculated  with  rare  philosophical  ingenuity  on  nature, 
discerning  in  it  a  unity  based  on  the  correlation  of  its  parts,  and  sug- 
gesting the  latter-day  doctrine  of  the  correlation  of  forces.  Emerson's 
statement  that  "he  has  said  the  best  things  about  nature  that  ever 
were  said,"  we  can  not  accept .  fully,  for  he  has  denied  some  of  the 
most  patent  scientific  principles  or  facts,  as  the  prismatic  colors. 
Concerning  unity,  the  leaf,  in  his  judgment,  is  the  key  to  the  botanical 
kingdom,  and  the  spine  to  the  vertebrates;   that  is,  the  leaf  is  the 


/ 


SCIENTIFIC  CONCLUSIONS.  135 

unit  in  the  one  kingdom,  and  the  spine  the  unit  in  the  other.  He 
affirms  that  the  plant  is  a  transformed  leaf,  and  that  the  leaf  may  be 
converted  into  any  organ  of  the  plant,  and  any  organ  of  a  plant  may 
be  converted  into  a  leaf.  As  clearly  does  he  declare  that  the  head  is 
the  spine  transformed,  and  it  would  follow  that  the  head  might  be 
converted  into  spines,  or  a  spine  into  any  organ  of  the  head.  This 
theory  of  "  transformation"  implies  an  involved  relationship  that  bor- 
ders closely  on  the  chemical  idea  of  correlation,  as  motion  is  a  form 
of  heat,  and  heat  a  form  of  motion.  It  is  a  question  if  Goethe's  idea, 
rescued  from  a  scientific  form,  will  not  appear  more  speculative  than 
practical  or  real,  and  if  he  did  not  borrow  a  little  hallucination  from 
Swedenborg.  Even  if  the  doctrine  of  correlation  of  forces  has  an  in- 
disputable basis  in  fact,  it  may  not  be  true  as  applied  to  the  organs  of 
plants,  or  the  forms  of  matter,  that  is,  the  products  of  these  forces. 
The  homology  of  organs  does  not  imply  the  convertibility  of  organs 
into  one  another.  A  leaf  may  be  the  figure  of  a  tree  in  the  mind's 
eye,  but  it  is  not  clear  that  the  tree  is  a  transformed  leaf.  Goethe 
looked  at  nature,  not  in  its  wholeness,  but  in  its  parts,  and  proceeded 
in  his  theorizing  from  the  particular  to  the  universal,  a  mistaken  order, 
resulting  in  a  mistaken  interpretation  of  nature.  Like  all  other  theo- 
ries, however,  it  confirms  the  doctrine  of  unity  in  nature,  which  is 
the  chief  point  under  consideration. 

Humboldt,  prying  into  the  deep  secrets  of  the  Avorld  as  if  they 
must  throw  ofl^  their  disguises  in  his  presence,  imbibed  as  a  founda- 
tion-idea of  his  cosmical  beliefs  the  conception  of  a  world-wide  unity, 
which  was  the  inspiration  of  all  his  discoveries  and  the  root  of  all  his 
labors.  In  him  the  conviction  was  profound  that  throughout  nature 
one  plan  prevails  by  which  order  and  development  can  be  explained, 
and  which  had  behind  it  the  principle  of  an  efficient  and  final 
causation.  Swedenborg  is  mystical ;  Goethe,  speculative ;  Hum- 
boldt is  rigidly  scientific,  and  therefore  the  most  accurate  and  "the 
most  conclusive. 

^  The  option  of  the  student  is  that,  while  accepting  unity  as  a 
scientific  and  philosophic  doctrine,  he  may  choose  the  materialistic 
solution  of  the  doctrine  as  enunciated  by  Hiickel,  the  mystical  as 
avowed  by  Swedenborg,  the  correlative  as  proclaimed  by  Goethe,  or 
the  scientific  as  clearly  presented  by  Humboldt.  The  trend  of 
science,  speculation,  and  philosophy  ig  tmyard  the  doctrine  of  "unity 
VILIL^^"^?-  Excej,it  the  most  deformed  and  irrational  pessimisms,  all 
science,  all  philosophy,  all  religions,  _all  materialisms,  unite  in  pro- 
cMndng  the  regnancy  of  an  absolute  monisUc  ^yinciph  in  the  realm  of 
nature.  On  any  other  hypothesis  science  "is  impossible,  and  along 
this  line  of  accepted  doctrine  there  is  the  possibility  of  reconciliation 


136  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

between  systems  hitherto  roughly  antagonistic  and  productive  of  dis- 
cord in  circles  that  ought  to  agree.  The  first  right  view  of  nature, 
then,  is  that  which  so  many  divergent  systems  of  thinking  combine 
in  maintaining,  namely,  the  unity  of  the  physical  world. 

Agreeing  to  the  doctrine  of  unity,  the  problem  of  the  origin  of 
nature,  which  now  introduces  itself,  is  somewhat  simplified,  for,  if 
there  are  two  or  more  kinds  of  matter,  one  origin  might  be  insuffi- 
cient to  account  for  them.  As  it  is,  in  the  solution  of  the  origin  of 
an  atom  of  matter,  or  the  discovery  of  a  physiological  or  initial  unit, 
lies  the  solution  of  the  universe,  and,  conversely,  the  solution  of  the 
universe  involves  the  solution  of  all  that  it  contains. 

In  its  search  after  solutions  the  reason  is  confined  to  one  of  three 
theories,  all  of  which  have  been  ably  expounded,  but  only  one  of 
which  can  be  entertained  as  true. 

(a).  The  theory  of  the  pre-existence  Qf  matter  which  the  Stoics 
espoused  and  which  does  not  require  personal  agency  to  account  for 
it.  Personal  agency  may  be  necessary  to  the  organization  of  matter 
into  forms,  but  by  this  theory  divine  intervention  in  the  institution 
of  matter  is  eliminated.  Seneca  taught  that  God  organized  matter, 
but  did  not  create  it.  Anaxagoros  said  * '  all  things  had  been  pro- 
duced at  the  same  time,  and  then  intellect  had  come  and  arranged 
them  all  in  order."     Intellect  is  an  organizer,  but  not  a  creator. 

(6).  The  theory  that  matter  created  itself.  This  is  absurd,  but 
recent  scientistsTiave  held  that  the  world  organized  itself  Avithout  divine 
agency.  Even  Kant  conceded  that  while  God  created  matter  and 
endowed  it  with  laws,  the  universe  developed  without  his  personal 
supervision.  Seneca  and  Kant  occupy  opposite  grounds.  Cicero\ 
conclusively  disposes  of  the  theory  of  a  self-made  universe  by  re- 
marking that  it  is  as  sensible  to  suppose  the  Iliad  was  written  by 
shaking  letters  in  a  bag  as  to  suppose  that  the  universe  made  itself.^ 

(c).  The  theorv  of  the  divine  creatiojL-oLjnatter,  This  solves 
every  difficulty  and  in  itself  is  the  most  rational  conception  of  the 
origin  of  the  universe.  Given  an  intelligent  Creator,  and  the  end  is 
reached,  the  dilemma  is  solved.  Middle  ground  is  impossible  here. 
Between  a  self-made  and  a  created  universe  there  is  no  room  even 
for  thought.  By  its  very  constitution  the  mind  demands  not  only  a 
cause  for  every  thing,  but  the  cause  must  be  sufficient  to  produce 
the  effect.  The  Greeks  fancied  that  every  tree  had  its  Dryad,  which 
inspired  it  with  life  and  died  with  the  tree.  The  Dryad  is  repre- 
sented as  a  cause,  but  it  is  not  a  sufficient  cause.  The  mind  refuses  to  be 
satisfied  with  inadequate  causes,  even  though  they  are  causes  and 
come  to  us  in  stately  forms  and  are  dressed  in  philosophic  beauty. 
The  cause  must  not  only  be  a  cause,  but  it  must  be  adequate.    Atom- 


UNSATISFACTORY  THEORIES.  137 

ism  is  inadequate,  for  the  atomist  is  unable  to  account  for  the  atom. 
Atomism  explains  nothing;  the  most  that  it  does  is  to  remove  the 
problem  so  far  back  that  the  mind  loses  sight  of  it,  but  vagueness  is 
not  solution.  In  the  present  stage  of  scientific  research  mystery  im- 
pends over  all  problems,  but  it  is  incumbent  on  the  scientist  to  avoid 
absurdities,  contradictions,  and  false  shows,  and  either  suspend  judg- 
ment until  all  the  facts  are  obtained,  or  provisionally  accept  that 
theory  which  contains  the  fewest  antinomies,  and  is  freest  from  inter- 
nal difficulties. 

Reference  to  the  mechanicaJLlIiaory  of  the  world  is  unsatisfactory, 
for  it  deals  with  a  developing  world,  or  one  in  process  of  organic 
structure  from  pre-existing  substances  and  by  virtue  of  pre-existing 
forces  and  laws,  and  goes  not  back  to  primary  or  original  sources. 
Reaching  secondary  causes  it  labels  them  primary,  but  the  deception 
is  apparent.  Even  should  it  contract  the  universe  into  a  single  atom, 
with  a  potentiality  equal  to  the  production  of  the  universe,  it  is  in- 
cumbent that  it  show  where  and  how  the  first  atom  originated  and 
whence  it  derived  its  sovereign  vitality.  What  Avas  the  first  throb  of 
power  that  resulted  in  a  potential  atom,  an  atom  that  had  a  world  or 
system  of  worlds  rolled  up  in  its  invisible  boundaries?  Mechanical 
philosophy  stares  wildly  as  it  searches  for  the  beginning  of  the  atomic 
movement. 

Musa3us,  an  Athenian,  taught  that  "all  things  originated  in  one 
thing  and  when  dissolved  returned  to  the  same  thing ;  "  but  the  one 
thing,  as  source  of  all  things,  he  does  not  name  or  describe,  and  had 
he  described  it,  its  origin  had  still  been  a  problem.  Simplification  of 
a  problem  is  desirable,  but  it  is  not  equivalent  to  a  solution.  Germs, 
physiological  units,  protoplasm,  atoms,  cells,  eggs, — these  do  not  contain 
the  whole  truth,  the  omitted  portion  being  more  important  than  what 
is  declared.  Atomism,  monism,  mechanism,  words  these  that  vindi- 
cate the  doctrine  of  unity,  but  the  origin  of  unity,  the  origin  of 
atoms,  cells,  eggs,  still  remains  unanswered. 

The  nebular  hypothesis  if  true  may  explain  the  origin  of  planets 
but  not  the  origin  of  matter  ;  that  is,  mechanical  theories  may  be 
useful  in  determining  the  origin  of  the  forms  of  matter  without 
giving  the  least  hint  of  the  origin  of  matter.  Bet\veen  substance 
and  form,  or  the  spirit  and  body  of  matter,  the  difference  is  as  great 
aFnEEaf  between  memory  and  the  brain.  Once  insure  the  existence 
of  formless  matter  and  its  subsequent  formal  assertion  follows.  In' 
this  connection  Kant  perpetrates  the  following:  "Give  me  matter, 
and  I  wiirexplaiu  Lire  formation  of  a  world ;  but  give  me  matter 
only,  and  I  can  not  explain  the  formation  of  a  caterpillar."  Form-' 
less  matter  is  the  prophecy  of  formal  matter  only  because  a  Former 


138  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

exists  and  superintends  the  form.  First  the  Former,  second  formless 
matter,  third  formal  matter  ;  these  steps  are  philosophical  because 
necessary  and  rational.  Spinoza  accords  to  matter  three  potencies, 
gravity,  light,  and  organization,  but  these  are  the  potencies  of  law, 
for  the '  organizing  process  is  quite  as  much  a  legal  procedure  as  the 
reign  of  gravity  in  nature.  In  no  sense  are  these  self-endowed  potencies, 
but  on  the  contrary,  they  are  the  expression  of  an  intelligent 
supervision  of  the  nature-world,  by  which  it  is  perpetuated  and  con- 
trolled. Organization,  or  form,  is  the  manner  in  which  substance 
chooses  to  express  itself;  it  is  the  way  in  which  substance  behaves. 
Original  or  formless  matter,  the  "world-stuff,"  may  have  been  inde- 
pendent of  government ;  if  so,  its  only  law  was  inertia ;  it  existed  with 
scarcely  a  property ;  it  was  potential,  not  actual ;  but  in  process  of 
time  the  organizing  spirit  being  imparted  to  it,  it  took  permanent 
shape  through  the  avenues  of  gravitation,  chemical  affinity,  crystal- 
lization, and  by  means  of  the  entire  catalogue  of  nature's  laws.  By 
this  change  from  the  formless  to  the  formal,  matter  advanced  to  a 
state  of  becoming  something  and  is  distinguished  from  being  by 
being  styled  the  becoming,  or  the  non-being.  It  is  not  being,  but  it 
seems  to  strive  after  being,  and  comes  as  near  to  it  as  one  substance 
can  be  like  another.  It  has  reality,  but  its  visible  reality  consists 
in  its  forms  ;  its  hidden  reality  is  the  spirit  that  dwells  in  it.  Both 
the  form  and  the  spirit  we  shall  now  consider. 

/  The  ^-ivn^jg  nf  mn^^^*^'^  ^''^  not  the  accidental  results  of  the  attrition 
/of  unguided  forces,  but  the  careful  expression  of  geometrical  ideas, 
evincing  a  plan  in  the  history  and  development  of  nature.  Nature^ 
is  geometigtjCja^SJLaliized.  Not  a  single  physical  form  can  be  pointed 
out  that  is  not  the  embodiment  of  a  geometrical  principle  or  figure. 
The  circle  and  the  ellipse  are  embodied  in  the  orbits  of  the  spheres, 
and  in  the  spheres  themselves ;  and  angles  of  every  name  are  illus- 
trated in  crystals,  ores,  and  the  physiological  construction  of  animals 
and  plants.  Music,  painting,  sculpture  can  be  reduced  to  a  mathe- 
matical process.  Number  is  the  ideal  of  the  universe.  Pythagoras  dis- 
cerned the  ideal  plan,  but  did  not  elaborate  it  perfectly.  Agreeing 
to  a  plan  and  then  ascertaining  what  it  is,  it'goes  far  toward  confirm- 
ing the  theistic  conception  of  the  origin  of  the  world,  for  a  plan  that 
involves  geometric  law  is  implicit  with  divine  intelligence  and  points 
directly  to  a  supervising  Creator. 

So  closely  related  is  the  subject  of  form  to  that  of  substance,  that 
the  passage  from  one  to  the  other  is  not  difficult ;  and  as  form  can 
not  be  explained  without  substance,  the  latter  must  receive  careful 
attention.  The  interpretations  of  nature,  or  those  theoretical  read- 
ings of  the  spirit  of  nature  which  obtain  in  philosophy,  compel  the 


IDEALISM  A  FANATICISM.  139 

conclusion  that  a  solution  of  matter  except  by  the  theistic  suggestion  is 
improbable.  To  reach  the  theistic  suggestion,  however,  certain  logi- 
cal steps  must  be  taken,  beginning  with  the  objective  or  formal 
realities  of  matter,  and  proceeding  until  the  subjective  side  or  inner 
light  of  nature  is  discerned. 

Every  one  sees  the  world  differently ;  but  this  is  not  because  the 
world  is  absolutely  different  to  every  individual,  but  because  every 
iu^iduaLk_dififixaiit.  Epicurus  tauj^it  that  the  world  is  actually 
what  it  appears  to  be ;  an  absurd  idea,  for  to  no  two  persons  does  it 
appear  the  same.  Yet  it  is  the  same  world,  and  it  is  the  actual, 
not  the  appearing,  world,  that  the  mind  seeks  to  understand.  Be- 
neath its  appearance  is  the  substantial,  manipulating  spirit  that  gives 
its  form  ;  this  unseen  power,  this  invisible  substance,  the  mind  desires 
to  know.  Schopenhauer  considered  the  world  as  his  representation, 
or  the  product  of  his  idea,  a  not  uninteresting  conception,  however  far 
from  absolute  truth  it  is.  It  is  not  one's  idea  of  the  world,  but  rather 
the  absolute  world,  that  philosophy  must  deal  with  and  reveal.  Not 
appearances,  not  representations,  not  ideas,  not  forms,  but  substance, 
absolute  spirit,  internal  reality,  philosophy  must  find  and  declare. 

The  idealistic  intgrpretation  of  nature  is  not  without  friends  in 
these  modern  days,  as  it  was  not  wanting  in  advocates  in  the  palmy 
days  of  Greece.  Its  danger  lies  in  its  tendency  to  fanaticism,  for  it 
is  idealism  that  raises  the  question,  doesmattcr_rea]ly_£:dsi?  With 
this  extreme  we  have  no  sympathy.  ^JNature'lsa  sublime  reality, 
whose  polarity  or  opposite  is  spirit.  Non-be_in^js_jis_real jis^  b^ 
the  phenomenal  as  patent  as  the  substantial.  Bishop  Berkeley  de- 
veloped idealism  into  a  philosophic  fanaticism,  which  received  a 
philosophic  thrashing  at  the  hands  of  Hume. 

Purified  of  the  fanatical  tendency,  and  restrained  by  the  realistic 
spirit,  idealism,  as  a  logical  system,  tends  to  the  denial  of  the  exist- 
ence of  matter,  and  is  therefore  repugnant  to  the  common  sense  of 
mankind.     However,  philosophy  does  not,  and  perhaps  ought  not  to, 
ask  the  opinion  of  the  majority  concerning  its  teachings ;   for  its  pur- 
pose is  truth,  which  the  majority  may  at  first  be  inclined  to  reject. 
/The^apology  for  the  fanatical  content  of  idealism  is  in  the  plausible 
I  statement  that  the  only  reality  is  being,  and  that  nature  is  becoming, 
I  but  never  is,  and  so  is  an  illusion.     To  this  transcendental  interpre- 
tation, which   reduces   the  visible   to   nothingness,  Emerson    commits 
himself,  justifying  it  quite  as  much  on    Christian   as   on   philosophic 
grounds ;  for  he  insists  that  Christianity,  by  its  denunciation  of  the 
world,  by  its  declaration  that  it  is  perishable,  and  that  it  will  finally 
perish,  suggests  an  idealism  identical  with  that  of  philosophy.     But 
the  idealism  of  Christianity  does  not  deny  the  existence  of  matter  ; 


140  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

it  puts  upon  it  the  bau  of  perishability,  and  declares  that,  as  com- 
pared with  truth,  spirit,  knowledge,  redemption,  the  world  is  valueless, 
is  notliing.  Christian  idealism  is  productive  of  contempt  for  matter 
as  such,  because  immortal  things  are  in  the  foreground  of  the  soul, 
and  bel(Hig  to  it  as  its  rightful  inheritance. 

The  old  view  of  Heraclitus,  that  nature  is  involved  in  a  process 
of  flux  or  constant  change,  Plato  accepted ;  and,  as  a  philosophic 
principle,  it  certainly  is  not  wanting  for  demonstration.  Seneca  says 
no  man  bathes  in  the  same  river  twice.  Nature  is  a  miracle  of  mu- 
tation— ever  changing,  yet  ever  remaining.  The  instability  of_natU£&\ 
is  not  an  instability  of  geometric  ideals,  for  these  are  fixed  ;  nor  an  \ 
instability  of  inherent  laws,  for  these  abide,  but  an  instability  of 
phenomena;  the  details,  the  products,  the  forms,  perish,  revive,  and 
perish  again.  An  inquiry  into  nature  will  be  incomplete,  therefore, 
that  does  not  probe  for  stable  elements,  for  fixed  principles ;  it  is  the 
fixed,  and  not  the  fluxing,  that  really  constitutes  nature.  An  ex- 
planation of  nature  is  not  in  a  revelation  of  a  flux  in  nature,  but  of 
something  which,  producing  the  flux,  remains  itself  unfluxed,  un- 
changeable. 

Oersted,  a  Danish  philosopher,  was  convinced  that  the  world  has 
a  soul,  but  this  is  more  fictitious  than  real,  unless  it  be  conceded  that 
by  soul  is  meant  the  law  by  which  nature  exists  ;  for  our  final  analysis 
of  nature  conducts  to  the  belief  that  it  is  impregnated  by  a  legal 
spirit*  which  is  the  essence  of  its  reality.  There  is  something  in  na- 
ture which  the  eye  can  not  see.  It  is  the  soul  of  law.  To  the  eye 
of  man  nature  is  full  of  facts ;  to  the  mind  of  man  nature  is  full  of 
laws  ;  nature  is  law  hijxectdion. 

Prof.  Morris~hords  that  the  life  of  nature  is  the  life  of  spirit, 
which  may  be  accepted  with  the  qualification  that  the  spirit-life  mani- 
fests itself  through  law,  otherwise  he  must  affirm  that  nature  is  spirit, 
abolishing  the  primal  distinctions  between  matter  and  spirit,  or  verg- 
ing on  the  idealistic  denial  of  the  existence  of  matter.  In  the  very 
highest  sense  it  is  true  to  say  that  God  is  in  nature,  and  that  its  life 
is  the  life  of  God ;  but  in  a  critical  or  philosophic  sense  it  is  equally 
true  to  affirm  that  nature  is  the  product  of  the  laws  of  God,  and  so 
reducing  nature  to  law. 

Horace  Bushnell  defines  nature  to  be  that  "created  realm  of 
being  or  substance  which  has  an  acting,  a  going  on,  or  process  from 
within  itself,  under  and  by  its  own  laws."  Nature  is  an  "acting 
from  within  itself,"  or  a  process  of  law,  as  we  prefer  to  phrase  it. 

Herbart  reduces  the  essence  of  a  thing  to  a  "  simple  quality ;  "  but, 
as  he  can  not  designate  the  quality,  his  theory  is  a  bundle  of 
words. 


DEFINITIONS  OF  MATTER.  141 

John  Stuart  Mill  defines  matter  to  be  a  "  permanent  possibility 
of  sensations,"  but  this  is  uo  definition  at  all.  Matter  a  possibility ! 
Matter  is  a  certainty,  a  reality,  whose  existence  is  in  no  sense  depend- 
ent on  human  consciousness,  or  its  relation  to  sensation. 

Herbert  Spencer  is  equally  airy  in  his  definition,  which  is  as  fol- 
lows: "Our  conception  of  matter  reduced  to  its  simplest  shape  is 
that  of  co-existent  positions  that  offer  resistance."  Matter  a  position  ! 
This  only  states  where  matter  is,  not  what  it  is. 

The  familiar  definition  of  Alexander  Bain,  that  matter  is  a 
"double-faced  somewhat,  having  a  spiritual  and  a  physical  side,"  is 
readily  recalled  in  this  connection.  Without  dissecting  his  applica- 
tion of  the  definition,  but  using  it  in  our  own  way,  we  confess  that  it 
represents  the  truth  respecting  matter,  whose  physical  side  is  its  form, 
together  with  its  properties,  and  whose  spiritual  side  is  the  law,  the 
life  of  its  activity  or  existence. 

Hermann  Lotze,  sweeping  away  the  mists,  settles  down  to  the 
conclusion  that  a  Tliiug  is  law ;  the  essence  of  matter  is  not  a  simple 
quality,  as  Herbart  holds,  nor  an  aggregation  of  qualities,  nor  is  it  a 
"possibility"  or  "position,"  but  it  is  the  spirit  of  law,  or  tlie  law  of 
its  .activity  or  existence.  Nature  is  the  form  of  law  ;  law  is  in  nature. 
He  says:  "Laws  never  exist  outside,  between,  beside,  or  above  the 
things  that  are  to  obey  them."  "Law  or  truth  is,"  with  which  Plato 
agrees  when  he  defines  law  to  be  the  discovery  of  that  ivhich  is.  Law 
is  the  great  reality,  the  ruling  spirit,  the  life  of  the  world. 

Prof  Bowne,  seeing  that  activity  is  involved  in  the  nature  of 
things,  and  going  behind  the  scenes  of  the  phenomenal  world,  am- 
plifies the  law  of  activity  into  the  law  of  being,  which  means  that 
law  accounts  for  reality,  or  phenomena.  In  the  law  by  which  a 
thing  exists  is  the  secret  of  existence.  A  thing  may  therefore  be  de- 
fined, not  by  properties  or  its  form,  but  by  the  law  by  which  it  is 
produced. 

Plato  taught  that  ideas  "participated"  in  the  formal  appearance 
of  matter,  which  philosophy  has  either  perverted  or  innocently  mis- 
understood ;  for,  stripped  of  its  mystical  guise,  the  meaning  is  that 
law,  which  is  a  divine  idea,  not  alone  became  incorporated  with  mat- 
ter, but  instruraentally  originated  it.  \Vitbiuit  law  mnlt£j:i§Jm]30S- 
sible.  Law  originated  and  participated  in  matter,  and  abides  there. 
It  is  the  onlx  thing  that  does  abide.  Forms  perish,  but  the  geometric 
ideals,  which_are  the  signs  of  geometric  law,  abide  forever.  Forms, 
appeamnces,  possibilities,  properties,  positions,  all  are  lost  sight  of  in 
the  radical  idea  of  law,  as  the  essence  of  things,  as  the  spirit  of  the 
life  of  nature,  as  the  revealed  secret  of  the  universe. 

Going  back  to  the  source  of  things,  the  explanation  of  material 


142  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

phenomena,  as  respects  their  origin,  development,  history,  and  des- 
tiny, is  not  so  difficult  a  task  as  has  been  imagined. 

Creation  may  be  interpreted  as  the  outgoing  of  law.  By  "  crea- 
^tion"  is  meant  not  alone  the  physical  universe,  which  is  properly  the 
result  of  creative  energy,  but  the  act  or  process  of  creation  itself. 
If  at  one  time  the  universe  was  involved  in  an  atom,  it  is  rational 
to  conceive  of  the  atom  as  constituted  in  its  prophetic  fullness  by  law. 
Just  what  was  the  first  act  of  Deity  when  he  resolved  upon  creation 
is  not  known,  but  it  is  quite  conceivable  that  motion  or  action  itself 
was  the  first  sensation  of  the  divine  being.  As  motion  is  convertible 
into  heat,  light,  electricity,  so  the  first  motion  of  the  Deity  contained 
potentially  the  life  of  the  universe.  It  is  possible  that  the  first  divine 
act  resulted  in  non-living  matter,  for  the  historic  order  of  the  phe- 
nomenal world,  according  to  science,  is  from  the  non-living  to  the 
living,  and  this  is  also  according  to  the  Mosaic  cosmogony.  Matter 
first,  life  afterwards.  The  non-living  first,  that  the  Deity  might  be- 
hold his  crude  work ;  the  living  next,  that  he  might  glorify  himself 
in  it.  If  motion  were  the  first  act  of  the  Deity,  it  was  also  the  first 
law,  or  tlie  law  of  activity,  by  which  all  things  finally  appeared. 

This  leads  out  into  the  broader  arena  of  the  universe  as  a  created 
product,  or  the  result  of  a  Being  whose  first  law  is  motion,  and  whose 
condition  is  activity.  The  universe  was  created  according  to  law. 
This  means  method  or  order  in  the  process  of  creation.  What  that 
order  was,  geology  attempts  in  part  to  explain,  while  Moses  gives  it 
in  full;  it  was  a  scientific  order,  a  progress  from  the  non-living  toward 
the  living,  a  methodical  development  of  physical  history.  It  is  clear, 
therefore,  that  the  highest  as  well  as  the  lowest  types  of  existence, 
the  crudest  as  well  as  the  most  finished  forms  of  matter,  are  the  re- 
sults of  the  law  of  motion,  which,  distributed  throughout  the  limitless 
field  of  being,  and  applied  by  infinite  wisdom,  produced  trees,  crys- 
tals, birds,  fishes,  worlds,  men. 

Every  thing — matter,  mind,  soul — came  into  existence  by  virtue  of 
a  legal,  that  is,  an  orderly  and  methodical,  process,  since  law  is  life, 
and  life  is  the  spirit  of  law.  *  Our  conclusions  respecting  nature  are 
as  follows : 

1st.  Nature  is  the  embodiment  of  the  principle  of  unity  ;  it  is  a 
unit  in  its  physical  substance,  whether  the  substance  is  hydrogen,  pro- 
toplasm, bioplasm,  or  any  undetermined  substance.  The  differ- 
ences in  matter  are  largely  the  differences  of  form,  for  all  things  may 
finally  be  reduced  to  the  same  thing.  The  correlation  of  substances 
is  a  standing  proof  of  the  unity  of  substance.  Nature  is  one,  not  two. 
This  demonstrates  the  singleness  of  its  authorship,  and  points  to  one 
Supreme  Being,  the  maker  of  all  things. 


THE  ATOMIC  MOVEMENT.  143 

2d.  Respecting  its  origin,  nature  is  proof  of  the  necessity  of  a  Cre- 
ator ;  the  theistic  conception  is  fundamental  to  an  explanation  of  the 
existence  of  nature.  No  materialistic  theory  can  account  for  an  atom  ; 
God  is  a  necessity. 

3d.  The  substance,  the  spirit,  of  matter,  is  the  law  by  which  it 
exists.  Nature  is  law  in  form ;  nature  can  not  exist  without  law,  but 
the  law  may  exist  without  nature.  Hence  nature  may  perish  and 
the  law  remain.  The  substance,  the  spirit,  is  immortal ;  the  form  or 
nature  is  mortal.  As  law  is  immortal,  so  God,  from  whom  it  came, 
is  immortal. 

The  unity,  the  form,  the  substance  of  nature  join  in  an  affidavit 
to  the  necessity  of  the  theistic  conception  as  alone  adequate  to  the 
existence  of  a  phenomenal  world. 


CHAPTER  V. 

THE   DANCE  OE  THE  ATOMS. 

IN  the  year  1599  Sir  John  Davies  published  a  poem  entitled 
"  Nosee  Te  ipsum,"  in  which  he  describes  the  original  movements 
of  matter  under  the  figure  of  a  dance.  All  space  is  at  the  disposal 
of  the  dancers ;  plants,  animals,  men,  stars,  and  angels  engage  in  the 
mazy  scene,  the  movements  being  alternately  gentle  and  violent, 
quiet  and  demonstrative,  graceful  and  awkward,  solemn  and  gay,  as 
the  parties  are  absorbed  with  the  business-like  amusement  before  them. 
Going  back  of  these,  the  poet  fancies  that  he  sees  the  elements,  fire, 
air,  water,  and  earth,  engaged  in  a  revolving  motion,  now  embracing, 
then  separating,  now  combining,  then  each  standing  apart,  and  so 
proceeding  until  a  world  of  order  and  beauty  is  the  result. 

John  Dryden  likewise  embalms  in  verse  the  idea  of  the   world's 
creation  by  atomic  movement,  as  follows  f 

"  From  harmony,  from  heav'nly  harmony, 
This  universal  frame  began, 
•When  Nature  underneath  a  heap 
Of  jarring  atoms  lay, 
And  could  not  heave  her  head. 
The  tuneful  voice  was  heard  from  high, 

Arise,  ye  more  than  dead ! 
Then  cold  and  hot  and  moist  and  dry. 
In  order  to  their  stations  leap. 
And  Musick's  pow'r  obey. 


144  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

From  harmony,  from  heav'nly  harmony, 

This  universal  frame  began  ; 
From  harmony  to  harmony, 

Througli  all  the  compass  of  the  notes  it  ran, 

The  diapason  closing  full  in  man." 

These  are  poetic  representations  of  a  great  philosophic  thought — 
the  theory  of  the  origin  of  the  worlds  in  atomic  substances  or  forces. 
It  therefore  deserves  special  consideration.  A  comprehensive  study 
of  original  or  atomic  movement  includes,  1.  The  existence  of  the 
atom  ;  2.  The  character  of  the  atom ;  3.  Its  capacity  for  motion  ;  4. 
The  genesis  of  its  impulse  to  motion  ;  5.  Its  selection  of  form  ;  6.  Its 
development  and  history. 

If  it  can  be  scientifically  settled  beyond  doubt  that  the  worlds 
were  originally  atoms,  or  that  the  original  forms  of  matter  from  which 
worlds  have  issued  were  atoms,  the  mystery  of  the  dance  is  consider- 
ably simplified.  It  is,  however,  at  this  point  that  the  trouble  begins. 
The  hypothesis  of  the  atom  is  a  good  "  working  hypothesis"  for  the 
materialist,  and,  for  that  matter,  for  the  theologian  also,  but  the  data 
for  such  hypothesis  are  not  the  most  assuring.  The  assertion  that  the 
universe  is  the  product  of  evolution  from  star-dust,  or  atomic  centers, 
is  easily  made,  and  such  words  as  "  protoplasm,"  "germs,"  "  units," 
"ultimates,"  and  "atoms"  may  be  used  with  a  confidence  that  wiU 
inspire  respect ;  but  the  assertion  of  atomic  origin  is  not  equivalent  to 
the  demonstration.  "  The  genesis  of  an  atom,"  says  Spencer,  "  is  no 
easier  to  conceive  than  the  genesis  of  a  planet." 

Perhaps  it  should  not  make  against  the  theory  that  no  one  ever  saw 
an  atomj  for  the  greatest  forces  are  invisible ;  nor  should  it  be  charged  in 
derision  that  atoms  do  not  now  exist,  for  existing  worlds  have  taken  the 
place  of  atoms.  It  should  not  be  forgotten,  also,  that  if  the  existence 
of  original  atoms  be  established,  our  reverence  for  the  Creator  must 
be  intensified,  for  if  he  built  the  worlds,  so  magnificent  in  structure 
and  equipment,  from  beginnings  so  marvelously  small  and  unpromis- 
ing, he  is  a  most  wonderful  being,  quite  as  marvelous  in  his  doings 
as  the  most  devout  Christian  ever  supposed  him  to  be.  Religion  can 
apostrophize  the  atom,  since  it  magnifies  the  Creator,  a  result  the 
materialistic  atomist  did  not  foresee,  or  he  had  been  slow  in  adopt- 
ing i^-  ,  ,       .    . 

It  is  not  sufficient  to  inspire  faith  in.the  theory  to  know  that  it  is 

both  ancient  and  modern  ;  to  be  told  that  "Democritus  expounded  it 
with  great  enthusiasm,  and  Epicurus  indorsed  it  as  if  it  were  a  con- 
viction of  his  own ;  or  to  be  reminded  that  Leibnitz  reduced  original 
matter  to  monads,  every  one  of  which  was  potentially  a  mirror  of  the 
universe.     But  when  such  a  metaphysician  as  Lotze  insists  that  the 


INQUIRIES  CONCERNING  ATOMS.  145 

real  world  of  nature  should  be  considered  "  under  the  form  of  an  in- 
finite number  of  discrete  centers  of  activity,"  we  are  compelled  to 
treat  the  atomic  theory  with  the  highest  respect.  He  discusses  in  his 
"  Metaphysic"  the  "  antithesis  between  atomism  and  the  theory  of  a 
continuous  extension  in  space,"  and  because  he  can  not  accept  the 
latter  he  proceeds  to  vindicate  the  former.  "The  sharp  edge  of  a 
knife,  when  placed  beneath  a  microscope,  appears  to  be  notched  like 
a  saw,  and  the  surface,  which  feels  quite  smooth,  becomes  a  region 
of  mountains,"  is  his  illustrative  argument  against  "  continuous  ex- 
tension ;"  but  it  is  not  clear  that  atomism  is  the  polar  extremity  of 
such  extension.  Mountain  peaks,  apparently  standing  apart,  may  be 
joined  at  the  base;  "discrete"  forms  maybe  lost  in  underlying 
unity.  Atomic  separations  may  be  consistent  with  a  basal  continuous 
extension.  This  involves  relation,  correlation,  interaction,  and  the 
system  of  inter-dependence  in  the  universe,  into  which  it  is  not  neces- 
sary to  go. 

For  us,  it  is  not  so  important  to  know  who  subscribes  to  the  atomic 
theory  as  it  is  to  know  on  what  basis  the  theory  rests.  We  are  not 
disposed  to  assail  it  on  the  ground  of  prejudice,  for  we  have  no  preju- 
dice to  serve ;  we  can  believe  in  the  atomic  idea  with  as  much  en- 
thusiasm as  any  student  of  truth,  and  without  any  fear  of  danger 
to  the  Biblical  exegesis,  so  soon  as  the  proof,  or  even  the  probability, 
of  the  existence  of  atoms  is  furnished.  At  present,  however,  the 
atomic  idea  is  a  conjecture,  the  proof  indefinite  and  imaginary,  and 
faith  in  it  must_be.jit„£ur„ option.  It  does  not  suit  our  purpose  to 
deny  theTKeory ;  on  the  contrary,  anxious  that  it  may  be  fully  under- 
stood and  thoroughly  investigated,  we  proceed  to  inspect  its  contents 
and  listen  to  its  explanation  of  the  evolution  of  the  worlds. 

A  mystery  confronts  the  inquirer  before  he  takes  the  first  step. 
It  is  not  proclaim ed^ith  sufl^icient  clearness  by  the  advocates  of  the 
theory  just  what  the  original  atoms  were,  that  is,  Avhether  they  were 
solids,  liquids,  or  vapors,  or  whether  they  had  fixed  forms  or  were 
formless,  or  where  they  came  from,  or  whether  they  were  eternal  or 
made  themselves.  Some  of  these  questions  have  been  overlooked  in 
the  eagerness  to  trace  worlds  to  revolving  points,  inscrutable  in  their 
origin,  and  potential  in  their  contents,  adaptations,  and  prophecies. 
The  settlement  of  some  of  them,  however,  is  necessary  to  the  existence 
of  the  theory.  Belief  in  atoms  presupposes  a  knowledge  of  their 
origin,  content,  purpose,  power,  relation,  form,  or  acting  principle. 
Touching  some  of  these  things,  the  atomist  can  not  be  wholly  in  the 
dark ;  hence,  the  duty  of  revealing  what  he  knows.  Democritus  was 
somewhat  specific  in  his  description  of  atoms,  conjecturing  that  they 
were  infinite  in  number,  assumed  mathematical  figures,  were  divisible, 

10 


146  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

and  propelled  by  an  inherent  law  of  motion.  Epicurus,  an  enthusi- 
astic supporter  of  the  theory,  gave  particular  attention  to  the  forms 
of  atoms,  describing  them  as  square,  spherical,  and  triangular,  and 
that  these  forms  were  unchangeable.  He  also  maintained  that,  by 
combination,  secondary  forms  were  produced,  but  that  the  original  or 
primordial  atoms  were  indestructible  and  entered  into  all  things. 

Without  controversy,  it  is  conceded  that  an  original  atom  must 
have  been  physical  or  natural  in  character  or  essence ;  that  is,  it  was 
in  no  sense  supernatural,  for,  had  it  been  supernatural,  the  product 
or  development  had  been  a  supernatural  world.  Inasmuch  as  the 
universe  is  the  resultant  of  the  atomic  movement,  the  atom  could  not 
have  differed  in  character  from  the  universe.  The  fig-tree  does  not 
produce  thistles ;  the  atom  produced  a  world  after  its  kind.  This  is 
logically,  genetically  consistent,  and  science  takes  no  exception. 
Natural  atoms  may  be  divided  into  two  kinds:  atoms  of  ether,  and 
atoms  of  solid  matter.  Over  the  latter  the  law  of  gravitation  exer- 
cises its  influence ;  the  former  are  independent  of  it.  But  this  division 
introduces  a  vexing  problem,  for  the  law  of  motion  affecting  a  solid 
can  not  affect  a  vapor ;  hence,  two  laws  of  motion  are  required. 

Again,  if  the  atom  was  the  prophecy  of  the  "becoming,"  then  it 
was  potentially  the  becoming.  As  the  acorn  contains  potentially  the 
oak,  so  the  atom  contains  potentially  the  universe.  Evolution  is  in 
proportion  to  involution.  The  miner  gets  out  of  the  mountain  only 
what  is  in  it.  To  allow  that  one  small  planet  like  ours  was  once  an 
atom  is  to  concede  a  great  deal ;  but  the  theory  requires  that  all  the 
solar  systems,  the  nebulie  unresolved,  the  whole  firmament,  the  astro- 
nomic heavens,  were  at  one  time  nomadic  atoms,  wanderers  in  the 
spatial  sea.  The  magnitude  of  the  universe  is  not  quoted  as  an  em- 
barrassment to  the  theory,  for  the  theory  is  tenable  if  based  on  the 
theistic  conception,  the  very  thing,  however,  which  the  materialist  is 
anxious  to  overthrow.  The  fact  that  the  world  was  built  at  all,  that 
it  exists,  is  as  great  a  wonder  as  any  process  by  which  it  came  into 
existence.  Any  process  of  world-building  will  excite  reverence  in  the 
thoughtful  mind. 

A  striking  peculiarity  of  the  atom  is  its  tendency  to  motion  or 
capacity  for  development.  Without  such  capacity,  the  universe  had 
not  appeared.  All  forms,  both  of  organic  and  inorganic  matter, 
are  the  results  of  the  internal  disposition  of  the  atom  to  develop- 
ment. In  speaking  of  the  capacities  of  the  atom,  we  should  speak 
cautiously,  since  very  little  has  been  demonstrated ;  but,  speaking 
speculatively,  we  may  be  bold  in  statement  and  even  heroic  in 
theoretical  suggestion.  Granting  that  the  atomic  theory  is  possibly  ' 
tenable,  one  is  compelled  to  allow  that  the  atom  shall  have  certain 


ENDOWMENTS  OF  THE  ATOM.  147 

attributes  and  functions,  without  which  its  task  can  not  be  performed. 
Granting  it  one  function,  another  must  be  conceded,  and  still  another, 
until  it  is  sufficiently  endowed  to  project  worlds  from  its  center. 

Its  chief  characteristic   is  the  power_fl|l-iiaQtk)n.     Scientists  agree 
that  motion  is  a  principle  in  the  universe,  and  not  a  few  suspect  that 
it  is  the  essence  of  things,  or,  as  it  has  been  demonstrated  that  heat 
may  be  converted  into  motion  and  motion  into  heat,  the  conclusion 
that  all   things  are  but  the  expression  or  types  of  motion  has  been 
advocated  with  a  logical  plausibility.     If  motion  is  a  universal  prin- 
ciple, primarily  it  must  have  belonged  to  the  atom  ;  but  how  the  atom 
came  in  possession  of  the  impulse  is  yet  an  undecided  question.    Was\ 
the  atom  a  center  of  motion,  with  independent  power  of  self-motion?] 
or  was  it  an  inert  thing,  incapable  of  motion   until  acted  upon  by/ 
some  external  force  ?     This  is  the  dilemma  of  philosophy.     To  admit 
to  the  atoni  the  j^acity_for  motion   exxjlains  nothing.     "WTtlTTETs' 
embarrassment  in  view,  many  scientific   thinkers   intimate    that   the 
atom  had   an   inherent   power  of  movement.     Lotze,    no   less   than 
Hartmann,  representing  the  opposite   poles  of  philosophic  thought, 
substantially  agree  in  conferring  upon  the  atom  the  function  of  ele- 
mentary force  ;  but  Lotze  accepts  the  theistic  conception,  and  so  is 
consistent.     He  does  not  regard  atoms  as  the  final  elements  of  matter, 
but  looks  upon  them  as  complex  data,  behind  which  science  can  not 
go,  but  from  which  a  divine  creative  act  may  be  inferred. 

The  materialistic  atomist  has  no  solution  for  his  difficulty  except 
scientific  superstition. 

Epicurus,  atheistic  in  theology,  advocated  the  theory  of  spontaneous 
motion  in  atoms,  explaining  their  nature  and  activities  by  a  purely 
materialistic  hypothesis.  In  his  judgment,  the  atom  is  an  eternal 
substance  and  has  always  been  in  motion.  In  itself  it  is  nervous, 
restless,  eager,  aspiring,  and  will  not  lie  still.  He  attributes  weight 
to  it,  which  presupposes  external  influence,  or  the  doctrine  of  the 
mutual  relation  of  atoms.  Its  incipient  movement  is  in  a  straight 
line,  but  suddenly  and  of  its  own  accord  it  may  deviate  in  any  direc- 
tion, going  diagonally,  turning  around,  rising  up,  or  falling  down. 
Independent  of  all  control,  it  may  act  soberly  or  wildly,  it  may  be- 
have itself  or  appear  as  if  intoxicated,  it  may  walk  alone  or  waltz 
through  space  with  kindred  atoms;  it  gives  no  account  of  itself,  ex- 
cept as  it  pleases.  This  is  a  pretty  fair  biography  of  the  atom,  but 
it  is  necessarily  incomplete. 

Leucippus,  Democritus,  and  Epicurus,  the  ancient  fathers  of  the 
atomic  theory,  not  always  clear  in  conception  or  conclusive  in  state- 
ment, do  not  differ  respecting  the  endowments  of  the  atom  which 
qualify  it  for  independent  activity  and   the  power  to  produce  cos- 


148  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

mical  systems.  Leucippus,  attributing  an  infinite  standing  to  atoms, 
conceived  that,  under  the  natural  principle  of  like  attracting  like, 
similar  atoms  approached  one  another,  combined  their  interests,  and 
grew  into  the  mammoth  proportions  of  the  stars.  By  "ceaseless  reper- 
cussion," the  atoms  in  the  progress  of  their  development  assumed  all 
the  "possibilities  of  forms,"  which  took  the  names  of  mountains, 
oceans,  trees,  birds,  animals,  and  men.  Even  man  is  traced  to  the 
atom!  Clearly  enough,  the  old  philosophers  were  not  afraid  of  the 
consequences  of  their  theories.  Atomism  and  atheism  joined  their 
interests,  and  materialism  was  triumphant.  To  such  a  conclusion  an 
auti-theistic  atomic  theory  necessarily  leads,  for  the  atom  is  dependent 
or  independent,  derived  or  primary.  Its  status  once  settled,  and  a 
conclusion  is  inevitable. 

The  genesis  of  atomic  motion  is  the  conundrum  of  the  atomists. 

The  spoutaneity_^o_f  atoimc  motwnjjbe^materify^ 
resort  to  the  delusion  of  the  eternity  of  matter.  Spontaneous  motion, 
however,  is  as  mythological  as  spontaneous  generation.  Motion  is 
implicit  with  antecedence.  It  goes  back,  ever  pointing  to  a  single 
source.  Motion  implies  a  mover — so  taught  Plato ;  and  his  account 
of  creation  in  the  Timwus,  through  atomic  movements,  is  superior  to 
the  modern  materialistic  conception,  because  it  involves  the  presence 
of  an  organizing  and  directing  mind.  Motion  implies  antecedent 
preparation,  begetting,  touching,  imparting,  or  it  is  self-begotten. 
Without  pressing  this  distinction  far  enough  to  verge  on  the  necessity 
of  a  personal  being  as  the  author  of  all  motion,  we  observe  that  mo- 
tion, as  now  understood  and  explained,  is  the  result  of  law,  and  is  in 
no  instance  spoken  of  as  spontaneous.  IVIotion  is  the  product  of  a 
system  of  laws,  the  chief  of  which  is  gravitation,  and  without  which 
motion  would  be  impossible.  The  revolutions  of  the  solar  system  are 
not  attributed  to  any  spontaneous  force  in  matter,  but  rather  to  the 
influence  of  the  law  of  attraction,  and  every  other  motion  is  explained 
by  reference  to  the  same  general  influence.  Is  gravitation  the  law 
of  atomic  movement?  Sir^ Isaac  Newton  denies  that  the  "force  of 
gravity"  resides  in  the  atom,  leaving  it  a  forceless,  motionless  thing, 
and  dependent  upon  an  outside  power  for  animation  and  movement. 
He  was  emphatic  in  the  rejection  of  the  idea  that  gravity  is  "  innate, 
inherent,  and  essential  to  matter."  laxada^Jikewise  pronounced  the 
dynamical  theory  absurd.  McCosh  repudiates  the  idea  of  self-acting 
matter.  Either  this  conclusiorTraust  be  accepted,  or  the  dynamical 
theory  of  matter,  the  theory  of  inherent  force,  or  feelf-moving  matter. 
Few  theists  subscribe  to  the  latter,  for  it  is  full  of  danger;  it 
points  to  pantheism.  The  old  atomic  theory  of  Democritus  is  too 
materialistic   for  Anglo-Saxon   or  modern  theologians;    but   theistic 


ORIGIN  OF  ATOMIC  MOTION.  149 

metaphysicians  are  found  supporting  both  Sir  Isaac  Newton  in  his 
denial  of  inherent  force,  and  the  dynamical  theory,  or  the  theory  of 
innate  power.  As  yet,  there  is  no  standard  by  which  to  determine 
whether  one's  view  is  orthodox  or  not,  for  if  he  accept  the  theistic 
government  of  the  world,  he  can  accept  any  philosophic  theory  of 
matter. 

•  As  there  is  no  motion  known  to  science  that  is  not  due  to  attrac- 
tion, it  is  consistent  to  affirm  that  the  atom  was  governed  in  its  initial 
movements  by  the  law  of  gravitation,  which  had  its  source,  not  in  the 
atom,  but  in  the  supervising  and  endowing  will  of  God.  This  cer- 
tainly is  the  genesis  of  motion  in  the  atom.  In  itself,  the  atom  had 
no  power  of  motion;  that  is,  it  did  not  originate  motion.  Unless 
moyed,  it  remained  motionless.  Inertia  was,  therefore,  the  primal 
condition  of  the  original  atom. 

Nevertheless,  the  atoms  dance — what  music  thrills  them  into 
motion?  What  voice  do  they  hear  and  obey?  What  impulse  over- 
comes the  inertia  of  the  atom?  Heraclitus  held  that  all  nature  is  in 
a  perpetual  flux,  forever  but  silently  changing,  its  constituents  pass- 
ing away  to  be  replaced  by  similar  constituents  ;  perpetual  change  is 
the  order  of  phenomena.  The  law  of  change  however,  does  not  ex- 
plain the  origin  of  the  dance.  GeofFroy  Saint  Hilaire  refers  all 
forms  of  matter  to  certain  "  elective  affinities  of  the  organic  elements," 
but  this  is  a  rhetorical  statement,  not  a  philosophic  explanation. 
Whence  the  organic  elements?  Whence  the  affinities?  The  affinities 
of  matter  are  the  attractive  forces  of  matter,  expressed  by  the 
generic  word — gravitation.  If  atoms  exist,  and  are  endowed  with 
"  elective  affinities,"  by  which  they  are  drawn  together  and  combine 
in  an  aggregation  of  worlds,  dispute  ends;  but  to  assume  such  en- 
dowment and  then  build  up  the  theory  on  the  assumption  is  a  strange 
way  of  getting  at  the  truth. 

Spencer,  compelled  to  account  for  these  things,  suggests  the 
natural  instability  of  the  homogeneous  as  the  fundamental  cause,  but 
it  is  a  superficial  explanation  ;  it  explains  nothing.  Suppose  the 
homogeneous  were  unstable,  what  caused  the  instability  ?  Were  the 
atoms  of  uniform  size,  function,  and  power,  or  were  they  of  diverse 
sizes,  and  did  they  possess  various  and  dissimilar  functions,  and  were 
there  jealousies  and  rivalries  among  the  atoms,  producing  discord  of 
feeling,  instability  of  friendships,  and  actual  hostility,  resulting  in 
wars  and  aggressions?  The  doctrine  of  instability  implies  general 
commotion,  and  commotion  is  proof  of  motion ;  but  Spencer  conducts 
us  no  nearer  the  beginning  than  Hilaire. 

Granting  that  motion  is  implicit  with  the  law  of  gravitation,  it 
must  be  understood  that  it  includes  a  variety  of  laws,  without  which 


150  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

atomic  movement  can  not  be  explained.  Inertia  is  the  primal  state 
of  the  atom  ;  motion  is  communicated  ;  attraction  begins  here ;  re- 
pulsion is  felt  there;  equilibrium  or  neutrality  is  maintained  yonder; 
and  so  in  the  general  movement  centripetal  and  centrifugal  influences 
become  clearly  manifest.  As  these  are  more  or  less  positive,  adhe- 
sion, cohesion,  chemical  attraction,  crystallization,  condensation,  com- 
bustion, reaction,  interaction,  and  specific  forms  follo^Y.  To  explain* 
all  these  by  the  dynamical  theory  is  quite  impossible;  to  explain 
them  as  variations  of  the  initial  law  of  motion  is  not  absurd,  provided 
the  law  of  motion  is  accounted  for.  If  one  is  undertaking  to  explain 
atomic  movement,  one  is  bound  to  explain  the  first  movement  as 
well  as  the  last ;  in  fact,  if  one  will  explain  the  first  movement,  one 
can  be  excused  from  explaining  any  thing  else.  The  atomic  theory  is 
burdened  with  this  unanswered  and  unanswerable  disadvantage  that, 
whatever  the  explanation  of  the  movement,  whether  "elective  affin- 
ity," "  instability,"  "  inherent  force,"  or  any  thiu^  else,  it  fails  to  ac- 
count for  the  "affinity,"  "  instability,"  "  inherent  force,"  or  any  thing 
else  that  it  uses  as  an  explanation.  Its  explanation  always  re- 
quires another  explanation  which  it  can  not  give.  The  theory  is 
proof  of  the  limitations  of  human  thought,  and  shows  that  matter, 
movement,  and  law  must  have  an  outside  explanation,  or  a  theistic 
source. 

The  difficulty  is  not  ended.  Granting  the  power  of  motion  to 
the  atom,  according  to  the  theory,  it  is  perplexing  to  understand  the 
variety  of  forms  matter  has  assumed,  or  to  explain  its  transmuta- 
bleness.  If  the  atom  has  the  power  of  motion,  has  it  the  power  of 
choice  in  its  development,  or  is  the  development  an  accident  ?  Darwin 
does  not  explain  the  introduction  of  forms,  but  this  explanation  the 
theory  must  make,  or  it  is  valueless.  The  original  atoms  were  of 
uniform  size,  functions,  and  aims,  or  they  were  not;  if  they  were 
alike  in  every  particular,  if  they  believed  alike,  so  to  speak,  and 
danced  in  the  same  way  and  to  the  same  music,  it  is  difficult  to  ac- 
count for  diflTerentiation  in  result ;  if  they  differed,  who  or  what 
made  them  to  differ?  If  like  produce  like,  then  uniform  atoms 
should  produce  uniform  results,  but  the  "becoming"  is  a  panorama 
of  infinite  variety.  It  is  necessary  therefore  to  allow  difference,  con- 
trariety, and  a   menagerie  of  functions  to  atoms. 

But  how  account  for  conti-ariety  of  purpose  in  atoms  ?  What  es- 
tablished the  difference  of  aims?  Did  they  hold  a  convention,  and 
agree  on  separate  idiosyncrasies,  or  did  they  inherit  from  a  common 
parent  a  multitude  of  diverse  qualifications  for  their  future  history  ? 
Uniformity  of  aim  in  atoms  is  inconsistent  with  variety  of  result ; 
contrariety   of  aim   is  indicative  of   wisdom,   a  supervising  agency, 


FORMS  OF  ATOMS.  151 

which  means  more  than  the  materialistic  atomist  can  understand.  No 
knowledge  of  the  universe  is  at  all  possible  that  does  not  account  for 
difference  of  aim  in  nature.  Verily,  as  Herschel  suggests,  the  atom, 
with  its  power,  functions,  aims,  and  forms,  begins  to  look  like  a 
manufactured  article. 

The  form  of  the  original  atom  is  still  undetermined.  If  a  solid, 
its  physical  shape  might  be  conjectured  ;  if  a  liquid  or  vapor,  it  was 
without  form.  Plato  in  the  Timaeus  represents  the  original  elements 
as  shapeless,  and  from  the  shapeless  the  shaped  universe  proceeded, 
but  the  result  is  explained  by  the  participation  of  divine  ideas  with 
matter  in  its  progress  toward  forms.  Moses  writes  that  the  earth  was 
without  form,  but  was  shaped  by  a  Shaper ;  so""the  atom  may  have 
Been~formless',"But  too^'Iofm  in  the  hands  of  a  Former,  From  the 
theistic  standpoint  the  forming  process  is  one  of  ease  and  account- 
ability; from  the  standpoint  of  the  atomist  it  is  in  vain  that  we  seek 
for  the  power  of  form,  unless  it  is  insisted,  like  motion,  to  be  inherent; 
but  if  the  one  is  absurd,  so  is  the  other. 

Whence,  then,  the  propensity  to  form  in  matter?  The  relation  of 
motion  to  form  is  conspicuous ;  that  is,  without  motion,  form  is  impos- 
sible. With  a  predisposition  to  form,  an  atom  must  be  stirred,  moved, 
excited,  and  whirled  before  it  will  reveal  its  preference  for  a  partic- 
ular form.  Why  the  final  preference?  Why  the  circular  form?  Why 
the  octahedral  ?  Why  the  triangular  ?  Why  all  the  simple  and  com- 
pound forms  of  matter?  Atoms  might  have  danced  themselves  into 
a  few  simple  forms,  and  these  by  combination  have  solidified  into  com- 
plex forms,  but  so  soon  as  the  dance  was  over,  each  atom,  if  it  had 
any  respect  for  itself,  would  seek  to  preserve  its  identity,  and  a  re- 
turn to  original  simplicity  had  been  unavoidable. 

It  is  time  to  consider  whether  the  original  atom  was  a  simple, 
unorganized  substance,  or  a  concrete  receptacle  ot  co-ordinate  powers 
and  substantial  elements.  The  validity  of  the  atomic  theory,  as  well 
as  the  present  question  of  the  origin  of  forms,  is  involved  in  this  inquiry. 
Spencer  intimates  that  germs  are  homogeneous,  or  simple  substances, 
without  signs  of  organization  ;  but  Mr.  Tyndall  suspects  that  the 
most  simple  is  complex,  that  the  microscopically  small  is  mysteriously 
large,  and  that  it  is  impossible  to  "grapple  with  the  ultimate  struc- 
tural energies  of  nature."  Spencer  proposes  simplicity,  unity,  as  an 
underlying  fact ;  Tyndall  proposes  complexity.  The  two  may  fight 
it  out,  but  observers  of  the  spectacle  have  something  to  say  while  it 
is  going  on.  If  Mr.  Tyndall  is  correct,  the  atom  is  a  complex  sub- 
stance, which  Lotze  really  implies  ;  but  whence  the  complexity  ?  If 
Spencer  is  correct  the  atom  is  a  simple  substance,  but  whence  the 
simple  content  ?     The  problem    is  not  reduced  by  Spencer,  it  is  not 


152  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

magnified  by  Tyndall ;  it  is  as  great,  it  is  the  same  problem  whether 
a  germ  is  simple  or  complex,  for  the  problem  is,  not  how  much  is  in 
the  atom,  but  is  there  any  thing  in  it?  Tell  how  the  atom  came  to 
be  loaded  at  all,  and  the  size  of  the  load  will  then  receive  consider- 
ation ;  and  until  the  origin  of  content  is  settled  the  origin  of  form 
can  not  be  settled. 

The  permanency  of  natural  forms  also  provokes  inquiry,  compell- 
ing the  atomist  to  explain  or  retreat.  With  divergence  of  form  there 
is  stability  and  a  basis  of  classification.  Mathematics  is  grounded  in 
the  construction  of  the  universe.  Not  only  architectural  ideas  of 
order  and  proportion  obtain  in  nature,  but  mathematical  princi- 
ples are  easily  traced  in  the  organic  and  inorganic  realms.  Geometry 
is  the  mathematical  spirit  of  matter.  Creation  proceeded  by  its  rules. 
The  Duke  of  Argyll  emphasizes  the  belief  that  creation  was  by  law, 
as  evinced  in  its  order,  in  its  fixed  types,  in  its  gradations,  in  its 
adaptations  ;  but  he  might  have  added  that  the  specific  law  of  crea- 
tion, however  manifold  the  types,  orders,  adaptations,  and  adjust- 
ments, is  mathematical.  Plato  lays  the  universe  in  triangles. 
Pythagoras  projected  his  philosophy  of  number  as  the  secret  of  the 
universe,  the  interpretation  being  that  mathematical  proportion, 
order,  and  forms  constituted  the  principles  and  archetypes  of  the 
divine  mind  in  the  development  of  the  astronomic  worlds.  Astron- 
omy is  the  crystallization  of  geometry.  Min^alogy  is  geometry  as  a 
fine  art.     Chemistry  is  geometry  on  wheels. 

As  geometrical  principles  are  decisive  and  fixed,  so  are  the  forms 
of  matter"T5~wlrich  they  have  illustration.  Hence  no  new  mathemat- 
ical forms  have  been  discovered  ;  the  concrete  owes  its  concreteness 
to  the  limitations  of  applied  mathematics.  Spheres,  angles,  squares, 
cubes,  polyhedi-ons,  and  their  cognate  forms,  constitute  the  essential 
manifestations  of  matter ;  while  straight  lines  and  curved,  with  their 
variations,  are  the  tape-lines  by  which  to  measure  the  forms. 

We  insist  upon  the  permanency  of  matter-forms,  but  in  so  doing 
the  atom  may  be  interrogated  for  a  history  of  the  facts.  Left  to 
itself,  would  it  seek  any  particular  form  ?  Would  it  especially  settle 
down  to  one  form  ?  In  the  mad  dance  in  space,  aroused  by  inequal- 
ities of  endowments,  would  not  the  atoms  assume  a  thousand  different 
attitudes,  and  take  as  many  forms  as  there  were  groups  or  individ- 
uals ?  What  would  restrict  the  selection  of  form  ?  Wg^uld  not  each 
palpitating  atom,  through  slioer  jealousy,  adopt  a  form  for  itself,  as 
the  old  families  of  Europe. had  each  its  coat-of-arms  ?  Evidently  the 
atom,  however  inclined  to  independence,  felt  its  limitation,  and 
stepped  into  the  dance  under  command  of  a  very  embarrassing  re- 
striction, compelled  to  adopt  a  form  it  neither  invented  nor  possibly 


THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  ATOM.  153 

preferred ;  yet  it  obeyed.  Itself  formless,  yet  endowed  with  a  pro- 
pensity to  form,  it  found  it  must  regard  certain  principles  which  lim- 
ited its  products  to  a  few  visible  manifestations.  Doubtless,  as  the 
dance  proceeded,  the  atomic  world  groaned  under  the  restriction  of 
geometrical  ideals,  but  there  was  no  way  to  avoid  them.  These 
ideals,  these  geometrical  restrictions,  the  materialistic  atomist  can  not 
explain  ;  they  point  to  divine  wisdom,  and  are  proof  of  the  necessity 
of  a  divine  personality  in  creation. 

The  future  history  of  the  atom,  or  its  development  from  the 
atomic  condition  to  a  world-state,  it  belongs  to  us  to  read.  Whatever 
makes  against  the  theory  itself  we  waive,  for  materialistic  science  is 
inclined  to  accept  it.  Let  us  concede  to  the  atom  an  unquestioned 
reality,  endowed  with  capacities  unmeasured,  if  not  infinite ;  let  it 
contain  potentially  the  universe  ;  let  there  dwell  in  it  the  power  of 
self-motion  ;  let  the  propensity  to  form  be  ever  one  of  its  animating 
impulses  or  thoughts ;  thus  dowered,  it  starts  upon  its  course.  Two 
questions  arise :  What  is  its  actual  development  ?  What  becomes 
of  it? 

Look ! — a  universe  greets  us.  Fi-om  the  atom  to  the  universe  is 
an  immense,  a  magnificent,  development,  proving  that  the  universe 
was  potentially  in  the  atom,  if  it  prove  any  thing,  and  that  under  no 
circumstances  could  it  have  developed  into  any  thing  but  the  universe. 
This  restriction,  in  its  development,  overthrows  the  suspicion  of  the 
element  of  chance,  or  even  of  self-guidance,  in  its  history ;  it  estab- 
lishes the  presence  of  supervising  mind.  The  universe  is  not  an 
accident,  but  the  orderly  progress  of  atomic  movement,  and  the  result 
of  the  concurrent  and  forefixed  agreement  among  the  atoms,  which 
safeguards  the  divine  factor  in  creation.  Noj^,  if  tlie  po.teutiality..at 
the_universejTside^ 

or  in  a  single'atom.  If  in  a  single  atom,  why  other  atoms  at  all? 
If  in  a  single  atom,  does  every  other  atom  contain  potentially  a  uni- 
verse ?  If  so,  why  are  there  not  other  universes  ?  On  the  supposi- 
tion that  a  single  atom  is  the  germ  of  the  universe,  atoms  disappear, 
and  the  atomic  theory  is  the  theory  of  an  atom  ;  on  the  supposition 
that  the  universe  is  the  development  of  an  indefinite  number  of 
atoms  in  various  combinations  and  relations,  the  incompetency  of  any 
single  atom  to  produce  the  universe  is  foreshadowed.  But  so  soon  as 
the  imperfection  of  a  single  atom  is  discovered,  suspicion  is  raised 
against  all  atoms,  whatever  their  number  or  relations.  Ifjevery  atom 
is  deficient,  or  insufficient  to  produce  the  universe,  it  is  difficult  to 
understand  how  any  number  of  atoms  can  produce  it.  Deficiency 
added  to  deficiency  a  thousand  times  does  not  give  value  to  the  other 
side  of  the    equation.      Zero  multiplied   a  million  times  by  zero  is 


154  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

zero.  Deficiencies  multiplied  by  as  many  times  as  there  are  atoms 
will  not  equal  potentiality.  In  this  view  the  atomic  individuals  are 
potentially  inadequate  to  the  universe. 

To  assert  that  the  universe  is  the  result  of  a  combination  of  atoms 
is  not  to  add  a  new  meaning  to  the  theory.  A  combination  of  atoms 
is  not  essentially  a  new  production.  New  forms  may  appear  by  com- 
bination, but  not  new  constituents  of  matter  ;  but  it  is  new  constitu- 
ents that  are  required  to  help  the  infirmities  of  the  original  atoms. 
In  this  view  a  new  atomic  theory  is  required. 

If  it  is  alleged  that  imperfect  atoms  are  competent  to  evolve  an 
imperfect  universe,  and,  in  order  to  justify  the  atomic  theory,  it  be 
added  that  the  universe  is  imperfect,  we  take  issue  at  once,  for,  in- 
stead of  evolving  an  imperfect  universe,  the  imperfect  atom  could  not 
evolve  any  universe  at  all.  An  inadequate  atom  will  not  satisfy  the 
demands  of  any  atomic  theory. 

Thus,  fVom  whatever  view  the  atom  is  considered  as  an  original, 
independent,  self-existing,  self-endowed  source  of  power,  it  turns  out 
to  be  a  lamentable  failure.  To  give  it  the  required  efficiency ;  to  en- 
dow it  with  the  heritage  of  omnipotence  ;  to  clothe  it  with  selective 
affinities ;  to  stimulate  it  with  an  infinite  energy,  and  to  circumscribe 
it  with  restrictions  that  prevent  it  fVom  becoming  the  sole  Infinite, 
supplemental  agencies,  forces,  or  personalities  are  required.  The  atom 
needed  for  the  theorist  probably  never  existed,  and  it  is  certain  that 
the  atom  described  by  the  atomist  is  only  the  atom  of  his  imagina- 
tion.  In  the  development  of  the  universe  the  atom,  therefore,  be- 
comes extinct. 

To  conclude:  The  atomic  theory  of  the  universe  is  philosophically 
incompetent  to  account  for  it.  It  satisfies  no  inquiry  respecting  the 
genesis  of  things.  Phenomena  can  not  be  explained  by  phenomena. 
An  atom  is  a  phenomenon  requiring  explanation. 

The  atomic  theory,  eliminating  the  influence  of  a  governing 
mind,  is  self-destructive,  since  it  involves  the  absurdity  of  self-originat- 
ing functions  and  powers  in  matter  without  mind.  Given  a  Creator 
of  atoms,  and  the  atomic  theory  is  tenable.  In  that  case  the  Creator 
may  have  to  be  explained,  which  involves  other  questions,  but,  what 
is  all-important  to  the  student  of  genesis,  the  atom  is  explained,  and 
a  cosmological  basis  satisfactorily  settled. 

/^  The  dance  of  the  atoms,  as  the  materialist  describes  it,  is  the  dance 
/  of  darkness  and  death  ;  as  the  theist  would  gladly  describe  it,  it  is  the 
I  movement  of  God  over  the  face  of  the  deeps. 


THEORIES  OF  LIFE.  155 


CHAPTER  VI. 

THE     GROUND     OK     LIKK. 

**  'T^HE  word  Life  still  wanders  through  science  without  a  defini- 

X  nition,"  says  Henry  Drummond.  The  failure  to  define  is  not 
the  result  of  scientific  indifference  to  the  subject,  for  it  has  been  thor- 
oughly investigated  by  the  thinkers  of  all  the  schools,  but  it  is  rather 
the  result  of  a  pronounced  mystery  that  envelops  it.  Scarcely  a  solu- 
tion or  provisional  hypothesis  presented  is  satisfactory  from  the  inner 
sanctuary  of  things ;  not  a  theory  has  been  urged  that  has  not  been 
modified  or  overthrown ;  and  it  is  confessed  that,  from  the  philosoph- 
ical standpoint  alone,  the  mystery  is  quite  as  profound  as  ever. 

The  principal  theories  of  life,  as  announced  by  biologists,  natural- 
ists, physiologists,  and  scientists  in  general,  may  be  designated  as 
follows:  1.  Spontaneous  Generation;  2.  "Omne  Vivum  ex  Ovo;"  3. 
Pangenesis ;  4.  Development ;  5.  The  Physical  Basis ;  6.  Biogenesis ; 
7.  Creation. 

The  theory  of  spontaneous  generation  is  a  short  cut  to  results 
without  adequate  causes ;  but  at  one  time  it  was  supported  by  distin- 
guished scientists,  and  in  lieu  of  something  more  specific  or  satisfac- 
tory, received  general  though  hesitating  assent.  It  was  apparently 
demonstrated  by  such  learned  experimenters  as  Prof  Wyman,  Dr. 
Bastian,  and  Prof  H.  J.  Clark,  that  the  reproduction  of  infusoria  by 
spontaneous  generation  had  taken  place,  and  even  Dr.  McCosh  con- 
sidered the  announcement  not  entirely  void  of  truth.  Without  de- 
tailing the  experiments  adduced  in  suppci't  of  the  theory,  it  is  suffi- 
cient to  notify  the  reader  that  amoebas,  bacteriums,  vibrios,  and 
monads  were  said  to  be  produced  from  liquids  heated  to  such  a  degree 
that  all  infusorial  life  originally  in  them  was  destroyed,  and  that,  of 
their  own  accord,  or  by  spontaneous  activity,  many  of  these  re- 
appeared. 

The  experiments  were  repeated  by  others  who  doubted  the  results, 
and  Prof.  Wyman's  conclusions  were  disputed ;  and,  while  material- 
istic science  would  gladly  accept  spontaneous  generation  if  it  could 
be  established,  it  has  been  rejected  by  Huxley,  Tyndall,  Darwin, 
Dallinger,  Prof  Tait,  and  M.  Pasteur.  As  a  theory  of  the  orjgm^Qf. 
life,  it  is  now  virtually  defunct. 

'      S^cientists  have  also  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the  old  formula, 
"Omne  Vivum  ex  Ovo,"  is  not  exactly  true,  for,  while  the  egg  plays 


156  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

an  important  part  in  the  life  of  the  world,  certain  it  is  that  life  is 
produced  without  the  egg,  and  so  often  that  it  is  a  question  whether 
the  egg  condition  is  not  an  exception  rather  than  the  rule.  Anemones 
and  hydras,  insects  and  fishes,  originate  by  budding  and  self-division, 
processes  entirely  independent  of  parental  generation  or  the  egg  con- 
dition. Allowing,  however,  that  in  vertebrates  in  particular  the  egg 
is  a  necessity  to  life,  one  might  ask,  whence  the  egg?  To  accept 
the  egg  theory  is  not  to  solve  the  genesis  of  life. 

Mr.  Darwin  is  the  exponent  of  the  theory  of  jjangenesis,  which 
has  been  completely  shattered  by  Mivart  and  Prof.  Delphino.  He 
held  that  each  organism  consists  of  an  incalculable  number  of  organic 
atoms,  which  had  the  power  of  reproduction.  These  atoms  he  called 
"  gemmules,"  in  order  to  be  original  in  the  creation  of  a  term,  but 
the  idea  he  borrowed  from  Democritus,  amplifying  it  and  adapting  it 
to  the  emergencies  of  modern  science.  As  a  single  theory  of  life, 
pangenesis  has  less  in  it  than  spontaneous  generation,  and  has  been 
abandoned. 

The  larger,  more  comprehensive  theory  of  life  is  that  known  as 
the  theory  of  development,  first  skeletonized  by  Lamarck,  then  clothed 
by  the  anonymous  author  of  "The  Vestiges  of  the  Natural  History  of 
Creation,"  and  finally  adopted  as  the  child  of  Darwin.  As  its  chief 
expounder  and  promoter,  it  bears  the  name  of  Darwin,  but  it  must  be 
understood  that  it  did  not  originate  with  him.  In  explanation  of  the 
theory  we  quote  him:  "I  believe  that  all  animals  have  descended 
from  at  most  only  four  or  five  progenitors,  and  plants  from  an  equal 
or  lesser  number.  Probably  all  the  organic  beings  which  have  ever 
lived  on  this  earth  have  descended  from  some  one  primordial  form, 
into  which  life  was  first  breathed."  It  is  at  once  seen  that  this  really 
accounts  not  at  all  for  life,  but  only  for  its  development.  It  does 
not  go  back  to  the  source,  but  contents  itself  with  the  method  of  its 
successive  manifestations.  Keeping  in  mind  that  the  development 
theory  per  se  only  proposes  to  trace  the  laws  or  forms  of  manifested 
life,  it  is  not  so  objectionable,  even  though  it  may  be  found  erroneous 
in  that  particular ;  but  when  it  is  strained  to  account  for  life  itself, 
alleging  that  it  too  is  the  product  of  development,  unbelievers  in  the 
theory  may  at  least  ask  for  the  proof  of  it.  Accepting,  if  one  must, 
the  theory  as  an  explanation  of  cosmical  growth,  he  is  at  liberty  to 
reject  it,  until  the  proof  is  furnished,  as  an  explanation  of  life  itself. 

Closely  related  to  this  theory  is  that  more  pronounced  hypothesis 
of  Mr.  Huxley,  which  he  designates  as  the  "Physical  Basis  of  Life." 
If  all  life  is  the  product  of  protoplasm,  or  protopiasm"Ts  "life,  as  the 
terms  of  his  theory  require  us  to  believe,  then  matter  itself  not  only 
had  the  "potency  and  promise  of  life,"  but  is  the  fulfillment  of  life; 


PRO  TOPLASM-BA  THYBl  US— BIOPLASM.  157 

it  is  life.  All  substances,  Huxley  is  fond  of  asserting,  consist  of  car- 
bonic acid,  water,  and  ammonia ;  or,  to  speak  more  correctly  in  a 
chemical  way,  of  carbon,  hydrogen,  oxygen,  and  nitrogen.  All 
living  organisms,  whether  animals  or  plants,  in  their  chemical  sub- 
stance  may  be  reduced  to  these  four  elements,  but  in  none  of  these 
taken  singly  is  the  principle  of  life.  How,  then,  can  they  produce 
it  when  combined?  When  combined  "  under  certain  conditions,"  he 
says,  the  result  is  protoplasm,  which  "exhibits  the  phenomena  of 
life."  This  word  ' 'j^rotoplasm  "  is  borrowed  from  the  Germans,  Max 
Schultze  especially  having  used  it,  and  Huxley  sees  in  it  the  "  life- 
stuft*"  of  the  world.  How  far  it  accounts  for  life,  or  whether  it  is 
life,  is  the  question.  Its  deficiencies  are  many,  and  the  admissions 
of  Huxley  are  quite  fatal  to  the  theory.  He  does  not  distinguish 
between  living  protoplasm  and  dead  protoplasm,  but  if  there  is  any 
difference  at  all  between  life  and  death  it  must  apply  to  animate  or 
vital  protoplasm  and  that  which  is  not  vital.  In  that  li.xing,..proto- 
plasm.  is  productive,  and  dead  protoplasm  is  not  productive,  a  differ- 
ence appears  that  can  not  be  eradicated  ;  but  Huxley  fails  to  recognize 
it.  He  is  compelled  by  his  theory  to  state  exactly  what  protoplasm 
is,  inasmuch  as  it  is  a  physical  substance,  or  the  vital  property  of  the 
world.  Finding  it,  he  should  describe  it.  It  is  at  this  point  that  he 
breaks  down,  confessing  that  protoplasm  is  a  product  of  the  vegetable 
world  whose  chief  property  i^  contractility ;  but  in  tracing  it  to  the 
vegetable  kingdom  he  suiTenders  the  issue,  for,  instead  of  pointing 
out  a  vital,  originating  substance,  he  has  qnly„ indicated  a  j9roc?uc<, 
which  implies  an  antecedent  originating  cause.  This,  therefore,  de- 
stroys the  protoplastic  theory  of  life. 

Equally  fallacious  are  the  theories  that  substitute  bathybius  for 
protoplasm,  for  it  utterly  fails  to  bridge  the  distance  between  the  or- 
ganic and  inorganic  worlds.  Strauss,  pressing  the  question,  whether 
the  living  can  be  evolved  from  the  non-living,  was  at  first  embar- 
rassed for  the  want  of  an  answer,  but  like  Hiickel  finally  accepted 
bathybius  as  the  connecting  link  between  them.  What  is  bathybius  f 
"A  sheet  of  living  matter,"  says  Huxley,  "enveloping  the  whole 
earth  beneath  the  seas."  As  no  one  has  seen  this  "living  matter," 
St.  George  Mivart  pronounces  it  a  "sea-mare's  nest." 

Bioplasm  is  the  latest  substitute  for  protoplasm.  It  is  a  shapeless, 
structureless  substance,  with  power  to  convert  matter  into  life.  A 
bioplast  is  a  sensitive,  ger.erating  substance,  of  a  higher  order  and 
with  more  specific  functions  than  at  first  were  assigned  to  protoplasm. 
Protoplasm  lost  caste  because  a  certain  kind  of  vegetable  dullness 
surrounded  it ;  but  the  bioplasts  are  a  society  of  beings,  commissioned 
to  build  worlds,  with  all  they  contain.     The  superior  djgnity  of  the 


158  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

bioplastic  to  the  protoplastic  theory  is  very  apparent;  but  the  one  is 
as  objectionable  as  the  other,  and  even  more  so,  for  protoplasm  can 
be  traced-  to  the  vegetable  world,  but  the  bioplasts  are  independent 
creatures  that  are  above  revealing  their  origin.  SfiW..came  the^bio; 
plasts?  is  a  crucial  question;  for,  until  answered,  the  source  of  life 
is  still  a  mystery. 

■  In  the  same  line  is  the  attempt  to  explain  life  by  the  doctrine  of 
the  conservation  and  correlation  of  forces,  which  reduces  it  to  a 
physical  force,  like  light,  heat,  motion,  and  electricity.  The  process 
of  reduction  is  simple.  It  is  agreed  that  heat,  light,  and  motion  are 
convertible  terms,  one  being  changed  into  another  with  perfect  ease ; 
and  it  is  affirmed  that  at  no  distant  day  life  will  be  added  to  the 
series  of  convertible  terms,  so  that  it  will  be  but  another  word  for 
motion,  or  light,  or  heat.  The  discovery  of  its  physical  character  is 
thus  anticipated  and  prematurely  declared.  That  this  conception  is 
only  in  its  rudimentary  or  theoretical  stages  ought  to  restrain  its 
advocates  from  a  too  hasty  announcement  of  the  far-off  conclusion, 
but  science  is  not  given  to  modest  and  imperfect  statements. 

To  this  thoroughly  materialistic  conception  there  is  a  stronger  ob- 
jection than  that  it  is  rudimentary.  If  life  is  a  purely  physical 
force,  in  correlation  with  other  physical  forces,  it  ought  to  be  easy 
for  the  chemist  to  produce  it.  That  he  has  not  produced  it;  that 
he  has  not  changed  the  inorganic  into  the  organic,  or  the  non- 
living into  the  living,  is  more  than  a  proof  of  a  present  incapac- 
ity which  may  be  finally  succeeded  by  an  ability  to  do  it;  it  is  a 
proof  that  life  is  not  a  physical  resultant,  and  in  no  sense  a  physical 
substance. 

While  the  scientist  may  disorganize  living  matter,  so  that  it  be- 
comes non-living  matter,  he  can  not  reorganize  the  latter  so  that  it 
becomes  the  former.  The  analysis  of  living  matter  is  within  his 
power ;  the  synthesis  of  living  matter  he  has  not  accomplished.  He 
may  analyze  water;  he  may  synthesize  water ;  but  he  can  not  produce 
a  living  frog,  or  bee,  or  fly.  This  is  the  more  perplexing  because 
science  teaches  that  of  the  seventy  elementary  substances,  only  four 
are  involved  in  the  substance  of  living  matter.  Why  can  not  the 
scientist  so  combine  them  that  life  in  some  of  its  stages  will  appear  ? 
The  task,  stated  in  terms,  does  not  appear  difiicult.  Given  four 
simple  elements,  out  of  an  infinite  variety  of  possible  combinations, 
surely  that  combination  which  results  in  what  is  called  life  will  be 
found.  One  might  think  so,  but  the  key  to  the  combination  is  still 
undiscovered.  The  stupendous  fact  is  that,  according  to  his  theory, 
with  all  the  materials  of  life  at  hand,  with  every  physical  element, 
primary  and  secondary,  at  his  disposal,  he  is  unable  to  produce  the 


RELATION  OF  LIFE  AND  ORGANIZATION.  159 

first  pulsation  of  life ;  and  this  failure  must  be  taken  as  the  evidence 
of  the  supreme  folly  of  his  conception  and  the  supreme  inadequacy 
of  the  theory. 

In  passing  let  it  be  noted  that  in  the  inorganic  world  one  substance 
never  becomes  another.  Sapphire  never  turns  into  silver,  and  clay 
never  turns  into  sandstone.  If  inorganic  substances  never  inter- 
change, surely  the  inorganic  never  turns  into  the  organic.  Materialism 
may  dream  of  the  future  discovery  of  the  physical  basis  of  life,  but 
it  comports  with  the  dignity  of  manhood  to  reject  such  dreams  in  the 
presence  of  truths  that  solve  the  mystery  in  a  more  consistent  and 
elevating  way. 

Ancient  philosophy,  more  excusable  than  modern,  since  its  dis- 
coveries were  fewer,  drifted  into  a  materialism  respecting  life  that  has 
reappeared  in  these  days,  although  in  a  new  form.  It  was  held  that 
life  is  a  form  of  matter,  but  of  a  higher  kind  than  ordinary  matter ; 
but  this  did  not  relieve  the  subject  of  embarrassment,  for  matter  is 
matter,  whatever  its  form.  It  was  also  taught  that  life  is  in  some 
mysterious  way  the  product  of  the  bodily  organism  containing  it ;  in 
other  words,  that  life  is  a  result  rather  than  a  cause.  This  theory 
some  of  the  moderns  have  adopted,  expressing  it  thus:  there  is  no 
life  without  organization ;  the  organization  of  matter  is  implicit  with 
life ;  organization  being  effected  by  self-acting  forces,  life  is  a  phe- 
nomenal result.  For  this  one-sided  conclusion  materialists  are  con- 
tending with  unusual  violence,  forgetting  or  failing  to  see  that  possibly 
the  truth  is  the  very  reverse  of  the  conclusion,  namely,  that  life  pre- 
cedes organization,  and  is  the  only  explanation  of  the  organic  world. 
In  the  azoic  period  of  the  earth's  history,  electricity,  heat,  and  grav- 
itation were  probably  in  operation,  governed  by  the  same  laws  under 
which  they  now  act ;  matter  assumed  mathematical  forms  just  as  it 
does  now  ;  suns  may  have  blazed  in  the  firmament,  as  they  do  now  ;  but 
matter  was  unorganized ;  that  is,  the  vital  principle  was  absent,  and  the 
earth  was  dead.  It  had  form,  but  organization  relates  to  a  principle  of 
life.  At  this  point  we  see  the  difference  between  living  and  non  living 
matter;  the  latter  is  unorganized,  the  former  organized.  A  stone  is 
unorganized,  a  bee  is  organized.  Did  the  bee  organize  itself  into 
life,  or  did  the  life  of  the  bee  proceed  to  incarnate  itself  in  an  or- 
ganized form  ?  Organization  signifies  life ;  life  is  the  sign  of  organiza- 
tion ;  but  it  is  the  extreme  of  philosophical  dullness  to  proclaim  that 
organization  resulted  in  life.  Verily,  there  is  little  diff'erence  between 
the  ancient  and  modern  schools  of  philosophy  in  their  teachings  re- 
specting the  origin  of  life,  and  so  neither  is  satisfactory.  Epicurus 
and  Hiickel,  Democritus  and  Huxley,  different  in  their  methods  of 
research,  and  also  in  their  forms  of  expression,  are  not  far  apart  in 


160  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

their  conclusions ;  all  are  materialists,  in  spite  of  any  sentimental  re- 
cantation of  materialism,  with  which  some  of  them,  Huxley  especially, 
are  credited. 

The  theory  of  Biogenesis,  or  that  life  springs  from  life,  is  one  of 
the  recent  concessions  of  Tyndall,  and  Huxley,  apparently  abandon- 
ing the  protoplastic  theory,  coincides  with  this  latest  proposition. 
Biogenesis  means  that  the  non-living  can  not  produce  the  living,  but 
that  the  living  has  a  life-source.  This  is  the  vitalistic  theory  of  life 
which  promises  to  crowd  out  all  materialistic  views  from  biology.  At  one 
time  Professor  Tyndall  declared  that  the  laws  which  produce  the  crystal 
will  also  produce  the  entire  vegetable  and  animal  world.  Materialists 
generally  reject  this  bold  assumption.  A  crystal  and  a  lion  are  two 
things,  the  vitalistic  principle  being  as  conspicuously  absent  from  the 
one  as  it  is  present  in  the  other.  Vitalis7n  and  materialism  can  not 
co-exist  as  explanations  of  life.  The  latter  deals  with  the  non-living 
as  the  source  of  life ;  the  former  forever  with  the  living ;  the  latter 
must  bridge  the  distance  between  the  non-living  and  the  living,  a 
feat  not  yet  accomplished  ;  the  latter  has  no  bridges  to  build,  but 
needs  to  travel  upward  to  one  life-giving  source  of  all  things. 
Plato  in  the  Phcedo  discusses  the  origin  of  life  in  death  and  the  origin 
of  death  in  life,  representing  the  one  as  contrary  to  the  other,  and 
each  reproducing  the  other,  from  which  materialism  probably  took  its 
cue ;  but  Plato  here  teaches  the  doctrine  of  the  resurrection  of  the 
dead  rather  than  a  materialistic  origin  of  life.  Resurrection  and 
biogenesis  are  different  ideas  ;  the  one  looking  forward  to  the  revival  of 
life,  the  other  looking  backward  to  the  beginning  of  life.  It  is  the 
beginning  of  life  that  now  concerns  us. 

The  vitalistic  philosophy  points  in  the  right  direction,  but  it  is  de- 
ficient in  its  final  utterance.  It  does  not  entirely  lift  the  veil.  It 
still  leaves  the  question  of  origin  unsettled.  Another  theory  is  de- 
manded, and  without  circumlocution  we  announce  the  theory  of^ 
Creatiouism  as  absolutely  sufficient  in  its  contents  to  account  for  all 
the  mysteiy,  magnitude,  and  magnificence  of  life,  whether  of  animals, 
plants,  or  man.  Without  a  positive  creation  of  the  vitalistic  princi- 
ple, and  its  introduction  into  the  physical  universe  by  a  supervising 
intelligence,  it  is  impossible  to  account  for  any  thing,  or  get  beyond  a 
chain  of  secondary  causes.  Given  a  creating  power,  and  mystery 
ceases ;  given  a  living  God,  and  universal  life  is  solved.  Professor 
Agassiz  was  a  creationist  from  the  necessity  of  the  case.  The  insuf- 
ficiency of  all  other  explanations  compelled  him  to  seek  refuge  in  the 
sufficient  power  and  wisdom  of  Almighty  God.  Agreed  on  this,  men 
may  differ  concerning  the  vital  development  of  the  world,  and  not 
imperil   the  foundations  of  faith,  or   retard   the   progress  of  human 


ILLOGICAL  DEFINITIONS  OF  LIFE.  161 

history.  Agreed  that  all  life  sprang  froni  the  one  great  life,  and 
confusion  in  philosophy  disappears.  Agreed  here,  almost  any  the- 
ory hitherto  propounded  as  an  explanation  of  historical  develop- 
ment might  be  sustained ;  spontaneous  generation  is  possible  with 
a  living  God  to  order  it;  pangenesis,  or  any  atomic  theory,  is  pos- 
sible with  a  living  God  to  endow  the  atoms  with  life;  even  the  pro- 
toplastic basis  might  be  approved  if  God  is  allowed  to  impart  to  it 
its  life-giving  property ;  and  materialism,  vitalized  by  the  divine 
spirit,  and  put  under  divine  control,  might  be  radiant  with  uni- 
versal truth. 

Such  are  the  philosophic  theories  respecting  the  origin  of  life. 
Until  one  advances  to  the  biogenetic  and  creational  conceptions  of  the 
universe,  he  flounders  in  misshapen  definitions  and  complex  but  in- 
complete explanations.  Outside  of  this  region  of  dullness  and  darkness, 
or  inside  the  realm  of  religious  investigation,  one  would  expect  to 
meet  with  clearer  statements,  and  more  satisfactory  conclusions.  In 
this  expectation  one  will  not  be  for  the  most  part  disappointed  ;  but 
occasionally  an  erroneous  view  is  taken,  or  a  compromising  explana- 
tion given,  even  when  the  highest  religion  is  guiding  the  investigator 
into  the  truth.  Dr.  Noah  Porter  translates  life  into  soul,  but  this  is 
objectionable,  since  it  will  apply  only  to  the  spiritual  nature  of  man. 
Vegetable  life  is  not  soul -life.  Dr.  Wythe  defines  life  ' '  as  the  sum 
of  the  activities  resulting  from  the  union  of  mind  and  matter."  In 
framing  a  definition  a  cautious  phraseology  is  required  in  order  to 
secure  accuracy  of  statement  and  prevent  a  misleading  influence.  To 
use  life  and  soul  as  synonymous  is  a  high  idea,  but  it  is  not  broad 
enough  ;  to  say  that  life  is  the  sum  of  the  union  of  mind  and  mat- 
ter is  certainly  not  discriminating,  for  it  does  not  concede  that  mind 
is  independent  of  matter,  nor  does  it  insist  that  the  vital  principle  is 
not  a  property  of  matter.  Life  is  the  sura  of  mind  and  matter ; 
therefore,  it  is  not  either  alone.  Applied  to  the  vegetable  kingdom, 
the  definition  is  faulty,  for  mind  is  not  ascribed  to  it  at  all ;  applied 
to  man,  it  makes  matter  as  much  an  essential  as  mind.  Life  is  more 
than  a  sum ;  it  is  not  a  total  of  activities.  The  activities  resulting 
from  the  union  of  mind  and  matter  are  the  manifestations  of  life 
through  an  organization,  by  which  we  predicate  life,  but  with  which 
we  do  not  confound  life.  In  some  particular  cases,  and  applied  nar- 
rowly, life  may  appear  to  be  the  sum  of  its  own  manifestations;  but 
in  a  large  sense  this  is  confounding  results  with  causes.  The  material- 
ist interprets  life  to  be  the  result  of  organization ;  Dr.  Wythe  inter- 
prets it  to  be  the  result  of  the  union  of  mind  and  matter,  without 
-which  life  would  be  impossible.  Dr.  Wythe  is  not  a  materialist  but 
his  interpretation  is  logically  materialistic. 


162  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

Dissatisfied  with  idealistic  and  materialistic  definitions,  it  is  in- 
cumbent upon  us  to  advance  a  definition,  in  doing  which  we  confess 
we  run  the  usual  risk  of  failure.  However,  our  estimate  of  life  is  in 
very  general  tei'ms  that  it  is  the  cause  of  all  physical  and  intellectual 
manifestation ;  that  it  precedes  all  organization  and  is  separate  from  all 
physical  forms,  having  no  physical  property  whatever ;  that  it  is  in- 
visible, intangible,  the  supreme  force,  superior  to  magnetism,  gravity, 
heat,  light  and  motion,  is  inconvertible  into  any  thing  else,  and  is 
eternal.  It  is  the  principle  _,  of ^  creatipji,  the  breath  of  God,  and 
therefore  capable  of  an  infinite  variety  of  forms,  phases  and  mani- 
festations. It  ranks  law,  force,  matter,  every  thing  visible,  formal, 
phenomenal.  It  is  not  a  material  substance;  it  is  not  a  combina- 
tion of  chemical  elements ;  neither  is  it  a  total  of  manifestations, 
or  activities. 

In  particular,  f'i/ejsj^irii ;  its  activity  is  the  activity  of  spirit ;  its 
manifestation  is  the  manifestation  of  spirit.  Paul  says,  "  The  spirit 
giveth  life."  This  is  its  origin  ;  it  flows  from  the  fountains  of  the 
eternal.  Life  is  the  stamp  of  the  unseen  on  the  seen.  Life  is  God, 
the  sign  of  God  in  the  world.  The  living,  whether  in  animals, 
plants,  or  men,  is  the  proclamation  of  the  living  God. 

The  word  "  life"  has  now  a  new  meaning  ;  it  is  the  word  of  words. 
Inspiration  is  in  its  bosom ;  eternity  is  in  its  atmosphere.  Defining 
the  word  thus,  we  have  escaped  the  usual  dilemmas  of  the  definition- 
makers,  and  have  accounted  for  the  appearance  of  life  in  a  way  con- 
sistent and  satisfactory  to  the  reason. 

If  we  consider  the  kinds  of  life  on  the  earth,  the  subject  will  have 
a  practical  complexion,  but  lose  none  of  its  philosophic  interest. 
Indeed,  the  interest  is  heightened,  for  difficulties  multiply  as  the 
varieties  of  life  are  considered  in  their  relation  to  one  another,  and  in 
their  higher  relation  to  a  common  source.  In  ordinary  phrase,  there 
are  vegetable  life,  animal  life,  human  life,  intellectual  life,  spiritual 
life.  Is  life  a  unit  ?  Are  these  varieties  the  product  of  one  life  ?  Is 
there  a  unity  in  the  life  of  the  world  ?  Science  answers  that  the  four 
elements,  carbon,  hydrogen,  oxygen,  and  nitrogen,  compose  all  kinds 
of  bioplastic  material,  with  sometimes  the  accidental  addition  of  other 
elements,  and  that  bioplasm  is  the  same  in  appearance,  whether  it  be 
the  bioplasm  of  a  geranium,  a  sponge,  an  elephant,  a  dog,  a  croco- 
dile, a  horse,  or  a  man.  The  microscopic  appearance  of  universal 
bioplasm  is  doubtless  tlie  same,  but  evidently  the  power  of  the  bio- 
plasm in  each  individual  is  different,  or  the  result  would  be  the  same. 
The  sameness  of  bioplastic  substance  is  incompatible  with  variety. 
The  unity  of  life  does  not  signify  bioplastic  sameness  or  similarity. 
In  fact,  bioplastic  life  relates  only  to  the  animal  and  vegetable  king- 


THE  TROUBLES  OF  EVOLUTION.  163 

doms,  while  the  life  that  includes  or  accounts  for  intellectual  and 
spiritual  activities  is  of  another  kind. 

Beginning  with  bioplastic  life,  as  thus  limited,  it  is  profitable  to 
note  the  difiereuce  between  it  and  non-living  matter.  The  distin- 
guishing mark  is  that  inertia  belongs  to  the  non-living  and  spontaneity 
to  the  living.  A  piece  of  quartz  illustrates  the  one,  amoeboid  motion 
the  other.  Self-motion  characterizes  the  bioplastic  center ;  inertia 
dominates  in  the  inorganic  world. 

Equally  conspicuous  is  the  power  of  reproduction  in  the  living  and 
its  absence  in  the  non-living.  The  power  of  identity  also  attaches  to 
bioplastic  life.  Living  matter,  from  its  law  of  activity,  is  like  a  river, 
ever  flowing,  and  yet  bearing  the  same  name  and  preserving  itself 
Forever  sweeping  on  and  changing  in  appearance,  its  identity  is  a 
marked  fact  in  its  history.  Heraclitus's  doctrine  of  the  flux  of  mat- 
ter has  a  constant  illustration  in  the  realm  of  bioplasm.  With  all  the 
varieties  of  living  matter,  the  special  peculiarities  of  the  original  vi- 
talistic  substance  predominate,  and  are  ever  maintained.  There  are 
varieties  of  oak,  varieties  of  roses,  varieties  of  sheep,  varieties  of  in- 
sects, varieties  of  birds  ;  but  it  is  noticeable  that  the  law  of  identity 
is  not  disturbed.     Relationship  in  varieties  is  easily  traced. 

This  leads  necessarily  to  the  perplexing  but  inviting  dogma — if  it 
may  be  so  termed — of  the  stability  or  permanence  of  species,  a  dogma 
as  perplexing  to  the  evolutionists  as  it  is  comforting  to  Christian 
metaphysicians.  Its  chief  value  is  its  demonstration  that  life  is  under 
law,  and  yet  above  natural  law  ;  that  it  has  metes  and  bounds, 
beyond  which  it  will  not  pass,  and  that  the  life-world  has  a  fixed 
order,  consistent  with  apparent  variations  from  it.  This  is  a  hard 
lesson  for  the  evolutionist. 

The  dogma  is  not  difficult  to  understand.  The  animal  kingdom 
abounds  in  species  which  have  not  multiplied  since  the  age  of  man. 
Varieties,  many  and  singular,  have  multiplied,  but  the  species  are 
identical ;  that  is,  fixed,  permanent,  unchangeable  from  age  to  age. 
Evolution,  if  true,  would  require  the  occasional,  if  not  frequent, 
production  of  new  species,  but  the  utmost  that  it  can  do  is  to  produce 
new  varieties  of  the  same  species.  If  evolution  produced  species  in 
other  ages,  why  not  now  ?  Here  the  evolutionist  stumbles  and  falls. 
The  changes  of  evolution  result  in  varieties  only.  The  dog  is  the  dog 
in  all  lands ;  the  ox  is  always  the  ox  ;  the  horse  is  the  horse.  The 
fact  is  all  the  stronger  when  it  is  remembered  that  man,  with  all  his 
skill  and  genius,  and  moved  by  a  scientific  purpose  to  break  the  law, 
has  been  unable  to  undermine  the  permanence  of  species  in  any  direc- 
tion. He  has  not  originated  any  new  .species,  and  none  have  appeared 
during  his  occupancy  of  the  earth.     Species  may  become  extinct,  but 


164  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

new  species  are  unknown.  The  relation  of  Jiybrids  to  species  in  no 
way  disturbs  the  dogma  of  the  stability  of  species,  for  the  attempt  to 
produce  new  species  results  in  abnormal  products,  stamped  with  ster- 
ility, the  sign  of  nature's  protest,  and  the  proof  of  nature's  law  in  the 
case.  Tins  means  sometking.  It  means  tlmt  life  has  its  appointed  chan- 
nels 'and  limitations;  it  means  ilie  overthrow  of  the  scientific  theory  of  evo- 
lution as  an  explanation  of  the  genesis  of  life;  it  compels  a  reconstruction 
of  the  scicrUifu:  vieiv  of  creation,  and  secures  the  confirmation  of  the  Biblical 
revelation  of  the  same. 

The  introduction  of  species  is  quite  as  mysterious  as  the  stability 
of  species  is  perplexing.  Any  natural  process  of  introduction  is  bound 
to  continue  to  produce  species,  while  a  supernatural  process  may  stop 
with  one  exercise.  This  seems  really  to  have  been  the  case.  The  cre- 
ation of  one  pair  for  the  propagation  of  one  species  is  the  only  refuge 
for  the  thinker ;  the  sending  down  the  ages  of  one  line  of  animals, 
not  to  be  broken  by  nature  or  man,  but  to  be  preserved  amid  all  its 
changes  and  varieties,  is  proof  of  a  creative  will  and  a  supervising  in- 
telligence. This  is  creatiouism  again,  the  inevitable  issue  of  every 
fact  in  nature.  Bioplasfti  is  tinctured  with  creationism  ;  the  vegeta- 
ble kingdom  chants  creationism  ;  the  animal  kingdom  is  alive  with 
it.  The  speculation  that  stability  is  only  apparent,  and  not  real,  we 
dismiss  as  idle.  It  is  proof  that  there  is  trouble  in  the  camp  of  the 
agnostics,  and  nothing  short  of  a  denial  of  the  dogma  will  answer 
their  end. 

It  is  patent  to  the  reader  that  living  matter  is  distinguished  by  the 
power  of  growth  and  non-living  matter  by  its  absence.  Iron  does  not 
grow ;  the  fern  grows.  Silver  does  not  grow ;  the  squirrel,  the  os- 
trish,  man  grows.  Life  signifies  enlargement,  development,  change 
of  form,  and  final  cause.  These  no  one  predicates  of  non-living 
things. 

If,  with  these  distinctions,  we  stop,  where  are  we  ?  The  chief 
differences  between  non-living  and  bioplastic  matter  are :  as  to  living 
matter,  spontaneity  of  motion,  or  power  of  self-motion,  power  of  re- 
production, power  of  identity,  power  of  internal  development ;  as  to 
7ion-living  matter,  the  absence  of  all  these — its  negative  characteristics, 
its  positive  characteristic  being  inertia.  The  vitalistic  principle  focal- 
izes itself  in  a  number  of  concurrent  powers,  motion,  reproduction, 
identity  and  development,  while  the  non-living  substance  may  be  ex- 
pressed best  by  a  single  word — inertia. 

From  bioplastic  to  spiritual  life  is  the  next  step,  if  we  choose  to 
take  it.  Bioplastic  life,  as  seen  in  vegetables  and  animals,  and  in  the 
physical  structure  of  man  is  intermediate  between  the  inorganic  or 
non-living  world,  and  the  psychological  and  spiritual  life,  which  dis- 


BIRTH-MARKS  OF  THE  SOUL.  165 

tinguishes  man   from  all  below  him,  and  allies  him  to  every  thing 
above  him. 

Not  a  few  scientists  detest  classification.  It  interferes  with  fancy ; 
it  hinders  speculation.  Geometry,  algebra,  fixed  forms,  and  fixed 
systems  are  inconsistent  with  theoretical  science.  For  this  reason 
Hiickel  condemned  the  division  of  matter  into  organic  and  inorganic ; 
it  made  him  pause.  The  classification  of  life  into  bioplastic  and  spir- 
itualistic disturbs  the  dreams  of  the  materialist,  who  would  run  his 
biological  thread  through  all  the  cells  and  tissues  of  all  the  forms  and 
manifestations  of  life,  regarding  them  all  as  varieties  of  one  life.  He 
insists  upon  the  unity  of  life  at  the  expense  of  ineradicable  differ- 
ences, but  classification  compels  him  to  recognize  these  diflferences, 
and  through  them  to  see  varieties  of  life.  His  vegetable  biology  he 
would  transmute  into  psychological  biology,  but  this  is  a  task  he  has 
not  yet  accomplished.  Just  as  living  matter  is  distinguished  from 
non-living  matter,  so  spiritual  life  has  its  differentia,  standing  out 
from  bioplastic  forms  with  a  grandeur  peculiar  to  itself,  and  inde- 
pendent of  all  physical  relations. 

Keener  vision  will  be  required  to  detect  the  essentia  of  this  high- 
est product  of  the  vitalistic  principle,  since  it  is  so  modest  that  it 
often  refuses  to  be  seen.  Between  the  psychological  and  the  sensational 
life  of  man  the  materialist  affects  to  believe  that  there  is  no  radical 
difference  ;  but  the  difference  between  the  non-living  and  the  living  is 
not  so  great  as  that  between  the  psychological  and  the  bioplastic. 
Psychological  law  may  be  in  perfect  harmony  with  physical  law,  just 
as  base  and  soprano  in  music  may  be  in  harmony,  but  they  are  not 
the  same.  If  in  the  process  of  thinking  the  brain  seems  to  resemble 
the  liver  in  its  processes  of  secretion,  it  does  not  justify  the  conclusion 
that  thought  is  a  physical  secretion,  and  that  the  mental  process  is 
physical.  Yet  modern  materialistic  philosophy  has  confounded  the 
processes  and  degraded  the  thinker  into  a  bioplastic  machine. 

The_J}irth-mark_  oObs_souJ,is  ^  mnscioiisness,  a  recognition  of 
itself  as  distinct  from  every  thing  else?  the  ego  and  the  non-ego, 
the  subjective  and  the  objective,  become  distinct  realities  to  the  soul, 
through  the  avenue  of  consciousness,  and  it  never  confounds  them. 
In  its" normal  moods  the  soul  clings  to  the  idea  of  its  separateness  or 
exclusiveness  from  all  things  else.  However  rapid  and  extensive  its 
flights  through  the  power  of  imagination ;  however  retrospective  in 
its  thinking  ;  however  distant  at  times  it  may  seem  from  itself  ;^  it 
always  falls  back  upon  the  consciousness  of  its  own  individual  exist- 
ence. The  ogsmtions  of  consciousness  may  even  be  unconscious,  as 
the  mind  often  indulges  in  calculations  which  it  does  not  remember ; 
but  in  either  case   the   fact   of  consciousness  remains.     Unconscious 


166  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

calculations,  unconscious  indulgences,  do  not  interfere  with  the  vice- 
gerency  of  consciousness.  The  mind  often  determines  as  to  the 
beauty  of  an  object  by  an  unconscious  process;  the  individual  can 
not  explain  or  express  the  process  by  which  he  reached  the  conclu- 
sion ;  but  that  he  reached  it  he  knows.  Thus  the  consciousness  is  so 
swift  in  its  ratiocinations,  its  intuitive  conceptions  are  so  electric,  its 
discernment  of  ratio  is  so  immediate  and  comprehensive^  that  the 
mind  can  not  report  the  processes,  and  even  loses  sight  of  the  data 
which  were  employed,  rejoicing  only  in  the  results.  Now,  thisjs  riot 
a  characteristic  of  bioplastic  material.  No  philosopher  atFributes  con- 
sciousness to  a  rose,  or  a  wheat-blade.  There  is  spontaneity  of 
motion,  but  this  is  not  self-recognition.  There  is  identity  of  species, 
or  self-preservation,  but  this  is  not  self-knowledge.  Thelaw  of 
identity  in  bioplastic  matter  is  analogous  to  the  law  of  consciousnessln" 
soul-life.  In  both  identity  is  maintained  with  this  difference,  namely, 
living  matter  does  not  recognize  its  identity,  while  tho  soul  does  rec- 
ognize its  identity.     Soul-life  is  therefore  the  hiiilicr  life. 

A  still  more  marked  difference  is  the  power  of  volition,  or  of 
self-determination  in  the  soul,  the  analogy  to  which  in  bioplasm  is  its 
spontaneity  or  the  power  of  self-motion.  But  living  matter  is  uncon- 
sciously spontaneous  ;  that  is,  while  its  direction  is  from  within,  it  is 
instinctive  rather  than  voluntarily  intelligent.  Even  the  bee  build-\ 
ing  its  cell  after  the  most  correct  mathematical  principles,  displays  no  ] 
such  intelligent  volitional  power  as  the  child  in  determining  a  moral , 
issue.  Right  horc  is  the  abyss  between  the  spontaneous  activity  of 
bioplastic  life,  and  the  volitional  power  of  the  soul,  which  has  never 
been  bridged.  The  volitional  power  in  man  is  exercised  with  respect 
to~moral  problems  which  bioplastic  life  is  not  called  upon  to  consider. 
He  must  analyze  the  moral  quality  of  actions,  and  he  has  the  power 
to  do  it.  He  must  understand  the  principles  of  the  divinest  juris- 
prudence and  know  how  to  apply  them  to  the  case  in  "hand.  He 
must  know  what  law  is;  he  must  knoAv  the  difference  between  right 
and  wrong,  justice  and  injustice,  truth  and  falsehood,  sin  and  holi- 
ness. He  must  be  able  to  choose  the  right  and  reject  the  wrong.  He 
must  see  differences,  and  choose  between  them.  This  is  a  high  prerog- 
ative which  bioplastic  life  never  exercises.  This  prerogative,  the 
*po"wer  of  alternate  elioiee,  tlie  soul  fully,  freely,  and  responsibly  does 
exercise.  Tliis  is  its  highest  endowment;  this  lifts  it  above  bioplasm. 
In  itself,  or  through  external  influence,  the  ><oiil  Ii<t^  poiver  to  change 
its  character,  a  most  wonderful  result,  and  sueh  as  is  never  witnessed 
in  the  purely  bioplastic  realm.  Look  at  it.  A  soul  is  deformed  by 
contact  with  evil ;  it  is  purified  by  contact  with  righteous  principle. 
What  is  lovely  in  it  is  obscured  or  brightened,  just  as  evil  or  right- 


MAN'S  PERSONALITY.  167 

eousness  plays  upon  it.  It  is  the  subject  of  change  in  its  depths  and 
at  its  very  basis.  This  change  is  moral.  Now,  it  is  not  essential 
whether  the  change  is  the  result  of  its  own  volition  or  of  some  helpful 
external  agency,  or  of  the  influence  of  environment.  The  fact  of 
change  is  more  important  than  the  agency  by  which  it  is  produced. 
Solomon  at  his  anointing  was  different  from  Solomon  on  the  mount 
of  corruption.  Saul  of  Tarsus  was  not  Paul  in  Ephesus  ;  that  is, 
morally.  Yet,  the  singular  fact  is  that  underlying  these  alternative 
susceptibilities  of  the  soul  is  the  consciousness  of  its  identity,  making 
itself  manifest  in  the  actual  extremes  of  moral  life.  No  such  sus- 
ceptibility pertains  to  bioplasm  ;  no  such  extremes  of  nature  exhibit 
themselves  in  living  matter.  The  law  of  identity  forbids  alternation 
in  bioplasm  ;  in  soul-life,  paradoxical  as  it  may  seem,  identity  and 
alternation,  consciousness  and  volitional  extremes,  are  compatible,  and 
always  abide. 

Profouuder  vet  is  the  characteristic_ot_jjigrsona^tfy  that  is  attributed 
to  spiritualistic  life.  However  defined  the  word,  whether  it  is  regarded 
as  the  sum  of  moral  powers,  or  the  equipment  of  conscious  being, 
one  thing  is  certain,  it  belongs  not  to  bioplasm.  The  palm  tree  is  not 
a  person ;  the  lizard  wears  not  the  sign  of  personality ;  the  whale  is 
not  a  person  ;  the  kangaroo  claims  not  the  lineage  of  a  person.  Pgr- 
sonality  marks  the  man  ;  it  makes  man  what  he  is.  By_J;his  is  he 
separated  from  the  bioplastic  realm  and  enters  the  divine.  This  is 
not  fiction,  or  a  term  of  flattery,  or  the  exclamation  of  self-praise. 
Pprsonnlity  is  man's  inheritance  from  God,  and  he  has  the  right  to 
shoiLtjaY£r_it. 

A  complete  philosophy  will  not  fail  to  attempt  to  account  for 
soul-life  as  it  has  attempted  to  account  for  the  non-living  and  the 
living  worlds  about  us.  Evidently  the  soul  is  not  the  product  of  an 
evolutionary  force.  As  the  living  does  not  emerge  from  the  non- 
living, so  the  spiritual  does  not  issue  from  the  bioplastic.  Higher 
forms  of  life  were  never  produced  by  lower,  although  chronologically 
the  relation  between  them  may  be  that  of  antecedent  and  consequent. 
The  abyss  between  different  kinds  of  life  is  not  crossed  by  an 
evolirtionary  bridge.  The  chain  of  life  does  not  extend  from  bio- 
plasm to  soul. 

What  then  ?  The  old  notion  of  the  pre-existence  of  souls,  advo- 
cated by  Plato,  and  taught  by  Origen,  has  no  lodging-place  in 
Christian  circles.  It  opened  the  door  to  transmigration,  the  bane  of 
Oriental  religions,  and  robbed  the  soul  of  individuality.  The  doctrine 
of  creationism,  namely,  that  God  creates  the  soul  at  the  time  the 
human  body  is  ready  for  it,  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  larger  theory 
that  he  created  all  life,  all  matter,  and  all  the  forms  thereof.     To  ac- 


168  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

count  for  non-living  matter,  creationism  is  necessary;  to  account  for 
living  matter,  bioplastic  or  spiritual,  it  is  equally  indispensable. 

The  theory  of  Traducianism,  namely,  that  the  soul  is  derived  in 
part  from  the  souls  of  the  parents,  just  as  the  body  is,  has  been  ac- 
cepted in  some  quarters  as  sufficiently  explanatory ;  but  it  is  a  com- 
promise. Indeed,  it  resembles  the  theory  that  organization  precedes 
and  accounts  for  life,  which  we  have  rejected. 

All  life  is  the  product  of  creative  power.  This  does  not  involve 
special  creations,  except  in  the  case  of  the  soul,  for  bioplastic  life  in 
all  its  forms  may  be  the  development  of  a  single  principle ;  that  is, 
the  vitalistic  principle  may  be  more  or  less  active  all  along  the  line, 
and  the  forms  be  different.  But  the  soul,  essentially  diflerent  from 
bioplastic  substance,  can  not  arise  from  the  vitalistic  force  as  ordi- 
narily manifested  in  the  bioplastic  realm ;  it  requires  the  special  ex- 
ercise of  the  creative  principle.  For  the  bioplastic  world  the  vitalis- 
tic principle  under  divine  supervision  is  sufficient ;  for  the  soul-world 
the  creative  principle,  which  is  the  vitalistic  concentered  in  a  special 
product,  working  immediately,  and  not  by  a  process  of  development, 
is  required.  Thus  all  life  is  the  result  of  the  highest  force,  whether 
ordinarily  vitalistic  or  creative.      This  force  is  God. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

IVIAN  ;    OR,  A-NTHROF-OLOGY. 

*'  "ly  /TAN,"  says  Kant,  "  can  not  think  highly  enough  of  man."  Of 
iVX  all  earthly  creatures  the  greatest,  the  most  commanding,  the 
most  magnificent ;  if  an  animal  only,  the  most  perfect  in  physiological 
structure  and  form  ;  if  more  than  an  animal,  then  a  being  with  an 
investiture  of  mystery;  his  "place  in  nature"  still  in  dispute;  his 
place  in  time  still  a  subject  of  inquiry ;  his  history  involved  in  ob- 
scurity;  his  destiny  yet  to  be  revealed  or  wrought  out;  surely  man 
is  justified  in  centering  his  study  in  man.  Darwin  extols  him  as 
"the  wonder  and  glory  of  the  universe,"  and  a  Hebrew  writer  inti- 
mates that  he  is  only  a  little  lower  than  the  angels  in  the  scale  of 
created  intelligences. 

Whether  man  is  natural  or  supernatural,  or  both,  philosophy  is 
seeking  to  determine ;  for,  as  related  to  the  physical  world  by  a  ma- 
terial body,  he  appears  to  be  natural,  but,  displaying  an  intellective 
capacity,  he  appears  to  be  related  to  the  supernatural,  also;  hence, 
the  inquiry  concerning  man's  exact  place  is  fundamental.     In  a  sense. 


MAN'S  RELATION  TO  NATURE.  169 

he  seems  to  stand  on  the  border  line  between  the  two,  partaking 
somewhat  of  both  and  illustrating  the  existence  of  both,  and  yet  be- 
longing wholly  to  neither.  As  such  he  is  the  connecting  link  between 
the  natural  and  the  supernatural,  or  nature  and  spirit;  he  is  the  right 
and  left  hands  of  existence,  the  right  clasping  the  essential  or  spirit, 
the  left  joining  the  phenomenal  or  nature.  Midway  between  them,' 
he  is  perishable  because  nature  is  perishable,  and  indestructible  be- 
cause spirit  is  indestructible.  The  double  view  seems  to  be  according 
to  the  facts,  but  neither  philosophy  nor  religion,  in  their  strict  terms, 
can  accept  it.  Man  must  be  one  or  the  other ;  he  belongs  to  the  do- 
main of  the  natural  or  the  domain  of  the  supernatural.  Materialistic 
philosophy  descends  to  the  natural  estimate,  while  religion  fore- 
glimpses  man's  supernatural  character. 

Widely  divergent  as  are  these  two  general  views,  they  both  recog- 
nize man's  double  relations,  accounting  for  them  in  harmony  with 
their  preconceived  estimates,  and  according  to  facts  which  seem  to 
point  in  both  directions.  Man's  relation  to  nature  is  one  of  the  first 
facts  of  his  existence.  What  the  relation  is,  or  rather  what  it  signi- 
fies, is  an  entirely  different  question,  for,  while  the  relation  appears 
natural,  the  meaning  of  it  may  be  supernatural.  Materialism  in- 
terprets the  relation  just  as  it  seems,  and  fails  to  detect  its  hidden 
meaning. 

Within  the  so-called  historic  period,  man  has  in  part  demonstrated 
the  significance  of  his  relation  to  nature.  He  has  shown  a  purpose 
to  subdue  nature,  and  nature  is  fast  yielding  to  his  lofty  claim  of  do- 
minion. Nature,  stubborn  at  first,  is  beginning  to  feel  the  spell  of 
his  presence,  the  token  of  supernatural  power,  for  it  is  the  super- 
natural only  that  can  control  and  subdue  the  natural.  He  has  fer- 
reted out  laws  which  at  one  time  made  sport  of  him  ;  he  has  defined  the 
poisonous  and  the  harmless  in  atmosphere  and  earth ;  he  has  changed 
marshes  into  landscapes  of  beauty,  deserts  into  fruitful  gardens,  and 
made  the  ocean  a  highway  of  travel  for  all  nations.  At  no  distant 
day  the  conquest  of  earth's  forces  will  be  complete,  and  she  will 
acknowdedge  the  right  of  dominion  exercised  by  her  new  master. 
Over  the  vegetable,  mineral,  and  animal  kingdoms,  he  will  wave  the 
scepter  of  power,  and  they  will  yield  to  his  authority  and  minister  to 
his  wants.  Crystal,  insect,  bird,  reptile,  quadruped,  flower,  fern, 
plant,  moss,  tree,  and  grass,  will  tender  an  ovation  to  the  human 
ruler,  and  surrender  to  his  government.  By  this  is  not  meant  that 
nature  in  its  essentia  will  be  changed,  but  only  that  the  agreement 
between  man  and  nature  will  be  specific,  and  the  latter  will  be  subor- 
dinated to  the  former. 

During  the  growth  of  this  supremacy  over  nature,  man  also  has 


170  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

waxed  in  strength,  increased  in  wisdom,  and  is  working  out  in  his 
history  ends  higher  than  the  exclusively  natural.  Which  is  the  more 
wonderful,  man's  command  over  nature,  or  his  self-development,  it  is 
difficult  to  determine. 

Back  of  man's  relation  to  nature  is  the  inquiry  of  his  origin,  in 
which  are  involved  all  the  facts  of  history,  all  the  theories  of  philo- 
sophic speculation,  and  all  the  revelations  of  inspired  penmen.  None 
of  these  can  be  overlooked  if  a  true  account  of  man's  origin  is  ob- 
tained. The  field  is  vast,  the  theories  are  many  and  conflicting,  and  the 
facts  themselves  somewhat  discordant  or  perplexiugly  difficult  to  trace 
and  establish.  The  statement  needs  no  proof  that  the  Biblical  and 
philosophical  representations  of  the  subject  are  in  disagreement,  and 
indeed  at  such  variance  that,  accepting  one  account,  the  student  is 
obliged  to  reject  the  other.  This  is  unfortunate,  for  the  two  views 
ought  to  harmonize,  so  that  the  believer  in  the  Biblical  view  may  rest 
hiT  faith  on  a  philosophical  basis,  aijd  the  philosophical  advocate  sup- 
port liimself  by  the  records  of  inspiration. 

The  disclosures  of  philosophy  relate  to  four  aspects:  1.  The  Origin 
of  Man ;  II.  The  Character  of  Man ;  III.  The  Antiquity  of  Man ; 
IV.  The  Destiny  of  Man. 

Concerning  the  origin  of  man,  there  is  wanting  a  uniformity  of 
opinion  among  philosophic  thinkers,  many  of  whom  seem  to  be  im- 
pelled only  by  an  antagonistic  spirit  to  the  Biblical  representation ; 
others  are  almost  in  harmony  with  it.  As  a  whole,  however,  the 
philosophical  conception  is  void  of  the  Biblical  spirit,  and  as  Rome 
debased  her  coin  when  in  the  decline,  so  the  philosophic  conception 
is  grosser  and  more  materialistic  as  philosophy  itself  inclines  to  ma- 
terialism. The  following  theories  include  the  more  prominent  of 
those  which  may  be  found  among  the  thinkers:  1.  The  Mechanical 
theory  of  the  world ;  2.  The  theory  of  Descent,  known  as  Darwinism ; 
3.  The  theory  of  Transcendence,  or  that  of  Strauss ;  4.  The  Teleo- 
logical  view,  or  man  the  end  of  nature.  In  the  mechanical  theory, 
as  in  a  womb,  lie  all  other  theories  of  a  materialistic  complexion,  ior 
it  includes  all  creation  from  the  polyp  to  man,  and  accounts  for  all 
in  the  same  way.  The  teleological  interpretation  of  nature  has  re- 
acted in  certain  circles,  resulting  in  the  elimination  of  the  doctrine  of 
a  personal  Creator  and  in  a  monistic  conception  of  the  nniverse.  All 
reactions  from  theological  conceptions  are  materialistic  in  their  teach- 
ings. Not  intending  that  evolution  as  propounded  by  h-im  should 
furnish  the  basis  for  atheistic  materialism,  Mr.  Darwin  has  been  used 
by  Hackel,  Biichner,  and  others,  to  sustain  the  attack  on  the  teleological 
philosophy  and  the  theological  conception  of  the  world.  Nature  has 
been  credited  with  certain   independent   impulses  to  life  and  order, 


ORIGIN  OF  MAN.  171 

which  in  their  self-initiated  activity  produced  the  worlds  which  now 
compose  the  clusters  of  the  firmament,  with  all  else  that  exists. 
Nature  is  its  own  creation.  By  virtue  of  this  predisposition  to  devel- 
opment, both  the  organic  and  the  inorganic  have  resulted;  and,  accord- 
ing to  Hiickel,  so  prominent  is  the  monistic  principle  in  matter  that 
the  scientific  distinction  between  the  organic  and  inorganic  is  a  delu- 
sion, having  no  reality  in  fact.  All  things  are  one,  or  the  emanation 
of  a  principle  of  unity  that  presides  throughout  the  universe.  In  the 
face  of  the  fact  that  the  distance  between  the  organic  and  inorganic 
has  never  been  spanned,  it  is  asserted  that  there  is  no  difl^erence  be- 
tween them,  and  that  the  cosmical  spirit  is  one  and  indivisible.  To 
this  theory  of  unity  we  might  subscribe  if  it  were  qualified,  and  if  in 
its  application  to  nature  certain  facts  were  not  ignored.  To  a  theory 
of  monism  that  eliminates  the  teleological  principle,  and  especially 
that  dispenses  with  intelligent  supervision  by  endowing  matter  with 
life  propensities,  we  can  not  subscribe,  for  it  asks  us  to  believe  in 
a  self-acting  universe,  which  is  a  most  stupendous  absurdity. 

The  bearing  of  the  monistic  or  mechanical  theory  on  the  origin  of 
man  is  quite  apparent.  It  includes  in  its  sweep  all  creatures — man, 
bird,  beast,  fish,  and  creeping  thing.  It  classifies  nothing ;  it  masses 
creation  under  one  banner.  Nature  is  producer  and  product ;  man  is 
involved  in  nature.  Whatever  will  account  for  nature  as  a  whole 
will  account  for  man  as  an  individual  of  nature ;  whatever  will  ac- 
count for  any  thing  will  accouut  for  every  thing.  Man  was  not  created 
as  Moses  teaches — his  "foundations  are  in  the  dust;"  he  is  the  result 
of  the  complicated  forces  of  a  self-acting  world,  and  is  as  much  an  acci- 
dent as  a  logical  product.  Certainly,,  nature  did  not  mtewtj  to  make 
i^n,  for  thisjs ^teleology ;  hence,  he  was  a  surprise  even  to  nature. 
ActingTn  a  different  manner,  nature's  forces  would  have  produced  a 
different  kind  of  being  from  man,  or  no  being  at  all.  The  mechanical 
theory  of  the  world  involves  the  accidental,  and  not  the  intended  or 
inevitable,  appearance  of  man. 

The  tliocrv  of  "descent,"  formerly  adopted  by  Darwin,  is  a  more 
precise  deterniination  of  man's  origin,  and  at  one  time  threatened  to 
supersede  the  Biblical  account.  It  would  be  premature  to  announce 
its  overthrow,  but  oertainly  the  theory  has  not  been  suflSciently  sus- 
tained. In  liis  oarlior  studios.  "S\v.  Darwin  had  no  intention  of  ex- 
cluding the  reign  of  a  I'roator  and  Preserver  from  the  realm  of 
nature,  and  even  his  latest  utterances  are  not  atheistic.  He  meant 
not  to  be  materialist  or  atheist.  His  original  thought  was  that 
man  is  in  the  line  of  animal  succession,  descending — ascending  is  a 
truer  term — from  the  animal  kingdom,  and  developing  as  animals  do 
into  his  present  position  in  nature.     The  superiority  of  man   to  ani- 


172  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

mals  is  no  proof  of  a  different  origin,  but  proof  of  a  larger  develop- 
ment according  to  the  lavvs  of  nature.  To  sustain  this  theory  he 
pointed  out  the  signs  of  relationship  between  man  and  aiiimals,  in 
habits,  in  hygienic  laws,  in  structural  likenesses,  and  in  common 
physiological  vices  and  virtues.  He  attempts  to  show  that  "man  is 
constructed  on  the  same  general  type  or  model  as  other  mammals ;" 
that  his  skeleton  resembles  that  of  the  seal ;  that  he  can  receive  from 
and  communicate  to  animals  certain  diseases,  as  hydrophobia,  cholera, 
variola;  that  "he  passes  through  the  same  phases  of  enibryological 
development;"  that  he  "retains  many  rudimentary  and  useless 
structures  which  no  doubt  were  once  serviceable ;"  and  that  he  is 
"descended  from  some  lower  form,  notwithstanding  that  connecting 
links  have  not  hitherto  been  discovered."  The  physical  relationship 
is  quite  fairly  sustained. 

'  X  psychological  relationship  is  more  difficult  to  establish,  but  Dar- 
win eagerly"seeks  for  facts  to  support  it.  He  declares  that  animals 
have  the  same  senses  as  men ;  ' '  similar  passions,  affections,  and  emo- 
tions ;  they  possess  the  same  faculties  of  imitation,  attention,  delibera- 
tion, choice,  memory,  imagination,  the  association  of  ideas,  and  reason, 
though  in  very  different  degrees;"  they  are  liable  to  insanity  also.  It 
is  not  certain  that  Darwin  is  correct  in  these  statements,  for,  in  order 
to  sustain  them,  he  must  abolish  well-settled  distinctions  between  instinct 
and  rational  intelligence,  which  his  theory  compelled  him  to  do.  As 
to  self-consciousness,  the  ingrain  idea  of  personality,  Darwin  was  not 
bold  enough  to  allow  that  it  belonged  to  the  animal  kingdom.  "No 
animal  is  self-conscious,"  he  says,  "if  by  this  term  it  is  implied  that  he 
reflects  on  such  points  as  whence  he  comes,  or  whither  he  will  go,  or 
what  is  life  and  death;"  biit  self-consciousness  does  include  reflection  on 
the  questions  of  past,  present,  and  future,  or  life  and  death.  Belief  in 
self  is  so  intense,  says  Spencer,  that  "no  hypothesis  enables  us  to  escape" 
it.  This  is  the  dividing  line  between  a  man  aud  an  animal :  the  one  is 
self-conscious  in  the  highest  sense,  embracing  past  and  future ;  the  other 
is  self-conscious,  if  at  all,  with  respect  to  the  present.  The  psycholog- 
ical relationship  has  not  been  made  out  quite  to  our  satisfaction. 

The  difficulty  grows  as  one  looks  for  signs  of  moral  relationship 
with  the  animal  kingdom.  In  no  hesitating  spirit,  however,  Mr. 
Darwin  approaches_„th.e  problem  and  disposes  of  it  by  referring  the 
origin  of  the  moral  nature  in  man  to  the  operation  of  the  social 
forces;  "the  foundation  lies  in  the  social  instincts."  Agcording  to 
this  view,  moral  ideas  are  not  instinctive  or  intuitional,  but  the  result 
of  social  development  which  has  been  going  on  from  the  earliest  ages 
until  now.  Besides,  he  discovers  the  counterpart  of  moral  emotions, 
or  the  moral  nature  of  man,  in  animals ;  he  points  to  affection,  sym- 


THE  THEORY  OF  ''DESCENT."  173 

patliy,  shame,  remorse,  aud  the  family  tie,  in  the  animal  kingdom. 
Mr.  Huxley  relates  an  incident  to  show  that  a  gibbon  has  a  con- 
science. Thus  man  is  a  descendant  of  the  animal  kingdom,  is  pei-  se 
an  animal. 

The  theory  of  "descent"  is  already  stereotyped  in  science  aud 
philosophy.  Karl  Vogt  has  sketched  man's  pedigree  from  the  ape,  and 
Darwin  contrasting  monkeys  and  savages,  concluded  that  descent  from 
the  former  would  be  more  honorable  to  our  race  than  descent  from  the 
latter.  In  a  coarse  aud  vehement  style  Hiickel  vindicates  the  theory, 
pointing  out  twenty-two  stages  of  development  from  the  lowest  form 
of  animal  life  to  man,  aud  apparently  connecting  them  without  any 
missing  links ;  but  scientists  have  shown  the  error  of  the  stages,  prov- 
ing that  some  of  them  do  not  exist  in  nature. 

The  tracing  of  man's  genealogy  is  an  imperative  requirement 
of  evolution.  Darwin  himself  accepted  such  a  task,  but  met  with 
some  difficulty  when  it  became  necessary  to  pass  from  invertebrates 
to  vertebrates.  The  passage  between  the  ascidse  and  the  lancelet  fish 
was^easily  traced ;  from  fish  came  amphibia ;  from  the  amphibia  the 
reptilia;  these  developed  into  marsupialia;  these  developed  into  lemurs 
or  half-apes ;  from  these  a  variety  of  apes  issued ;  then  the  gibbon 
and  the  gorilla;  then  one  link  more;  then  man.  But  this  schedule  of 
development  is  by  no  means  complete,  as  others  have  shown,  and  it 
fails  just  where  demonstration  is  the  most  imperative. 

Huxley  espouses  "descent,"  tracing  the  development  of  the  ani- 
mal kingdom  through  man-like  apes  or  anthropoids  until  its  consumma- 
tion is  reached  in  man.  For  his  purposes,  he  exposes  the  physiologi- 
cal likeness  of  the  gibbon,  the  ourang,  the  chimpanzee,  and  the 
gorilla  to  the  human  skeleton,  affirming  in  the  end  that  structural 
similarity  establishes  physical  relationship  or  genealogical  descent.  He 
insists  also  that  "  the  mode  of  origin  and  the  early  stages  of  the  de- 
velopment of  man  are  identical  with  those  of  the  animals  immediately 
below  him  in  the  scale,"  and  concludes  that  "secondary  causes"  are 
sufficient  to  account  for  the  phenomena  of  the  universe,  man 
included. 

As  the  Athenians  who  boasted  that  they  sprung  from  the  earth 
wore,  as  a  symbol,  a  grasshopper  in  their  hair,  so  those  moderns  who 
espouse  the  animal  theory  of  the  origin  of  man  should  engrave  an 
anthropoid  on  their  coat-of-arms. 

Darwin  did  not  intend  that  "  descent "  should  undermine  the 
theistic  notion,  and  AVallace  still  later  insists  that  they  are  compatible; 
but  Hiickel  and  Huxley  crush  out  the  idea  of  a  personal  Creator  in 
the  development  of  the  universe.  We  do  not  assume  that  a  theory 
which  carried  to  the  extreme  invalidates  a  fundamental  religious  idea 


174  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

is  to  be  rejected  but  it  is  a  suspicious  theory,  and  can  not  be  fully 
accepted  without  further  proof. 

Against  the  theory  of  "  descent,"  as  a  whole,  we  offer  the  following 
consideration  or  two,  which  make  it  difficult  to  accept  it ;  indeed,  until 
certain  facts  shall  have  been  discovered,  the  theory  is  absolutely  null 
and  void.  As  it  is,  it  has  only  a  tentative  character.  No  geologist 
claini^.that  fossils  have  been  found  that  indicate  a  passage  from  lower 
organizations  into  man ;  it  is  the  great  grief  of  materialistic  scien- 
tists that  a  "missing  link"  is  still  missing  between  the  gorilla  and 
man.  To  assume  that  such  a  link  will  be  found  is  unphilosophical. 
Until  it  is  fojand,  "descent"  fails  of  its  purpose. 

Inasmuch  as  a  wide  intellectual  and  morafgap  exists  between  man 
and  the  animal  kingdom,  some  geologists  are  disposed  to  refer  man 
to  a  "distinct  kingdom  in  nature."  Sir  Charles  Lyell  quotes  approv- 
ingly the  "reasoning  of  M.  Quatrefages "  on  this  proposition.  Man 
constitutes  a  kingdom  himself,  the  kingdom  of  improving  reason,  of 
intellectual  activity,  of  spiritual  life.  This  certainly  is  an  inde- 
pendent view,  destructive  of  "  descent,"  and  in  harmony  with  the 
Biblical  interpretation. 

The  character  of  the  "  primitive  "  man  is  usually  employed  in  de- 
fense of  the  "development"  theory,  inasmuch  as  it  is  taken  for 
g.ranted  that  he  was  but  a  little  in  advance  of  an  animal.  Professor 
Whitney,  however,  insists  that  man,  whether  found  in  pliocene  or 
post-pliocene  or  recent  formations  is  nothing  hut  man.  Sir  J.  Lubbock 
has  certainly  made  out  a  case  against  savages  or  barbarians,  but  his 
volume  of  facts  goes  not  back  of  historic  times  and  only  proves  the 
degeneracy  of  man,  not  ivhaf  he  iva^  orujinaUfg.  The  man  of  the 
"stone  age"  was  probal^Ty  less  civilized  than  the  man  of  the  "bronze 
age,"  and  the  latter  was  behind  the  man  of  the  "  iron  age,"  but  who 
claims,  unless  he  is  a  materialist,  that  the  palaeolithic  man  was  the 
original  man,  or  even  a  type  of  him?  After  the  "ice  epoch"  was  a 
long  "watery  epoch,"  or  between  the  glacial  period  and  the  stone 
man — between  the  original  man  and  the  post-diluvian  man — was  the 
age  of  a  splendid  race,  followed  by  a  degenerate  people,  or  the  savages 
who,  beginning  with  or  constituting  the  stone  age,  remain  until 
the  present  time. 

Of  the  primeval  inhabitants  no  remains  have  been  found,  unless 
language,  the  family  institution,  and  the  religious  idea  make  up  a 
portion  of  their  legacy.  Of  monuments  there  is  none;  of  works 
of  art,  of  philosophy,  poetry,  there  is  none;  but  language,  home 
and  religion  are  the  imperishable  mementoes  of~thaF  early  race,  m;. 
halted  by  savages,  and  transmitted  to  all  nations,  civilizing  and 
elevating   them.     Concerning    language  it   must   be   said    that   like 


THE  THEORY  OF  STRAUSS.  175 

the  hieroglyphs  of  Egypt  the  oldestare  the  best,  that  is,  the  first 
languages  have  ueetrecr"'uo"  improvement.  The  perfection  of  the 
primitive  l:uiuii:ii;(s  speaks  loudly  for  a  perfect  people  who  used  them, 
and  overwhelms  the  theory  of  evolution  in  complete  ruin.  The 
historic  course  of  the  early  languages  shows  a  descent,  or  degrada- 
tion, and  the  historic  course  of  mankind  shows  also  a  similar  descent 
or  degradation,  which  is  contrary  to  the  germinal  idea  of  Darwin, 
who  means  by  descent  the  ascent  of  the  race.  But  the  palaeolithic 
man  was  not  an  ascent ;  he  was  a  descent,  like  his  language  ;  he  was 
a  savage,  preserving  language,  home,  and  religion,  but  in  the  grossest 
forms,  the  purification  of  which  has  required  the  work  of  many  gen- 
erations. "Descent"  hrmk^dowii.m  language,  the fani'dij  ui><t it td ion,  and 
the  rrliijioii.-<  nhl;  and  in  the  same  way  it  breaks  at  a  vital  point  in 
the  history  of  man.     It  is  a  guess,  not  a  fact. 

The  transcendental  theory  of  Strauss  is  essentially  materialistic,  a 
modified  evolutionary  process  resulting' in  man.  He  speaks  of  the 
"ascending  evolution  of  nature,"  and  intimates  that  the  scientist  con- 
ceives of  the  possibility  of  the  development  of  the  organic  from  the 
inorganic,  but  he  confesses  "enduring  ignorance"  of  the  origin  of 
consciousness.  Evolution  can  not  explain  self-consciousness.  It  ex- 
plains man,  as  a  whole,  however.  He  says:  "As  nature  can  not  go 
higher,  she  would  go  inwards" — man  is  the  limitation,  the  end  of 
evolution.  Again  he  says:  "In  man  nature  endeavored,  not  merely 
to  exalt,  but  to  transcend  herself;"  and,  rising  in  spite  of  his  ma- 
terialistic preferences,  he  shouts,  "do  not  forget  for  a  moment  that 
thou  art  human  ;  not  merely  a  natural  production."  Is  man  a  "nat- 
ural production,"  like  a  tree,  or  cloud,  or  bird,  or  frog,  or  flower? 
According  to  the  mechanical  theory  of  the  world,  and  according  to 
the  theory  of  "descent,"  as  manipulated  by  the  atheists,  he  is  a  "nat- 
ural production,"  nothing  more ;  but,  according  to  Strauss  in  his 
highest  mood,  he  is  "human,"  implying,  if  it  mean  any  thing,  some- 
thing more  than  a  natural  result.  N"ature  transcended  herself  in 
man;  she  could  go  no  highei-,  and  hence  turned  "inwards."  The_ 
highest  expression  of  evolution  or  creative  force  is  man.  This  much 
Strauss  means ;  and,  notwithstanding  his  infidelic  spirit,  we  accept 
him  as  an  intermediate  teacher  between  Hiickel  and  Owen  ;  or,  in 
broader  phrase,  as  a  step  from  rank  materialism  to  theism.  He  did 
not  intend  to  occupy  this  middle  ground,  but  the  first  step  toward 
a  true  conception  of  man  is  his  relation  to  nature — ^just  the  step 
Strauss  took.  In  his  effort  to  abandon  the  Biblical  account  of  miracu- 
lous creation,  he  swings  to  materialism,  but  finds  in  his  last  analysis 
of  man  an  element  that  materialism  can  not  explain,  and  leaves  it 
without  explanation.     This   is   the  weakness  of  scientific   theories  in 


176  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

general,  that  the  human  element  in  man,  entirely  different  from  the 
natural  or  animal  element,  they  can  not  explain ;  or,  if  they  attempt 
explanation  they  refer  it  to  a  secondary  cause,  which  may  account  for 
man  as  an  improved  descendant  of  the  kingdom  of  nature. 

The  last  view  claiming  notice  is  teleological  in  spirit  and  scientific 
in  form.  Louis  Agassiz  expresses  it  thus:  "Man  is  the  purpose  to- 
ward which  the  whole  animal  creation  tends  from  the  first  appearance 
of  the  first  paleozoic  fish."  By  this  he  does  not  mean  that  man  was 
the  last  in  a  series  of  natural  developments,  partaking  of  the  spirit 
of  the  whole,  and  the  inevitable  outgrowth  of  it  all — this  were  but 
the  mechanician's  view  over  again  ;  but  he  means  that  nature  tvas 
jplamied  with  reference  to. jimn;  that  the  earth  was  prepared  for  his 
abode ;  and  tliat,  beginning  back  in  the  early  ages,  the  purpose  to 
adjust  the  world  to  its  future  inhabitant  is  evident.  This  is  a  broad 
view  of  nature,  and  a  broader  view  of  man  than  the  materialists  can 
allow.  It  is  the  teleological  view  of  creation  which  excites  Hiickel, 
and  convulses  him  with  rage.  He  can  not  for  a  moment  consent  to 
it.  He  says  that  "since  the  awakening  of  human  consciousness,  hu- 
man vanity"  has  insisted  that  man  is  the  main  purpose  of  terrestial 
life,  but  it  is  a  baseless  presumption ! 

The  teleological  view  of  creation  is  inspiring ;  at  least  it  is  more 
elevating  in  its  eff*ect  to  thiuk  that  man  is  the  end  or  purpose  of  na- 
ture, than  that  he  is  the  product  of  nature.  Richard  Owen,  prefer- 
ring the  former,  exclaims:  "Man,  from  the  beginning  of  organisms, 
was  ideally  present  upon  the  earth."  The  ideal  aim  of  nature,  under 
the  intelligent  supervision  of  a  personal  Creator  and  Ruler,  was 
preparation  for  an  inhabitant  it  could  not  produce,  but  who  would  in 
time  appear  through  the  intervention  and  by  the  appointment  of  that 
Creator  and  Lord.  This  waiting  of  nature  for  its  master,  to  he  intro- 
duced by  a  higher  power,  is  a  finer  conception  than  that  of  the  effort 
of  nature  to  produce  man  as  a  higher  organism  than  brutes.  Between 
the  two  theories  or  conceptions,  whether  man  is  the  product  of  nature, 
or  the  end  of  nature ;  whether  he  is  in  the  line  of  animal  succession, 
or  independent  of  it  and  appointed  over  it ;  whether  he  developed,  as 
Hackel  insists,  or  was  ideally  present  from  the  beginning,  as  Owen 
finely  phrases  it,  one  must  choose,  or  have  no  conception  at  all.  The 
four  theories  here  considered  are  reducible  to  two  :  nian  is  the  product 
of  nature,  or  the  purjwse  of  nature.  These  two  theories  iTre  the  height 
and  depth  of  philosophic  and  scientific  conclusion  respecting  man ; 
they  vibrate  between  a  materialistic,  atheistic,  monistic  conception, 
and  an  ideal  or  teleological  theory  of  his  origin,  the  latter  being  in 
harmony  with  the  theological  conception  that  will  have  consideration 
later  in  the  volume.     The  gospel  of  monism,  as  preached  by  Hackel, 


EXPLANATION  OF  MAN'S  HIGHER  NATURE.  177 

Huxley,  evolutionists  in  general,  or  the  gospel  of  ideal  teleology, 
already  foreshadowed  in  the  scientific  hypotheses  of  Agassiz,  Owen, 
and  Rudolf  Schmid,  will  be  the  scientific  gospel  of  the  future,  with 
the  probabilities  in  favor  of  the  latter. 

Our  next  duty  is  to  ascertain  the  interpretation  put  by  philosophy 
upon  the  intellectual  and  moral  nature  of  man,  to  know  whether, 
even  allowing  that  the  physical  man  has  an  animalic  basis,  his  higher 
nature  is  the  resultant  of  animalic  agencies,  or  has  an  independent 
basis.  Man's  greatness  is  a  supreme  fact.  Plato  affirms  that  the 
mind  is  the  man,  and  Hamilton  declares  there  is  nothing  great  but 
mind.  Man's  greatness,  therefore,  is  the  greatness  of  mind.  Exactly 
what  mind  is,  under  what  laws  it  exists  and  operates,  we  consider 
elsewhere,  while  here  we  must  consider  it  only  in  connection  with 
those  materialistic  theories  which  propose  to  account  for  it.  It  may 
be  supposed  that  the  theory  that  will  account  for  man  at  all  will  ac- 
count for  the  whole  man ;  that  his  character  is  so  involved  in  his 
origin  that  one  theory  only  is  required  to  explain  both.  We  shall 
not  insist  that  two  origins  are  demanded,  one  for  the  body,  and  an- 
other for  the  intellectual  and  moral  nature  ;  one  origin  is  sufficient. 
The  cause  that  produced  man  produced  all  there  is  of  him.  If  he  is 
a  descendant  of  the  animal  kingdom,  then  whatever  he  is  is  a  devel- 
opment of  an  animalic  nature ;  otherwise  he  is  not  such  descendant, 
and  another  history  must  be  invoked.  As  we  have  seen,  Darwin 
undertook  to  explain  the  higher  nature  of  man  in  harmony  with  the 
theory  of  "descent,"  but  the  proof  is  not  conclusive  that  intellect, 
conscience,  volition,  self-determination,  and  self-consciousness,  are  the 
products  of  development,  oi-  ai-c  natural  states  evolved  through 
natural  processes.  The  phy.-^ical  man  may  consist  of  solid  matter 
held  in  solution  in  about  six  pails  of  water,  but  the  Intellectual  and 
moral  qualitfes  of  man  can  ijot  be  reduced  to  chemical  proportions 
<;^phy.si'cal  affinities. 

"The  unity  of  the  higher  nature  is  a  troublesome  fact  to  the  ma- 
terialists, for  it  requires  that  the  theory  that  will  explain  the  intellec- 
tual nature  will  explain  the  moral  also ;  but  while  they  persuade 
themselves  that  thought  is  the  result  of  molecular  action,  or  mere 
nervous  force,  they  find  it  difficult  to  explain  conscience  and  moral 
self-determination  in  the  same  way.  Hence,  they  are  driven  to  manu- 
facture two  theories,  or,  in  the  language  of  Strauss,  confess  "enduring 
ignorance."  Hartley  and  James  Mill  heralded  the  theory  that  thought 
is  the  product  of  brain  organism,  while  Bain  elaborated  it  into  a  nerv- 
ous result;  but  none  of  them  explains  consciousness,  or  memory,  or 
unagination  in  that  way.  However  far  the  psychologists  go,  they 
always  stop  before  they  reach  the  end.     True,   in   mere   terms,  the 


178  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

psychical  character  of  man  has  been  reduced  by  the  empiricists 
to  a  physiological  basis,  but  it  is  a  theoretical  reduction  only. 
Thought  is  a  physical  play;  mental  and  nervous  action  are  inter- 
changeable terms ;  affection,  fear,  hope,  joy,  sorrow,  are  chemical 
results,  the  product  of  altered  molecular  conditions.  T^  Starr  King, 
commenting  on  the  sublimated  theory^  said:  "  When  a  lady  scolds,  a 
man  has  to  face  tmly  a  few  })uils  of  articulate  carbonic  acid,  l)ut  her 
weej)iug  is  liquid  lightning."  If  thought  and  feeling  are  pliysical 
states,  superinduced  by  sensation,  or  the  interaction  of  the  molecular 
forces,  it  is  not  far,  so  the  psychologist  imagines,  to  the  explanation 
of  the  moral  states,  which  may  be  also  the  play  of  differently  directed 
nervous  sensibilities.  This  is  only  an  inference,  however ;  the  proof 
is  still  wanting. 

For  an  explanation  of  the  moral  attributes  of  man  we  have : 
1.  The  Principle  of  Association,  enunciated  by  Bain ;  2.  The  Law  of 
Social  Development,  proclaimed  by  Darwin  ;  ■  3.  The  theory  of  Evo- 
lution, adopted  by  Spencer.  Differing  as  these  do  in  details,  they 
are  closely  related,  and  possess  the  same  value,  since  they  all  reject 
the  notion  of  an  independent  basis  for  the  higher  nature  of  man.  It 
makes  little  difference  whether  the  moral  nature  originated  in  intel- 
lectual exercise,  or  bloomed  from  the  social  instincts,  or  was  evolved 
by  physical  processes,  the  result  is  the  same,  the  materialism  of  hu- 
man nature.  In  none  of  these  theories  is  there  room  for  providential 
endowments,  or  special  creative  forces,  or  the  need  of  divine  inter- 
position in  equipping  man  for  rightful  sovereignty,  or  clothing  him 
with  a  noble  dignity.  Against  all  these  theories  we  present  the 
plausible  conjecture,  supported  by  religious  revelation  or  teaching, 
that  man's  moral  nature  was  in  him  ah  initio,  and  its  presence  can 
not  be  accounted  for  by  any  theory  of  development  whatever.  Sir  J. 
Lubbock,  it  is  true,  asserts  that  the  lowest  savages  seem  to  him  to  be 
"almost  entirely  wanting  in  moral  feeling,"  while  Mr.  Wallace  points 
out  that  our  civilized  populations,  progressing  intellectually,  "have 
not  advanced  beyond  the  savage  code  of  morals,  and  have  in  many 
cases  sunk  below  it."  Lord  Kames  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  moral 
sense  is  native  to  man ;  Prof.  Winchell  speaks  of  it  as  intuitional. 
This  is  all  that  we  now  care  to  claim.  Whether  the  primitive  inhabi- 
tants of  the  earth  had  a  profound  or  native  sense  of  the  divine 
sovereignty,  or  believed  in  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  does  not  belong 
to  the  simple  inquiry  concerning  a  moral  sense  in  man ;  and  even 
were  they  involved  in  the  inquiry,  Lubbock's  instances  of  atheism,  or 
rather  ignorance  of  God,  only  prove  the  extinction  or  reduction  of 
the  moral  idea,  and  not  that  it  did  not  originally  exist.  Nothing  has 
been  adduced  and  no  example  cited,  to  disprove  the  conjecture  that 


THE  ANTIQUITY  OF  MAN.  179 

the  moral  idea  did   not  domiuate  in    the   earliest   inhabitants  of  the 
globe.     If.it  was  a  reigning  idea  as  far  back  as  history  can  conduct 
us,  then  it  is  difficult  to  establish  that  it  is  a  development.     Its  re- 
finement  iiTay  be  the  result  of  a  developing  process ;    its__existenGe  is 
another  thing,  and   is   implicit  with  a  miraculous  suspicion!      What 
are  the  conclusions  of  philosophy  respecting  the   character  of  man? 
It  traces  his  physical  body  to  the  ancestry  of  apes ;  it  converts  intellectual  \ 
processes  into  nervous  irritations ;  it  represents  the  moral  faculties  as  the   j 
outcome  of  intellectual  and  social  interactions ;  and  contentedly  suspe^ids  its  j 
investigation  ivith  the  play  of  secondary  causes. 

No  study  of  man  is  complete  that  omits  a  searching  inquiry  into 
his  antiqxiity,  since  the  fate  of  many  theories  is  involved  in  it.  His 
appearance  on  earth  was  the  beginning  of  a  new  lordship,  and  a  new 
life  on  the  planet.  Could  it  be  ascertained  about  when  he  appeared, 
controversy  over  correlated  hypotheses  would  end,  and  the  traditional 
account  would  be  overthrown  or  confirmed.  It  is  a  singular  fact  that 
the  Biblical  account  can  be  readily  and  consistently  adjusted  to  a 
brief  or  long  antiquity,  while  a  short  antiquity  would  be  utterly  and 
ruinously  subversive  of  all  materialistic  and  evolutionary  suppositions, 
since  they  require  indefinite  periods  of  time  for  the  accomplishment 
of  their  tasks.  Take  the  conscience  alone — a  million  years  would  be 
none  too  long  for  its  evolution,  even  from  a  potential  to  the  actual 
state.  The  stone-wall  fact  is,  that  iXjcaaji  first  appeared  seven  thou- 
sand  years  ago,  then  the  web  of  materialism  is  torn  into  threads. 
Merely  as  a  religious  problem,  the  Bible  has  been  interpreted  to  settle 
in  favor  of  a  short  antiquity,  but  no  violence  would  be  done  either 
its  chronology  or  history  to  lengthen  it.  As  a  scientific  question,  the 
antiquity  of  man  has  been  pushed  back  into  the  misty  periods  of  the 
fossiliferous  ages,  because  on  that  hypothesis  other  hypotheses  depend 
for  vitality.  Unfortunately,  the  subject  has  not  been  considered  ex- 
cept in  its  bearings  on  some  heretical  scientific  notion,  and  the  result 
has  been  a  false  interpretation  of  the  facts,  as  they  were  discovered, 
or  a  mere  conjecture  of  facts  when  none  were  found.  A  Biblicist 
should  have  no  anxiety  either  way,  for  it  is  immaterial  whether  the 
scientific  antiquity  be  overthrown  or  not,  except  as  it  tends  to  sup- 
port evolution.  In  any  event,  and  whatever  the  final  discovery,  the\ 
Bible  will  be  found  in  happy  concordance  with  it.  The  scientific  ) 
spirit  may  be  hostile  to  the  Biblical  interpretation,  but  the  scientific/ 
residt  can  not  be  contrary  to  the  Biblical  truth.  The  Bible  will/ 
stand,  whatever  science  may  find  ;  philosophy  can  not  stand  if  science 
finally  reduces  man's  antiquity  to  a  very  short  period.  This  being 
the  case,  the  defenders  of  the  Biblical  account  are  disposed  quietly  to 
wait  until  scientific  exploration  and  research  have  submitted  all  the 


180  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

facts,  for  this  is  a  question  of  fact,  not  of  opinion.  On  the  other 
hand,  philosophy,  seeing  its  fate  depends  upon  the  specific  favor  of 
scientific  elaboration  and  deduction,  is  in  no  indifierent  mood  when 
new  facts  are  announced,  for  it  lives  only  as  they  are  propitious. 

What,  at  this  stage  of  research,  are  the  scientific  facts  touching  the 
antiquity  of  man?  Are  they  bulwarking  philosophic'  speculation,  or 
buttressing  the  Biblical  interpretation  ?  If  the  final  verdict  of  science 
should  be  opposed  to  both  the  current  philosophical  and  theological 
interpretations,  asserting  a  middle  view,  would  not  the  gods  rather 
laugh  than  weep  ?  Precisely  to  such  an  overturning,  science  seems, 
however  unwillingly,  to  conduct  us.  Within  fifty  years  past  a  scien- 
tific revolution  concerning  man  has  taken  place,  leaving  us  the  option 
of  accepting  an  interminable  antiquity,  or  a  modified  Biblical  inter- 
pretation. Within  this  period  the  geologists  have  not  been  idle,  but 
in  an  enthusiastic  spirit  they  have  gone  to  the  extreme  of  belief  in 
the  age  of  man,  supporting  it  by  discoveries  that  for  the  time 
appeared  authentic  and  declaratory.  That  the  prehistoric  antiquity 
which  they  avowed  for  man  was  contradictory  of  religious  traditions, 
and  might  unsettle  faith  in  all  religious  teaching,  did  not  concern 
them ;  with  consequences  they  had  nothing  to  do.  Vulnerable  as 
are  the  inferences  drawn  from  the  facts,  the  geologists  deserve  credit 
for  their  persevering  industry  in  searching  the  fields  of  nature  for 
testimony  to  the  age  of  the  human  race,  and  they  have  enriched  our 
knowledge  by  their  discoveries.  Carried  forward  by  a  scientific  en- 
thusiasm that  knows  no  quenching,  scientists  began  explorations  in 
geological  fields  for  ethnological  purposes,  gathering  facts  from  all 
quarters  of  the  globe  and  turning  nations  into  fact-seekers.  Caves 
were  explored  ;  peat  bogs  were  upturned  ;  tumuli  were  sifted  of  their 
contents ;  even  the  bottoms  of  the  oceans  were  dragged ;  deserts 
were  crossed  ;  river  gravels  were  analyzed  ;  every  climate,  every  zone, 
and  every  geological  stratum  was  inspected,  and  the  crust  of  the 
earth  was  struck  with  a  hammer  as  if  it  would  ring  back  the  answer 
of  the  antiquity  of  man.  The  results  were  wonderful,  and,  as  the 
range  of  investigation  was  no  "  pent-up  Utica,"  the  inferences  ought 
to  have  been  decisive. 

What  are  the  results  of  the  scientific  travail  ?  Are  they  philo- 
sophically anthropocentric,  or  do  they  vindicate  the  standard  Biblical 
interpretation  ?  The  answer  to  these  questions  can  not  be  given  in  a 
word.  The  discovery  of  facts  is  one  thing  ;  the  inference  from  them 
is  another ;  and  the  process  by  whicb  a  conclusion  is  reached,  or  the. 
rule  of  inference,  is  still  another,  and  indeed  the  vital  feature.  The 
general  geological  rule  is  to  estimate  the  age  of  fossils  by  the,  relative 
age  of  the  stratum  in  which  they  are  found;    for  instance,  whatever 


STONE,  BRONZE,  AND  IRON  AGES.  181 

is  found  in  the  Silurian  stratum  must  be  much  older  than  what  is 
found  in  the  Post- tertiary.  This  seems  like  a  safe  rule,  but  it  has 
led  to  extravagant  calculations.  M.  Mortillet,  by  this  rule,  has 
figured  that  man  appeared  240,000  years  ago !  Sir  Charles  Lyell  es- 
timated huniau  relics  in  the  valley  of  the  Somme  to  be  800,000  years 
old !  Mr.  A.  R.  Wallace  estimated  the  age  of  some  flint  implements 
found  in  a  cavern  at  Torquay,  at  500,000  years !  The  weakness  of 
the  rule  is,  that  whatever  conclusion  is  reached,  it  is  only  relative, 
not  absolute.  There  is  no  starting-point  for  a  mathematical  calcula- 
lation.  It  has  not  heen  ascertained  how  old  any  particular  stratum 
is,  nor  can  it  be,  for  nature  has  not  dated  its  works.  Hence,  the 
conclusions  are  suppositions  and  have  only  a  relative  value. 

Geologists  are  fond  of  alluding  to  what  they  call  the  stone, 
bronze,  and  iron  ages,  periods  when  the  inhabitants  of  the  earth 
manufactured  their  implements  after  rude  patterns,  and  advanced 
slowly  toward  civilization.  Mr.  Southall  believes  that  these  ages 
were  largely  contemporaneous,  and  not  historically  successional.  He 
goes  so  far  as  to  deny  the  existence  of  a  bronze  age,  regarding  it  as 
merely  imaginary.  Especially  is  there  no  proof  of  a  bronze  age  in 
England,  Switzerland,  Russia,  and  other  parts  of  Europe.  In  proof 
of  the  contemporaneous  character  of  the  Ages,  he  cites  the  fact  that 
the  tumuli  of  Russia  abound  in  stone*  bronze,  and  iron  implements, 
a«d  that  while  one  race  Avas  using  stone,  another  at  the  same  time 
was  using  iron.  Dr.  Schliemann,  in  unearthing  layers  at  Troy  and 
Mycenae,  found  stone  implements  in  the  top  layers  and  bronze  in  the 
fourth  stratum  below,  showing  that  bronze  preceded  stone,  or  the 
stone  age  was  last  instead  of  first.  This  shows  the  unreliability  of 
this  kind  of  argument.  The  Stone  Age,  in  fact,  still  exists.  Finding 
human  implements  in  strata,  or  caves,  or  bogs,  whose  age  they 
thought  they  knew,  the  Swiss  geologists  especially  began  the  work  of 
calculation  respecting  the  antiquity  of  the  people  of  those  periods  ; 
and  M.  Morlot  concludes  that  the  stone  age  represents  five  or  six 
thousand  years,  and  the  bronze  age  three  or  four  thousand  more.  If 
contemporaneous,  they  may  represent  three  thousand  years.  It  is 
not  very  difficult  to  demonstrate  that  the  Palaeolithic  man  so-called, 
was  an  average  man,  if  the  size  of  the  skull  is  an  indication  of 
character ;  and*  when  it  is  remembered  that  he  used  a  needle  and 
thread  in  making  his  clothing,  loved  song,  and  made  instruments  of 
music,  manufactured  implements  out  of  wood  as  well  as  stone,  and 
reverenced  the  memory  of  the  dead,  he  must  not  be  too  harshly 
judged  in  this  day.  At  all  events,  it  is  clear  that  he  himself  is  not 
a  proof  of  even  a  prehistoric  antiquity  of  any  great  length.  Another 
estimate  has  been  made  in   Egypt,  inasmuch   as    pottery  and   even 


182  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

works  of  art,  have  been  found  that,  measured  by  the  geological  rule, 
point  to  a  civilization  that  must  have  existed  thirty  thousand  years 
ago;  but  Sir  Charles  Lyell  considers  the  "  chronometric  scale"  un- 
satisfactory. No  absolute  "chronometric  scale"  for  the  measurement 
of  strata  has  been  found ;  this  is  the  difficulty. 

Much  has  been  made  of  relics  found  in  the  peat  in  the  Somme 
Valley  in  France,  but  Mr.  Southall  points  to  the  fact  that  Eoman 
brichs  have  been  found  below  the  peat,  proving  that  it  is  a  modern, 
instead  of  an  ancient  deposit,  as  was  claimed.  In  certain  alluvial 
deposits,  hatchets,  knives,  and  the  bones  of  extinct  mammalia  have 
been  found,  showing  that  the  people  who  made  the  hatchets  were 
contemporaneous  with  the  extinct  mammalia ;  and,  as  it  is  assumed 
that  the  latter  became  extinct  thousands  of  years  ago,  so  man 
must  have  been  living  then.  This  is  a  safer  rule  of  inference  than 
the  other,  but  our  confidence  in  it  is  shaken  by  the  supposition, 
justified  by  the  history  of  man,  that  the  mammalia  became  extinct 
by  virtue  of  man's  opposition  ;  he  destroyed  the  wild  beasts  as  they 
interfered  with  his  progress  ;  and,  instead  of  showing  that  he  is  as 
old  as  they  were,  it  shows  that  they  disappeared  when  he  appeared, 
and  that  his  antiquity  is  much  less  than  theirs.  The  theory  has  been 
disturbed  recently  by  the  discovery  that  many  supposed  extinct 
animals  are  not  extinct,  as  the  elephant,  lion,  bear,  hyena,  etc.,  so 
that  an  argument  founded  on  the  remains  of  these  extinct  (?)  species 
needs  reconstruction.  "There  are  more  false  facts,"  says  Cullen, 
"  current  in  the  world,  than  false  theories."  We  have  here  an  ex- 
ample of  "false  facts."  Besides,  Prof.  Winchell  points  out  that 
extinctions  of  species  have  occurred  within  the  historic  period,  as  the 
great  birds  of  New  Zealand,  proving  that  the  argument  from  "  extinct 
species"  is  of  little  account  to  the  antiquarian.  Prof.  Southall  adds 
that  the  "extinct"  reindeer  was  found  in  Gei-many  in  the  time  of 
Caesar  and  that  the  cave  horse  still  exists.  Of  a  similar  character  is 
the  argument  drawn  from  megalithic  monuments  and  tumuli, 
scattered  all  over  the  globe,  Avhich  the  geologists  have  interpreted  to 
indicate  an  extravagant  antiquity ;  but  Mr.  Southall  reduces  the 
argument  to  very  small  proportions  by  pointing  out,  historically,  their 
origin,  the  names  of  their  builders,  and  the  purposes  of  many  of  the 
monuments  and  tombs.  Mr.  Worsade  assigns  twenty-five  hundred 
years  to  some  woolen  garments  found  in  the  cromlechs  in  Denmark, 
but  it  has  been  shown  that  they  date  from  the  fifth  century ! 

Still  another  and,  as  it  seems  to  us,  fatal  objection  to  the  two 
geological  rules  above  mentioned,  is  the  paucity  of  human  remains  in 
the  strata,  caves,  and  glacial  layers,  relied  upon  to  establish  a  great 
antiquity  for  man.     When  it  is  remembered  how  abundant  are  the 


HUMAN  REMAINS.  183 

remains  of  reptiles,  fishes,  and  mammoths  in  these  strata,  the  absence 
of  human  remains  provokes  astonishment,  and  is  not  easily  explained 
except  on  the  hypothesis  that  man  was  the  latest  arrival  on  the  earth, 
and  has  not  been  here  long  enough  to  become  a  fossil,  or  to  crowd 
the  crust  with  his  remains.  This  fact  troubled  Sir  Charles  Lyell, 
who  attempted  to  account  for  it  in  part  by  the  dissolution  of 
human  skeletons  into  dust ;  also  by  cremation,  a  mode  of  disposition 
cf  the  dead  among  the  primitive  inhabitants,  and  by  destruction,  by 
fishes  and  animals,  who  devoured  bones  and  digested  them.  It  seems 
not  to  have  occurred  to  him  that  such  causes,  if  sufficient  to  destroy 
human  remains,  would  be  sufficient  greatly  to  limit  animal  remains, 
but  they  are  found  in  abundance.  Struggling  with  the  fact  he  ad- 
mits the  "extreme  imperfection  of  the  geological  record,"  but  "con- 
fidently expects"  that  the  "  older  alluvium  of  the  European  valleys" 
will  in  due  time  exhibit  human  remains  in  such  quantities  as  to 
satisfy  the  demands  of  the  advocates  of  a  long  antiquity !  This  is 
pure  conjecture. 

Are  there  no  human  remains  at  all?  Sir  Charles  Lyell  dwells  at 
length  upon  the  age  of  the  "  fossil  man  of  Denise,"  and,  from  a  human 
bone  found  on  the  banks  of  the  Mississippi  River,  concludes  that 
man's  antiquity  dates  back  to  the  "  mastodon  and  megalouyx."  Some 
remains  were  exhumed  near  Maestricht,  but  he  saw  no  evidence  of 
antiquity  in  them. 

Geologists  refer  to  an  old  skull  found  in  a  cave  near  Diisseldorf 
in  proof  of  the  antiquity  of  man  ;  but  it  is  not  certain  whether  it  is 
the  skull  of  a  man  or  an  ape.  If  of  a  man,  as  the  forehead  would 
indicate,  it  does  not  establish  antiquity ;  for  it  is  the  skull  of  an  old 
man,  or  not  of  a  man  at  all.  Tl^e  pronfi  required  to  establish- tJie  exiitr 
ence  of  an  old  )»a)^  are  different  from  tlLO.-<c  required  to  establish  the  exist- 
ence of  an  old  race.  Neither  from  the  few  human  skulls  nor  from 
the  many  human  implements  found  in  the  crust  of  the  earth  is  it 
possible  to  construct  an  argument  in  favor  of  a  high  antiquity  for  the 
race.  On  the  contrary,  the  geological  evidence  seems  to  indicate  a 
brief  antiquity,  which  can  be  lengthened  only  by  a  torture  of  the 
facts.  Huxley  says  that  the  evidence  that  assigns  the  first  appear- 
ance of  man  anterior  to  the  drift  period  is  of  a  very  "  dubious  char- 
acter," and  Nicholson  designates  a  post-glacial  period  for  that  appear- 
ance. The  geologists  have  well-nigh  established  the  conclusion  that 
the  Ice  Peril )ilTK\oan  six  or  seven  thousand  years  ago,  and  if  man 
appeared  at  the  close  of  the  Ice  Period,  his  presence  on  the  earth  is 
reduce<l  to  about  six  thousand  years,  a  figure  singularly  coincident 
with  that  of  tlie  Biblical  interpretation.  Mr.  Southall  has  calculated 
that  the  Glacial   Age   closed   in  the  north   of  Europe  about  thirty- 


184  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

five  hundred  years  ago ;  archseologists  say    six    or   seven  thousand 
years  ago. 

Prof.  Capellini  recently  submitted  some  proofs  looking  to  the  ex- 
istence of  "  pliocene  "  man,  which  Prof.  Dawkins  has  overthrown,  the 
latter  maintaining  that  no  traces  of  man  appear  until  the  "  suc- 
ceeding stage,  or  the  pleistocene."  Other  geologists  agree  with  Prof. 
Dawkins,  but  use  the  word  "  quaternary"  instead  of  pleistocene.  The 
significant  fact  in  this  connection  is  that  "living  species  of  mamma- 
lia" begin  to  abound  in  the  "pleistocene,"  and  the  cereals  first  dis- 
play themselves  in  the  "  quaternary  ;"  that  is,  in  the  period  or  stratum 
denominated  pleistocene  or  quaternary.  When  man's  first  appearance 
is  detected,  the  cereals  and  living  mammalia  also  make  their  first  ap- 
pearance. Equally  serviceable  is  the  conclusion  of  Prof.  Blake  that 
no  flint  implements  have  been  found  in  England  that  bear  evidence 
of  an  antiquity  earlier  than  the  Post-glacial  period.  Prof  Winchell 
bravely  but  inconclusively  argues  for  man's  origin  in  the  middle  Ter- 
tiary period  ;  and  Prof.  Geikie,  from  a  single  bone,  not  known  to  be 
human  even,  claims  it  as  "direct  proof  that  man  lived  prior  to  the 
last  inter-glacial  period  !  " 

Principal  Dawson,  whose  scholarship  needs  no  defense,  exhibits 
the  proof  of  man's  post-glacial  origin,  and  assigns  him  a  history  of  six 
or  seven  thousand  years.  In  an  address  delivered  before  the  Amer- 
ican Association  for  the  Advancement  of  Science,  of  which  he  was 
the  president,  he  said:  "Since  the  comparatively  short  post-glacial 
and  recent  periods  apparently  include  the  whole  of  human  his- 
tory, we  are  but  new-comers  on  the  earth,  and  therefore  have  had 
little  opportunity  to  solve  the  great  problems  which  it  presents  to 
us."  He  further  and  promptly  intimates  that  "  the  cessation  of  gla- 
cial cold  and  settlement  of  our  continents  at  their  present  levels  are 
events  which  may  have  occurred  not  more  than  6,000  or  7,000 
years  ago." 

Thus  science,  running  wild  for  a  time,  and  extending  its  hallucina- 
tions to  every  hint,  or  fact,  or  skull,  or  ax,  is  at  last  swinging  to  the 
support  of  the  theory  of  a  limited  history  of  man,  as  interpreted  by  the 
Bible  defenders.  All  along  the  latter  have  been  unaccountably  dis- 
turbed over  the  radical  scientific  variations  from  the  traditional  standard, 
which  has  been  vindicated  rather  than  overthrown.  The  caverns,  in- 
deed, throw  up  no  proofs  against  the  old  faith  ;  the  seas,  dredged  and 
sounded,  speak  not  against  the  accepted  account ;  not  one  skull  or  a 
hundred,  not  one  implement  or  a  thousand,  invalidates  the  theory  of 
a  short  antiquity.  If  finally,  abandoning  its  pretentious  inferences 
from  a  few  skulls,  and  the  contents  of  geological  strata,  science  should 
settle   down  to   the  acceptance  of  the  validity  of  the  orthodox   an- 


PROOFS  OF  A  SHORT  ANTIQUITY.  185 

tiquity,  then  indeed  human  history  might  finally  be  compassed,  and  its 
unwritten  chapters  be  deciphered,  but  the  thought  of  a  remote  an- 
tiquity fills  history  with  vagueness  ;  it  blots  out  history. 

With  the  geological  evidence  thus  interpreted,  the  historical  and 
monumental  records  of  men  are  in  perfect  harmony.  Grote  has 
shown  that  the  first  Greek  Olympiad  dates  seven  hundred  and  sev- 
enty-six years  before  Christ,  and  Sir  Charles  Lyell  admits  that  Roman 
and  Egyptian  monuments  carry  us  back  no  farther  than  fifteen  hun- 
dred years  before  Christ.  Hindu  history  is  mythical  back  of  thirty- 
six  hundred  years  ago. 

The  proof  from  the  lake  dwellings  in  Switzerland,  so  often  referred 
to  by  geologists  as  pointing  to  the  Neolithic  Age,  is  utterly  over- 
thrown by  the  fact  that  pile  villages,  as  primitive  as  those  of  the  early 
Swiss,  are  still  established  on  many  Oriental  coasts,  the  people  build- 
ing them  being  in  an  advanced  stage  of  civilization. 

History,  monuments,  and  geology  agree  with  the  Biblical  interpreta- 
tion of  a  short  antiquity,  the  overthrow  of  which  belongs  to  those  wlio, 
infatuated  with  the  superstitious  idea  that  man  sprang  from  animals, 
are  determined  to  have  a  long  enough  period  to  bring  it  about.  Prof. 
Dawson  frankly  admits  that  the  value  of  a  long  antiquity  is  its  bear- 
ing on  evolution,  while  a  short  antiquity  is  in  the  interest  of  human 
history,  as  known.  The  drift  of  science  at  this  time,  however,  is 
toward  the  Biblical  interpretation. 

In  connection  with  the  origin  and  antiquity  of  man,  scientifically 
considered,  other  questions  might  be  brought  forward,  such  as  the 
plurality  of  races,  the  different  departments  of  ethnography,  and  the 
common  bond  of  humanity,  or  the  unity  of  mankind.  Prof  Winchell, 
with  a  scientific  boldness  peculiar  to  the  times,  is  disseminating  the 
theory  of  a  pre-Adamite  race,  in  order  to  vindicate  the  early  geolog- 
ical supposition  of  a  fabulous  antiquity.  At  this  stage  of  the  discussion 
it  is  not  important  whether  or  not  there  was  a  race  of  pre-Adamites, 
only  so  far  as  it  tends  to  invalidate  the  Mosaic  record,  and  give  coun- 
tenance to  the  evolution  theories  of  the  materialists. 

A  race  of  pre-Adamites  may  have  consisted  of  beings  half  animals 
and  half  men,  or  centaurs,  who  through  evolution  finally  produced 
Adam,  with  which  the  Bible  concerns  itself.  But  this  is  as  unscien- 
tific as  it  is  unscriptural,  and  in  no  way  disposes  of  any  existing  diflS- 
culty  or  throws  light  upon  any  ethnic  problem.  A  pre-Adamite  was 
a  man  or  he  was  not.  If  not,  he  is  outside  of  our  inquiry  ;  if  he  was, 
the  same  questions  arise  to  perplex  the  ethnologist,  as  Adam  himself 
suggests.  Besides,  if  the  last  scientific  word  on  anthropology  should 
favor  a  short  antiquity  of  man,  confirming  the  Mosaic  revelation,  the 
pre-Adamite  would  disappear  quite  as  suddenly  as  he  has  appeared. 


186  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

Touching  the  plurality  of  races,  some  inquiry  is  pertinent  at  this 
time,  inasmuch  as  it  is  in  conflict  with  the  doctrine  of  the  unity  of  the 
race,  or  its  foundation  in  a  single  pair.  The  origin  of  the  races,  as  a 
scientific  problem,  is  as  perplexing  as  the  origin  of  man  himself. 
Whether  he  has  a  monogenetic  pedigree  or  a  polygenetic  history,  eth- 
nology is  making  debatable.  For  it  has  been  demonstrated  that 
climate,  food,  and  temporal  conditions  alone  are  not  adequate  causes 
of  the'  ethnic  lines  of  separation,  and,  to  involve  the  matter  in  increas- 
ing mystery,  outside  of  these  physical  causes  others  have  not  been 
enumerated.  The  student  is  in  a  painful  dilemma,  for  he  can  pro- 
ceed no  farther  until  the  door  to  another  explanation  is  opened. 
What  is  also  most  singular  is  that,  as  in  the  animal  kingdom  the 
race-types — that  is,  the  species — are  fixed,  so  in  human  history  the 
race-types  have  not  changed,  and  give  no  sign  of  change.  The  race- 
types  of  the  one  can  not  be  the  product  of  development  any  more 
than  the  species-types  of  the  other  are  the  product  of  development. 

The  fixity  of  race-types  is  not  at  all  inconsistent  with  the  varieties 
of  individuals,  or  the  unity  of  the  races,  for  the  law  of  fixity  admits 
of  innumerable  extensions  and  modifications,  without  compromising 
its  character  or  influence.  The  diversity  of  the  races  is  a  fact  no  one 
will  deny  ;  but  this  should  be  expected,  as,  whether  outside  influences 
are  sufiicient  or  not  to  modify  man,  he  is  sufficient  to  modify  him- 
self, which  he  has  done.  With  variations  occurring  constantly  in  the 
race,  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  they  are  no  greater  than  the  vari- 
ations in  animals  having  a  common  origin,  and  so  the  fact  makes  not 
against  unity. 

Physiologists  concede  that  the  structure  of  the  skin  of  the  negro 
and  the  white  man  is  the  same,  and  the  brains  and  the  nerves  of  the 
lowest  races  do  not  differ  structurally  from  those  of  the  highest.  The 
languages  of  the  races,  under  thorough  analysis,  exhibit  in  their  roots 
a  similarity  that  is  suggestive  of  a  common  origin.  The  Aryan,  the 
Semitic,  and  the  Allophylian  group  of  tongues,  with  all  their  varia- 
tions, point  to  a  "primitive  identity  ;"  and  the  same  intellectual 
aspirations  actuate  all  alike.  Even  the  same  moral  problems  are  dis- 
cussed with  more  or  less  intensity  by  all.  With  marked  diversities 
there  is  a  wonderful  unity  among  the  races,  a  physical,  moral,  and 
intellectual  unity.  The  several  race-types  prove  to  be  compatible  with 
one  race  idea,  a  very  satisfactory  ethnic  conclusion,  which,  however, 
is  not  favorable  to  "  descent"  or  evolution,  since  the  latter  must  have 
changeable  types  and  a  disunion  of  races  in  order  to  illustrate  its 
meaning  and  maintain  its  position.  The  unity  of  the  race,  as  a  fact 
of  anthropology,  is  more  than  a  thorn  in  the  theory  of  evolution  ;  it 
is  the  death-knell  of  materialism. 


THE  DESTINY  OF  THE  RACE.  187 

Perhaps  no  phase  of  anthropology  is  more  captivating  than  the 
future  of  man  or  the  destiny  of  the  race,  a  subject  that  follows  in  the 
wake  of  the  former  discussions,  and  is  really  as  philosophical  as  it  is 
religious.  What  is  the  philosophic  prospectus  of  man's  future  ?  It 
will  be  agreed  that  pessimism — a  form  of  philosophic  hypochondria — 
is  without  inspiration  ;  it  dims  the  eye  as  one  looks  forward,  and  fills 
it  with  tears.  The  fear  of  J.  S.  Mill  that  man  may  reach  the  limit 
of  knowledge  or  achievement  in  music,  is  not  productive  of  energy  in 
musical  pursuits.  The  belief  of  Schopenhauer  that  the  government 
of  the  world  is  as  bad  as  it  possibly  can  be,  with  no  assurance  of 
change,  strips  life  of  all  eagerness,  and  paralyzes  human  effort  for 
progress.  The  denial  of  freedom  to  man,  as  made  by  Hiickel — that 
is,  that  he  is  a  part  of  the  autonomy  of  nature,  subservient  to  its 
conditions,  and  that  development  and  responsibility  are  idle  words — is 
a  discouraging  aspect  of  life,  the  correction  of  which  is  both  a  duty 
and  a  necessity. 

Has  philosophy  nothing  more  to  offer  than  a  series  of  discourage- 
ments ?  Is  there  any  ])hilosophic  hope  of  the  race  ?  The  general 
theory  of  development  is  an  inspiration  in  itself,  but  that  it  has  not 
inspired  man  is  proof  that  it  is  wanting  in  a  vital  element,  or,  if  not 
thus  deficient,  that  it  is  self-hindering  or  self-destructive,  by  virtue 
of  other  elements,  or  associations  and  relations. 

The  weakness  of  the  doctrine  of  development  is  its  prostitution  to 
the  service  of  materialism.  Make  it  a  Christian  doctrine — that  is, 
turn  it  to  the  service  of  humanity — and  the  stars  in  their  courses  will 
fight  for  it.  It  has  been  suspected  more  than  once  that  the  philo- 
sophic interpretation  of  the  doctrine  implied  the  retardation  of  the 
race;  hence  it  lost  its  glow.  If  "  development"  means  only  the  im- 
provement of  man  as  an  animal,  there  is  no  inspiration  in  it ;  but  if 
it  means  the  progress  of  man  towards  his  Maker,  the  supremacy  of 
the  spiritual  over  the  animalic,  the  world  will  shout  in  its  favor. 
Deny  freedom,  banish  the  idea  of  moral  responsibility,  suppress  the 
personality  of  man,  reduce  thought  to  nervous  action,  and  conscience 
to  a  social  impulse,  and  the  future  of  man  loses  its  attraction  as  a 
subject  of  contemplation. 

If  the  interpretation  of  some  evolutionists  be  considered,  the 
"development"  theory  signifies  too  much,  more  than  we  can  ask, 
for,  carried  to  its  logical  conclusion,  the  theory  promises,  not  the 
future  development  of  man,  but  his  disappearance  from  the  earth, 
being  succeeded  by  a  still  higher  organized  being,  as  superior  to  man 
as  man  is  superior  to  the  gorilla,  but  retaining  traceable  signs  of  re- 
lationship to  man.  This  goes  too  far,  as  the  other  interpretation  goes 
not  far  enough.     Unless  development  stops  with  man,  centering  itself 


188  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

iu  his  upbuilding,  he  must  become  a  fossil  in  the  future ;  and  such  a 
fate  philosophers  have  assumed  as  possible,  and  really  ventured  to 
predict  its  probable  fulfillment.  Thus  the  "development"  theory  is 
(lano-erous,  however  applied,  resulting,  on  the  one  hand,  in  the 
dwarfishness  and  degradation  of  man,  or,  on  the  other,  in  his  extinc- 
tion either  view  being  repugnant  to  that  Christian  hope  of  the  race 
which  involves  an  increase  in  knowledge  and  the  gradual  moral  ele- 
vation of  all  mankind. 

The  hypothesis  of  Christianity,  which  involves  the  development  of 
man  in  the  image  of  God,  the  enlargement  of  his  moral  and  intellec- 
tual possibilities  until  he  is  a  hundred-fold  greater  than  he  no\v  is,  has 
iu  it  a  propelling  influence  that  makes  progress  both  a  delight  and  a  cer- 
tainty. Hackel,  dispensing  entirely  with  Christianity  as  an  uplifting 
force  foreshadows  a  future  for  man  on  the  lower  basis  of  mechanical 
development ;  but  in  dispensing  with  religion,  or  that  form  of  it  which 
Gustave  Jaeger  pronounced  the  "best  weapon"  in  the  struggle  of 
human  life,  he  disqualifies  man  for  the  largest  and  truest  development. 
Humanity  can  not  be  run  on  steam-engine  principles,  or  played  like 
an  J^olian  harp.  Precisely  this  is "  the  religion  of  materialism,  the 
religion  of  mechanics  or  mechanical  development.  Man  is  the  product 
of  environing  forces,  and  will  be  developed  by  them. 

In  our  conception  of  the  future  man,  we  are  not  loaded  with  phil- 
osophic dead-weights,  or  embarrassed  by  clouds  of  pessimistic  dark- 
ness. The  development  we  foresee  is  along  the  line  of  the  higher 
nature,  resulting  in  the  suppression  of  the  animalic  spirit  and  an  ex- 
tinction of  those  signs  of  relationship  to  the  animal  world  that  Mr. 
Darwin  was  very  successful  in  pointing  out.  The  social  nature,  the 
intellectual  faculties,  the  moral  powers,  we  see  blooming  in  the  I'adi- 
ance  of  a  light  that  shines  -from  above  ;  they  are  developed,  not  by 
mechanical  processes,  but,  in  spite  of  environment,  in  spite  of  physical 
economies,  by  the  aid  of  religious  influences,  always  the  most  potent 
and  the  most  effective  in  the  intellectual  and  moral  regeneration  of 
man.  The  ideal  man  is  not  the  mechanically  developed,  but  the  re- 
ligiously developed,  man,  for  the  reason  that  mechanical  forces  are 
the  lowest,  and  religious  forces  the  highest.  Nor,  on  the  hypothesis 
of  Christianity,  is  there  any  reason  to  suspect  that  the  race  is  march- 
ing on  to  extinction,  to  be  succeeded  by  another  race  still  more  highly 
organized  and  endowed.  The  higher  race  is  sure  to  come,  but  it  will 
be  human  ;  it  uill  he  our  race  perfected  along  the  reUgiom  line.  In  this 
there  is  inspiration ;  along  this  avenue  of  hope  we  walk. 

Even  a  careless  reader  can  see  how  closely  related  to  the  question 
of  the  eternal  life  of  man  are  these  philosophic  conjectures,  on  which 
alone  immortality  can  not  be  predicated.     "  If  a  man  die,  shall  he  live 


ASS UMF  TIONS  OF  SCIENCE.  189 

again  ?"  is  quite  as  philosophic  as  religious,  but  philosophy  is  uncertain 
in  its  answer.  Emerson,  reaching  into  highest  things,  rests  faith  in 
immortality  chiefly  in  the  desire  for  it,  a  beautiful  but  rather  provok- 
ing kind  of  transcendentalism,  for  it  is  wanting  in  persuasive  suffi- 
ciency. The  doctrine  of  immortality  is  a  stumbling-block  to  material- 
ism. No  mechanical  or  evolutionary  theory  that  attributes  instincts, 
emotions,  aspirations,  faculties,  moral  powers,  to  natural  processes, 
will  readily  affiliate  with  a  system  that  allows  immortality  to  man. 
The  argument  that  makes  out  man's  immortality  will  also  make  out 
the  immortality  of  the  animal  kingdom,  according  to  the  mechan- 
ician ;  we  regret  that  Prof.  Agassiz  conceded  this  much  to  those  who 
differed  with  him. 

Thus  we  see  what  robbery  materialism  has  made  of  one  of  man's 
cherished  hopes !  It  has  struck  at  his  nobility,  allied  him  to  animals, 
threatened  him  with  future  extinction,  and  quenched  the  fires  of 
immortality. 

Ours  is  quite  another  faith,  which,  turning  the  laws  of  develop- 
ment into  another  channel,  foresees  another  future  for  man,  and 
intrenches  itself  in  the  truth-girdled  teachings  of  Christianity. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

MIND    AN     INTEGER. 


BY  insisting  on  certain  limitations  to  human  inquiry,  and  the 
proofs  of  traditional  dogmas,  modern  science  has  permanently 
checked  the  spirit  of  assumption  which  more  or  less  characterized  the 
psychology,  and  especially  the  theology,  of  the  past.  It  refuses  to 
believe  on  the  ground  of  authority  alone ;  it  demands  evidence  of 
every  proposition,  and  virtually  suspends  its  faith  even  in  axiomatic 
or  primary  truths  until  they  have  been  demonstrated.  An  axiom  can 
not  defend  itself  behind  the  assertion  that  it  is  incapable  of  demon- 
stration, or  by  the  bolder  announcement  that  its  truth  is  self-evident. 
Convicted  of  granite  stubbornness  in  its  position,  science  nevertheless 
maintains  opposition  to  so-called  self-evident  and  necessary  truths, 
requiring  their  logical  exposition,  and  asking  at  least  for  a  show  of 
syllogistic  sympathy  in  their  framework  and  functions. 

Defensible  to  a  degree  as  is  this  position,  it  is  indefensible  just  so 
far  as  it  overlooks  the  distinction  between  assumption  and  conclusion, 
the  former  being  the  latter  without  evidence,  the  latter  being  the 
former  with  evidence.     Pure  assumption  is  unevidenced  conclusion ; 


1 90  PHIL  OSOPH  Y  AND  CHRIS TIANITY. 

pure  conclusion  is  evidenced  assumption.  Of  the  former,  superstition 
is  an  example ;  of  the  latter,  axioms,  primary  truths,  established  de- 
ductions, rational  results,  or  the  results  of  rational  processes,  are 
sufficient  examj)les. 

In  the  study  of  mind,  a  subject  by  no  means  transparent,  \^e  must 
be  on  our  guard  against  the  influence  of  old  theories,  and  those  pre- 
possessions which  have  been  handed  down  from  generation  to  genera- 
tion ;  but  at  the  same  time  the  conclusions  of  history  must  be  ac- 
cepted at  their  full  value.  One  of  these,  and  lying  at  the  foundation 
of  this  discussion,  is  the  fact  of  mind  itself,  which,  until  philosophy 
raised  its  inquiring  hand,  was  accepted  without  dispute  or  hesitancy. 
At  the  very  threshold  of  the  inquiry,  the  fact  of  the  mind's  existence 
as  a  separate  and  independent  entity,  and  entitled  to  recognition  as  a 
-prima  facie  force,  must  be  established.  Hitherto  accepted  without 
controversy,  science  designates  the  traditional  and  popular  belief  in 
its  independent  existence  as  an  assumption,  requiring  its  demonstra- 
tion just  as  it  requires  the  demonstration  of  the  existence  of  God. 
"We  are  forbidden  to  assume  the  existence  of  mind ;  it  must  be 
proven.  Prof.  Ferriersays:  "Matter  is  already  in  the  field  as  an 
acknowledged  entity — this  both  parties  admit.  Mind,  considered  as 
an  independent  entity,  is  not  so  unmistakably  in  the  field.  Therefore, 
as  entities  are  not  to  be  multiplied  without  necessity,  we  are  not  en- 
titled to  postulate  a  new  cause,  so  long  as  it  is  possible  to  account  for 
the  phenomena  by  a  cause  already  in  existence  ;  which  possibility  has 
never  yet  been  disproved."  In  another  form,  Alexander  Bain  at- 
tempts to  demolish  the  doctrine  of  the  two  substances,  mind  and 
matter,  asserting  that  the  so-called  differences  between  them  can  not 
be  longer  maintained.  Even  Dugald  Stewart  raised  the  suspicious  ques- 
tion, whether  consciousness  adequately  testifies  to  the  existence  of  mind, 
thus  aiding  the  empirical  psychologists  in  their  work  of  destruction. 
He  says:  "We  are  conscious  of  sensation,  thought,  desire,  volition, 
but  we  are  not  conscious  of  the  existence  of  mind  itself."  The  sensa- 
tionalism of  Locke  is  here  reproduced,  or  its  effect  on  the  philosophy 
of  Stewart  is  manifest.  The  untenableness  of  the  position  of  Stewart 
is  in  allowing  consciousness  of  thought,  but  denying  consciousness  of 
the  thinking  power,  faculty,  or  sense.  A  consciousness  of  an  act  of 
memory  is  a  consciousness  of  memory ;  at  least  the  separation  between 
them  can  not  be  drawn.  To  be  conscious  of  one  and  not  of  the  other 
is  impossible.  To  be  conscious  of  the  mind's  activity  and  of  its  results 
implies  a  consciousness  of  mind  ;  not  a  consciousness  of  the  nature  of 
mind,  but  of  the  fact  of  mind.  Thought  is  proof  of  mind,  as  sight 
is  proof  of  the  eye.  The  fact  of  mind  is  therefore  a  conclusion,  and 
not  an  assumption.  


AD  UMBRA  TIONS  OF  MIND.  191 

What  is  the  miucl  ?  To  this  questiou,  so  easily  asked,  a  confusion 
of  answers  has  been  retui-ued,  each  in  itself  an  exploring  line  of 
thought,  each  a  contributio^i  to  the  solution  of  the  philosopher's 
enigma.  Prof.  Bain  observes  that,  ' '  the  drawing  of  too  sharp  a  line 
between  sense  aud  intelligeuce  has  been  the  fruitful  source  of  confu- 
sions in  philosophy,"  but  it  might  also  be  remarked  that  the  attempted 
blending  of  sense  aud  intelligence  has  been  the  fruitful  source,  not 
only  of  confusion,  but  also  of  error  and  despair,  in  philosophy.  The 
sharper  the  line  between  the  two,  like  the  channel  between  England 
and  France,  the  clearer  the  characteristics  and  possessions  of  each. 
To  undL-rtakt'  to  convert  the  figure  two  into  one,  Mr.  Bain  assumes, 
is  the  duty  uf  philosophy ;  to  others,  it  seems  like  a  destruction  both 
of  philosophy  aud  religion. 

The  task  of  analyzing  the  mind  is  not  so  easy  as  the  task  of  dis- 
secting the  body.  Mind  is  invisible,  eluding  physical  grasping  and 
physical  analysis.  Veiled  and  uuseen,  however,  it  shines  as  did  Moses' 
face  through  the  veil,  illuminating  the  tabernacle  of  flesh  and  pro- 
claiming somewhat  of  its  hidden  nature.  Manifestation  of  mind  is  a 
proclamation  of  mind,  and  in  sympathetic  hands  it  is  a  key  to  its 
nature.  Oxygen  is  invisible,  but  it  will  burn,  the  lungs  will  inhale 
it,  aud  both  its  existence  and  character  are  demonstrated.  In  the 
activities  and  results  of  mental  operations,  there  are  the  adumbrations 
of  the  character  of  mind. 

Is  it  possible  to  contemplate  the  mind,  apart  from  its  physical 
associations  and  connections?  Can  it  be  insulated,  studied  as  an  in- 
dependent entity?  Fhilo,  the  Jew,  remarked  that  the  mind  is  like 
the  eve,  which,  seeing  other  objects,  can  not  see  itself;  and  Prof. 
Draper  concludes  that  it  can  not  judge  of  itself.  Prof.  Bain  dis- 
courages self-study  by  remarking  that,  "we  are  not  allowed  to  per- 
ceive a  mind  acting  apart  from  its  material  companion  ;"  and  again, 
he  says,  "in  removing  the  body  we  remove  our  indicator  of  the 
mind,  namely,  the  bodily  manifestations,  as  if  in  testing  for  magnet- 
ism we  should  set  aside  the  needle  and  other  tokens  of  its  presence." 
Here  he  broaches  the  doctrine  of  the  identity  of  mental  manifestations 
and  physical  states,  an  instance  of  the  pelitio  prwcipii  not  infrequent 
in  his  writings.  His  illustration  is  not  exactly  pertinent.  Magnetism 
may  be  contemplated  without  the  needle,  and  color  may  be  studied 
independently  of  objects ;  that  is  to  say,  even  physical  properties  may 
be  insulated  from  physical  objects  and  studied  apart.  If  so,  much 
more  may  the  mind  be  made  an  exclusive  subject  of  investigation.  As 
the  Nilometer  marks  the  rise  and  fall  of  the  Nile,  so  the  body,  to  a 
degree,  may  denote  the  activities  of  the  intellect;  beyond  a  certain 
stage  of  interaction ,  the  mind  disengages  itself  from  bodily  control  or 


192  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

interference,  is  set  free  like  oxygen  from  water,  or  chlorine  from  salt» 
and  stands  out  an  insulated  fact,  a  spiritual  entity.  Plato  insisted 
that  the  eye,  by  means  of  a  mirror,  can  see  itself,  and  taught  that 
the  soul,  as  if  uhstiacted  from  the  body,  can  shut  itself  up  within 
its  own  limits  and  think  only  of  itself 

The  habit  of  studying  the  mind  in  its  relations  with  the  body,  and 
determining  its  limitations  by  the  law  of  interaction,  has  led  the  psy- 
choloo-ists  into  the  error  of  believing  that  the  mind,  separate  from  the 
body,  can  not  be  rationally  expounded,  and  that  a  knowledge  of  it 
as  an  independent  substance  is  impossible.  If  the  body  can  be  studied 
as  an  independent  instrument,  and  pliysiology  be  interpreted  as  the 
science  of  the  instrument,  the  mind  can  be  studied  as  an  independent 
agency,  and  psychology  be  interpreted  as  the  science  of  such  agency. 
The  blending  of  the  two,  or  the  creation  of  a  physiological  psychol- 
ogy, is  the  attempt  of  such  thinkers  as  Ferrier,  Bain,  Spencer,  and 
others ;  but  it  is  irrational,  confusing  things  that  are  essentially  inde- 
pendent. The  connection  of  body  and  mind  is  an  indisputable  fact, 
but  the  identity  of  the  connected  parts  remains  to  be  established  ;  it 
must  not  be  assumed.  'Bain,  speaking  of  the  connection,  pronounces 
it  "an  unaccountable,  because  an  ultimate,  fact,"  but  it  is  unaccount- 
able, as  it  seems  to  us,  because  of  the  dissimilarity  of  the  two  sub- 
stances, and  hence  the  expression  of  the  union  in  language  is  a 
"  puzzle."  The  union  of  oxygen  and  hydrogen  in  water  is  expressi- 
ble, because  they  are  similar  substances ;  the  union  of  mind  and  mat- 
ter is  not  expressible,  because  they  are  not  similar  substances.  The 
great  differences  forever  forbids  expression,  and  proves  independence. 

Recognizing  the  mind  as  an  independent  substance,  it  is  our  pur- 
pose now  carefully  to  consider  the  different  interpretations  put  upon 
it  by  the  speculating  philosophy  of  modern  times,  since  it  is  the 
ruling  philosophy  of  to-day.  At  least  eight  interpretations,  each  rep- 
resented by  a  distinguished  name,  must  be  considered,  if  we  do  justice 
to  the  scientific  and  philosophic  attempts  at  the  solution  of  mind. 
Let  Locke,  Leibnitz,  Hegel,  Reid,  Hobbes,  Mill,  Spencer,  and  Bain 
represent  the  manifold  interpretations,  to  which  others  might,  indeed, 
be  added,  but  without  additional  gain.  In  a  general  sense,  these  in- 
terpretations may  be  characterized  as  sensational,  idealistic,  and  material 
istie,  showing  the  fluctuations  of  philosophic  thought  and  the  instabil- 
ity of  its  conclusions. 

To  Locke's  interpretation  we  so  frequently  allude  that  it  is 
unnecessary  to  reproduce  it  in  this  connection  in  detail.  It  is  suffi- 
cient to  remind  the  reader  that,  having  projected  the  theory  of  sensa- 
tion as  the  source  of  knowledge,  Locke  deprived  the  mind  of  all 
nascent  ideas,  or  intuitional  knowledge,  leaving  it  a  perfect  blank,  a 


LOCKE'S  INTERPRETATION  OF  MIND.  193 

capacious  but  unfilled  reservoir,  into  which  truths  might  be  poured. 
His  theory  of  knowledge  defined  his  interpretation  of  mind.  Later 
sensationalists  have  not  agreed  with  Locke  as  to  the  necessity  of  a 
complete  expurgation  of  original  ideas  from  the  mind,  in  order  to 
sustain  empirical  psychology,  since  sensation  may  be  as  necessary,  to 
a  certain  extent,  to  a  mind  stored  with  ideas  as  to  one  empty.  In 
the  one  case,  it  opens  the  well-stored  mind  ;  in  the  other,  it  fills  it. 
Sensationalism  does  not,  therefore,  require  a  vacant  mind. 

The  inner  deficiencies  of  Locke's  interpretation  are  all  but  appar- 
ent. It  is  destructive  of  the  intuitional  sense  or  the  intellectual  con- 
tents of  the  consciousness.  Locke  attempts  an  explanation  of  those 
constitutional  ideas  and  primary  truths  usually  attributed  to  man  by 
referring  their  origin  to  the  teachings  of  the  nursery,  the  instructions 
of  parents,  and  social  education  in  general.  An  investigator  tracing 
inborn  ideas  to  servants  and  grandmothers !  This  theory  assumes 
that  servants  and  grandmothers  teach  constitutional  ideas,  when,  if 
any  thing  is  certain,  it  is  that  such  ideas  do  not  result  from  teaching, 
but  precede  it,  and  that  children  are  taught  nearly  every  thing  else 
but  constitutional  ideas.  Intuitional  ideas  spring  up  in  us  like  foun- 
tains in  Athens  ;  they  can  not  be  explained  from  the  nursery.  Locke 
compels  the  mind  to  begin  its  housekeeping  without  any  furniture,  or 
begs  it  seek  the  aid  of  hired  servants.  In  itself  it  is  destitute,  power- 
less, helpless. 

The  interpretation  does  not  provide  for  intellectual  expansion. 
Such  a  mind  as  Locke  describes  is  receptive,  not  creative.  An  in- 
finitely receptive  mind  is  not  necessarily  a  growing,  expansive  mind ; 
its  materials  multiply,  but  itself  does  not  enlarge;  its  capacity  may 
be  filled,  but  the  mind  itself  remains  unchanged. 

Moreover,  Locke's  interpretation  is  contradicted  by  consciousness ; 
that  is,  by  the  mind  itself.  No  man  is  conscious  of  being  born  with 
a  blank  mind  any  more  than  with  blind  eyes.  Blankness  is  idiocy, 
as  the  closed  eye  is  blindness.  In  the  earliest  stages  of  conscious  ex- 
istence the  mind  exerts  a  self-determining  power,  which  grows  with 
the  life  of  the  individual,  and  establishes  itself  as  an  inherent  and 
original  function,  underived  from  sensational  experience,  and  often 
commanding  and  generating  experience. 

The  ethical  tendency  of  the  interpretation  is  toward  materialism, 
which  is  its  most  unfortunate  aspect.  The  doctrines  of  immortality, 
human  responsibility,  regeneration,  and  the  highest  religious  truths 
were  involved  in  the  determinations  of  Locke,  who,  discovering  the 
natural  significance  of  his  interpretation,  attempted  to  modify  it, 
but  in  vain. 

The  interpretation  of  Leibnitz  is  the  theory  of  an  idealistic 
13 


194  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

philosopher,  and  an  advance  over  that  of  the  empiricist.  In  the  gen- 
eral he  held  that  the  mind  is  a  mirror  of  the  universe,  reflecting  all 
things,  and  containing  the  types,  forms,  and  ideas  of  universal  exist- 
ence. Locke  held  that  the  mind  receives  the  images  or  impressions 
of  things,  is  an  image-bearer,  a  reflector  ;  Leibnitz  assumed  that  the 
mind  threw  back,  like  a  mirror,  universal  truths  as  its  original  con- 
tents, and  also  germinated  ideas  and  the  forms  of  truth.  The  difi'er- 
ence  between  the  two  philosophies  is  radical.  Locke's  image-bearer 
was  originally  empty  ;  Leibnitz's  mirror  is  full.  Locke's  reflector  re- 
flected what  was  cast  upon  it ;  Leibnitz's  reflected  its  own  depths. 
One  is  an  external  mirror  ;  the  other  internal. 

Contrary  to  Locke's,  the  idealistic  interpretation  recognizes  the  in- 
tuitional character  of  mind,  assigning  to  it  universal  ideas,  and  pro- 
claiming the  independence  of  mind  from  sensation  and  experience.  This 
extreme  view  is  objectionable,  but  as  a  reaction  from  the  experience 
philosophy,  it  has  some  justification. 

The  interpretation  is  also  a  reaction  from  the  pantheistic  doctrine 
of  Spinoza,  who  reduced  all  things,  including  mind,  to  one  substance, 
which  compromised  immortality  and  the  divine  existence.  Leibnitz, 
therefore,  introduced  the  doctrine  of  the  monads  into  his  system  of 
thought,  designating  each  monad  as  a  world  in  itself,  or  a  soul,  thus 
going  as  far  in  one  direction  as  Spinoza  had  in  the  other.  Spinoza 
shouts  one  universe,  one  substance  ;  Leibnitz  shouts  myriads  of  worlds, 
myriads  of  substances.  Spinoza  unified  all  things  in  a  logical  pan- 
theism ;  Leibnitz  separated  them  in  the  diflference  of  substance,  and 
redeemed  the  divine  existence.  Spinozism  was  intensely  centripetal ; 
Leibuitzism  intensely  centrifugal.  In  so  far  as  it  was  an  attempt  to 
turn  back  the  tide  of  pantheism,  idealism  must  be  approved ;  but  the 
monadic  doctrine  is  as  unwarrantable  as  pantheism  itself,  for  it  tends 
to  undermine  the  great  fact  of  unity  observable  in  the  universe,  and  ' 
which  unmistakably  points  to  one  Father,  the  Creator  of  all  things. 

The  ethical  character  of  monadism  is  in  harmony  with  orthodox 
teachings  respecting  immortality  and  responsibility  ;  it  acknowledges 
the  individuality  of  mind,  and  insists  upon  individual  righteousness  as 
the  condition  of  happiness. 

The  theory  of  Leibnitz  is  unsatisfactory,  in  that  it  does  not  define 
the  mind,  or  even  clearly  denote  its  functions.  The  idea  that  the 
mind  is  a  mirror  in  any  sense  or  of  any  thing  is  inconsistent  with  its 
nature.  It  is  not  a  reflector — that  is,  throwing  back  what  it  receives 
or  what  it  contains — but  a  reflector  in  the  sense  of  thinking,  which 
implies  an  active,  creative  process  ;  it  is  not  a  mirror,  but  a  meditator; 
not  a  thrower  back  of  ideas,  but  an  originator  of  ideas  ;  not  a  pano- 
rama of  existing  thoughts,  but  a  creator  of  thought.     Proclus,  a  Neo- 


HEGEL'S  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MIND.  195 

platonist,  asserted  that  a  knowledge  of  the  miud  is  a  knowledge  of 
the  whole  universe ;  that  is,  the  knowledge  of  the  universe  is  in  some 
way  reflected  upon  human  consciousness  through  the  mind.  This 
extreme  Leibnitz  seems  to  have  absorbed,  for  it  is  his  inter- 
pretation in  a  statelier  form.  The  mind  is  something  more  than 
a  passive  substance,  something  more  than  a  recipient  of  thought ;  it 
is  not  a  sponge. 

The  philosophy  of  Hegel  introduces  a  new  idealistic  interpretation 
of  mind.  Quenching  the  empirical  spirit  at  its  birth,  he  rose  to  the 
contemplation  of  the  highest  truth,  and  attempted  to  restore  it  to  its 
rightful  authority  and  influence.  Transcendental  in  his  conceptions, 
bordering  even  on  mysticism,  it  is  not  always  easy  to  extract  his 
meaning  from  the  encumbered  language  he  employs  to  represent  his 
ideas.  The  light  does  not  shine  through  him  as  it  does  through  a 
diamond.  He  is  penetrative  and  suggestive,  however,  to  those  who 
plunge  into  his  obscurities. 

In  discoursing  upon  the  philosophy  of  mind  he  divides  it  into 
three  classes  :  1.  The  subjective  mind  ;  2.  The  objective  mind  ;  3.  The 
absolute  mind, — a  classification  intended  to  include  all  departments  of 
the  mind's  activities  and  relations.  The  "subjective"  mind  is  the  in- 
ternal mind,  the  rational,  thinking  power,  the  intelligent  ego,  that 
which  contitutes  personality,  identity.  This  mind  Hegel  regards  as 
enslaved,  subject  to  sloth  and  passion,  and  that  it  must  experience 
emancipation  before  it  can  be  what  it  was  intended  to  be.  In  union 
with  nature  the  mind  is  individual  ;  when  free  from  nature  it  is  con- 
sciousness or  ego.  In  its  individual  state  mind  is  a  theoretical  fact, 
probably  what  Aristotle  calls  "  potential  ;"  it  is  intelligence  but  un- 
developed ;  in  the  ego  state  it  is  practical,  developed,  represented  by 
the  will — it  has  become  "  actual,"  as  Aristotle  would  say.  When  it 
has  passed  from  the  individual  state — a  state  of  nature — to  con- 
sciousness or  will-power — a  state  of  supremacy — it  has  realized 
emancipation. 

Passing  to  the  "objective"  mind,  it  has  respect  to  the  person,  but 
not  to  personality  ;  that  is,  it  regards  the  rights,  the  ethics,  the  con- 
duct, of  the  person.  The  subjective  mind  relates  to  personality, 
thought,  spirituality ;  the  objective  mind  to  personal  rights,  conduct, 
government,  social  conditions.  The  subjective  mind  is  represented 
by  the  philosopher,  theologian,  metaphysician,  poet,  thinker  ;  the  ob- 
jective mind  by  the  statesman,  ruler,  legislator. 

The  "absolute"  mind,  abandoning  an  objective  form,  becomes 
ideally  subjective,  expressing  itself  in  art,  religion,  and  philosophy.  The 
highest  mind  is  not  subjective,  that  is,  personal,  or  objective,  that  is, 
ethical  and  governmental,  but  absolute,  that  is,  aesthetic,  philosophical, 


196  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

religious.  Religion  is  the  expression  of  the  "absolute"  as  government 
is  the  expression  of  the  "objective,"  and  consciousness  the  expression 
of  the  "subjective"  mind. 

This  three-fold  conception  of  mind,  as  framed  by  Hegel,  is  not 
without  its  merits.  In  the  acknowledgment  of  the  enslavement  of 
the  subjective  mind  or  will-poAver,  he  is  in  harmony  with  the  writers  of 
the  Scriptures,  who  affirm  the  debasement  of  the  mental  constitution. 
Upon  the  objective  mind  he  imposes  the  duty  of  erecting  States,  de- 
vising ethical  and  governmental  systems,  and  of  providing  for  the 
protection  of  property,  the  peace  and  order  of  society,  and  the  sanc- 
tity and  perpetuity  of  the  family  institution.  More  than  all,  he 
emphasized  the  relation  of  religion  to  the  individual,  styling  the  re- 
ligious mind  as  the  highest  type  of  conscious  intelligence,  and  vindi- 
cated its  universal  necessity. 

Hegel's  interpretation,  suggestive  as  we  have  allowed,  is  not 
altogether  satisfactory,  for  it  fails  at  a  vital  point.  He  classifies 
mind  with  reference  to  its  activities,  or  manifestations  in  conscious- 
ness, society,  and  religion  ;  but  these  are  the  results  of  mind,  indic- 
ative of  the  nature  of  mind,  we  admit,  but  an  a  posteriori  method  of 
getting  at  the  mind  itself.  Indeed,  Hegel  stops  with  the  functions 
of  mind,  and  leaves  the  problem  of  mind  unsolved.  To  say  that  a 
knife  will  cut  is  not  a  definition  of  knife.  The  only  approach  to  a 
definition  that  Hegel  makes  is  that  mind  involves  intelligence  and 
will ;  but  it  is  unsafe  to  admit  the  word  intelligence  into  the  defini- 
tion. Mind  and  intelligence  are  not  identical ;  mind  is  power, 
intelligence  is  result.  No  less  vulnerable  is  the  statement  that  the 
mind  is  the  will  in  its  practical  form,  since  that  is  defining  the  whole 
by  a  part.  The  will  is  a  department  of  mind,  and  to  identify  it  with 
the  mind  is  like  identifying  the  War  Department  Avith  the  United 
States  Government. 

The  classification  of  Hegel,  comprehensive  as  it  appears,  is  incom- 
plete. Imagination  and  memory,  quite  as  much  as  the  will,  are 
powers  of  the  mind  ;  but  they,  as  well  as  the  intuitions,  are  omitted, 
or  merged  into  the  general  contents  of  consciousness. 

The  three  minds  of  Hegel,  or  the  three  phases  of  mind,  are 
alike  enslaved,  requiring  emancipation;  but  Hegel  limits  enslave- 
ment to  the  subjective  mind.  In  its  governmental  products,  in  its 
ethical  systems,  in  its  domestic  institutions  and  regulations,  the 
objective  mind  betrays  imperfection  and  unfitness  for  great  achieve- 
ments. Despotisms,  oligarchies,  monarchies,  are  the  creations  of  the 
objective  mind,  proving  its  corruption,  cruelty,  and  instability.  In 
the  spirit  of  caste,  the  artificial  distinctions  of  society,  and  race- 
prejudices,  we  see  again  the  incapacity  of  the  objective   mind  for  its 


THE  INTERPRETATION  OF  REID.  197 

tasks.  In  the  enslavement  of  races,  in  the  feudal  system,  in  intoler- 
ance, persecution,  and  barbarism,  we  discover  the  objective  mind  in 
positive  debasement.     Emancipation  is  its  necessity. 

The  absolute  mind  drags  a  chain.  Look  at  the  religions  of  the 
world;  heathenish,  abominable  all,  save  the  One,  high  over  all. 
Hegel  admits  that  the  Oriental  religions  but  crudely  represent  the 
absolute  mind  ;  the  Judaic  religion  is  an  improvement ;  Christianity 
is  its  best  exponent.  Christianity,  however,  is  not  a  product  of  the 
human  mind ;  it  is  the  religion  of  Revelation ;  pagan  religions  are 
man-made,  the  products  of  the  absolute  mind  of  man.  It  needs, 
therefore,  purification,  yea,  emancipation  from  superstition,  idolatry, 
mysticism,  and  ignorance.  The  three  minds  are  in  chains,  the  en- 
slavement of  one  is  the  enslavement  of  all.  Necessity  is  upon  us, 
therefore,  to  pass  on  in  our  search  for  a  true  theory  or  concep- 
tion of  mind. 

The  interpretation  of  Reid  we  next  submit  for  examination. 
Reid  prides  himself  on  taking  a  common-sense  view  of  things,  even 
of  mysteries,  which  if  they  can  not  be  solved  he  justifies  as 
mysteries;  but  we  must  beware  a  little  of  the  "common-sense"  phi- 
losophy of  this  Scotch  thinker,  for  this  term  is  sometimes  used  as  a 
cover  for  inexcusable  ignorance,  an  obstacle  to  further  investigation. 
The  common,  that  is,  the  ordinary,  sense  of  mankind  might  brand 
with  folly  the  attempt  to  ferret  out  the  hidden  facts,  to  solve  the  in- 
soluble secrets  of  the  universe ;  and  unfortunately  Reid  sometimes 
shackles  and  paralyzes  investigation  by  the  employment  of  this 
prejudice.  The  dictum  of  modern  philosophy  that  God,  mind,  and 
matter  are  unknowable,  Reid^  accepts  so  far  as  it  relates  to  mind, 
agreeing  with  Hume  that  the*  substantive  nature  of  mind  is  beyond 
knowledge  and  insists  that  common  sense  requires  the  acceptance 
of  this  conclusion.  In  like  manner  he  maintains  that  perception 
and  reflection,  as  states,  are  knowable  and  analyzable,  but  perceived 
objects  and  the  perceiving  mind  are  unknowable;  in  other  words, 
he  draws  the  limitations  of  knowledge  around  perception  and  re- 
flection. 

Affirming  that  the  mind  is  unknowable,  Reid  nevertheless  assures 
us  that  it  is  a  perceiving  and  reflecting  somewhat ;  that  it  observes, 
discriminates,  discovers,  for  this  is  the  idea  of  perception  ;  that  it 
combines,  judges,  compares,  analyzes,  for  this  is  the  total  of  reflection. 
Whatever  may  be  said  of  this  finally,  Reid  has  rendered  service  to 
philosophy  in  the  assignment  of  these  two  functions— percemwgr  and 
reflecting,  to  mind  ;  for,  while  they  are  the  terms  of  Locke,  he  meant 
more  than  Locke,  because  he  was  more  than  an  empiricist.  The 
original  mind,  according  to  Reid,  was  not  empty  ;  and  if  we  compre- 


198  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

hend  not  its  nature,  we  apprehend  its  faculties  or  functions.  The 
theory,  however,  abounds  in  antinomies,  and  is  as  unsatisfactory  as 
Hegel's,  and  that  of  Leibnitz.  Insisting  that  the  mind  is  unknow- 
able, he  declares  investigation  of  its  nature  useless,  and  so  paralyzes 
intelligent  endeavor,  relieves  mental  aspiration  of  purpose,  and  directs 
meditation  merely  to  the  results  of  mental  activity,  without  solving 
activity  itself  Without  asserting  that  the  mind  may  know  itself,  we 
are  strong  in  the  conviction  that  Reid  has  not  declared  all  that  is 
possible  to  be  known  of  mind.  If  it  can  not  be  fully  known,  we 
may  know  more  of  it  than  that  it  has  certain  functions.  Moreover, 
he  is  contradictory  in  the  statement  that  mind  is  unknowable,  for  he 
makes  mind  somewhat  known  to  us  through  its  functions.  One 
knows  in  part  what  paper  is  when  told  that  it  is  made  of  rags ;  one 
knows  something  of  mind  when  told  that  it  perceives  and  reflects. 
Like  Hamilton  and  Spencer,  Reid  is  guilty  of  philosophic  inconsist- 
ency. Haniilton  declared  the  Absolute  unknowable,  but  spoke  of  it 
as  the  Infinite.  If  the  mind  is  unknowable,  one  can  not  know  any 
thing  of  it;  one  can  not  be  certain  that  ther'^  is  such  a  thing  as 
mind  ;  but  Reid  affirms  its  existence,  and  attributes  to  it  two  high 
prerogatives,  proving  knowledge  of  it.  Evidently  then,  he  was  look- 
ing in  the  right  direction,  but  stopped  wdien  he  ought  to  have  pro- 
ceeded. He  limited  his  observation  when  the  field  of  vision  began  to 
extend.  This  is  the  common  fault  of  philosophic  investigation,  es- 
pecially of  modern  inquiry,  as  we  shall  often  see. 

Of  the  historic  interpretations  of  mind,  the  materialistic  is  perhaps 
the  most  imposing,  as  it  is  the  most  daring  and  destructive.  Hobbes, 
who  was  neither  a  sensationalist,  like  Locke,  nor  an  idealist  in  any 
sense,  represents  elementary  materialism  in  the  department  of  meta- 
physics. Having  studied  Francis  Bacon  and  Descartes,  he  departed 
sufficiently  from  both  to  justify  his  claim  as  an  original  thinker,  and 
original  thought,  even  though  erroneous,  is  apt  to  command  atten- 
tion. Hobbes  had  a  mathematical  mind,  which  prepared  him  to  deal 
with  the  sophistries  of  speculation,  and  enabled  him  to  construct  a 
philosophy  of  his  own.  Prof.  Morris  contends  that  the  poetical 
mind  sustains  a  vital  relation  to  the  philosophical,  is  propsBdeutic  in 
its  influence,  since  he  finds  in  Shakespeare  traces  of  philosophical 
genius.  Plato  extolled  geometry  as  the  preparatory  gateway  to  philo- 
sophical study;  and  Galen,  the  ancient  physician,  declared  that 
geometry  saved  him  from  Pyrrhonism.  Roger  Bacon  pronounced 
mathematics  the  "alphabet  of  philosophy."  In  Plato  we  discover  the 
poetical  as  well  as  the  mathematical ;  in  Shakespeare  the  poetical 
only ;  in  Galen  and  Bacon  the  mathematical ;  so  that  it  would  appear 
that  mathematical  studies,  rather  than  poetical,  prepare  the  mind  for 


MATERIALISM  OF  HOBBES.  199 

the  grasping  of  those  sturdy  and  abstruse  problems  which  metaphysics 
ever  thrusts  before  us. 

Hobbes  was  not  poetical ;  he  was  mathematical ;  this  is  the  key  to 
his  character,  and  the  opening  vein  to  his  philosophy.  As  he  ad- 
vanced in  mathematical  knowledge,  he  was  led  to  believe  that  reason- 
ing is  a  mathematical  calculation,  an  example  in  arithmetic.  With 
this  explanation,  he  assumed  that  man  is  "  a  calculating,  computing, 
ratiocinative  machine,"  the  mind  is  an  arithmetic  in  itself.  This  is 
Hobbes's  first  interpretation  of  mind,  as  dangerous  as  it  is  plausible. 

What  his  second  view  is  may  be  ai'rived  at  in  a  similar  manner. 
The  physical  sciences  exerted  a  peculiar  fascination  over  him ;  he 
studied  every  thing  from  their  stand-point,  mind  no  less  than  matter; 
and  in  the  progress  of  his  studies  he  reached  the  conclusion  that 
physical  phenomena  are  merely  modes  of  motion;  but  he  did  not  stop 
with  this  announcement.  Like  a  philosopher  who  wishes  to  extend 
law  to  the  widest  bounds,  he  soon  began  to  assert  tliat  mental  phe- 
nomena were  likewise  modes  of  motion  ;  that  is,  that  life  is  the 
"mechanical  play  of  sensation  and  passion."  Here  are  two  views  of 
mind,  the  second  supplemental  of  the  first.  The  first  is,  that  the 
mind  acts,  thinks,  reasons,  mathematically;  the  second  is,  that  the  mind 
acts,  thinks,  reasons,  mechanically;  and,  combining  them,  the  whole 
view  is  that  the  mathematical  mind  is  mechanical  in   its  operations. 

That  Hobbes  was  influenced  by  Pythagoras  can  not  be  doubted, 
for  the  ancient  mathematical  philosopher  held  that  "the  world  is 
a  living  arithmetic  in  its  development,  a  realized  geotnetry  in  its  re- 
pose;" and  all  Pythagoreans,  including  Plato  himself,  conceived  that 
the  universe  was  built  according  to  mathematical  principles,  repre- 
sented by  the  generic  word  number.  A  mathematical  conception  of 
the  universe  was  not,  therefore,  original  with  Hobbes,  notwithstand- 
ing his  claim  to  originality.  The  application  of  the  mathematical,  or 
rather,  the  mechanical,  principle  to  mind,  was  a  daring  attempt,  and 
introduced  into  philosophic  speculation  the  materialistic  tendency. 
Schwegler  tells  us  that  Hegel  aimed  to  prove  that  the  world  is  ex- 
ternally what  the  mind  is  internally,  while  Spencer  asserts  that  the 
mind  is  internally  what  the  world  is  externally.  Either  view  is  a 
participation  in  the  mechanical  principle  of  Hobbes,  derived  in  part 
from  the  Pythagorean  conception  of  the  univei'se. 

Without  controverting  the  mechanical  principle,  does  it  throw 
light  upon  the  nature  of  mind?  Hobbes  regards  the  mind  as  a 
reasoning  power;  it  calculates,  computes;  its  chief  office  is  to  reason. 
No  one  will  dispute  the  verity  of  this  discovery,  or  attempt  a  reduc- 
tion of  its  value.  Incidentally,  too,  Hobbes  demonstrates  not  only 
the  value  of  mathematical  studies,  but  their  relation  to  the  develop- 


200  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

ment  of  the  mind — a  hint  to  educators  that  ought  not  to  be  over- 
looked. 

Lifting  the  veil  a  little,  however,  the  interpretation  is  seen  to  be 
radically  defective  and  ethically  dangerous.  It  involves  a  too  precise 
and  limited  view  of  man.  He  is  more  than  a  reasoner.  To  think  is 
the  noblest  characteristic  of  man  ;  to  think  correctly  the  badge  of  his 
greatness  ;  yet  he  is  more  than  a  rational,  ratiociuative,  calculating 
animal — he  is  a  loving,  sympathetic,  charitable,  emotional  being, 
having  a  moral  as  well  as  an  intellectual  nature.  To  discard  the 
spiritual  element  and  exalt  the  intellectual  at  the  expense  of  every 
thing  else,  is  to  degrade  man  in  the  very  attempt  to  ennoble  him. 
Man  is  complete  only  in  the  relative  development  of  the  spiritual, 
intellectual,  and  physical  qualities  and  functions  of  his  being. 
Hobbes  overlooks  the  difference  between  spiritual  and.  intellectual, 
reducing  the  activity  of  man  to  a  mechanical  rationalism.  Good 
grounds  also  exist  for  doubting  that  mental  phenomena  are  modes  of 
motion.  Whether  physical  phenomena  are  modes  of  motion  we  shall 
not  now  discuss ;  but  when  Hobbes  undertakes  to  explain  the  opera- 
tions of  mind  by  analogous  operations  in  the  physical  world,  we  are 
at  liberty  to  question  the  attempt,  and  ask  for  the  proof  of  the  con- 
clusions. Mental  action,  that  is,  the  ferment  of  mind  in  the  process 
of  thought,  may  partake  of  the  character  of  motion  ;  but  if  so,  it  is 
motion,  sui  generis,  without  counterpart  or  even  resemblance  in  nature. 
Poetically  speaking,  the  rush  of  thought  may  be  likened  to  the  flow 
of  ocean  waves*  philosophically  speaking,  it  would  be  incorrect  to 
apply  the  laws  of  one  to  the  other.  Fancied  re^mblance  must  not 
be  resorted  to  in  vindication  of  philosophic  interpretation. 

Hobbes's  theory  is,  in  its  essence,  merely  a  statement  of  the 
method  of  the  mind's  activity.  It  is  a  mode  of  motion.  False  or 
true,  it  gives  the  method,  not  the  nature,  of  mind. 

Ethically,  the  interpretation  does  violence  to  the  doctrine  of  moral 
responsibility;  and,  religiously,  it  is  prejudicial  to  the  doctrine  of  im- 
mortality. A  mechanically  acting  mind,  governed  by  unchangeable 
mathematical  principles,  is  relieved  of  that  responsibility  which  a 
mind  free  from  a  fixed  government  must  assume ;  and  it  is  equally 
clear  that,  mechanically  acting,  the  mind  may  be  mechanical,  that  is, 
material  in  its  nature ;  hence,  it  can  not  be  immortal.  In  its  last 
analysis  Hobbes's  interpretation  is  materialistic,  and  suggestive  of  all 
those  dreary  conclusions  which  more  recent  philosophers,  like  Hackel, 
Mill,  Spencer,  and  Bain,  have  affirmed. 

John  Stuart  Mill,  inheriting  the  materialistic  prejudice,  threw  out 
upon  the  world  an  interpretation  of  mind  which,  like  an  attractive 
waif,  has  been  picked  up,  housed,  and  adopted   as  the  child  of  the 


PHRASES  OF  MILL.  201 

latest  schools.  Slightly,  or  at  least  apparently,  less  materialistic  than 
that  of  Hobbes,  because  edged  with  idealistic  phrases,  the  interpretation 
is  as  barren  of  positive  results  as  Sahara  of  trees.  His  definitions  of 
mind,  scattered  throughout  his  works,  are  not  at  all  engaging  or  assur- 
ing, nor  explicit,  definite,  broad,  coherent.  Atone  time  he  writes  that 
"  mind  is  the  mysterious  something  which  feels  and  thinks,"  recognizing 
its  reflective  and  emotional  character ;  at  another  time  he  speaks  of  it 
as  "a  permanent  possibility  of  feeling,"  indicating,  perhaps,  that  it 
consists  in  permanent  consciousness;  then  again  he  refers  to  it  as  a 
"series  of  feelings,"  drifting  away  from  the  position  that  it  is  that 
"mysterious  something  which  feels  and  thinks;"  lastly,  he  refers  to 
it  as  "an  inexplicable  tie." 

What  is  the  value  of  these  definitions?  In  the  definition  that 
mind  is  something  that  thinks,  there  is  a  great  philosophical  truth ;  in 
the  definition  that  it  is  something  that  feels,  there  is  an  equally  im- 
portant psychological  truth.  The  mind  is  the  thinking  and  emotional 
center  of  man,  according  to  these  definitions. 

Looking  at  the  other  side  of  this  interpretation,  and  following 
Mill  so  far  as  he  ventures  to  go,  we  find  we  have  allowed  too  much 
to  his  definitions,  and  given  them  an  overstrained  and  unintended 
meaning.  Mind  is  a  "  mysterious  something,"  an  "  inexplicable  tie." 
Of  its  nature,  he  holds  that  w^e  know  nothing.  That  mind  thinks,  he 
admits,  but  thinking  or  thought  does  not  indicate  the  nature  of  the 
thing  that  thinks.  Thought  is  a  superficial  manifestation  of  mind, 
utterly  non-reflective  of  its  character.  The  definition  that  mind  con- 
sists in  a  "  series  of  feelings "  is,  according  to  his  own  confession, 
narrow  and  inconclusive,  for  memory,  imagination,  hope,  can  not  be 
explained  as  a  series  of  feelings.  Thought  itself  is  more  than  a  feel- 
ing. Hobbes  defined  it  a  mode  of  motion  ;  Mill,  a  feeling.  Between 
thought  and  feeling  there  is  a  chasm  that  Mill's  definitions  do  not 
bridge ;  the  two  may  be  coupled — they  will  not  coalesce  into  unity. 
Thus  Mill's  interpretation  consists  in  elegant  words,  fraudulent  phrases, 
superficial  explanations,  and  despairing  admissions.  It  is  in  the  line 
of  fatalism. 

The  interpretation  of  Spencer  is  the  theory  of  evolution,  a  modern 
theory  in  the  form  of  its  statement,  yet  a  conglomeration  distinguished 
rather  for  many-phased  conceptions  than  singleness  of  view.  Evolu- 
tion is  the  talismanic  word  of  the  nineteenth  century,  explaining  all 
things,  God  excepted,  whose  existence  it  in  no  sense  recognizes.  In 
the  hands  of  a  scholar,  such  as  Herbert  Spencer  is  conceded  to  be, 
the  word  has  been  transposed  into  doctrine,  or  brought  forward  as  a 
revelation  of  the  secret  processes  of  mind  and  matter,  supplanting 
idealism  in  philosophy  and  theology  in  religion.     If  any  one,  how- 


202  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

ever,  approach  evolution  with  the  expectation  that  he  will  know  any 
thing  more  about  mind  when  he  has  exhausted  Spencer  than  before, 
he  will  meet  with  disappointment,  for,  while  Spencer  is  voluminous, 
he  is  not  conclusive ;  while  he  is  always  dogmatic,  he  is  not  always 
clear  ;  while  he  assumes  to  be  an  oracle,  he  is  of  doubtful  interpretation. 
The  initial  thought  of  the  evolutionists  is  that  mind  did  not  make 
its  appearance  in  the  early  stages  of  the  unfolding  world,  but  toward 
its  close ;  that  it  did  not  manifest  itself  at  all  in  the  beginning,  but 
dawned  at  the  end  of  the  task  of  upbuilding ;  that  it  is,  therefore,  a 
development,  and  not  an  original  force  or  guiding  power ;  in  other 
words,  mind  has  been  evolved  just  as  the  race  has  been  evolved,  its 
beginnings  poor,  feeble,  unpromising,  and  rising  into  greatness  with 
its  opportunities.  Evolved  mind,  not  original  or  "created  mind ;  a 
mind  that  has  grown  from  a  germ ;  a  mind  that  was  almost  nothing 
at  first,  and  became  something  afterward,  plodding  through  the  stages 
of  impulse,  instinct,  desire,  aspiration,  perception,  and  conception, 
toward  intellectual  self-assertion  ;  this  is  the  theory  of  evolution  re- 
specting mind.  Plato  believed  that  mind  was  first,  not  last,  and  that 
the  earliest  races  were  no  less  endowed  with  memory,  imagination, 
volition,  cognition,  and  all  the  mental  faculties,  than  the  Greeks.  It 
is  singular,  if  Spencer's  theory  be  true,  that  he  can  not  point  to  a  race 
deficient  in  memory,  imagination,  or  will  power,  and  that  history 
furnishes  the  account  of  no  such  a  race,  or  in  whom  the  development 
of  mind  from  one  faculty  to  another  can  be  detected.  The  historic 
man  shows  no  deficiency  of  mind;  the  prehistoric  man  exhibits  the 
mental  traces  quite  as  explicitly  as  the  modern  man.  Mind  sho^vs  no 
evolution  of  faculties.  Nevertheless,  the  evolutionist,  in  violation  of 
historic  facts  and  the  antecedents  of  the  race,  assumes  that  mind  is 
the  product  of  an  evolutionary  process,  still  manifest  in  history. 

The  second  step  follows  the  first  and  is  consistent  with  it.  Dr. 
David  Hartley,  after  many  physiological  experiments,  began  to  sus- 
pect that  mental  action  is  due  to  vibrations  in  the  white  medullary 
substance  of  the  brain,  a  theory  as  insufficient  as  that  which  would 
explain  electricity  by  the  trembling  wire.  Conceding  that  mental 
activity  must  inspire  corresponding  activity  in  the  brain,  it  no  more 
explains  mental  action  than  muscular  movement  explains  volition. 
Such  a  theory  is  a  complete  reversal  of  the  accepted  order  of  facts  in 
mental  history.  Until  Hartley,  it  was  believed  that  thought  causes 
cerebral  vibration  ;  he  announced  that  cerebral  vibration  produces 
thought. 

Spencer,  influenced  by  the  physiological  determinations  of  Hartley, 
turned  them  to  the  support  of  the  evolutionary  hypothesis  of  mind, 
and  with  the  aid  of  association alists.  Bain  in  particular,  the   popu- 


RELATIONS  OF  BODY  AND  MIND.  203 

lar  conception  has  been  well-nigh  wrecked.  The  step  is  a  short  one 
from  Hartley's  physiology  to  Speucer's  account  of  the  origin  of  mind, 
namely,  in  the  physical  organization  of  man.  De  la  Mettrie  expresses 
the  theory  thus:  "We  are  what  we  are  by  our  organization  in  the 
first  instance,  and  by  instruction  in  the  second."  Hartley's  theory 
that  the  brain  produces  thought,  Spencer  transformed  into  the  larger 
theory  that  physical  activity  results  in  mind.  The  theories  differ 
only  in  their  extent.  In  keeping  with  the  theory  of  tlie  origin  of 
mind,  Spencer  teaches  that  it  is  subject  to  an  evolutionary  process  of 
development  resulting  from  a  "redistribution  of  matter  and  motion," 
agreeing  exactly  with  Mr.  Bain,  who,  as  a  psychologist,  completes 
what  Spencer  begins  as  an  evolutionist.  With  Spencer,  nerve  action 
is  the  basis  of  mental  action,  the  Hartley  theory  in  a  modified  form. 
Hume  also  speaks  of  thought  as  a  Uitle  agitation  of  the  brain,  show- 
ing the  influence  of  the  mechanical  philosophy. 

Reducing  the  mind  to  a  physical  product,  and  explaining  its 
operations  by  nervous  excitements,  Spencer  declares  the  nature  of 
mind  unknowable,  leaving  the  student  of  the  subject  just  where  he 
was  in  the  beginning.  There  is  a  science  of  mind,  says  Spencer,  but 
not  a  philosophy  of  mind.     Mind  is  "static,  not  dynamic." 

Not  intending  now  to  analyze  the  evolutionary  theory,  it  is  im- 
portant to  remember  that  the  evolutionist  finds  it  exceedingly  difficult 
to  account  for  the  self-acting,  self-determining  power  of  mind,  which 
distinguishes  it  from  the  body.  Practically,  the  body  is  the  instru- 
ment of  the  mind  ;  evolution  must  pronounce  the  mind  the  insti-ument 
of  the  body,  but  it  hesitates  to  do  so.  The  body  may  be  compared 
to  a  ship — the  mind  is  the  pilot.  Sometimes  it  happens  that  a  ship 
in  a  storm  is  uncontrollable  even  by  a  skillful  pilot,  but  the  pilot  ordi- 
narily is  in  control.  Under  certain  contingencies,  the  body  may 
usurp  control  of  the  mind,  as  when  it  is  diseased,  but  that  is  not  the 
natural  relation.  Except  the  involuntary  processes  of  nature,  such 
as  breathing,  assimilation,  circulation  of  the  blood,  pulsations  of  the 
heart,  the  mind  will  determine  the  movements  of  the  body ;  but  this 
is  not  the  chief  function  of  mind.  It  determines  for  itself  as  well  as 
for  the  body ;  it  regulates  its  own  thinking  and  decides  on  moral  con- 
duct— is  master  of  itself.  This  proves  independence  of  the  body,  or, 
at  the  least,  superiority  to  it. 

Contrary,  also,  to  Spencer,  it  may  finally  be  demonstrated  that  the 
body  does  not  produce  the  mind,  but  the  mind  the  body.  Organiza- 
tion is  the  basis  of  mind,  according  to  the  evolutionist ;  mind  is  the 
root  of  organization,  according  to  a  well-founded  supposition.  The 
weakness  of  evolution  in  its  wholeness  is  that  it  produces  the  higher 
from  the  lower,  when    in   point  of  fact  the  higher  produces  the  lower. 


204  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

Chronologically,  the  lower  often  seems  to  precede  the  higher;  but 
actually,  the  higher  is  present  and  working,  making  its  appearance 
later,  because  it  is  more  elaborate  and  permanent.  The  lower,  super- 
ficial, temporary,  accidental,  is  first  visible;  the  higher,  refined,  force- 
ful, is  invisible  until  a  later  stage  of  the  development  of  the  lower, 
but  it  has  been  in  movement  all  the  time.  The  body,  gross,  material, 
a  finally  vanishing  substance,  is  visible ;  the  mind,  a  positive  and 
perpetual  force,  is  invisible.  It  is  the  invisible  that  produces  the 
visible ;  the  laws  of  the  invisible  become  the  laws  of  the  visible ;  but 
Spencer  teaches  that  the  laws  of  the  visible  control  the  invisible,  or 
body  both  organizes  and  controls  mind.  Evolution  reverses  the  his- 
toric and  organic  order  of  the  two  substances. 

Mr.  Bain  is  the  Representative  of  the  school  of  associationalists 
who,  evolutionists  as  they  are,  conduct  their  interpretation  of  mind 
to  the  rankest  materialism.  In  their  conclusions  they  go  no  farther 
than  Mr.  Spencer,  who  himself  was  an  associationalist,  but  they  are 
more  specific  in  details.  From  the  connection  between  body  and 
mind  they  conclude  that  they  are  identical ;  but  the  connection  es- 
tablishes relation  only,  interaction  only,  not  identity.  Because  the 
body  affects  the  mind,  as  in  disease,  or  grief  or  age,  there  is  no 
warrant  for  concluding  that  the  mind  is  material ;  such  effects  prove 
relation  and  interaction,  w^hich  no  theologian  will  deny.  Mr.  Bain 
presses  the  claim  of  identity  by  describing  a  mental  fact  as  a  double- 
faced  somewhat,  being  mental  on  one  side  and  physical  on  the  other, 
obtaining  the  distinction  from  Aristotle.  A  thought  has  both  a  sub- 
jective and  objective  face,  but,  as  it  is  one  thing,  so  the  two  faces 
are  a  double  view  of  the  same  thing.  Even  this  strained  statement 
proves  nothing  more  than  relation  and  interaction,  for  the  two  faces 
involve  difference,  and  difference  precludes  identity.  In  the  fact  that 
thought  exhausts  nervous  substance.  Bain  discovers  the  origin  of 
thought  in  nerve-action,  but  it  only  proves  dependence,  not  origin  ; 
relation,  not  identity.  "No  phosphorus,  no  thinking,"  Moleschott 
declared.  This  is  the  same  materialism.  Intellectual  action  is  a 
nervous  shock,  according  to  Bain  ;  but  this  proves  that  the  reason 
employs  the  nerves  in  thinking,  just  as  the  volition  employs  muscles 
in  lifting  a  weight.  Why  not  style  Bain's  theory  the  shock  philosophy  f 
It  shocks  both  reason  and  faith.  Dr.  Hammond  speaks  of  the  mind 
as  "a  force  developed  by  nervous  action."  It  may  be  true  that  for 
every  mental  action  there  is  a  nervous  response,  but  it  by  no  means 
establishes  the  identity  of  the  action  and  the  response.  When  he  as- 
serts that  mental  and  physical  states  correspond  ;  that  the  mental 
series  and  the  physical  series  are  exactly  alike  ;  that  physical  feeling 
reflects  the  mental ;  we  must  ask  for  the  evidence.     The  most  that 


METHODS  OF  MENTAL  ACTIVITY.  205 

Mr.  Bain  has  established  is  that  mind  and  body  are  related  and  in- 
teract, and  that  possibly  the  law  of  mental  activity  controls  the 
physical  life.  Earnestly  does  he  teach  that  the  law  of  the  physical 
life  may  be  the  law  of  the  mental  life  ;  this  is  materialism  ;  he  will 
be  surprised  to  learn  that  possibly  he  has  demonstrated  the  reverse, 
if  he  has  demonstrated  any  thing.  The  law  of  lower  is  not  the  law 
of  the  higher,  but  the  law  of  the  higher  is  molding,  and  will  explain 
the  activities  of  the  lower.  This  is  spiritual  government  extended  to 
the  physical  universe.  The  Associationalists  make  much  of  the  laws 
of  association  by  which  they  affirm  the  mind  is  governed  in  its 
processes  of  thought ;  but  it  should  be  remembered  that  all  such 
laws  explain  the  method  of  the  mind's  action,  not  mind  itself.  To  de- 
scribe -the  rotation  of  the  planets  according  to  law,  does  not  explain 
the  nature  of  the  planetary  substance  ;  and  a  knowledge  of  association, 
as  a  law  of  the  mind's  processes,  is  not  equivalent  to  a  knowledge  of 
the  mind  itself.  By  the  law  ot  association  Bain  explains  the  method 
of  the  memory,  not  the  memory.  Mill  said  he  could  not  understand 
the  memory ;  Bain  does  not  explain  it.  To  show  how  the  mind 
thinks  is  one  thing ;  to  show  what  the  mind  is,  is  quite  another. 
Bain  has  been  credited  in  the  International  Review  with  tracing 
mental  action  to  its  source,  but  if  he  has  done  any  thing  he  has  an- 
nounced the  method  of  mental  action  only  ;  yet  not  the  only  method, 
for  associational  thought  is  the  result  of  the  law  of  association.  Out- 
side of  associational  thought  is  original,  intuitional  thought;  and  be- 
yond is  creative  thought,  independent  of  association  and  intuition. 
The  law  of  association  results  in  thought  in  harmony  with  itself;  in- 
tuitional thought  must  result  from  another  law  ;  creative  thought 
from  another  still.  Associationalism,  the  last  outburst  of  philosoph- 
ical definition,  tested  by  thought  itself,  is  deficient  as  a  law  of  mental 
activity,  and  reveals  nothing  of  the  nature  of  mind.  Bain  himself, 
while  insisting  that  our  conscious  states  may  be  analyzed  by  physical 
law,  confesses  of  pure  mind  he  knows  nothing. 

Neither  sensationalism,  idealism,  nor  materialism,  besides  specify- 
ing some  of  the  contents  and  processes  of  mind,  afford  a  distinct 
knowledge  of  its  nattire,  compelling  us  to  seek  elsewhere  it  we  ascer- 
tain what  is  mind. 

Beginning  where  associationalism  leaves  off,  we  wish  to  express 
belief  in  the  great  fact  that  the  mind,  like  the  body,  like  the 
universe,  is  under  law,  and  that  the  key  to  its  nature  is  in  the 
supreme  law  of  its  being,  or  the  laws  of  its  activity.  Matter  is  not 
alone  under  law,  nor  is  it  under  the  influence  of  lower  law  ;  it  is  under 
the  mind's  law,  so  modified  as  to  act  without  friction  and  in  harmony 
with  its  nature. 


206  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

Contrary  to  scientists  in  general,  Mr.  Huxley  agrees  with  Des- 
cartes that  "  we  know  more  of  mind  than  we  do  of  body,"  to  which 
we  add  that  a  knowledge  of  the  body  is  possible  only  as  we  know 
the  mind.  Scientists  prate  of  physiological  psychology ;  a  true  phi- 
losophy points  to  psychological  physiology.  The  Duke  of  Argyll, 
repudiating  phrenology,  declares  its  error  to  be  "  that  physiology  can 
ever  be  the  basis  of  psychology;"  related  as  the  two  are,  "it  is  not 
true  that  psychology  is  subordinate  to  physiology."  Psychology  may 
explain  physiology;  physiology  can  never  explain  psychology.  Tlie 
explanation  of  ynatter  lies  in  the  explanation  of  mind;  but  materialists 
have  essayed  to  explain  mind  by  a  study  of  matter.  Even  Spen- 
cer has  admitted  that  there  is  no  "  perceptible  or  conceivable  com- 
munity of  nature  "  between  the  two  sciences,  and  yet  persists  in  identi- 
fying the  laws  that  govern  in  the  processes  of  mind  and  matter. 
Any  resemblance  between  the  processes,  or  any  parallel  that  may  be 
shown  between  mental  and  physical  laws,  must  be  interpreted  as  the 
evidence  of  the  descent  of  the  mental  into  the  physical,  and  not  of 
the  ascent  of  the  physical  into  the  mental ;  and  identity  can  be 
predicated  only  on  the  supposition  of  the  former.  It  has  been  as- 
sumed on  the  basis  of  the  latter  ;  hence,  the  destruction  wrought  by 
materialism. 

Many  are  the  laws  of  the  mind,  all  of  which  have  not  as  yet  been 
discovered ;  but  the  more  conspicuous  may  be  indicated,  paralleled  to 
some  extent  by  laws  observable  in  the  realm  of  matter.  In  general 
terms,  it  may  be  conceded  that  the  mind  acts  at  times  involuutarily, 
even  unconsciously,  as  in  dreams,  absent-mindedness,  and  other  states, 
just  as  the  involuntary  processes  of  digestion  and  the  blood's  circula- 
tion go  on  constantly  but  without  conscious  direction,  prompting,  or 
interference  by  the  person ;  and  then  it  acts  voluntarily,  directing 
commanding,  perceiving  and  conceiving,  just  as  walking  and  talking 
are  under  the  voluntary  control  of  the  person.  This  parallelism  of 
voluntary  and  involuntary  activity  between  the  body  and  the  mind 
is  suggestive  of  relation,  and  community  of  the  lower  with  the 
higher.  Mental  activity  is  under  specific  government,  expressing  all 
its  results  in  harmony  with  transparent  or  occiflt  laws,  the  investiga- 
tion of  which  may  require  patient  study,  but  the  rewards  thereof 
will  be  sufficiently  compensative  and  enduring. 

In  its  historical  aspects,  the  mind  displays  a  tendency  to  develop- 
ment from  incipient  stages  of  thinking  to  robust  reasoning  habits, 
and  from  ignorance  to  the  facts  of  knowledge.  It  is  a  growing  sub- 
stance ;  in  its  constitution  is  the  prophecy  of  growth ;  so  that  among 
the  conspicuous  laws  of  mind  must  be  placed  the  laiv  of  growth,  paral- 
leled by  a  similar  law  in  the  realm  of  matter.     In  what  manner  the 


CONGENITA  LISM—  CA  USA  TION.  207 

mind  realizes  enlargement,  both  history  and  experience  make  known, 
that  is,  by  growth  from  within  to  without,  and  from  without  to  within  ; 
in  other  words,  by  sensations  and  reflections,  or  again,  by  appropria- 
tion of  the  facts  of  the  outer  world,  and  by  independent  self-action, 
or  communion  with  itself.  Its  growth  is  exosmose  and  endosmose. 
But  if  the  contents  of  the  law  of  growth  are  not  accurately  stated, 
the  fact  of  growth  will  not  be  disputed,  and  at  this  stage  of 
the  inquiry  the  fact  is  quite  as  important  as  the  law.  Growth 
is  a  condition  of  mind;  this  implies  activity,  the  constituent  fact 
of  mind. 

In  its  activity  the  law  of  association  is  very  manifest,  accounting  in 
many  cases  for  thought,  conduct,  and  character;  but  the  guilt  of  the 
associationalists  is  the  claim  that  the  entire  history  of  mind  may  be 
reduced  to  the  single  principle  of  association,  as  if  it  had  no  inde- 
pendent power,  and  especially  no  intuitional  sense.  The  law  of 
association  we  accept  as  one  of  many,  and  not  as  the  all  in  all  of 
mental  activity. 

Almost  as  conspicuous,  at  least  as  dominant  in  tendency,  as  the 
preceding,  is  the  law  of  congenital  influence  in  the  structure,  if  not 
in  the  methods,  of  the  mind  itself  The  law  of  heredity  certainly 
manifests  itself  in  the  bodily  organism  of  man,  which  is  proof  that 
it  obtains  in  mental  character ;  but  to  what  extent  it  obtains  has  not 
been  fully  determined.  Robert  Burns  inherited  the  poetic  instinct, 
as  Charles  Darwin  inherited  the  scientific,  inquiring  mind.  Mental 
tendencies  are  transmitted,  as  are  physical  tendencies.  It  is  not  our 
purpose  to  inquire  as  to  the  origin  of  the  mind,  but  merely  to  indicate 
•the  reign  of  parental  influence  over  it,  yet  so  as  not  to  interfere  with 
its  legitimate  functions  or  self-evident  possibilities.  Keither  the  law 
of  association  nor  congenitalism  can  rob  the  mind  of  its  individuality 
or  responsibility.  The  law^  of  association  is  a  method  of  activity ; 
congenitalism  is  a  hint  of  character. 

In  many  of  its  processes,  the  mind  is  under  the  law  of  causation, 
or  cause  and  effect ;  in  fact,  the  order  of  thought  is  the  order  of 
antecedent  and  consequent.  Pure  logic  is  pure  cau.sation.  If,  as 
Aristotle  says,  the  active  reason  is  "something  divine,"  it  is  because 
it  is  orderly  in  its  processes,  either  a  pnori  or  a  posteriori  or  some 
other  order  in  its  premises  and  conclusions.  Admitting  so  much,  we 
do  not  mean  that  the  mind  is  under  inexorable  necessity  to  one 
method  in  its  thinking,  for  this  would  reduce  it  to  a  machine ;  but 
we  do  mean  that,  in  certain  processes,  it  observes  the  necessary  order  of 
causation,  without,  however,  compromising  its  freedom  or  independ- 
ence. It  is  free  to  think  or  not  to  think  on  a  given  subject,  but  if  it 
choose  a  particular  subject,  as,  perhaps,  the  facts  of  astronomy  and 


208  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

geology,  it  must  have  respect  to  a  fixed  order  of  thought,  which  in 
these  cases  we  denominate  the  law  of  causation. 

In  the  largest  sense,  the  mind  acts  under  the  law  of  freedom  in 
perfect  harmony  with  the  preceding  laws,  and,  in  fact,  is  reflexively 
their  inspiration  and  sanctificatiou.  Without  freedom,  the  laAvs  of 
growth,  association,  congenitalism,  and  causation  would  be  inoperative, 
or  at  least  unproductive  of  a  responsible  development.  Whatever 
else  the  mind  is,  it  is  free;  not  free  from  motives,  but  free  to  select 
one  motive  from  a  number  and  act  accordingly,  and  free  to  reject  all 
motives  and  not  act  at  all.  To  a  degree,  it  is  under  the  law  of 
motive  in  its  choices  and  achievements,  but  even  the  motives  it  respects 
it  sometimes  originates  within  itself,  demonstrating  its  independence 
and  self-acting  character.  The  mind  is  free ;  not  free  from  intuitions, 
since  they  are  a  part  of  itself;  hence,  it  is  under  intuitional  law; 
but  neither  motives,  having  an  external  source,  nor  intuitions,  being 
internal,  arrest  the  free  action  of  the  mind  in  its  determinations. 
Motives  persuade,  intuitions  command ;  the  persuasion  is  not  irresisti- 
ble, the  command  is  that  of  the  mind  itself.  While  philosophers 
have  considered  the  law  of  freedom  in  activity  as  chief  in  the  realm 
of  mind,  we  submit  that  its  greatest  law  has  been  overlooked,  namely, 
the  law  of  power,  or  the  measure  of  the  mind's  activity.  Freedom  re- 
fers to  the  ease  of  the  mind  in  activity ;  power,  to  the  extent  of  its 
activity,  and  hence  is  a  key  to  its  nature.  Identifying  mental  and 
physical  action,  as  the  associationalists  are  striving  to  do,  it  is  being 
recognized  that  the  brain  acts  only  as  it  is  acted  upon,  is  purely 
passive,  like  the  eye  or  ear,  while  the  mind  self-acts,  and  is  therefore 
independent.  A  great  difference,  this,  and  the  measure  of  mind 
and  matter.  One  is  passive,  the  other  active;  one  is  inertness,  the 
other  energy.  The  self-acting  power  of  mind  implies  originating 
power,  which  can  not  be  assigned  to  matter.  It  originates  ideas ;  it 
weaves'  thought  out  of  physical  materials,  or,  like  the  s^^ider,  out  of 
its  own  substance;  it  creates.  In  a  lower  sense,  it  subordinates  aU 
things  to  itself;  it  is  making  nature  tributary  to  it;  it  changes 
nature's  forms,  subordinates  nature's  laws  to  its  own  purposes,  and 
exercises  dominion  in  the  realm  of  matter.  This  is  its  power :  self- 
acting,  originating,  and  subordinating  all  things  to  itself  This  makes 
it  supreme,  and  defines  it  by  differentia  and  essentia  from  every 
thing  else. 

What,  therefore,  is  mind?  It  is  something  to  say  that  it  is  an 
immaterial  substance,  differing  from  phenomenal  substance,  not  so 
much  in  its  laws  as  in  its  qualities ;  but  this  difference  has  either 
paralyzed  the  materialist  or  led  him  to  identify  the  substances.  Iden- 
tity of  laws  does  not   imply  identity  of  qualities  ;   but  identity  of 


DEFINITIONS  OF  MIND.  209 

substances  requires  identity  of  qualities.  The  difference  between  the 
substances  is  the  difierence  of  qualities ;  of  matter,  divisibility,  ex- 
tension, density,  color,  may  be  predicated  ;  of  mind,  volition,  cogni- 
tion, perception,  desire,  may  be  affirmed.  The  parallelism  or  identity 
of  the  laws  governing  them  must  not  blind  one  to  the  ineradicable 
difference  in  substantive  qualifications. 

Immateriality  is  not  a  definite  term.  It  takes  one  away  from  mat- 
ter, but  it  does  not  clearly  translate  itself  into  an  intelligible  form  or 
utterance.  What  is  immateriality?  Kant  really  demonstrated  the 
existence  of  a  dynamic  self-consciousness,  or  the  consciousness  of  in- 
dependent, self-acting,  self-regulating  spirit-power.  This,  as  a  defini- 
tion of  immaterial  substance,  is  so  nearly  complete  that  it  needs  not 
more  than  brief  expansion  to  accept  it.  Mind  is  not  to  be  defined 
from  its  qualities,  for,  while  they  illustrate  its  nature,  another  key 
must  be  used  in  analyzing  the  mind  itself  By  qualities  we  mean 
faculties,  but,  strictly  speaking,  there  are  no  faculties.  Locke's  de- 
cision against  faculties  is  impregnable.  The  mind  is  a  unit,  a  single 
substance,  acting  in  various  ways,  but  always  in  complete  harmony 
with  itself.  Dugald  Stewart's  enumeration  of  ten  faculties  is  an  ex- 
hibition of  a  very  faulty  analysis  of  mental  operations,  because  such 
an  exaltation  of  faculties  is  at  the  expense  of  unity,  and  it  is  a  ques- 
tion if  certain  so-called  faculties  in  his  list  are  functions  of  the  mind 
at  all.  Not  by  faculties  alone  may  the  mind  be  interpreted.  It  is 
immateriality  ;  it  is  consciousness ;  but  Avhat  kind  of  consciousness, 
the  faculties  do  not  intimate.  The  key  to  the  nature  of  mind  is  its 
laws,  not  its  qualities. 

By  virtue  of  the  law  of  mind,  the  law  of  activity,  of  power,  of 
freedom,  it  is  evident  that  mind  is  conscious  activity,  or  the  activity  of 
consciousness;  or,  to  reduce  the  definition  to  a  single  word,  mind  is 
power,  it  is  force.  The  measurement  of  mind  involves  the  measurement 
of  its  power,  but  as  the  power  refuses  to  submit  to  measure,  or  even 
regulation,  so  the  mind  is  beyond  measure  and  stands  above  well-defined 
limitation.  The  word  power,  however,  is  slightly  ambiguous,  since  it 
may  be  separated  from  personality ;  and  power  may  be  latent  or  in- 
active;  but  mind  is  not  an  inactive  power,  or  blind,  irrational  force. 
To  free  the  definition  from  ambiguity,  it  is  better  to  say  that  mind  is 
conscious  activity,  or  the  activity  of  consciousness.  Spinoza  attrib- 
uted to  the  mind  three  potencies,  knowledge,  action,  reason,  to 
which  we  raise  no  objection,  since  it  is  clear  that  the  activity  of  con- 
sciousness is  according  to  its  intuitions,  and  its  reason ;  that  is,  con- 
sciousness is  governed  by  its  own  laws.  Without  such  laws  there  is 
no  consciousness,  and  without  consciousness  no  activity. 

If  the  definition  of  mind  as  above  given  is  held  to  be  objection- 
14 


210  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

able,  the  objection  must  lie  against  the  form  in  which  the  definition 
is  expressed,  rather  than  against  its  essence,  for  that  mind  is  activity 
is  certainly  a  fact.  Whether  we  say  it  is  the  activity  of  conscious- 
ness, or  the  activity  of  spirit,  is  of  no  consequence ;  spirit  is  life,  ac- 
tivity, power — and  consciousness  is  the  same  thing.  Consciousness 
and  spirit  are  identical ;  activity  is  the  normal  state,  the  essential 
condition  of  spirit;  hence,  the  definition  must  retain  the  idea  of  ac- 
tivity ;  itideed,  it  is  sufficient  if  it  contain  nothing  else.  James  Mil\ 
says  that  consciousness  is  nothing  but  feeling;  but,  if  this  is  true,  it 
is  the  feeling  of  power,  of  activity.  To  feel  implies  the 'consciousness 
of  something.  Feeling  is  impossible  without  a  consciousness  of  some- 
thing created  for  it  or  by  it.  The  mind  feels  its  power,  is  itself  the 
feeling  of  activity.  Whatever  the  definition  of  consciousness,  it  re- 
solves itself  into  a  recognition  of  existence  and  activity  ;  self-con- 
sciousness is  the  recognition  of  self-activity.     This  is  mind. 

Bain's  classification  of  the  intellect  into  discrimination,  or  conscious- 
ness of  diffei-ence,  similarity,  or  consciousness  of  agreement,  and  re- 
tentiveness,  or  consciousness  of  acquisition,  is  in  harmony  with  our 
conception.  To  discriminate  is  to  act ;  to  agree  is  to  act ;  to  acquire 
is  to  act.  Discrimination,  agreement,  acquisition,  the  three  functions 
of  intellect,  are  the  processes  of  consciousness  in  activity.  This  is 
mind. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

THE    AREA    OE    HUIVEAN     I-CNOWLEDOE. 

ANCIENT  Pyrrhonism  has  been  reproduced  in  the  agnosticism  of 
modern  times,  with  the  difference  that  the  recent  error  is  worse 
than  the  first.  Pyrrhonism  doubted  and  waited;  agnosticism  denies 
every  thing  and  concedes  nothing.  The  Pyrrhonist  walked  in  the 
twilight,  uncertain  that  he  saw  any  thing  distinctly ;  the  agnostic 
walks  "late  at  night  in  JEgina,"  certain  that  he  sees  nothing.  The 
one  bruited  the  doctrine  of  uncertainty ;  the  other  proclaims  the 
dogma  of  ignorance. 

To  knoAV  or  not  to  know  is  as  important  as  Hamlet's  aphorism, 
"to  be  or  not  to  be."  Does  man  know  any  thing?  What  is  it  that 
he  knows  ?  •  How  does  he  know  what  he  knows  ?  What  are  the 
boundaries  of  the  intellect,  and  how  are  they  indicated  ?  Is  the  in- 
tellect a  circumscribed  power?  What  is  the  value  of  knowledge? 
These  and  cognate  questions  the  inquirer  is  bound  to  consider,  since 


ADMISSIONS  OF  IGNORANCE.  211 

philosophy  itself,  no  less  than  religion,  is  dependent  on  the  validity 
of  their  solution.  The  assumption  that  man  knows  nothing  and  can 
know  nothing;  that  his  estate  is  one  of  pitiable  and  unending  dark- 
ness ;  that  so-called  light  is  a  delusion,  and  faith  in  it  a  superstition ; 
that  the  expectation  of  progress  is  a  courageous  but  profitless  vanity ; 
that  supposed  consciousness  of  truth  is  only  a  form  of  self-flattery ; 
involves  so  many  incongruities  and  absurdities,  and  so  strikes  at  the 
root  of  things,  that  in  righteous  self-defense  the  mind  must  declare 
its  prerogatives,  and  assert  its  possibilities  in  the  realm  of  what  is 
called  the  knowable. 

At  this  stage  of  the  discussion  we  are  prepared  to  make  several 
important  admissions,  all  the  more  necessary  in  order  to  simplify  the 
treatment  of  the  subject,  and  avoid  unnecessary  conflict  with  the 
agnostic.  It  is  admitted  that  man  does  not  and  possibly  can  not 
know  all  things ;  that  as  infinity  transcends  the  finite,  the  finite  may 
find  it  impossible  completely  to  know  the  infinite,  or  things  that  are 
exclusively  and  unrelatedly  infinite.  It  is  admitted  that,  owing  to 
defective  methods  of  human  inquiry,  many  facts,  truths,  laws,  and 
relations  are  unknown  that  are  not  necessarily  and  absolutely  unknow- 
able, and  which  will  probably  be  discovered  as  improved  methods  of 
inquiry  are  adopted.  It  is  admitted  that  man's  preferences  for  truth 
are  so  vitiated  by  natural  tastes  for  lower  things,  and  so  inactive  in 
assertion  that  he  can  rise  but  slowly  from  darkness  into  light,  but  the 
ascent  is  gloriously  possible,  as  Plato's  men  emerged  at  last  from  their 
caves.  It  is  admitted  that  special  truth  labeled  ' '  supernatural "  often 
meets  with  obstructive  disfavor  among  those  who  profess  to  be  in 
search  of  all  truth,  and  that  this  cherished  prejudice  forbids  the  im- 
mediate ascertainment  of  the  highest  truth,  especially  by  those  seek- 
ing it.  It  is  admitted  that  the  exact  value  of  truth  has  not  been 
philosophically  determined  further  than  that  a  knowledge  of  it  would 
prove  a  convenience,  but  is  not  esteemed  a  necessity.  It  is  admit- 
ted that  such  are  the  physical  necessities  of  men  and  the  time  re- 
quired by  their  occupations  in  supplying  them,  that  few  can  devote 
themselves  sufficiently  to  the  investigation  of  the  highest  problems  of 
truth ;  hence,  the  race's  rapid  advance  in  knowledge  is  hardly  to  be 
expected. 

These  admissions,  and  many  others  of  a  similar  nature  that  readily 
suggest  themselves,  imply  an  imperfect  state  of  human  knowledge, 
and  the  need  of  advancement  all  along  the  line  of  speculation  and 
inquiry.  From  such  admissions,  frankly  offered,  agnosticism  has  has- 
tily inferred  the  necessary  ignorance  and  the  non-improvability  of 
man,  and  settled  down  into  that  bliss  which  is  supposed  to  spring 
from  intellectual  know-nothingism.     The  inference  of  agnosticism — a 


2 1 2  PHIL OSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

wild  bird  in  paradise — has  not  a  single  premise  on  which  to  rest  its 
feather-plucked  and  eyeless  form,  and  not  an  inch  of  ground  where 
its  bleeding  and  tangled  feet  may  stand.  On  the  contrary,  the  as- 
sumption of  human  knowledge,  the  certainty  of  its  facts,  the  trust- 
worthiness of  its  deductions,  and  the  infinite  scope  of  its  possibilities, 
may  be  proclaimed  from  evidences  alike  entertaining  and  assuring. 
The  task  of  the  vindication  of  man's  inheritance  to  a  realm  of  knowl- 
edge, not  measurable  by  words,  we  now  assume. 

The  foundation  of  this  assumption  is  in  the  mind  itself,  its  capac- 
ity and  aspiration,  the  two  conditions  of  knowledge,  both  of  its  nature 
and  limitations.  The  measure  of  mind  is  its  capacity,  as  the  measure 
of  a  river  is  its  basin  or  banks.  The  spirit  of  mind  expresses  itself 
in  a  capacious  yearning  for  knowledge,  in  a  subtle  hostility  to  iguo- 
rance,  and  a  persistent  seeking  after  truth.  The  mind  is  that  vital 
something  that  prompts  to  inquiry,  demands  explanations  of  mysteries, 
laughs  at  fables  and  superstitions,  and  mourns  over  denials  of  its 
requests.  The  truth-prompting  factor  of  the  mind  is  proof  of  its 
ability  to  know  and  understand  truth.  Equipped  with  mind,  it  is  as 
evident  that  man  is  related  to  the  realm  of  knowledge  as  that,  fur- 
nished with  eyes,  he  is  related  to  physical  things  or  the  realm  of 
observation.  Only  by  a  denial  of  mind,  or  a  rejection  of  those  facul- 
ties we  denominate  mental,  and  which  distinguish  man  from  the 
mastodon,  can  the  possibilities  of  agnosticism  be  entertained.  The 
ground-work  of  the  subject  is  the  intellectual  fitness  of  man  for 
knowledge,  not  how  much  he  has  acquired,  or  whether  he  has  ac- 
quired any,  nor  whether  his  methods  for  arriving  at  truth  are  con- 
sistent or  inconsistent,  but  whether  in  his  mental  constitution  there  is 
an  irrepressible  aptitude  for  knowledge,  any  receptive  or  open-door 
faculties  seeking  knowledge,  any  spontaneous  affinities  with  truth, 
any  unquenchable  purpose  to  find  the  truth.  Without  this  inbred 
predisposition  to  knowledge,  this  inherited  and  dominant  familiarity 
with  the  kindred  forms  of  truth,  knowledge  is  impossible.  If  mind 
is  mere  nerve-force,  and  mental  action  a  physical  throb,  agnosticism 
may  be  true ;  but  if  it  is  a  divinely  illuminated  entity,  a  spirit-acting 
force,  agnosticism  is  false,  for  the  realm  of  knowledge  may  be  entered 
by  such  a  force.     Mind  admitted,  knowledge  is  possible. 

Assuming  the  possibility  of  knowledge  from  the  fact  of  mind,  we 
proceed  with  our  inquiry  in  the  form  of  a  fourfold  analysis :  I.  The 
source  of  knowledge.  II.  The  subject-matter  of  knowledge,  the  real 
or  the  phenomenal.  III.  The  limitations  of  knowledge.  IV.  The 
methods  of  acquiring  knowledge. 

The  source  of  knowledge  is  a  philosophical  problem  over  which 
the  greatest  thinkers   have  bent  their  energies,  pronouncing  results 


EVILS  OF  SENSATIONALISM.  213 

neither  wholly  satisfactory  nor  totally  unsatisfactory.  Does  the  know- 
ing, perceiving,  thinking  mind  know  by  an  intuitional  power,  or  by 
immediate  revelations  of  truth  through  supernatui-al  agencies,  or  does 
it  strive  for  knowledge  through  physical  avenues?  One  is  not  com- 
pelled to  make  choice  here,  for  it  is  possible  that  the  mind  arrives  at 
knowledge  in  the  three  ways  indicated,  depending  not  on  any  single 
source  or  njethod  for  a  sufficiency  of  truth.  PhilosoiDhers  have  been 
guilty  of  advocating  single  sources  or  methods  ;  hence  the  confusion, 
the  utter  irreconcilability  of  their  theories  with  the  facts  of  psychologi- 
cal history. 

The  old  theory  of  sensationalism,  that  sense-perception  is  the  foun- 
dation of  mind-conception,  or  knowledge  derived  through  the  senses, 
which  has  corrupted  philosophy  from  the  days  of  Aristotle  until  now, 
bears  the  mark  of  the  common  deficiency  ;  it  is  too  exclusive  as  an 
explanation  of  the  mind's  activities  and  resources,  and  fails  to  account 
for  knowledge. 

Among  the  Greeks,  according  to  Cudworth,  the  intellectual 
states  which  had  a  purely  internal  origin,  were  named  noemata,  or 
thoughts  ;  while  those  of  external  origin  were  called  aisthemata,  or 
sensations.  By  virtue  of  the  sensations  the  external  intellect  is  de- 
veloped ;  by  virtue  of  thoughts  the  internal  intellect  unfolds.  But 
the  empirical  psychologist  knows  no  difference  between  thought  and 
sensation ;  sensation  is  thought,  and  the  external  is  the  internal  in- 
tellect.    This  is  a  blending  of  things  entirely  separate. 

Aristotle,  though  not  the  first  teacher  of  empiricism,  gave  it  phil- 
osophical form,  and  must  be  charged  with  the  responsibility  of  its 
introduction.  Plato  began  with  ideas  ;  Aristotle  with  things.  Plato's 
starting-point  was  the  ego;  Aristotle's  the  non-ego.  In  elucidation  of 
the  mind  Aristotle  classified  it  into  two  parts— the  Passive  or  Recep- 
tive Intellect,  and  the  Active  or  Creative  Intellect — a  division,  if 
properly  qualified  or  expressed,  not  specially  objectionable ;  but  it  has 
wrought  incalculable  mischief  in  that  the  empirical  schools  of  phil- 
osophy, ignoring  the  creative  character  of  intellect,  have  constructed 
an  argument  from  its  purely  receptive  character  for  the  rankest  ma- 
terialism. The  mind  may  be  both  passive  and  active,  says  Aristotle ; 
the  empiricist  says  it  is  passive  only  ;  the  truest  philosophy  will  pro- 
nounce it  active  only,  and  never  passive.  The  condition  of  mind  is 
activity.  The  passivity  of  mind  opens  the  way  for  sensationalism 
as  the  source  or  theory  of  knowledge.  Locke,  taking  it  up, 
found  it  convenient  to  deny  to  mind  not  only  activity,  but  in- 
heritance, or  possessions.  It  is  an  empty  thing,  ready,  like  a  cask, 
to  be  filled  with  whatever  is  poured  into  it.  Passivity,  emptiness, 
empiricism — these    are    logical    steps ;    and  Locke  took  them,    since 


214  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

whose  day  a  large  brood  of  sensational  tliefiries  have  hovered  over  the 
psychological  realm.  The  French  philosophers  carried  Locke's  con- 
jectures to  the  wildest  extremes,  denying  immortality  and  responsi- 
bility, with  a  plausibility  that  threatened  the  extinction  of  the  moral 
foundations  of  society. 

Is  there  no  truth  in  sensationalism  ?  Is  it  all  an  absurdity  ?  Was 
Locke  entirely  mistaken  ?  Was  Aristotle  misunderstood  and  perverted, 
or  is  there  some  truth  in  the  theory  of  empiricism  ?  It  must  be  con- 
ceded that  the  senses  are  avenlxes  of  some  kinds  of  knowledge  ;  that 
is,  many  streams  of  truth  seem  to  flow  along  the  channels  of  the 
senses,  and  at  least  alphabetic  or  symbolic  knowledge  is  the  result. 
An  ox  looks  upon  the  landscape  that  attracts  the  eye  of  Laudseer ; 
a  dog  may  hear  the  organ  whose  keys  Beethoven  fingers  to  the  delight 
of  thousands  ;  but  there  is  a  diflereuce  in  the  results  of  seeing  and 
liearing,  and  it  is  this  difference  that  makes  for  the  immortality  of 
man,  and  which  is  singularly  overlooked  by  materialists.  The  ox  is 
not  affected  by  beauty,  or  botanical  structure,  or  laws,  or  the  relation 
of  part  to  part ;  he  can  not  analyze  the  flower  or  interpret  the  mean- 
ing of  the  plains  and  the  mountains ;  he  can  not  measure  the  dimen- 
sions of  a  field  or  calculate  the  age  of  a  tree.  Nor  can  the  dog  explain 
the  process  of  hearing,  or  distinguish  the  notes  of  the  organ,  or  sepa- 
rate the  melody  from  the  discord  of  the  instrument.  Sense-knowledge, 
or  knowledge  by  sensation,  must  be  superficial.  Eyes  and  ears  are 
the  gateways  of  the  streams — nothing  more.  They  do  not  know  any 
thing  ;  they  report  only  what  passes  through  them.  Back  of  these  re- 
porters must  be  something  that  distinguishes  in  the  reports  the  true 
and  the  false,  the  beautiful  and  the  deformed,  the  right  and  the 
wrong.  It  is  the  classification  of  the  reports  of  the  senses  that  consti- 
tutes hnoxdedge,  and  it  is  this  power  of  classification  that  distinguishes 
man  from  the  ox.  He  sees  more  than  form  and  color  ;  from  these  he 
goes  to  structure,  law,  growth,  beauty,  inferring  scientific  principles, 
and  fashioning  at  last  the  sciences  themselves.  Sense-knowledge 
stops  with  the  outline  of  things,  a  mere  recognition  of  their  existence, 
without  the  recognition  of  their  properties,  laws,  harmonies  and  func- 
tions. It  furnishes  materials,  but  can  not  combine  them  into  truth, 
or  even  index  their  meaning.  It  may  spell  out  the  words,  but  can  not 
pronounce,  much  less  define  them.  Evidently,  then,  to  assume,  as 
does  James  Mill  that  all  our  knowledge  of  objects  is  the  sensations  they 
produce,  or  that  sense-perception  is  the  sole  inspiration  of  human 
thinking,  is  to  assume  what  is  objectionable  on  the  ground  of  its  su- 
perficiality, for  it  does  not  include  all  the  facts  of  knowledge. 

In  man's  present  state  he  is  somewhat  dependent  on  empirical 
sources  for  knowledge  of  physical  things ;  but  this  dependence  must 


INTUITIONAL  KNOWLEDGE.  215 

not  be  confouuded  Avith  origin,  a  distinction  that  philosophy  has  not 
recognied.  Malebranche  insisted  that  the  material  world  can  not  im- 
press itself  upon  the  immaterial  soul,  that  our  ideas  of  things  are  not 
derived  from  the  things  themselves,  a  reaffirmation,  as  the  reader  will 
remember,  of  the  dualism  of  Descartes ;  but  this  is  as  extreme  as  dualism 
itself.  The  defect  of  the  Cartesian  teaching  is  its  complete  separation 
of  mind  and  matter,  whereas  they  sustain  mutual  relations,  and  ex- 
hibit interactions  in  their  history  and  manifestations.  Sensationalism 
is  defective  in  holding  that  the  external  world  is  the  source  of  knowl- 
edge ;  dualism  is  equally  defective  in  teaching  the  absolute  separation 
of  mind  and  matter  ;  while  with  Beneke  we  believe  that  the  "  with- 
out "  stimulates  the  mind's  activity,  and  yet,  differing  from  him,  that 
'  it  has  an  independent  power,  which  enables  it  to  create  thought  and 
arrive  at  truth  without  the  influence  of  any  empirical  auxiliary 
whatever. 

To  notice  this  independent  power  is  now  proper.  In  the  natural 
order  of  the  mind's  development  the  intuitions  make  themselves  felt 
first,  having  authority  over  sensations,  conduct,  and  the  outward  life, 
and  constitute  the  fiber  of  original  experiences  and  history.  Intui- 
tional knowledge,  or  the  contents  of  the  consciousness,  are  of  the 
highest,  purest,  and  simplest  kind,  being  different  in  this  respect  from 
sensational  knowledge,  which  is  always  complex  and  somewhat  delu- 
sive. From  a  sensation  arises  a  complex  notion,  as  the  touch  of  a 
piece  of  marble  suggests  more  than  the  idea  of  hardness  or  whiteness ; 
from  an  intuition  emerges  a  single,  simple,  decisive  idea,  as  self-exist- 
ence, identity.  The  complexity  of  sensational  ideas  led  Locke  to 
speak  of  them  as  chimerical,  as  the  centaur  is  a  complex  but  chimer- 
ical idea.  Consciousness,  or  an  intuitional  idea,  always  suggesting 
necessary  truth,  presents  it  in  simplest  form,  from  which  combina- 
tions and  complexities  may  arise,  but  in  no  case  are  they  chimerical. 
A  chimerical  sensation  is  possible ;  a  chimerical  intuition  is  an 
absurdity. 

According  to  Hume,  the  consciousuess  is  panoramic,  reflecting 
images,  ideas,  facts,  but  it  is  also  dynamic  ;  that  is,  self-impelling,  or 
a  reservoir  of  self-contained,  immutable  truth.  Not  only  are  images 
or  impressions  of  truth  seen  in  the  consciousness,  but  truths  them- 
selves, imbedded,  as  it  were,  in  the  very  constitution  of  the  moral 
nature.  Intuitional  truth  is  necessary  in  its  very  nature,  but  Spencer 
repudiates  the  theory  of  necessary  truth  ;  but  if  intuitionalism  can 
be  destroyed  only  by  the  sacrifice  of  the  contents  of  consciousness,  or 
the  primary  ideas  of  the  intellect,  it  will  endure  until  the  end  of  the 
race.  Zeno  the  Stoic  agreed  that  the  mind  entertains  ideas  not  de- 
rived from  the  senses  ;   that  they  are  connatural  to  us ;  that  they  be- 


216  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

long  prima  facie  to  the  mind;  that  they  are  intuitions,  Reid,  in 
framing  his  theory  of  "  original  suggestion,"  protested  against  the 
Lockeian  formula  of  a  barren  mind,  and  insisted  that  the  mind  drew 
from  its  mysterious  depths  ideas  which  not  only  were  regulative,  but 
constitutive  in  essence  and  function.  Among  these  ideas  are  those  of 
self-existence,  identity,  space,  time,  unity,  number,  causation,  ac- 
countability, right,  and  wrong.  Jacobi  said  we  see  God  through  the 
intuitions.  These  are  necessary  truths,  beliefs  independent  of  ex- 
perience, primary  conceptions,  the  noeinata  of  the  Greeks,  the  inter- 
nal intellect  acting  and  originating  for  itself 

The  theory  of  the  intuitional  source  of  knowledge  is  as  old  as  sen- 
sationalism, Plato  having  held  that  the  human  mind  contained  ideas 
not  derived  from  experience,  and  that  they  were  connatural  to  it. 
This  conception  of  the  mind,  or  idealism,  drove  Aristotle  into  sensa- 
tionalism, and  the  two  doctrines  have  clashed  in  the  conflicts  of  the 
ages.  The  existence  of  the  intuitions  or  intuitional  faculties  is  not 
now  in  dispute  ;  we  accept  them  as  the  facts  of  our  mental  nature,  a 
part  of  our  intellectual  furniture,  by  the  use  of  which  certain  truths, 
called  primary  or  axiomatic,  we  recognize.  That  an  effect  must  have 
a  cause  is  a  rational,  an  intuitional  truth.  The  belief  in  the  exist- 
ence of  God,  the  notions  of  right  and  wrong,  the  haunting  sense  of 
responsibility  for  conduct,  the  correlated  ideas  of  finite  and  infinite, 
unity  and  multiplicity,  and  quality  and  substance,  and  all  those  in- 
stincts which  guide  in  morals,  relationships,  occupations,  and  re- 
ligions are  classed  among  those  truths  denominated  intuitional. 
Certain  mathematical  axioms  or  principles  also  belong  here.  Locke 
is  mistaken  when  he  says  they  can  not  be  pointed  out.  In  a  sense, 
they  are  born  in  the  mind  without  scientific  influence,  aid,  or 
regulation. 

Intuitional  truths  are  those  formerly  known  as  "  innate  ideas," 
against  which  the  sensationalists  aimed  their  thunderbolts  ;  but  cer- 
tain it  is  that  such  truths  exist,  or  the  mind  is  not  a  spiritual  entity. 
It  is  either  a  perfect  blank,  a  reservoir  of  emptiness,  or  it  possesses 
inherent  truths.  Between  the  doctrine  of  innate  ideas,  as  Plato 
teaches  in  the  Phcedo,  and  the  tabida  rasa  conception  of  Locke,  one 
must  prefer  the  former.  Accepting  Plato  on  this  point,  we  do  not 
accept  his  doctrine  of  reminiscence  as  the  explanation  of  knowledge 
or  the  explanation  of  intuitional  truth,  for  that  involves  his  doctrine 
of  the  pre-existence  of  the  soul.  Intuitionalism  does  not  necessarily 
involve  pre-existence,  as  pre-existence  does  not  involve  intuitionalism. 
The  connection  between  them  is  the  result  of  a  philosophical  strain 
which  philosophy  can  not  bear. 

What  is  the  mind  ?     Is  it  any  thing  ?     Is  it  a   waxen  tablet  for 


THE  LAW  OF  SPONTANEOUS  REASON.  217 

receiving  impressions,  or  has  it  the  power  of  making  impressions? 
Has  it  knowledge  of  itself,  or  only  the  capacity  for  knowledge  ?  Of 
steam  it  may  be  said  that  it  is  not  only  capable  of  power,  but  also  it 
is  power,  and  when  employed  it  is  power  in  exercise.  Latent  power 
is  power.  Latent  knowledge  is  knowledge.  The  mind  possesses 
knowledge  in  itself,  is  full,  not  empty  ;  hence  education  is  literally  a 
drawing  out  of  the  contents  of  the  mind,  and  not  putting  into  it,  any 
thing  from  the  outer  world.  It  is  not  a  citadel  of  darkness,  but  a 
center  of  light.  The  mind  goes  not  to  the  world  for  knowledge,  but 
the  world  goes  to  the  mind  for  truth.  Intuitional  truth  precedes  sen- 
sational trutli,  and  is  the  test  of  it.  No  truth  can  be  accepted  that 
contradicts  the  intuitions  ;  but  truths  may  be  received  that  contradict 
the  sensations.  Intuitional  truth  arises  from  the  constitution  of  the 
mind,  is  primary,  fundamental,  to  be  received  without  challenge ; 
sensational  truth  arises  from  the  fluctuating  reports  of  the  senses,  and 
needs  to  be  carefully  scrutinized  before  being  adopted. 

Kindred  to  the  contents  of  the  consciousness  are  the  products  of 
the  spontaneous  reason,  as  materials  of  knowledge,  to  be  appropriated 
and  used  in  the  grand  march  of  the  ages.  By  the  spontaneous 
reason  is  meant  neither  intuition  on  the  one  hand,  which  is  not 
reason,  nor  reflection  on  the  other,  which  is  directed  reason,  but  a 
midway  functional  force,  an  intellectual  rational  conviction,  consist- 
ent in  essence,  and  self-vindicating  in  its  final  form.  There  is  in  man 
a  spontaneous,  unreflective  reason  in  contrast  to  that  which  reflects, 
syllogizes,  analyzes,  synthesizes.  Often  in  the  unlearned  there  is  a 
clearness  in  the  apperceptions  of  reason  that,  being  wholly  spontaneous, . 
without  any  premeditated  analysis,  astonishes  the  learned.  The  nat- 
ural philosopher  and  his  servant  reach  the  same  conclusion  respect- 
ing the  agency  of  fire  in  the  economy  of  nature ;  both  agree  as  to 
its  relation  to  life ;  the  one  frames  complex  notions,  the  other  simple, 
but  the  conclusions  are  the  same.  In  a  simple  way  the  spontaneous 
reason  conducts  to  a  knowledge  of  substance,  power,  being ;  gives 
tokens  of  a  true  ontology,  while  the  developed  reason  fashions  them 
into  formulae. 

Kant  was  fond  of  saying  that  knowledge  takes  the  form  of  the 
mind,  one  of  the  mischievous  errors  in  his  philosophy,  since  it  is  fatal 
to  uniformity  of  knowledge  of  truth.  If  the  mind  give  form  to 
knowledge,  as  the  color  of  a  vessel  appears  to  give  color  to  the  liquid 
in  it,  then  intuitional  knowledge  will  be  individualized,  and  each 
man,  as  Protagoras  taught,  will  be  the  measure  of  all  things,  and  all 
truths  as  well.  Reid  well  says,  "  When  we  have  an  idea  of  some  ob- 
ject as  round,  we  are  not  to  infer  that  the  mental  state  is  possessed 
of  the  same  quality ;  when  we  think  of  any  thing  as  extended,  it  is 


218  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

not  to  be  supposed  that  the  thought  itself  has  extension  ;  when  we 
behold  and  admire  the  varieties  of  color  we  are  not  at  liberty  to  in- 
dulge the  presumption  that  the  inward  feelings  are  painted  over 
and  radiant  with  corresponding  hues."  Clearly,  knowledge  is  not 
governed  by  the  form  of  the  mind  ;  truth  is  not  mind-molded,  but 
mind-assimilated,  mind-received,  mind-projected. 

If  the  spontaneous  reason  is  a  source  of  knowledge.  Reason  itself, 
or  Reflection,  must  be  allowed  a  place  also  in  the  category.  Hegel 
once  taught  that  the  acquisition  of  knowledge  is  possible  through 
pure  thought,  a  position  which  contemporaneous  philosophy 
unanimously  condemned.  Is  pure  thinking  a  possibility?  May 
mental  absorption  be  so  complete,  so  uninfluenced  by  any  thing  but 
mind,  that  new  truth  will  be  the  product  of  its  soliloquies?  The 
Athenians  held  their  assemblies  at  night  that  they  might  not  be  dis- 
turbed by  visible  things — can  the  mind  retire  within  itself,  or  shut 
the  doors  of  the  visible  and  in  itself  contemplate  the  great  problems 
of  theology,  psychology,  and  ontology?  The  rational  power,  ex- 
ercised exclusively  upon  invisible  things  and  guided  by  its  own  cat- 
egories of  thought,  must  succeed  in  the  acquisition  of  intellectual 
truth ;  pure  thinking  under  such  circumstances  must  result  in  pure 
knowledge.  By  reflection,  however,  we  do  not  mean  pure  thought 
in  the  Hegelian  sense  but  that  faculty  which  in  possession  of  facts 
and  truths  is  able  to  generalize  them,  and  combine  them  into  systems. 
The  reflective  reason  could  not  exercise  if  there  were  no  objects  of 
reflection.  It  moves  out,  therefore,  from  its  own  domain  in  search  of 
reprisals  in  the  form  of  truths  and  facts,  unfurling  its  flag  upon  the 
widened  seas  of  knowledge,  and  running  down  the  piratical  crafts  of 
error,  and  fraternizing  with  all  truth.  Reason  may  occupy  itself  with 
nature  searching  for  its  laws,  or  with  man  probing  mind,  or  with 
God  bringing  him  nearer  to  the  view.  In  whatever  direction  it  goes, 
it  will  find  the  path  broad,  long,  perhaps  thorny,  but  it  has  a  goal, 
the  discovery  of  truth  in  some  of  its  myriad  forms.  Reason  is  dia- 
lectic in  form,  substance,  authoritv. 

Not  all  truth  is  attainable  through  sensation,  intuition,  or  the 
double  reason  ;  there  is  a  realm  of  knowledge  that  sense-perception 
can  not  invade,  and  which  the  intuitional  powder  can  not  fully  com- 
mand. If  a  realm  of  truth  is  beyond  the  invasion  of  the  senses,  the 
intuitions,  and  the  reasons,  then  the  source  of  knowledge  must  be 
beyond  these  instruments  of  inquiry.  In  both  cases  the  supposition 
is  correct.  There  is  a  realm  of  truth  beyond  the  sensational,  the  in- 
tuitional, the  rational ;  there  is  therefore  a  source  of  knowledge  not 
yet  mentioned. 

Such  truth  is  wholly  supernatural,  supersensible  ;   the   source  of 


MEANING  OF  INSPIRATION.  219 

knowledge,  inspiration  and  revelation.  The  difference  between  in- 
spiration and  revelation  is  very  like  the  difference  between  the  spon- 
taneous and  the  reflective  reason,  both  essentially  the  same,  but  in  form 
and  extension  different.  Revelation  is  written  inspiration.  Inspiration, 
as  a  source  of  knowledge,  is  treated  with  indifl'erence  by  modern 
philosophy,  but  Plato  in  the  Ion  speaks  of  a  divine  power  moving 
men,  which  he  compares  to  magnetism,  and  also  to  the  influence  of 
a  god  on  the  priestesses  of  Bacchus,  which  enables  them  to  draw  milk 
and  honey  from  rivers.  If  poets  and  musicians  and  priestesses  may 
be  influenced  by  the  gods,  why  may  not  the  magnetic  power  come 
upon  men  in  search  of  truth  and  help  them  to  find  it?  This  is  in- 
spiration, a  purely  philosophical  doctrine  when  thoroughly  understood. 

In  the  theological  sense,  inspiration  is  the  impression  of  the  divine 
Spirit  upon  the  human  mind  conveying  positive  knowledge,  or  so 
illuminating  the  understanding  that  its  conceptive  power  is  intensified 
to  that  degree  that  it  easily  discovers  and  readily  discerns  the  truth. 
In  another  form,  inspiration  is  a  divine  sensation,  the  counterpart  of 
physical  sensation.  Both  have  external  sources,  the  one  material, 
the  other  spiritual.  Inspiration  is  as  valid  as  sensationalism  ;  it  is 
sensationalism  refined.  The  only  ground  of  assault  upon  it  lies  in 
the  results  of  the  higher  sensation,  which,  however,  are  in  keeping 
with  its  sphere  of  action  and  influence.  Pure  or  physical  sensations 
result  in  external  knowledge  ;  refined  or  divine  sensations  result  in 
supernatural  knowledge.  In  the  one  case,  matter  impresses  mind,  and 
mind  becomes  acquainted  with  matter ;  in  the  other,  God  impresses 
mind,  and  mind  becomes  acquainted  with  God.  Sensation  is  Nature 
rapping  at  the  door  of  the  intellect ;  inspiration  is  God  tapping  on 
the  windows  of  the  soul. 

It  should  be  remembered  that  if  God  is  what  he  is  supposed  to 
be,  a  personal,  all-wise,  merciful  being,  he  will  be  as  eager  to  com- 
municate himself  to  man  as  man  will  be  to  receive  the  communica- 
tion. If  he  is  the  universal  mind,  the  mind  of  minds,  himself  the 
All-thought,  it  is  inconceivable  that  he  would  not  impress  himself  upon 
mind  wherever  he  found  it.  Nature,  hard,  mindless,  characterless, 
touches  us  at  five  points,  speaking  by  signs  and  symbols  and  in  a 
langviage  we  partly  understand  ;  is  the  mighty  God,  mind  of  minds, 
unable  to  reach  us?  As  Prof.  Bowne  puts  it,  "If  God  is  finite  we 
can  reach  him  ;  if  he  is  infinite  he  can  reach  us."  Inspiration  is 
God  reaching  us.  The  Duke  of  Argyll  phrases  faith  in  inspiration 
in  the  following  manner:  "That  the  human  mind  is  always  in  some 
degree,  and  that  certain  individual  minds  have  been  in  a  special  de- 
gree, reflecting  surfaces,  as  it  were,  for  the  verities  of  the  unseen  and 
eternal  world,  is  a  conception  having  all  the  characters  of  coherence, 


220  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

which  assure  us  of  its  harmony  with  the  general  constitution  and  the 
common  course  of  things."  The  mind  is  a  reflecting  surface  for  eternal 
truths — this  is  inspiration,  and  as  philosophical  as  to  say  that  the  mind 
is  a  reflecting  surface  for  physical  truth. 

What  are  the  truths  derived  from  inspiration?  The  truths  of  in- 
spiration, like  the  truths  of  sensation,  intuition,  and  reason,  are  in 
harmony  with  their  source,  the  Artesian  principle  being  as  applicable 
in  the  one  case  as  in  the  other.  Truth  rises  no  higher  than  its 
source.  From  sensation  a  knowledge  is  obtained  of  material  phe- 
nomena; from  intuition,  mind-truths;  from  reason,  rational  truths; 
from  inspiration,  inspired  or  supernatural  truths.  God  in  his  attri- 
butes, eternal,  infinite,  omnipotent,  omnisceut,  immutable,  holy, 
merciful,  just;  God  in  his  relations  to  the  world  as  Creator,  Preserver, 
Upholder;  God  as  Redeemer,  Judge,  Rewarder;  the  eternal  world, 
the  immortality  of  man,  the  character  and  possibilities  of  the  soul  in 
the  future  state ;  these  and  many  other  truths  are  valid  subjects  of  in- 
spiration, without  which,  indeed,  they  can  not  be  known.  Granting 
the  necessity  of  inspiration  as  a  means  of  knowledge  of  supernatural 
truth,  it  has  been  alleged  that  it  is  difficult  to  discriminate  between 
truth  professedly  acquired  by  inspiration,  and  that  which  mysticism, 
fanaticism,  and  superstition  have  endeavored  to  fasten  upon  the  world 
as  from  God ;  that  is,  the  line  of  difference  between  inspiration  and 
superstition  is  not  clearly  drawn,  hence  the  latter  often  imposes  itself 
for  the  former.  The  objection  rests  upon  historic  data,  and  is  ad- 
mitted to  be  forceful.  The  Neoplatonists,  as  sincere  as  any  religious- 
philosophical  sect,  plunged  into  the  excesses  of  mysticism,  claiming 
inspiration  for  their  utterances,  and  divine  direction  for  their  deeds. 
What  was  the  claim  of  Pope  Pius  IX.  to  infallibility  but  the  assertion 
of  inspiration  ?  Errors,  false  doctrines,  misinterpretations  of  Scrip- 
tural truth,  and  fanaticism  in  all  forms,  have  been  sustained  by  the 
assumption  of  divine  support,  discrediting  the  doctrine  of  inspiration 
by  teachings  subversive  of  it. 

Allowing  that  the  doctrine  has  been  perverted,  misused,  and  cred- 
ited with  unworth}^  associations,  it  must  still  be  maintained  that  in- 
spiration, that  is,  the  in-breathing  of  spiritual  knowledge  by  the 
divine  Spirit,  is  a  probability,  a  certainty;  and  it  is  for  man,  by  the 
right  use  of  reason,  so  far  as  it  will  apply,  to  separate  between  the 
true  and  the  false,  the  human  and  the  divine — a  task  attended,  we 
admit,  with  no  little  embarrassment. 

Owing  to  these  embarrassments,  there  is  need  of  a  supplemental, 
or  final  and  satisfactory  source  of  knowledge,  which  is  found  in  reve- 
lation, or  the  written  form  of  inspired  truth.  The  value  of  the 
written  form  is  that  it  remains  the  same   throucjh  the  ages,  and  can 


NECESSITY  OF  REVELATION.  221 

be  tested  by  one  age  as  well  as  another ;  it  varies  not,  hence  it  is  a 
standard  of  truth.  • 

The  integrity  of  the  alleged  revelation  of  truth  we  do  not  now 
consider,  but  mention  it  as  one  of  the  accepted  sources  of  knowledge 
to  millions.  How  a  truth  can  be  revealed  in  the  way  claimed  involves 
a  study  of  supernatural  methods  which  for  the  most  part  are  myster- 
ious, but  which  are  as  reliable  as  natural  methods,  which  are  no  less 
mysterious  also.  Familiarity  with  empirical  methods  does  not  enable 
us  to  explain  them  ;  and  intuitional  processes  are  as  obscure  to  us  as 
the  miraculous.  Sense-knowledge  is  as  mysterious  as  inspired  knowl- 
edge. Whether  knowledge  come  to  us  from  the  world  through  the 
senses,  or  from  God  through  the  mind  alone,  the  mystery  is  as  great 
in  the  one  case  as  the  other,  and  philosophy,  accepting  one,  must 
finally  accept  the  other. 

The  necessity  of  the  revelation  of  higher  truth  is  also  as  conclusive 
as  the  necessity  of  knowledge  of  it  at  all ;  and  the  alternative  is, 
either  not  to  know  it  at  all,  or  to  know  it  by  the  supernatural  method 
of  revelation.  Accepting  revelation,  what  a  realm  of  truth  is  open 
to  human  vision  and  to  the  possession  of  faith  !  St.  Aquinas  used 
to  remark  that  the  beginnings  of  knowledge  are  the  morning  walks 
of  faith,  but  it  is  equally  true  to  say  that  the  beginnings  of  faith  in 
revelation  are  the  morning  walks  of  knowledge.  Not  that  the  knowl- 
edge thus  furnished  is  complete,  but  it  is  a  key  to  openings  in  the 
vast  realm  of  supernaturalism,  a  knowledge  of  which  is  desirable. 
By  the  sense-method  our  knowledge  of  the  physical  world  is  painfully 
incomplete,  and  were  the  mind  to  rely  upon  eyes  and  ears  alone  we 
should  walk  in  a  blacker  than  Egyptian  darkness.  The  intuitional 
process  reports  a  limited  number  of  truths,  without  explanation,  im- 
posing them  upon  our  recognition  by  the  great  weight  of  their  author- 
ity. So  revealed  truth  may  be  wanting  in  that  thoroughness  and 
completeness  which  belongs  to  the  other  methods,  and  still  be  a  reve- 
lation. Concerning  revealed  truths,  we  are  emphatic  in  the  assertion 
that,  since  they  are  of  God  on  the  supposition  that  there  is  a  revela- 
tion at  all,  they  are  more  reliable  than  either  the  intuitional,  which  is 
of  man,  or  the  sensational,  which  is  of  matter.  Revealed  truth 
should  have  the  greatest  authority,  sensational  truth  the  least.  The 
one  brings  us  nearer  to  realities,  exposes  the  invisible  foundation  of 
things,  makes  the  universe  transparent,  and  sounds  like  the  voice 
of  God ;  the  other  acquaints  us  with  phenomena  alone,  and  points  to 
forms.  That  which  philosophy  rejects  should  have  the  first,  and  that 
which  it  accepts  the  last,  place  in  the  category  of  sources  of  human 
knowledge. 

It  is  not  our  intention  to  vindicate  the  Scriptures  in  any  theologi- 


222  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

cal  sense,  but  to  consider  them  philosophically  as  a  source  of  knowl- 
edge. Fitche  boldly  acknowledged  the  necessity  of  a  revelation ; 
Schelling,  though  prejudiced  against  the  Bible  as  a  whole,  adopted 
Johannean  Christianity  as  the  best  exponent  of  the  highest  truth ; 
Hegel  regarded  Christ  as  the  "self-externalizing  idea;"  Locke  rever- 
ently read  the  Scriptures,  and  was  a  Christian  believer. 

Turn  to  Revelation,  and  what  are  its  teachings  respecting  funda- 
mental problems?  In  the  writings  of  Moses,  as  throughout  the 
Bible,  the  existence  of  God  is  assumed  but  not  proved.  Is  the  as- 
sumption unphilosophical?  Is  it  an  instance  of  a  petitio  principiil 
Philosophy,  failing  for  the  want  of  a  proper  starting-point,  has  invariably 
ended  in  fog  or  drift;  Revelation,  beginning  with  the  First  Cause,  the 
principle  of  principles,  the  being  of  beings,  explains  all  things.  The 
beginning  must  be  mind  or  matter,  but  matter  is  an  effect  of  mind. 
Philosophy,  contemplating  the  effect,  has  attempted  to  find  its  way 
through  the  a  posteriori  method  back  to  cause ;  Revelation,  contem- 
plating the  cause,  has  gone  a  priori  to  the  manifold  effect.  In  method 
of  procedure  one  is  the  reverse  of  the  other.  Beginning  with  the 
Beginner,  Revelation  is  a  narration  of  God's  unfolding  in  the  universe 
of  matter  and  his  presence  in  human  history,  accounting  for  worlds, 
races,  and  destinies;  beginning  with  effects,  philosophy  tediously  es- 
says to  climb  to  summits  beyond  its  vision,  lighting  its  pathway  with 
sparks  of  its  own  kindling.  Revelation  is  a  descent  of  truth ;  philos- 
ophy an  attempted  ascent  to  truth.  Revelation  is  explicit  where 
philosophy  is  vague  ;  full,  where  it  is  incomplete;  certain,  where  it  is 
in  doubt ;  knowing,  where  it  is  ignorant.  In  revelation  we  attain  to 
a  knowledge  of  God ;  in  philosophy  he  is  the  great  unknown. 

In  respect  to  man,  his  character,  the  account  of  his  moral  weak- 
ness, the  possibility  of  his  restoration  to  moral  greatness.  Revelation 
speaks  a  specific  truth.  Plato,  acknowledging  the  impurity  of  the 
race,  prescribed  intellectual  discipline  as  the  chief  means  of  purifica- 
tion ;  Gautama  prescribed  penances  and  transmigrations ;  Spencer 
foresees  the  natural  evanescence  of  evil ;  the  Bible  preaches  regenera- 
tion and  sanctification. 

In  respect  to  Nature,  origin,  character,  and  destiny,  the  Bible 
is  equally  definite  and  satisfactory ;  the  universe  is  the  effect  of  the 
creative  impulse  in  a  personal  deity.  Man  is  as  much  bound  to 
consider  the  teachings  of  Christ,  Moses,  Isaiah,  and  Paul,  as  he  is  fo 
heed  the  oracles  of  Plato,  Kant,  Hamilton,  Hume,  and  Spencer.  On 
intellectual  grounds,  not  more  can  be  claimed  for  the  latter  than  for 
the  former ;  on  spiritual  grounds,  the  former  must  be  preferred  to 
the  latter. 

Human  knowledge,  as  we  have  seen,  has  a  six-fold  source,  to  wit: 


SUBJECT-MATTER  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  223 

sensation,  intuition,  spontaneous  reason,  reflection,  inspiration,  revela- 
tion ;  but  these  may  be  reduced  to  three :  Nature,  the  source  of  sen- 
sation ;  Mind,  including  the  intuitions,  the  reason,  and  reflection ; 
and  Revehxtion,  including  inspiration.  The  first  is  the  simplest,  the 
commonest,  the  rudest ;  the  second,  more  refined,  but  limited ;  the 
third,  divine.  Nature,  Mind,  Revelation — these  three,  but  the  great- 
est of  these  is  Revelation. 

The  next  step  in  the  inquiry  is  that  which  concerns  the  subject- 
matter  of  knowledge.  What  do  we  know?  Is  knowledge  of  the  real, 
or  of  the  phenomenal  only?  This  is  a  broad  and  profound  question, 
to  be  answered,  if  answered  at  all,  in  the  spirit  of  carefulness  and 
humility,  for  the  agnosticism  of  the  day  is  persuaded  that  absolute 
knowledge  is  impossible.  Some  things  all  men  think  they  know,  and 
they  would  repudiate  the  philosophy  that  denied  to  them  such  knowl- 
edge. They  know,  as  they  think,  the  difierence  between  a  square 
and  a  circle,  not  so  much  as  mathematical  statements  as  forms  of 
matter.  Granted,  then,  that  men  understand  the  differences  in  the 
forms  of  matter.  This  is  a  beginning,  and,  as  knowledge,  is  valuable. 
It  involves  magnitude,  extension,  figure,  a  great  many  mathematical 
ideas  applied  to  planets  and  objects  on  the  earth.  No  one  would  say 
this  is  complete  knowledge ;  no  one  should  say  it  is  knowledge  re- 
specting the  object  at  all,  as  the  form  of  a  thing  is  not  the  thing 
itself.  Form  and  substance  are  by  no  means  the  same.  Glass  may 
be  shaped  into  a  bowl,  or  cup,  or  ball— the  form  diflferent,  the  sub- 
stance the  same.  Hence,  we  must  advance  a  little,  that  is,  know 
something  more  than  the  form  of  matter  to  know  what  matter  is. 

Many  men  believe  they  can  name  some  of  the  laws  of  matter. 
They  know  the  difference  between  inertia  and  motion,  attraction  and 
repulsion,  cohesion  and  adhesion,  chemical  aflSnity  and  gravitation, 
and  understand  the  late  doctrines  of  the  conservation  and  correlation 
of  forces.  Granted  that  our  familiarity  with  nature  is  on  the  in- 
crease, in  that  its  laws  are  being  discovered  and  understood.  This  is 
a  great  gain,  for  by  such  knowledge  we  may  explain  the  rotations  of 
the  planets,  calculate  their  distances  from  the  sun,  and  apprehend 
the  commonest  activities  of  the  natural  world.  But  should  one  ferret 
out  all  the  laws  of  nature,  and  comprehend  thoroughly  the  govern- 
ment of  the  physical  universe,  one  could  not  affirm  that  he  had  com- 
plete knowledge  of  things.  If  there  is  a  difference  between  the  form 
of  matter  and  its  substance,  there  is  even  a  greater  difference  between 
a  law  of  matter  and  its  substance.  Prof  Bowne,  the  gifted  meta- 
physician of  Boston,  insists  that  a  knowledge  of  the  law  of  a  thing  is 
a  knowledge  of  the  thing  itself;  and  it  is  admitted  that,  in  the  light 
of  his  elaboration,  the  statement  seems  unobjectionable;  but  we  can 


224  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

afford  to  pause  before  accepting  it  fully.  Theoretically  speaking,  the 
substance  might  exist  without  the  law  and  without  the  form ;  it  might 
be  formless,  it  might  be  lawless.  Law  is  no  part  of  matter,  is  not 
the  key  to  the  substance  of  matter,  although  it  is  a  key  to  the  ex- 
planation of  matter.  To  know  the  universe,  he  must  needs  know 
more  than  the  laws  which  produced  the  universe ;  they  explain  the 
how,  do  they  divine  the  wliatt  Is  the  how  the  what?  Can  one  know 
any  thing  beyond  law? 

Here  is  a  bar  of  iron — what  can  one  know  of  iron  ?  That  it  is 
malleable,  ductile,  hard,  non-transparent,  heavy,  solid,  durable,  useful. 
This  is  an  enumeration  of  some  of  the  properties  of  iron,  a  complete 
list  of  which  would  seem  to  broaden  our  knowledge  of  this  very  use- 
ful metal.  Here  is  a  branch  of  cedar,  or  there  a  block  of  marble, 
the  properties  of  each  being  distinct  and  clearly  defined.  This  is  a 
knowledge  of  the  properties  of  matter,  an  approach  to  a  knowledge 
of  its  substance,  and  an  advance  over  a  knowledge  of  the  forms  of 
matter.  Without  this  knoAvledge,  it  would  not  be  possible  to  use 
matter.  We  must  know  that  coal  is  combustible  in  order  to  use  it  in 
our  stoves,  grates,  and  furnaces.  To  understand  properties  is  appar- 
ently akin  to  an  understanding  of  substance. 

The  serious  question  is  now  at  hand :  Is  a  hioivledge  of  properties 
complete  knotvledgef  Do  we  know  the  substance  when  we  enumerate 
qualities?  Do  we  know  a  leaf  when  we  say  it  is  green,  rectangular, 
sweet?  We  are  in  trouble  at  this  point.  No  one  will  say  that  a 
knowledge  of  one  property  of  an  object  is  a  satisfactory  or  complete 
knowledge  of  it ;  and  it  is  a  question  if  a  knowledge  of  all  the  parts 
is  equivalent  to  a  knowledge  of  the  whole.  Between  properties  and 
substance  there  is  a  wide  gulf;  is  it  impassable  ?  If  not  impassable, 
what  is  the  bridge  ?  Can  we  go  back  of  properties  or  beyond  them 
in  the  direction  of  the  real?  or  must  we  stop  with  properties?  The 
delicate  threads  or  cables  extending  from  properties  to  substance  are 
invisible,  ambiguous,  anonymous,  difficult  to  trace,  since  they  do  not 
break  out  in  concrete  forms,  or  in  visible  points  or  knots.  We  say 
we  are  in  trouble.  Give  us  one  thread,  and  we  will  pull  our  way 
through  to  the  Real.  Is  there  any  realf  or  is  our  knowledge  of  the 
phenomenal  a  knowledge  of  all  that  exists?  Is  not  this  idea  of  a  real, 
as  distinguished  from  the  phenomenal,  a  mere  fiction,  a  dream  of  the 
philosopher?  or  is  it  a  substantive,  whose  manifestations  are  the 
properties,  forms,  laws,  and  -whatever  is  visible?  We  can  not  part 
with  tlie  idea  of  the  real ;  we  can  not  think  the  phenomenal  to  be 
the  all  in  all ;  but  how  to  connect  or  trace  the  connection  is  a  task 
which  many  assume  can  not  be  accomplished.  Let  us  assume  there 
is  such  a  connection ;   let  us  assume  the  reality  of  the  real ;  let  us 


LAW  THE  GREAT  REALITY.  225 

plunge  from  the  phenomenal  toward  the  real,  whether  we  alight  in 
darkness  or  on  the  solid  granite  of  reality.  Our  track  is  along  the 
line  of  law.  The  comiecting  link  between  phenomena  and  reality  is  law. 
The  explanation  of  all  things  is  law. 

Is  law  the  great  reality  ?  Is  law  substance  ?  Actually,  substance 
without  law  is  impossible ;  law  is  the  producing  agency  of  substance ; 
law  is  the  explanation  of  substance.  By  this  we  do  not  mean  gen- 
eral laws,  or  the  category  of  laws  as  enounced  by  science,  but  the 
particular  law  by  which  a  particular  thing  is  produced,  the  law  of  its 
existence,  or  the  law  of  its  activity.  In  this  higher  sense  law  is  sub- 
stance, and  a  knowledge  of  one  is  a  knowledge  of  the  other.  The 
highest  knowledge  is  not  of  forms,  nor  of  properties,  nor  of  general 
laws,  but  of  the  law  of  forms,  the  law  of  properties,  the  law  of  the 
unity  of  substance.  Under  this  transformation  the  world  is  but  the 
effigy  of  the  creative  principle,  the  outline  of  the  law  that  produced 
it.  Plato's  definition  of  law,  that  it  is  the  discovery  of  what  is,  sur- 
passes any  thing  ever  framed,  and  justifies  Bowne  in  claiming  that  a 
knowledge  of  law  is  a  knowledge  of  the  thing  it  produces  and  sustains. 
The  only  real  in  nature  is  law;  this  is  the  thiug-in-itself  which  Kant 
said  is  undiscoverable,  but  it  is  now  made  manifest.  The  Eleatics 
denied  the  existence  of  the  phenomenal  world,  but  failed  to  point  out 
the  underlying  reality.  The  reality  of  the  Eleatics  was  the  ego ;  but 
law  is  the  non-ego,  or  the  real  of  nature.  Knowledge  of  the  phe- 
nomenal centers  at  last  in  the  knowledge  of  the  real  that  produced  it. 

To  what  extent  may  the  mind  know  itself?  Is  self-knowledge  a 
possibility?  This  is  a  root-question,  sinking  itself  deeper  than  the 
other.  The  French  Leroux  denies  the  existence  of  the  me  or  ego, 
and  denies  that  man  can  know  himself  in  the  consciousness.  Can  he 
know  himself  at  all,  then?  Does  he  exist?  Locke  was  driven  by 
his  empiricism  to  deny  that  the  mind  can  know  itself,  and  sensation- 
alism generally  espouses  this  conclusion.  Drawing  a  distinction 
between  subject  and  object,  it  is  asserted  by  the  empirical  school  that 
the  mind  can  not  be  both  subject  and  object,  or  the  perceiving  and 
the  perceived,  the  knowing  and  the  known.  If,  however,  the  mind 
can  not  know  itself,  certain  it  is  that  mind  can  not  be  known,  for  it 
can  only  be  known  by  knowing  itself  Sir  John  Davies  held  to 
man's  capaliility  of  self-knowledge ;  Lord  Herbert  believed  in  innate 
ideas,  but  innate  ideas  imply  self-knowledge,  or  knowledge  of  the  con- 
tents of  the  mind.  The  intuitional  spirit  is  the  self-knowing  spirit.! 
The  mind  that  knows  any  thing  must  first  know  itself,  for  there  must 
be  a  mind  to  know  before  any  thing  can  be  known.  A  knowing  mind 
must  be  a  conscious  mind ;  if  conscious,  it  is  conscious  of  itself  be- 
fore it  is  conscious  of  any  thing  else ;  so  that  self-knowledge  is  first, 

15  . 


226  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

chronologically.  The  source  of  origiual  knowledge  is  not  sensation, 
as  some  schools  affirm,  but  consciousness.  Knowledge  postulates  con- 
sciousness; that  is,  self-knowledge  precedes  sensational  knowledge. 
The  experience-jDhilosophers  reverse  the  order,  and  make  the  former 
the  product  of  the  latter.  A  false  philosophy  is  always  disposed  to 
torture  facts,  but  facts  must  govern.  Self-knowledge  is  consciousness 
opening,  widening,  reporting  to  itself,  is  subject  and  object,  an  indi- 
visible unity,  a  stupendous  reality.  Self-knowledge  is  real,  sensational 
knowledge  phenomenal.  As  in  nature  the  real  is  back  of*  the  phe- 
nomenal and  takes  the  name  of  law,  so  in  self-knowledge  the  real  is 
back  of  the  sensational,  and  is  located  in  consciousness,  or  in  being 
itself,  postulated  by  the  fact  of  knowledge. 

The  greatest  Real  is  God.  Is  he  knowable?  Pushing  the  phe- 
nomenal far  from  us,  and  going  out  of  ourselves,  does  the  soul  scent 
the  atmosphere  of  the  infinite?  Do  the  shadows  of  the  infinite 
deepen  and  lengthen  toward  us  as  we  attempt  to  approach  it?  Surely 
the  going  toward  the  highest  Real  is  not  an  impossilile  experience. 
Repudiated  by  Spencer,  the  approach  to  a  personal  Real  is  in  the 
highest  degree  a  possibility,  a  matter  of  fact,  a  fact  of  experience. 
What  is  the  Real?  Let  us  not  deceive  ourselves  with  a  jugglery  of 
words.  The  Real,  remote  from  all  manifestation,  must  include  the 
essence  of  power,  and  wisdom,  and  the  integers  of  goodness  and 
justice.  It  must  mean  the  first  source  of  all  that  we  see,  hear,  and 
know.  It  must  suggest  a  producer,  an  organizer,  a  Creator.  In  a 
correlative  sense,  the  perishable  must  suggest  the  imperishable,  the 
deformed  the  beautiful,  the  formal  the  artificer,  the  phenomenal  the 
absolutely  unphenomenal  or  the  original  real.  The  real  must  be 
mind,  thought,  personality,  God ;  all  else  is  temporary,  fugitive, 
deceptive.  He  is  the  great  Real  in  the  universe,  the  one  source  of  all 
things,  knowable  because  he  is  reality.  The  phenomenal  is  less 
knowable  than  reality.  God  is  more  knowable  than  the  universe, 
since  it  fadeth,  but  he  abideth  forever.  The  great,  genuine  Real  is 
God ;  the  lesser  Real  is  man  ;  the  only  phenomenal  is  the  world,  its 
reality  being  hidden  in  the  law  by  which  it  is  made.  Law, 
mind,  God — these  three  are  the  only  reals,  but  the  greatest  of 
these  is  God. 

The  subject-matter  of  knowledge  is  the  history,  the  functions,  the 
prerogatives,  the  relations,  one  to  another,  of  the  reals;  a  vast  field, 
imperfectly  surveyed,  slowly  conquered.  The  incompleteness  of 
human  knowledge  is  frankly  admitted ;  it  has  always  been  incom- 
plete; the  conclusion  of  philosophy  is  that  it  will  always  be 
unsatisfactory. 

This  suggests  an  inquiry  into  the  limitations  or  boundary  lines  of 


LAW  OF  MOVABLE  LIMITATIONS.  227 

human  knowledge,  how  far  it  is  possible  to  go,  and  what  are  the 
probabilities  of  pushing  the  frontier  lines  a  little  beyond  their  pres- 
ent indications.  This  involves  not  so  much  a  critical  investigation 
of  the  subject-matter  of  knowledge  as  a  critical  study  of  the  power 
of  the  human  mind  to  comprehend  such  subject-matter ;  it  requires 
a  criticism  of  the  thinking,  knowing  mind,  and  not  a  criticism  of  the 
subjects  to  be  known.  Is  the  mind  under  fixed  limitations,  as  the  as- 
sociationalists  insist,  preventing  it  from  a  research  of  all  reality? 
The  metaphysical  theory  is  that  a  barrier  like  a  Chinese  wall  sur- 
rounds the  mind,  checking  its  advance ;  the  vision  of  the  intellect  is 
bounded  by  a  horizon  ;  and  these  limitations  are  fixed,  immovable, 
permanent,  final.  Knowledge  is  relative,  not  absolute,  according  to 
Hamilton  ;  phenomena,  not  substance,  may  be  known,  according  to 
Kant;  being,  power,  mind,  God,  are  forever  inscrutable,  according 
to  Spencer.  In  contrast  to  this  law  of  fixed  limitations,  we  shall 
aflEirm  that  the  mind  is  under  a  law  of  movable  limitations,  whereby 
its  progress,  however  difficult,  is  assured,  and  can  never  be  perma- 
nently impeded.  Whatever  limitations  confront  the  speculator  and 
truth-seeker,  they  are  apparently,  but  not  unchangeably,  fixed;  they  are 
movable,  yielding  to  persistent  advance.  If  there  is  a  horizon,  it 
always  recedes  as  one  approaches  it.  The  mind  is  on  the  march,  is 
incessant  in  its  going,  and  never  stops  because  it  can  go  no  farther.  It 
moves  by  its  own  impulses,  and  knows  no  latitude  or  longitude.  The 
universe  is  not  large  enough  for  its  activity. 

Are  there  any  limitations  which  estop  farther  advance?  Paul 
writes,  "  We  see  through  a  glass  darkly,"  but  we  see.  The  sight  is 
obscure,  uncertain,  but  it  is  sight,  certainly.  "  We  know  in  part," 
he  also  writes ;  but  we  know.  Along  this  line  we  may  interpret  the 
limitations  of  knowledge,  or  at  least  admit  vaguely-defined  limitations, 
since  Paul-  himself  does  not  name  them.  Partial  but  not  complete 
knowledge,  the  apostle  affirms,  belongs  to  our  present  state.  We 
will  illustrate  his  meaning.  Ordinary  sight  is  suflScient  for  practical 
life,  but  it  is  often  embarrassed  by  limitations,  and  makes  a  great 
many  mistakes.  On  the  prairie  it  will  decide,  unless  trained  to  meas- 
ure distances,  that  a  hill  or  house  is  distant  not  more  than  five  miles, 
when  it  is  fifteen  miles  away.  Respecting  magnitude  it  makes 
failures  equally  humiliating.  Distances,  magnitudes,  densities,  the 
untrained  eye  can  not  accurately  determine.  Some  things,  too,  as 
the  gases,  as  aniraalculse,  enterely  elude  the  searching  gaze  of  the 
eye.  We  do  not  quote  these  facts  so  much  as  incidents  of  a  defect- 
ive apparatus,  as  to  show  how  it  is  possible  to  see  and  know  in  part, 
and  not  see  and  know  in  whole.  We  know  in  part,  just  as  we 
see  in  part. 


228  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

Of  the  phenomenal  world  we  know  not  the  whole,  and  it  may  be 
that  it  will  never  be  entirely  known  ;  but  of  this  we  are  not  certain. 
As  a  field  of  investigation  and'  discovery,  it  is  rich  in  forms,  relations, 
laws,  and  principles,  rewarding  the  diligent  inquirer  by  opening 
the  passage-ways  to  its  mysteries,  and  declaring  its  grandeur  and  pur- 
pose to  him  who  seeks  to  know  it.  In  his  intense  search  for  the 
real,  man  is  continually  stumbling  over  the  phenomenal,  which  is 
full  of  truth  for  his  guidance  and  illumination ;  and  so  slothful  is 
the  mind  in  its  present  environment,  that  it  has  tardily  discovered 
the  physical  facts  it  most  needs  to  know.  For  ages  the  race  breathed 
the  air  without  knowing  its  composition.  Oxygen  at'  last  was  sighted, 
and  has  a  name.  What  is  true  of  the  air,  is  true  of  water,  the 
metals,  the  rocks,  the  trees,  the  stars.  Even  nature  invites  the 
largest  genius  and  covets  the  presence  of  the  investigating  spirit  of 
man.  Much  remains  to  be  discovered ;  the  forces  and  laws  of  nature 
are  still  in  obscurity ;  gases  are  but  feebly  understood ;  electricity  is 
a  runaway  power  that  needs  to  be  harnessed,  controlled,  directed ;  all 
the  properties  of  matter  have  not  been  divulged.  Some  properties, 
it  is  true,  may  be  so  exceedingly  fine  and  delicate,  so  invisible  even 
with  the  aid  of  the  most  powerful  instruments,  and  serve  such  occult 
purposes  in  the  economy  of  nature,  that  for  ages  to  come  they  may 
escape  detection,  and  man,  ignorant  of  them,  be  subject  to  accident 
or  danger,  which  he  might  otherwise  avoid. 

Very  few  laws  are  known  with  absolute  certainty.  Even  Newton 
at  one  time  lost  faith  in  the  law  of  gravitation,  which  he  announced. 
The  scientist  may  discover  the  factfof  a  law,  but  not  the  law  itself. 
Gravitation,  as  a  fact,  was  known  long  before  it  was  discovered  as  a 
law.  Magnetism  is  a  fact,  but  the  law  of  magnetism  is  another 
thing,  and  a  mystery.  The  facts  of  nature  are  within  easy  reach  ; 
the  laws  of  nature  may  be  beyond  immediate  grasp.  Facts  are  ac- 
cumulating; laws  are  the  invisible  influences  that  connect  the  phe- 
nomenal and  the  real ;  verily  they  are  the  real  in  the  phenomenal, 
and  must  be  sought  out  by  labor,  research,  comparison,  application. 
What  we  call  principles  of  science,  or  the  basis  of  scientific  proced- 
ure, the  phenomenalists  themselves — a  class  of  thinkers  who  veer 
toward  agnosticism — are  disposed  hesitatingly  to  use,  because  of  a 
suspicion  against  their  reliability.  Prof.  Clifford  declares  that  we  have 
no  right  to  assume  that  "the  laws  of  geometery  and  mechanics  are 
exactly  and  absolutely  true,  and  that  they  will  continue  exactly  and 
absolutely  true  forever  and  ever."  This  casts  suspicion,, if  not  odium, 
on  the  whole  fabric  of  science,  linking  phenomenalisra  to  agnosti- 
cism, and  giving  us  for  a  footing  nothing  but  "sinking  sand." 

What,  then,  can  be  known?     If  the  principles  of  science,  other- 


DIFFICULTIES  TO  ABSOLUTE  KNOWLEDGE.  229 

wise  the  laws  of  nature,  are  not  fully  established,  or  established  be- 
yond the  possibility  of  a  doubt;  if  men  are  still  groping  in  darkness 
respecting  the  fundamental  principles  of  the  government  of  nature ; 
and  if  scientists  themselves  suspect  the  reality  or  integrity  of  the 
laws  they  have  taugh^  others  to  respect ;  it  is  evident  that  man's 
knowledge  is  ignorance,  and  the  prospect  of  enlargement  is  lost  in 
the  saddening  and  hopeless  limitations  of  his  own  anarchy.  To  this 
dreary  conclusion  phenomenalism  conducts  us ;  but  this  conclu- 
sion we  reject. 

That  the  present  state  of  knowledge  is  one  of  deficiency  and 
difficulty,  it  is  freely  confessed ;  but  the  main  question  is,  whether  the 
deficiency  is  absolute,  and  the  difficulty  insurmountable,  or  is  the  dis- 
covery of  phenomena,  properties,  laws  a  rightful  expectancy?  The 
ascertainment  of  law  is  not  an  impossibility,  and  faith  in  mathe- 
matical principles  may  be  grounded  in  their  absolute  correctness,  as 
tested  in  life's  history.  Forms,  properties,  laws,  as  proper  subjects  of 
inquiry,  will  be  scientifically  apprehended  more  and  more,  and  so 
formulated  as  to  be  easily  understood.  If  our  knowledge  now  of 
these  things  is  of  a  doubtful  character,  it  is  proof  that  man  is  in  the 
transition  state  betAveen  suspicion  and  certainty ;  he  is  on  the  way  to 
positive  revelation  and  "much  assurance." 

If  difficulties  confront  us  as  we  inquire  into  phenomena,  or  natu- 
ral facts  and  conditions,  what  may  Ave  not  expect  when  realities  are 
the  subject-matter  of  search  ?  Of  mind  itself  what  is  known  ?  If 
we  study  matter  by  its  properties,  may  Ave  study  mind  by  its  attri- 
butes? Memory,  imagination,  judgment,  conscience,  will,  and  affec- 
tion belong  to  mind,  as  malleability  and  ductility  belong  to  iron. 
But  if  behind  the  properties  of  matter  is  the  real,  so  behind  the  at- 
tributes of  mind  must  be  the  mind  itself,  a  thought  that  compels  the 
consideration  of  mind  separate  from  its  faculties,  which  is  absurd  ;  or 
its  consideration  as  a  mere  aggregate  of  faculties,  Avhich  is  as  objec- 
tionable as  the  idea  that  matter  is  a  combination  of  its  properties. 
In  psychological  inquiry  Ave  separate  the  faculties,  and  discuss  them 
separately ;  but  in  point  of  fact,  the  mind  must  be  considered  in  its 
wholeness,  undivided  and  indivisible. 

The  fact  of  mental  operation  appeals  for  solution  ;  it  taxes  in- 
genuity to  its  utmost  tension.  This  is  a  field  for  the  most  persistent 
inquiry,  in  which  superficial  methods  of  study  will  avail  nothing. 
Mental  processes,  an  act  of  volition  or  judgment,  an  effort  of  the 
imagination,  the  dictatorial  voice  of  the  conscience,  the  proceeding 
of  the  memory,  the  exercises  of  affection,  elude  superficial  search  ;  but 
a  search  profound  and  prolonged  must  be  made.  Self-knowledge,  or 
the  mind  knowing  itself,  which  is  something  more  than  consciousness 


230  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

of  existence,  is  an  achievement  which  includes  a  knowledge  of  facul- 
ties, their  relations  and  processes,  the  spirit  of  reality  itself.  The 
attainment  of  such  knowledge  is  not  "too  high;"  it  is  not  beyond 
us.  If  it  has  not  been  acquired  by  this  time,  its  acquirement  belongs 
to  the  early  future,  possibly  to  our  own  day.  ^ 

The  great  Real,  or  God,  is  still  a  problem.  He  is  infinite,  man 
finite.  On  these  premises  the  unkuowableness  of  God  might  be 
predicated,  but  it  would  be  insufiicient.  Infinite  things  the  finite 
mind  may,  to  some  extent,  apprehend,  as  space,  time,  right,  justice, 
purity.  An  infinite  being,  or  combination  of  infinite  qualities,  such 
as  spirituality,  omniscience,  omnipotence,  immutability,  and  eternity, 
the  finite  being  may  not  completely  define,  but  it  is  a  question  if  hu- 
man ignorance  of  God  must  forever  remain  as  it  is.  Herbert  Spencer 
is  emphatic  in  the  belief  that  the  infinite  is  beyond  any  anthropo- 
morphic conception,  and  can  not  be  reduced  within  our  psychological 
limitations ;  but  if  correct  in  the  assumption  that  the  finite  can  not 
find  the  infinite,  it  remains  to  be  proven  that  the  infinite  can  not  re- 
veal himself  to  the  finite.  The  break-down  of  the  finite  is  repaired 
by  the  revelation  of  the  infinite,  which  religion  provides  in  its  book 
of  truth.  Revelation  is  not  anthropomorphic  ;  the  very  idea  of  reve- 
lation is  that  it  is  God  showing  himself,  and  not  that  it  is  man 
expressing  his  view  of  God.  Anthropomorphism  and  revelation  are 
antipodal  ideas.  The  revelation  of  the  Real  is  the  sure  source  of 
knowledge  of  the  Real.  As  we  study  matter  by  its  properties,  finding 
its  reality  in  law,  and  the  mind  by  its  attributes,  locating  its  reality 
in  consciousness,  so  we  study  God  in  the  light  of  his  manifested 
attributes,  discerning  his  only  reality  in  spirit,  or  conscious  being. 

"  We  know  in  part,"  but  we  know  all  along  the  lines  and  in  the 
direction  of  the  three-fold  realities  of  law,  mind,  and  spirit,  and  if 
there  are  limitations  they  are  not  the  limitations  of  the  reals,  but 
arise  from  the  subjective  inabilities  and  hindrances  of  the  mind  itself. 
Like  a  heroic  and  advancing  army,  the  mind  is  pushing  on  its  con- 
quests into  the  interior  of  the  enemy's  country,  assailing  the  castles 
of  ignorance,  and  really  threatening  to  invade  the  realms  of  the  in- 
finite. Surely  it  is  extending  its  base-line  tow^ard  the  summit,  and 
will  some  time  shout  the  word  of  triumph  from  the  apparently  inac- 
cessible heights  of  celestial  knowledge. 

In  this  faith  we  announce  that  the  mind  in  its  struggles  after 
truth  will  finally  demonstrate  its  power  to  remove  all  limitations  to 
advance,  and  will  compass  all  knowledge.  Acting  for  a  time  under 
the  law  of  movable  limitations,  it  will  finally  act  as  if  under  a  law 
of  removable  limitations,  breaking:  down  all  barriers,  and  contented 


LAW  OF  REMOVABLE  LIMITATIONS.  231 

with  its  knowledge  of  truth.  The  law  of  movable  limitations  is  in 
harmony  with  the  history  of  the  race ;  the  law  of  removable  limitations 
may  be  judged  a  mere  speculation,  but  it  is  the  real  law  of  progress, 
it  is  the  law  of  mind,  of  God,  and  is  the  opposite  of  the  philosophy 
of  ignorance.  It  implies  that  the  boundaries  of  knowledge  are  in- 
finite ;  that  is,  there  are  no  boundaries ;  the  universe  of  thought, 
being,  substance,  personality,  reality,  is  knowable,  and  if  knowable 
the  mind  is  not  piratical  in  seizing  it.  The  soul  that  keeps  house  in 
the  universe  of  God  must  at  last  be  at  home  anywhere  in  it,  with  a 
right  to  all  that  it  seeks  and  finds,  with  a  freedom  that  no  hindrance  can 
disturb.  Under  such  a  law  ignorance  is  contraband  in  the  universe, 
and  has  no  sure  abiding-place. 

With  these  two  laws  before  us,  we  see  the  mind  in  two  aspects: 
first,  the  mind  as  it  is,  crippled  but  pressing  on ;  second,  the  mind  as 
it  must  be,  unembarrassed  by  limitation.  Eespecting  its  limitations, 
we  see  them,  first  moved,  second  removed.  This  is  infinite  progress 
in  knowledge.  In  keeping  with  these  laws  we  may  classify  the  mind, 
and  designate  the  contents  of  knowledge.  There  is  the  spatial,  or 
longitudinal  mind,  which  is  bounded  by  space  and  time,  and  affected 
in  its  activities  by  their  contents.  Within  these  boundaries  it  moves, 
driving  back  the  limitations  of  knowledge  with  its  own  advancement,  and 
acquiring  a  familiarity  with  things  beyond,  by  which  it  is  lured  on- 
ward. It  unmasks  nature,  it  tears  the  bandage  from  its  own  eyes,  it 
walks,  it  flies,  it  seeks,  it  finds;  but  it  flies  with  broken  wing,  and 
seeks  the  truth  only  at  short  range.  The  spatial  mind  is  the  walled 
mind.  Then  there  is  the  ecuvxeniGol  mind,  which,  acting  in  harmony 
with  the  law  of  removable  limitations,  smiles  at  the  toyish  boundaries 
of  space  and  time,  overleaps  all  barriers  in  its  aspirations,  is  allo- 
pathic and  universal  in  its  conquests.  The  elasticity  of  mind  has 
been  admitted,  but  it  has  been  supposed  to  be  like  a  bow,  which 
would  bend  only  so  far  without  breaking ;  but  the  ecumenical  mind 
is  mobile,  divinely  tempered,  avaricious  of  knowledge,  runs  the 
blockade  of  phenomena,  and  sails  into  the  ports  of  universal  truth. 
It  is  exceedingly  familiar  with  some  truths,  and  has  a  bowing  ac- 
quaintance with  all.  Fitche  said  the  non-ego  is  a  hindrance  to  the 
ego  ;  it  is  a  temporary  hindrance  to  the  spatial  mind ;  to  the  ecumen- 
ical mind  limitations  are  invisible,  unknown.  Modern  philosophy 
deals  with  the  spatial  mind,  fixing  unalterably  its  limitations  ;  a  true 
philosophy  must  accept  the  law  of  removable  limitations,  under  which 
the  mind  becomes  ecumenical. 

The  conquest  of  truth,  hitherto  interrupted  by  the  sloth,  the  pas- 
sions, the  natural  blindness  of  man,  is  under  the  operation  of  the  law 


232  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

of  illimitable  progress,  an  admitted  possibility,  and  will  eventuate  in 
glorious  certainty.  God  is  better  known  to-day  than  at  any  time  in 
the  past ;  man  is  slowly  resolving  his  own  mysteries ;  nature  is  yield- 
ing her  secrets,  disclosing  her  laws,  and  revealing  origin  and  destiny. 
The  excavation  of  hidden  truth,  the  solution  of  trigonometrical  prob- 
lems, the  dissolution  of  metaphysical  nebulse,  must  go  on  until  the 
mind  is  satisfied  with  its  achievements,  aiid  glories  as  an  acknowledged 
monarch  in  the  vastness  of  its  kingdom.  Hamilton  admitted,  in  the 
following  declaration,  that  both  the  ego  and  the  non-ego  are  kuow- 
able:  "We  may  therefore  lay  it  down  as  an  undisputed  truth,  that 
consciousness  gives,  as  an  ultimate  fact,  a  primitive  duality— a.  knowl- 
edge of  the  ego  in  relation  and  contrast  to  the  non-ego,  and  a 
knowledge  of  the  non-ego  in  relation  and  contrast  to  the  ego."  This, 
though  contradicted  afterwards  by  Hamilton's  assertion  of  the  law  of 
relativity,  is,  to  our  thinking,  an  exact,  but  perhaps  not  final,  state- 
ment of  possible  intellectual  attainment;  the  ego  is  self-knowing;  it 
knows  the  non-ego;  it  knows  God. 

The  extension  of  knowledge  in  the  direction  of  absolute  realities 
implies  an  improvement  in  the  methods  of  research,  a  revisal  of  ex- 
»isting  methods  of  reasoning,  and  the  adoption  of  short-cut  processes  to 
realities.  It  may  be  that  the  syllogistic  methods  of  Aristotle,  the  Ba- 
conian system  of  induction,  and  the  Kantian  antinomies  should  be 
accepted  as  final,  and  that  an  entirely  new  method  of  inquiry,  in 
which  the  old  style  of  reasoning  will  be  incidental,  or  at  the  most  only 
auxiliary,  can  not  be  devised  ;  but  certain  it  is  that  the  highest  truth 
can  not  be  ascertained,  or  the  instrument  of  inquiry  is  faulty  and  in- 
sufficient. Considering  the  sources  of  knowledge,  we  affirm  that  a 
knowledge  of  truth  is  attainable ;  tridh  exists  only  to  be  known,  and 
if  not  known,  the  method  of  introduction  and  acquaintance  is  at  fault. 
Perhaps  the  old  methods,  seemingly  inadequate  and  certainly  insuffi- 
cient, may  not  be  rudely  set  aside,  but  be  incorporated  with  more 
efficient  methods  of  inquiry,  occupying  subordinate  but  useful  rela- 
tions to  the  highest  results.  No  one  method  is  at  present  supreme. 
Neither  induction  nor  deduction,  neither  the  a  priori  nor  the  a  poste- 
riori method,  is  complete  in  itself.  Each  is  wanting  in  something  to 
make  its  last  word  infallible.  The  scientific  method  of  inquiry,  em- 
bracing the  four  steps  of  observation,  analysis,  classification,  and  con- 
clusion has  flooded  the  world  with  inharmonious  theories,  and  arrayed 
science  against  itself  Touching  geological  questions,  the  age  of  the 
world  in  particular,  the  scientific  method  has  been  singularly  fruitful 
of  contradictory  results,  and  especially  prolific  of  error  when  applied 
to  religious  truth,  showing  the  necessity  of  a  revisal  of  the  method. 


STUMBLING-BLOCKS  TO  PROGRESS.  233 

Metaphysical  theologians  not  a  few  have  conceded  that  the  demon- 
stration of  the  existence  of  God  by  the  a  'priori  method  is  impossible, 
while  the  materialists  ridicule  the  a  posteriori  method  when  applied  in 
defense  of  the  theistic  idea..  The  assault  on  these  various  methods 
by  different  thinkers,  and  the  unsatisfactory  results  obtained,  justify 
the  belief  that  a  new  method,  retaining  the  excellences,  but  relieved 
of  the  deficiencies  of  the  old,  by  which  the  gateway  to  truth  will  be 
opened,  will  some  time  appear. 

The  greatest  stumbling-block  to  intellectual  progress  is  perhaps 
Kant's  "antinomies;"  that  is,  if  the  mind,  in  its  struggles,  is  bound 
by  these  contradictions,  as  laid  down  by  the  German  philosopher, 
there  can  be  no  progress.  His  first  antinomy  admits  and  denies  a 
"  beginning  ;"  his  second  antinomy  assumes  and  rejects  simplicity  of 
origin  ;  his  third  antinomy  joins  freedom  and  necessity  in  the  mind's 
deliberations ;  his  fourth  antinomy  accepts  and  rejects  the  idea  of 
a  necessary  being,  or  cause  of  all  things.  How  can  the  mind  ascend 
under  such  a  load  of  contradictions  ?  Yet  philosophy  stands  in  awe 
of  this  Kantian  environment,  refusing  to  proceed  beyond  it,  and  suc- 
cumbing to  the  adversity  of  ignorance  within  its  bounds.  Evidently, 
escape  from  the  environment  is  the  next  duty  of  the  mind  ;  freedom 
from  the  reign  of  the  "  insoluble  contradictions"  must  be  the  cry  of  a 
true  philosophy. 

The  weaknesses  of  the  present  methods  of  reasoning  is  that  in 
many  respects  they  are  artificial,  the  framework  of  metaphysicians, 
who,  instead  of  discovering  from  the  mind  itself  the  method  of  its  ac- 
tivity, have  invented  a  method  and  imposed  it  upon  the  mind. 
Reasoning  must  be  conducted  according  to  reason  ;  reflecting  must  be 
governed  by  the  reflective  faculty  ;  the  mind  must  make  its  own 
method.     Discoverers,  not  inventors,  are  in  demand. 

New  methods,  freedom  from  embarrassments,  persistence  in  claim- 
ing the  possibility  of  acquaintance  with  all  truth,  a  rejection  of  the 
philosophy  of  ignorance,  must  characterize  the  attempts  of  the  human 
mind  in  the  future,  if  its  progress  toward  reality  be  real  itself. 

Aristotle,  Bacon,  Kant — who  next? 


234  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 


CHAPTER  X. 

THE)    Ti>AMV    OF"    CAUSALITY;     OR     EFFICIENT    CAUSE. 

IN  the  early  morning  an  Arab  saw  the  foot-priut  of  a  camel  near  his 
tent-door.  It  made  no  impression  upon  him,  because  he  was  not 
unacquainted  with  the  quadruped  that  made  it ;  but  the  stranger  whom 
he  lodged  Avas  all-anxious  to  see  the  camel.  Empiricism  studies  the 
foot-print,  and  is  unaroused  from  its  monotonous  stupidity ;  philosophy 
ought  to  flame  with  a  desire  to  find  the  camel.  Empirical  psycholo- 
gists, evolutionists,  associatioualists,  all  heroically  assert  that  there  is 
no  camel ;  the  foot-print  made  itself;  it  evolved  from  prior  conditions  of 
soil  and  climate ;  or,  if  a  camel  is  conceded,  he  is  pronounced  altogether 
unknowable. 

We  have  chosen  to  present  a  great  philosophical  principle  in  this 
fable  form,  in  order  to  bring  it  out  in  its  clearness,  and  to  fasten  the 
mind  upon  the  differences  that  subsist  between  being  and  non-being, 
or  between  cause,  as  an  originating  influence,  and  effect,  as  its  legiti- 
mate result. 

Is  there  a  dividing  line  between  cause  and  effect  ?  Is  there  a  dif- 
ference between  phenomena  and  noumena  ?  Either  phenomena  must 
explain  themselves — that  is,  possess  the  principle  of  reality,  and 
stand  as  self-existences — or  they  must  be  referred  to  some  external 
principle  competent  to  produce  them.  The  choice  is  between  the 
foot-print  and  the  camel.  It  is  pleasant  to  sojourn  in  the  region  of 
phenomena;  it  is  not  easy  to  climb  rays  of  light,  or  go  toward  the  sun 
with  opened  eyes.  But  the  philosopher's  vocation  compels  him  to  go 
back  of  phenomena  to  sources,  back  of  effects  to  causes  ;  and  he  is  not 
a  philosopher  who  does  not  strive  to  do  it.  If  unsuccessful  in  his 
search,  he  can  console  himself  with  the  reflection  that  he  attempted  to 
break  through  the  network  of  phenomena,  or  scale  its  bold  heights, 
but  was  unable  to  do  so. 

The  problem  of  efficient  cause  has  a  bearing  on  the  fundamental 
questions  of  philosophy  and  religion  ;  hence  its  importance,  and  the 
demand  for  careful  investigation.  The  discussion  of  the  problem  we 
shall  conduct  under  the  following  heads  :  1.  The  Basis  of  the  Law  ; 
2.  The  Spirit  of  the  Law  ;  3.  Objections  to  the  Law ;  4.  Value 
of  the  Law. 

If  the  doctrine  of  efficient  cause  can  stand  upon  its  own  merits — 
that  is,  if  it  can  be  separated  from  other  "  causes,"  and  be  viewed 


SECOND AR  Y  CA  USES  ELIMINA  TED.  235 

independently — its  basis  will  be  made  manifest,  and  its  vindication 
will  be  supreme.  Philosophy  can  not  be  charged  with  a  spirit  of 
simplicity,  either  in  the  distinctions  it  makes,  the  terms  it  employs, 
or  the  systems  it  constructs.  So  great  sometimes  are  the  systems  it 
builds — for  example,  Hegel's  and  Kant's — that  one  wearies  in  trying 
to  remember  them,  and  often  loses  sight  of  the  main  issue  in 
the  superabundant  dress  with  which  they  are  clothed.  The  doctrine  of 
causation  has  suffered  from  philosophical  padding  until  it  has  stag- 
gered with  its  load.  The  generic  idea  of  cause,  simple  enough  in 
itself,  has  been  expanded  with  the  aid  of  refined  distinctions  into  four 
different  kinds  of  causes,  only  one  of  which  is  essentially  a  cause. 
Would  one  sweep  them  out  of  the  circle  of  investigation,  as  a  servant 
does  the  cobwebs  from  the  ceiling,  the  voice  of  criticism  would  be 
heard  ;  but  the  problem  would  be  simplified,  and  the  task  of  solution 
relieved  of  embarrassment.  Newton  advises  against  the  multiplication 
of  causes  without  necessity. 

Plato,  in  the  Statesman,  distinguishes  between  "co-causes"  and 
"  causes"  as  follows  :  "  Such  arts  as  do  not  fabricate  the  thing  itself, 
but  prepare  instruments  for  the  fabricating  (arts),  without  the  pres- 
ence of  which  the  proposed  work  could  not  be  effected  by  each  of  the 
arts,  these  are  co-causes  ;  but  those  which  fabricate  the  thing  itself 
are  causes."  Co-causes  are  secondary  causes  ;  but  the  efficient  cause 
is  that  which  produces  the  thing  itself ;  it  stands  to  the  result  in  the 
relation  of  a  creative  power. 

Neither  Aristotle's  famous  four-fold  division  of  causes  nor  Plato's 
"co-causes,"  nor  any  secondary  causes,  belong  to  a  study  of  the  cre- 
ating or  originating  cause  of  things.  Separating  the  latter  from  all 
other  causes,  however  related  they  may  be  to  it,  its  basis  can  the 
more  clearly  be  ascertained.  The  basis  of  the  law — that  is,  its  existence — 
may  be  predicated  by  either  the  a  priori  or  the  a  posteriori  method ; 
but  the  a  priori  method  is  little  less  than  an  assumption.  To  reason 
from  cause  to  effect  is  possible  only  by  assuming  the  cause,  unless  the 
existence  of  cause  can  be  demonstrated  without  any  reference  to 
effect,  but  effect  is  involved  in  cause.  The  idea  of  cause  is  implicit 
with  the  idea  of  effect,  and  neither  can  be  considered  as  if  the  other 
did  not  exist.     The  a  priori  method,  therefore,  involves  an  assumption. 

To  reason  from  effect  to  cause  requires  no  assumption  whatever. 
Effect  is  a  fact,  and  is  not  in  dispute  ;  eaiise  is  in  dispute.  To  en- 
force the  doctrine  of  causation  by  first  assuming  it  is  not  the  truest 
way  of  defending  or  defining  it.  The  basis  of  the  law  of  causality  is 
in  the  a  p)osteriori  method  of  reason.  Given  an  effect,  the  first  in- 
quiry relates  to  what  produced  it.  "We  pick  up  a  round  pebble 
from  the  beach,"  savs   Balfour  Stewart,  "and   at  once  acknowledge 


236  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

there  has  been  some  physical  cause  for  the  shape  into  which  it  has 
been  worn."  The  color  of  a  leaf,  the  sides  of  a  crystal,  the  fins  of  a 
fish,  the  velocity  of  the  wind,  the  approach  of  the  seasons,  are  sug- 
gestive of  cause.  The  inquiry  raised  is  usually  simple,  not  complex, 
and  the  answer  expected  is  not  complex,  but  simple.  The  cause,  not 
causes,  we  seek  to  know.  Examination  and  reflection  may  lead  to 
the  consideration  of  co-causes,  but  the  mind's  first  inquiry  is  for  a 
single  cause.  The  basis  of  the  law  is  in  the  intuitional  structure 
of  the  mind,  acting  in  the  a  posteriori  manner  for  the  ascertainment 
of  truth.  There  is  nothing  stronger  than  an  intuitional  law  or  truth. 
Gravitation  is  not  an  intuitional  law ;  it  must  first  be  observed,  then 
verified  by  experiment.  Intuitional  laws  or  truths  require  no  inde- 
pendent verification.  The  criteria  by  which  they  may  be  determined 
are  as  follows  :  1.  Self-evidence  ;  2.  Logical  priority  ;  3.  Universality ; 
4.  Necessity. 

By  these  criteria,  the  law  of  causality,  or  its  basis  in  rational 
intuition,  may  be  discovered.  A  noise  is  heard  in  Indianapolis  at  six 
o'clock  every  morning.  A  stranger  will  inquire  the  cause.  A  sav- 
age, an  Egyptian,  a  Chinaman,  if  in  the  city,  will  make  the  same 
inquiry.  The  great  cannon  at  the  arsenal  is  fired  at  that  hour,  and 
the  whole  city  hears  it.  The  strangei^'s  inquiry  for  the  cause  is  based 
upon  the  following  conditions :  it  is  self-evident  that  there  is  a  cause ; 
the  idea  of  cause  antedates  every  thing  else ;  his  inquiry  is  the  inquiry 
of  all  who  hear  it  for  the  first  time,  and  is  in  a  sense  universal;  and 
he  finds  it  absolutely  necessary  to  make  it.  The  idea  of  cause  is  an 
intuitional  idea.  It  finds  expression,  therefore,  in  all  languages,  it  is 
the  underthought  of  all  science,  it  is  the  leading  factor  in  all  history, 
and  the  essential  element  in  all  religion. 

When  Mill  attributes  the  idea  to  the  habit  of  "association,"  he 
makes  no  explanation  of  it  at  all ;  for  it  may  be  asked,  whence  the  habit 
of  associating  a  cause  with  an  effect,  if  there  is  no  absolute  connection 
or  relation  between  them?  Comte  denies  that  ca^ise  may  be  known; 
but  the  denial  is  compatible  with  a  faith  in  the  existence  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  causation.  One  may  not  know  cause,  but  believe  in  cause. 
That  is  a  narrow  view  of  universal  history  which  limits  the  interpre- 
tation of  the  order  of  things  to  a  mere  succession,  which  reduces 
natural  phenomena  to  a  series  of  antecedents  and  consequents  without 
any  known  connection,  which  denies  a  nexus  between  historic  events, 
and  emphasizes  the  visible  progress  of  the  ages  as  an  accidental  and 
undesigned  order.  "We  think  things,"  says  Kant,  "in  the  relation 
of  cause  and  effect ;"  we  can  not  think  otherwise.  The  idea  of  mere 
succession  in  nature  and  history  is  objectionable,  because  it  contains 
not  the  key  to  an   explanation  of  things ;   it  can  not  even  explain 


BASIS  OF  EFFICIENT  CA  USE.  237 

itself.  If  nature  or  history  is  a  succession  of  events  without  causal 
order,  there  will  be  some  difficulty  in  tracing  the  succession  ;  but  even 
allowing  succession  and  that  it  can  be  traced,  the  tracer,  going  back, 
will  finally  reach  a  time  when  there  was  a  first  event.  A  first  event 
in  the  line  of  succession  is  inevitable.  No  difil'rence  what  it  was,  it 
occurred ;  and,  occurring,  the  mind  comes  forward  with  its  demand 
for  explanation.  Admit  that  both  nature  and  history  are  successwiis, 
from  which  the  causal  order  and  the  law  of  causality  have  disappeared, 
the  beginning  of  nature  and  history  was  not  a  succession.  There  was 
an  antecedent  that  did  not  follow  a  consequent,  but  there  never  was 
a  consequent  that  did  not  follow  an  antecedent.  Whence  the  first 
antecedent? 

Advocates  of  succession  are  embarrassed  by  a  dilemma,  as  difficult 
of  solution  as  any  thing  presented  in  philosophy.  Dr.  Carpenter  in- 
sists that  scientists  confine  themselves  to  the  order  of  nature,  and  the- 
ologians study  the  caiise  of  nature.  This  is  a  division  of  labor  which, 
observed  by  both  parties,  will  result  in  the  discovery  of  both  the  or- 
der and  the  cause  of  nature.  Order  and  cause  are  two  things.  Mill, 
Hume,  and  others  have  reduced  the  order  to  succession,  but  this  is 
unsatisfactory ;  and  theologians,  not  a  few,  have  assumed  the  cause, 
which  is  equally  unsatisfactory. 

The  mind  demands  a  cause  ;  its  rational  activities  ai-e  grounded  in 
the  principle  of  cause,  and  can  be  explained  on  no  other  principle. 
The  idea  of  cause  is  a  rational  intuition  ;  it  may  be  urged  as  a  religious 
precept  and  a  philosophical  principle,  but  its  foundations  are  in  the 
consciousness,  or  the  rational  exercise  of  mind.  An  inquiry  may  be 
raised  at  this  point.  Will  a  phenomenon  father  its  cause?  Will  an 
event  point  unerringly  to  the  particular  influence  that  produced  it? 
What  causes  dew,  frost,  hail,  snow,  rain?  Intuitionally,  we  decide 
at  once,  as  the  snow  falls,  as  the  rain  pours,  that  it  has  been 
caused ;  the  idea  of  cause  is  irresistible ;  but  what  the  cause  is, 
the  intuitions  do  not  decide.  There  is  need,  therefore,  of  other 
faculties,  or  the  exercise  of  other  mental  powers.  Reason  now 
exerts  itself  to  find  out  the  particular  cause,  but  is  inactive  until 
the  intuitions  first  suggest  that  there  is  a  cause.  Intuition  originates 
the  thought  of  cause  ;  reason  seeks  to  know  the  cause.  The  basis 
of  efficient  cause  is,  first,  intuitional,  and  second,  rational.  We  go 
one  step  farther,  and  affirm  that  the  law  of  causation  has  a  relia- 
ble basis  in  experience.  Hume  opposed  miracles  on  the  ground, 
as  he  alleged,  that  they  were  contrary  to  experience.  In  his  judg- 
ment, experience  is  a  standard  or  the  ultimate  test  of  the  reality  of  a 
thing.  Unwilling  to  concede  so  much,  for  it  savors  of  sensationalism, 
we  are  quite  willing  to  submit  the  law  under  consideration  to  so  severe 


238  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

a  test.  For,  if  it  is  contrary  to  universal  experience  that  effects  are 
caused — in  other  words,  if  events  occur  without  being  caused — it  will 
be  difficult  to  convince  men  of  the  operation  of  the  law  of  causation 
in  nature,  or  win  their  faith  in  it  as  a  principle.  If  required  to  point 
out  the  nextts  between  an  effect  and  its  cause,  in  order  to  establish 
faith  in  the  connecting  link,  it  can  be  done  in  cases  without  number ; 
but  no  argument  can  be  made  against  it  in  cases  in  which  the  nexus 
is  concealed,  for  many  of  the  processes  of  nature  are  hidden  and  can 
not  be  announced.  To  conclude  that,  since  a  process  is  hidden,  there 
is  no  process,  is  as  reasonable  as  to  conclude  that,  since  the  nexus  is 
unknown,  there  is  no  connection.  So  far  as  experience  is  worth  any 
thing,  it  establishes  that  an  effect  without  a  cause  is  impossible.  The 
savage  recognizes  this  principle;  a  scientist  is  necessary  to  explain  it. 
But  it  is  the  fact  of  the  principle,  and  not  its  explanation,  that  must 
first  be  ascertained.  The  proof  of  the  principle  is  in  the  mind's 
structure  and  the  necessities  of  thought,  or  in  the  intuitions,  the 
reason,  and  experience. 

Accepting  the  law  of  causality  as  established,  we  inquire  more 
particularly  now  into  the  content  of  the  law  itself,  or  the  processes 
of  its  exhibition  both  in  nature  and  history.  With  Dr.  McCosh's 
definition  of  cause  we  can  not  express  unqualified  satisfaction. 
"Cause,"  he  says,  "consists  in  the  mutual  action  of  two  or  more 
bodies;  that  is,  their  action  on  each  other."  This  is  a  limitation  of 
the  arena  of  cause  to  physical  existences,  precluding  the  operation  of 
cause  outside  of  the  physical  realm,  and  preventing  it  where  one  body 
only  exists.  This  limitation  is  not  warranted  by  the  facts.  It  is 
true,  we  deal  with  cause  as  we  see  it  in  the  natural  universe,  but  it  is 
not  true  that  the  idea  of  cause  involves  "mutual  action,"  or  a  "duality 
or  plurality  in  causation."  If  two  bodies  must  exist  before  cause  can 
operate,  if  the  two  must  influence  each  other  before  an  effect  is  pos- 
sible, one  body  is  powerless  to  do  any  thing  in  an  independent  way, 
or  by  virtue  of  its  laws.  To  admit  this  is  to  pluck  up  the  law  to  its 
very  roots.  The  idea  of  causation  is  not  mutual  action,  but  single,  in- 
dependent action.  Regarding  causation  as  the  primary  law  of  creation, 
or  as  the  underlying  principle  of  cosmical  order,  it  implies  God's  inde- 
pendent action.  Creation  was  not  the  "mutual  action"  of  God  and 
matter,  but  the  single,  independent  action  of  God.  If  the  root-idea 
of  causality  is  opposed  to  the  idea  of  "  mutual  action,"  its  application 
throughout  nature  must  be  grounded  in  the  single,  independent  action 
of  cause.  Mutual  action  of  bodies  and  forces  may  subsequently  occur, 
but  it  is  co-operation,  it  is  combination  ;   it  is  not  causation. 

With  Herbart's  conclusion,  that  every  action  is  due  to  several 
causes,  we  can  not  agree,  since  it  involves  the  idea  of  plurality  in 


MA  TEE  TALIS  TIC  INTERPRETA  TION  OF  CA  USA  TION.     239 

causatioD,  whereas  the  idea  of  causation  is  simple,  and  the  root  of 
causation  is  single  and  independent  in  creative  power.  The  expres- 
sion of  the  principle  of  cause  in  the  universe,  or  just  how  the  law  of 
causality  maintains  itself  in  the  phenomenal  world,  is  a  problem  over 
which  the  strongest  minds  have  pondered  with  enthusiasm  and 
anxiety.  While  various  explanations  of  its  activity  have  been 
framed,  they  may  be  reduced  to  two  general  propositions,  each  in 
content  opposed  to  the  other,  and  each  advocated  by  brilliant  and 
distinguished  thinkers:  1.  Materialism,  atheism,  pantheism,  and  evo- 
lution virtually  subscribe  to  the  same  interpretation,  in  that  they 
more  or  less  eliminate  the  divine  presence  from  the  universe,  assum- 
ing that  it  is  self-acting,  self-centered,  and  self-sufficient.  2.  Theism 
asserts  divine  control,  and  insists  upon  the  divine  presence  in  the 
universe.  Whatever  form  the  interpretation  takes,  it  is  the  old 
question.  Is  God  in  the  world? 

Prof.  Tyndall  affirms  that  matter  received  at  the  time  of  its  formal 
organization  a  quantum  of  energy  sufficient  for  its  purpose  until  the 
end ;  hence,  there  is  no  need  of  divine  supervision.  Prof.  Huxley 
regards  force  as  a  manifestation  of  something  unknown,  but  which  he 
suspects  is  a  material  phase  of  the  Deity ;  but  Deity  is  only  present 
through  force.  Cudworth  suggested  the  existence  of  a  plastic  nature, 
on  which  the  Creator  works,  by  which  to  sustain  the  phenomenal 
world.  Dr.  Laycock  attributes  to  nature  an  organizing  intelligence. 
These  represent  the  different  phases  of  the  materialistic  conception  of 
the  universe  in  its  sustained  forms  and  activities.  They  are  consistent 
with  a  theistic  conception  of  the  origin  of  the  universe,  but  in  run- 
ning it  on  independent  principles,  or  by  self-guiding  forces,  an  athe- 
istic world  is  the  result.  It  now  runs  itself  The  laws,  forces, 
forms,  and  activities  imparted  to  it  in  its  atomic  state  are  sufficient  to 
preserve,  guide,  and  develop  it.  The  world  retains  the  impelling 
cause  or  force  communicated  to  it  in  the  beginning.  It  is  as  if  one 
would  say  that  a  top,  being  set  in  motion,  would  acquire  and  retain 
the  impelling  motion  forever. 

Theism,  both  scientific  and  Christian,  introduces  the  divine  pres- 
ence everywhere.  Lotze  represents  the  scientific  side.  Dr.  B.  F. 
Cocker  the  Christian  idea.  Causation  is  the  direct  manifestation  of  the 
divine  will  in  phenomena.  God  is  everywhere  present,  and  in  every 
thing.  He  personally  supervises  all  things,  small  and  great,  in 
the  universe.  Force  is  the  energizing  spirit  of  God.  He  is  in  na- 
ture, not  outside.  He  is  in  law  ;  he  is  law.  Joseph  Cook,  expound- 
ing this  idea  and  subscribing  to  the  doctrine  of  divine  immanence, 
says  :  "  We  talk  of  matter  as  if  it  were  a  hand,  and  not  a  glove  with 
a  hand  in  it.     So  far  as  matter  is  inert,  it  is  glove  only.     This  glove 


240  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

may  be  taken  off;  the  supersensible  reality  at  the  core  of  it — the 
spirit — is  God,  and  is  indestructible."  Even  more  explicitly  does  he 
express  himself:  "  In  a  better  age  science,  lighting  her  lamps  at  that 
higher  unity,  will  teach  that  although  he  whom  we  dare  not  name 
transcends  all  natural  laws,  they — the  natural  laws — are  through  his 
immanence  literally  God."  Dr.  Cocker  glories  in  the  thought  of  the 
divine  immanence,  supporting  it  on  Scriptural  grounds,  and  is  as  con- 
clusive as  Joseph  Cook  and  Lotze  in  the  use  of  the  scientific  method. 

The  danger  of  the  doctrine  of  the  Divine  Immanence  is  its  pan- 
theistic complexion,  which,  however,  is  guarded  against  by  the  ac- 
companying doctrine  of  the  Divine  Transcendency.  God  is  in  nature, 
but  above  it.  He  dwells  in  the  universe,  but  is  superior  to  it,  pre- 
serving, guiding,  and  developing  it.  He  not  only  authorizes  phenom- 
ena,  but  he  produces  them.  He  is  the  causal  spirit  in  the  universe. 
He  not  only  originated  the  universe,  but  he  also  sustains  it.  He  is 
not  only  the  First  Cause,  but  also  the  present  Cause.  He  is  Cause. 
To  this  conclusion  both  science  and  religion  must  come.  God  is  not 
an  outsider  or  spectator  of  his  works.  He  is  in  his  works,  and  yet 
different  from  them.  One  of  his  ancient  names  was  "  mover  ;"  he  is 
the  mover,  the  originator,  of  all  changes,  of  all  activities.  Believing 
in  the  principle  of  cause,  it  has  its  embodiment  in  personality,  mani- 
festing himself  in  law  and  phenomena. 

The  objections  to  the  law  of  causality  must  receive  attention.  In 
these  pages  we  seek  the  truth,  and  if  belief  in  the  law  is  a  result  of 
education,  or  if  it  have  no  foundation  in  fact,  it  is  well  to  know  it. 
If  valid  objections  can  be  raised  to  the  principle,  they  ought  to  be 
candidly  reviewed.  Alexander  Bain  declares  the  doctrine  of  efiicient 
cause  unimportant ;  but  if  this  is  true,  we  are  at  a  loss  to  know  what 
is  important.  The  doctrine  implies  a  going  to  the  root  of  things,  just 
what  he  has  been  trying  to  do  by  the  materialistic  route,  but  without 
success.  It  can  only  be  unimportant  in  the  sense  that  some  other  doc- 
trine is  more  important ;  practically,  the  social  and  moral  questions 
of  life  may  be  more  important;  metaphysically,  it  is  the  only  impor- 
tant question — there  is  no  other  question.  The  correct  interpretation 
of  the  law  of  causality  includes  the  correct  interpretation  of  God  and 
the  universe. 

The  standing  objection  of  Hume,  Mill,  and  Comte,  that  the  phe- 
nomena of  causation,  or  the  phenomena  of  succession,  may  be  recalled 
for  examination.  The  constancy  of  succession,  or  the  uniformity  of 
like  results  from  like  conditions  or  causes,  has  been  overlooked  by  the 
objectors.  Why  is  there  never  a  break  in  the  royal  line  of  succes- 
sion ?  Certain  effects  always  follow  certain  so-called  causes.  Why  no 
disturbance  of  this  fact  if  there  is  no  connection  between  antecedent 


OBJECTIONS  TO  CAUSATION.  241 

and  consequent  ?  The  uuiformity  of  result  demonstrates  the  existence 
of  law,  for  law  is  the  expression  of  uniformity. 

One  might  venture  to  ask,  What  is  meant  by  succession  ?  Hume 
could  only  mean  antecedent  and  consequent,  without  relations  ;  for 
the  admission  of  relations  is  implicit  with  order,  and  order  is  implicit 
with  law,  and  law  is  implicit  with  intelligence.  But  materialistic 
philosophy  points  with  pride  to  the  law  of  relativity,  by  which  it 
hopes  to  demolish  the  idea  of  the  Absolute  and  Unconditioned; 
hence  the  idea  of  antecedent  and  consequent  without  relations  is  phil- 
osophically absurd.  So  soon,  however,  as  the  idea  of  relation  is  in- 
troduced, the  idea  of  order,  implying  the  reign  of  law,  imperatively 
appears,  and  this  compels  recognition  of  causality  as  a  principle  in 
nature.  Succession  is  involved  in  causation.  Without  a  regular, 
uniform  succession  the  theory  of  causation  can  not  be  maintained; 
without  causation,  succession  is  impossible;  for  the  process  of  things 
■would  be  irregular,  if  there  was  any  process  at  all.  Succession  is  the 
proof  of  causation,  aud  causation  the  raison  d'etre  of  succession. 

It  has  been  supposed  that  causation  is  a  word  that  refers  to  a  mere 
coincidence  of  events,  and  can  not  rightly  be  applied  to  an  established 
order  ;  that  is,  since  certain  results  have  happened  when  certain  contem- 
poraneous influences  were  recognized,  it  has  been  inferred  that  the  two 
were  in  inviolable  association,  from  which  the  law  of  causality  has 
been  framed.  For  example,  Sirius,  or  the  dog-star,  was  observed  to 
appear  when  the  Nile  began  to  rise,  and  the  Egyptians  surmised  that 
the  star  caused  the  river  to  swell  and  overflow.  This  is  the  theory  of 
coincidence.  Coincidence  and  causation  are  as  different  as  time  and 
gravitation.  Coincidence  may  occur  without  any  connection  or  rela- 
tion whatever  between  the  facts ;  it  can  not  in  any  sense  belong  to 
the  category  of  cause.  Coincidence  is  a  sham  ;  like  the  rebels  at 
Manasseh  hoisting  the  Union  flag,  it  appears  in  the  camp  of  causation, 
and  attempts  to  capture  it.     It  is  a  rebel  against  the  truth. 

It  has  been  pointed  out  that  what  is  called  Cause  is  only  another 
word  for  effect ;  that  is,  nature  is  a  circle  of  forces  or  influences,  each 
of  which  is  the  effect  of  something  preceding,  and  becomes  in  turn 
the  agency  of  something  following.  Natural  phenomena  are  the 
products  of  an  endless  repetition  of  forces,  interchanging  as  causes  and 
effects,  whose  scientific  classification  is  resorted  to  for  the  better  under- 
standing of  nature.  No  denial  is  made  that  nature's  programme  appears 
like  a  rotation  of  causes  and  effects;  but  since  a  cause  becomes  an 
eflfect.  and  an  effect  a  cause,  the  law  of  causation  is  not  imperiled, 
but  the  rather  established.  The  repetition  of  causes  points  to  the  in- 
fluence of  the  principle,  and  the  conversion  of  effect  into  causes  is 
proof  that  it  is  in  power.    That  a  cause  becomes  an  effect  is  proof  that 

16 


242  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

as  cause  it  has  served  its  purpose ;  it  does  not  show  that  cause  did  not 
exist.  Tlie  classification  of  causes  and  effects  is  in  accordance  with  the 
facts  of  nature,  and  therefore  not  imaginary. 

Against  the  association  of  personality  with  causation,  the  doctrine  of 
the  equivalence  of  effects  and  their  causes  has  been  urged ;  but  the 
doctrine  itself  is  still  in  dispute.  In  a  certain  sense  every  cause  must  be 
equal  to  its  effect,  and  the  total  of  causes  concerned  in  the  origin  of  the 
universe  must  be  equal  to  the  phenomena  of  the  universe.  If  these 
causes  are  sufficient  for  effects,  there  is  no  room,  as  there  is  no  neces- 
sity, for  personal  agency,  and  cause  is  left  as  a  self-managing  some- 
thing, without  personal  form  or  spirit.  This  not  only  empties  it  of 
power,  but  reduces  it  to  a  shadow  that  can  not  be  traced.  In  the 
scientific  sense,  causes  and  effects  are  not  equal ;  but  science  is  slow  to 
learn  this  great  truth.  If  the  doctrine  of  the  equivalence  of  cause  and 
effect  can  be  maintained,  then,  indeed,  there  is  no  need  of  going  out- 
side of  a  particular  cause  for  a  particular  effect.  But  eflfects  sometimes 
far  transcend  the  cause.  In  many  cases  there  is  a  great  disproportion 
between  causes  and  effects,  for,  as  saith  the  Scripture,  "Behold,  how 
great  a  matter  a  little  fire  kindleth."  Hermann  Lotze,  admitting  that 
the  idea  of  the  equality  of  causes  and  effects  obtains  in  philosophy,  pro- 
nounces it  an  error,  and  explains  its  oi-igin  in  loose  conceptions.  "  It 
would  in  itself  be  an  inexactness  to  try  to  establish  an  equation  between 
the  '  cause,'  which  is  a  thing,  and  the  eflTect,  which  is  a  state  or  an 
occurrence,"  says  the  German  metaphysician.  He  denies  that  the 
"  effect  must  be  the  precise  counterpart  of  its  cause,"  and  sees  no 
ground  for  identifying  in  kind  and  degree  the  cause  with  its  effect. 
To  insist  on  identity,  resemblance,  or  equality  between  cause  and  effect 
is  philosophically  absurd,  according  to  Lotze.  The  idea  of  causation 
implies  divine  sovereignity,  or  a  supervision  of  forces  for  the  produc- 
tion of  given  ends  ;  and  this  may  require  the  combination  of  forces  or 
causes,  so  that  the  smallest  fact  in  nature  may  be  the  result  of  a  num- 
ber of  forces  or  causes  in  operation.  In  this  sense  there  is  "  duality 
or  plurality  in  causation  ;"  but  plurality  is  possible  only  because  there 
is  personality  behind  it. 

Mr.  Mill,  speaking  of  the  seventy  chemical  elements,  observes  that 
they  exhibit  no  evidence  of  being  efeds ;  there  is  nothing  in  them  to 
prove  that  they  were  created,  and  if  they  were  not  created,  the  uni- 
verse of  w^hich  they  are  composed  was  not  created.  Such  a  statement 
must  have  been  projected  for  the  purpose  of  compelling  the  believer 
in  causality  to  declare  what  constitutes  an  effect,  for  if  one  is  ignorant 
of  the  nature  or  evidence  of  an  effect,  one  can  not  found  an  a  posteriori 
argument  for  Cause.  The  proof  that  oxygen  is  an  effect,  he  thinks, 
is  wanting.     Is  this  because  of  its  simplicity  ?     Is  it  a  simple  element  ? 


OXYGEN  AN  EFFECT.  243 

Until  it  is  fully  demonstrated  that  the  primary  elements  are  not  com- 
plex in  constitution,  it  can  not  be  affirmed  that  they  have  not  the 
appearance  of  effects. 

Granting,  however,  that  the  primary  elements  are  simple,  it  is  as 
inconceivable  that  they  were  produced  without  cause  as  that  the  uni- 
verse itself  was  uncaused.  This  means  the  eternity  of  the  elements, 
if  it  means  any  thing.  But  if  the  elements  have  existed  eternally, 
there  was  a  period  when  they  were  organized  into  worlds,  and  organ- 
ization required  the  intervention  of  Cause.  Even  in  this  aspect  of 
the  case  the  idea  of  Cause  is  not  eliminated  from  the  history  of  the 
universe,  for  if  Cause  was  not  involved  in  the  existence  of  atoms  or 
elements,  it  was  involved  in  the  organization  of  the  universe. 

The  eternity  of  the  elements  is  a  serious  inference  if  the  facts 
justify  it,  and  a  brazen  assumption  if  they  do  not.  The  statement 
that  an  element  does  not  appear  to  be  an  effect  suggests  a  question 
or  two.  What  is  an  effect  ?  That  which  is  produced  by  a  cause,  says 
Webster.  This  definition  does  not  meet  the  present  emergency,  for 
as  yet  it  is  not  certain  that  there  are  any  effects.  An  effect,  in  order 
to  establish  the  fact  that  it  is  an  effect,  must  contain  the  proof  of  it  in 
its  own  nature,  as  in  its  functions,  or  adaptations,  or  possibilities; 
there  must  be  something  in  it  which  goes  to  show  that  it  was  pro- 
duced. Take  oxygen.  What  can  be  said  of  it  in  proof  that  it  is  an 
effect?  In  its  original  state  it  is  a  gas,  but  it  is  generally  diffused, 
entering  into  combination  with  the  solid  earth,  and  constitutes  about 
one-half  of  the  entire  mass.  In  its  aeriform  condition  it  is  capable 
of  almost  illimitable  expansion,  and  remains  unchanged,  no  difference 
how  great  the  temperature  or  pressure  applied  to  it.  Prof.  Cooke 
affirms  that  "twenty  tons  of  pressure  on  a  square  inch  are  not  suffi- 
cient to  reduce  oxygen  to  a  liquid  condition."  Recently,  however,  it 
has  been  reduced  to  a  liquid.  It  maintains  its  identity,  whether  as 
gas  or  liquid.  Then  oxygen  is  the  well-known  supporter  of  combus- 
tion, and  indispensable  to  life.  Without  analyzing  the  element,  or 
considering  its  character  further,  it  is  clear  that  in  its  expansive  ten- 
dency, in  its  ability  to  combine  with  all  other  materials,  in  its  self- 
preservation,  and  its  relation  to  combustion,  it  sustains  its  reputation 
as  the  most  useful  element  in  the  economy  of  nature,  and  bears  the 
image  of  an  effect.  Go  through  the  list  of  primary  elements,  analyz- 
ing each  and  all,  and  the  same  conclusion  will  be  reached ;  they  are 
effects ;  they  contain  the  proofs  in  themselves  of  having  been  pro- 
duced. To  deny  the  appearance  of  effect  to  the  elements  is  a 
stepping-stone  to  a  denial  of  effect  in  the  universe,  which  means  the 
banishment  of  Cause.  As  the  first  step  can  not  be  taken,  so  the 
second  is  improbable.     The  fact  of  Cause  still  remains. 


244  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

The  admission  of  the  law  of  causality  in  the  realm  of  nature  is 
fatal  to  the  mechanical  hypothesis  of  the  origin  and  development  of 
nature;  on  this  account  materialism  denies  its  existence.  The  law 
presupposes  the  presence  of  a  superintending  mind,  which  the  ma- 
terialist feigns  not  to  discover  anywhere.  To  oppose  the  doctrine  of 
causation  because  it  hypothecates  the  doctrine  of  the  divine  existence 
is  proof  that  prejudice  is  the  substance  of  the  opposition.  The  law 
is  not  urged  in  these  pages  with  reference  to  a  theological  tenet,  but 
solely  because  it  is  a  self-evidencing  primary  law  of  nature,  the  fun- 
damental content  of  which  appears  to  be  the  divine  presence.  The 
philosophy  of  the  law  is  one  thing,  the  theology  of  the  law  quite 
another ;  but  it  is  true  that,  given  its  philosophy,  its  theological 
bearing  manifests  itself.  For  this,  however,  no  one  is  responsible,  the 
law  itself  predicating  a  divine  idea. 

The  law  of  causality  is  a  stumbling-block  of  no  mean  magnitude 
in  the  path  of  the  fatalists ;  hence,  one  pronounces  it  unimportant ; 
another  reduces  phenomenal  order  to  an  unconnected  succession ; 
another  affirms  that  cause  is  entirely  unknowable.  All  sorts  of  defi- 
nitions, explanations,  guesses,  and  theories,  have  been  proposed  to 
escape  the  alternative  of  theism  or  atheism,  but  the  issue  is  plainly 
along  this  line.  The  fact  of  causal  order  is  a  demonstration  in  itself 
of  the  Infinite ;  hence,  it  must  be  impeached,  and  the  absurdity  of 
an  uncaused  universe  reiterated  until  philosophy  will  wonder  if  it 
may  not  possibly  be  true.  The  animus  of  the  assault  on  the  law  of 
causality  is  its  inherent  support  of  the  theistic  hypothesis. 

This  prepares  the  way  for  a  brief  consideration  of  the  doctrine 
of  efficient  cause  in  its  relation  to  general  truth.  By  virtue  of  the 
causal  idea  the  world  appears  as  the  product  of  law,  and  exists  under 
and  is  sustained  by  law.  Science  has  strained  itself  to  establish  that 
nature  is  under  the  dominion  of  law;  but  it  must  be  understood  that 
law  is  universal,  because  the  principle  of  causation  is  supreme. 
Causation  is  law — the  first  law.  Law  is  the  content  of  superintend- 
ing wisdom,  and  nature  is  its  theater  or  receptacle.  Every  thing,  even 
the  wind  that  blows,  is  under  the  surveillance  of  law,  as  the  Signal 
Service  Bureau  of  the  United  Stales  has  ascertained.  But  law,  or 
the  expression  of  order  in  nature,  is  impossible  except  as  the  princi- 
ple of  causation  underlies  and  precedes  it.  Causation  is  the  explana- 
tion of  uni'-ersal  law. 

The  doctrine  of  efficient  cause  is  the  key  to  the  highest  philosophy. 
In  order  that  the  mind's  activities  may  be  reliable,  it  must  be  gov- 
erned by  certain  primary  principles,  of  whose  existence  there  is  no 
dispute.  The  astronomer  does  not  halt  in  his  calculation  to  consider 
or  prove  that  a  circle  involves  three  hundred  and  sixty  degrees.     If 


RELATION  OF  EFFICIENT  TO  FINAL  CAUSE.  245 

he  can  not  rely  on  this  conclusion,  he  can  not  be  certain  of  the  truth 
of  any  calculation.  In  geometry  there  are  a  multitude  of  axioms 
the  truth  of  which  is  not  contingent  on  repeated  demonstration ;  they 
must  be  accepted,  or  the  mathematician  can  not  proceed.  Likewise 
in  philosophy  there  must  be  axiomatic  truths  requiring  no  further 
elucidation,  if  philosophical  inquiry  can  proceed.  Among  the  axioms 
of  the  highest  philsophy  is  this  of  efficient  cause.  Without  it,  there 
is  neither  starting-point  nor  landing-place.  Materialists  have  floated 
in  a  sea  of  doubt,  because  they  started  from  nowhere  and  were  mak- 
ing for  no  headland.  The  best  cure  for  a  false  philosophy  is  the  orthodox 
doctrine  of  caiise.  Schopenhauer  and  Hartmann  accepted  the  doctrine, 
but,  stripping  it  of  personal  features,  and  resolving  it  into  impersonal 
force,  or  an  unconscious  activity,  they  sunk  it  to  the  level  of  a  phys- 
ical agency,  and  pessimism  was  the  result.  One  may  assent  to  a  law 
of  causality,  and  be  fatalistic ;  if  he  ascertain  the  law  of  causation,  he 
becomes  theistic. 

It  is  patent  to  him  who  reads  that  the  doctrine  of  efficient  cause 
justifies  faith  in  the  doctrine  of  final  cause  ;  in  other  words,  the  two 
causes  are  related  like  two  brothers.  They  rise  and  fall  together.  A 
final  cause,  as  we  shall  hereafter  show,  is  often  the  key  to  an  efficient 
cause;  and  an  efficient  cause,  as  we  now  declare,  is  often  a  key  to  a 
final  cause.  If  the  principle  of  design  is  existent  in  nature,  it  must 
be  the  fruit  of  the  principle  of  efficiency  in  nature.  Design  carried 
out  implies  previous  executing  force.  Teleology  is  one  of  the  paths 
to  the  law  of  causation.  If  effect  is  proof  of  cause,  design  is  proof 
of  efficiency.  The  two  links  are  inseparable,  and  opposition  to  one 
is  opposition  to  the  other.  Hostility  to  the  law  of  causation  means  a 
broad  attack  on  all  the  "causes"  in  philosophy — a  shipwreck  of  effi- 
cient means  the  shipwreck  of  final  cause. 

The  value  of  the  doctrine  of  causation  will  appreciate  as  its  re- 
lation to  the  theory  of  development  is  disclosed.  Not  disputing 
that  the  natural  universe  is  a  gradual  development  from  germinal  or 
atomic  forms,  through  manifold  stages,  into  final  and  fixed  forms,  it 
is  difficult  to  understand  the  system  of  development  which  it  exhibits 
without  the  pre-supposition  of  the  causative  principle.  If  nature's 
development  is  a  syste7n  of  development,  it  implies  causal  order ;  if  it 
is  not  a  system  of  development,  it  is  a  question  if  there  has  been 
any  development.  Development  signifies  system  ;  system  is  pregnant 
with  law;  law  is  the  sign  of  Cause.  Dr.  McCosh  represents  develop- 
ment as  organized  causation,  a  strong  putting  of  the  truth.  Any  de- 
velopment without  directing  cause,  or  independent  of  law,  would  be 
the  development  of  irregularity ;  but  it  is  agreed  that  nature  is  a  regular 
development  of  order,    beauty,  adaptation,   proportion,   and   utility, 


246  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

which  can  not  be  accounted  for  in  the  absence  of  the  causative  spirit. 
Thus  the  scientific  theory  of  development,  if  true,  is  a  corroboration 
of  the  law  of  causality. 

The  doctrine  has  its  practical  features.  We  sometimes  speak  of 
the  stability  of  nature  or  of  the  universe,  meaning  that  the  natural 
order  of  phenomena  will  continue  without  a  probability  of  disorder 
or  wreck.  Business,  commerce,  navigation,  travel,  manufacturing 
and  agricultural  interests,  are  conducted  without  much  anxiety,  so 
far  as  nature's  order  is  involved  in  these  interests.  We  expect  no 
change  of  law.  The  seasons  will  come  and  go  as  in  the  past,  the 
laws  of  atmospheric  phenomena  will  abide,  chemical  principles  may 
be  trusted  to-morrow  as  they  were  yesterday,  and  mathematical  truths 
will  not  deceive.  The  stability  of  the  universe  is  insured  through 
the  presence  of  the  principle  of  Cause,  which,  establishing  nature's 
order  as  the  best,  will  perpetuate  it  until  its  mission  is  accomplished. 

In  the  truest  sense  the  principle  is  the  foundation-stone  of  the 
truest  religion.  The  greatest  question  of  religion  is  that  of  a  personal 
God.  '  The  mind  readily  espouses  the  idea  of  a  Supreme  Power ;  but 
to  apprehend  the  Power  as  a  personal  being,  to  understand  his  char- 
acter, to  formulate  his  dispositions,  to  catalogue  his  attributes,  and 
express  his  relations  to  all  things,  involves  the  highest  thought ;  it  is, 
indeed,  impossible  to  the  highest  human  thought.  Philosophers  from 
the  time  of  Thales  until  now  have  agonized  over  the  problem  of  the 
supreme  power;  they  have  sought  to  know  if  there  is  a  personal 
being,  endowed  with  infinite  faculties,  or  if  Force  inherent  in  matter 
constitutes  the  sum  of  infinite  cause,  or  if  there  is  a  principle  of  life 
impacting  nature,  yet  derived  from  an  underived  source,  too  remote 
for  human  discovery.  At  this  point  the  law  of  causality  affords  not 
a  little  relief.  Either  the  universe  created  itself,  or  it  was  created; 
but  as  the  idea  of  a  self-made  universe  is  absurd,  the  other  idea  of 
creation  may  be  maintained  on  the  Platonic  dialectic  of  refutation  or 
contradiction.  Creation  once  admitted  involves  the  truth  of  the 
causative  principle.  Mysterious  it  is,  but  it  is  not  absurd.  Causa- 
tion points  to  the  First  Cause.  All  causes,  mediate  and  immediate, 
become  multiples  of  the  First  Cause. 

If  causation  points  to  an  absolute  Cause,  it  is  a  safe  principle  on 
which  to  build  a  religion.  It  goes  back  to  original  power.  Causa- 
tion is  the  autograph  of  the  Deity.  In  the  light  of  such  a  revelation 
all  objections  to  the  principle  must  vanish ;  a  true  philosophy  and  a 
true  religion  should  shake  hands  over  it,  agreeing  fully  with  Paul 
that  "the  invisible  things  of  him  from  the  creation  of  the  world  are 
clearly  seen,  being  understood  by  the  things  that  are  made,  even  his 
eternal  power  and  Godhead." 


PLATO'S  DEFINITION  OF  FORCE.  247 


CHAPTER  XI. 

THE>  CONTENT  OK  KOROK. 

PROFESSOR  TAITS  survey  of  advances  in  the  physical  sciences 
justifies  the  conclusion  that  force  is  only  a  name,  the  thing  rep- 
resented by  it  being  unknown.  Is  the  scientist  only  a  name-maker, 
or  a  dealer  in  substances?  Is  philosophy  a  barren  nominalism,  or  is 
it  the  discovery  of  realities  ?  This  Adamic  habit  of  naming  things, 
powers,  and  manifestations,  is  a  great  convenience,  and  indeed  the  first 
step  in  progress,  but  entirely  unsatisfactory  if  one  must  stop  with  it. 
Wrapped  up  in  names  are  problems,  facts,  laws,  principles  ;  at  least 
we  fancy  they  mean  something  ;  if  they  do  not,  they  are  of  no  more 
value  than  Plato's  "wind-eggs."  In  this  chapter  w^e  treat  of  the 
name  and  the  thing,  the  sign  and  that  which  is  signified.  The  name 
is  the  index  to  the  reality,  in  quest  of  which  men  are  consum- 
ing their  lives. 

What  is  Force?  In  the  Parmenides  Plato  represents  force  as  "the 
sudden,"  or  that  which  has  the  power  to  change.  "For  the  sudden," 
he  says,  "seems  to  signify  some  such  thing  as  changing  from  it  to 
either.  For  there  is  no  change  from  standing,  while  standing  ;  nor  a 
change  from  motion,  while  in  motion  ;  but  that  wonderful  nature, 
'the  sudden,'  is  situated  between  motion  and  standing,  and  is  in  no 
time ;  and  into  this  and  from  this,  that  which  is  moved  changes,  for 
the  purpose  of  standing  still  ;  and  that  which  stands  for  the  purpose 
of  being  moved."  Every  translator  of  this  passage  confesses  that  it 
is  ambiguous  ;  but  we  introduce  it  to  show  that  Plato's  conception 
of  force  was  that  of  an  influence  which  affected  motions  and  changes, 
or  is  the  cause  of  both  stability  and  instability  in  the  universe.  He 
names  it  "the  sudden"  because  it  is  the  unexpected,  the  unknown. 
While  this  definition  is  indefinite,  it  is  as  comprehensive  as  any  that 
modern  science  has  succeeded  in  inventing,  and  in  some  respects  less 
objectionable,  for  it  points  to  the  theistic  notion. 

Any  observer  of  nature  must  conclude  that  in,  through,  and  over 
all  its  departments  or  kingdoms  is  an  influence  to  which  every  thing 
is  more  or  less  obedient,  an  influence  originating,  controlling,  per- 
petuating, and  voicing  supreme  governmental  ideas,  which,  the  more 
they  are  studied,  seem  to  reflect  the  presence  of  a  single  governing 
mind.  Nature  is  the  theater  of  motion,  activity,  growth,  decay,  and 
revival.    Over  all  its  processes,  variations,  and  developments,  through 


248  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

all  its  history  of  appearances,  a  dominant  influence  has  been  felt, 
and  is  clearly  recognizable.  To  that  influence,  supreme,  lofty,  in- 
cessant, science  has  given  the  name  of  Force.  The  selection  of  the 
name  we  do  not  criticise,  since  from  a  scientific  view  of  nature,  it  is 
as  appropriate  as  any.  The  word,  as  applied,  does  not  contain  all 
the  facts  ;  but  so  far  as  it  means  anything,  it  means  the  dominant 
idea  in  nature,  as  understood  by  the  inquirer. 

The  relation  of  force  to  matter,  which  involves  either  their  identi- 
fication or  a  statement  of  their  differences,  has  provoked  not  a  little 
discussion  in  philosophic  circles,  the  earlier  opinion  being  an 
affirmation  of  their  differences,  while  the  later  borders  on  a  qualified 
identification.  The  common  observer  resents  at  once  as  fictitious,  and 
in  a  sense  impious,  the  suggestion  that  force,  or  the  propelling  in- 
fluence of  nature,  is  to  any  extent  identical  with  nature  ;  but  the 
philosopher  does  not  consult  the  common  observer,  who,  he  imagines, 
sees  with  veiled  face,  and  therefore  reports  incorrectly  concerning 
nature.  Is  force  identical  with  matter,  or  are  they  two  empirico- 
physical  priuciples,  with  properties  and  functions  entirely  unlike? 
Ludwig  Biichner  is  fond  of  distinguishing  force  and  matter  as  two 
eternal  elements ;  but  he  has  been  overruled  by  others,  who  insist 
that  matter  is  the  product  of  force  ;  that  force  is  the  essential  fact, 
while  matter  is  a  shadowy,  phenomenal  issue.  The  relation  of  force 
to  matter  in  a  philosophic  sense,  may  be  expressed  in  three  forms : 
1.  Force  is  identical  with  matter  ;  2.  Force  is  inherent  in  matter ; 
3.  Force  is  an  independent  element.  As  to  the  identity  of  force  and 
matter,  the  proof  is  wanting ;  besides,  the  pantheistic  complexion  of 
the  theory  must  condemn  it.  Identification  is  confusion  of  things 
essentially  separate.  Muscular  force  is  not  muscle ;  a  crystallizing 
force  is  not  a  crystal. 

The  Dynamical  theory  of  matter,  or  the  residence  of  force  in 
matter,  has  been  employed  in  vindication  of  the  supposition  of  the 
identity  of  the  two  ;  but  the  supposition  itself  is  grounded  on  the 
generally  admitted  belief  of  the  inherency  of  force  in  matter.  The 
advocates  of  "  inherency"  are  numerous,  embracing  both  theistic  and 
materialistic  thinkers,  who  assume  it  from  different  motives.  Prof. 
Huxley  says,  "Matter  is  all-powerful  and  all-sufficient ;"  Minark  holds 
to  the  theory  of  "  innate  forces;"  and  Biichner  divides  the  forces  of 
matter  into  physical,  chemical,  and  mechanical.  Spencer,  employing 
the  word  "  gravity  "  as  generic,  asserts  that  it  manifests  itself  as  heat, 
light,  electi'icity,  magnetism,  cohesion,  affinity,  and  gravity,  or  in 
seven  different  forms  ;  but,  whatever  the  form,  it  belongs  to,  and  in- 
heres in  matter.  There  is  but  one  force,  and  its  forms  are  convert- 
ible into  one  another.     The   old  division   of  forces  into  kinetic   or 


RELATION  OF  FORCE  TO  MATTER.  249 

active,  and  latent  has  been,  or  should  be,  abandoned,  for  there  is  no 
such  thing  as  latent  force;  but  whatever  the  division,  or  how 
numerous  the  forms,  it  is  a  prevalent  assumption  that  force  inheres 
in  matter. 

The  word  "  inherent,"  however,  is  misleading.  The  materialist 
means  by  "inherent,"  not  a  quality,  but  the  essential  element,  the 
thing  itself,  and  so  blots  out  the  distinction  between  force  and  matter. 
Force  is  inherent  in  that  it  is  intimately  associated  with  matter,  but 
the  association  has  its  limitations.  Force  is  necessary  to,  but  is  not 
the  quality  of,  matter.  Force  is  a  necessary  condition,  but  not  a 
necessary  quality,  of  matter.  The  relation  is  one  of  condition,  but 
not  of  quality. 

If  not  identical  with  matter,  and  not  a  quality  of  matter,  Force 
must  be  external  to  iiuitter,  and  can  be  understood  only  as  it  is  sepa- 
rated from  matter.  The  difficulty  of  separating  the  two,  the  materi- 
alist magnifies  into  an  impossibility ;  but  the  union  of  force  and 
matter  has  an  analogy  in  the  union  of  soul  and  body,  Avhich  we 
are  aware  is  to  the  materialist  not  only  inexplicable  but  absurd. 
His  opinion  aside,  force  is  the  soul  of  matter,  to  be  interpreted  as  the 
acting  and  interacting  influence,  separate  from  that  on  and  with 
which  it  acts,  and  as  having  independent  qualities,  functions,  and 
purposes.  This  is  going  beyond  the  name  to  the  thing,  but  an  ex- 
pression of  the  relation  of  force  and  matter  involves  a  definition  of 
terms  used.  Force  is  not  matter ;  matter  is  not  force.  Force  may 
be  inherent  in  matter,  if  "inherent"  be  explained;  it  is  not 
identical  with  matter. 

As  there  is  a  distinction  between  force  and  matter,  so  there  is  a 
distinction  between  force  and  law,  which  in  some  philosophies  are  re- 
garded identical;  hence,  the  confusion  in  thinking,  and  the  failure 
to  understand  phenomena.  Matter  is  the  theater  of  force  ;  law  is 
the  regulation  of  force.  Force  acts  not  only  within  the  limits  of 
space,  but  also  within  the  limits  of  law,  but  is  not  to  be  confounded 
with  either.  The  law  of  force,  or  the  methods  by  which  force  is 
communicated  and  conducted,  are  not  as  clearly  expressed  in  phi- 
losophy as  the  inquirer  might  desire.  How  force  acts  at  all  is  really  a 
leading  question.  Hermann  Lotze  decides  that  the  element  of  time 
is  not  involved  in  the  communication  or  transmission  of  force,  and 
also  that  force  can  act  only  at  a  distance.  Accepting  these  conclu- 
sions as  correct,  they  point  to  certain  characteristics  of  force  which 
do  not  belong  to  matter ;  but  the  law  of  transmission  yet  lacks  ex- 
pression. Certain  laws,  as  the  law  of  gravitation,  the  law  of 
reflection  and  refraction,  the  law  of  cohesion  and  adhesion,  and  the 
laws  of  light  and  sound,   are  intended  to  express   the  methods  of 


250  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

activity  in  the  physical  world  ;  but  while  they  furnish  a  clue  to  the 
presence  of  force,  they  do  not  strictly  define  it.  The  revelation  of  a 
method  of  activity  is  not  equivalent  to  a  revelation  of  the  thing  that 
is  active.  Hence,  law  and  force,  harmonious  and  suggestive  of  each 
other,  are  distinct  and  individual. 

A  still  closer  distinction  will  disclose  more  fully  the  isolation  of 
force.  Force  must  not  be  confounded  with  its  manifestations,  some 
of  which  seem  to  be  forces  themselves.  The  usual  classification  of 
forces  is  a  classification  of  the  manifestation  of  forces.  The  old  terms, 
"centripetal"  and  "centrifugal,"  and  the  later  terms,  "vital,"  "phys- 
ical," "chemical,"  "mechanical,"  which  abound  in  science  and  phi- 
losophy, express  only  the  manifestations  of  force,  and  do  not  convey 
any  idea  of  its  nature.  A  "centripetal"  force  is  a  form  of  speech 
intended  to  represent  the  direction  in  which  force  extends  itself;  a 
"moving"  force  is  that  which  produces  motion;  "vital"  force  is  that 
which  produces  life.  Motion  is  a  result,  and  must  not  be  confounded 
with  that  which  produced  it.  When  force  produces  force,  we  can 
only  speak  of  the  latter  as  secondary  and  mechanical ;  for  it  as  incon- 
sistent to  confound  a  secondary  or  resultant  force  with  the  original  or 
producing  force,  as  it  is  to  confound  any  efiTect  with  its  cause.  When 
Kant  speaks  of  the  forces  that  occupy  space,  he  can  only  mean  the 
secondary  or  mechanical  forces  inherent  in  matter,  the  resultant  of 
the  primary  force  that  rules  everywhere.  Force  must  be  distinguished 
from  forces.  Force  is  not  the  aggregation  of  forces.  Forces  are 
those  manifestations  of  activity  that  science  denominates  physical, 
chemical,  vital,  mechanical ;  force  is  the  parent  of  forces.  Dis- 
tinguishing force  from  manifestation  or  forces,  we  approach  the 
thing  itself 

Matter  is  the  theater  of  force,  therefore  not  force  itself;  law  is  the 
regulation  or  method  of  force,  therefore  not  force  itself;  forces  are 
manifestations  of  force,  therefore  not  force  itself.  Separating  it  from 
all  its  relations  and  incorporations,  we  are  compelled  to  deal  with 
force  in  the  abstract,  or  as  the  transcendental  factor  in  the  universe. 
Mivart  attributes  all  existences  to  an  "  internal  force,"  which  he  styles 
a  "single  form  of  force,"  implying  that  the  parent  force  is  capa- 
ble of  transmutations ;  but  it  is  not  a  for7n  of  force  we  seek,  it  is 
force  itself 

The  necessity  of  assigning  to  force  some  attributes  or  properties  is 
imperative,  if  an  intellectual  conception  of  it  be  entertained.  The 
first  condition  of  a  conception  of  any  thing  is  attrihvte.  A  knowledge 
of  attributes  is  not  a  knowledge  of  substance  or  reality,  but  they  af- 
ford standing-room  for  thought ;  and  in  this  case  standing-room  even 
is  desirable.     The  diflference  between  an  intellectual  concession  to  the 


CONFLICT  OF  SECONDARY  FORCES.  251 

existence  of  force  and  an  iutellectiial  conception  of  its  nature,  must 
be  kept  in  mind,  in  order  to  advance  beyond  a  dreamy  or  imaginative 
conclusion  respecting  it.  Wanted,  manifestations  of  force — these  we 
have  in  forces ;  wanted,  the  laws  of  force — these  have  been  named ; 
wanted,  the  theater  of  force — this  has  been  pointed  out ;  wanted,  the 
attributes  of  force — these  we  seek. 

It  is  a  superb  fact  that,  going  out  of  phenomena,  or  merely  ob- 
servii}g  the  play  of  things,  there  seems  to  be  the  manifestation  of  but 
a  single  force  ;  that  is,  the  unity  of  force,  notwithstanding  its  varieties, 
may  be  proclaimed.  This  is  important,  beyond  all  question  ;  it  sim- 
plifies the  problem  of  attributes ;  it  harmonizes  the  secondary  or  de- 
rivative with  the  primitive  or  original  force.  From  a  superficial  obser- 
vation of  nature,  one  might  conclude  that  force  is  suicidal,  so  incessant 
is  the  conflict  or  antagonism  of  secondary  forces.  To  preserve  the 
balance  or  sustain  the  equilibrium,  however,  the  observer  soon  dis- 
covers that  action  and  reaction  are  equal,  and  that,  however  violent 
and  aggressive  the  destructive  tendencies,  the  recuperative  powers  of 
nature  are  equal  to  any  emergency  or  distress.  Counter-irritation  is 
also  a  principle  in  nature,  intended  to  preserve  its  order  and  insure 
its  stability.  Gravitation  draws  downward,  but  the  blade  of  wheat 
overcomes  it  and  shoots  upward.  Here  is  the  victory  of  one  force 
over  another,  the  resultant  being,  not  destruction,  but  the  conserva- 
tion of  a  benevolent  end.  On  the  other  hand,  the  majestic  oak 
graces  the  hill-side,  but  a  thunderbolt  demolishes  it.  This  is  a  victory 
of  a  destructive  force,  but  it  is  not  always  in  operation.  Benevolent 
forces  are  in  constant  operation  ;  destructive  forces  only  occasionally 
manifest  themselves;  so  that,  by  a  just  balance  of  the  facts,  it  is 
clear  that  the  conflict  of  forces  is  in  the  interest  of  benevolent  ends, 
reflecting  the  teleological  principle,  and  pointing  to  a  wise  supervision 
of  nature. 

Besides,  the  fact  must  not  be  overlooked  that  the  conflict  in  nature 
is  the  conflict  of  purely  secondary  forces.  Original  force  is  not  in 
conflict  with  secondary  forces,  but  the  secondary  forces  themselves, 
as  gravitation  and  cohesive  attraction,  are  in  antagonism.  The  con- 
flict is  the  result  of  the  variety  of  forces  and  the  variety  of  ends  to 
be  accomplished  by  them  ;  hence,  it  is  more  of  a  seeming  than  a  real 
conflict.  It  is  a  conflict  for  the  best  ends,  or  a  combination  for  the 
execution  of  the  purposes  of  nature.  Taking  this  view  of  the  com- 
plex forces  of  nature,  it  points  to  an  underlying  unity,  a  unity  of 
idea,  and  a  unity  of  force. 

The  modality  of  force  in  no  wise  contradicts  the  hypothesis  of  the 
unity  of  force.  Herbert  Rpencer  now  regards  all  imponderables  as 
modes  of  one  force.     The  variety  of  mode  in  the  expression  of  force 


252  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

is  no  greater  than  the  variety  of  color  into  which  a  ray  of  light  may 
be  dissolved.  Colors  do  not  invalidate  the  conclusion  of  one  light; 
modes  of  force  do  not  invalidate  the  conclusion  of  one  force.  The 
unity  of  light  is  no  truer  than  the  unity  of  force.  As  electricity  is 
one,  but  is  called  by  different  names  as  its  manifestations  differ,  so 
force  may  be  chemical,  physical,  mechanical,  or  vital  in  manifesta- 
tion, and  be  the  same.  Science  has  drifted  into  the  doctrine  of  the 
unity  of  a  supreme  force  ;  there  is  no  polytheism  in  science.  Spencer 
speaks  of  an  "infinite  force;"  Faraday,  Helmholtz,  Carpenter,  Liebig, 
and  Meyer  stand  as  sponsors  for  the  scientic  dogma  of  unity  of  force. 

Scientific  minds  quote  approvingly  the  doctrine  of  the  correlation 
and  conservation  of  forces,  or  the  convertibility  of  forces,  as  the 
proof  of  the  relationship  of  forces,  or  the  final  unity  of  force.  To 
the  doctrine  itself  we  make  no  objection ;  to  the  materialistic  conclu- 
sion that  the  sum  of  these  forces  constitutes  the  entire  force  of  the 
universe,  we  demur,  for  no  number  of  secondary  forces  will  equal  the 
supreme  force  from  which  they  are  derived.  Mr.  H.  C.  Carey  is  in- 
clined to  reduce  all  forces  to  electricity,  even  insisting  that  it  closely 
resembles  brain  power ;  but  this  is  carrying  the  deduction  to  an  ex- 
treme. Whether  the  atomic  unit  is  hydrogen,  and  the  supreme  sec- 
ondary force  is  electricity,  we  care  not,  only  so  that  the  supreme 
force  is  not  confounded  with  either.  Keference  is  sometimes  made  by 
scientists,  especially  by  Spencer,  to  persistence  of  force,  by  which  is  meant 
the  preservation  of  force  in  one  form  or  another ;  that  force  itself 
never  is  lost;  that  it  will  reappear  in  new  forms  if  its  old  manifesta- 
tions cease  to  exist.  This  is  an  index  to  the  character  of  force  ;  it  is 
one  and  unchangeable  in  essence  forever. 

Chemistry  has  been  defined  as  the  identification  of  the  one  in  the 
many,  or  unity  in  the  manifold;  and,  so  far  as  it  distinguishes  the 
one  from  the  many,  it  is  a  very  concise  and  expressive  definition  ; 
but  so  far  as  it  confounds  the  one  with  the  many,  it  is  a  learned  sup- 
port of  pantheism,  and  must  be  rejected.  From  the  apparent  conflict 
of  secondary  forces,  from  the  modality  of  forces,  from  the  correlation 
and  conservation  of  forces,  from  the  persistence  of  forces,  and  from 
the  definitions  of  science,  the  conclusion  of  the  unity  of  force  seems 
scientifically  warranted.  In  the  highest  sense,  there  are  not  two 
forces ;  there  is  om  only.     This  is  simplification  ;  this  is  progress. 

Let  us  advance  to  another  conception  of  force.  The  word  itself 
conveys  the  idea  of  resources,  and  includes  possibility,  sufficiency. 
When  one  speaks  of  the  power  of  a  government,  several  things  are 
signified,  as  naval  and  military  equipments,  wealth,  patriotism,  religion, 
and  the  common  intelligence  of  the  nation.  The  word  "  force,"  taken 
in  the  abstract,  is  suggestive  of  a  complex  idea ;  it  suggests  resources, 


ATTRIBUTES  OF  FORCE.  253 

possibilities,  reserved  powers.  It  means  accumulation,  exhaustless 
energies.  In  the  sense  now  considered,  the  universe  stands  as  its 
product,  the  masterpiece  of  its  work  ;  no  conception  is  too  great  for 
its  capability,  no  execution  too  small  for  its  notice.  The  relation  of 
force  to  the  universe  is  the  relation  of  creative  power  to  its  product. 
Forc6  is  the  spirit  of  creation,  the  spirit  of  rule,  guidance,  preserva- 
tion.    It  is  competent  both  to  create  and  rule. 

Creation  involves,  presupposes  omnipotence,  and  omnipotence  has 
been  regarded  as  a  credential  of  personality.  Schopenhauer's  idea  of 
the  ultimate  principle  is  will,  or  blind,  unregulated,  and  therefore 
capricious  will-power.  Whether  the  "  infinite  force,"  as  Spencer  styles 
it,  is  the  force  of  will  or  the  force  of  anything  else,  its  omnipotence 
points  to  an  omnipotent  personality,  and  yet  is  not  conclusive  of  it. 
Again,  whatever  the  force  is,  it  is  invisible  ;  it  lies  back  of  phenom- 
ena. It  is  all  around  us  ;  it  is  in  every  thing  ;  it  propels  every  thing  ; 
it  breathes  life  and  death  everywhere  ;  it  is  ceaseless,  and  slumbers 
not.  The  invisibility  of  force  is  consistent  with  the  universality  of 
force,  and  both  make  for  an  invisible,  universal  personality ;  at  least 
they  raise  the  suspicion  of  personality.  Even  science  proclaims  the 
invisibility  of  reality  ;  the  visible  is  a  sham  or  a  shadow.  The  hiding 
of  his  presence  is  as  potent  as  the  hiding  of  his  power. 

Thus  far  we  have  ascertained  the  locus  of  the  activity  of  Force — 
the  universe  of  space  and  time  ;  the  method  of  its  activity — law  ;  the 
products  of  its  activity — phenomena ;  and  necessarily  some  of  its  at- 
tribtdes,  or  conditions  of  existence,  as  unity,  power,  invisibility,  and 
infinity.     Shall  we  stop  here  ? 

Stopping  at  this  point,  we  should  conclude  for  an  all-powerful,  in- 
visible, impersonal  Force,  As  yet,  there  is  no  absolute  proof  of 
personality,  for  all  these  attributes  or  conditions  might  co-exist,  co- 
operate, and  unite  in  a  single  force,  which  would  be  wanting  in  other 
evidences  of  personality. 

Strictly  speaking,  if  Force  is  a  Personality,  it  must  possess  other 
attributes  than  these  named,  for  a  materialist  may  agree  with  our 
conclusions  thus  far  and  be  a  materialist  still.  Are  there  other 
attributes  ? 

The  revelation  of  nature  or  the  universe  is  the  only  book  whose 
pages  the  scientist  will  consult,  and  if  the  imprint  of  a  Personal 
Force  is  not  on  the  first  page  he  is  not  inclined  to  believe  in  such  a 
force.  Looking  through  the  volume,  he  would  be  compelled  to  ad- 
mit what  at  first  he  indignantly  rejected. 

Keeping  in  the  background. the  idea  of  personality  as  the  goal  of 
investigation,  we  proceed,  by  a  purely  scientific  method,  to  inqHire 
for  other  attributes  of  the  infinite  force,  regardless  of  what  they  shall 


254  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

teach  on  the  subject.  The  suspicion  grows  into  conviction,  as  one 
makes  a  tour  through  nature,  that  the  omnipotent  and  impersonal 
force,  the  spirit  of  creation,  is  conscious  of  itself.  Neither  gravitation 
nor  crystallizatiou  makes  an  impression  of  self-consciousness,  because 
they  are  secondary  forces  or  results ;  but  the  supreme  force,  in  its 
government  of  nature,  makes  the  impression  that  it  knows  whtft  it  is 
doing.  If  it  is  ignorant  of  itself,  or  insensible  of  its  activities,  it  is 
inexplicable  how  it  acts  with  uniformity  under  similar  conditions,  and 
equally  difficult  to  explain  its  unity.  To  admit  consciousness  to  man 
and  deny  it  to  the  supreme  Force  is  to  raise  man  above  the  supreme 
Force  ;  but  this  involves  absurdity.  Absurd  or  not,  man  is  the  su- 
preme Force,  or  the  infinite  force  is  conscious  of  itself.  Conscious- 
ness, however,  is  the  capital  attribute  of  personality. 

Secondary  forces  are  without  self-consciousness,  and  without  reg- 
ulation, direction,  and  control,  they  would  wreck  the  universe.  Let 
electricity  have  a  chance,  and  it  would  burn  up  the  cosmos.  Grav- 
itation unrestrained  would  shatter  the  firmament.  Fire  unbridled 
would  reduce  the  earth  to  a  cinder.  Something  controls.  Natural, 
secondary  forces  are  under  restraint,  embarrassed  by  the  presence  of 
a  superior  influence,  and  order  prevails  throughout  the  dominions. 
On  the  whole,  nature  is  calm  because  of  a  supernatural  presence. 
The  subserviency  of  secondary  causes  to  the  First  Cause,  the  re- 
straining hand  upon  nature's  erratic  and  rebellious  dispositions,  is 
proof  that  the  Force  above  nature  is  conscious,  understanding  not 
only  what  it  is  doing,  but  what  ought  to  be  done  to  preserve  the 
peace  of  the  universe. 

If  the  supreme  Force  be  conscious  of  itself,  it  follows  that  order, 
peace,  masterly  rule,  and  development  are  ends  contemplated  and 
sought  by  this  Force.  The  activity  of  Force  is  in  some  way  allied  to 
its  results.  This  alliance  is  not  only  chronological,  which  is  all  that 
materialism  has  hitherto  allowed,  but  it  is  causal,  which  implies  a 
contemplation  of  results,  or  thought  and  purpose  embodied  in  activ- 
ity. This  is  teleology  !  We  know  it.  The  omnipotent,  self-conscious 
Force  is,  per  necessity,  a  teleological  Force,  acting  with  something 
in  view,  seeking  certain  ends,  and,  at  all  events,  promoting  order, 
stability,  and  development.  It  certainly  conducts  itself  as  if  it  had 
these  ends  in  view. 

Were  it  indifferent  to  ends,  it  might  sleep  or  violate  the  conditions 
of  order,  or  it  might  withdraw  itself  entirely  from  the  world  of  mat- 
ter. If  it  is  foreign  to  matter,  as  we  had  heretofore  conjectured,  what 
is  the  bond  of  association  with  matter  but  the  ends  it  consciously 
seeks  to  secure?  As  nature  is  the  embodiment  of  order,  beauty, 
adaptation,  and  development,  these  must  be  the  ends  of  the  supreme 


FORCE— ENERG  Y—G  OD.  255 

Force ;  and  if  man  is  its  highest  product,  then  intelligence  and  holi- 
ness must  be  added  to  the  designs  according  to  which  its  activities  are 
regulated.  For  if  order,  beauty,  adaptation,  intelligence,  and  holi- 
ness were  not  designed  by  the  supreme  Force,  it  is  difficult  to  explain 
their  existence.  Dr.  J.  W.  Dawson  affirms  that  the  science  that  re- 
jects the  divine  principle  in  creation  is  "  impotent  to  explain  nature." 
So  we  think,  and  add  that  nature  is  not  explained  at  all  unless  it 
was  designed,  and  design  establishes  personality. 

Governed  by  the  reasoning  indicated,  the  infinite  Force*  appears 
to  be  a  self-conscious,  thinking,  rational  force.  On  this  ground 
man  is  justified  in  becoming  a  worshiper.  Beyond  this  philosoph- 
ical outline,  or  preparation  for  the  theistic  affirmation,  we  need  not 
now  advance. 

What  is  Force  ?  Kant  says  it  is  an  endowment  of  God.  John 
Fiske,  a  disciple  of  Spencer,  says,  if  he  must  choose  between  the  ex- 
pressions, "  God  is  a  spirit"  and  "  God  is  a  force,"  he  will  choose  the 
latter.  In  the  philosophical  sense  Force  is  a  name,  and  not  a  defini- 
tion. Even  the  philosophers  are  suspecting  that  it  is  an  insuf^cient 
name  for  the  thing  it  pretends  to  represent,  and  they  are  therefore 
quietly  substituting  the  word  "  energy,"  as  more  expressive  of  the 
spirit  of  creation  or  matter.  After  another  decade  "  energy"  Avill  be 
outlawed,  and  another  word  proposed.  What  word?  What  is  the 
imcommuuicable,  the  unnamed  word  yet  to  be  spoken  by  the  philoso- 
pher ?  Thomas  Carlyle  said:  "Force,  force,  everywhere  force! 
Illimitable  whirlwind  of  force  which  envelops  us ;  everlasting  whirl- 
wind, high  as  immensity,  old  as  eternity — what  is  it?  It  is  Al- 
mighty God  !"  Force— Energy — God.  The  first  a  name  ;  the  second 
a  definition  ;  the  third  a  Personality.  To  this  philosophy  will  come. 
Weary  with  its  materialistic  phraseology,  it  will  consult  the  language 
of  religion  for  the  Unnamed,  and  find  it  in — God. 


CHAPTER   XII. 

THE     KIRST     CAUSE. 


SCHLEGEL  affirms  that  the  idea  of  God  is  the  only  idea,  all 
others  being  derivative  and  subordinate ;  and  Lotze  teaches  that 
the  "absolute,  living  and  creative  Spirit  alone  is,"  all  else  being  sec- 
ondary, and  the  effect  of  one  all-sufficient  cause.  The  study  of  this 
Idea  is  the  imperative  of  all  preliminaries. 

The   piv.lilem   of  the  First  Cause  is  the  problem  of  the  universe. 


256  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

Given  the  First,  and  the  descending  series  through  infinite  gradations 
and  to  an  infinite  number  may  be  traced,  arranged,  explained.  With- 
out it  confusion  reigns  in  inquiry,  and  conclusion  is  the  merest  con- 
jecture. A  Beginner  and  a  beginning — one  or  the  other  is  required ; 
one  implies  the  other  ;  to  find  one  is  to  find  both ;  to  find  one  or  the 
other  is  the  object  of  the  mysterious  searchings  of  philosophy.  To 
accept  either  without  demonstration  is  contrary  to  the  function  of 
philosophy  ;  to  reject  both  until  demonstrated  prevents  demonstration. 
The  problem  embracing  the  questions  of  self-existence,  the  essentia  of 
being,  the  attributes  of  absolute  spirit,  and  its  relations  to  phenomena 
is  too  large  to  be  confined  to  a  single  aspect ;  to  be  understood  it 
must  be  grasped  in  its  magnitude,  and  every  feature  receive  exhaust- 
ive analysis.  Philosopliy,  tireless  in  its  purpose,  but  changeable  in 
its  methods,  has  undertaken  to  reduce  the  idea  of  God  to  a  concrete 
form ;  but  its  results  have  been  far  from  satisfactoiy. 

We  shall  examine  the  different  schools  of  thought  which  three 
centuries  have  produced  in  the  attempt  to  solve  the  first  and  final 
problem,  namely,  the  original  causer  of  the  universe,  observing  that  up 
to  this  hour  the  problem  is  unsolved.  Varying  in  methods  of  reason- 
ing, these  systems  have  a  single  aim,  and  when  closely  studied  reveal 
an  inner  bond  of  connection,  as  if  leagued  together  in  a  destructive 
purpose,  which  they  propose  to  accomplish  each  by  methods  of  its 
own.  In  the  nineteenth  century,  or  the  latest  philosophy,  the  stu- 
dent discovers  a  reproduction  or  imitation  of  the  philosophical  fabrics 
of  the  ancient  Greeks,  Schopenhauer,  Hartmann,  Spencer,  and  Htickel 
having  advanced  but  a  little  beyond  Democritus,  Heraclitus,  or  the 
Ionics  in  general.  They  often  whistle  the  old  tunes  of  Greece,  but 
palm  them  off"  as  the  original  melodies  of  the  modern  musician.  If,  how- 
ever, these  systems  exhibit  an  originality  of  thought  in  the  investiga- 
tion of  the  problem  of  problems,  they  relapse  into  the  same  icono- 
clastic conclusions  which  the  old  Grecian  materialists  foretold.  Nothing 
essentially  new,  certainly  nothing  striking  in  results,  may  be  antici- 
pated from  a  study  of  the  materialistic  phases  of  modern  thought. 

In  what  manner  philosophy  has  considered  the  problems,  what 
processes  it  has  adopted,  and  what  conclusions  reached,  we  are  now 
prepared  to  learn.  To  exhibit  these  inquiries  and  their  results,  we 
set  in  tabular  form  the  leading  philosophies  of  modern  times,  or  those 
which  have  exercised  a  superior  influence  in  the  field  of  investigation. 

I.  The  creed  of  Sensationalism  or  Empiricism,  namely,  knowledge 
is  derived  from  sensation,  necessarily  precludes  by  its  limitations  any 
knowledge  whatever  of  the  First  Cause. 

II.  The  embryonic  philosophy  of  Positivism,  which  teaches  that 
knowledge  is  limited  to  material  phenomena,  and  that  the  principle 


ADVERSE  PHILOSOPHIC  CREEDS.  257 

of  causation   is  irrational,  is  inadequate  to   the    interpretation  of  a 
First  Cause. 

III.  The  Common  Sense  Philosophy,  heralding  ultimate  facts,  but 
unable  to  explain  them,  affords  no  ground  for  belief  in  a  great  First 
Cause. 

IV.  In  Pessimism,  the  melancholy  wail  of  atheistic  conviction, 
there  is  no  foundation  for  faith  in  a  Supreme  Being. 

V.  Idealism,  an  ebbing  and  flowing  tide,  rising  betimes  to  super- 
natural heights,  sinks  back  into  unsatisfying  sentiment,  leaving  the 
mind  bewildered  rather  than  contented  respecting  the  character  of 
the  First  Cause. 

VI.  The  philosophy  of  Relativity,  imprisoning  knowledge  within 
the  walls  of  the  phenomenal,  opens  no  trap-door  into  the  mysteries 
of  the  Infinite. 

VH.  The  theory  of  Associationalism,  anchoring  itself  in  the  cor- 
relation and  conservation  of  forces,  sinks  lower  than  any  in  ignorance 
of  the  First  Cause. 

VIII.  The  philosophy  of  Evolution,  or  Spencerianism,  instead  of 
carrying  the  mind  to  starlit  heights  of  vision,  sinks  it  into  the  tertiary 
depths  of  impenetrable  nothingness. 

These  let  us  consider  in  their  order. 

Beginning  with  Sensationalism,  its  failure  to  discover  the  Infinite, 
with  both  its  process  and  object  understood,  is  not  surprising.  Turning 
its  back  upon  the  Infinite,  it  never  wheeled  around  faceward  toward 
God.  Aristotle,  having  declared  that  knowledge  is  derived  from 
sensation,  not  only  disturbed  the  thinkers  of  his  age,  but  also  sug- 
gested a  theory  that  the  moderns  appropriated,  building  upon  it  a 
materialistic  philosophy,  damaging  both  to  intellectual  research  and 
the  religious  spirit.  Bacon,  wedded  to  the  physical  sciences,  and 
Hobbes,  dealing  with  metaphysical  as  if  they  were  physical  problems, 
paved  the  way  for  Locke,  who  came  forth  as  the  champion  of  the 
theory  in  his  explanation  of  the  laws  and  operations  of  the  human  un- 
derstanding, that  sensation  is  the  source  of  knowledge.  Logically, 
empiricism  must  maintain  that  the  condition  of  knowledge  is  a  posteriori; 
it  is  derived  from  without,  or  at  the  most  from  experience,  and  the 
mind  has  no  a  priori  power  to  discover  truth,  or  reflect  upon  it  when 
presented.  Sensationalism,  therefore,  is  experience-philosophy,  or  the 
theory  of  a  posteriori  knowledge,  which  is  essentially  atheistic. 

To  produce  an  overflow  of  materialistic  sentiment,  there  must 
have  been  in  Locke's  theory  of  the  mind,  or  of  the  origin  of  knowl- 
edge, something  that  naturally  and  logically  led  to  it.  Atheism  is 
not  an  artificial  result  of  sensationalism.  Locke's  starting-point  was 
the  denial  of  innate  ideas,  or  the  emptiness  of  mind   until  it  began 

17 


258  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

to  fill  up  by  impressions  from  external  sources.  Self-knowledge,  or 
the  power  to  originate  ideas,  does  not  belong  to  mind,  as  it  first 
manifests  itself;  it  is  a  mirror,  reflecting  what  is  cast  upon  it.  Such 
a  theory  allows  to  the  mind  no  spirituality,  no  independent,  original, 
self-acting,  or  self-determining  power ;  it  does  away  with  the  imma- 
terialism  of  man  at  a  stroke.  Locke  meant  not  to  go  so  far ;  but 
the  skeptics  engineered  sensationalism  into  the  camp  of  materialism 
without  any  difficulty.  If  the  human  mind  is  not  immaterial,  is  there 
any  immaterialism  ?  Who  will  affirm  that  God  is  spiritual,  if  man  is 
not?  Accordingly,  knowledge  consists  in  the  perception  of  sensations; 
consciousness  is  "  static,  spectacular,  sensible ;"  the  soul  is  mortal ;  death 
ends  all.     Empirical  psychology  could  reach  no  other  conclusion. 

What,  now,  of  its  relation  to  the  Causer?  Evidently,  the  same 
method  of  argumentation  which  disposes  of  mind,  disposes  of  God 
also ;  and  even  Locke  was  compelled  by  his  philosophy  toj  teach 
that,  as  knowledge  is  the  product  of  sensations,  man  can  know  noth- 
ing of  substance,  being,  or  God.  Man  must  float  in  the  world  of 
sensations,  like  an  insect  in  the  atmosphere,  impressed  by  the  flow 
of  its  currents,  without  the  power  of  self-direction,  or  control  of 
impressions.  Sensations  we  know ;  but  substance,  being,  God,  we 
can  not  know.  From  admissions  or  conclusions  so  unfortunate,  Con- 
dillac,  Hume,  and  others  were  justified  in  proclaiming  a  materialism 
not  at  all  foreseen  by  the  founder  of  empiricism  ;  and  afterward, 
Bentham  and  the  elder  Mill,  the  one  in  elaborating  his  utilitarianism, 
and  the  other  his  materialism,  only  completed  the  destructive  work 
that  Locke  so  innocently  forged.  Indeed,  the  sensationalism  of  Aris- 
totle, amplified  into  a  system  by  Locke,  is  one  of  the  pillai's  of 
modern  philosophy,  especially  English  philosophy.  Huxley  has  af- 
firmed that  "  our  sensations,  our  pleasures,  and  our  pains,  and  the 
relations  of  these,  make  up  the  sum  total  of  the  elements  of  positive, 
unquestionable  knowledge."  Spencer,  as  is  well  know^n,  is  an  advo- 
cate of  the  experience-philosophy  ;  and,  as  an  evidence  of  the  ma- 
terialistic character  of  such  philosophy,  it  is  not  contrary  to  fact  to 
state  that  these  latest  and  living  exponents  of  it  affirm  that  God  is 
unknowable.  The  First  can  not  be  known  through  the  sensations, 
and  as  sensation  is  the  sole  source  of  knowledge,  there  is  no  possible 
hope  of  ever  knowing  the  Divine  Cause.  Strangely,  these  advocates 
spurn  the  charge  of  being  materialists,  though  they  support  material- 
ism, on  the  ground  that  they  do  not  deny  the  existence  of  a  Supreme 
Being,  but  affirm  he  is  beyond  us,  indiscernible,  inaccessible,  beyond 
all  knowledge,  beyond  all  thought.  What  is  the  difference  between 
a  being  that  can  not  be  known  or  conceived  of,  and  a  being  that 
does  not  exist?     As  between  them,  there  is  a  possible  preference,  for 


POSITIVISM  OF  COMTE.  259 

to  say  that  God  does  not  exist  is  absolute  atheism,  but  to  say  that  we 
know  nothing  about  him  is  only  a  confession  of  the  feebleness  of  our 
powers  to  grasp  a  being  so  infinitely  great  as  the  Uncaused  must  be. 
The  one  extinguishes  the  Uncaused ;  the  other  enshrouds  him  in  an 
inaccessible  gloom.  The  one  blots  him  out;  the  other  says  he  can  not 
be  found.  In  the  latter  view  he  is  the  Charles  Ross  of  philosophy, 
believed  to  exist  but  forever  undiscoverable.  Such  is  the  conclusion 
of  Sensationalism  touching  the  problem  of  the  First  Cause. 

II.  What  is  the  interpretation  of  Positivism?  In  one  respect  it 
is  kindred  to  sensationalism,  as,  in  its  affirmation  that  knowledge  is 
confined  to  the  phenomena  of  the  material  world,  it  can  never  rise  in 
its  apprehensions  above  phenomena ;  it  can  never  discern  substance, 
or  penetrate  being.  Comte  is  the  author  of  this  school  of  philosophers, 
a  man  less  fearless  of  consequences  than  Locke,  less  systematic  in  his 
system,  and  more  eager  to  overthrow  existing  religious  ideas  of  God 
than  to  establish  the  truth.  Locke  searches  the  laws  of  mind ;  Comte, 
the  laws  of  matter.  One  is  an  internal  thinker,  the  other  an  external 
thinker.  Locke's  internal  philosophy  in  its  last  analysis  became  ex- 
ternal ;  that  is,  from  the  laws  of  mind  he  could  not  predicate  sub- 
jective existence,  or  substance  back  of  phenomena.  From  the  laws 
of  matter,  cognition  of  whose  phenomena  is  the  sum  of  knowledge, 
Comte  undertook  to  establish  the  same  conclusion.  Reversing  the 
method,  he  emerged  into  the  materialism  to  which  empiricism  had 
conducted  its  friends.  Locke  was  the  right  hand,  and  Comte  the 
left,  in  the  movement  against  immaterialism. 

Adequately  to  establish  his  conclusion,  Comte  arrayed  his  forces 
against  the  principle  of  causation,  as  recognized  hy  consciousness,  and 
as  inductively  observed  in  nature  ;  and  refused  to  accept  the  Aris- 
totelian category  of  causes,  which  has  been  regarded  as  almost  com- 
plete. The  notion  of  cause  seems  native  to  mind  ;  it  is  that  from 
which  the  mind  is  led  to  a  conception  of  the  order  of  the  universe, 
and  the  existence  of  the  cause  of  causes.  An  apple  falls  from  a 
tree ;  the  mind  inquires  the  cause  in  the  belief  that  there  is  a  cause ; 
and  so  strong  is  the  belief  that  one  can  not  be  educated  out  of  it. 
The  force  of  the  idea  of  cause  and  its  relations  to,  and  proof  of,  a 
first  cause,  Comte  could  not  escape  ;  hence,  his  effort  to  annihilate  it. 
He  says:  "The  inevitable  tendency  of  our  intelligence  is  toward  a 
philosophy  radically  theological,  so  often  as  we  seek  to  penetrate,  on 
whatever  pretext,  into  the  intimate  nature  of  phenomena."  That  is, 
a  recognition  of  the  phenomena  of  nature  in  their  relations  as  causes 
and  eflfects  tends  to  establish  the  theological  conception  of  God — a  conclu- 
sion that  he  proposes  to  overthrow  because  his  theory  requires  him  to 
do  so.     The  Idea  of  God  and  Positivism  can  not  co-exist ;  one  or  the 


260  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

other  must  go.  After  a  Spenceriau  fashion,  he  does  Bot  deny  causa- 
tion, but  he  pronounces  it  inscrutable,  unknown,  unknowable,  un- 
thinkable. What  a  hiding-place  for  philosophy  is  the  word  ' '  unknown !" 
If  God  is  in  question,  concede  his  existence,  and  then  blot  him  out 
of  sight  by  saying  he  is  unknowable  ;  if  the  principle  of  causation  is 
under  consideration,  say  it  exists,  but  pronounce  it  unknowable. 
Phenomena  may  be  known,  but  not  their  causes.  What  is  may  be 
studied,  but  not  tohy  it  is,  or  what  produced  it. 

Hume  varied  from  this  in  holding  that  by  causation  is  meant  only 
a  succession  ;  that  is,  events  are  a  series  of  successional  facts  where 
legal  connection  can  not  be  established.  As  regards  creation  he  as- 
serts that  no  one  is  competent  as  a  witness  to  testify  that  causation, 
as  understood  to  imply  cause  and  effect,  was  involved  in  the  process. 
John  S.  Mill  espouses  a  similar  view,  reducing  causes  and  effects  to 
mere  sequences,  or  successive  acts.  Sir  William  Hamilton  likewise 
trends  toward  that  ignis  fatuus  by  saying  that  "  Ave  have  no  pei'cep- 
tion  of  the  causal  nexus  in  the  material  world."  If  the  principle  of 
causation  be  reduced  to  an  appearance  of  successional  movements, 
without  connection,  or  whose  connection  can  not  be  established,  or  on 
no  a  priori  grounds  admitted ;  if  the  natural  world  displays  no  con- 
nectionalism  ;  if  causality,  hitherto  relied  on  as  invulnerable,  is  an 
inductive  hallucination  ;  then  the  argument  for  a  First  Cause  has  re- 
ceived a  blow  from  which  it  can  scarcely  recover.  To  eliniiuate  the 
lurking  theology  from  the  principle  of  causation,  to  overthrow  the 
principle,  as  the  physician  destroys  disease,  was  Comte's  great  aim. 
AVhat  Locke  ignorantly  achieved,  Comte  purposely  wrought  out,  the 
elimination  of  the  idea  of  a  First  Cause.  What  deadly,  destructive 
criticism  is  this?  Sensationalism,  beginning  with  mind,  ends  in 
materialism ;  Positivism,  beginning  with  matter,  pronounces  the  the- 
ology of  causation  inscrutable,  and  ends  in  a  godless  universe.  The 
former  says  God  is  unknowable  ;  the  latter,  that  he  does  not  exist. 
The  one  names  itself  a  guarded  materialism ;  the  other  is  atheism. 

III.  Next  in  order,  is  the  philosophy  of  "  Common-sense,"  its 
name  being  suggestive  of  fair  dealing  with  intuitions,  consciousness, 
historic  facts,  and  metaphysical  truths.  Surely,  Reid,  who  represents 
this  phase  of  speculation,  and  who  discovered  the  dilemma  of  his 
predecessors,  will  not  fall  into  the  same,  or  an  equal  error,  but  point 
out  a  way  of  escape  from  destructive  conclusions.  Let  us  see.  Reid 
enunciates  the  doctrine  of  ultimate  facts,  which,  in  its  phraseology, 
is  the  core  of  a  great  philosophical  utterance ;  for  there  must  be 
basal  truths,  foundation-stones  of  belief,  on  which  human  history 
may  rest.  With  Reid,  however,  these  corner-stones  are  not  what 
philosophy  demands;  they  are,  in   short,  not  basal   facts,  but  inter- 


COMMON-SENSE  FACTS.  261 

mediate  facts  which  require  solution.  An  initial  fact  presupposes  no 
anterior  fact ;  it  is  the  end  of  speculation,  solution,  inquiry.  To 
such  a  final  fact  Reid  does  not  conduct  us,  for  his  finals  are  sensation, 
memory,  imagination,  the  ordinary  operations  of  intellection,  which 
the  common  sense  of  mankind  accept  as  real,  and  against  which  it 
would  be  useless  to  contend.  Quite  vigorously,  but  really  unnecessarily, 
he  makes  a  defense  of  these  common-sense  facts,  requiring  belief  in 
them,  as  they  are  related  to  life,  society,  government,  and  religion. 

Back  of  these,  however,  we  must  go  if  the  problem  of  philosophy 
be  solved.  On  none  of  these  can  the  final  fact  be  predicated — the 
quest  of  philosophy.  Furthermore,  the  value  of  the  theory  is  de- 
stroyed by  Reid's  own  confession  that,  going  back  and  recognizing 
the  initial  facts  as  given,  no  explanation  of  them  is  possible — the 
very  thing  the  truth-searcher  demands.  The  idea  of  an  original  fact 
is  self-explanation.  A  noise  occurs  in  the  orchard  ;  the  original  fact 
is,  not  that  something  made  the  noise,  but  that  a  pear  fell  to  the 
ground,  the  cause  being  thus  ascertained.  Not  generals,  but  particu- 
lars, not  something,  but  the  exact  somewhat,  the  searcher  must  find, 
or  he  is  in  the  dark.  A  so-called  first  fact,  without  explanation,  im- 
plies that  causes  are  still  remote  and  obscure ;  but  in  a  true  phi- 
losophy the  distance  to  the  remote  must  be  blotted  out,  and  the  ob- 
scure must  become  transparent.  According  to  Reid,  a  sensation  is  an 
original  fact  which  common  sense  forces  us  to  believe ;  but  the  first  cause 
of  the  original  fact,  he  declares,  can  not  be  discovered.  In  what  is  this 
superior  to  Positivism?  Not  denying  the  principle  of  causation,  the 
theory  of  Reid  implies  that  it  can  not  be  investigated,  whith  advances 
the  inquirer  no  farther  than  the  dogma  of  Positivism.  As  Locke  did 
not  intend  to  furnish  a  foothold  for  materialism  in  his  empiricism,  but 
did  open  the  way  for  philosophical  disasters,  so  Reid,  unwittingly, 
furnished  an  argument  for  the  most  virulent  assaults  of  Positivism. 

Respecting  the  problem  of  being,  or  God,  Reid  stands  upon  the 
platform  of  Locke,  Hume,  and  Kant,  none  of  whom,  through  their 
philosophies,  ascended  the  mountain  of  vision,  and  from  its  summit 
beheld  the  Cause  of  the  universe.  Kant's  "  phenomena,"  Locke's 
"images,"  Hume's  "impressions,"  and  Reid's  "beliefs,"  diifering 
slightly  in  character,  sustained  a  uniform  relation  to  the  problem  of 
problems,  echoing  a  nescience  of  the  character  of  the  Supreme 
Power,  and  virtually  banishing  the  Creator  from  the  universe. 

In  the  "  Common-sense"  philosophy  there  is  the  breaking  out  of 
a  doctrine  which,  though  characteristic  of  the  earlier  modern  systems 
of  speculative  thought,  is  more  patent  in  Reid,  and  becomes  the 
shibboleth  of  the  latest  apostles  of  philosoph}'.  According  to  Locke, 
sensation  is  the  source  of  knowledge,  which   signifies  original  empti- 


262  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

ness  of  mind,  and  a  qualified  imbecility  of  the  mental  powers ;  ac- 
cording to  Comte,  causation  is  inscrutable,  which  signifies  mysteries 
that  can  not  be  solved  ;  and  now,  in  the  assertion  that  such  mind- 
facts  as  memory,  imagination,  and  will,  can  not  be  explained,  Reid 
prepares  the  way  for  that  final  accusation  of  mental  imbecility  which 
characterizes  Spencer  and  his  followers.  Had  he  contented  himself 
with  denying  to  man  the  power  to  comprehend  the  infinite,  he  had 
occupied  high  and  unimpeachable  ground ;  but,  in  addition  thereto, 
he  denies  to  mind  a  knowledge  of  itself,  or  allows  only  an  acquaint- 
ance with  its  powers  and  functions,  which  even  the  untutored  readily 
admit.     Evidently,  in  Reid,  we  go  not  below  the  surface. 

IV.  Advancing  in  our  analysis  of  these  systems,  we  approach  a 
form  of  philosophy  which,  icicle-like,  has  no  recommendation  other 
than  that  it  exists.  Without  heat,  without  light,  it  is  rigid  and 
comfortless,  and  goes  farther  in  its  sui-render  than  any  of  the  preced- 
ing. Pessimism  is  no  longer  an  abstraction,  no  longer  a  stray  possi- 
bility, but  an  actual  conjecture,  the  pillar  of  a  philosophy  that  claims 
for  itself  a  rational  basis.  Its  earlier  exponent  was  Schopenhauer,  a 
man  who  hated  his  mother,  and  interpreted  the  universe  from  a  dys- 
peptic standp<Mnt ;  its  present  advocate  is  Hartmann,  a  young  lion  of 
Germany,  eager,  bold,  self-sufficient.  These  two  thinkers,  assigning 
to  others  the  question  of  the  operations  of  the  mind  and  the  origin  of 
knowledge,  saw  that  the  problem  of  the  existence  of  a  Supreme  Power  is 
chief,  and  devoted  their  energies  to  its  solution.  Neither  in  sensation- 
alism, nor  in  positivism,  nor  in  the  "common-sense"  philosophy,  is 
the  problem  the  subject  of  direct  contemplation,  its  appearance  being 
due  to  other  problems  with  which  it  is  associated.  Contrariwise,  the 
pessimists  of  Germany  discerned  the  supremacy  of  the  problem  of  the 
First  Cause,  which,  instead  of  ignoring,  they  sought  to  explain  ;  but 
the  explanation  is  an  Arctic  blast,  withering  the  flowers  of  faith  and 
hope  which  hitherto  have  flourished  in  the  warmer  latitudes  of  re- 
ligion. Schopenhauer  sees  everywhere  the  manifestations  of  an  iron 
will-power ;  not  an  intelligent  personal  will,  but  a  blind,  impersonal 
force,  nature  speaking  the  words  of  a  characterless  mover  and  gov- 
ernor. Force  is  omnipresent,  an  idiotic  runaway,  building  up  and 
tearing  down  with  fiendish  delight,  and  creating  disorder  and  misery 
for  the  mere  pleasure  of  it.  In  his  view,  the  world  is  badly  managed, 
its  government  being  rather  one  of  chance  than  of  purpose,  and  the 
hope  of  improvement  is  a  delusive  anticipation.  To  this  pessimistic 
representation  of  the  world  Hartmann  does  not  take  exception,  but 
he  has  attempted  to  define  the  will-power  of  Schopenhauer  by  adding 
to  it  the  faculty  of  reason,  and  endowing  the  Somewhat  with  the 
powers  of  being,  fir  will  and  reason  certainly  indicate  being.     Here 


PHIL  OSOPHIC  REG  EN  ERA  Tl  ON.  263 

is  ontology ;  but  Hartmaun  perpetrates  a  strange  paralogism  by  in- 
sisting that  this  ontological  power  is  unconscious,  and  that  will  and 
reason,  though  acting  in  concert,  act  unconsciously.  Hence,  God,  in 
the  latest  pessimism  of  Germany,  is  the  Unconscious.  Reason  govern- 
ing and  will  enforcing,  nevertheless  the  Supreme  Power  acts  without 
knowing  that  it  acts.  Hartmunn's  God  is  a  somnambulistic  creature, 
a  walking  sleeper  in  the  universe,  moving  according  to  the  dictates 
of  a  rational  intelligence,  but  meanwhile  unconscious.  Between  an 
unconscious  deity  and  no  deity  at  all,  there  can  be  no  choice;  one  is 
as  destructive  of  worshij),  faith,  prayer,  religion,  as  the  other. 
According  to  Schopenhauer,  God  is  a  wandering  idiot ;  according  to 
Hartmann,  he  is  a  sleeping  monster.     Of  both  we  are  equally  afraid. 

j^ccording  to  the  systems  previously  considered,  the  First  Cause 
is  unknowable ;  but,  excepting  the  evident  atheism  of  Comte,  they 
impliedly  agree  that  there  is  a  First  Cause,  which,  however,  is  beyond 
our  investigation.  Pessimism  lifts  the  veil,  and  touches  our  eye- 
balls with  flashes  of  celestial  light,  inviting  us  to  behold  what  was 
unknowable  to  Locke,  Hume,  Reid,  Kant,  and  Hamilton,  and  what 
did  not  exist,  according  to  Comte.  And  what  is  the  what  ?  A  divine 
majesty,  in  truth ;  but  a  blind  rover,  without  a  throne,  a  sleepy-head, 
or  a  prostrate  being,  drugged  into  perpetual  unconsciousness  by  the 
poison  of  the  universe,  or  by  the  tireless  vibrations  of  his  own  nature. 
Enough  of  pessimism. 

V.  In  Idealism  philosophy  attained  a  regeneration.  From  the 
days  of  Leibnitz,  the  idealistic  stand-point  has  been  occupied  by  many 
noted  thinkers,  among  them  Kant,  Berkeley,  Wolff*,  Fichte,  Schelling, 
and  Hegel,  all  of  whom  perceived  the  reality  of  subjective  experi- 
ences, and  the  superiority  of  the  subjective  to  the  objective  in  the 
universe.  As  contrasted  with  sensationalism,  idealism  is  as  the 
mountain  to  the  foot-hill ;  as  contrasted  with  positivism,  it  is  as  faith 
to  unbelief;  as  contrasted  with  the  "common-sense"  dogma,  one 
fathoms  the  ocean  while  the  other  skims  the  surface;  as  contrasted 
with  pessimism,  the  one  is  an  unlit  tunnel,  the  other  is  a  sunrise. 
Idealism  is  the  summit  of  modern  philosophy.  Either  on  that  summit 
stand  the  philosophers,  or  on  the  slopes  of  sensationalism,  positivism, 
pessimism,  associationalism,  or  materialism. 

From  the  heights  of  idealism,  a  clearer  view  of  the  divine  majesty, 
a  more  rational  explanation  of  the  universe,  is  taken ;  nevertheless, 
we  have  somewhat  against  thee,  O  Idealism !  Not  that  thy  works 
are  evil,  but  that  they  are  insufficient.  Passing  Leibnitz,  Berkeley, 
and  Wolff",  we  begin  with  Kant,  as,  perhaps,  on  the  whole,  the  best 
representative  of  the  earlier  idealism,  than  which  the  very  latest 
has  surpassed  it  in  few  particulars,  or  a  wider  grasp  of  the  facts  in- 


264  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHBISTIANITY. 

volved.  The  theory  of  Kant  respecting  knowledge,  though  not  es- 
sentially sensational  or  emiDirical,  is  not  an  advance,  for  he  held  that 
the  world,  owing  to  the  intervention  of  space  and  time,  can  not  be 
known  as  it  really  is.  Phenomena  alone  can  be  known  ;  being,  sub- 
stance, must  forever  remain  unknown.  With  this  limitation,  a 
knowledge  of  God,  from  the  evidence  of  external  signs,  is  al)Solutely 
impossible.  The  step  from  phenomenon  to  God  can  not  be  taken. 
Seeing  the  destructive  tendency  of  the  theory,  and  its  kinship  to  em- 
piricism, Kant  did  not  press  it  as  the  conclusion  of  philosophy,  but 
as  a  speculation,  from  which  he  emerged  into  an  all-sufficient  idealism. 
Between  empiricism  and  idealism  there  is  a  wide  difference,  but  Kant 
escaped  the  one  and  settled  in  the  other  through  the  avenue  of 
the  Reason.  Of  the  Pure  or  theoretical  and  the  Practical  Rtason 
he  affirms  that  the  former  deals  with  abstract  or  metaphysical  no- 
tions, the  latter  with  common  principles  or  facts,  or  the  higher  prob- 
lems in  a  common  manner.  As  against  this  division,  it  may  be  urged 
that  the  same  powers  exercised  by  the  theoretical  reason  are  em- 
ployed by  the  practical ;  wherefore  it  is  difficult  to  understand  why 
the  one  reason  will  reach  conclusions  the  other  will  not  approve.  As 
evidence  of  the  unfitness  of  the  classification,  it  will  be  noted  that 
Kant  himself  declares  that,  by  the  Pnre  Reason,  the  doctrine  of  the 
immortality  of  the  soul,  the  moral  freedom  of  man,  and  the  existence 
of  God — the  three  greatest  facts — can  not  be  demonstrated.  If  the 
theoretical  reason,  dealing  with  psychological,  cosmological,  ontolog- 
ical,  and  theological  ideas,  finds  itself  unable  to  demonstrate  the 
necessary  and  the  true,  then  is  it  essentially  weak.  Either  these 
great  ideas  must  be  abandoned,  or  a  new  instrument  of  defense  and 
demonstration  must  be  found.  In  the  Practical  reason,  Kant  finds  a 
sufficient  sustaining  force.  It  disposes  of  paralogisms  ;  it  unties  Gor- 
dian  knots;  it  disperses  fogs ;  it  lifts  the  darkness;  it  harmonizes  discrep- 
ancies, converting  discords  into  concords;  it  restores  the  unities,  sees 
the  infinite  in  the  phenomenal,  and  at  last  demonstrates  the  existence 
of  God  and  the  immortality  of  man.     Thanks  to  the  Practical  Reason ! 

Again,  Kant  taught  that  the  practical  reason  is  the  source  of  pure 
a  priori  knowledge,  which  was  in  contrast  with  the  a  posteriori  condi- 
tion of  knowledge  as  affirmed  by  Locke,  and  is  a  safer  theory. 

With  its  weaknesses,  the  Kantian  scheme  is  elaborate  and  strong. 
It  served  as  a  breakwater  against  the  sensationalism  of  Locke,  and 
resisted  the  destructive  tides  of  materialism,  which  for  a  long  period 
threatened  to  sweep  away  the  bulwarks  of  religious  faith.  After 
Kant,  idealism  was  modified  by  Fichte,  Schelling,  and  Hegel,  three 
names  usually  linked  together ;  but  that  it  rose  any  higher,  or  that 
more  satisfactorv  results  were  reached,  mav  be  doubted. 


HEGEL  AND  HAMILTON.  265 

In  Hegel  we  have  the  consummation  of  idealism,  as  in  Liebnitz 
its  beginning.  Fichte  advocated  subjective  idealism ;  Schelling,  ob- 
jective idealism  ;  Hegel,  absolute  idealism.  Prominently  uufokle<l  in 
Hegel's  logic  are  the  doctrines  of  being,  of  essence,  and  of  notion,  all 
of  which  are  conceived  in  a  transcendental  spirit  and  discussed  in  an 
obscure  and  subtle  manner.  As  to  being,  it  is  per  se;  it  is  the  one,  but 
the  one  is  as  truly  the  manifold.  Though  a  variation  from  Spiuozism, 
it  can  not  be  called  an  improvement  or  a  purification.  "What  kind 
of  an  Absolute  Being  is  that  which  does  not  contain  in  itself  all  that  is 
actual,  even  evil  included?"  asks  Hegel.  God  is  this  Absolute  Being. 
God  is  not  a  "motionless,  self-identical,  unchangeable  being,  but  a 
living,  eternal  process  of  absolute  self-existence" — a  developing  being, 
including  all  development.     This  is  the  ideal  of  idealism. 

In  his  treatment  of  the  doctrine  of  Notion,  the  divine  being  ap- 
pears in  another  light.  The  Notion  is  subjective,  objective,  and  the 
Idea.  The  Idea  is  the  highest  logical  definition  of  the  Absolute;  the 
Supreme  Notion  is  the  Absolute  Idea ;  therefore  the  Supreme  Notion 
is  the  Absolute.  God  is  a  being  of  ideas,  supreme,  lofty,  controlling, 
which  is  a  Platonic  conception  in  a  new  guise. 

Hegel  also  finds  it  convenient  to  ornament  his  idealism  with 
Christian  truth,  for  he  afiirms  that  Christ  is  the  internal  idea  exter- 
nalized ;  in  other  words,  that  Christ  is  externally  what  God  is  inter- 
nally;  or,  as  Paul  phrases  it,  Christ  was  "  God  manifest  in  the  flesh." 
Perhaps  Hegelians  will  resist  this  interpretation  of  their  master,  as 
being  entirely  too  Scriptural  and  over-theological ;  but  certain  it  is 
that  the  three  advocates  of  idealism  herein  mentioned  made  an  ex- 
haustive attempt  to  harmonize  it  with  Christianity  ;  hence,  the  theo- 
logical bias  of  the  highest  idealism. 

But  idealism,  even  in  its  refined  form,  failed  of  its  purpose;  it  did 
not  unite  with  Christianity ;  it  did  not  reveal  God.  According  to 
Kant,  God  is  indemonstrable  by  pure  reason  ;  according  to  Fichte,  he 
is  the  infinite  subject ;  according  to  Schelling,  the  infinite  mind ;  ac- 
cording to  Hegel,  the  process  of  absolute  being.  None  of  these  is  a 
demonstration  ;  none  even  a  satisfactory  definition  of  the  Absolute,  or 
the  Eternal  God. 

VI.  The  philosophy  of  Relativity  was  inaugurated  by  Sir  William 
Hamilton,  who,  expounding  it  with  singular  clearness  and  force,  and 
yet  in  a  contradictory  way,  conceived  that  the  Absolute  is  unknow- 
able. Reasoning  from  the  law  of  causation,  he  demonstrated  the 
existence  of  a  First  Cause  ;  reasoning  from  the  law  of  relativity,  he 
concluded  the  First  Cause  is  unknowable.  The  law  of  relativity  is, 
substantially,  that  knowledge  is  conditioned  upon  relations,  and 
therefore  no  object  or  being  aloof  from   relation  can  be  known.     Re- 


266  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

specting  physical  objects,  we  know  them  in  their  relations,  as  a  tree 
is  known  to  exist  in  its  relation  to  the  earth,  gravity,  moisture,  sun- 
light. We  do  not  consider  any  object  separate  from  fixed  or  accidental 
relationships,  for  outside  of  relationship  v.e  find  nothing.  Now,  is 
God  related  or  unrelated?  If  it  is  shown  that  he  sustains  relations, 
which  are  recognized  by  finite  minds,  then  he  too  is  knowable ;  but 
if  he  is  outside  of  all  relation,  then  he  is  outside  of  human  knowl- 
edge. Hamilton's  Deity  is  an  unrelated,  unconditioned  being ;  there- 
fore, unknowable.  But  God  certainly  exists  in  relation  to  cause  and 
eflfect;  the  universe  is  the  image  of  his  thought,  the  work  of  his 
hands,  the  eflPect  of  his  causative  agency ;  he  enters  into  relations, 
because  he  acts,  thinks,  wills,  creates,  preserves,  and  governs;  and 
thinking,  acting,  preserving,  and  governing  imply  close  relationships. 
An  unrelated  God  is  a  do-nothing  God,  an  inglorious  idler ;  a  related 
deity  is  a  necessary  postulate  of  any  deity  at  all.  An  unrelated 
deity  is,  indeed,  unthinkable;  but  such  a  nondescript  deity  can  only 
be  found  in  a  false  philosophy. 

In  order  to  strengthen  the  law  of  relativity  in  its  application  to  a 
nescience  of  the  divine  being,  Hamilton  asserts  that  thought  itself  is 
limited  by  the  conditioned;  "to  think  is  to  condition,"  or  to  roam 
within  limits ;  but  the  infinite  is  beyond  limitation,  and  must  be  un- 
thinkable. Still  Hamilton  breaks  his  unbreakable  law  by  thinking 
of  the  Infinite,  philosophizing  on  the  unconditioned,  and  declaring  his 
greatness.  To  predicate  infinity  of  the  unthinkable  involves  an  exer- 
cise of  thought,  and  in  a  particular  and  logical  manner ;  for,  unless 
one  know  the  difference  between  the  finite  and  the  infinite,  one  can 
not  predicate  infinity  of  any  thing.  According  to  Hamilton,  we 
know  that  the  unthinkable,  the  unrelated,  the  unknowable,  is  infinite; 
but  infinite  in  what?  In  extent?  in  wisdom?  in  power?  In  some- 
thing, surely.  If  by  finite  we  mean  limitation,  by  infinite  we  must 
mean  unlimited — unlimited  in  power,  wisdom,  goodness.  Certainly 
this  is  knowledge  worth  knowing. 

Again,  respecting  the  universe,  Hamilton  maintains  with  rare 
strength  that  it  had  an  absolute  commencement,  or  we  must  predicate 
of  it  an  infinite  non-commencement ;  a  beginning  it  had,  or  eternal 
existence  must  be  accepted.  To  assume  no  beginning  is  to  assume 
an  absurdity.  The  regression  of  an  infinite  series  of  causes  is  not 
only  bewildering,  but  also  perplexingly  absurd,  for  it  is  less  difficult 
to  believe  in  a  created  than  in  a  self-originating  universe.  This, 
however,  implies  a  Creator,  which  Hamilton  foresaw  and  conceded ; 
but  he  perpetrated  one  of  those  contradictions  for  which  he  was 
famous  in  alleging  that  mind,  though  compelled  to  choose  one  or  the 
other,  is  unable  to  conceive  of  either.      "The  Infinite  and  the  Abso- 


LA  W  OF  ASSOCIA  TION.  267 

lute,"  says  he,  "are  only  the  names  of  two  counter  imbecilities  of 
the  human  mind ;"  namely,  absolute  commencement  and  eternal 
existence. 

Hamilton's  practical  and  ethical  deductions  were  superior  to  his 
philosophy.  Urging,  in  accordance  with  the  law  of  relativity,  that 
the  Absolute  is  unrelated  and  inconceivable,  he  admitted  the  neces- 
sity of  faith  in  the  Deity.  "  We  must  believe  in  the  infinity  of  God." 
Faith  in  the  unknowable  is  as  prominent  in  Hamilton  as  faith  in  the 
knowable  is  prominent  in  Christian  theology.  Like  Jacobi's,  it  is  a 
faith-philosophy.  Without  knowing  God,  we  may  believe  in  him  ! 
Unthinkable  as  he  is,  we  may  trust  him !  To  those  whose  faith  is 
founded  on  a  partial  knowledge  of  God  obtained  from  revelation  and 
through  regeneration,  this  doctrine  of  faith  without  knowledge  has 
the  likeness  of  a  great  superstition,  which  even  fetich-worshipers 
have  never  entertained. 

What  is  the  basal  feature  of  this  philosophy?  Hamilton  was  an 
empirical  psychologist,  denying  the  knowableness  of  reals,  of  exist- 
ence, of  being,  of  substance,  and  confining  knowledge  to  phenomena 
and  their  relations.  It  is  the  old  sensationalism  in  a  new  form,  made 
legitimate  by  philosophical  legislation,  and  heralded  as  the  beacon- 
light  in  the  darkness  of  the  nineteenth  century.  The  affirmation  of 
the  law  of  relativity  is  more  plausible  than  the  denial  of  innate  ideas ; 
but  Hamilton's  conclusion  is  as  destructive  of  theism  as  Locke's 
famous  proverb.  The  one  philosophy  as  the  other  is  a  denial  to  tire 
mind  of  the  capability  of  apprehending  or  conceiving  the  Absolute, 
attributing  to  man  an  intellectual  imbecility  which  forbids  acquaint- 
ance with  any  thing  beyond  the  visible,  the  actual,  the  phenomenal. 
Hamilton  banishes  God  from  thought ;  Comte  went  a  step  further,  and 
banished  him  from  existence. 

VII.  The  philosophy  of  Associationalism,  dealing  less  with  meta- 
physical problems  than  pessimism  or  idealism,  renders  in  its  final 
proclamations  an  adverse  decision  respecting  the  theistic  hypothesis. 
Inasmuch  as  the  mind  often  acts  as  by  a  law  of  association — e.  g.,  as 
in  memory  an  object  will  suggest  the  scenes  that  ocurred  in  its  vi- 
cinity, as  Bunker  Hill  the  Revolutionary  contest — it  is  inferred  that 
the  mind's  action  is  wholly  governed  by  this  law,  that  all  its  thoughts 
are  trains  of  ideas  suggested  by  association.  This  being  the  case,  the 
mind  acts  mechanically  and  from  necessity,  and  must  be  without  in- 
dependence or  originality  ;  for,  if  thought  is  the  result  of  association, 
a  mental  operation,  independent  of  association,  is  impossible.  The 
thoughts,  too,  form  "a  compound  in  which  the  separate  elements  are 
no  more  distinguishable,  as  such,  than  oxygen  and  hydrogen  in 
water."     This  law  of  association,  says   Schwegler,  has   been  made  as 


268  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

cotLspicuous  iu  philosophy  as  gravitation  in  nature,  its  chief  advo- 
cates having  been  Hartley,  James  Mill,  John  S.  Mill,  and  Alexander 
Bain.  Hartley  was  a  physician,  who  first  taught  that  mental  action 
is  explainable  by  the  vibrations  of  brain-matter,  a  theory  indorsed 
by  Jeremy  Beutham  and  James  Mill,  who  transmitted  it  to  John  S. 
Mill,  who  formulated  it  anew,  and  to  Alexander  Bain,  who  heads  the 
list  of  living  psychologists. 

Important  as  other  questions  are,  we  will  now  inquire  into  its  re- 
lation to  the  problem  of  the  First  Cause.  Its  relation  is  apparent  in 
its  theoretical  conception  of  man,  which  allows  him  an  automatic 
existence,  whose  soul  is  deprived  of  an  immortal  nature,  whose 
whole  life  is  purely  and  exclusively  mechanical.  As  it  respects  im- 
mortality, it  is  in  the  line  of  materialism  ;  as  it  respects  the  origin 
of  human  knowledge,  it  is  in  the  line  of  sensationalism  ;  as  it  respects 
the  Deity,  it  is  in  the  line  of  positivism.  A  mechanically  acting 
mind  is  incapable  of  discerning  the  relations  of  things,  of  probing 
until  their  origin  is  gained,  of  understanding  being  or  God.  To  an 
associationalist  the  Deity,  if  not  mythical,  is  inscrutable  and  incon- 
ceivable. The  younger  Mill  held  with  Comte  that  the  doctrine  of 
causation  signified  nothing  more  than  a  succession  of  events,  in  which 
case  it  could  not  suggest  a  First  Cause.  Causation  is  not  anticipatory 
or  prophetic  of  a  First  Cause.  Associationalism,  therefore,  is  meta- 
physical mechanism,  or  mechanical  metaphysics,  robbing  man  of 
spirituality,  thought  of  independence,  and  God  of  existence.  This 
Bain  calls  a  "guarded  or  qualified  materialism;"  this,  we  admonish 
the  reader,  is  the  quicksand  of  atheism. 

VIII.  We  approach,  now,  the  last  form  of  materialistic  philos- 
ophy, namely,  Spencerianism,  a  form  of  associationalism,  and  yet 
distinct  from  it  in  that  its  ground-plan  is  evolution.  Herbert  Spen- 
cer, like  Bain,  holds  that  the  laws  of  thought  may  be  reduced  to  one 
law — namely,  association — but  that  the  process  by  which  progress 
takes  place  is  evolution.  Though  Spencer  insists  that  his  system 
makes  neither  for  materialism  nor  idealism,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how 
it  can  be  separated  from  its  consequences,  any  more  than  a  blow 
can  be  separated  from  the  bruise  it  inflicts. 

In  its  relation  to  the  First  Cause,  Spencer,  as  if  in  humiliation, 
confesses  that  that  is  a  separate  problem,  and  that  God  is  unknowable 
and  unthinkable.  He  confounds  the  unknowable  and  the  unex- 
plainable ;  he  sees  contradiction  in  the  idea  of  the  absolute  and  the 
infinite,  and  repudiates  the  doctrine  of  self-existence.  Unfortunately 
for  the  truth,  he  has  been  apparently  strengthened  by  Dean  Mansel, 
who  declares  that  God's  spirit  and  God's  ways  are  incognoscible ;  but 
theDean  does  not  mean  to  be  understood  in  the  sense  in  which  he  is 


EVOLUTION.  269 

interpreted.  Hitherto,  the  belief  among  theologians  has  been  that 
God  is  incomprehensible,  but  not  inconceivable  or  unthinkable. 
Theology  has  maintained  that  God  is  an  intelligent  personality,  the 
Absolute  Being,  incomprehensible  because  of  magnitude,  magnifi- 
cence, infinity,  but  knowable  through  the  three-fold  revelation  of  a 
written  Word,  a  divine  incarnation,  and  the  outpouring  of  his  own 
Spirit.  Evolution  can  not  evolve  God  from  its  materials,  finds  him 
not  in  the  universe,  declares  him  not  necessary  to  it,  traces  not  his  un- 
seen paths  in  the  fields  of  existence,  and  so  considers  him  outside  the 
pale  of  human  knowledge.  The  trend  of  evolution  is  toward  atheism. 
Hamilton  recovered  himself  from  the  fatal  inclination  of  his  philoso- 
phy by  declaring  that  the  unknowable  God  must  be  believed ;  Dean 
Mansel  pronounces  in  favor  of  faith  in  the  incomprehensible  God ; 
but  Spencer  uplifts  the  Deity  first  beyond  knowledge,  then  beyond 
thought,  then  beyond  faith.  What  is  this  but  atheism  ?  Consistent 
product  of  evolution,  but  impious,  withering,  soul-blasting  black- 
ness ;  this  is  the  outcome.  Spencer  is  the  Diagoras  of  the  nine- 
teenth century.  However,  he  is  not  a  professed  atheist ;  he  is  better 
than  his  system.  He  gives  us  a  cobble-stone  pliilosophy ;  not  the 
philosophy  of  the  stars;  not  the  philosophy  of  Being,  of  Power,  of 
Substance;  but  the  philosophy  of  stone.  Man  is  a  sculptured  figure, 
a  piece  of  marble,  not  a  personality,  not  a  spirituality.  God  is  no- 
where ;  there  is  no  God. 

Evolution  is  the  latest  form  of  the  philosophy  of  ignorance,  a 
self-confessed  impotent  system  of  speculative  thought,  unable  to  find 
the  ground  of  existence,  denying,  in  fact,  that  there  is  any  ground 
outside  of  itself,  making  no  explanation  of  the  unexplained,  offering 
no  conception  of  the  inconceivable,  no  knowledge  of  the  unknowable. 
Thus,  after  a  candid  survey  of  eight  systems  of  philosophic  inquiry, 
representing  all  shades  of  metaphysical  attempts  at  solving  the  great 
problem,  we  find  none  adequate  to  the  demonstration  of  the  colossal 
principle  in  the  universe  ;  none  is  sufficient  to  reveal  tlie  First  Cause, 
or  pronounce  the  incommunicable  name  of  Jehovah. 

Not  one  system  has  lifted  us  to  Sinai's  top  ;  not  one  ushered  us 
into  the  presence  of  him  whose  footfalls  echo  in  the  storm,  whose 
breath  is  felt  in  the  hurricane  or  dew ;  not  one  has  placed  the 
human  hand  in  the  divine  and  unclasped  the  grip  of  power ;  not  one 
has  brought  us  face  to  face  with  the  Infinite.  Idealism  mystified 
him  ;  Positivism  denied  him  ;  Hamiltonianism  believed  in  him,  but 
as  one  believes  in  the  center  of  the  earth  ;  Evolution  turned  him  out 
beyond  space,  and  bade  him  never  return.  The  answer  of  modern 
philosophy  to  the  inquiry.  Is  there  a  God  ?  is  yea  and  nay  ;  yea,  but 
we  can  know  nothing  of  him  ;  nay,  for  he  does  not  exist. 


270  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

Plainly,  a  mountain  of  error  must  be  shaken  down,  or  it  will 
bury  forever  the  first  truth  of  God.  In  opposition  to  Empirical  Phi- 
losophy we  proclaim  the  Absolute  from  pJienomena  alone ;  in  opposi- 
tion to  Positivism,  the  First  Cause  may  be  predicated  on  the  principle 
of  causation  alone ;  in  opposition  to  the  "Common-sense"  philosophy, 
faith  in  God  may  be  grounded  in  the  contents  of  consciousness  or  rational 
intuition;  in  opposition  to  Pessimism,  a  personal,  conscious  Will  may 
be  affirmed  from  its  historic  manifestation  in  a  superintending  Providence ; 
in  opposition  to  Idealism,  a  subjective  Absolute,  a  personal  God  may 
be  declared  as  the  prinmry  truth  of  religion;  in  opposition  to  Hamilton's 
unknowable  Unconditioned,  we  proclaim  tJie  knowable  Conditioned ;  in 
opposition  to  the  unknowable  of  Associationalism  we  proclaim  the 
hnowable  of  History  and  Religion ;  and  in  opposition  to  the  unthink- 
able of  Evolution,  we  proclaim  the  thinkable  of  Reason  and   Revelation. 

The  gravity  of  the  problem  increases  with  the  failure  of  Phi- 
losophy to  solve  it,  and  the  responsibility  of  those  who  affirm  the  the- 
istic  hypothesis,  and  especially  of  those  who  accept  the  Christian  idea 
of  the  Absolute,  is  profound  and  burdensome.  It  would  be  legiti- 
mate to  employ  the  theistic  idea  as  a  working  hypothesis  in  account- 
ing for  history  and  nature ;  for  the  scientist,  in  his  searchings,  usually 
begins  with  hypothesis,  and  can  not  deny  it  to  those  of  an  opposite 
faith  ;  but  at  once  to  assume  the  divine  existence  or  posit  it  on 
a  priori  grounds,  would  be  unphilosophical,  and  virtually  a  begging 
of  the  question.  Prof  Samuel  Harris  teaches  that  "we  can  not 
know  a  priori  what  the  Absolute  Being  is ;"  to  assume  his  existence, 
therefore,  would  be  subversive  of  rational  processes,  and  destructive 
of  our  knowledge  of  certainties.  At  the  same  time,  it  is  confessed 
that  the  a  posteriori  method  is  not  entii'ely  unobjectionable ;  we  de- 
clare without  reserve  that  the  accepted  methods  for  the  investigation 
of  the  First  Cause,  as  a  philosophical  problem,  are  utterly  and  pain- 
fully inadequate,  and  must  some  time  surrender  to  an  easier  and 
more  complete  rational  determination.  "To  go  from  reason  to  God," 
says  Cousin,  "  there  is  no  need  of  a  long  journey  ;"  but  Mansel  ob- 
jects to  the  method  of  rationalism,  yet  offers  nothing  as  a  substi- 
tute, but  declares  the  theistic  hypothesis  untenable  on  rational 
grounds.  Rationalism  is  defective  as  an  instrument  of  investigation  ; 
so  is  apriorism  ;  so  is  aposteriorism  ;  so  is  intuitionalism  ;  but  rational 
intuitionalism  is  the  highway  to  truth,  and  he  that  travels  along 
that  road  will  arrive  at  the  truth.  The  idea  of  God,  or  the  fact  of 
bis  existence,  and  the  character  of  God,  or  the  fact  of  his  attributes, 
must  not  be  confounded,  since  the  first  may  be  established,  and  the 
second  be  unknown.  To  prove  the  divine  existence  is  not  equiva- 
lent to  proving   the   divine  attributes.     Hitherto,  one   attribute  has 


A  SUBJECTIVE  ABSOLUTE.  271 

been  used  as  a  key  to  other  attributes ;  but  the  process  can  not  be 
|ustified,  for  they  do  not  exist  in  correlation.  One  does  not  imply  the 
others,  any  more  than  one  property  of  a  circle  implies  all  the  other 
properties.     Each  must  be  ascertained  in  succession. 

Mausel  yields  entirely  too  much  when  he  attempts  to  establish 
that  the  thought  of  the  Absolute  iuvolves  self-contradictions,  for  such 
an  Absolute  can  not  exist.  By  this  attempt  he  opens  the  path  to 
atheism,  which  he  rejects;  or  compels  one  to  suspect  the  validity  of 
his  own  rational  processes,  which  we  reject.  The  alternative  is,  the 
dethronement  of  God,  or  the  dethronement  of  reason  ;  whereas,  the 
enthronement  of  both  is  a  possibility,  a  necessity  to  both.  If  the  ex- 
istence of  the  First  Cause  is  indemonstrable  by  the  reason,  then  there 
is  no  place  either  for  the  Cause  or  the  Reason  in  philosophy  and  re- 
ligion. That  the  reason  may  have  projected  incompetent  and  un- 
worthy ideas  of  the  divine  Being  ;  that  idolatry,  pantheism,  dualism, 
materialism  are  among  its  products,  we  make  no  denial ;  but  this 
does  not  invalidate  the  authority  of  the  rational  influences  of  con- 
sciousness or  intuition,  the  certificate  of  the  mind  to  God's  existence. 
Bad  poetry  does  not  make  against  the  poetic  product  in  Homer, 
Shakespeare,  Milton ;  nor  the  bad  astronomy  of  Ptolemy  against  the 
correct  discoveries  of  Copernicus  and  Kepler  ;  so  rationalism,  run  to 
materialism,  is  not  a  sign  of  the  incompetency  of  the  reason  to  frame 
an  incontrovertible  argument  for  the  existence  of  a  First  Cause. 

We  readily  grant  that  many  philosophical  and  theological  argu- 
ments in  support  of  the  theistic  hypothesis  are  untenable,  being  rather 
the  products  of  faith  than  of  reason,  between  which  the  theologian 
has  not  carefully  enough  distinguished,  and  so  he  has  been  van- 
quished, or  humiliated,  in  a  contest  with  his  foe.  The  argument 
from  faith  is  tenable  only  as  it  springs  from  the  reason,  and  even 
then  it  must  occupj'  relatively  a  subordinate  position.  The  standing 
argument,  that  in  the  idea  of  correlation  is  a  proof  of  the  ideal  God, 
is  valuable  only  as  an  analogy,  and  not  as  absolutely  unanswerable. 
The  phenomenal  may  imply  the  real ;  the  finite,  the  infinite  ;  the 
temporal,  the  eternal ;  the  implication  may  be  one  of  the  necessities 
of  thought,  but  it  appears  more  like  the  trick  of  logic.  It  is  a  ques- 
tion if  any  one  thing  implies  the  other  actually,  especially  if  the 
other  must  be  opposite  or  contradictory.  White  does  not  necessarily 
imply  black,  high  is  not  the  proof  of  low,  except  as  logic  may  insist 
upon  it.  The  conceptional  may  not  imply  the  actual ;  the  condi- 
tioned may  not  imply  the  unconditioned  ;  in  fact,  we  deny  the  im- 
plication. There  is  no  unconditioned — it  is  the  vain  word  of 
philosophy,  the  result  of  the  theory  of  correlation  imposed  upon  the 
reason.       Reason,   tortured,   traduced,   imposed  upon,  may  seem   to 


272  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

support  a  lawful  hypothesis,  which  in  the  end  is  found  untenable, 
and  then  a  cry  is  made  against  reason.  Against  many  so-called 
rational  arguments,  against  laws,  theories,  hypotheses,  often  used  to 
bolster  up  the  theistic  fact,  there  comes  a  time  when  reaction  sets  in, 
and  they  are  abandoned.  Hence,  reason  is  at  a  discount  in  the 
realm  of  the  highest  truth  ;  but  it  ought  to  support  the  reign  of 
Authority,  and  it  will  support  it  as  reason  grounds  itself  more  and 
more  in  consciousness,  and  less  and  less  in  speculation. 

In  the  preceding  paragraph  we  have  denied  the  existence  of  what 
is  called  the  unconditioned;  for,  believing  in  the  First  Cause,  in  a 
personal  God,  it  is  impossible  to  conceive  of  him  as  unconditinoed. 
An  unconditioned  Absolute  Being  is  unthinkable,  unknowable — does 
not  exist.  More  than  one  pseudo-absolute  may  be  found  in  the 
realm  of  philosophic  thought,  as  the  pantheistic  absolute,  the  agnostic 
absolute,  the  anthropomorphic  absolute,  all  these  and  more ;  but  the 
greatest  of  these,  the  most  contradictory,  the  self-evideutly  non-existent, 
is  the  unconditioned  Absolute.  Lotze  defines  being  to  be  something 
that  stands  in  relation,  and  that  out  of  relation  it  has  no  existence. 
In  harmony  with  this  thought,  Prof.  Bowue  demonstrates  that,  con- 
trary to  Hegel,  pure  being  can  not  exist,  but  must  "  stand  in  relation." 
Fichte  says,  "The  ego  posits  itself,"  but  always  in  relation.  An  un- 
conditioned being  is  an  absolute  impossibility — impossible  even  to 
thought,   and  impossible  as  an  actual  existence. 

The  first  thought  of  the  Absolute  is  of  a  related  Something ;  the 
first  idea  of  a  First  Cause  is  of  an  effect ;  the  idea  of  cause  contains 
the  idea  of  effect.  Reason  appropriates  and  endeavors  to  interpret 
the  related  Cause  through  the  relations,  finding  in  the  contents  of 
the  relations  tlie  content  of  the  idea  of  God.  Existence  without  rela- 
tion is  non-existence. 

A  second  conception  of  the  First  Cause  is  its  unity ;  it  can  not  be 
divided  against  itself;  it  is  not  self-contradictory,  as  Mansel  aflSrms, 
for  that  involves  self-destruction.  In  Avhat  the  unity  of  being,  or 
the  unity  of  the  Absolute,  consists,  whether  unity  of  motion,  unity 
of  force,  or  unity  of  character,  or  all  three,  it  is  not  now  important 
to  consider.  It  is  enough  to  recognize  the  fact  of  its  unity  in  the 
most  general  sense. 

A  third  conception  grows  out  of  itself  as  cause  whose  content  is 
activity,  energy,  manifested  force.  Canse  is  activitij.  The  condition 
of  being  is  energy ;  hence  manifestation.  Philosophy  is  recognizing 
the  law  of  being  in  the  activity  of  being,  and  finds  itself  capable  of 
explaining  being  by  the  law  of  its  existence,  which  is  nothing  else 
than  energy  in  execution.  This  really  is  the  highest  interpretation 
of  Spirit — activity.      Activity    implies    manifestation ;    manifestation 


THE  ABSOLUTE  IS  CAUSE.  273 

must  be  totally  different  from  the  activity,  or  resemble  it.  If  totally 
different,  it  can  not  be  accounted  for  ;  it  must  resemble  it,  therefore ; 
that  is,  the  effect  of  the  cause,  which  is  the  manifestation  of  activity, 
must  contain  something  of  the  cause.  The  effect  may  be  spiritual, 
which  is  a  close  resemblance,  or  physical,  which  is  a  rude  exhibition 
of  the  operating  cause.  Man  is  the  spiritual  resemblance,  nature  the 
physical ;  in  bf)th  cases  the  activity  has  manifested  itself. 

Spinoza  taught  that  God  in  activity  is  under  a  mathematical  ne- 
cessity, limited  by  laws  which  in  themselves  are  eternal ;  but  far 
easier  is  it  to  believe  that  they  are  in  subjection  to  him  than  that  he 
is  in  bondage  to  them.  The  characteristic  of  man  is  his  freedom ; 
surely  the  Absolute  is  as  free  as  his  creature.  The  Absolute  as  First 
Cause  is  free  in  activity,  and  the  author  of  all  methods  of  activity. 

From  this  law  of  activity  we  determine  the  Absolute  to  be  Cause. 
There  is  nothing  in  the  First  Cause  to  show  that  it  is  an  effect ;  there 
is  every  thing  in  the  effect  to  show  that  it  had  a  cause.  So  the  Cause 
stands  in  relation  to  effect  as  antecedent,  self-impelling,  self-existing, 
and  all-sufficient.  As  First  Cause,  it  must  differ  from  every  thing 
else,  except  so  far  as,  in  the  manifestation  of  itself  by  the  law  of  its 
activity,  it  imparted  somewhat  of  itself  to  the  manifestation.  Resem- 
bling the  manifestation,  it  must  possess  differentia  or  characteristics 
which  lift  it  above  the  things  which  are  its  products.  The  philosopher's 
task  at  this  point  is  by  no  means  an  easy  one.  Just  so  long  as  the 
Absolute  may  be  contemplated  by  the  aid  of  fixed  relations  between 
cause  and  effect,  or  the  law  of  causality  in  the  universe — ^just  so  long 
as  the  law  of  activity  is  predicated  as  the  law  of  being,  and  is  applied 
to  the  Absolute,  the  task,  though  difficult,  may  be  pei-formed  ;  but 
when  the  word  "being"  must  be  changed  for  Person,  in  whom  centers 
activity,  and  from  whom  proceeds  relations  and  manifestations,  the 
task  is  almost  beyond  performance.  The  designation  of  the  First 
Cause  as  a  Person  materialistic  philosophy  condemns  as  the  gratuitous 
assumption  of  dogmatic  theology  ;  but  to  this  it  must  come.  The 
Scriptures  always  represent  God  as  a  Person,  and,  as  Mansel  says, 
never  as  a  Law ;  God  is  not  Relation  or  Unity  or  Activity  only ;  he 
is  Personality.  He  is  Unity  in  Personality  ;  Activity  in  Personality. 
He  sustains  personal  relations  to  man  and  the  universe,  and  may  be 
interpreted  in  the  light  of  them.  An  unrelated  universe  is  as  great  a 
fiction  as  an  unrelated  Absolute ;  neither  exists.  A  personal  God  is 
the  stumbling-block  of  philosophy.  Spencer,  holding  to  a  belief  in  a 
Creator,  so  magnifies  him  beyond  all  anthropomorphic  relations  and 
conceptions  that  he  can  not  be  known  or  understood.  He  advances 
him  beyond  the  altitude  of  personality.  Personality  implies  limita- 
tion, according  to  the  genius  of  philosophv,  and  is  inapplicable  to  the 

18 


274  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

infinite,  which  is  unlimited.  An  infinite  personality,  or  rather  a  per- 
sonal Infinite,  is  just  as  consistent  as  a  personal  finite ;  both  are  con- 
scious intelligences,  both  are  spiritual  activities — the  one  under  limita- 
tion, the  other  beyond.  Tyndall  calls  the  Supreme  Activity  a  Power 
which  refuses  in  his  hands  to  take  a  personal  fiDrm,  and  slips  away 
from  all  "  intellectual  manipulations."  It  is  a  singular  faith  that 
allows  the  existence  of  a  Power  and  denies  the  existence  of  a  Person- 
ality ;  yet  such  is  Tyndall's  tentative  faith. 

What  is  God  ?  is  a  profound  question,  even  after  it  has  been 
settled  that  he  exists.  From  existence  to  character  the  journey  is  of 
not  inconsiderable  length,  but  he  will  be  rewarded  who  honestly  at- 
tempts to  make  it.  Plato's  conception  of  God  as  the  First  Cause  in 
the  organization  of  the  world,  though  far  from  beiug  complete,  may 
be  commended  to  those  who,  blind  to  all  the  evidence  of  design  in 
the  world's  organization,  have  reduced  the  Deity  either  to  zero  or  an 
impersonal  force.  Not  at  all  times  clear  himself,  Plato  nevertheless 
supports  the  theistic  hypothesis  with  more  than  a  conjecture  of  its 
truthfulness.  Modern  teachers  have  descended  from  the  Platonic 
elevation  into  bogs  and  caves,  sending  forth  the  most  dismal  proc- 
lamations concerning  the  world's  government  and  the  Supi-eme  Power. 

Hartniann  conceives  the  First  Cause  to  be  an  unconscious  intelli- 
gence, operating  in  a  causal  manner,  and  dreaming  away  his  eternity. 
He  is  an  insensible  God  ;  he  is  taking  an  eternal  nap  or  walking  in 
his  sleep.  Spencer  concedes  intelligence  and  power,  regulated  by 
wisdom,  to  the  First  Cause  ;  Hartmann  concedes  intelligence  acting 
automatically  and  unerringly.  The  concession  apparently  relieves 
the  conception  of  an  atheistic  color.  Ludwng  Biichner,  reckless  in 
his  daring,  eliminates  the  idea  of  a  personal  God  from  philosophy,  as- 
serting what  he  does  not  prove,  that  it  is  obstructive  of  man's  spir- 
itual, social,  and  political  development,  and  reduces  it  to  the  activity 
of  impersonal  reason.  His  task  of  elimination  is  somewhat  difficult, 
but  he  plunges  into  it  as  Pharaoh  into  the  Red  Sea.  Oskar  Schmidt 
has  no  room  for  the  theistic  idea  in  his  philosophic  meditations.  On 
the  other  hand,  A.  R.  Wallace,  a  Darwinian  in  belief,  supports  the 
idea  of  a  personal  God  as  a  necessity  to  the  explanation  of  the  uni- 
verse. The  Duke  of  Argyll,  it  is  well  known,  devoutly  recognizes  the 
living  God.  The  vibration  of  philosophic  belief  touching  the  theistic 
idea  from  rank  atheism  to  positive  theism  is  here  manifest,  showing  the 
unsettled  state  of  philosophic  thought,  and  the  need  of  further  in- 
quiry and  investigation. 

The  ground  of  the  theological  philosophy  is  Nature,  not  Christian- 
ity. To  nature  let  the  appeal  be  made.  What  is  its  testimony  con- 
cerning the  theistic  idea?     Cato  once  said,  ''That  God  is,  all  nature 


NATURE'S  TESTIMONY  TO  GOD.  275 

cries  aloud."  Jacobi  has  said  that  "  nature  conceals  God."  Both 
Cato  and  Jacobi  are  right :  Cato  respecting  the  affirmation  of  nature, 
Jacobi  respecting  the  incompleteness  of  that  affirmation.  Nature  is 
a  revelation,  but  not  a  full  revelatiou,  of  God,  and,  because  of  its  in- 
completeness, it  has  been  misinterpreted  in  the  interest  of  material- 
ism, agnosticism,  and  atheism.  Viewed  as  a  whole,  the  universe  is  a 
proclamation  of  God,  as  the  author  of  it,  and  as  in  some  sense  a  re- 
flection of  his  character.  It  is  plain  that  the  universe  had  a  com- 
mencement, or  it  had  not.  If  it  had  no  beginning,  then  matter  is 
eternal,  and  its  existence  is  not  a  proof  of  God.  The  eternity  of 
matter  displaces  the  theistic  presupposition.  If  it  had  a  beginning, 
then  something  originated  it,  or  it  was  self-originative,  whicli  is  ab- 
surd. The  conception  of  an  eternal  universe  is  even  more  mysterious 
than  the  conception  of  an  eternal  being,  and  the  conception  of  a  self- 
originating  universe  is  far  more  absurd  than  the  conception  of  a  being 
who  never  had  a  beginning.  Suppose  the  theistic  conception  is  a 
mystery  ;  the  other  is  au  absurdity.  Suppose  the  first  is  an  incom- 
prehensibility ;  the  second  is  an  inconceivability. 

Admitting  a  beginning,  Herbert  Spencer  is  not  satisfied  that 
nature  is  a  solemn  proof  of  a  personal  God ;  the  uniformity  of  nature's 
phenomena  protests  against  the  rule  of  a  personal  being  ;  nature  rules 
itself,  and  is  therefore  invariable.  It  is  clear  that  nature  does  not  re- 
veal God  to  Spencer ;  it  conceals  him,  as  Jacobi  said.  J.  S.  Mill, 
less  cautious  in  utterance,  went  so  far  as  to  deny  perfection  to  "  the 
author  and  ruler  of  so  clumsily  made  and  capriciously  governed  a 
creation  as  this  planet  and  the  life  of  its  inhabitants."  Either  a  per- 
sonal God  had  notliing  to  do  with  the  planet,  or  he  is  involved  in  its 
imperfections.  If  nature  cries  aloud  that  God  is,  as  Cato  said,  it 
cries  out  an  imperfect  God,  according  to  Mill. 

What,  then,  is  the  testimony  of  Nature  ?  If  it  is  true  that  the 
medium  through  which  one  sees  an  object  affects  the  sight  of  it,  in- 
terfering with  clear  vision  in  proportion  as  its  opaque,  then  it  is  im- 
portant that  the  medium  be  transparent  or  removed  entirely,  and  the 
object  be  seen  without  any  intermediary  substance,  if  accurate  judg- 
ment is  finally  declared.  Looking  at  an  object  through  glass  or  water, 
it  may  be  discolored,  distorted,  appear  broken,  larger  or  smaller  than  it 
actually  is,  and  so  not  be  seen  truly.  If"  one,  then,  attempt  to  ob- 
serve the  First  Cause  through  Nature,  it  is  conceded  that  the  medium 
will  affect  the  observation  ;  but  whether  a  distorted  view  or  a  strictly 
rational  and  theistic  view  will  be  obtained,  will  depend  upon  the 
medium  itself,  and  upon  the  thoroughness  of  the  observation.  Na- 
ture conceals  God  to  the  incompetent  observer  ;  it  reveals  him  to  the 
friend  of  God.     Whatever  may  be  said  of  the   revelation,  it  is  not 


276  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

anthropomorphic ;  it  is  the  voice  of  the  physical  universe  asserting 
the  sovereignty  of  God,  and  he  that  hath  an  ear  may  hear  it. 

The  total  power  of  Nature  is  too  immense  for  measure  ;  and  while 
it  may  not  be  infinite,  it  is  above  human  calculation  ;  hence  the 
nature-Cause  is  immensely  powerful.  lu  like  manner  the  total  wis- 
dom of  nature,  after  deducting  the  facts  which  apparently  point  to 
misrule,  appears  at  least  superhuman  ;  hence  the  nature-God  is  su- 
perhumanly  wise.  The  total  benevolence  of  nature  is  stupendous, 
and,  notwithstanding  Mill's  suspicion  of  its  hollowness,  it  is  in  keep- 
ing with  a  being  who  has  infinite  resources  ;  hence  the  nature-God  is 
benevolent.  The  total  order  of  nature — that  is,  its  apparent  system 
of  causal  procedure — evokes  admiration,  and  justifies  faith  in  it; 
hence  the  nature-God  is  order-loving,  order-enforcing.  The  totalities 
of  nature,  without  reference  to  the  details,  affecting  observation  of 
the  First  Cause,  suggest  that  the  nature-God  is  powerful,  wise,  be- 
nevolent, orderly.  The  totalities  are  revelations,  so  far  as  they  are 
of  any  value  at  all. 

The  medium  is  rather  a  help  than  a  hindrance  to  observation. 
If  it  wholly  obscured  the  object  to  be  seen,  the  medium  only  would 
be  seen  ;  but  in  this  case  the  medium  reveals — does  not  conceal.  It 
is  not  nature  that  one  sees,  but  God  in  nature;  not  the  medium,  but 
the  object.  Nature  qualifies  the  object  just  as  any  other  medium 
would ;  that  is,  a  medium  is  obstructive  of  some  light,  unless  its 
power  of  transmission  is  perfect,  which  is  not  claimed  for  nature.  It 
is  claimed,  however,  that  it  is  a  good  medium,  even  though  it  refracts 
some  of  the  divine  rays.  All  mediums  of  observation  of  the  First 
Cause  are  open  to  this  objection,  and  hence  a  mediumistic  result  must 
necessarily  be  an  imperfect  result.  The  First  Cause  we  apprehend 
correctly  in  this  way,  so  far  as  we  apprehend  it  at  all,  but  imperfectly. 
If  God,  apprehended  imperfectly,  appears  glorious,  how  would  he 
appear  if  apprehended  without  a  medium?  Nature  is  the  proof,  as 
Cato  says,  that  God  is. 

By  the  materialistic  philosopher  the  anthropomorphic  conception 
of  the  First  Cause  is  regarded  untenable,  since  man  is  the  medium 
of  observation ;  but,  if  the  nature-medium  is  a  philosophical  ground 
of  observation,  surely  the  man-medium  can  not  be  ignored.  The 
trend  of  the  nature-medium  is  to  materialism ;  the  trend  of  the  man- 
medium  is  to  a  personal  God.  This  explains  the  readiness  of  the 
materialist  to  turn  from  man  to  nature.  Humanity,  in  its  historic 
development  and  individual  character,  exhibits  a  panorama  of  attri- 
butes that  nature  does  not  display,  and  new  ideas  of  God  find  utter- 
ance in  every  man.  The  faculties  of  memory,  conscience,  judgment, 
volition,  perception,  and  cognition,  the  power  of  thought  and  reason, 


USES  OF  REASON.  277 

suggest  that  the  First  Cause  is  intellectual,  uioral,  spiritual;  for  what 
is  in  man  must  be  in  the  Cause.  This  heightens  our  view  of  the  in- 
finite God.  The  nature-God  is  the  God  of  power,  wisdom,  benevo- 
lence, goodness ;  the  man-God  is  the  God  of  intellect,  having  a  moral 
nature,  being  true,  eternal,  ever-acting  Spirit.  If  the  medium  of 
observation  is  obstructive,  then  our  apprehension  of  the  First  Cause 
as  intellectual,  moral,  and  spiritual,  is  far  below  the  truth ;  that  is, 
it  is  infinitely  intellectual,  moral,  and  spiritual.  The  anthropomorphic 
conception  of  God,  instead  of  being  limited  and  unreliable,  as  is 
charged  by  a  certain  school,  is  the  basis  or  medium  of  infinite  views 
of  his  character  and  sovereignty.  Imperfect  as  is  the  view,  it  is  ele- 
vating; and  limited  as  is  our  apprehension  of  the  Infinite,  it  is 
progressive  and  comforting. 

A  complete  philosophic  conclusion,  however,  Avill  not  rest  upon 
mediumistic  suggestions,  but  will  advance,  if  it  can,  to  a  knowledge 
of  the  Absolute  without  the  mesmeric  aids  of  nature  and  anthropology. 
Can  it  go  to  such  heights?  Can  it  rise  to  a  clear,  rational  perception 
of  the  First  Cause  by  reason  alone?  Homer  relates  that,  when 
Pallas  Athene  blew  the  mist  from  the  eyes  of  Diomedes,  he  saw  the 
gods  in  battle.  In  a  greater  book  than  the  Iliad,  we  read  that  Elisha 
prayed,  and  his  servant's  eyes  were  opened,  so  that  he  saw  the  mount- 
ains of  Samaria  full  of  celestial  chariots  and  horsemen — a  real  dis- 
play of  the  supernatural.  Perhaps  reason's  eye,  if  opened,  might 
discern,  back  of  all  phenomena,  back  of  the  visible,  the  invisible 
Power  that  produced  all  things  ;  perhaps  a  touch  of  the  eye-ball  by  a 
single  ray  of  light  might  reveal  the  First  Cause  in  supreme  command 
of  all  the  causes  now  recognized  as  operating  and  controlling  in  the 
universe.  We  believe  in  the  power  of  the  reason,  under  a  spiritual 
quickening,  to  recognize  the  Supreme  Power,  and,  without  violence 
to  the  laws  of  thought,  to  satisfy  itself  of  the  existence  and  character 
of  the  personal  Absolute. 

Including  in  the  Reason  the  intuitions  and  all  the  moral  faculties 
and  yearnings  of  the  soul,  it  proceeds  to  demonstrate  the  problem  in 
the  following  manner :  First,  it  attaches  supreme  significance  to  the 
law  of  causality  as  manifested  in  the  universe  of  matter  and  being. 
This  is  not  the  place  to  vindicate  or  even  point  out  the  contents  of 
the  law  ;  but,  recognizing  it  in  full  operation  as  a  universal  principle, 
the  human  mind,  acting  under  the  same  law,  steps  backward  through 
the  multiplicity  of  antecedents  and  consequents  until  it  reaches  an 
initial  antecedent,  and  then  it  stops,  and  stops  forever.  The  alterna- 
tive is  an  initial  antecedent  or  an  endless  series  of  causes.  The  latter 
is  absurd,  since  it  finally  involves  uncaused  causes.  An  uncaused  or 
the  First  Cause  is  rational ;  but  uncaused  causes  are  inconsistent  with 


278  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

the  notion  of  a  First  Cause.  A  non-beginning  is  not  half  so  satisfac- 
tory as  a  beginning.  The  law  of  causation  conducts  backward  to  an 
initial  cause,  and  stops.  Mental  satisfaction  is  one  result ;  consistent, 
effective  logic  is  another;  explanation  of  the  universe  is  another,  for, 
given  the  First  and  second  causes  without  number  may  be  marshaled 
into  activity;  religion,  human  responsibility,  sacred  institutions, 
Churches,  prayers,  necessarily  follow;  a  sense  of  Fatherhood  in  the 
First  Cause  rests  upon  the  world,  and  darkness  flees  away. 

If  the  law  of  causality,  as  applied  to  the  defense  of  the  theistic 
notion,  involves  an  endless  metaphysical  speculation,  whose  conclu- 
sions can  satisfy  only  because  based  on  certain  presuppositions  which 
materialism  ignores,  Reason  may  employ  another  method,  or  other 
facts  too  patent  to  be  denied,  in  support  of  the  common  idea.  The 
preservation  of  the  universe,  or  the  law  of  Conti^nuity,  is  as  great  a 
mystery  as,  and  certainly  no  less  a  fact  than,  its  organization,  or  the 
existence  of  the  law  of  Causality.  In  fact,  the  law  of  Continuity, 
securing  uninterrupted  duration  to  the  universe,  is  even  more  mar- 
velous than  the  law  of  causality  which  produced  it.  In  the  search 
for  causes,  however,  this  is  likely  to  be  forgotten.  In  a  theoretical 
sense,  it  might  be  admitted  that  the  universe  required  an  originator, 
but  that  its  preservation  is  due  to  the  laws  imparted  to  it  by  the 
originator,  who  retired  from  the  government  of  the  world  as  soon  as 
he  organized  it,  authorizing  its  future  existence  by  virtue  of  its  own 
laws  and  resources,  or  committing  it  to  some  inferior  but  superhuman 
power  that  would  look  after  it.  If  an  organized  world  require  an 
organizer,  a  preserved,  continuous  world  requires  a  Preserver.  To 
establish  that  the  organizer  and  preserver  are  one  and  the  same  is  an 
advance  over  the  materialistic  negation  of  a  personal  government  in 
the  world.  God  tvas ;  God  is.  If  compelled  to  accept  the  Organizer, 
the  materialist  utterly  refuses  recognition  of  a  Preserver. 

The  spectacle  of  the  universe  in  utmost  harmony  throughout  its 
vast  domains,  all  its  forces  united  in  the  bonds  of  cordial  sympathy 
and  working  for  the  common  end  of  order  and  progress,  all  its  king- 
doms maintaining  their  original  lines  of  difference,  without  trespass 
one  upon  another,  worlds  and  systems  of  worlds  traveling  noiselessly 
toward  an  appointed  goal  and  shining  perpetually,  must  be  as  wonder- 
ful to  the  higher  powers  as  to  men.  True  it  is  that  imperfection  is 
charged  against  the  cosmic  systems ;  the  pessimist  reiterates  his  plati- 
tudes of  misgovernment,  as  did  Mill,  and  the  materialist  protests 
agaiust  the  infirmities  and  struggles  of  men,  as  does  Hiickel ;  but  no 
one  can  deny  the  stupendous  fact  of  the  world's  preservation.  De- 
struction is  not  the  goal  of  the  universe,  or  at  least  the  facts  are 
against    such    a    supposition.     What    this    has    required,  what  vast 


THE  LA  W  OF  CONTINUITY.  279 

expenditures  of  power,  what  constant  watchfulness  to  prevent  collisions, 
what  interpositions  of  wisdom,  just  how  to  balance  the  universe  so 
that  it  shall  not  shipwreck  itself  in  the  spatial  sea,  no  one  can  esti- 
mate or  reveal.  Yet,  in  spite  of  possible  collision  of  worlds,  in  spite 
of  possible  conflagrations  so  vast  that  once  started  the  universe  might 
be  reduced  to  an  ash-heap,  in  spite  of  possible  vacillations  of  climate 
that  might  destroy  the  human  race,  in  spite  of  possible  relationships 
to  the  sun  that  changed  in  the  least  might  extinguish  the  planets 
or  deprive  them  of  light,  the  world  moves  on  without  a  jar,  and  is 
preserved.  So  marvelous  an  arrangement,  resulting  in  the  perpetuity 
of  the  universe,  it  is  difficult  to  account  for,  except  on  the  hypothesis 
of  a  pi'esent  personal  superintending  agency.  Atomism  comes  not  to 
our  relief  here.  The  potency  of  law  is  almost  a  fiction-phrase,  unless 
explained.  Law  is  life,  law  is  power ;  but  only  as  the  law  of  life,  or 
the  law  of  Continuity,  is  breathed  into  the  great  universal  mass,  and 
kept  there  by  the  Sovereign  who  is  life  himself,  can  the  preservation 
of  the  universe  be  explained.  Preservation  is  the  proof  of  per- 
sonal agency. 

Reason,  building  up  a  faith  in  a  divine  personality  on  the  impreg- 
nable basis  of  the  laAVS  of  causality  and  continuity,  or  the  stupendous 
facts  of  organization  and  preservation,  finds  additional  strength  for 
its  assurance  in  an  inquiry  concerning  the  purpose  of  the  universe. 
Lying  back  of  organization  and  preservation  is  the  stupendous  motive 
governing  both;  and  motive  is  the  credential  of  personality.  It  is 
not  so  much  what  the  motive  is  that  underlies  the  universe,  as  whether 
it  exists  by  reason  of  a  motive,  whether  it  implies  a  motive  at  all. 
If  the  spirit  of  purpose  is  abroad  in  the  universe,  stamped  upon 
every  orb,  beaming  in  every  law,  and  bursting  out  of  the  ages  as 
they  pass  along,  then  the  creation  and  preservation  of  the  universe 
may  be  justified ;  but  not  otherwise.  Materialism  scorns  the  teleo- 
logical  proof  of  personality,  because  it  is  conclusive.  The  law  of  de- 
sign in  the  universe  is  as  conspicuous  as  the  law  of  causality  and  the 
law  of  continuity,  and  the  three  agree  in  a  demonstration  of  an 
Absolute  Personality.  If  reason  require  a  cause  for  things,  it  equally 
demands  the  end  or  purpose  of  things.  Just  here  the  distinction, 
usually  clear,  between  efficient  and  final  cause,  fades  away,  enabling 
one  to  see  in  the  efficient  the  final  cause;  that  is,  the  final  purpose 
of  an  act  becomes  the  efficient  or  controlling  cause  in  the  act. 
Reason  requires  both ;  one  implies  the  other.  It  is  not  enough  to 
say  that  cause  implies  effect ;  it  implies  a  designed  effect.  Again,  the 
constitution  of  nature  involves  a  purpose  or  end  for  itself;  else  why 
its  order,  beauty,  symmetry,  harmony?  Why  not  disorder,  accident, 
revolution,  disharmony,  absence  of  adaptation  ?     The  exceptional  dis- 


280  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

orders  are  not  numerous  enough  to  overthrow  the  law  of  design  ;  the 
law  of  causality  and  the  law  of  continuity  run  the  gauntlet  of  excep- 
tions, but  they  run  it  in  safety.  Suppose  the  spleen  is  an  organ 
Avithout  a  known  function ;  it  does  not  contradict  the  general  idea  of 
end  or  function  in  the  human  system.  Even  studying  final  cause  as 
merely  a  preponderating  influence,  and  not  as  a  universal  law,  it  is 
true  to  say  that,  balancing  chaotic  evidences  Avith  cosmical  order,  the 
average  is  on  the  side  of  the  latter.  For,  suppose  some  things  in 
nature  appear  to  be  without  design — this  is  all  that  one  dare  affirm  ; 
as  nature  on  the  tvhole  exhibits  design,  the  conclusion  must  be  in 
favor  of  the  latter.  Remembering,  too,  that  it  requires  more  knowl- 
edge than  man  at  present  possesses  to  warrant  him  in  assuming  that 
any  thing  that  exists  is  barren  of  purpose,  any  argument  built  on 
man's  ignorance  can  hardly  have  the  weight  of  a  rational  conjecture. 
Ouce  it  was  said  the  thistle  is  without  an  excuse  for  being;  but 
in  recent  years  it  has  been  converted  into  paper,  proving  its  utility. 
The  failure  to  find  a  purpose  in  some  things  is  not  so  much  a  proof 
of  the  absence  of  purpose  as  it  is  a  reflection  on  man's  ignorance. 
We  repeat,  then,  that  the  constitution  of  nature  involves  purpose. 

The  final  step  is  that  nature  is  the  prophecy  of  a  purpose  which 
it  is  steadily  working  out,  and  is  making  visible  to  those  who  have 
eyes  to  see  purpose  at  all.  Von  Baer  was  fond  of  saying  that  nature 
is  striving  toward  an  end,  as  if  it  is  alive  with  purpose,  as  if  it  un- 
derstands the  object,  the  reason  of  its  being,  and  is  consciously  press- 
ing forward  to  its  accomplishment.  The  expression  is  strictly 
philosophical.  Nature  is  rushing  on  with  a  speed  incalculable  to  a 
positive  achievement,  hindered  at  times  by  the  apparent  antagonism 
of  its  diverse  forces,  but  harmonizing  at  last  in  the  unity  of  a  uni- 
versal design. 

What  the  end  is,  reason  may  not  fully  discover ;  but  the  province 
of  philosophy  is  in  great  part  fulfilled  when  it  establishes  the  exist- 
ence of  end.  That  settled,  as  we  think  it  has  been,  in  the  affirmative, 
it  may  seek  to  ascertain  the  precise  end  itself  The  precise  end  of 
nature  even  theistic  philosophers  themselves  have  not  fully  indicated ; 
they  are  not  agreed  what  it  is ;  but  any  end  at  all  is  proof  of  per- 
sonal supervision.  If  the  end  is  that  the  First  Cause  may  be  studied 
in  physical  achievements;  if  it  is  the  expression  of  supernatural 
power ;  if  it  is  to  root  moral  ideas  in  concrete  forms ;  if  it  is  to  es- 
tablish the  idea  of  God ;  while  these  ends  may  be  of  different  value, 
they  reveal  purpose,  and  purpose  is  the  key  to  personality.  Mr. 
Mivart  so  interprets  organic  nature;  but  the  London  Spectator  denies 
the  sufficiency  of  design  in  nature  to  establish  the  existence  of  an  in- 
finite intelligence.     "Design  proves  intelligence  of  a   limited   kind, 


THE  THE  IS  TIC  CONCEPTION.  281 

not  of  an  infinite  kind,"  says  the  Spectator;  but  we  must  rlistiuguish 
between  the  design  of  the  details  of  natural  things,  and  the  design  of 
the  universe  as  a  whole,  a  distinction  entirely  misapprehended  by  the 
London  writer.  An  insect's  wing,  however  well  formed  and  adapted 
to  a  specific  purpose,  can  not  be  quoted  in  proof  of  an  infinite  intel- 
ligence, for  the  works  of  man  often  eclipse  the  works  of  nature  in 
the  exhibition  of  design.  The  locomotive,  the  telegraph,  the  tele- 
phone, the  steamship,  the  printing-press,  exhibits  more  design  than  a 
thousand  things  in  nature,  proving  intelligence,  but  not  infinite  in- 
telligence ;  so  design  in  the  small  things  in  nature,  or  in  great  things 
taken  separately,  may  only  prove  "intelligence  of  a  limited  kind;" 
but  the  design  of  the  universe  as  a  whole  is  very  diflferent  from  the 
functional  uses  of  organs,  or  the  specific  purpose  of  planets.  In  the 
one  we  see  a  limited  intelligence,  which,  however,  implies  personality; 
in  the  other  an  infinite  intelligence,  implying  an  infinite  personality. 

By  a  rational  interpretation  of  the  laws  of  causation,  continuity, 
and  design,  faith  receives  unequivocal  support  in  a  personality,  self- 
endowed  with  all-mightiness,  infinite  wisdom,  perfect  benevolence,  all 
concreted  in  self-existence,  without  beginmng  or  end.  This  philosoph- 
ical conclusion  is  in  accord  with  the  purest  theistic  conception,  and  it 
is  only  by  violence  that  they  can  be  separated. 

But  the  purely  philosophical  basis  of  the  theistic  conception,  con- 
clusive enough  at  least  to  those  who  are  in  sympathy  with  it,  lacks 
what  one  may  term  vitality  or  sufficiency  of  inner  force.  Granite-like 
as  it  is,  it  is  cold,  unattractive,  without  contagious  influence.  Some- 
thing more  is  wanted — the  conception  needs  the  baptism  of  fire.  If, 
obscuring  its  philosophical  form,  it  assumes  to  be  a  semi-religious 
truth,  or  exchanges  its  metaphysical  dialectic  for  a  religious  teaching, 
interest  in  it  wilf  increase.  The  theistic  conception  is,  in  its  very  na- 
ture, more  than  a  philosophical  theorem.  The  trend  of  the  latter  is 
to  the  former.  The  mind  in  its  outgoing  relaxes  its  grip  on  the  ex- 
clusively philosophical,  and  gently  grasps  the  religious,  the  whole 
process  being  philosophical,  for  the  end  of  philosophy  is  religion. 
This  intermediate  and  progressive  state  from  one  to  the  other  arises 
philosophically  from  the  law  of  development  which  obtains  in  the  his- 
tory of  mind,  and  religiously  from  the  manifestations  of  Providence, 
which  religion  more  than  philosophy  is  inclined  to  appropriate  and 
interpret  in  its  own  interest. 

The  defect  in  the  philosophical  basis  is  its  pantheistic  view  of  the 
universe,  including  man  as  well  as  God,  mind  as  well  as  matter,  and 
so  confounding  things  that  are  essentially  separate.  Its  ground,  or 
the  content  of  its  theory,  is  nature,  with  its  forms,  forces,  and  laws ; 
but,  incontrovertible   as  is  the   argument   from    nature,  philosophy 


282  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

weakens  itself  by  confining  its  view  to  nature,  as  if  it  were  all  of 
existence.  Identifying  nature  with  the  universe  of  beiug,  its  conclu- 
sion is  intended  to  be  universal  when  it  is  only  particular,  and  so  it 
lacks  in  completeness  and  sufficiency. 

Development  in  nature,  according  to  a  pre-established  order,  is  a 
philosophical  ground  of  belief  in  the  Absolute  ;  development  in  hu- 
man history,  according  to  a  pre-established  providential  plan,  is  a  re- 
ligious ground  for  faith  in  a  Personal  God.  This  is  the  dividing 
line  between  philosophy  and  religion — evolution  in  nature  and  evolu- 
tion in  history.  Materialistic  philosophy  deals  primarily  with  the 
fixed,  the  permanent,  regarding  the  variable  as  an  incident  of  the 
permanent ;  hence,  nature  is  its  field.  The  manifestations  of  life,  the 
variable  products  of  causes,  laws,  and  forces,  and  the  outgrowths  of 
human  history,  it  makes  too  little  account  of  in  its  theories,  interpret- 
ing the  whole  from  the  underground  basis  of  matter.  Religion  pur- 
sues the  opposite  method,  viewing  the  universe  from  the  stand-point 
of  man,  and  interpreting  nature  accordingly.  Nature  explains  all, 
says  the  materialist;  man  explains  all,  says  the  rational  intuitionalist, 
or  theistic  advocate.  One  opens  the  front-door,  the  other  the  back- 
door ;  both  should  meet  at  the  altars  of  the  temple  of  truth.  Philos- 
ophy scans  natural  evolution ;  religion,  historic  manifestation.  His- 
tory is  quite  as  much  a  development  as  nature ;  but  it  is  the  variable, 
while  nature  is  the  fixed,  with  qualifications.  TJie  execution  of  the 
historic  plan,  tvhatever  the  plan  is,  with  its  constantly  fluctuating  forces, 
its  variable  elements,  is  even  more  ivonderfid  than  the  execution  of  nature's 
purpose,  underlying  which  are  fixed  forces  and  laws.  He  who  holds  the 
winds  in  his  fists  must  be  as  strong  as  He  who  brought  forth  the 
mountains.  The  Ruler  of  such  an  inconstant  thing  as  Time  must  be 
as  great  as  the  maker  of  globes.  History  is  in  the  stupenduous  scale 
an  even  balance  for  nature ;  the  former  proves  as  much  as  the  latter. 
Nature  may  strive  toward  an  end;  but  history  is  pregnant  with  a 
vital,  sovereign  purpose,  namely,  the  elevation  of  man.  If  the  doc- 
trine of  teleology  is  at  all  relevant  or  tenable,  it  has  strong  confirma- 
tion in  human  history,  where  the  resultant  of  complicated  and 
apparently  antagonistic  forces  is  the  gradual  advancement  of  the 
race.  This  is  philosophical  in  its  aspect;  for  the  "survival  of  the 
fittest"  is  but  the  expression  of  the  historic  plan,  and  the  ideal  of 
human  life.  This  plan  is  all  the  more  wonderful  since  it  is  not  self- 
executing,  nor  the  result  of  an  administration  of  law  as  in  nature ; 
for  volitional,  that  is,  concurrent  and  opposing  forces,  are  vitally 
related  to  it,  and  depend  upon  personal  agency  for  harmony,  devel- 
opment, fulfillment.  The  nature-plan,  the  materialist  avows,  is  self- 
executing,  that  is,  independent  of  personal  supervision ;  but  the  his- 


CONCEPTION  OF  THE  FIRST  CAUSE.  283 

toric  plan  shrivels  without  personal  execution.  Hence,  historic  de- 
velopment is  a  profound  proof  of  a  personal  God.  The  nature-God 
and  the  historic-God,  the  philosophic  and  the  religious  God,  are  one 
and  the  same,  so  proclaimed  by  religion,  but  rejected  by  matei-ialism. 
The  advance  of  the  religious  conception  over  the  philosophical  is 
therefore  apparent. 

The  way  is  now  prepared  for  a  discussion  of  the  problem  of  the 
First  Cause  in  another  aspect,  or  that  which  is  appareutly  farthest  re- 
moved from  the  philosophic  stand-point,  namely,  the  religious  repre- 
sentation of  God.  However,  the  representation  is  strictly  philosophical ; 
for  the  religious  idea  is  philosophical  in  essence,  and  belongs  to  the 
category  of  particular  philosophic  primaries.  A  true  philosophical 
conception  of  the  First  Cause  has  logically  a  religious  termiuation  or 
accent.  In  spite  of  itself  philosophy  has  a  religious  brogue.  "Thy 
speech  bewrayeth  thee." 

In  this  tracing  of  the  religious  representation  we  shall  not  be 
aided  by  the  dicta  of  theologians,  the  opinions  of  the  Christian  fathers, 
or  the  pronunciations  of  the  Church,  for  these  are  entirely  outside  of 
the  specific  view  here  to  be  opened.  Justin  Martyr  ascribes  shape  to 
God ;  Clement  of  Alexandria  denies  him  shape  and  name ;  Origen 
pronounces  him  an  "  incorporeal  unity."  Not  on  such  opinions  do 
we  rise  to  conceptions  of  the  Absolute,  but  in  the  study  of  the  royal 
facts  undergirding  human  existence,  which  point  unerringly  to  the 
Infinite. 

The  first  religious  intimation  of  God  we  notice,  is  the  religious 
intuition  in  man.  The  day  has  passed  when  this  can  be  satired  out 
of  existence,  or  reduced  to  an  ephemeral  emotion  or  an  intellectual 
sentiment.  Theodore  Parker  allows  an  intuitive  sense  of  God,  and 
Spencer  can  not  escape  from  the  intimation  of  consciousness,  which 
presupposes,  logically,  the  existence  of  God.  Prof.  Samuel  Harris 
observes  that  "the  development  of  man's  consciousness  of  himself  in 
his  relation  to  the  world  is  the  development  of  his  eonsciousness  of 
God."  The  argument  from  consciousness,  the  reason,  and  the  intui- 
tions, is  absolutely  triumphant  over  every  form  of  skepticism,  and  is 
a  standing  rebuke  of,  and  a  challenge  to,  agnosticism  to  proceed.  In 
a  religious  sense,  the  religious  intuition  or  reason  is  God  in  man.  It 
is  the  divine  idea  taking  root  in  humanity  ;  it  is  the  proleptic  sign 
of  God,  unfolding  itself  in  consciousness  and  in  history.  Like 
language,  or  music,  or  art,  it  is  native  to  man,  a  primitive  datum  of 
the  consciousness,  the  ground  of  thought,  of  knowledge,  of  science, 
of  religion.  The  divine  idea  is  "unmistakably  voiced  by  human 
nature  in  its  great  need  of  divine  help.  It  is  more  than  a  feeling ; 
it  is  the  divine  personality  awaking  man  to  his  own  personality. 


284  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

This  is  evidenced  in  its  universality,  for  all  men,  the  illiterate  and 
the  cultured,  the  barbarian  and  the  civilized,  the  pagan  and  the 
Christian,  the  atheist  and  the  theist,  possess  the  ineradicable  mark 
on  forehead  and  soul,  and  temples  of  worship  and  religious  ideas  and 
forms  are  the  product.  An  explanation  of  the  religious  intuition 
with  its  entire  contents  it  is  not  necessary  to  give ;  for,  as  it  is  funda- 
mental to  personality,  the  first  duty  of  philosophy  is  to  recognize  it, 
and  explanation  then  may  follow.  Consciousness,  or  intuition,  the 
mother  of  the  theistic  notion,  can  not  be  accounted  for  by  evolution. 
It  exists  without  evolution  ;  hence,  the  data  of  consciousness  are  not 
dependent  for  existence  on  the  law  of  evolution.  In  this  way  the 
Absolute  impresses  the  thought  of  himself  in  a  permanent  form  upon 
humanity ;  it  is  the  only  way  to  do  it,  and  the  human  mind  can 
sooner  annihilate  itself  than  shake  off  the  great  conviction.  By  as 
much  as  the  historic  is  in  advance  over  the  natural  proof  of  the 
Absolute,  by  so  much  the  intuitional  is  in  advance  of  the  historic 
basis  of  faith  in  the  Infinite.     The  proof,  therefore,  is  cumulative. 

Interpreting  the  intuitional  anxiety  for  God  by  a  strictly  scientific 
method,  or  according  to  the  principle  of  correlation,  which  in  sub- 
stance is  that  a  demand  of  nature  indicates  a  supply,  as  hunger  im- 
plies food,  and  love  of  truth  implies  truth,  it  is  evident  that  the 
religious  basis  of  theism  is  as  iiivulnerable  as  the  philosophical. 
Aristotle  declares  that  the  intuitive  reason  is  the  source  of  first 
principles.  Unless  the  contents  of  consciousness  are  entirely  mis- 
leading, and  the  intuitional  suggestion  a  piece  of  self-mockery,  in 
which  case  philosophy  can  have  no  foundation  whatever,  we  may 
interpret  the  demands  of  the  moral  nature  as  significant  of  an 
adequate  supply.  Either  the  intuition  is  a  deceptive  play  of  the 
emotions,  or  its  meaning  must  be  found  in  the  accepted  law  of 
correlation,  which  points  to  religion,  or  the  idea  of  a  personal  God. 
The  correlative  of  the  religious  intuition  is  a  personal  infinite,  or 
nothing.  It  can  not  be  one  of  many  possible  beings  or  realities ;  it  is 
the  highest  or  nothing.  It  is  not  asserted  that  the  intuitional  sense 
looks  immediately  for  gratification  to  the  Christian  religion,  for  that 
is  not  involved  in  the  issue,  but  that  it  does  point  to  the  highest  re- 
ligious conception  of  God,  which  is  enough  to  warrant  faith  in 
his  existence. 

Singularly  enough,  the  Bible  writers  do  not  attempt  to  demon- 
strate the  existence  of  the  Absolute,  it  either  being  assumed  as  a 
rational  inference  from  consciousness,  or  revealed  by  direct  spiritual 
communication.  One  is  as  authentic  as  the  other.  Intuition  is  as 
reliable  as  inspiration. 

Neither,  taken  singly,  is  the  highest  or  safest  source  of  knowl- 


ATTRIBUTES  OF  THE  ABSOLUTE.  285 

edge,  but  in  combination,  tbe  consciousness  spiritualized,  the  intui- 
tional reason  quickened,  inspired,  the  resultant  knowledge  is  infallible. 
Lisplred  intuition  is  the  highest  form  of  knowledge  of  the  absolute.  We  live 
in  two  worlds,  the  physical  and  the  spiritual :  the  physical  presses  upon 
us,  the  result  is  sensation  ;  the  spiritual  presses  upon  us,  the  result 
is  inspiration.  The  vision  of  God  through  the  spiritualized  intuitions 
is  complete  or  not,  as  the  spiritualiziug  process  is  perfect  or  deficient. 
There  must  be  a  faculty  for  apprehending  or  perceiving  the  Infinite, 
or  he  can  not  be  perceived.  This  faculty  is  consciousness  under  inspi- 
ration. In  its  final  graspings  the  consciousness  goes  beyond  truths 
to  Personality,  in  whom  they  center,  and  from  whom  they  issue.  It 
is  the  soul's  vision  of  God.  The  purest  philosophy  stops  with 
truths;  Religion  drops  on  its  knees  before  Personality.  The  one  points 
to  God ;  the  other  goes  to  him. 

The  philosophy  of  the  First  Cause,  however,  is  not  at  variance 
with  the  religious  representations,  so  far  as  it  concerns  the  conspicu- 
ous attributes  of  God.  Singularly,  they  are  at  one  touching  these, 
though  divided  as  to  method,  and  as  to  the  fact  of  a  personal 
Absolute.  If  there  is  an  Absolute  at  all,  philosophy  agrees  with  Re- 
ligion in  the  recognition  of  certain  characteristics,  among  which  we 
name  the  following :  The  invisibility  of  the  Absolute ;  the  unity  of 
his  nature ;  the  omnipotence  of  his  energy ;  the  spirituality  of  his 
substance  ;  the  omniscience  of  his  vision.  To  be  sure,  the  philosophical 
conception  of  these  attributes  is  not  exactly  the  religious  conception 
of  the  same,  but  the  difference  is  not  one  of  antagonism.  As  to 
spirituality,  even  pessimism  allows  that  the  Supi-eme  Power,  w^hat- 
ever  it  is,  is  a  Somewhat  different  from  organic,  material  substance — it 
is  Spirit,  or  Will,  or  Reason,  an  intellectual  energy,  if  nothing  else. 
The  Biblical  conception  of  God  is  that  of  a  conscious  intelligence, 
and  at  all  events  a  Somewhat  totally  different  from  the  non-ego.  Our 
conclusion  respecting  the  First  Cause  is  reached.  Step  by  step  have 
we  proceeded  from  the  lowest  philosophical  suspicion,  to  the  highest 
religious  or  spiritual  conception  of  the  Absolute  as  an  eternal  Person, 
clothed  with  corresponding  attributes,  the  Creator,  Preserver,  and 
Ruler  of  the  worlds ;  and  here  the  task  ends.  Religion  has  not  framed 
our  pliilosophy  of  the  First,  but  philosophy  confirms  our  religion  of 
the  First.  Nature,  Reason,  History,  Consciousness,  and  Religion  unite 
in  the  proclamation  of  a  First  Cause,  always  existing,  supernatural, 
infinite ;  a  Cause  adequate  to  the  universe  ;  a  Cause  conscious,  per- 
sorml,  eternal.     That  First  Cause  we  call  God. 


286  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

THE   FINAL  CAUSE 

LUDWIG  BiJCHNER  has  discovered  that  the  vindication  of  the 
teleological  principle  involves  the  overthrow  of  the  mechanical 
conception  of  the  universe,  while  Prof.  Huxley  is  not  certain  but 
that  one  may  be  a  teleologist  and  a  materialist  at  the  same  time  ;  at 
least,  he  urges  that  the  one  view  does  not  exclude  the  other.  Biichner's 
position  is  the  more  consistent,  for  teleology  and  materialism  are  in- 
compatible, as  will  a]ipear  in  these  discussions. 

Plato  did  not  elaborate  a  theory  of  causality  or  suggest  an  ex- 
planation of  nature  that  is  satisfactory  to  the  philosophic  sense  of 
modern  times.  He  held  that  two  causes  were  involved  in  the 
organization  of  world-types ;  viz.,  the  Necessary  and  the  Divine; 
but  this  is  superficial,  for,  while  it  admits  the  presence  of  a  creative 
energy  and  the  fixedness  of  nature's  laws,  it  does  not  enter  into  an 
exposition  of  design  in  nature  or  reveal  the  basal  motive  of  the 
universe.  Aristotle  censured  Plato  for  ignoring  both  efficient  and 
final  causes,  and,  taking  the  subject  in  hand  himself,  he  formulated  a 
system  of  causes  which  for  completeness  can  not  be  excelled ;  but  it  is 
not  clear  that  it  does  not  include  more  than  properly  belongs  to  it. 
He  reduced  all  causes,  as  if  there  could  be  more  than  one,  to  four : 
namely,  material  cause,  or  the  substance,  or  matter  itself;  formal 
cause,  or  the  pattern,  after  which  a  Thing  is  made  or  the  form  which 
it  assumes;  effi,G{ent  cause,  or  the  power  that  produces  change  or 
motion  ;  final  cause,  or  that  on  account  of  which  a  Thing  is,  other- 
wise the  end  or  purpose  of  a  Thing.  The  words  "  final  cause,"  he 
did  not  originate  nor  even  employ,  but  he  speaks  of  the  "end"  of  a 
Thing,  or  of  Nature,  which  led  the  school-men  to  frame  and  adopt 
"  final  cause  "  as  the  expression  of  Aristotle's  idea. 

It  is  not  our  purpose  to  investigate  these  distinctions,  arbitrarily 
made  as  they  were,  or  to  dwell  upon  the  relation  of  each  "cause" 
to  the  great  problems  in  philosophy  and  religion ;  but,  separating 
"final  cause"  from  its  associations,  to  consider  its  value  as  an  expo- 
nent'of  a  creative  intelligence,  and  therefore  as  a  proof  of  a  personal 
Author  of  Nature.  In  order  to  its  full,  or  at  least  suflicient,  discus- 
sion, it  will  be  presented  as  follows  :  I.  The  Principle  Stated  ;  II.  The 
Principle  Defended ;  III.  Objections  to  the  Principle  Removed;  IV. 
The  Final  Cause  or  Established  End  of  Nature. 


THE  PRINCIPLE  STATED.  287 

The  principle  of  final  cause  is  simply  that  nature  exhibits  evi- 
dences of  a  purpose  or  end  in  its  forms,  functions,  and  adaj)tations, 
and  that  the  idea  of  purpose  or  design  thus  discovered  in  nature  is  an 
infallible  proof  of  a  supervising  intelligence  in,  over,  and  above  na- 
ture. It  is  the  principle  of  iutentionality  in  the  universe,  embracing 
the  largest  cosmical  plans  and  the  smallest  purposes  in  the  most  minute 
objects  of  nature.  It  sweeps  the  whole  circle  of  design  on  exhibition 
in  the  phenomenal  realm.  To  express  the  teleological  character  of 
nature,  or  the  presence  of  a  teleological  spirit  in  nature,  philosophers 
should  invent  a  more  adequate  and  less  misleading  form  of  speech 
than  the  scholastic  term  "final  cause,"  and  a  more  definite  word 
than  "  design,"  which  theology  has  pressed  into  service  quite  beyond 
justification  or  necessity.  Still,  so  long  as  they  are  understood  to 
refer  to  an  intelligent  principle,  or  the  operation  of  a  governing  mind 
in  the  universe,  we  shall  not  quarrel  over  words  and  phrases,  how- 
ever inadequate  and  incomplete  they  are  as  representations  of  the 
great  idea. 

Hartmann  introduces  four  elements  into  the  idea  of  final  cause  : 
(a).  The  conception  of  the  end;  (b).  The  conception  of  the  means; 
(c).  The  realization  of  the  means;  (d).  The  realization  of  the  end. 
This  is  a  larger  definition  than  is  required,  and  involves  certain  im- 
portant distinctions  in  confusion.  The  end  must  be  distinguished 
from  the  means  ;  the  means  are  included  in  the  idea  of  efficient  cause, 
and  do  not  enter  into  the  idea  of  final  cause.  To  be  sure,  the  con- 
ception of  end  in  the  divine  mind  may  have  been  associated  with 
the  conception  of  means  to  the  end,  whiah  is  saying  that  final  and 
efficient  causes  may  be  parallel,  but  not  on  that  account  identical,  or 
even  always  mutually  inclusive.  In  its  application  to  nature  final 
cause  must  be  separated  from  association  with  efficient  cause,  or  both 
will  lose  their  individuality.  Each  means  a  separate  and  distinct 
feature,  requiring,  in  order  to  be  understood,  a  separate  and  distinct 
treatment. 

The  necessity  of  the  vindication  of  teleology  as  a  natural  principle 
arises  from  several  considerations,  one  of  which  is  that  David  Hume 
undertook  the  wholesale  destruction  of  all  causal  principles  in  nature 
by  reducing  all  events  to  a  series  of  antecedents  and  consequents,  and 
denying  the  causal  connection  of  physical  changes  and  motions.  The 
end  he  had  in  view  was  the  annihilation  of  the  doctrine  of  efficient 
cause,  but  it  carried  with  it  the  elimination  of  final  cause,  or  the  tel- 
eological principle.  In  our  day  INIr.  Darwin  utters  a  caution  against 
"  ascribing  intentions  to  nature,"  but  the  weakness  of  the  caution  lies 
in  the  phraseology  with  which  it  is  expressed.  There  is  a  difference 
between   "ascribing  intentions  to  nature,"  and  discovering  purposes  in 


288  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

nature.  If  Mr.  Darwin  found  tlieistic  scientists  ascribing  intentions  to 
nature,  he  did  well  to  caution  against  it ;  but  the  work  of  discovering 
ends  in  the  economy  of  nature  involves  no  embarrassment,  and  calls 
for  no  caution. 

Quite  to  our  surprise,  an  attack  has  recently  been  made  on  teleol- 
ogy from  a  Christian  quarter  on  the  ground  that  it  undertakes  to 
prove  too  much,  and  fails  in  proving  the  very  point  in  dispute, 
namely,  the  presence  of  a  supervising  intelligence.  Prof.  Hicks  is  the 
new  assailant,  who  coins  a  word — eutaxiology — to  express  the  idea  that 
order  in  nature,  rather  than  the  purpose  of  nature,  is  the  strongest 
proof  of  divine  supervision  over  nature.  Teleology  is  thus  retired 
to  the  rear. 

The  verity  of  the  doctrine  of  final  cause,  or  its  defense  and  estab- 
lishment, is  incumbent  on  those  who  reject  the  successional  idea  of 
Hume,  or  who  refuse  to  see  it  retired  at  the  dictum  of  others,  who 
imagine  a  better  theory  in  its  stead.  Preliminarily,  we  observe  that 
the  exposition  and  proof  of  the  teleological  principle  is  not  so  easy  a 
task  as  that  Avhich  is  imposed  on  the  advocates  of  the  doctrine  of  effi- 
cient cause.  The  existence  of  any  object  raises  the  presumption  of 
efficient  cause.  What  caused  the  cholera  ?  What  caused  the  Amer- 
ican Revolution?  Of  every  thing,  every  historic  event,  every  disease, 
every  action,  we  naturally  and  instinctively  inquire  the  cause.  The 
doctrine  of  efficient  causation  is  primarily,  intuitively,  and  univer- 
sally received,  except  Avhen  a  perverted  philosophy  undertakes  to 
overthrow  it.  The  doctrine  of  final  cause  does  not  spring  from  a  law 
of  the  mind.  It  can  not  be  urged  on  primary  or  universal  grounds. 
Cause  implies  effect,  but  not  the  purpose  of  the  effect.  The  purpose 
is  an  after-thought,  taken  up,  if  at  all,  subsequently  to  the  recognition 
of  both  cause  and  effect.  A  child  may  inquire  the  cause  of  an  action 
without  inquiring  if  any  thing  is  designed  by  it.  The  thought  of 
cause  is  spontaneous,  the  thought  of  purpose  reflective.  The  one  in- 
volves no  rational  exercise  of  the  mental  powers ;  the  other  requires 
an  intellectual  act.  It  is  not  intuitive  to  follow  out  the  results  of 
actions,  and  knit  together  the  observable  designs  into  a  concrete  or 
complex  system.  The  first  inquiry  we  can  not  avoid  ;  the  second  we 
can  refuse  to  make.  The  first,  therefore,  is  necessary  ;  the  second 
optional.  If,  however,  final  cause  is  not  an  intuitional  suspicion,  and 
requires  demonstration  before  it  can  be  received,  it  is  as  necessary  to 
the  explanation  of  nature  as  efficient  cause,  as  either  without  the 
other  would  be  insufficient. 

In  support  of  the  doctrine  of  final  cause  we  call  attention  to  the 
relation  to  it  of  the  theory  of  development,  affirming  that  if  the  evo- 
lutionary hypothesis  of  nature  be  true  only  in  its  most  general  aspects, 


METHODOLOGY  OF  NATURE. 


289 


it  is  a  complete  confirmation  of  the  doctrine  under  consideration. 
Specific  evolution,  as  advocated  by  Hiickel  and  others,  is  essentially 
materialistic,  but  in  its  processes  and  results  it  is  essentially  teleolog- 
ical.  If  nature  is  a  development  at  all,  it  is  the  development  of  a 
fixed  order,  and,  therefore,  of  a  fixed  or  necessitated  and  contemplated 
result.  Fixedness  of  order,  process,  or  result  is  a  sign  of  the  teleo- 
logical  spirit.  Dr.  McCosh  uses  the  phrase  "uniformity  of  nature" 
as  expressive  of  the  single-eyed  purpose  of  nature ;  but  we  prefer  to 
speak  of  the  fixedness  of  nature's  processes  and  the  certainty  of  na- 
ture's results  as  the  constituents  of  the  fact  of  design  in  nature.  Be- 
tween chance  and  design  there  is  no  middle  ground.  Nature  bears 
the  stamp  either  of  chance  or  design.  If  of  chance,  then  how  is 
development  to  be  accounted  for?  How  are  the  laws  of  development 
to  be  explained  ?  How  are  the  orderly  results  of  nature  to  be  analyzed 
and  interpreted  ?  How  is  the  ' '  survival  of  the  fittest "  to  be  vindicated  ? 
If  nature,  in  her  different  realms,  steadily  tends  to  the  preservation 
of  the  best  and  the  survival  of  the  fittest,  it  is  proof  that  the  idea  of 
preservation  and  survival  ]iarticipates — to  use  Plato's  word — in  nature, 
and  is  the  inspiration  of  her  energies  and  the  goal  of  her  activities. 
This  is  design  on  a  large  scale. 

Strangely  enough,  and  inconsistently,  the  development  theory  has 
been  turned  against  final  cause,  because  the  latter  is  implicit  with  the 
theistic  notion.  A  true  evolution  theory  is  implicit  also  with  the 
idea  of  God,  but  since  the  idea  has  been  eliminated  the  theory  has 
fallen  into  decay. 

It  is  affirmed,  however,  that  the  development  theory,  strictly  ap- 
plied, can  have  reference  only  to  the  order  or  method  in  nature,  and 
is  in  no  way  related  to  the  design  or  end  of  nature.  It  is  clear  that 
an  argument  built  upon  the  methodology  of  nature — the  eutaxwhgy 
of  Prof  Hicks — in  favor  of  divine  supervision  in  the  universe  must 
be  irresistible ;  but  methodology  is  one  of  the  strongest  evidences  of 
teleology.  Why  a  methodical  action,  if  nothing  is  intended  ?  Why 
the  regular  or  uniform  rotation  of  the  earth,  if  it  is  not  intended  ? 
Why  the  seasons,  the  law  of  gravitation,  the  law  of  chemical  affinity? 
The  fact  of  method,  order,  harmony,  uniformity,  regularity  in  nature, 
demonstrates  not  only  a  controlling  agency,  but  also  a  designing 
agency,  which  supervises  nature  through  harmonious  methods  for  the 
accomplishment  of  specific  purposes,  inwrought  in  the  very  fibers  of 
the  natural  world. 

In  the  same  way  efficient  cause  becomes  a  proclamation  of  final 
cause.  One  is  a  key  to  the  other,  if  one  will  use  it  as  such.  For- 
getting the  mysterious  gap  that  sometimes  exists  between  them,  the 
nexus  being  obscure,  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect  is  such  that, 

19 


290  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

given  the  one,  the  other  may  in  most  cases  be  found.  In  fact,  the 
efficient  is  the  pledge  of  the  final  cause ;  for  action  is  not  for  itself, 
but  for  something  beyond  itself  Motion  is  not  for  motion,  but  for 
change.  In  nature  nothing  exists  or  occurs  for  its  own  sake,  but  has 
reference  to  something  beyond.  An  efficient  cause  can  not  stop 
with  itself;  if  it  does,  in  what  sense  is  it  efficient?  It  is  efficient  in 
proportion  as  it  produces  something  or  effects  something  beyond 
itself.  An  efficient  cause  is  not  a  species  of  ventriloquism,  a  mere 
appearance  of  power,  a  mockery,  and  a  vanity  ;  but  a  cause  capable 
of  achievement,  execution,  having  the  ability  to  go  beyond  itself; 
otherwise  it  is  inefficient.  The  idea  of  efficient  cause  carries  the  idea 
of  final  cause,  or  the  terms  im})ly  nothing. 

The  direct  or  affirmative  evidence  of  the  doctrine  is  m  the  nature 
of  facts  that  are  difficult  of  explanation  on  any  other  hypothesis  than 
that  of  final  cause.  In  certain  forms  of  matter  we  see  certain  uses 
and  adaptations,  a  certain  preparation  for  ends;  as  in  the  eye  the 
preparation  for  vision,  and  in  the  stomach  a  preparation  for  digestion. 
These  preparations,  adaptations,  and  functions  are  the  anticipations 
of,  or  sign-boards  to,  final  cause.  If  this  be  regarded  as  a  new 
statement  of  the  old  principle  that  design  signifies  a  designer,  no 
denial  will  be  made ;  for  it  is  difficult  to  overcome  the  prejudice 
that,  wherever  there  is  use  or  adajitation,  it  is  the  result  of  inten- 
tion, and,  if  intended,  the  personality  of  the  agent  intending  it  is 
inferred. 

At  this  point  not  a  little  warfare  has  occurred.  A  discrimination 
has  been  demanded  between  function  and  end,  or  use  and  design,  on 
the  ground  that  there  is  no  positive  relation  between  them.  It  is 
denied  that  function  or  use  can  be  inferred  from  the  structure  of  an 
organ  ;  and,  likewise,  that  end  or  design,  in  the  sense  of  previously 
contemplated  purpose,  can  be  inferred  either  from  structure  or  func- 
tion. Quoting  Janet's  illustrated  statement  of  the  denial,  "Respira- 
tion is  performed  in  one  case  by  lungs,  in  another  by  gills ;  among 
certain  animals  it  is  effected  by  the  skin  ;  among  plants  by  the  leaves." 
Function,  therefore,  can  not  be  inferred  from  structure,  since  the 
same  function  is  performed  by  organs  of  different  structure.  Such  a 
conclusion  is  not  warranted  by  the  facts,  which  rather  prove  that 
variety  of  structure  is  in  perfect  harmony  with  singleness  of  function. 
Besides,  the  argument  for  final  cause  does  not  rest  in  structure,  but 
in  function.  That  several  organs,  as  the  lungs,  gills,  and  leaves, 
perform  the  same  function  of  respiration,  is  proof  that  the  function- 
maker  employed  various  instrumentalities  for  the  execution  of  a 
common  purpose.  In  these  cases  there  is  not  variety  of  function, 
but  variety  of  structure.     Function   is  the  chief  thought ;   function 


INTENTIONALITY  IN  NATURE.  291 

determines  final  cause ;  for  if,  as  Janet  shows,  function  is  imminent 
in  structure,  design  or  intended  purpose  is  imminent  in  function. 
Natural  functions  imply  original  design  respecting  them.  There  may- 
be perversion  of  use,  or  artificial  employment  of  structures,  which 
might  seem  to  contradict  the  general  relation  of  structure  and  func- 
tion ;  but  perverted  use  must  not  be  confounded  with  natural  use. 
David  selects  a  pebble,  and  sinks  it  into  the  forehead  of  Goliah. 
Here  the  pebble  is  used  to  inflict  death  ;  its  natural  use,  its  orginal 
design,  is  something  very  different.  In  the  colonial  period  of  our 
country's  history,  when  metallic  money  was  scarce,  tobacco  was  used 
in  Virginia  as  a  medium  of  exchange.  The  use  of  tobacco  as  money 
must  be  separated  from  the  natural  design  of  tobacco.  Artificial  use 
bears  against '  the  doctrine  of  final  cause ;  natural  use  supports  it. 
In  the  physical  world,  perversion  of  function  is  not  the  rule,  but 
the  exception ;  hence,  the  argument  from  natural  use  is  undis- 
turbed. The  steps  of  the  argument  are,  first,  structure ;  second, 
function;  third,  design.  Structure  points  to  function;  function  points 
to  design. 

It  is  immaterial  whether  we  subpoena  physiology,  chemistry, 
astronomy,  geology,  natural  philosophy,  botany,  or  meteorology  in 
defense  and  illustration  of  the  principle  of  intentionality  in  nature ; 
the  scientific  proof  of  the  principle,  taken  from  any  department  of 
nature,  is  abundant  and  irresistible.  It  is  a  condition  underlying 
human  belief  that  a  concurrence  of  facts  reflecting  a  law  or  principle 
strengthens  faith  in  the  law  or  principle.  If  it  were  difficult  to  point 
to  instances  of  design  in  the  phenomenal  world ;  if  the  majority  of 
facts  were  against  it;  if  the  evidences  of  design  were  not  clearly 
manifest,  but  must  be  searched  for  and  explained  when  found, — the 
doctrine  of  final  cause  would  soon  retire  from  philosophy.  On  the 
other  hand,  if  the  instances  are  rare  in  which  design  is  absent ;  if  every 
science  abounds  in  facts  bearing  the  marks  of  original  purpose ;  if 
the  exceptions  to  the  doctrine  can  be  explained  in  harmony  with  the 
doctrine ;  if  the  evidences  of  the  principle  are  universal, — it  must  be 
received,  all  other  views  to  the  contrary.  Design  in  nature  is  the 
proof  that  it  was  designed  ;  or,  design  was  desigtied.  This  we  affirm. 
Plato  foreshadows  it  in  the  Timceus,  when  he  intimates  that  motion 
implies  a  mover,  the  effect  implies  a  cause.  Prof.  J.  P.  Cooke 
yields  entirely  too  much  when  he  says,  "design  in  nature  can  not  be 
demonstrated,"  but  that  the  argument  for  it  is  purely  analogical.  Any 
thing  less  than  demonstration  will  not  meet  the  emergency.  Unless 
the  principle  can  be  established  with  mathematical  certainty,  unless 
something  more  than  probability  can  be  invoked  in  its  behalf,  it  will 
beget  a  doubt  of  its  own  existence,  and  merely  rank  as  a  hypothesis 


292  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

or  presumption,  and  not  as  a  fact  or  reality.     To  the  facts  of  nature 
we  appeal  in  support  of  the  reality  of  the  principle. 

First,  the  "testimony  of  the  atmosphere,"  which  Prof-  Cooke  re- 
gards unimpeachable,  is  briefly  submitted.  Consider  the  simple  fact 
of  its  currents.  We  refer  not  to  tornadoes  or  local  breezes,  but  to 
great  atmospheric  movements,  extending  from  the  Equator  to  the 
Poles,  and  from  the  Poles  to  the  Equator — currents  sweeping  from 
continent  to  continent,  equalizing  the  climate  of  the  globe.  Without 
these  currents,  the  temperate  zone  would  be  almost  uninhabitable; 
but  the  warm  air  of  the  tropics,  in  its  northward  march,  bathes  the 
zone  and  renders  it  delightful.  The  annual  changes  in  the  climates 
of  Asia  and  Africa,  "  the  daily  alternation  of  land  and  sea  breezes," 
and  the  regularity  of  the  principal  trade-winds,  are  due  to  this  at- 
mospheric interchange.  Now,  either  this  interchange  was  designed, 
or  it  is  the  purest  accident.  If  accidental,  it  may  not  occur  next 
year;  but  that  it  will  repeat  itself,  and  that  the  interchange  is  an 
established  order,  all  believe ;  and,  if  it  is  a  fixed  order,  the  argument 
for  teleology  has  something  of  a  basis.  This  general  fact  aside,  let 
us  consider  some  particulars,  more  important  and  more  conclusive. 
The  atmosphere  is  a  reservoir  of  electricity.  The  "electrical  machine 
of  nature  "  produces  electricity  in  such  quantities,  and  hurls  it  with 
such  desperation,  that,  without  some  provision  to  prevent  its  whole- 
sale discharge  upon  the  earth,  man  will  be  in  perpetual  danger  of 
destruction  from  this  agency  alone.  This  is  no  trifling  matter,  there- 
fore. If  any  arrangement  can  be  detected  by  which  such  a  danger  is 
averted,  the  evidence  of  design  in  the  arrangement  should  be  granted. 
A  very  important  fact  in  this  connection  is  that  the  atmosphere  itself 
is  a  poor  conductor  of  electricity.  A  second  fact  is,  that  every  rain- 
drop and  snow-flake  will  absorb  electricity  on  its  way  to  the  earth, 
thus  limiting  the  discharge.  A  still  more  interesting  fact  is,  that 
every  mountain-chain  is  hungry  for  the  electrical  content,  and 
silently  lifts  up  its  hands  to  receive  the  descending  force.  To  com- 
plete the  arrangement,  every  tree  is  a  lightning-rod,  safely  and 
quietly  conducting  electricity  to  the  ground,  while  every  blade  of 
grass  is  an  absorbent  of  the  descending  fire.  Thus,  the  atmosphere 
and  the  solid  earth  are  so  related  that  it  is  only  when  the  electricity 
accumulates  in  larger  quantities  than  can  be  carried  ofl^,  it  becomes  a 
hurtful  force ;  but  even  then  it  is  under  restraint,  showing  the  pres- 
ence of  a  governing  and  guarding  power.  The  arrangement  may  be 
accidental,  but  to  one  accustomed  to  perceive  relations,  or  trace  the 
connection  between  causes  and  eflfects,  it  appears  like  a  fore-ordained 
system  of  checks  and  balances,  by  which  benevolent  ends  may 
be  realized. 


PROOFS  OF  FINAL  CAUSE.  293 

A  still  more  striking  instance  of  a  plan  in  the  chemistry  of  nature 
is  the  "diffusion"  of  oxygen,  or  its  constancy  in  the  atmosphere. 
The  disturbance  of  the  proportion  of  oxygen  would  aftect  sound, 
sight,  breathing,  life ;  whatever  changes  take  place  in  the  atmosphere, 
the  proportion  of  oxygen  must  remain.  The  chemist  affirms  that  the 
law  of  proportion  is  never  disturbed.  This  may  be  accidental,  but  it 
is  difficult  to  understand  how  an  accidental  arrangement  has  the  ap- 
pearance of,  and  is,  in  fact,  a  fixed  and  unchangeable  order. 

The  arrangement  includes  the  preservation  of  the  equilibrium  of 
the  atmosphere;  its  homogeneity  might  be  disturbed,  its  volume 
might  be  reduced  or  increased,  effecting  changes  prejudicial  to  human 
interests ;  but  the  quantity  remains  the  same,  and  its  equilibrium  is 
preserved.  Contributing  to  this  end  is  that  delicate  provision  by 
which  the  vegetable  world  is  continually  exchanging  oxygen  for  the 
carbon  of  the  animal  world — a  process  that  insures  stability,  circula- 
tion, interchange,  and  unity  in  the  atmosphere. 

Oxygen,  too,  is  odorless  and  tasteless.  Perhaps  this  is  a  small 
fact ;  but,  since  the  air  must  be  inhaled  every  moment,  what  an  an- 
noyance it  would  prove  if  the  olfactory  nerve  or  the  sense  of  taste 
were  affected  at  every  inspiration!  This  is  a  part  of  the  testimony 
of  chemistry  to  the  righteousness  of  the  claim  of  teleology.  Is  it  not 
sufficient?  The  alternative  is,  that  the  atmospheric  arrangement 
is  wholly  and  essentially  accidental,  or  that  it  is  designed.  Order, 
plans,  ends,  are  the  evidences  of  design,  or  design  is  a  word  that  has 
no  meaning,  or  represents,  if  it  represent  any  thing,  a  fictitious  idea. 
The  imrainency  of  end  or  purpose  in  nature  has  a  satisfactory  dem- 
onstration in  the  appointments,  laws,  and  facts  of  chemistry. 

Nor  less  conclusive  is  the  argument  from  physiology,  or  the  evi- 
dences of  final  cause  in  man.  Galen,  the  physician,  said  the  teleology 
of  physiology  is  the  foundation  of  religion.  Janet  confines  his  chap- 
ter on  "Facts"  in  proof  of  final  cause  to  the  human  body,  discover- 
ing in  its  laws  and  adaptations  the  evidence  he  is  seeking.  "  The 
happiness  of  mankind,  as  well  as  of  all  other  rational  creatures,"  says 
Adam  Smith,  "seems  to  have  been  the  original  purpose  of  the  Au- 
thor of  nature."  Man  the  proof  of  final  cause  !  This  is  the  base-line 
of  the  defense. 

Look  at  the  human  skeleton  ;  a  frame-work  of  uses ;  an  outline  of 
design;  a  model  of  purpose.  By  reason  of  the  bone-form,  man  is  up- 
right, different  in  this  respect  from  all  other  animals.  This  means 
something ;  surely  it  is  not  an  accident.  The  protection  of  the 
vital  organs,  a  most  important  feature  in  the  human  economy,  is  se- 
cured by  the  arrangement  of  the  osseous  system.  The  skull  protects 
the  brain,  gives  form  to  the  head,  and  is  a  distinguishing  mark  among 


294  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

the  races.  The  ribs  protect  the  lungs,  and  the  pelvis  the  organs  of 
generation.  In  the  formation  of  the  knee-joint  the  idea  of  a  hinge  is 
patent,  allowing  one  kind  of  motion,  while  the  shoulder-joint — a  ball 
and  socket — is  so  constructed  as  to  permit  a  free  movement  of  the 
arm  in  nearly  every  direction.  Had  accident  ruled,  the  hinge  might 
have  appeared  at  the  shoulder,  and  the  ball  and  socket  at  the  knee, 
and  then  man  had  been  in  perpetual  trouble.  The  skeleton  as  it  is 
is  proof  of  wisdom  in  its  construction. 

Passing  to  the  muscular  system,  it  should  be  observed  that  the 
muscles  are  attached  to  the  bones,  which  secures  for  them  permanency 
of  place.  This  is  something ;  it  is  a  fortunate  arrangement.  It  is 
usual  to  describe  some  of  the  processes  of  nature  as  involuntary,  such 
as  digestion,  respiration,  and  circulation ;  they  are  maintained  during 
the  sleeping  as  well  as  the  waking  hours,  and  are  in  no  sense  de- 
pendent on  the  volition  or  conscious  co-operation  of  the  individual. 
Dependent  on  his  co-operation,  his  life  would  be  a  terror  to  himself. 
Asthma,  dyspepsia,  and  palpitation  of  the  heart  show  what  trouble 
would  be  in  store  were  each  man  under  the  necessity  of  watching, 
regulating,  and  prompting  the  processes  now  happily  involuntarily 
performed.  That  these  processes  may  thus  be  performed  it  is  neces- 
sary that  the  muscles  involved  shall  perform  their  functions  without 
weariness.  This  we  find  to  be  actually  the  case.  The  heart  beats 
for  years  and  never  tires;  the  stomach,  unless  asked  to  do  more  than 
it  ought  to  do,  will  perform  its  work  without  fatigue.  It  should 
be  remembered  that  other  muscles,  not  involved  in  vital  or  involun- 
tary processes,  do  grow  weary,  and  expostulate  against  continued  toil. 
The  muscles  of  the  legs  and  hands,  though  consisting  of  the  same 
kind  of  muscular  tissue  as  the  heart,  and  their  method  of  action  the 
same,  soon  exhibit  signs  of  fatigue,  and  the  man  must  rest.  The  dif- 
ference is  indicative  of  wisdom  in  the  construction  of  the  machine ; 
the  body  has  been  formed  with  these  facts  in  view.  The  vital  pro- 
cesses are  ceaseless ;  the  voluntary  are  susceptible  of  weakness.  If  we 
should  consider  separate  from  the  others  any  single  process,  or  any 
muscle  whose  action  is  involuntary,  it  would  exhibit  the  strongest 
evidence  of  design.  As  to  the  heart,  the  right  ventricle  is  Aveaker 
than  the  left,  for  the  reason  that  it  propels  the  blood  to  the  lungs, 
while  the  left  ventricle  must  propel  it  throughout  the  system  ;  hence, 
the  walls  of  the  latter  are  stronger,  tougher,  merely  adapted  to  its 
purpose.  The  doctrine  of  final  cause  led  Harvey  to  the  discovery  of 
the  circulation  of  the  blood,  and  properly  so.  The  valves  and  general 
structure  of  the  heart  indicate  function.  But  we  reverse  Harvey's 
mental  process,  and  declare  that  the  circulation  of  the  blood  points  to 
final  cause.     It  has  an  end.     From  the  structure  of  the  heart  to  its 


PR 0 OFS  FR OM  PHYSIOL OGY.  295 

functions  is  an  easy  physiological  step ;  from   functions  to   intention- 
ality  is  as  easy  a  metaphysical  step. 

The  involuntary  process  of  digestion  is  dependent  on  the  gastric 
juice,  the  most  powerful  solvent  known.  With  the  exception  of 
mineral  and  poisonous  substances,  and  living  matter,  it  will  dissolve 
every  thing  that  enters  the  stomach.  All  animal  and  vegetable  food 
at  once  submits  to  its  power.  It  is  a  strange  fact  that  in  animals  the 
gastric  juice  has  no  such  almost  unlimited  power  as  it  has  in  man. 
In  animals  its  power  is  limited  to  a  few  articles,  so  that  some  are 
carnivorous  only,  while  man  eats  every  thing  and  digests  every  thing, 
except  as  above  stated.  If  the  gastric  juice  in  man  is  such  a  solvent, 
why  does  it  not  dissolve  the  stomach  itself?  Here  is  another  wonder, 
the  explanation  of  which  is  another  evidence  of  the  law  of  final 
cause  in  his  physiological  history.  The  juice  will  not  dissolve  living 
matter ;  hence,  a  tape-worm  wall  live  in  the  system  ;  so  also  other 
worms.  It  dissolves  dead  matter  only  ;  hence,  it  can  not  disorganize 
the  stomach.  If  this  is  not  proof  of  design,  we  know  not  where  to 
look  for  proof. 

In  the  respiratory  system  the  arragement  for  the  inhalation  and 
exhalation  of  air  is  so  perfect  that  it  must  have  been  intended,  or 
intention  can  not  be  predicated  of  anything. 

The  nervous  system  is  equally  wonderful  in  its  testimony  to  the 
idea  or  law  of  final  cause.  Admitting  that  the  nerves  are  the  con- 
necting links  between  mind  and  matter,  it  is  well  known  that  the 
material  properties  of  the  nerves  are  not  unlike  those  of  other  sub- 
stances. Again,  nerves  resembling  one  another  in  structure  are  en- 
dowed with  entirely  different  functions ;  as  the  optic  nerve  is  in  no 
essential  different  from  the  olfactory  nerve,  yet  each  exercises  an  in- 
dependent office.  Nervous  matter  does  not  differ  from  other  matter ; 
nervous  matter  composing  different  nervous  tissues  can  not  be  classi- 
fied into  different  kinds.  It  is  one  kind,  and  similar  to  other  matter. 
Why  these  different  properties,  functions,  adaptations  of  the  nerves? 
Certain  physiologists  quoted  by  Janet  can  not  harmonize  variety  of 
structure  with  oneness  of  function ;  but  here  is  even  a  deeper  prob- 
lem, the  harmonizing  of  variety  of  function  with  homogeneity  of  tissue. 
As,  however,  the  one  problem  has  its  solution  in  final  cause,  so  has 
the  other.  Both  are  proofs  of  the  superintendence  of  wisdom  in  the 
world,  of  ends  designed  by  an  infinite  mind. 

Of  the  five  senses,  and  the  marvelous  mechanism  of  the  organs, 
especially  of  sight  and  hearing,  a  lesson  in  wisdom  may  be  learned, 
and  a  deduction  in  favor  of  final  cause  be  made.  The  eye,  the  in^! 
strument  of  vision,  is  perhaps  the  most  wonderful  in  construction  and 
the  most  perfect  in  its  functions  of  the  organs  of  the   human   body. 


296  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

It  stands,  as  Janet  says,  as  the  classical  argument  for  design  or  final 
cause.  Its  offices  and  adaptations  have  been  so  frequently  described, 
and  all  are  so  familiar  with  its  value,  that  it  would  seem  like  need- 
less repetition  to  advance  here  an  argument  based  upon  it;  but  it 
may  be  said  that  the  eye  is  a  rebuke  of  atheism  such  as  no  other  or- 
gan can  administer.  The  ear  has  been  employed  in  defense  of  final 
cause,  and  why  not?  To  say  that  the  ear  may  be  used  in  hearing, 
implying  that  possibly  its  chief  function  may  be  something  else,  is  to 
disassociate  structure  and  function,  quite  impossible  in  this  instance. 
So  the  sense  of  touch,  the  sense  of  smeU,  and  the  sense  of  taste,  con- 
tributing to  man's  pleasure,  preservation  and  development,  may  be 
quoted  in  proof  of  intention  on  the  part  of  man's  Maker. 

To  assume  that  the  organs  of  the  body,  the  muscles,  nerves,  bones, 
viscera,  and  so  forth,  have  certain  functions,  without  assuming  at  the 
same  time  that  they  were  designed  or  appointed,  is  an  assumption 
that  falls  short  of  the  truth.  Even  if  structure  do  not  indicate  or 
prove  function,  function  indicates  and  proves  design.  Human  works 
are  interpreted  by  this  principle.  A  locomotive  voices  the  purpose 
of  the  mechanic  that  made  it ;  a  watch — Paley's  argument — reflects 
the  purpose  of  the  watchmaker  ;  a  statue — Socrates's  argument — ex- 
hibits the  mind  of  the  sculptor ;  Homer's  Iliad — Cicero's  argument — 
must  have  been  written,  and,  as  written,  it  reflects  the  genius,  the 
eiid,  of  its  author.  Shall  it  be  said  that  man  himself,  the  most  per- 
fect machine  ever  made,  is  barren  of  design  ?  So  reason  those  who 
distinguish  or  break  the  connection  between  function  and  design. 
Folly  the  most  stupendous,  this  is.  The  physiological  proof  of  final 
cause,  in  our  judgment,  has  never  been  answered  ;  it  is  unanswerable. 
The  astronomical  proof  which  we  now  examine,  although  express- 
ive of  power  and  wisdom,  has  not  been  considered  so  affirmative  in 
its  impression  as  the  meteorological  or  physiological,  for  the  reason 
that  astronomical  laws  are  so  occult,  and  astronomical  facts  so  obscure 
or  mysterious  as  to  render  full  and  adequate  interpretation  impos- 
sible. The  human  mind,  too,  is  not  so  eager  to  extend  its  inquiries 
to  other  globes  or  systems  beyond  our  own,  so  that  the  proof  from 
astronomy  has  not  been  fully  elaborated  ;  it  has  been  neglected.  It 
was  Ccmte,  a  French  atheist,  who  declared  our  solar  system  imper- 
fect, and  that  it  could  be  improved  ;  but  even  if  this  is  true,  it  makes 
not  against  the  doctrine  of  final  cause.  No  teleologist  insists  that  the 
ground  of  final  cause  is  the  perfection  of  nature,  but  that  structure, 
function,  adaptation,  achievement,  do  together  afford  a  basis  of  faith 
in  the  principle.  The  demonstration  of  design  in  the  eye  turns  not 
upon  the  perfection  of  the  organ,  but  upon  the  possibility  of  vision 
through  it.     Imperfect  hearing   does  not  invalidate  the  teleological 


TESTIMONY  OF  ASTRONOMY.  297 

argument  from  the  ear.  So  an  alleged  imperfection  in  the  astronom- 
ical systems  in  no  way  contradicts,  undermines,  or  reflects  unfavor- 
ably upon  the  teleological  argument  based  upon  the  systems.  What 
is  the  alleged  imperfection  ?  It  can  not  lie  in  the  law  of  attraction, 
which  binds  them  together,  and  especially  under  whose  influence  our 
solar  system,  embracing  thirty  planets,  is  maintained  in  perfect  order, 
every  planet  pursuing  its  circular  or  elliptical  course,  and  at  a  speed 
terrific  and  incomputable,  without  danger  of  collision  with  another, 
and  Avithout  variation  of  one  minute  in  a  thousand  years  from  the 
standard  time  of  its  revolutions.  Beyond  the  earth's  system  are 
others  still  more  stupendous  in  their  revolutions,  embracing  worlds 
that  eclipse  ours  in  magnitude,  and  all  revolving  around  a  com- 
mon center  in  blissful  unconsciousness  of  the  power  that,  controls 
and  the  spirit  that  ordains  their  movements.  Surely  there  is  no 
failure  here. 

In  the  prevention  of  antagonisms  and  accidents  in  the  astronom- 
ical systems,  in  the  everlasting  peace  and  order  of  the  firmament,  there 
is  indisputable  proof  of  the  presence  of  a  superintending  mind,  which 
regulates  the  velocity  of  the  planets,  and  determines  the  direction  of 
their  movements,  and  calculates  the  length  of  their  orbits,  thus  antic- 
ipating peace  and  securing  it.  Aware  that  this  is  a  general  statement, 
it  is  nevertheless  suflicient  for  our  purpose ;  besides,  astronomical  ev- 
idence can  not  be  very,  or  at  least  exhaustively,  minute.  What  the 
final  cause  of  the  astronomical  system  is,  we  do  not  now  inquire ;  for 
it  is  a  separate  question.  To  point  out  evidences  of  design  in  those 
systems  is  one  thing ;  to  declare  the  specific  design  of  the  systems  is 
quite  another,  a  task  that  does  not  belong  to  the  teleologist.  How- 
ever, respecting  the  earth,  it  is  evident  that  the  design  of  its  revolu- 
tions, both  on  its  axis  and  around  the  sun,  is  the  perpetual  recurrence 
of  day  and  night,  and  of  the  four  seasons  of  the  year.  So  marked 
results  must  have  been  designed  ;  for  if  not  designed,  we  ask  in  vain 
for  explanation.  If  better  acquainted  with  other  worlds,  one  might 
declare  the  results  of  their  revolutions  in  benefits  to  their  inhabitants ; 
but  without  inquiring  for  details,  or  summarizing  discoveries  in  this 
field,  it  is  apparent  that  the  great  design  of  the  astronomical  system 
is  in  some  form  the  conservation  of  life,  an  end  that  justifies  faith  in 
the  presence  of  infinite  wisdom  in  the  universe.  The  moral  effects 
arising  from  a  contemplation  of  the  astronomical  systems,  such  as  the 
spirit  of  humility  and  adoration,  and  an  overwhelming  sense  of  the 
greatness  of  the  Creator,  the  materialist  may  ignore,  nor  do  we  insist 
upon  them  ;  but,  confining  the  view  entirely  to  facts,  astronomy, 
with  its  wonders,  its  laws,  its  harmonies,  its  beneficial  schemes,  its 
security  of  safety  among  the  worlds,  and  the  spirit  of  unity  which  it 


298  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

everywhere  exhibits,  contributes  no  inconsiderable  argument  to  the 
support  of  the  claim  of  teleology. 

The  botanical  marks  of  design  must  be  added  to  the  catalogue  of 
proofs  of  the  doctrine  of  final  cause.  The  vegetable  kingdom  is,  to 
some  extent,  a  mirror  of  certain  biological  forces,  working  out  ends 
after  established  patterns  under  the  law  of  like  producing  like,  and 
verifying  the  operation  of  a  fundamental  and  universal  principle.  In 
that  the  acorn  produces  the  oak,  the  apple  the  apple,  the  grape  the 
grape,  it  may  be  claimed  that  the  law  of  stability  of  species  is  in  force 
in  the  vegetable  as  well  as  in  the  animal  kingdom.  Law  prevails 
quite  as  definitely  in  the  vegetable  as  in  the  animal  world.  The 
habits  of  plants  are  as  distinctly  marked  as  the  habits  of  ani- 
mals. In  origin,  in  structure,  in  development,  in  function,  and  in 
evident  design  the  vegetable  world  articulates  as  clearly  the  law  of 
final  cause  as  the  animal  world.  In  the  fructification  of  plants,  in 
the  phyllotactic  law  by  which  the  leaves  are  properly  distributed,  so 
as  to  secure  proportion  and  beauty,  in  the  uses  of  fruits  as  foods,  in 
the  variety  of  forms  and  colors  in  tree,  fern,  and  flower,  and  in  the 
general  use  of  wood  as  fuel,  in  house-building,  and  ship-building,  the 
marks  of  design  are  abundant  and  patent.  Even  in  the  decay  of  the 
vegetable  world,  resulting  in  the  enrichment  of  the  soil,  or  in  those 
vast  store-houses  of  coal,  the  result  of  buried  forests  ages  ago,  there 
is  proof  of  a  divine  purpose  to  prepare  the  earth  for  man,  and  make 
it  continually  contribute  to  his  happiness.  Of  the  beauty  in  the 
botanical  realm  we  need  not  more  than  say  that  it  is  a  reflection  of 
the  benevolence  and  beauty  of  its  Maker.  European  thinkers  are 
almost  agreed  that  beauty  is  an  unknown  quality  in  things  having  the 
power  to  excite  the  love  of  the  beautiful  in  man.  Beauty  is  objective. 
If  this  be  true,  then  indeed  is  it  a  marvelous  proof  of  the  final  cause 
of  nature.  Taking  all  the  facts  which  the  vegetable  kingdom  brings 
to  us,  and  interpreting  them  as  they  ought  to  be  interpreted,  it  is 
diflScult  not  to  see  that  they  support  the  doctrine  of  final  cause. 

The  zoological  argument  is  a  complete  demonstration  of  final  cause. 
The  Duke  of  Argyll  is  emphatic  in  the  assertion  that  "  the  whole 
order  of  nature  is  one  vast  system  of  contrivance,"  and  while  his  gen- 
eral argument  is  in  support  of  the  statement,  the  particular  argument 
is  drawn  from  that  provision  in  the  animal  kingdom  by  which  flight 
is  secured.  The  machinery  by  which  the  navigation  of  the  air  is  ac- 
complished is  a  striking  evidence  of  the  spirit  of  contrivance  in  the 
world,  which  adjusts  means  to  ends.  Whether  one,  like  Janet,  spe- 
cializes human  physiology,  or,  like  the  Duke  of  Argyll,  magnifies  the 
machinery  of  birds,  whether  man  or  bird  be  studied,  the  result  is  the 
same — final  cause  is  proclaimed.     Roaming  over  the  field  of  zoology 


PROOFS  FROM  NATURE  AS  A   WHOLE.  299 

for  general  facts  or  evidences  of  the  principle  of  design,  they  are  soon 
found  in  the  habits  of  animals,  in  the  homes  they  build  for  them- 
selves, in  their  care  of  the  young,  in  their  means  of  self-defense,  and 
in  their  adaptations  to  particular  modes  of  life.  Here  is  a  spinning 
caterpillar  that  resembles  the  twig  under  which  it  has  taken  shelter— 
this  is  its  protection ;  there  is  a  lion  with  paw  strong  enough  to  kill 
a  horse  at  a  single  blow — this  is  his  protection.  The  monkey  sus- 
pends himself  by  his  tail  from  a  branch  of  a  tree,  and  sleeps  all 
night,  free  from  the  fear  of  danger  ;  the  panther  repairs  to  his  jungle, 
but  is  alert  to  see  danger,  and  stands  ready  to  meet  it.  The  squirrel 
will  lay  up  food  for  the  Winter ;  the  fox  will  depend  upon  his  shrewd- 
ness for  his  daily  allowance.  The  eagle  will  train  the  eaglet  to  fly  ; 
the  buffalo  rarely  imparts  instructions  to  the  young,  nor  is  it  neces- 
sary. Variety  of  methods,  variety  of  activities,  variety  of  functions, 
variety  of  adaptations — these  demonstrate  the  spirit  of  purpose  in  the 
animal  kingdom. 

Take  nature  as  a  whole ;  take  Alaupertiios's  law  of  least  action,  which 
implies  the  employment  of  only  a  sufficient  amount  of  force  for  a  given 
end,  and  forbids  a  waste  of  force;  take  "  the  law  of  definite  proportions," 
under  which  the  elementary  substances  will  combine,  and  combine  under 
no  other  law;  take  all  the  kingdoms  of  nature,  tvith  all  their  laws,  struc- 
tures, functions,  and  adaptations,  and  the  conclusion  must  be  that  nature 
is  a  scheme  of  ends,  breaking  out  in  wonderful  variety  in  all  its  depart- 
ments, and  regidated  by  the  laws  each  kingdom  reveals.  This  is  not 
exhaustive;  it  is  demonstrative,  however,  and  the  demonstration  is  as 
mathematical  as  any  solution  in  Euclid. 

The  duty  to  consider  objections  to  the  doctrine  of  final  cause  we 
shall  not  ignore  or  treat  with  contempt.  It  is  admitted  that,  dem- 
onstrated as  is  the  doctrine,  there  are  those  who  are  not  convinced 
by  the  "  evidences,"  and  require  still  stronger  foundations  for  faith. 
Their  intelligence  we  can  not  impeach,  the  plausibility  of  their  argu- 
ments we  can  not  deny.  Justice  to  truth  and  a  willingness  honestly 
to  inspect  the  alleged  weakness  of  the  doctrine  require  a  full  repre- 
sentation of  the  objections  in  all  their  bearings,  and  then  an  admis- 
sion of  their  force,  or  an  exposure  of  their  hollowness.  Both  sides 
are  bolstered  with  great  names.  This  should  warn  the  investigator 
against  accepting  or  rejecting  a  principle  merely  because  an  hon- 
ored thinker  may  be  quoted  on  one  side  or  the  other.  Nor  is  one's 
friendship  for  a  doctrine  to  weigh  in  a  final  estimate  of  it.  If  the 
doctrine  appeal  to  fact,  then  to  fact  all  must  go ;  if  to  revelation, 
then  to  revelation  all  should  go ;  if  to  law  or  scientifically-deduced 
principle,  then  law  shall  be  the  test;  if  to  reason,  there  is  room  for 
speculation,  but  logic  sometimes  is  imperious. 


300  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

lu  irony  K.  E.  von  Baer  characterizes  teleology  as  telephohy,  but 
the  teleological  claim  can  not  not  be  ridiculed  out  of  existence.  This, 
however,  is  one  of  the  steps  a  materialist  is  sure  to  take,  especially 
if  he  suspect  the  principle  he  assails  has  any  theological  bearing,  or 
is  difficult  to  extinguish.  Ridicule  deserves  no  answer.  An  effect 
follows  a  cause.  Is  effect  synonymous  with  end  ?  The  anti-teleologist 
discriminates  between  effect  and  end,  but  the  discrimination  is  no 
more  valid  than  that  of  the  physiologist  between  function  and  end. 
The  effect  of  the  flapping  of  the  eagle's  wings  is  flight ;  the  end  is 
the  effect.  The  effect  of  the  use  of  the  vocal  organs  is  speech  ;  the 
end  can  not  be  separated  from  the  effect. 

Schopenhauer  was  radical  enough  to  assert  that,  even  when  design 
can  be  predicated  from  structure,  it  is  not  an  indication  of  intelligence, 
so  that  the  doctrine  of  ends  fully  established  in  no  sense  justifies  be- 
lief in  a  governing  mind  in  the  universe.  As  pessimism  will  admit 
the  presence  of  mind  under  no  circumstances  in  the  affairs  of  the 
world,  it  is  of  little  use  to  contend  against  it  for  a  principle  the 
proof  of  which,  even  though  complete,  it  will  not  accept. 

Comte  denied  the  principle  of  intentionality,  and  asserted  that 
nature  can  be  sufficiently  explained  by  the  principle  of  gravitation ; 
but  he  forgot  to  acknowledge  that  the  law  of  gravitation  is  the  law 
of  final  cause.  Gravitation  means  order  and  harmony  throughout  the 
universe. 

Dropping  minor  objections,  a  very  forcible  exception  to  the  doc- 
trine has  been  framed  out  of  the  apparently  useless  structures,  organs, 
and  objects  in  nature,  to  overcome  which  an  adequate  explanation  of 
the  cases  cited  in  proof  must  be  given.  The  physiologist  reports  that 
the  spleen  in  man  is  an  organ  without  known  functions ;  hence,  it  is 
a  useless  organ.  It  should  be  remembered  that  Plato  considered  the 
bile  a  vicious  secretion.  As  modern  physiology  has  corrected  his 
error,  so  future  physiology  may  determine  the  mysterious  uses  of  the 
splenetic  organ.  It  is  also  said  that  the  intestinal  canal  has  a  "  blind 
intestine,"  and  the  eye  a  winking  membrane,  without  particular  func- 
tions, and  can  be  dispensed  with  without  loss;  but  it  is  going  be- 
yond warrant  to  assume  that  any  thing  is  functiouless  because  the 
investigator  is  ignorant  of  the  function.  The  argument  from  rudi- 
meniarij  organs  is  an  extended  one,  including  fish  with  rudimentary 
eyes,  whales  with  rudimentary  teeth,  animals  with  rudimenatry  mus- 
cles, worms  with  rudimentary  limbs,  and  birds  with  rudimentary 
wings.  The  ostrich  has  wings,  but  can  not  fly ;  true,  but  they  assist 
in  locomotion  nevertheless. 

Has  a  grain  of  sand  an  end  ?  This  perplexed  Plato  ;  but  the 
minerologist  finds  an  end  for  every  thing  in  his  kingdom.     It  is  some- 


RUDIMENTARY  ORGANS.  301 

times  hinted  that  as  nature  is  largely  composed  of  ten  or  twelve  ele- 
ments, it  is  proof  that  the  nearly  fifty  elements  remaining  are  almost 
if  not  wholly  useless,  and  that  the  spirit  of  purpose  did  not  play  an 
important  part  in  the  systems  of  world-building.  The  question  is  not 
so  much  whether  they  played  an  important  part  as  whether  they 
played  amj  part  at  all  in  the  construction  of  the  universe.  Essential 
as  are  oxygen,  carbon,  silicon,  and  hydrogen  to  the  universe,  it  had 
not  been  without  the  minor  elementary  substances.  Nitrogen,  dead 
as  it  seems  to  be,  is  as  necessary  as  oxygen,  the  life-giving  element. 
The  Duke  of  Argyll  regards  the  exceptions  pointed  out  by  physiolo- 
gists and  materialists  as  subordinate  facts  that  must  be  explained  by 
reference  to  the  general  purposes  of  nature.  This,  we  think,  is  the 
real  solution  of  the  difficulty.  Great  designs  include  all  the  subordi- 
nate facts  or  factors  with  which  they  are  associated,  whether  the  use 
of  subordinate  conditions  or  structures  can  be  explained  or  not.  The 
"  higher  purpose  of  nature  "  governs  the  "  lesser,"  the  latter  of  which 
it  is  not  essential  to  understand.  If  it  is  evident  that  a  bird's  wing 
is  constructed  for  flight,  it  is  not  necessary,  in  order  to  vindicate  final 
cause,  that  the  teleologist  shall  explain  the  design  of  the  color  of  the 
wing,  which  is  a  subordinate  question  entirely.  If  it  is  established 
that  the  eye  is  designed  for  sight,  the  failure  to  explain  the  winking 
membrane  is  not  stupendous,  or  at  all  vital.  One  great  purpose  may 
include  a  score  of  subordinate  purposes.  It  is  a  species  of  presump- 
tion in  man  to  circumscribe  the  purposes  of  nature  by  his  knowledge 
of  them,  or  his  ability  to  ascertain  them.  He  assumes  that  since  he 
does  not  know  the  special  use  of  an  organ  it  has  no  use,  when  science 
is  loudly  proclaiming  that  by  waiting  a  little  we  shall  know  more 
than  Ave  do  now.  This  scientific  dictum  we  accept,  and  urge  investi- 
gators not  too  hastily  to  employ  rudimentary  organs  in  their  attack 
on  final  cause  until  they  are  sure  they  are  rudimentary ;  and  when 
that  is  established  they  must  be  equally  sure  that  a  rudimentary  organ 
is  functionless.  Both  of  these  conclusions  have  been  assumed  ;  neither 
has  been  proved.  A  materialist  looks  upon  a  rudimentary  organ  as 
proof  that  nature  attempted  to  do  something  and  failed,  or  that,  at 
all  events,  its  work  in  those  cases  is  useless.  But  it  is  not  clear  in 
such  cases  that  nature  did  not  accomplish  all  she  had  in  view,  and  if 
she  did  not  it  might  be  pertinent  to  inquire  if  she  had  any  thing  in 
view,  for  if  she  had  nothing  in  view  she  can  not  be  accused  of  failing 
to  do  something ;  or  it  might  be  asked  if  she  might  not  yet  accom- 
plish purposes  not  revealed  through  the  rudimentary  organs?  To 
assume  that  a  rudimentary  organ  is  functionless,  is  to  assume  that  it 
served  no  purpose  in  the  past  and  can  serve  none  in  the  future,  an 
assumption  no  one  is  competent  to  make.     A  rudiTuent  is  the  historic 


302  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

sign  of  fulfilled  purpose,  m~  the  prophetic  sign  of  a  future  purpose.  In 
this  way  we  dispose  of  the  objection  from  rudimentary  organs  against 
final  cause. 

The  explanation  of  the  details  of  nature  can  not  be  satisfactorily 
made  in  the  light  of  a  single  principle.  Many  purposes  obtain  in 
the  phenomenal  world  to  which  the  great  facts  may  be  referred  ;  but 
the  minor  works  may  be  obscure  or  in  apparent  violation  of  the  great 
principles  or  great  purposes.  Meeting  with  such  contradictions,  it  is 
enough  if  the  great  principles  and  purposes  can  exist  in  spite  of 
them.  Nature  is  the  embodiment  of  a  great  plan.  Looking  at  it  as 
a  whole,  it  is  pertinent  to  inquire  if  the  alleged  irregularities  and  useless 
appendages  compromise  the  plan.  Is  the  discovery  of  a  single  un- 
favorable fact  sufficient  to  cancel  the  whole  plan  ?  Will  a  broken 
key  in  a  piano  destroy  the  evidence  of  design  in  the  instrument  ? 
Does  consumption  destroy  the  mark  of  design  in  the  lungs  ?  The 
whole  plan  of  nature  is  sufficient  to  carry  all  the  compromises,  irregu- 
larities, deficiencies,  and  rudimentary  exhibitions  which  the  busy  minds 
of  materialists  can  invent  or  discover.  In  the  large  view  of  nature 
the  small  disappears. 

The  next  objection  is  that  of  Comte,  who,  on  the  ground  that  the 
ways  of  the  Deity  can  not  be  ascertained  and  have  not  been  revealed, 
denies  validity  to  our  alleged  knowledge  of  final  cause.  While  he 
preferred  not  to  be  ranked  with  the  atheistic  school,  the  atheism  of 
his  objection  is  quite  apparent.  There  are  methods  of  divine  action 
that  have  not  been  explained  or  analyzed;  there  are  ends  of  the 
divine  government  so  obscure  that  one  must  hesitate  in  pronouncing 
them.  On  the  other  hand,  some  ends  of  his  government  are  fully  re- 
vealed ;  or,  if  not  revealed,  they  may  be  rationally  discovered ;  and 
there  are  methods  that  are  sufficiently  transparent,  or  will  disclose 
themselves  to  the  searching  and  penetrating  spirit.  The  works  of  God 
are  not  enigmas,  in  the  sense  that  neither  the  purposes  with  which 
they  are  pregnant,  nor  the  methods  by  which  the  purposes  will  be 
wrought  out,  can  be  determined.  If  the  mineralogist  is  baffled  in  his 
search  for  purpose  in  certain  crystals,  the  physiologist  rejoices  in  the 
discovery  of  ends  in  structures  and  organs.  If  the  astronomer  can 
not  convince  himself  that  a  comet  has  any  special  end  to  serve, 
the  naturalist  is  constantly  astounded  by  the  revelations  of  new  de- 
signs in  the  vegetable  and  animal  kingdoms.  Nature,  dark  on  one 
side,  may  be  light  on  the  other.  God's  ways,  methods,  laws,  purposes, 
are  not  all  hidden.  Because  some  ends  are  unknown,  it  is  not  con- 
clusive that  all  ends  are  unknown.  But,  if  all  were  unknown,  it  is 
not  clear  that  we  would  be  justified  in  denying  the  existence  of  ends. 
Ignorance  of  ends  is  not  a  valid  objection  to  their  existence. 


THE  S  UPERNA  T  URA L  ELEMENT.  303 

The  objection  of  Positivism,  as  expressed  by  M.  Littre,  that  final 
cause  implies  supernatural  intervention,  or  an  interposing  miraculous 
influence,  is  a  concession  to  truth  not  anticipated  from  that  quarter. 
In  order  to  overthrow  the  doctrine  in  issue,  the  positivist  invokes  re- 
ligious prejudice  and  assails  it,  not  on  its  merits,  but  on  its  alleged 
theological,  or  rather  supernatural,  content,  and  achieves  an  apparent 
victory.  The  relation  of  supernatural  influence  or  agency  to  final 
cause  is  such  that  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  ends  can  be  framed  and  exe- 
cuted without  a  supervising  intelligence ;  but  the  positivist  surrenders 
his  position  when  he  recognizes  that  relation.  However,  the  super- 
natural element  in  final  cause,  or  the  necessity  of  a  constantly  inter- 
fering influence  in  order  to  accomplish  ends,  has  been  misinterpreted 
by  the  positivist ;  hence,  his  antagonism.  He  fancies  that  the  super- 
natural element  can  express  itself  only  by  miraculous  method,  which 
compels  him  to  reject  it;  for  the  idea  of  a  miraculously  sustained 
universe  is  repugnant  to  his  sense  of  order  in  nature.  Any  end  that 
must  depend  upon  miraculous  aid  for  its  accomplishment,  he  conceives 
will  never  be  Avrought  out.  He,  therefore,  is  ready  to  disown  the 
supernatural  element  entirely. 

One  great  lesson  to  be  learned  is,  that  the  supernatural  element, 
in  its  interposition  in  nature,  or  association  with  it,  through  laws,  or 
otherwise,  for  the  attainment  of  specific  ends,  acts,  not  miraculously, 
but  regularly,  orderly,  and  naturally.  Prof.  Newcomb,  blind  to  this 
distinction,  goes  over  to  the  mechanical  theory  of  the  universe.  This 
is  a  turning-point  in  the  history  of  supernatural  influence  in  nature 
and  humanity.  It  may  insert  itself  in  a  miraculous  manner,  but  its 
ordinary  method  is  natural.  It  is  a  lurking  influence  in  nature,  but 
it  is  not  a  miraculously  expressed  power.  Failing  to  make  this  dis- 
crimination. Positivism  has  expelled  the  end-securing  influence  from 
its  circle. 

Descartes  denied  that  a  knowledge  of  ends  is  possible,  but  he  is 
sufficiently  answered  in  our  reply  to  the  objection  of  Comte.  Bacon 
eliminated  final  cause  from  physics,  not  because  he  did  not  accept  the 
doctrine,  but  because  it  belonged,  in  his  opinion,  to  the  region  of  met- 
aphysics. Forgetting  this  distinction,  others  have  quoted  him  in  op- 
position to  the  doctrine,  but  unjustly.  Conceding  sincerity  of  motive 
to  Bacon,  it  is  not  evident  that  he  was  wise  in  the  position  taken,  for 
final  cause  has  its  physical,  as  well  as  metaphysical,  aspects ;  it  is  scien- 
tific, as  well  as  theological ;  and,  while  the  value  of  the  doctrine  is 
theological,  the  proof  of  it  is  physical.  Along  these  lines  a  great 
argument  might  be  constructed,  showing  the  interdependence  of  the 
physical  and  metaphysical,  and  confirming  theological  truth  from  a 
scientific   stand-point.       Bacon    separates    the    two    departments    of 


304  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

thought,  scientific  and  metaphysical,  in  quite  a  satisfactory  manner ; 
but  neither  is  wholly  exclusive  of  the  other.  He  strikes  no  blow  at 
final  cause,  but  separates  it  from  unnecessary  association,  as  he  thinks, 
and  relegates  its  vindication  to  the  metaphysicians. 

Perhaps  the  strongest  objection  to  final  cause  is  not  theoretical,  but 
practical.  Of  all  problems,  the  problem  of  evil  is  the  most  perplexing 
both  in  philosophy  and  religion.  The  manner  of  its  introduction  into 
the  universe,  its  possibility  in  a  system  of  benevolent  administration, 
and  the  purposes  to  be  achieved  through  its  presence,  are  alike  elusive 
and  unsearchable  subjects  of  discussion.  Apparently  inconsistent 
with  all  optimistic  ideas,  revolting  to  all  benevolent  considerations, 
inimical  to  good,  it  is  incumbent  upon  the  teleologist  to  point  out  the 
providential  ends  involved  in  the  dominion  of  evil  in  this  world. 
Evil  is  the  pessimistic  spirit  that  broods  over  human  history.  Disease, 
tornado,  accident,  death — what  the  final  cause  of  these? 

Janet  undertakes  to  establish  that  evil  is  the  "accidental  conse- 
quence of  the  conflict  of  efiicient  and  final  causes,  and  of  the  conflict 
of  final  causes  with  each  other."  Usually  clear  in  conception  and 
strong  in  statement,  Janet  here  seems  uncertain  of  his  ground,  or  he 
would  not  concede  that  evil  is  an  "accidental  consequence"  of 
any  thing.  That  it  implies  a  conflict  of  causes  is  evident ;  but  it  is 
not  an  accidental  issue  of  such  conflict.  Far  better  would  it  be  to 
say  that  the  conflict  is  accidental,  than  that  the  issue  is  accidental. 
Given  the  conflict,  the  issue  is  certain.  Besides,  evil  lies  in  or  grows 
out  of  the  conflict  of  causes ;  evil  is  conflict.  Evil  is  not  the  issue 
of  conflict,  but  the  cause  of  conflict.  Here  Janet  mistakes  the  origin 
of  evil.  It  is  not  an  effect  of  antagonistic  causes  ;  but  the  antagonism 
of  causes  is  the  eflTect  of  evil.  Thus,  the  origin  of  evil  lies  farther 
back  than  Janet  traced  it. 

An  argument  from  the  methodology  of  nature  in  favor  of  final 
cause  is  legitimate ;  but  an  argument  from  the  disorders  of  nature,  or 
want  of  method,  is  a  little  more  difficult  of  construction.  However, 
disorder  in  the  universe  is  quite  as  much  under  law,  or  the  product 
of  law,  as  order ;  and  until  it  is  admitted  that  evil  is  an  orderly  re- 
sult, if  regarded  as  a  result  at  all,  it  can  have  no  explanation.  It  is 
either  a  spirit  of  order,  or  the  essence  of  disorder ;  it  is  either  causally 
produced,  or  it  is  an  accident.  It  can  not  be  an  accident,  for  this  im- 
plies chaos  in  the  universe ;  it  must  be  a  causal  act,  procedure,  or  effect, 
which  implies  that  it  is  under  supervision.  In  a  competent  theodicy 
there  may  be  a  place  for  evil,  and  moral  reasons  may  be  elaborated 
in  its  behalf,  confirmatory  of  the  teleological  claim,  and  satisfactory 
to  the  theologian  ;  but  the  philosopher  makes  sport  of  them,  and  pur- 
sues his  inquiries  independently  of  theology.     What  then  ?    Is  there  a 


FINAL  CAUSE  OF  NATURE.  305 

break-down  here?  If  evil  is  a  mystery  iu  itself;  if  its  actual  benefits 
can  not  be  portrayed ;  if  its  final  cause  is  hidden  from  view, — it  does 
not  follow  that  it  is  inconsistent  with  benevolent  schemes,  or  that  it 
reflects  upon  the  goodness  of  the  Creator.  The  contraries  of  good 
and  evil  co-exist  in  the  world,  and  under  the  divine  administration, 
with  some  obscure  purpose  in  view.  In  the  present  state  of  knowl- 
edge, one  is  not  warranted  in  arraying  evil,  with  all  its  difiiculties, 
against  the  doctrine  of  final  cause. 

The  feeble  attack  of  Lucretius  on  the  doctrine,  that  it  reverses 
the  natural  order  of  facts  by  substituting  cause  for  eftect  and  eflect 
for  cause,  is  one  of  words  only,  and  arises  from  the  unfortunate  im- 
plication of  the  terms  by  which  the  doctrine  is  expressed.  "Final 
cause"  seems  to  imply  that  the  design  or  end  of  a  thing  is  in  some 
way  the  cause  of  the  thing.  While  it  is  a  governing  influence, 
•'final  cause"  is  not  the  essential  or  producing  cause,  and  can  not  be 
substituted  for  it.  Flying  is  not  the  ])rodiidng  cause  of  wings,  but  it 
is  the  final  came.  Lucretius  inverted  the  terms  himself,  and  then  at- 
tacked his  own  work,  and  supposed  he  had  extinguished  the  doctrine. 
The  terms  understood  and  properly  applied,  there  can  be  no  confusion 
in  reasoning  on  the  subject,  and  objection  to  the  doctrine  must  arise 
from  some  other  source. 

Spinoza  assailed  the  doctrine  with  vigor,  asserting  that  man  is  ig- 
norant of  causes,  and  that  a  discovery  of  ends  would  compromise  the 
perfections  of  God.  This  is  a  serious  charge.  As  man  is  not  ac- 
quainted with  all  the  ends  of  nature,  so  he  is  not  familiar  with  all 
the  causes  in  operation ;  but  as  some  ends  are  patent  to  his  thought, 
so  some  causes  are  evident  to  his  observation  and  reason.  Descartes 
denies  a  knowledge  of  ends ;  Spinoza,  a  knowledge  of  causes.  What 
is  left?  This  conducts  to  ignorance,  the  most  absolute,  of  the  phe- 
nomenal world.  To  deny  knowledge  of  causes  is  to  invalidate  all 
distinctions  drawn  respecting  the  forces  in  operation  iu  nature,  and  to 
reduce  nature  to  an  illusion.  Granted  the  imperfection  of  the  human 
faculties,  is  the  mind  unable  to  distinguish  one  force  from  another, 
one  form  from  another,  one  fact  from  another?  If  so,  the  denial  of 
the  existence  of  mind  might  as  well  follow. 

The  more  serious  objection  of  Spinoza  is  that  the  doctrine  of 
final  cause  implies  the  imperfection  of  the  Deity.  If  God  acts  with 
an  end  in  view,  it  is  proof  that  he  is  not  happy  in  himself,  but  is 
seeking  happiness  in  an  achievement  outside  of  himself,  according  to 
the  pantheistic  metaphysician.  On  such  a  hypothesis  the  creation  of 
the  universe  can  have  no  explanation,  for  had  the  Deity  been  com- 
pletely self-happy,  he  had  not  built  a  single  world,  and  if  not  self- 
happy  he  is  imperfect.     The  objection  proves  too  much,  and,  there" 

20 


306  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

fore,  overthrows  itself.  Again,  suppose  it  could  be  definitely  ascer- 
tained that  God  wrought  without  the  inspiration  or  knowledge  of 
ends — such  a  God  would  be  an  idiot,  no  better  than  Hartmaun's 
somnambulistic  supreme  power.  Of  all  beings,  God  must  act  with 
the  most  perfect  ends  in  view,  being  perfect  himself  He  is  not  an 
air-builder,  nor  does  he  engage  in  constructing  worlds  as  a  pastime ; 
but  he  has  specific  ends  to  accomplish,  which  are  the  product  of  a 
wisdom  that  knows  no  imperfection,  and  of  a  power  infinite  and 
eternal.  Spinoza's  objection,  the  most  elaborate,  is  the  most  vulnerable. 

The  principal  objections  to  final  cause  have  been  stated  and  re- 
viewed ;  a  page  only  can  be  given  to  the  fourth  proposition  an- 
nounced early  in  the  chapter,  namely,  the  final  cause  of  nature.  We 
have  alluded  to  the  necessity  of  viewing  nature  in  its  wholeness,  as 
the  only  condition  or  method  of  understanding  the  subordinate  facts 
and  factors  it  includes.  The  interpretation  of  nature  as  one  fact,  is 
a  large  problem,  but  it  must  not  be  set  aside  on  that  account. 
Janet  teaches  that  finality  is  a  law  of  nature  ;  that  is,  that  nature  re- 
flects the  teleological  spirit,  and  that  morality  is  the  supreme  end  of 
the  universe.  Nature  is  not  for  God's  sake,  nor  yet  for  man's  ex- 
clusive sake,  but  for  the  ends  of  righteousness,  which  concern  both 
God  and  man.  Malebranche,  in  spiritual  mood,  declares  that  the 
incarnation  of  Jesus  Christ  was  the  motive  that  led  to  the  creation 
of  the  universe  ;  that  is,  the  desire  for  manifestation  by  incarnation 
impelled  the  appearance  of  the  universe.  According  to  Plato,  the 
motive  of  Deity  in  the  organization  of  worlds,  was  the  love  of  exer- 
cising the  principle  of  goodness  infinitely  deep  in  him.  It  was  not 
love  of  happiness,  but  love  of  goodness  that  led  the  Deity  to  acts  of 
creation.  A  moral  principle  then  underlies  the  origin  of  the  universe. 
This  almost  harmonizes  with  Janet's  idea,  with  this  difl^erence  :  Plato 
held  that  a  moral  principle  Avas  the  eflficient  cause,  while  Janet  holds 
that  a  moral  purpose  is  the  final  cause  of  the  universe.  Possibly 
both  views  are  correct ;  they  can  not  be  far  out  of  the  way. 

To  conclude :  final  cause  is  evident  in  nature ;  the  final  cause  of 
nature  is  benevolence,  goodness,  morality.  If  not  exhaustively  satis- 
factory, it  is  sufficient  for  philosophy,  and  at  least  helpful  in  theology. 
It  contradicts  no  sound  principle  in  either.  Without  final  cause, 
the  universe  is  an  enigma.  Without  it,  God's  character  would  re- 
quire a  new  interpretation.      Teleology  or  atheism  is  the  alterrmtive. 


THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  SPIRIT.  307 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

THE  BREAK:=D0WISI   of   F-HIIvOSOPHY. 

IT  is  reported  that  Ulysses,  finding  his  ship  yielding  to  the  storm, 
sought  a  raft,  on  which  he  guided  himself  to  land.  He  abandoned 
the  great  vessel  so  soon  as  he  saw  that  its  ruin  was  inevitable.  Great 
ships  have  been  deserted  for  life-boats,  rafts,  a  single  plank,  any 
thing,  as  a  means  of  rescue  from  peril,  as  a  deliverance  from  ruin. 
Philosophy  is  Ulysses'  ship,  a  shattered,  broken-masted,  sinking 
vessel ;  Ulysses  needs  help,  a  raft,  a  life-boat. 

To  inspect  wrecks  is  not  a  cheerful  occupation  ;  to  gather  up  the 
remains  of  the  dead  after  an  earthquake,  or  storm,  or  accident,  is  not 
a  pleasant  task,  but  such  a  task  is  sometimes  required  at  our  hands. 
To  this  mournful  duty  we  now  address  ourselves. 

In  charging  speculative  philosophy  with  a  break-down,  or  in 
speaking  of  it  as  a  ruin,  we  must  be  clearly  understood,  or  be  ex- 
posed to  misunderstanding.  It  is  neither  assumed  nor  asserted  that 
the  philosophic  spirit  has  been  totally  productive  of  mischief  in 
rational  investigation  of  truth,  or  that  the  researches  of  the  phi- 
losophers have  been  valueless;  on  the  contrary,  both  science  and  re- 
ligion have  been  enriched  by  their  discoveries  and  strengthened  by 
their  teachings.  The  disposition  to  undervalue  things  that  do  not 
completely  answer  their  ends  has  led  not  a  few  to  reproach  phi- 
losophy with  failure ;  but  its  essential  work  must  be  recognized,  and 
its  worth  fairly  and  honestly  estimated. 

It  can  not  be  disputed  that  philosQphy  has  securely  fastened  in 
the  human  mind  the  conviction  of  the  presence  of  law  everywhere, 
creating  the  suspicion  of  a  great  Law-giver ;  it  can  not  be  doubted 
that  it  has  excited  the  human  mind  to  thought,  opened  paths  of 
inquiry  not  discovered  by  the  old  religions,  and  led  to  some  results 
that  religion  does  not  challenge.  It  has  not  proved  all  things,  but 
it  has  demonstrated  some  truths.  We  are  quite  ready  to  maintain 
that  the  scholars  it  has  produced  ;  the  systems  of  thought  it  has 
inspired ;  the  principles  it  has  applied  to  human  society  and  indi- 
vidual conduct;  and  the  daring  outreach  of  its  spirit  of  knowl- 
edge into  the  realm  of  the  infinite,  are  justifications  of  the  great 
speculation. 

It  is  neither  assumed  nor  asserted  that  the  introduction  of 
Christianity  superseded  the  necessity  of  philosophic  investigation,  and 


308  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

that  there  is  no  room  or  occupation  for  the  philosopher  in  the  pres- 
ence of  revealed  truth.  This  would  be  going  too  far,  for  so  long  as 
man  is  a  rational  intelligence,  he  will  be  interested,  and  will  employ 
himself,  in  the  discussion  of  problems  which  even  a  supernatural 
revelation  makes  plain  to  his  spiritualized  consciousness.  For  it  must 
be  remembered  that  Christianity  does  not  settle  every  thing,  and  re- 
veals no  truth,  after  a  philosophic  method.  Revealed  truths  have  a 
method  of  their  own,  so  that  the  philosophic  method  of  inquiry  though 
different  from,  is  yet  consistent  with,  the  revealed  method  of  super- 
natural truth.  The  mind  will  i^hilosophize  on  revealed  truth  because 
it  is  of  the  nature  of  mind  to  philosophize ;  revelation  does  not  alter 
the  mental  structure,  or  quiet  the  philosophizing  spirit.  In  the  in- 
terpretations of  the  words  of  God  the  philosophizing  spirit  is  as  help- 
ful as  in  the  investigation  of  the  works  of  God. 

Greek  philosophy,  in  its  bearings  on  or  relation*  to  Christianity, 
can  hardly  be  reproached  with  failure.  In  its  monotheism,  in  its 
doctrine  of  immortality,  in  its  teachings  concerning  future  rewards 
and  punishments,  and  even  in  its  perverted  conceptions  of  morality 
and  justice,  it  prepared  the  way  for  apostles  and  inspired  teachers  of 
truth.  Measured  by  its  absolute  results  in  ontology,  psychology,  and 
cosmology,  a  different  estimate  must  be  pronounced,  but  it  sustained 
for  a  time   a  close  relation  to  practical  Christianity. 

The  break-down  of  philosophy  is  a  serious,  an  unfortunate  fact. 
Admitting  its  services,  its  heroic  labors,  its  permanent  results,  and 
attaching  great  value  to  its  spirit  of  inquiry,  it  is  clear  that  it  has 
not  realized  its  aims  in  the  ascertainment  of* final  ft-uth,  nor  has  it 
comforted  the  intellectual  anxieties  of  the  race.  That  it  has  had 
sufficient  time  for  trial,  that  its  great  systems  have  been  tested  both 
by  psychological  and  religious  standards,  and  that  its  utter  inadequacy 
to  perform  the  tasks  assigned  it  has  been  pointed  out  with  every  re- 
curring age  of  thought,  must  be  manifest  to  all  readers  and  observers 
of  the  world's  intellectual  history.  Thales  was  no  greater  failure 
than  Herbert  Spencer ;  the  latter  went  deeper  into  the  materialism 
which  the  fjrmer  proposed.  In  general  terms,  philosophy  failed  in 
what  it  undertook  to  do— a  failure  consistent  with  valuable  services 
and  invaluable  results.  As  Dr.  Schliemann  has  not  fully  authenti- 
cated Homer's  Iliad  by  his  excavations  in  Asia  Minor,  but  has  already 
furnished  the  materials  for  the  rewriting  of  Trojan  history,  so  the 
philosopher  has  not  accomplished  his  purpose,  and  yet  he  has  ren- 
dered invaluable  service  to  the  cause  of  truth. 

It  is  evident  that  the  problems  of  philosophy  are  the  prob- 
lems of  religion.  Each  grapples  with  their  solution  by  different 
methods.     Religion  chants  revelations ;  philosophy  deduces  truth  from 


SPHERE  OF  ONTOLOGICAL  INQUIRY.  309 

observation  and  reason.  The  one  is  a  system  of  truths ;  the  other  a 
system  of  speculation.  The  one  appeals  to  the  reverent  instinct  for 
supernatural  truth ;  the  other  addresses  the  rational,  inquiring  spirit. 
In  their  earlier  history  the  two  came  in  conflict,  but  it  was  the  con- 
flict  of  method.  The  aims  of  both  were  the  same,  the  methods  differ- 
ent. Antagonism,  instead  of  fraternity,  was  the  result.  One  went 
into  superstition — the  other  into  speculation.  Neither  solved  the 
problems  at  issue ;  both  demonstrated  the  need  of  a  religion  that,  in 
itself  superhuman,  would  affirm  the  truth  whose  scientific  develop- 
ment might  be  left  to  human  reason.  However,  the  philosophic 
method  was  chiefly  in  fault ;  this  was,  and  is,  the  occasion  of  conflict. 
It  is  exclusive  in  its  spirit,  and  independent  in  its  inquiry.  The  re- 
ligious method  involves  the  philosophical ;  but  the  philosophical  ab- 
jures the  religious,  as  if  it  were  inimical  to  a  right  conception  of 
truth  and  a  successful  pursuit  of  it.  The  philosophic  method  and  the 
religious  spirit  are  compatible,  but  they  were  early  divorced,  resulting 
in  inefficient  methods  of  inquiry,  and  limited  and  imperfect  solutions 
of  problems.  This  characteristic,  and  the  consequent  failure,  we  shall 
discover  as  we  follow  the  track  of  philosophic  investigation. 

The  sphere  of  ontological  inquiry  affords  ample  illustration  of  the 
incompetency  of  the  philosophic  method  for  the  ascertainment  of 
truth.  Of  all  questions,  that  of  "  being"  is  confessedly  the  most  mys- 
terious, as  it  is  the  most  fundamental.  It  is  admitted  that  there  is 
no  such  thing  as  pure  being,  separate  from  associations,  conditions, 
activities,  and  manifestations ;  but  there  is  absolute,  essential  being, 
which  per  se  is  not  a  subject  of  observation.  The  difference  between 
being  and  becoming,  or  being  and  non-being,  or  being  and  phenomena, 
has  been  recognized  in  philosophic  circles,  but  the  marks  of  difference 
have  not  been  thoroughly  indicated  or  drawn.  It  is  one  thing  to 
admit  a  difference  ;  it  is  another  to  describe  it.  In  discussing  matter 
or  phenomena,  the  laws,  properties,  and  forms  are  certain  to  be  con- 
sidered ;  but  Kant  raised  the  inquiry  if  there  is  not  a  thing-in-itself, 
a  somewhat  that  constitutes  the  essence  or  reality  of  matter,  of  which 
the  forms  and  properties  are  the  suitable  expression.  The  Eleatic 
was  indisposed  to  recognize  the  existence  of  matter  at  all,  and  mod- 
ern philosophy  has  limited  our  knowledge  of  it  to  phenomena  or 
property.  Over  this  lower  problem  of  the  reality  of  matter  philos- 
ophy has  struggled  from  the  beginning,  vibrating  from  the  "flux" 
of  Heraclitus  to  the  idealism  of  Emerson,  without  determining  what 
is  the  becoming,  or  the  essence  of  matter.  Advancing  beyond  phe- 
nomena, and  grasping  the  problem  of  being  as  distinguished  from 
non-being,  it  makes  less  progress,  for  it  deals  with  a  mysterious  fact. 
It  discusses,  but  can  not  define  being.     It  endows  it  with  intelligence, 


310  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

wisdom,  power,  will,  but  allows  it  no  moral  virtues  or  convictions. 
Being  is  a  vague  condition  of  existence,  receding,  like  the  horizon,  as 
it  is  approached,  but  illuminating  phenomena,  and  is  the  inspiration 
of  the  universe.  Between  them  there  is  a  boundary  line,  but  it  is 
never  reached. 

In  philosophy  the  idea  of  the  First  Cause  is  enveloped  with  this 
vagueness.  Spoken  of  as  the  Absolute,  or  Infinite,  the  terms  are 
almost  meaningless  for  the  want  of  definition.  So  long  as  the  idea 
of  being  is  obscure  and  indefinite,  the  idea  of  absolute  being,  or  a 
personal  God,  must  be  intangible  and  mysterious. 

With  a  singular  persistence  in  perversity,  philosophy  acknowl- 
edges the  necessity  of  being,  but  denies  the  possibility  of  any  knowl- 
edge of  it.  Kant  affirms  the  existence  of  God  as  a  postulate  of  the 
Practical  Reason,  or  as  a  moral  necessity  of  thought,  but  concedes 
the  weakness  of  the  speculative  proof  of  the  idea.  Sir  William 
Hamilton  insists  ujion  the  prerequisite  of  faith  in  God,  at  the  same 
time  that  he  alleges  a  knowledge  of  him  impossible.  Before  the 
Bible  can  be  accepted  as  a  volume  of  revealed  truth,  James  Mill 
contended  that  the  moral  attributes  of  God  must  be  proved ;  but  he 
maintained  that  the  proof  had  not  been  and  could  not  be  produced. 
Still  later,  in  Herbert  Spencer,  philosophy  pronounces  God  "un- 
knowable," precisely  the  belief  of  the  earlier,  and  also  "unthinkable," 
the  very  latest  expression  of  agnostic,  belief  touching  the  Absolute 
Being.  Through  these  different  stages  of  unbelief  respecting  a  per- 
sonal being  philosophy  has  passed,  anchoring  itself  at  last  in  a  radical, 
atheistic  agnosticism,  which,  while  waiting  for  proof,  denies  the  idea 
of  God  as  even  conceivable.  At  the  very  highest  point,  it  fails ; 
where  it  should  be  the  strongest  it  is  weakest.  It  is  without  a  theism 
of  any  kind ;  the  universe  is  without  a  personal  presence  ;  the  uni- 
versal power  manifested  is  an  impregnable  mystery. 

To  dispense  with  the  idea  of  God  must  lead  to  the  subversion  of 
all  correlated  ideas,  and  involve  the  whole  fraternity  of  religious 
truths  in  wreck.  Without  God,  religion  of  any  kind  is  impossible. 
Not  only  the  death-knell  of  one  religion,  but  of  all  religions,  is 
sounded  by  the  philosophic  trumpet.  Without  God,  moral  distinc- 
tions are  dreamy  imaginations ;  the  Bible  turns  into  a  book  of 
fables;  and  the  thought  of  immortality  is  a  pleasant  deception.  In 
overthrowing  the  foundation  the  whole  superstructure  falls.  Philos- 
ophy may  revolt  against  the  impiety  of  its  decisions,  and  shrink  with 
horror  from  the  darkness  of  its  conclusions,  but  that  its  spirit  is 
essentially  chaotic,  and  destructive  of  eternal  principles,  can  be  fairly 
established  against  it. 

We  next  notice  that  philosophy,  as  applied  to  the  historic  course 


CO-OPERATION  OF  FORCES-  311 

of  civilization,  has  misinterpreted  its  genesis,  and  the  development  of 
the  forms  of  civilization,  besides  misunderstanding  the  processes  by 
which  its  forms  were  secured.  From  what  does  the  social  and  political 
condition  of  mankind  spring  ?  In  other  words,  what  is  the  warp  and 
woof  of  history  ?  To  confine  the  reply  to  the  presence  and  demon- 
stration of  certain  physical  factors  or  elements  would  be  to  exclude 
the  more  vital  spirit  of  history.  For  instance,  to  say  that  civilization 
is  the  outgrowth  of  militaiy  influence,  though  war  is  a  staple  color  in 
the  historic  fabric,  would  be  a  colossal  absurdity.  To  say  that  the 
ambitions  of  rulers  furnish  an  explanation  of  the  political  movements 
of  the  world,  would  be  equally  fallacious.  Deeper  than  these  streams 
are  undercurrents  which  touch  and  shake  the  foundations,  involving 
thrones  and  peoples  in  perpetual  vibrations.  Beneath  the  visible 
mutations  of  an  age  are  forces  at  work  that  determine  the  final  results 
of  movement  on  the  surface,  and  fix  the  order  of  progress  for  the  re- 
motest future.  No  student  of  history  can  fail  to  see  that  these  under- 
forces  may  be  classified  as  material  and  moral,  co-operating  for  the 
assertion  of  a  given  purpose,  and  the  evolution  of  a  predetermined 
plan.  By  "  material"  forces  we  mean  that  aggregation  of  influences 
that,  beginning  with  purely  physical  agencies  and  conditions,  such  as 
climate,  food,  and  soil,  ascend  until  they  include  the  purely  secular 
agencies,  such  as  pursuits,  governments,  ambitions,  armies,  and  every 
thing  potent  outside  of  the  still  higher,  or  purely  moral  and  intel- 
lectual agencies  of  society.  By  "moral"  forces  we  mean  the  aggre- 
gation of  all  the  religious,  artistic,  aesthetic,  and  rational  influences 
which  may  be  summoned  into  the  conflict  for  human  elevation. 

The  line  is  clearly  drawn,  the  propelling  forces  of  civilization  are 
at  once  recognized.  One  might  intelligently  suspect  that  all  these 
regenerating  forces  had  entered  into  the  composition  of  a  civilization 
so  complex  as  ours,  but  philosophy  refuses  so  broad  a  generalization, 
since  it  involves  a  concession  to  religion,  which  she  is  resolved  not  to 
make.  Besides,  it  is  frequently  hinted  that  religious  truths  and  in- 
stitutions are  rather  the  products  of  civilization  than  its  fountain-head, 
which  implies  the  transfer  of  the  problem  of  origin  from  civilization 
to  religion.  The  relation  of  civilization  to  religion  is  the  philosophic 
form  of  the  problem  ;  the  relation  of  religion  to  civilization  is  the 
theologic  form  of  the  problem.  It  is  a  question  of  antecedence, 
which,  until  settled,  will  not  allow  the  reign  of  the  religious  idea  in 
history.  Without  attempting  to  settle  the  order  of  relationship  be- 
tween these  forces,  it  is  enough  to  state  that  history  is  indebted  to 
one  or  the  other,  and,  in  fact,  to  both,  as  instrumental  elements  in  its 
development.  That  physical  agencies,  such  as  climate,  language,  na- 
tionality, soil,  food,  and  the  like  have  affected  man's  social  condition, 


312  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

and  initiated  political  governments  in  all  their  variety,  it  were  vain 
to  dispute.  The  torrid  zone  must  produce  a  different  race  of 
people  from  the  temperate  zone,  and  the  frigid  zone  a  people  still  dif- 
ferent in  national  impulses  and  social  habits.  As  a  result  of  climatic 
and  material  conditions,  there  are  different  races,  with  physical  pecu- 
liarities distinguishing  them  from  one  another,  and  with  social  im- 
pulses, which  have  found  expression  in  different  forms  of  government 
and  different  religious  faiths.  Taking  up  the  subject  at  this  point, 
Buckle,  Grote,  and  others  carry  it  forward  until  they  pretend  to  dem- 
onstrate that  all  history  is  the  result  of  the  interaction  of  material 
forces,  which  are  in  themselves  sufficient  to  account  for  the  highest 
types  of  government  and  religion. 

Admitting  material  agency  in  civilization,  its  limitations  must  be 
made  transparent.  To  interpret  history  by  the  materialistic  principle 
alone  would  be  very  like  interpreting  Washington's  monument  by  the 
amount  of  stone  it  contains.  The  materials  of  the  monument  are  one 
thing  ;  the  idea  of  the  monument  is  another.  The  materials  of  his- 
tory and  the  material  forces  of  civilization  constitute  one  class  of 
facts,  not  by  any  means  to  be  inconsiderately  passed  over ;  but  the 
idea  of  history,  and  the  intellectual  forces  in  harmony  with  it,  consti- 
tute an  entirely  different  class  of  facts,  which  can  not  be  ignored  or 
impugned  except  at  the  risk  of  making  a  false  interpretation  of  the 
whole.  The  lordship  of  man  over  nature  is  his  prophetic  destiny. 
He  assumes  the  position  of  lord,  not  because  the  Scriptures  fore- 
shadow this  relation,  but  because  his  superiority  fits  him  for  dominion. 
His  commission  requires  him  to  subdue  the  natural  world,  to  chain 
and  guide  the  natural  forces,  and  to  rise  from  a  servant  of  nature  to 
the  position  of  master.  If  history  is  but  the  outcome  of  material 
forces,  then  nature  is  master,  and  man  is  servant.  In  proportion  as 
he  breaks  with  nature — that  is,  controls  natural  forces — and  is  con- 
queror in  the  dominion  of  the  natural,  does  he  attain  to  his  rightful 
position  as  lord.  Instead  of  material  agencies  producing  civilizations, 
one  should  expect  the  spirit  of  civilization  to  exercise  dominion  over 
material  agencies.  This  reverses  Buckle's  materialism,  but  a  pyramid 
looks  better  to  stand  upon  its  base  than  its  apex. 

The  truth  is,  man  has  been  struggling  for  supremacy  ever  since 
he  was  delivered  to  the  world,  or  the  world  bequeathed  to  him  ;  he 
has  been  anxious  to  understand  his  relations  to  nature  ;  he  has  inquired 
concerning  the  laws  by  which  she  produces  her  forms  ;  he  desires  a 
knowledge  of  her  forces  :  he  is  a  student  of  her  plans ;  and  it  can  not 
be  denied  that  he  is  gradually  extending  his  authority  throughout  the 
entire  realm.  Instead  of  the  material  conquering  him,  he  has  con-, 
quered  the  material,  and  natural  conditions  are  the  product  of  man's 


CONFLICTING  ELEMENTS.  313 

presence  and  sovereignty.  The  material  has  not  dictated  history,  but 
history  is  a  revelation  of  the  dictating  power  of  man.  Buckle  reads 
history  with  blind  eyes. 

The  philosophic  conception  of  government  and  education  is  from  the 
same  materialistic  stand-point ;  that  is,  governmental  policies  and  edu- 
cational systems  must  be  determined  by  the  united  facts  of  geog- 
raphy, geology,  meteorology,  and  physiology,  a  low  basis  for  lofty 
structures.  Creeping  like  reptiles  on  the  ground,  the  materialists  can 
not  look  up  ;  the  philosophic  basis  of  the  best  institutions  must  be 
dust,  or,  as  Carlyle  roughly  phrases  it,  it  is  a  "  Gospel  of  dirt"  that 
these  materialists  preach  and  enforce.  Mill  says  the  end  of  govern- 
ment is  public  good,  but  as  he  does  not  define  the  word  "  good,"  the 
statement  is  ambiguous.  Grote  has  accepted  the  associational  or  evo- 
lutional principle  as  an  explanation  of  the  governmental  idea,  but  it 
is  materialistic  in  essence,  and  quite  as  inadequate  as  a  theory  as 
Buckle's  more  pronounced  physiological  hypothesis.  In  whatever  direc- 
tion we  turn  we  encounter  materialism  in  one  form  or  another  as  the 
active  principle,  and  fatalism  as  the  silent  spirit  in  history. 

That  another  explanation  is  possible  ;  that  another  spirit  controls 
in  historic  manifestations  ;  that  other  elements  conspire  in  civilization, 
we  hesitate  not  to  affirm,  and  immediately  submit  the  proof  Since 
the  beginning  of  history  the  moral  forces  have  played  a  conspicuous 
part  in  government,  education,  reforms,  and  social  movements,  and  it 
is  not  too  much  to  say  that  they  constitute  the  core  of  all  the  pro- 
cesses of  civilization.  Because  of  irreconcilable  differences  between 
the  moral  and  the  material,  history  presents  the  sad  spectacle  of  irrec- 
oncilable conflict  between  the  higher  and  the  lower,  or  the  natural  and 
the  intellectual.  Both  can  not  be  dominant;  like  Castor  and  Pollux, 
one  can  live  only  when  the  other  is  dead.  The  conflict  of  forces  has 
never  been  rightly  estimated  by  the  materialist  or  physiologist,  nor  is 
it  quite  certain  that  the  moral  speculatist  has  comprehended  the  sig- 
nificance of  the  issue.  The  ebbings  and  Sowings  of  human  history 
have  been  the  rising  and  falling  of  the  material  and  the  moral,  some- 
times alternately,  but  never  contemporaneously,  for  the  two  can  not 
co-exist,  except  in  hostile  relations.  When  the  material  has  been  in 
the  ascendant,  grossness  of  national  life  has  been  the  result.  Infidel 
France  is  a  striking  illustration  of  this  statement.  When  the  moral 
has  been  triumphant  there  has  been  advancement  toward  a  national 
ideal,  and  public  good  has  been  conserved.  History  is  a  vibration  be- 
tween the  material  and  the  moral,  philosophy  allying  itself  with  the 
descending,  and  Christianity  with  the  ascending,  forces. 

In  this  hand-to-hand  conflict  the  moral,  less  obtrusive  than  the 
material,    has    nevertheless    been    visible,   or   its    presence  has  been 


314  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

detected,  and  moral  progress  may  be  affirmed  as  the  result.  Steadily, 
moral  forces  are  triumphing  ;  revolutions,  quickened  often  by  the 
material  spirit,  end  in  moral  victories;  and  the  swing  of  the  world 
is  toward  a  universal  moral  conquest.  For  the  future,  then,  we  may 
confidently  anticipate  the  regnancy  of  the  moral  forces  over  the 
material,  whose  subordination,  however  slowly  wrought  out,  will  finally 
be  complete. 

In  its  interpretatioii  of  the  government  of  the  world,  philosophy 
has  exhibited  more  than  its  usual  bigotry  of  spirit  or  inability  to 
comprehend  all  the  facts  included  in  the  problem.  Pessimism  is  a 
corner-word  in  philosophy.  Deeming  the  world  under  a  system  of 
misrule  for  which  there  is  no  remedy,  the  pessimist  cries  out  against 
it  and  condemns  the  cruelty  which  has  inspired  it.  The  banishment 
of  God  from  the  universe,  and  the  false  interpretation  of  the  historic 
momentum,  naturally  prepare  the  mind  for  the  pessimistic  conception 
of  government.  Without  a  thinkable  and  knowable  God ;  without  a 
system  of  moral  forces  in  operation  ;  the  government  of  the  world 
appears  to  the  pessimist  like  the  merest  accident,  and  disorder  is  the 
natural  result.  Without  a  supreme  power  intelligently  and  mercifully 
guiding  the  lives  of  men,  they  must  run  into  danger  and  be  enveloped 
in  darkness.  Pessimism  is  the  inevitable  product  of  materialism. 
Schopenhauer,  dismantling  the  theistic  idea,  and  reducing  the  divine 
sovereignty  to  an  imbecile  will-force,  drifted  into  a  hollow  and  nerve- 
less conception  of  Providence,  which  invalidated  all  hopes,  enervated 
all  desires,  and  spread  gloom  over  his  whole  life. 

One  of  the  weaknesses  of  the  pessimist  is  his  habit  of  observing 
and  magnifying  the  admitted  evils  of  the  world  to  the  exclusion  of 
the  good  that  is  equally  manifest,  and  his  inability  after  comparing 
the  evil  and  the  good,  to  perceive  an  excess  of  good  in  the  divine  ad- 
ministration. He  it  is  who  raises  the  question,  "Is  life  worth 
living  ?"  Recently  Mr.  Mallock,  a  Roman  Catholic  writer,  has  taken 
up  the  pessimistic  question  in  a  semi-philosophical  way,  and  answered 
it  in  the  negative.  Schopenhauer  said  it  is  better  "not  to  be"  than 
"  to  be."  In  this  question  all  men  have  a  vital,  because  it  is  a  per- 
sonal, interest,  yet  it  can  not  be  solved  summarily  or  imperatively. 
It  is  a  question  of  comparison  of  facts ;  neither  side  can  be  ignored. 
We  dwell  amid  shadows,  and  we  know  only  in  part ;  we  see  only  the 
smallest  openings  through  the  dark-browed  clouds  that  fill  the  sky. 
Human  life  is  a  pent-up  mystery ;  the  world  at  times  is  refractory 
and  dull.  Through  feeble,  if  not  a  perturbed,  vision  we  do  not  see 
things  as  they  are,  and  are  prone  to  misjudge  the  ruling  spirit,  and 
pronounce  against  the  decrees  of  the  throne.  Considering  by  them- 
selves the  evils  of  life,  Buddha  taught  the  mischievous  and  hopeless 


INABILITIES  OF  PESSIMISM.  315 

doctrine  of  nirvana,  or  that  release  from  the  world  and  absorption 
with  the  supreme  Good  will  be  most  fortunate.  The  idea  of  death 
awakens  music  in  the  soul ;  the  idea  of  life  produces  a  monotone  of 
despair.  Consistently  he  authorized  the  means  of  death,  such  as  dis- 
ease, crime,  self  murder,  any  thing  to  secure  the  release  of  the  soul 
from  its  bondage  to  matter,  any  thing  that  would  conduct  to  eternal 
freedom,  though  it  involve  eternal  silence  or  annihilation  of  conscious 
existence.  This  was  the  philosophy,  not  the  religion,  of  Buddha.  In 
any  form  whatever,  Paganism  substantially  accords  with  this  inter- 
pretation of  life.  It  degrades  it  into  a  hopeless  ruin ;  it  robs  it  of  the 
possibilities  of  development ;  it  points  to  a  future  of  uncertain  ex- 
istence or  substantial  annihilation. 

Is  pessimism  a  factor  of  civilization?  It  is  not,  but  its  shadow  falls 
occasionally  on  the  thinker,  who  finds  it  difficult  to  account  for  the 
sway  of  evil  in  this  world,  who  sees  that  man  is  handicapped  with 
heredities,  mortgaged  with  infirmities,  and  doomed  to  a  grave ;  and 
he  pauses  to  wonder  at  the  apparent  insensibility  of  the  divine  ruler, 
who  might  order  a  different  state  of  things.  There  is  at  times  a 
seeming  undervaluation  of  life,  of  its  swelling  significance,  of  its 
growing  possibilities,  of  its  world-wide  relationships,  and  of  its  final 
adjustments.  Even  those  not  disposed  to  bad  dreams,  men  who  never 
have  the  dyspepsia,  who  never  see  the  world  going  to  pieces,  philan- 
thropists who  are  never  exhausted  or  discouraged,  and  statesmen  who 
are  never  disheartened  and  never  grow  weary,  sometimes  indulge  in 
gloomy  forebodings  touching  life,  the  human  race,  and  the  great  world. 
The  spirit  of  sin  menaces  every  human  being ;  storms  bewilder  every 
pilgrim  ;  misery  is  universal ;  the  invisible  ruler  of  the  nether  world 
strikes  like  an  invisible  Gyges  whomsoever  he  will ;  God  seems  im- 
passive and  impersonal ;  and  the  suspicion  that  possibly  life  is  a  mis- 
take gnaws  like  a  vulture  at  human  hopes,  and  men  are  afraid.  The 
disadvantages  of  the  present  life  are  too  many  to  be  unobserved,  and 
too  severe  and  debilitating  to  be  estimated  as  trifles.  Man  enters  the 
world,  helpless,  dependent,  exposed  to  forces  he  can  not  control,  under 
laws  he  does  not  understand,  the  victim  of  an  environment  he  did  not 
originate.  Physical  evils  are  so  abundant  as  to  fill  him  with  fear,  and 
often  so  terrible  as  to  prostrate  and  destroy  him.  Earthquakes,  vol- 
canoes, water-spouts,  electrical  discharges,  atmospheric  commotions, 
famine,  pestilence,  heat  and  cold,  all  the  vicissitudes  of  the  natural 
world,  seem  in  league  against  him,  oppressing  and  taxing  him  beyond 
his  power  of  endurance. 

To  none  of  these  things  is  a  denial  made ;  but,  granting  the  pres- 
ence of  evil,  is  there  ground  for  pessimistic  inferences?  One  is  not 
compelled    to   choose    between    optimism    and    pessimism,    the    two 


316  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

extremes  respecting  the  governmeut  of  the  world,  for  it  is  neither  the 
best  possible  nor  the  worst  conceivable,  but  it  is  in  a  transition  state 
from  a  crude  form  to  that  which  is  absolutely  perfect.  It  can  not  be 
that  the  present  government  is  the  best,  but  it  is  becoming  the  best 
through  discipline  and  the  subordination  of  evil  to  righteousness.  If 
the  Captain  of  our  salvation  was  made  perfect  through  suffering,  then 
the  world-life  of  man,  which  includes  the  government  over  him  as 
well  as  that  in  him,  by  a  similar  process  may  be  developed  and  be 
made  to  harmonize  with  the  highest  ideals  of  order  and  perfection. 
Struggle,  discipline,  conflict  with  evil,  fear  of  danger,  liability  to 
overthrow,  are  steps  to  a  higher  condition.  When  the  purpose  of  life 
and  the  fruits  of  discipline  are  weighed,  the  mixed  government  of  the 
world  has  an  explanation,  and  pessimism  retreats  like  an  owl 
into  a  cave. 

Besides,  the  comparative  range  of  evil,  or  the  excess  of  good,  in 
human  history  is  sufficient  to  cancel  the  force  of  the  pessimistic 
declaration.  As  one  surveys  the  universe  the  conviction  spontaneously 
arises  that  it  is  framed  according  to  a  benevolent  idea,  working  itself 
out  by  manifold  methods  in  benevolent  results  ;  and,  looking  at  the 
course  of  history,  one  is  impressed  that  the  idea  of  good  is  dominant 
in  human  affairs,  and  that  the  presence  of  evil  is  an  accident  some 
time  to  be  overcome  and  removed.  This  large  view  must  precede  any 
study  of  details,  or  the  study  will  be  valueless.  The  idea  of  the  world 
must  first  be  understood  before  its  complex  movements  can  be 
analyzed  or  a  single  discordant  feature  explained.  Of  physical  evils 
how  great  the  sum,  but  they  are  counterbalanced  by  the  flowers,  the 
valleys,  the  landscapes,  the  cataracts,  the  mountains,  the  fruits  and 
grains,  or  the  beauties  and  the  blessings  of  nature.  A  judgment  ac- 
customed to  the  discernment  of  occult  differences,  and  expert  in  com- 
paring facts,  must  at  once  discover  the  excess  of  good  in  the  natural 
world,  and  this  excess  is  the  representation  or  sign  of  the  benevolent 
spirit  that  underlies  the  providential  administration  over  man.  It  is 
good  in  itself,  and  good  in  its  provisions,  adaptations,  and  possibilities. 
Passing  from  untoward  external  evils,  it  is  contended  that  man's 
condition  in  itself  is  one  of  pitiable  and  helpless  embarrassments  and 
restraints,  of  which  no  denial  is  made.  His  natural  ignorance,  his 
feeble  physical  powers,  his  limited  intellectual  acquisitions,  and  his 
uncertainty  touching  the  future,  are  proofs  of  man's  ignoble  state, 
justifying  the  pessimistic  conclusion.  Additionally,  the  condition  of 
those  more  unfortunate  than  the  majority,  in  the  partial  or  total  loss 
of  reason,  and  incurable  infirmities  and  deformities  of  the  body,  may 
be  used  in  resistance  of  the  idea  of  a  benevolent  government  of  the 
world.     The  insane,  the  idiotic,  the   blind,  the  deaf,  the  dumb,  the 


PESSIMISM  ONE-SIDED.  317 

walking  skeleton,  the  invalid  of  inherited  maladies,  speak  loudly 
against  the  present  order  of  life.  Even  the  social  and  industrial  con- 
ditions of  life  are  under  influences  that  imperil  society,  and,  un- 
checked, will  degrade  man.  The  point  is  made,  that  the  structure  of 
man's  world-life,  which  he  did  not  create  or  frame,  is  such  as  to  ad- 
mit of  the  social  and  industrial  oppression  of  man ;  whereas,  in  a 
wise,  and  especially  a  perfect,  government,  there  ought  to  be  no 
room  for  despotism,  disease,  or  sin.  The  poverty  of  the  race,  the 
unequal  distribution  of  riches,  the  hardships  of  the  laboring  classes, 
the  degradation  arising  from  pauperism  and  slavery  to  toil,  the  suffer- 
ing that  such  conditions  entail,  and  the  hopelessness  of  relief,  declare 
against  the  justice  and  goodness  of  the  divine  administration,  and 
furnish  weapons  for  the  pessimist. 

Nor  is  the  list  of  social  evils  yet  complete.  By  reason  of  igno- 
rance and  selfishness,  nations  are  led  to  differ  respecting  their  rights ; 
the  difference  appeals  to  the  sword ;  war  ensues,  and  nations  grieve. 
The  tramp  of  the  soldier  has  been  heard  in  every  land ;  the  roar 
of  cannon  and  the  flash  of  cimeter  are  not  new  to  any  people.  War 
is  the  staple  of  history,  and  one  nation  is  often  the  product  of  the 
ruin  of  another.  Why  this  antagonism  of  man  to  man?  Why  the 
absence  of  harmony  in  the  world  ? 

With  all  these  evils  as  his  inheritance,  there  is  the  appalling  fact 
of  the  inevitable  brevity  of  life,  which  haunts  every  man  and  pursues 
him  until  it  can  pursue  no  longer.  As  he  begins  to  shake  off  the 
nightmare  of  evil  surroundings,  and  to  ascend  into  better  conditions, 
life  reaches  a  termination. 

Adding  these  facts  together,  the  pessimist  seems  to  have  found  a 
footing  for  his  dismal  pi-oclamation.  Under  the  pressure  of  affliction, 
Job  complained  that  he  had  been  born,  and  was  ready  to  surrender 
his  life.  Elijah,  estimating  his  work  a  failure,  prostrated  himself 
beneath  a  juniper-tree,  and  solemnly  wished  for  death.  Jonah, 
troubled  over  the  turn  of  affairs  at  Nineveh,  sat  within  the  shade  of 
a  gourd,  and  was  eager  to  push  out  of  the  world.  Under  the 
touches  of  religion,  the  antidote  for  despair,  these  good  men  were  re- 
vived and  renewed  their  calling  ;  but  the  suicide  and  the  ungodly,  un- 
restrained by  the  absence  of  religious  convictions,  push  pessimism  to 
its  fatal  conclusion.  Pessimism  is  the  suicidal  view  of  the  world,  and 
philosophy  is  responsible  for  it. 

Another  view  of  the  world,  or  man's  relation  to  it,  is  possible. 
The  idea  of  life  is  sweet  to  the  mind ;  the  word  itself  is  musical  to 
the  ear  of  the  soul.  To  live  at  all ;  to  have  a  heart  that  can  beat,  a 
brain  that  permits  thought;  to  have  hands,  feet,  eyes,  ears,  nose, 
mouth — a  body  that  answers  the  soul ;  to  be  able  to  communicate 


318  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

with  the  outer  world;  to  hold  relationship  to  the  inner  realm  of 
being;  to  know  that  we  partake  of  tlxe  universal  life, — is,  as  it  b 
studied,  a  scfiirce  of  profound  gratification.  With  all  the  mystery 
that  impends  over  existence,  with  its  liabilities  to  misfortune,  with 
the  supposed  misrule  of  aftairs,  with  the  certainty  of  dissolution, 
life  is  an  inspiration.  Life  is  a  divine  product^  a  divine  substance, 
and  the  earthly  friction  which  it  experiences  diminishes  not  the 
sacredness  of  its  character,  nor  affects  its  eternal  value.  Looking 
deeper  than  this  general  estimate,  that  is,  inquiring  into  the  nature 
and  possibilities  of  human  life,  the  pessimistic  teaching  of  Schopen- 
hauer is  more  than  counterbalanced ;  it  is  overthrown.  The  marble 
bust  of  Shakespeare  is  without  possibilities;  but  the  living  Shake- 
speare was  a  prophecy  of  illimitable  development.  Aristotle  was  once 
an  infant;  the  Duke  of  Wellington  once  weighed  fourteen  pounds. 
In  infancy  life  is  only  a  promise,  but  it  is  a  promise  which  eventuates 
in  realization.  The  underrating  of  possibilities,  the  forgetting  of  the 
germs  of  power  in  man,  and  the  overrating  of  the  frictions,  hindrances, 
and  disturbances  that  environ  human  history,  have  led  to  a  gloomy 
interpretation  of  individual  life.  Keeping  the  eye  on  toils,  low  wages, 
persecutions,  infirmities,  all  of  which  are  external  and  no  essential 
part  of  man,  and  neglecting  the  essential  prophecies  within  us, 
the  gravitation  toward  the  despondency  of  pessimism  is  easy  and 
natural.  Solomon  says,  "a  living  dog  is  better  than  a  dead 
lion ;"  which,  being  interpreted,  is,  that  life  in  its  lowest  stages  is 
better  than  extinction.  Life  is  essential  possibility;  death  is  extinot 
possibility.  ' 

The  weakness  of  pessimism  is  its  omission  of  God  in  it&  calcula 
tions  and  interpretations.  The  philosophers  of  Greece  and  Rome  dis- 
cussed with  earnestness  the  old  problem  of  God's  relationship  to  the 
world,  and  divided  in  their  conclusions ;  some  asserting  that  he  is  in- 
sensible to  man's  dangers,  needs,  and  sufterings;  others,  that  he 
regards  only  the  great  and  vital  issues  of  the  world,  while  there  were 
few  who  comprehended  the  great  truth  that  not  a  sparrow  falls  with- 
out the  Father's  notice.  Without  God,  without  his  constant  interpo- 
sition in  human  affairs,  without  his  superintendency  of  the  world, 
there  must  be  friction,  collisions,  darkness,  death.  With  God  as  the 
Father,  Ruler,  Benefactor,  Redeemer,  man  lives  in  hope,  and  lifts  up 
his  head  in  every  storm.  Religion  reveals  God's  juxtaposition  to  the 
world.  Religion  explains  the  difficulties  of  man's  temporal  life. 
Religion  is  the  cure  for  pessimism. 

In  no  department  of  inquiry  is  the  break-down  of  philosophy  more 
conspicuous  and  more  complete  than  in  its  exposition  of  the  genesis 
of  life  arul  the  origin  of  the  universe,  or  its  attempted  settlement  of 


MECHANICAL  NOTIONS  INSUFFICIENT.  319 

the  whole  problem  of  being,  and  its  manifestations  in  the  organic 
and  inorganic  spheres  of  the  phenomenal  world.  Certain  facts  must 
be  admitted,  ab  initio,  as  the  conditions  of  discussion — the  facts  of 
the  world,  life,  phenomena.  Whence  life?  Whence  matter?  From 
among  the  multitude  of  answers  given  to  these  questions,  we  select 
two  as  expressive  of  nearly  all  that  can  be  said  on  the  subject,  two 
answers  that  are  directly  opposed  in  their  contents  to  each  other. 
They  are  the  religious  or  theological,  and  the  scientific  or  meta- 
physical. The  theological  account  of  the  world  involves  the  exer- 
cise of  the  creative  power  of  the  Almighty,  while  the  philosophical 
account  is  a  theoretical  attempt  to  trace  things  back  to  an  alleged 
self-originating  propensity  in  matter,  dispensing  entirely  with  the 
divine  principle.  Overwhelmed  with  defeat,  the  labors  of  the  theo- 
rists have  not  been  altogether  fruitless;  for,  in  addition  to  the  dis- 
covery of  the  properties,  forces,  laws,  and  functions  of  matter,  they 
have  unintentionally  rendered  the  theological  conception  impreg- 
nable. The  strongest  defense  of  the  theological  idea  is  the  break- 
down of  the  metaphysical. 

Without  analyzing  the  mechanical  notions  of  the  theorists,  it  is 
sufficient  to  state  that  the  problem  of  origin  is  practically  unsolved, 
and  that  no  light  has  been  thrown  upon  it.  When  Helmholtz  and 
Sir  William  Thompson  announce  that  organic  germs  were  originally 
distributed  over  the  earth  from  other  planets  by  means  of  aerolites, 
what  explanation  of  the  origin  of  things  is  given?  It  shifts  the 
origin  from  one  planet  to  another,  but  does  not  explain  the  origin ; 
in  fact,  it  makes  it  more  mysterious  than  ever,  for  this  places  it  be- 
yond our  reach.  When  Huxley  declared  that  bathybius  had  in  it  the 
potency  of  life,  it  was  supposed  a  great  discovery  was  made ;  but 
when  it  was  proved  that  bathybius  is  nothiug  more  than  gypsum, 
even  the  scientific  world  smiled  at  the  foolishness  of  the  professor. 
Had  his  discovery  been  genuine,  it  had  revealed  nothing  on  origin. 
When  the  theory  of  atoms  is  urged  as  a  sufficient  starting-point  for 
existence,  the  problem  is  simplified,  but  it  is  as  inexplicable  as  ever; 
for,  if  atoms  contained  the  principle  of  life,  it  is  imperative  that  the 
origin  of  life  in  them  be  explained.  How  came  an  atom  in  possession 
of  any  power,  any  principle?  How  came  there  to  be  an  atom 
at  all?  Conceding  that  the  development  theory,  if  true,  partially 
explains  the  method  of  the  growth  of  the  world,  it  fails  to  account 
for  the  origin  of  the  principle  of  growth,  or  for  a  beginning.  If 
it  account  for  the  development  of  species — a  matter  not  yet  fully 
substantiated — it  does  not  account  for  the  origination  of  species. 
The  "development  theory"  is  the  key  to  development  only,  not  the 
key  to  origin. 


320  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

From  the  mechanical  theory  of  things  the  history  of  man  or  his 
origin  presents  the  same  immovable  difficulty.  The  theory  of  de- 
scent may  account  for  certain  historic  courses,  or  certain  racial  char- 
acteristics or  human  customs,  but  it  is  incompetent  to  explain  the 
first  appearance  of  man.  The  gulf  between  man  and  the  animal 
kingdom  has  not  been  spanned.  Even  if  the  physical  man  were 
evolved  from  physical  antecedents  the  difficulty  of  explaining  his  in- 
tellectual and  moral  character  would  be  as  great  as  ever,  and  require 
another  and  essentially  diffi^rent  exposition.  Evolution  can  not 
explain  the  conscience,  or  judgment,  or  will,  or  memory.  The  prim- 
itive races  were  endowed  with  intellectual  and  moral  faculties,  and 
prehistoric  man  was  as  intellectual  as  the  modern  man.  Evolution 
has  added  no  new  faculties  to  the  equipments  of  the  race.  It  has  intro- 
duced nothing  new,  either  in  species,  which  have  had  fixed  types 
from  the  beginning,  or  in  man,  who  is  to-day  a  development  only 
of  what  he  was  in  the  prehistoric  ages. 

Back  of  all  these  attempts  at  world-building  without  the  divine 
energy,  back  of  evolutions  and  revolutions,  back  of  all  theories  re- 
specting life,  is  the  profounder  problem  of  life  itself.  What  is  it? 
Its  (yrigin  is  one  phase  of  inquiry  ;  its  development  is  another ;  its  na- 
ture is  primary  and  fundamental.  It  will  be  observed  that  some 
theories  are  applied  to  an  exposition  of  the  history  of  life,  or  its  un- 
foldings  in  permanent  forms ;  others  boldly  assume  the  task  of  ferret- 
ing out  the  beginning  or  origin  of  life ;  but  the  nature  of  life — more 
mysterious  than  its  origin  or  development — no  theorist  has  been  able 
to  make  transparent,  or  even  define,  with  any  approximation  to  truth. 
Bichat's  definition  that  life  is  the  "  sum  of  the  functions  by  which  death 
is  resisted,"  is  no  definition  at  all,  for  it  reduces  life  to  a  function  or 
purpose.  Life  is  a  cause  with  functions,  and  not  a  sum  of  functions. 
Coleridge  defined  life  as  "the  principle  of  individuation';"  but  a  tree 
has  individuation.  The  definition  is  incomplete.  The  difl'erence  be- 
tween organized  matter  and  inorganized  forms  has  been  thoroughly 
specialized,  but  the  materialist  would  strike  at  the  indestructible  bar- 
riers, and  reduce  the  organic  to  a  differentiation  of  the  inorganic. 
Herbert  Spencer  says,  "The  chasm  between  the  inorganic  and  the  or- 
ganic is  being  filled  up ;"  but  it  is  one  thing  to  make  a  statement  and 
another  to  prove  it  when  it  is  called  in  question.  The  bridge  between 
the  organic  and  inorganic  is  yet  to  be  built,  for  the  chasm  still  ex- 
ists. Hiickel  fancies  that  organic  matter  is  an  "albuminous  carbon 
combination,"  while  Du  Bois-Re}  mond  interprets  it  as  the  mechanical 
principle  of  atoms. 

With  these  statements,  definitions,  and  fancies,  the  student  is  as 
distant  from  a  proper  conception  of  life  and  of  the  world  as  he  was 


SYSTEMS  OF  ETHICS.  321 

at  the  beginning.  Ponderous  systems  and  theories  of  high-sounding 
names  have  been  framed  in  explanation  of  phenomena,  and  the  inor- 
ganic world  has  been  searched  for  a  clue  to  the  organic ;  and  the  re- 
sult has  been  a  number  of  hypothetical  accounts,  which,  with  their 
limitations,  are  unsatisfactory  and  tentative  only.  This  is  a  mon- 
strous failure.  Besides  demonstrating  the  limitations  of  human 
knowledge,  it  has  demonstrated  the  incompetency  of  philosophy  to 
settle  these  inquiries,  and  has  prepared  the  way  for  Christianity  as  an 
explanation  of  all  things,  which  introduces  God  as  the  author  of 
life,  and  fills  creation  with  the  splendors  of  his  glory. 

Thus  far  we  have  traced  the  philosophic  disclosures  respecting  the 
lower  problems,  with  occasional  hints  of  the  higher,  and  have  wit- 
nessed in  every  instance,  whether  the  origin  of  the  world  or  its  gov- 
ernment was  in  question,  its  complete  ignorance  of  both,  and  its  fail- 
ure to  account  for  either.  We  pronounce  these  "  lower  problems," 
inasmuch  as  they  relate  chiefly  to  material  principles,  forms,  connec- 
tions, and  results,  and  to  distinguish  them  from  the  moral  and  relig- 
ious problems  in  the  sphere  of  which  philosophy  is  dumb,  as  it  is  our 
purpose  soon  to  show.  If  in  the  lower  it  has  proved  a  failure,  we  can 
anticipate  nothing  better  in  the  higher,  where,  indeed,  it  comes  to  a 
stand-still,  and  makes  no  progress  whatever. 

The  theories  respecting  mind  and  intellectual  operations;  the 
theories  of  knowledge  and  their  application  to  both  infinite  and  finite, 
have  been  almost  exhaustively  considered  in  these  pages,  and  need  no 
recapitulation  here.  Herbert  Spencer  and  Alexander  Bain  are  the 
dead-weights  in  this  department,  for  the  one  declares  God  unknow- 
able, and  matter  unknowable,  save  in  its  phenomena,  thus  branding 
the  intellect  with  imbecility ;  and  the  other  predicates  mind  as  the 
product  of  organization,  and  ventures  to  explain  its  activities  on  me- 
chanical principles,  robbing  it  of  immortality,  and  man  of  any  great 
destiny.  According  to  both,  man  is  involved  in  the  mechanism  which 
produced  the  universe,  and  is  himself  as  much  a  mechanically  acting 
organism  as  any  thing  within  the  realms  of  space  and  time.  Mind 
is  the  flower  of  matter.  Philosophy  has  transformed  itself  into  phys- 
iology— this  is  its  failure. 

A  more  practical  phase  of  philosophic  inquiry  is  its  discussion 
of  the  ethical  element,  involving  the  construction  of  systems  of  moral- 
ity, or  the  presentation  of  rules  and  principles  for  the  government  of 
the  social  and  moral  relations.  The  inquiry  includes  two  points: 
1.  The  origin  of  ethical  or  moral  distinctions ;  2.  The  value  of  ethical 
instructions.  Touching  the  origin  of  moral  ideas  and  discriminations, 
there  is  a  great  diversity  of  views  among  the  philosophers,  with  little 
approach  to  uniformity  except  among   the   grosser  materialists,  who 

21 


322  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

resolve  ethics,  as  they  do  every  thing  else,  into  mechanical  products. 
Adam  Smith's  famous  doctrine  of ."  sympathy,"  as  the  explanation 
of  the  moral  sentiments,  is  peculiar  in  form,  and  immature  as  a  the- 
ory. The  intensity  of  the  sympathetic  instinct  is  admitted,  but  it  is 
no  stronger  than  other  instincts,  and  it  furnishes  no  secure  basis  for 
morality.  It  makes  every  man  the  measure  of  his  morality.  It 
does  not  recognize  a  uniform  outside  standard  of  right,  but  per- 
mits the  sympathetic  faculty  to  make  one  of  its  own,  by  which  each 
man  becomes  the  independent  judge  of  what  is  right  and  what  is 
wrong. 

Hobbes  taught  that  the  moral  idea  is  the  artificial  product  of 
law,  reversing  the  historic  order  of  the  two  principles,  I'or  law  is  the 
effect  of  moral  principle,  or  of  the  idea  of  right  and  wrong.  The  en- 
actment of  law  implies  the  antecedent  idea  of  right  and  wrong.  Law 
is  the  expression  of  that  idea.  Again,  inasmuch  as  civil  law  is 
changeable,  the  moral  sentiments  dependent  on  it  must  be  changeable 
also ;  hence,  the  stability  of  moral  ideas,  and  the  permanency  of 
moral  distinctions  might  be  disturbed  by  every  new  enactment,  and 
finally  be  destroyed  altogether.  The  safety  of  the  moral  idea  is  in  its 
independence  of  law,  or  the  caprices  of  men. 

Mandeville  resolved  all  morality  into  the  efflorescence  of  the  spirit 
of  self-love,  which  in  its  coarser  form  is  selfishness.  In  this  there  is 
no  innate  love  of  right  and  no  constitutional  abhorrence  of  wrong, 
but  a  determination  to  right  or  wrong  as  the  interests  of  the  individ- 
ual are  promoted  or  restrained.  This  is  only  another  and  perhaps 
better  form  of  the  utilitarian  theory  of  Hume,  who  held  that  the 
virtue  or  vice  of  an  action  must  be  determined  from  its  beneficial  or 
hurtful  tendencies.  James  Mill,  ignoring  a  moral  sense  in  man,  and 
renouncing  all  allegiance  to  moral  sentiments,  measures  an  action  by 
Hume's  law  of  utility. 

The  most  recent  exponent  of  moral  ideas  is  Herbert  Spencer,  who 
theorizes  at  length  both  on  the  data  of  ethics  and  the  contents  of  a 
scientific,  as  opposed  to  a  supernaturalistic,  morality.  In  the  fore- 
ground is  the  doctrine  of  altruism,  which  is  nothing  else  than  abso- 
lute selfishness.  From  this  beginning  Spencer  advances  to  the  sug- 
gestion that  moral  systems  are  the  result  of  evolutionary  processes, 
which  must  insure  with  the  passage  of  the  centuries  a  fixed  and  pos- 
sibly complete  system  of  ethics.  Ethical  systems  are  still  in  a  transi- 
tion state,  undergoing  silent  changes,  and  ripening  slowly  with  the  in- 
tellectual advances  of  the  race.  Originally  there  were  no  ethical 
ideas,  but  they  were  invented  or  formulated  as  the  necessities  of  the 
social  condition  required,  at  first  being  crude  and  often  inimical  to 
public  good,  but,  as  human  relations  were  more  thoroughly  considered, 


THE  ETHICAL  IDEA.  323 

the  ideas  of  right  and  wrong  took  more  definite  form,  and  were  appro- 
priated as  guides  in  social  life.  Moral  convictions  are,  therefore,  the 
products  of  evolution.  In  his  "  Data  of  Ethics"  Spencer  makes  a 
broad  distinction  between  absolute  and  relative  ethics,  and  attempts 
to' show  that  an  ideal  or  absolute  system  of  ethics  can  not  arise  from 
a  knowledge  of,  or  relations  to,  the  unconditioned,  but  must  be  the 
product  of  relations  suggested  by  the  conditioned,  which  robs  the 
moral  idea  of  its  divine  origin,  and  reduces  it  to  a  result  of  human 
adjustment  of  relations.  Conduct  is  the  product  of  the  adjustment 
of  man  to  his  condition.  Divine  principles  are  not  involved  in  this 
adjustment ;  it  is  a  human  effort  to  establish  harmony  between  inner 
and  outer  conditions.  If  one  succeed  in  perfecting  the  adjustment  his 
ethical  life  will  be  blameless;  but  if  he  fail  he  goes  down  under 
the  wrath  of  the  stronger  outer  conditions.  The  idea  of  absolute 
morality  is  foreign  to  all  philosophic  schemes.  What  is  called  "  Oc- 
camism  "  is  an  approach  to  it,  but  Mansel  objected  to  it,  and,  point- 
ing out  the  apparent  weaknesses  of  the  moral  faculty,  he  announced 
his  belief  in  a  relative  morality  only.  This  strikes  at  the  doctrine  of 
inherent  rightness.  If  right  is  a  relation,  or  the  expression  of  a  rela- 
tive condition  only,  the  standard  of  right  can  not  be  fixed  or  uniform, 
for  relations  and  conditions  vary.  Right  is  absolute,  or  its  authority 
is  gone. 

Ethical  naturalism  is  as  defective  as  evolutionary  ethics.  Hiickel, 
maintaining  the  mechanical  conception  of  the  universe,  includes  man 
in  the  mechanical  arrangement,  which  implies  his  want  of  freedom. 
If  man  is  not  free,  but  a  cog  in  the  wheel,  he  is  not  responsible,  and 
ethical  distinctions  vanish.  To  this  conclusion  Hackel  goes  at  a 
bound,  and  rejoices  in  it.  It  means  the  overthrow  of  the  ethical 
government,  and  the  correlated  ideas  of  future  responsibility  and  the 
possibility  of  future  punishment.  Mr.  Darwin  was  reproached  for 
the  ethical  weakness  of  his  theories,  but  it  is  allowed  that  his  disciples 
carried  the  destructive  work  farther  than  he  anticipated  or  desired. 
Rudolf  Schmid  afiirms  that  ethical  naturalism  means  the  dissolution 
of  all  moral  principles. 

Separating  these  philosophic  suggestions,  or  aggregating  them, 
what  is  their  significance?  What  becomes  of  the  ethical  spirit?  If 
the  moral  idea  is  the  product  of  law,  or  arises  from  an  observed 
utility  of  action,  or  from  the  indulgence  of  self-love,  or  the  practice 
of  selfishness,  or  is  evolutionally  produced,  or  is  a  feature  of  the 
mechanism  of  the  universe,  what  sacredness  can  attach  to  it?  What 
authority  has  it  ?  How  can  it  be  enforced  ?  As  it  is  not  supernat- 
ural in  origin,  it  may  not  be  imposed  from  supernatural  considera- 
tions;  and  as  God  is  not  behind   or  in  it,  it  is  only  a   prudential 


324  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

rule  of  conduct,  to  be  observed  as  necessities  or  conditions  may  sug- 
gest, in  which  event  it  is  without  authoritative  character.  To  be 
effective,  however,  the  moral  sentiment  must  be  obligatory;  and  it 
can  not  be  obligatory  unless  grounded  in  superior  authority.  Systems 
of  morality  framed  according  to  these  conceptions  must  be  defective 
in  representation,  and  as  powerless  in  influence  as  the  conception^ 
themselves.  As  a  result,  human  concepts  of  sympathy,  utility,  legal 
justice,  and  equity  Avill  be  dominant,  while  the  divine  ideas  of 
benevolence,  virtue,  truth,  and  holiness  will  be  absent,  except  as 
they  are  dragged  down  to  the  level  of  the  human  or  mechanical, 
in  which  case  they  would  be  as  powerless  as  mechanical  ideas 
themselves. 

Oilier  theories,  half  philosophic  and  half  religious,  and  in  advance 
of  the  preceding,  concerning  the  rise  of  the  moral  idea,  have  ap- 
peared, bridging  the  distance  from  philosophy  to  religion.  Lord 
Shaftesbury  pronounced  in  favor  of  a  moral  sense  in  man,  by  which 
he  is  able  to  detect  the  virtue  or  vice  of  actions,  a  conception  that 
was  previously  elaborated  by  Hutcheson.  Clarke  traced  the  moral 
idea  to  the  intuitions,  giving  it  a  psychological  basis.  Cudworth,  be- 
lieving that  an  ethical  decision  involved  a  rational  perception  and 
comparison  of  motives  and  facts,  attributed  the  final  moral  discrim- 
ination to  the  reason ;  while  Butler  rose  still  higher  in  attributing  it 
to  the  conscience. 

The  superiority  of  these  views  to  the  utilitarian  and  evolutional 
theories  must  be  apparent  without  discussion.  If  the  latter  are  cor- 
rect, fixed  and  invariable  ethical  standards  are  out  of  the  question  ; 
if  the  former  obtain,  uniform  and  authoritative  ideas  of  right  and 
wrong  may  be  installed  in  the  activities  of  the  world.  Grounded  in 
the  intuitions,  the  reason,  and  the  conscience,  there  can  be  no  varia- 
tion, and  they  may  be  enforced  by  sanctions  which  can  not  be  dis- 
puted. Moreover,  while  the  philosophical  systems,  inasmuch  as  they 
spring  from  external  conditions  and  relations,  are  conditional  systems 
of  morality,  the  intuitional  systems,  taking  their  rise  in  the  moral 
and  intellectual  nature  of  man,  are  unconditional,  and  therefore  uni- 
form and  universal. 

Yet,  that  the  ethical  notion  has  for  its  sole  or  chief  source  the 
moral  nature  of  man,  we  are  not  prepared  to  affirm.  This  is  an  ad- 
vance over  the  conclusions  of  the  materialists,  but  we  can  not  stop 
here.  The  ethical  idea  has  its  root  in  the  divine  being,  or  is  the  off- 
shoot of  the  theistic  influence,  which,  descending  into  the  conscience 
and  reason,  makes  itself  felt  in  intuitive  affirmation  of  right  and 
wrong.  This  is  its  highest  source  ;  it  is  too  high,  however,  for  philos- 
ophy.    In  the  interpretation  of  the  moral  instincts,  in  its  systems  of 


FAILURE  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  325 

morality,  in  the  character  aud  authority  of  its  ethical  instructions, 
philosophy  has  completely  failed.  The  total  of  its  teachings  is  that 
every  man  should  do  the  best  he  can  for  himself  in  given  conditions, 
being  governed  by  considerations  of  utility  and  self-interest. 

Plainly,  too,  philosophy,  pretending  to  reveal  the  secret  of  things, 
has  failed  in  pointing  out  the  secret  of  true  happiness,  and  in  sug- 
gesting methods  for  the  satisfaction  of  the  holiest  aspirations  of  the 
soul ;  and,  were  it  to  be  judged  by  its  own  principle  of  utilitarian- 
ism, it  would  be  summarily  rejected.  The  conviction  that  the  prin- 
ciples of  philosophy  are  not  sufficient,  when  enthusiastically  espoused, 
to  produce  abiding  contentment,  unless  cold  resignation  to  fate  be  hon- 
ored with  this  distinction,  is  abundantly  sustained  by  the  principles 
themselves,  and  by  the  lives  of  philosophers,  many  of  whom  have 
been  pessimists,  fatalists,  and  materialists.  Ignorance  of  God,  the 
theory  that  the  world  is  misgoverned,  the  hope  of  immortality  re- 
duced to  a  myth,  thought  pronounced  a  secretion,  mental  activity 
substantially  a  nervous  impulse,  and  man  a  descendant  of  the  animal 
kingdom — these  and  such  ideas  are  not  calculated  to  relieve  the  world 
of  gloom  and  pain,  or  introduce  sunlight  into  the  abodes  and  pursuits 
of  the  race.  By  such  teachings  one  is  not  made  strong  for  tempta- 
tion, nor  is  he  comforted  when  trial  comes,  nor  enlightened  as  the 
shadows  lengthen.  Fate,  Csesarism,  disease,  chains,  are  not  inspiring 
words,  yet  they  are  the  pass-words  of  materialistic  philosophy.  Epi- 
curus, denying  immortality,  pledged  his  life  to  pleasure,  but  it  was  a 
hollow  mockery,  and  fruitless  of  good.  That  man  who  bought  the 
earthen  lamp  of  Epictetus,  in  the  hope  that  he  could  get  wisdom 
from  it,  was  not  more  foolish  than  the  man  who  would  buy  the  cup  of 
Epicurus  in  the  belief  that  pleasure  is  hidden  in  it.  Adam  Smith  asked, 
"  What  can  be  added  to  the  happiness  of  the  man  who  is  in  health,  who 
is  out  of  debt,  and  has  a  clear  conscience?"  What  of  the  majority 
of  mankind,  who  are  without  health,  and  are  poor  and  in  debt,  and 
ignorant,  and  with  consciences  unenlightened?  Something  more  is 
wanted  than  health,  riches,  and  a  conscience.  Schopenhauer  hated 
his  mother,  despised  womankind,  and  drew  dark  pictures  of  life. 
J.  S.  Mill  was  a  proverbial  example  of  unhappiness,  the  victim  of  an 
inherited  and  enforced  philosophy.  Aristotle  held  that  the  life  of 
pleasure,  the  life  of  ambition,  aud  the  life  of  knowledge,  constitute 
the  life  of  happiness ;  but  pleasure  sought  for  its  own  sake  is  a  fail- 
ure, ambition  has  often  resulted  in  ruin,  and  culture  even  has  its 
drawbacks.  Consider  any  scheme  of  happiness  formulated  by  philos- 
ophy, and  essential  elements  will  be  wanting.  Thus  the  break-down 
is  patent. 

The  review  of  philosophy  as  a  failure  requires  at  least  an  inci- 


326  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

dental  allusion  to  the  insufficiency  of  its  reflections  and  teachings 
concerning  essential  religious  truth.  Since  philosophy  must  not  be 
confounded  with  religion,  any  estimate  of  the  one  from  the  stand- 
point of  the  other  may  seem  unwarranted  ;  but  it  must  be  remem- 
bered that  the  avowed  purpose  of  the  philosophical  teacher  is  to 
supplant  the  religious  teacher,  w'hich  implies  that  he  has  something 
better  to  offer  than  religion.  James  Mill  looked  upon  religion  as  a 
social  force,  and  Herbert  Spencer  tolerates  it  as  a  myth.  The  ulti- 
matum of  philosophy  is  the  abandonment  of  religion,  but  it  offers 
nothing  in  exchange  for  atonement,  inspiration,  resurrection,  immor- 
tality, heaven  ;  it  offers  nothing  in  exchange  for  the  world's  Creator 
and  Governor,  the  holy  Sabbath,  the  doctrine  of  moral  responsibility, 
and  the  pleasing  thought  of  man's  creation  in  the  image  of  God.  It 
demands  much,  but  gives  nothing  in  return.  Aristotle  said  the 
philosopher  is  a  devotee  of  fable.  He  was  right.  What  fables  are 
pessimism,  utilitarianism,  Epicureanism,  altruism,  materialism,  atom- 
ism, and  the  whole  brood  of  evolutionary  hypotheses !  Religion  is 
not  a  "cunningly  devised  fable,"  but  the  truth,  and  nothing  but 
the  truth. 

The  field  of  philosophy  is  a  field  of  ruins.  It  reminds  us  of 
Baalbec,  with  temples  in  decay,  with  pillars  broken,  defaced,  and 
scarred,  with  worshipers  absent,  and  music  and  sacrifices  wanting. 
Sensationalism,  Idealism,  Positivism,  Pessimism,  and  Associationalism 
are  the  prostrate  pillars  in  the  garden  of  the  world ;  the  temple  of 
worship  is  without  an  altar;  and  the  world's  throne  is  without  a 
Rulei*.  For  this  decay,  this  ruin,  this  break-down,  there  is  a  cause; 
and  it  is  either  in  the  nature  of  philosophy  itself  or  in  the  perverted 
aims  of  the  philosophers.  Philosophy  itself  is  a  legitimate  child  of 
thought,  but  the  philosopher  is  a  prodigal,  wasting  the  substance  of 
the  Father  in  riotous  demonstrations,  and  mocking  at  the  heavenly 
visions  with  which  he  is  sometimes  favored.  He  needs  to  turn  his 
head  upward,  to  ride  on  Ezekiel's  wheels  or  Zechariah's  horses  until 
he  reaches  the  azure  heights,  or  ascends  John's  mountains,  from 
whose  summits  he  may  catch  glimpses  of  the  ineffable  glory  of  the 
celestial  sphere.  A  new  phase  of  philosophy,  or  an  independent 
grappling  with  the  great  mysteries  of  ontology,  psychology,  and  cos- 
mology must  occur  before  its  redemption  from  materialism  is  possible. 
It  has  sight — it  needs  insight;  it  has  perseverance — it  needs  power; 
it  has  mechanism — it  needs  life ;  it  has  nature — it  needs  God. 

In  the  contemplation  of  the  various  systems  of  sj^eculative  thought, 
in  their  relation  to  human  interests,  scarcely  a  satisfactory  result  has 
been  obtained.  In  the  study  of  ontological  truth,  mystery,  vaster  and 
deeper    than    the  supernaturalism  of  religion,    is  proposed    to    our 


FUNDAMENTALS  OR  PERSONALITIES.  327 

acceptance.  Inquiring  for  biological  results,  life  is  presented  as  an 
atomic  mechanism  ;  seeking  psychological  principles,  the  mind  turns 
out  to  be  a  mechanically-derived  and  a  mechanically-acting  Thing  ; 
studying  nature,  causation  is  reduced  to  succession,  and  final  cause  is 
denied  an  existence ;  and  as  for  man,  his  origin  is  obscurely  derived 
from  animals,  and  his  destiny  is  involved  in  that  of  the  universe. 

For  the  greater  part  these  conclusions  are  denials  of  facts,  beliefs, 
and  principles,  which,  from  the  earliest  periods,  have  been  accepted 
by  the  popular  judgment  of  the  race  as  correct,  and  as  being  rooted 
in  consciousness  and  the  developments  of  history.  Yet  this  negative 
philosophy  calls  itself  positive ;  this  azoic  philosophy  styles  itself 
protoplastic  ;  this  severe  philosophy  calls  itself  benevolent ;  this  an- 
tagonistic, undermining,  pillar-throiving,  soul-blotting  philosophy  dares  to 
claim  that  it  is  progressive  !  Evidently,  there  is  something  wrong 
somewhere.  These  systems  are  comets,  not  stars ;  revolutions,  not 
reformations  ;  novels,  not  Bibles. 

The  root-defect  of  such  speculations  is  seen  in  the  difference  be- 
tween the  organic  purpose  of  philosophy  on  the  one  hand,  and  the 
organic  purpose  of  religion  on  the  other.  T/ie  ultimate  of  philosophy 
is — FUNDAMENTALS  ;  the  ultimate  of  religion  is — personalities.  Fun- 
damentals  embrace  principles,  laws,  facts,  agencies,  forces;  personalities 

INCLUDE  BEINGS,  INTELLIGENCES,  CONSCIOUS  EXISTENCES.  Philoso- 
phy, roving  among  the  fundamentals,  does  not  ri.se  to  the  personal- 
ities of  the  universe  ;  hence  it  talks,  but  can  not  explain.  It  eulo- 
gizes gravitation,  as  did  Comte  ;  it  bows  before  the  uniformity  and 
unity  of  law,  as  does  Huxley ;  it  creates  an  unconscious,  imper- 
sonal First  Cause,  as  do  Schopenhauer  and  Hartmann ;  but  it  knows 
nothing  of  the  living,  personal,  omnipresent  Jehovah,  or  of  man's 
relation  to  him.  Philosophy  reveals  facts,  laws,  methods,  principles ; 
religion  reveals  cause,  intelligence,  being,  persoiud  authorship. 

The  reconstruction  of  philosophy  is  imperative,  as  it  stops  short  of 
triumph.  Its  achievement  is  that  of  the  chemist,  who  can  decompose 
and  recompose  crystals,  but  who  can  not  compose  life.  Personality  is 
the  only  ultimate  of  thought,  the  original  source  of  all  things.  Philosophy 
has  concerned  itself  with  relativities,  not  with  absolute  truth  ;  with 
phenomena,  not  with  primary  cause.  .  It  must  go  beyond  fundamen- 
tals ;  it  mufit  advance  toward  the  great  Personality  ;  then  its  recon- 
struction will  be  complete. 

During  the  reign  of  the  Thirty  Tyrants  in  Athens  a  law  was 
enacted  prohibiting  conversations  on  philosophical  themes  in  the  city. 
Tyrannical  was  the  decree  ;  better  far  an  order  that  it  shall  take  a, 
broader  view;  that,  dropping  fables,  it  shall  embrace  truths;  that, 
heralding    fundamentals,    it    shall    march    upward    to    personalities. 


328  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

Neither  atheism,  nor  pantheism,  nor  pessimism  is  productive  of  enthu- 
siasm, generosity,  pocial  order,  or  the  elements  of  a  progressive  civili- 
zation.    Materialistic  philosophy  is  the  incubus  of  the  age. 

Clearly  and  sufficiently  has  the  necessity  for  a  religion  that  in- 
cludes the  highest  truth,  concreted  in  personal  intelligences,  been 
demonstrated  ;  and  since  philosophy,  even  in  its  best  estate,  has  failed 
to  furnish  the  required  truth,  we  turn  with  confidence  to  that  form 
of  religion  which,  rising  to  heights  illuminated  with  celestial  light, 
or  descending  from  summits  burning  with  a  supernatural  glory,  pro- 
poses to  answer  the  universal  question,  namely,  Christianity. 


CHAPTER  XV. 

THE    RELATION   OK    PHILOSOFHY    TO    CHRISTIANITY. 

IN  a  classification  of  contributing  elements  to  religion,  or  in  an  a^ 
tempt  to  do  justice  to  auxiliaries  in  the  development  of  religious 
truth,  philosophy  should  be  accorded  a  conspicuous  place.  As  a  tree 
is  indebted  to  soil,  moisture,  light,  heat,  and  the  atmosphere,  so  the 
best  system  of  religion  has  derived  its  character  and  strength  froxU  a 
multitude  of  forces  and  influences,  not  one  of  which  should  be  for- 
gotten in  the  final  estimate  or  historic  conception  of  religion.  Far 
too  common  is  it  either  to  ascribe  to  Christianity  an  exclusive  Jewish 
background,  regarding  the  pre-Christian  idea  as  the  root  of  the  Chris- 
tian system,  or  to  discern  in  it  only  the  supernatural  factor  that  gives 
it  its  high  value.  The  intimate  relation  of  other  things  not  essentially 
religious  to  religious  truth  will  be  acknowledged  more  and  more  as  an 
impartial  tracing  of  the  origin  of  Christianity  is  conducted,  and  the 
useful  elements  of  outside  systems  of  thought  are  properly  recognized. 
Outside  of  the  accepted  preliminary  religious  influences  that  aided 
in  the  introduction  of  Christianity,  philosophy  performed  a  service  in 
the  interest  of  the  true  religion,  both  in  its  preliminary  Avork  and  its 
radical  teachings,  that  should  not  be  despised.  What  that  work  was, 
what  its  revelations  and  teachings  were,  and  so  what  the  debt  of  Chris- 
tionity  to  philosophy  is,  we  shall  attempt  to  disclose.  Philosophy  is 
not  religion,  and  sometimes  it  has  lacked  the  religious  spirit,  being 
bent  in  the  pursuit  of  ends  strictly  special  to  its  calling  ;  but  it  has 
opened  many  a  door,  parted  many  a  cloud,  and  held  in  its  hands 
some  truths  that  we  now  see  were  antitypes  of  things  to  follow.  It  is 
not  ritualistic  in  form,  sacrificial  in  spirit,  mediatory  in  method,  or 
merciful   in   its  aims ;  yet  has  it  pointed   out   the  religious  factor  in 


PHILOSOPHIC  ICONOCLASM.  329 

nature,  history,  civilizations,  and  religions,  Hegel  going  so  far  as  to 
include  in  it  nearly  every  thing  good  or  worth  having,  and  making  it 
the  basis  of  civil,  political,  and  moral  life. 

The  relation  of  philosophy  to  Christianity  is  indicated  very  def- 
initely in  the  stubborn  resistance  it  offered  to  the  imjthologies  and 
idolatries  that  ■preceded  and  accompanied  the  introduction  of  Christian- 
ity, thus  preparing  the  way  for  the  assertion  of  some  of  the  great- 
est truths  of  a  true  religion.  In  this  preliminary  work  of  demolition 
it  had  no  intended  reference  to  Christianity*  nor  perhaps  to  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  different  or  better  religion  than  any  that  prevailed ;  its 
work  was  philosophical,  and  its  effect  on  the  popular  religions  was 
incidental.  Nevertheless,  the  process  of  undermining  was  as  effectual 
as  if  it  had  been  instituted  for  no  other  purpose,  and  in  Greece  the 
old  Homeric  and  Hesiodic  theologies  declined,  while  in  Eome  Cicero 
was  made  to  laugh  at  the  augurs,  and  statesmen  winked  at  one 
another  when  the  gods  were  worshiped.  In  far-off  Persia,  Zoroaster, 
climbing  to  the  heights  of  a  monotheistic  conception  through  philo- 
sophic visions,  dealt  sturdy  blows  against  idolatry,  and  left  on  record 
a  very  satisfactory  testimony  to  the  power  of  religion  based  on  philo- 
sophic instead  of  revealed  truth. 

It  may  be  stated,  as  a  fact,  that  the  philosophers  were  first  to 
break  with  national  religions  as  they  were  the  first  to  see  their 
absurdities ;  then  followed  the  poets,  the  historians,  the  common 
skeptics,  and,  at  last,  the  people.  The  poetic  spirit  was  too  sympa- 
thetic with  religious  impulses  to  inaugurate  preliminary  assaults  upon 
old  faiths  ;  indeed,  the  poets  were  the  founders  of  fabled  religions,  as 
the  philosophers  were  their  destroyers.  Historians  could  only  record 
the  initiatory  work  of  the  poets,  and  the  iconoclasm  of  the  phi- 
losophers. By  these  back-handed  strokes — strokes  in  the  dark,  for 
with  the  overthrow  of  the  prevailing,  religions  there  was  no  less  a 
need  of  a  right  religion,  which  philosophy  was  unable  to  provide — re- 
sulting in  the  extinction  of  public  faith  in  mythology,  idolatry,  super- 
stition, and  ignorance,  the  service  of  philosophy  was  incalculable. 

One  of  the  accusations  against  Socrates  was  that  he  did  not  believe 
in  the  gods,  and  that  in  disseminating  his  infidelity,  he  was  corrupt- 
ing the  youth  of  Athens.  Theodorus,  the  disciple  of  Aristippus, 
ridiculed  the  idea  of  the  existence  of  gods,  and  abandoned  nearly 
every  teaching  of  mythology.  Plato  proclaimed  the  existence  of  one 
Supreme  Being,  doing  for  the  Grecians  Avhat  Zoroaster  did  for  the 
Persians,  and  Moses  for  the  Jews,  though  under  less  religious  convic- 
tion and  with  less  spiritual  illumination  than  either.  Seneca  likewise 
espoused  the  idea  of  one  God,  bridging  the  distance  from  paganism  to 
Christianity,  and  preparing  the  way  for  a  Pauline  demonstration  of 


330  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

the  highest  truth  in  theology.  lu  this  preparatory  work  of  laying 
monotheistic  foundations  neither  Gautama,  the  exponent  of  Hindu 
philosophy,  nor  Lao-tzu,  the  representative  of  Chinese  philosophy, 
seemed  to  share,  for  neither  had  conceptions  of  a  personal  God ;  but 
Greece,  Rome,  Persia,  Palestine,  Assyria,  and  Egypt,  in  their  phi- 
losophers, swung  from  idolatrous  notions  toward  faith  in  one  God,  the 
Creator  of  all  things  and  Preserver  of  all  men.  Crude  and  indistinct 
was  this  philosophic  faith^  consisting  at  first  only  in  a  denial  of  the 
gods,  but  later  in  an  affirmation  of  a  personal  Ruler,  and  so  striking 
a  fatal  blow  at  polytheism,  and  co-ordinate  religious  teachings.  The 
accomplishment  of  the  ruin  of  the  pre-Christian  mythologies  was 
largely  due  to  the  infidelity  of  philosophies,  which,  dift'ering  from  one 
another  in  other  things,  joined  hands  in  an  assault  upon  the  poly- 
theism of  the  nations,  awakening  them  to  a  sense  of  unity  in  the 
Supreme  Power,  or  at  the  least  preparing  them  for  its  inculcation 
and  reception. 

The  preparatory  office  of  philosophy,  or  its  actual  work  in  pioneer- 
ing the  human  mind  through  the  darkness  of  speculation  into  a  state 
of  receptivity  for  religious  truth,  may  be  inferred  from  the  fact  that 
nearly  all  the  founders  of  religions  have  been  philosophers ;  that  is, 
that  religion,  true  or  false,  has  a  philosophical  basis,  resting  primarily 
on  the  reason,  and  secondarily  on  revelation.  The  exception  to  this 
statement  is  Christianity,  which  is  primarily  the  religion  of  revelation, 
and,  secondarily,  the  religion  of  the  reason.  The  philosophic  spirit 
is  an  inquiring  and  reflecting  spirit ;  it  refuses  to  accept  any  thing  on 
authority ;  it  demands  evidence  instead  of  assumption  ;  it  requires 
reason  instead  of  faith.  Hence,  it  often  doubts  when  another  spirit 
believes.  It  is  not  to  be  denied  that  the  old  philo.  ophic  doubt  of 
the  old  religions  was  a  step  in  advance,  and  that  philr?ophic  inquiry 
led  to  the  abandonment  of  errors,  both  scientific  and  r  Hgious.  That 
Arcesilaus  of  the  Middle  Academy  doubted  too  much  may  be  granted, 
for  he  even  doubted  the  possibility  of  knowing  any  thing ;  but  even 
this  infidelic,  Pyrrhonic  way  of  dealing  with  all  truths,  sacred, 
historic,  and  scientific,  disadvantageous  as  it  seemed  to  order,  harmony, 
and  progress,  was  productive  of  inquiry  which,  with  the  aid  of  other 
influences,  resulted  in  the  dethronement  of  the  old  faiths.  Bacon 
was  a  doubter  ;  Descartes  was  a  doubter.  Not  Pyrrhonists  were  these, 
but  investigators  of  truth,  and  found  it  after  much  searching. 

One  looking  into  the  old  religions  will  find  certain  philosophical 
forms  of  truth,  or  religious  dogmas,  grounded  in  philosophical  state- 
ments. Many  of  the  errors  of  the  antagonized  religions  are  these 
philosophic  forms  of  religious  dogmas.  On  no  moral  problem  has  phil- 
osophy expended  more  ingenuity  than  that  of  the  existence  of  evil. 


FATE  OF  SCHOLASTICISM.  331 

but  in  every  instance  the  religion  that  adopted  a  philosophic  explana- 
tion was  embarrassed  by  it,  and  never  recovered  from  it.  Neither 
Manes,  nor  Zoroaster,  nor  Gautama,  nor  Confucius,  nor  Epicurus, 
was  able  to  frame  a  satisfactory  theory  of  evil,  but  each  uttered  a 
little  philosophy,  which  went  forth  as  the  dictum  of  the  reason,  to  be 
afterward  contradicted  and  overthrown  by  the  doctrines  of  Revelation. 
At  the  head  of  all  outside  religious  there  have  stood  both  priests  and 
philosophers,  ready  to  philosophize  on  religion,  or  breathe  a  religious 
tone  into  philosophy ;  and  the  result  has  been  neither  pure  philosophy 
on  the  one  hand,  nor  an  incorruptible  religion  on  the  other.  Whether 
we  consider  Lao-tzii,  the  Chinese  philosopher,  or  Gautama,  the  estab- 
lisher  of  Buddhism,  or  Zoroaster,  the  Persian  priest,  or  the  unknown 
composer  of  Bhagavad  Gita,  or  the  Norse  system  of  theology,  or  the 
early  Germanic  religions,  a  philosophical  spirit  is  prominent  in  all 
their  teachings,  and  is  the  secret  guide  in  all  their  developments.  In 
one  religion  philosophy  produces  Pantheism  ;  in  another  Eclecticism  ; 
in  another  Pyrrhonism ;  in  another  Manicheism ;  in  another  a 
Platonic  spirit ;  in  another  Idealism  ;  in  another  Materialism.  When 
philosophy  assailed  the  old  religions,  it  purified  or  extinguished  them  ; 
when  it  incorporated  itself  with  them,  it  corrupted  and  prepared  the 
way  for  their  overthrow,  doing  equally  valuable  work  in  both 
directions. 

In  this  quasi  invasion  of  religion  by  philosophy,  or  the  attempted 
reduction  of  religious  truth  to  a  philosophic  form — an  outgrowth  of 
their  relations — we  discover  the  weakness  of  the  one  and  the  in- 
dependence of  the  other.  The  philosopher  could  not  accompany  the 
priest  all  the  way  from  reason  to  revelation,  nor  did  the  priest  sus- 
pect the  thunder-stroke  of  the  philosopher.  They  parted  company  so 
soon  as  one  detected  the  spirit  of  the  other,  but  often  it  was  too  late, 
either  to  save  religion  from  a  downfall,  or  philosophy  from  ridicule. 
In  most  cases  a  philosophical  cry  gave  way  to  a  religious  song,  or  a 
religious  dogma  was  lost  in  philosophic  formula.  The  character  and 
career  of  Scholasticism  is  a  conspicuous  proof  of  these  statements. 
If,  as  Prof.  G.  S.  Morris  observes,  it  ' '  was  in  some  sense  the  balance- 
wheel  of  mediaeval  life,"  still  it  was  incompetent  to  purify  the  life  or 
restore  the  supremacy  of  Christian  sentiment  to  the  age  which  it  was 
impressing.  That  it  toned  the  intellectual  spirit,  gave  direction  to 
research,  held  in  check  the  rapid  march  of  vice,  and  advertised  the 
necessity  of  a  public  reformation,  must  be  conceded  by  all  who  are 
familiar  with  the  epoch  of  its  authority.  Its  great  weakness  was  not 
its  method  of  expression,  or  the  character  of  its  purpose,  but  its  in- 
herent rationalism  from  which  it  could  not  extricate  itself.  From 
Anselm,  its  founder,  to  William  of  Occam,  who  inflicted   upon  it  a 


332  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

final  death-stroke,  there  is  a  constant  fluctuation  of  conceptions,  a 
change  of  faiths,  an  unsettled  conviction  of  truth,  a  philosophic  spirit 
that  tantalizes  the  religious  life  to  death  ;  and  reason  paralyzed  sur- 
renders the  field  to  those  more  capable  of  adjusting  the  difierences 
between  the  formalism  and  false  ideas  of  speculation  and  the  realities 
and  mysteries  of  religion.  Insufficient,  either  as  a  philosophy  or  a 
religion,  it  was  followed  by  something  more  definite  in  both  depart- 
ments of  thought,  not  without,  however,  illustrating  the  distinctness 
of  sphere  of  each,  and  teaching  the  lesson  needed  in  these  times  as 
well  as  then,  that  wherever  philosophy  exalts  itself  into  a  religious 
form,  or  attempts  to  dictate  the  highest  truth,  or  explain  revealed 
truth  by  its  rules  and  methods,  a  collapse  of  power  is  the  result. 
Both  go  down  in  the  wreck. 

Notwithstanding  the  usurpations  of  philosophy,  or  rather  its  at- 
tempted exposition  of  religious  dogma,  or  the  substitution  of  itself 
for  religion,  it  gave  expression  to  religious  truth,  especially  in  the 
early  period  of  the  Christian  Church,  in  such  a  way  as  to  confirm  the 
revelations  of  religion.  A  sufficient  example  is  the  relation  of  the 
Alexandrian  philosophy  to  Scripture  truth,  or  the  attempt,  under  the 
leadership  of  Philo,  to  unite  Hellenism  and  Orientalism.  Admitting 
the  Bible  to  be  true,  it  was  subjected  to  an  interpretation  that 
reduced  some  of  its  revelations  to  absurdities,  and  exalted  others 
into  a  refined  state  most  satisfactory  to  the  mystical  or  idealistic  mind. 
As  a  consequence,  Christianity  was  Platonized ;  in  other  words, 
Biblical  truth  was  transmuted  by  a  philosophical  exegesis  into  philo- 
sophical truth,  losing  its  spiritual  meaning,  and  raising  a  suspicion  of 
its  verity.  In  this  transmutation,  the  spirit  of  infidelity  is  conspicu- 
ously absent;  faith  abounds,  but  it  is  under  the  guidance  of  the 
speculative  reason.  The  weakness  of  mysticism,  as  a  philosophical 
interpretation  of  religion,  is  of  the  nature  of  a  false  and  imperfect 
interpretation,  and  as  such  it  could  not  long  endure.  Whether,  as 
between  Alexandrian  speculation  or  mysticism,  and  scholasticism, 
there  is  ground  for  preference,  certain  it  is  that  the  former  in  due 
time  subsided,  as  did  the  latter.  Christianity  was  compelled  to  sepa- 
rate from  both,  and  stand  in  its  true  position  as  a  religion  from  God, 
to  be  interpreted  rather  by  spiritual  than  philosophic  methods. 

A  more  direct  relationship  between  philosophy  and  religion  may 
be  traced  in  the  harmony  of  their  teachings  respectirig  fundamental 
religious  ideas;  for,  as  philosophy  broke  away  from  mythology  and 
idolatry,  it  was  moi*e  inclined  to  substitute  semi-religious  suggestions 
of  its  own,  which  in  many  respects  were  corroborative  of  the  more 
distinct  truths  of  revelation.  While  the  Gospels  brought  many  truths 
into  light,  without  which  they  would  not  be  apprehended  at  all,  it 


RELIGIOUS  TRUTH  ANTECEDENT.  333 

was,  in  a  sense,  to  make  transparent  what  was  only  obscure  ;  to  make 
plain  what  already  existed,  and  was  supposed  to  exist,  but  had  not 
been  articulated.  Harvey  did  not  originate  the  circulation  of  the 
blood  in  the  human  system,  but  gave  the  fact  a  physiological  expres- 
sion. No  one  will  assert  that  the  thought  of  immortality  had  no  ex- 
istence, and  that  it  did  not  cheer  the  race,  before  the  advent  of  the 
great  Teacher ;  but  it  is  quite  true  to  say  that  his  presentation  of  it 
was  of  the  nature  and  authority  of  demonstration ;  he  illuminated  it, 
and  changed  a  philosophic  suspicion  into  an  inspiring  reality.  In  the 
philosophic  uncertainties  of  Christ's  times  were  the  roots  of  many  re- 
ligious truths  that  grew  into  fullness  of  meaning  in  the  light  of  the 
Sun  of  righteousness. 

By  this  statement   is  not  meant   that  Christianity  is  indebted  to 
philosophy  for  germs  of  truth,  for   the  highest   religious   truth   has 
always  been  in  the  world,  and  preceded  all  philosophies.     Obscured, 
corrupted,  one  age  would  lose  sight  of  it,  and  another  would  recover 
it.     It  found  its  way  into  philosophy,  as  a  stray  light,  through  which 
it  shone,  and  from  which  it  may  seem  to  have  come  ;    but  philosophy 
is  indebted  to  religious  truth — that  is,  the  universal  idea  of  truth,  as 
imbedded  in  the  consciousness  of  the  race — and  should  not  assume  to 
be  the  fountain  of  truth.     In  a  certain  sense,  it  was  the  pioneer  of 
positive  religious  ideas,  the  pioneer  of  positive  religions;  but  back  of 
positive  philosophy  was  the  Judaic  religion,  which,  owing  to  the  dis- 
tribution of  Jews  throughout  the  East,  took  root  in  all  countries  and 
flourished  among  all  peoples,  afl^ecting  their  philosophies   as  well  as 
their  religions.     It  is  believed   that  Plato  acquired  a  knowledge  of 
Moses  and  the  prophets  through  Egyptian  priests,  and  it  is  not  a  dis- 
puted  fact   that  Daniel   and   the   Jewish    captives  made  known  the 
Jewish  cosmogony,  laws,  and    institutes,  throughout   the   Babylonish 
Empire.     While  granting  to  philosophy  a  propredeutic  office,  it  must 
be  understood  that  it  was  not  without  connection  with  antecedent  re- 
ligions; like  a  satellite,  it  shone  with   borrowed  light,  and  was  in  no 
sense  original  or  inspired.     That  is  a  pregnant  statement  of  Dr.  B.  F. 
Cocker,  that  "Greek  philosophy  was  unquestionably  a  development 
of  reason  alone,"  a  statement  accepted  with   a  qualification  or  two. 
If  the  Hebrew  Scriptures  were  unknown  to  the  philosophers  of  Greece, 
certain  religious  conceptions,  and  certain  fundamental  religious  ideas, 
were  not  unknown  to  them.     Even  in  the  dreamy  mythology  of  the 
poets  were  positive  religious  ideas,  which  were  wanting  in  a  proper 
presentation  to  be  true.     Overthrowing  mythology,  as  they  did,  they 
did  not  overthrow  fundamental  religious  ideas  adumbrated  by  mythol- 
ogy, but  appropriated  them,  as  spoils  from  a  wreck,  and  made  them 
philosophical.     Besides,  the  Holy  Spirit  brooded  over  the  philosophic 


334  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

mind  of  Athens,  inspiring  to  intellectual  activity,  but  not  to  spiritual 
revelation.  Admitting  the  pre-existence  of  religious  ideas  as  fashion- 
ing forces,  and  the  agency  of  the  Holy  Spirit  as  a  directing  and 
quickening  influence  in  the  development  of  Grecian  philosophy,  it  is 
true  that  Reason  exercised  itself  to  its  fullest  extent  in  the  solution 
of  the  problems  committed  to  it,  and  did  not  wholly  fail.  If,  there- 
fore, religion  is  indebted  to  philosophy  for  rescue  from  superstition 
and  mythology,  philosophy  is  indebted  to  religion  for  religious  influence 
and  the  contents  of  ttie  religious  idea. 

We  shall  now  briefly  examine  the  theological  elements  of  philos- 
ophy, in  order  to  ascertain  its  relation  to  Christianity,  or  the  final  re- 
ligion that  followed  the  early  philosophy.  The  first  necessary  idea 
of  a  correct  religion,  whether  supernatural  or  not,  is  a  true  conception 
of  God.  Without  this,  the  superstructure  must  be  baseless.  Mono- 
theism is  the  radical  element  of  a  permanent  or  absolute  religion. 
This  was  the  basal  idea  of  Judaism ;  nor  was  it  less  a  primal  concep- 
tion of  Christianity,  although  other  ends  engaged  its  contemplations. 
Twelve  hundred  years  before  Christ,  the  idea  of  one  Supreme  Being 
was  dominant  in  the  religion  of  Zoroaster,  who  was  as  devoted  in  its 
promulgation  among  the  Persians  as  was  Mohammed,  six  centuries 
after  Christ,  in  its  enforcement  in  the  countries  of  the  Levant.  It  has 
been  represented  that  Brahminism  was  the  original  religion  of  the 
Persians,  but  under  some  influence — the  penetrating,  if  not  universal, 
influence  of  the  Judaic  spirit — the  masses  revolted  against  it,  and  the 
unity  of  God  became  the  leading  and  impulsive  doctrine  of  the  new 
religion.  Under  the  sway  of  the  monotheistic  idea,  the  Persians  were 
delivered  from  idolatry,  and  became  worshipers  of  the  true  and 
living  God.  Ahuramazda  was  his  sacred  name.  He  differed  in 
no  essential  attribute  from  the  Jehovah  of  the  Hebi'ews.  Through 
the  influence  of  a  superstitious  spirit,  and  unable  to  settle  the  problem 
of  evil,  Zoroaster  compromised  his  monotheism  by  the  admission  of  a 
dualistic  principle  or  spirit  in  the  nature  of  God,  which  wrought  mis- 
chief in  both  philosophy  and  religion,  and  which  prepared  the  way 
for  the  gradual  decline  of  the  Persian  faith.  However,  the  monothe- 
istic principle,  pure  and  simple,  was  recovered  and  made  triumphant 
in  the  later  religion  of  the  Nazarene.  In  Greece,  the  monotheistic 
idea  was  antagonized  by  a  very  prevalent  polytheistic  sentiment, 
which  existed  down  to  the  time  of  Paul,  who,  seeing  an  altar  in  one 
of  their  temples  to  the  "Unknown  God,"  vindicated  the  theistic  hy- 
pothesis, and  shattered  the  lingering  faith  in  the  gods  of  Greece. 
Prof.  Draper  intimates  that  the  Oriental  conception  of  God  was  pri- 
marily adopted  by  the  Platonists,  or  that  monotheism  was  the  accred- 
ited faith   of  the  Platonic   Christians  or  Mystics  of  Egypt.     In  one 


PROVIDENTIAL  GOVERNMENT.  335 

way  and  another,  monotheism,  struggling  for  supremacy  in  Persia, 
Greece,  Egypt,  or  elsewhere,  and  contending  with  dualism,  polythe- 
ism, or  Brahminism,  succeeded  early  in  planting  itself  in  the  philos- 
ophies and  religious  of  the  world.  It  was  a  great  victory,  and 
Christianity  found  the  way  prepared  for  it  by  these  triumphs  over 
the  old  superstitions.  • 

Involved  in  the  monotheistic  conception  is  the  doctrine  of  the 
government  of  the  world,  and  the  reign  of  Providence  in  human 
affairs.  According  to  the  old  legends,  Zeus  reigned  in  the  heavens, 
Poseidon  in  the  sea,  and  Hades  in  the  invisible  or  under-world,  while 
all  shared  in  the  government  of  the  earth.  This  polytheistic  govern- 
ment subsided  so  soon  as  polytheism  itself  fell  under  the  blows  of  the 
rational  monotheism  of  Judaism,  philosophy,  and  Christianity,  but  the 
adjustment  to  the  idea  of  unity  in  the  divine  government  was  as  dif- 
ficult as  the  previous  adjustment  to  the  idea  of  unity  in  the  divine 
Being.  One  government  was  as  difficult  to  comprehend  as  one  God ; 
but  both  ideas,  involved  in  monotheism,  first  maintained  by  Judaism, 
then  by  other  religions,  then  by  philosophy,  passed  into  Christianity 
as  among  its  fundamental  truths,  and  are  now  universal. 

Respecting  Providence,  or  the  reign  of  divine  influence  in  human 
afiairs,  all  religions  and  all  philosophies  have  been  in  doubt  as  to  its 
extent,  and  some  have  even  questioned  the  fact  of  divine  supervision 
at  all.  Cicero  held  that  the  important  events  in  terrestrial  affairs 
might  receive  divine  attention,  but  that  divine  supervision  is  not 
minute  or  individual.  The  errors,  crudities,  sophistries,  and  uncer- 
tainties of  the  old  faiths,  and  the  skepticism  or  suspicious  interpreta- 
tions of  the  old  philosophies  adopted  in  a  reactionary  mood  of  mind, 
were  not  without  value  in  preparing  the  religious  mind  for  the  more 
comforting  doctrine  of  Christianity,  which  represents  that  not  even  a 
sparrow  falls  without  the  Father,  implying  the  most  careful  superin- 
tendence of  human  life  and  sympathy  with  it. 

Fundamental,  therefore,  as  these  double  ideas  of  the  divine  unity 
and  divine  government  are  to  Christianity,  philosophy,  by  its  vigorous 
protests  against  the  errors  of  false  religions,  and  by  its  own  errors 
touching  the  same  truths,  opened  the  way  for  the  transparent  and 
authoritative  promulgation  of  the  truth,  as  it  is,  by  Him  who  is  the 
truth  and  the  life. 

In  the  struggle  for  the  assertion  of  human  rights,  that  is,  in  the 
final  religious  estimate  placed  upon  man,  philosophy,  though  not 
uniform  in  its  teachings,  nor  wholly  consistent  with  the  revelations 
of  Christianity,  played  no  inconsiderable  part,  and  has  aided  in  gen- 
erating a  much-needed  enthusiasm  over  humanity,  in  its  rights  and 
interests.     Hindu  philosophy,  prescribing  caste,  asceticism,   and  an 


336  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

inhuman  eschatology,  can  not  be  wholly  condemned,  for  it  has  noui^ 
ished  the  religious  instinct,  and  kept  it  alive,  even  when  it  was  per- 
verting it  and  stupefying  it  into  permanent  lethargy  and  dullness. 
Hindu  eclecticism,  as  represented  in  the  Bhagavad  Gita,  elaborates 
the  caste  system  in  an  attractive  form,  basing  its  discriminations  on 
a  supposed  existent  differentiation  ift  humanity,  which  is  a  contradic- 
tion of  the  doctrine  of  the  unity  of  the  race  ;  but  it  leads  to  the 
doctrine  by  a  perverted  discussion  of  it.  In  the  Yoga  philosophy 
man's  bondage  to  evil  is  explained  as  the  result  of  five  causes;  viz., 
ignorance,  egoism,  desire,  aversion,  and  love  of  life  ;  and  "the  means 
or  accessories  of  Yoga,"  by  which  emancipation  or  restoration  is 
secured,  are  eight;  viz.,  restraint,  obligation,  posture,  regulation,  abstrac- 
tion, devotion,  contemplation,  aiid  meditation.  No  one  can  read  this  philos- 
ophy without  feeling  that  the  diagnosis  of  man's  condition  is  ap- 
proximately good,  and  that  the  complex  remedy  is  beneficial.  The 
analysis  of  the  disease  does  not  include  all  the  symptoms  ;  the  remedy 
is  not  atoning  or  redemptive ;  but  both  the  analysis  and  remedy  are 
suggestive,  and  the  reign  of  that  philosophy  is  a  preparation  for  the 
truth  as  it  is  in  Christianity. 

Seneca,  representing  the  Stoical  philosophy  of  Rome,  advocated 
human  rights  with  a  fidelity  and  a  conscientiousness  not  excelled  by 
Christian  writers.  He  declaimed  against  gladiatorial  sports,  savage 
customs,  and  cruelty  of  all  kinds,  and  exalted  the  rights  of  man  into 
a  doctrine  of  political  faith.  He  believed  in  the  brotherhood  of 
man.  This  was  a  step  in  the  right  direction,  and  Roman  Stoicism 
may  be  credited  with  a  propaedeutic  office  in  its  relation  to  Christianity. 
»  Grecian  Stoicism,  dimmed  by  the  spirit  of  the  age,  but  feeling  its 
way  along  the  lines  of  human  thought,  rather  inclined  to  broad  views 
of  the  natural  rights  of  man,  and  was  less  friendly  to  systems  of  caste, 
slavery,  and  oppression,  than  the  petrified  religions  of  the  East.  In 
its  larger  vision  of  what  man  is,  and  of  his  rights,  relations,  and 
obligations,  Grecian  philosophy  was  a  ray  of  that  light  that  was  so 
soon  to  dawn  upon  the  world,  and  drive  away  the  darkness  that  had 
enveloped  it  from  the  beginning. 

In  its  ethical  teachings,  philosophy  prepared  the  way  for  the  super- 
naturalistic  morality  of  the  New  Testament.  It  taught  morality  from 
different  motives ;  its  standards  of  right  and  wrong  were  defective  ; 
its  application  of  ethical  rules  to  the  social  condition  of  man  was 
loose  and  ineffectual  ;  and  it  is  a  question  if  philosophic  morality  was 
ever  reduced  to  practice,  or  elevated  human  society  in  its  practical  ad- 
ministration. In  spite  of  these  deficiencies  no  one  can  read  Cicero, 
Epictetus,  Seneca,  Socrates,  and  Plato,  without  recognizing  the  intense 
earnestness  of  these  teachers  in  their  searching  for  a  moral  base,  and 


PA  GAN  ANTICIPA  TIONS.  337 

without  being  convinced  that  they  desired  the  moral  elevation  of 
their  respective  nations.  What  learned  disquisitions  they  have 
written  on  patience,  fortitude,  benevolence,  patriotism,  temperance, 
the  chief  good,  the  true,  the  beautiful,  filial  love,  and  the  parental 
relation,  and  the  virtues  and  duties  suggested  by  man's  relation  to 
himself,  his  family,  his  country,  and  God !  It  may  be  doubted  that 
modern  philosophy  has  gone  beyond  the  ancient  in  the  value  of  ethi- 
cal suggestion,  or  in  the  construction  of  ethical  systems.  Surely 
Adam  Smith,  in  his  theory  of  "sympathy,"  and  Herbert  Spencer,  in 
his  theory  of  altruism,  and  James  Mill,  in  his  abnegation  of  the 
moral  sense,  may  not  claim  suj)eriority  to  Seneca  or  Socrates,  who 
thundered  against  vice  with  apostolic  fervor  and  apparent  inspiration. 
By  virtue  of  the  ethical  spirit  of  philosophy,  sufficient  or  deficient, 
humanity  was  prepared  for  the  revelation  of  a  fixed,  uniform,  and 
universal  standard  of  morality. 

A  glance  at  Assyrian  philosophy,  as  the  preparation  or  virtually 
the  embodiment  of  the  Assyrian  religions,  leads  to  the  same  conclu- 
sion. According  to  the  discoveries  of  George  Smith  in  Assyria,  the 
religion  of  the  Accads  embraced  such  ideas  as  magic,  gnosticism, 
sorcery,  diabolism,  solar  influences,  good  and  evil  spirits,  and  many 
other  curious  and  erroneous  teachings;  but  they  were  related  to  the 
philosophy  that  then  prevailed,  and  to  the  Jewish  religion  that  followed ; 
to  the  one  in  that  practically  philosophy  and  religion  agreed  in  teach- 
ing the  same  things,  to  the  other  in  that  they  prepared  the  public 
mind  for  a  religion  of  a  higher  order,  with  the  supernatural  factor  in 
it.  Whatever  the  philosophy,  whether  as  diagnostic  as  Hindu  Eclec- 
ticism, as  discriminating  as  Koman  Stoicism,  or  as  superstitious  as 
Assyrian  Gnosticism,  in  every  instance  it  has  pioneered  the  mind  to- 
ward a  better  condition,  or  prepared  it  for  a  better  religion. 

As  prominent  as  any  thing  in  Christianity  are  the  two  doctrines 
of  incarnation  and  atonement,  the  one  pertaining  to  the  birth,  the 
other  pertaining  to  the  death  of  its  founder.  So  radical  are  these 
truths  that  without  them  the  proclamation  of  Christianity  would  be  a 
failure.  Did  these  doctrines  have  any.  foreshado wings  in  the  national 
philosophies,  or  did  Christianity  appear  unheralded  in  these  respects? 
As  to  incarnation,  Brahminism  was  already  full  of  examples,  and 
Judaism  had  predicted  the  birth  of  a  son  from  a  virgin  as  the  world's 
Savior.  But  these  were  the  anticipations  of  religions;  what,  if  any, 
were  !he  anticipations  of  philosophy?  As  in  Assyria,  so  in  India, 
the  popular  religion  was  the  popular  philosophy  ;  what  was  taught 
by  one  was  assumed  by  the  other  ;  the  distinction  between  philosophy 
and  religion  was  not  clear,  therefore.  The  doctrine  of  incarnation 
vas  a  Brahminical  doctrine,  quite  as  philosophical  as  religious,  pre- 


338  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

paring  the  Oriental  mind  for  one  incarnation  not  included  in  their 
prophecies  or  expectations.  Even  the  grotesque  and  fabulous  stories 
of  Brahminical  incarnations,  baseless  and  foolish  as  they  were,  would 
qualify  the  mind  to  consider  a  supernatural  incarnation,  or  an  event 
so  lofty  and  divine  that,  instead  of  being  rejected,  it  ;iiust  be  ac- 
counted for  and  received.  The  philosophical  religions  prepared  the 
Eastern  mind  for  the  new  doctrine  of  incarnation. 

Pure  philosophy,  revolting  from  mythology  and  superstition,  never 
expressed  itself  directly  on  the  subject;  at  least,  no  philosopher 
turned  prophet,  like  Isaiah  or  Micah,  and  announced  the  advent  of 
the  great  Teacher;  but  philosophers,  historians,  poets,  and  people 
lived  in  anticipation  of  the  arrival  of  a  Revealer  of  truth  in  the 
person  of  a  Messiah.  The  expectation  was  general,  created  for  the 
most  part  by  the  Jewish  prophecies,  but  also  by  that  philosophic 
preparation,  perhaps  not  fully  recognized,  that  preceded  it. 

As  to  atonement,  the  principle  is  as  philosophical  as  it  is  religiom, 
and  the  fact  of  atonement  is  as  historical  as  the  fact  of  death  itself. 
All  religions,  barbarous  and  enlightened,  have  acknowledged  the  ne- 
cessity of  sutiering,  both  as  a  penalty  and  remedy  for  sin.  The 
sacrificial  system  of  Judaism  was  the  ordained  typical  system  of 
atonement,  completed  in  the  voluntary  death  of  Jesus  Christ.  The 
religious  idea  of  atonement  by  sacrifice  pervaded  all  schools  of 
thought,  as  it  had  all  systems  of  religion,  only  it  was  clouded  by  su- 
perstition, and  enforced  without  proper  guards  and  restrictions,  lead- 
ing often  to  inhumanity  and  cruelty  without  procuring  the  ends  in 
view.  Just  before  he  drank  the  hemlock,  Socrates  ordered  the  sacri- 
fice of  a  fowl  to  iEsculapius,  recognizing  the  duty  of  sacrifice,  and 
that  it  in  some  way  atoned  for  sin. 

In  these  particulars  philosophy,  crude  in  its  conception  of  the 
relation  of  sacrifice  to  human  redemption,  and  superstitious  in  its 
faith  touching  religious  duties,  laid  the  foundation  for  a  belief,  first, 
in  the  incarnation  of  the  Son  of  God,  and,  second,  in  a  sufficient 
sacrifice  for  sin  by  the  death  of  the  Great  Master.  Less  reliance, 
however,  should  be  placed  on  these  foreshadowings  which  relate  more 
particularly  to  Christianity  than  on  those  which  relate  to  religion  in 
general ;  for,  in  its  broadest  scope,  philosophic  truth  is  a  finger-board 
to  the  great  principles,  such  as  monotheism,  human  responsibility, 
and  eschatology,  that  underlie  religion,  rather  than  an  index  to  the 
particular  tenets  of  Christianity.  It  may  be  added,  however,  that  in 
proportion  as  it  points  to  religion  at  all,  it  must  point  to  Christianity, 
which  embodies  all  the  virtues  and  truths  of  the  religious  idea. 

Viewed  in  this  general  aspect,  philosophy  is  the  best  antecedent 
perspective  of  eschatological  truth  that  ancient  literature  affords.      The 


MUSINGS  ON  IMMORTALITY.  339 

doctrine  of  immortality,  dimly  apprehended,  did  not  go  begging  for 
support  among  the  philosophers.  It  was  questioned,  analyzed,  sus- 
pected, but  not  often,  except  by  the  materialists,  rejected ;  influenced 
by  the  superstitious  spirit  of  the  age,  it  was  associated  with  errors, 
such  as  transmigration,  but  it  was  not  pantheistic,  and  so  was  an  im- 
provement on  the  fatal  dream  of  the  Buddhist.  In  fact,  as  between 
Grecian  philosophy,  with  its  echoing  discord  of  announcements  touch- 
ing the  future  life,  and  those  Asiatic  religions  that  fostered  panthe- 
ism, transmigration,  nirvana,  and  all  such  uncongenial  dogmas,  the 
former  must  be  preferred.  While  Cato  mused  on  immortality,  Socra- 
tes, under  condemnation,  talked  of  meeting  Orpheus,  Homer,  and 
Ajax  in  the  other  life,  gleams  of  immortality  irradiating  from  his 
prison  couch.  Did  Stephen  talk  more  confidently  when  stoned? 
Epicurus,  a  materialist  of  the  lowest  grade,  advanced  arguments  against 
a  belief  in  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  showing  the  decadence  or  un- 
certainty of  faith  in  the  later  period  of  the  philosophical  era  of  Greece, 
but  as  a  whole  Greek  philosophy  may  be  quoted  on  the  side  of  the 
great  doctrine. 

As  to  the  abode  of  departed  spirits,  the  standard  by  which  rewards 
and  retributions  will  be  administered,  and  in  what  the  rewards  and 
retributions  consist,  philosophy  theorized  freely,  and  was  more  rational 
than  some  of  the  old  religions.  The  old  Homeric  theology,  popular 
with  the  masses,  was  not  without  influence  in  philosophic  circles,  but 
it  was  resisted  as  it  was  subjected  to  analysis,  and  in  the  later  days 
only  unconsciously  recognized,  if  recognized  at  all.  As  the  apostles 
were  infected  with  the  Judaiziug  spirit  and  carried  into  the  new  dis- 
pensation some  of  the  features  of  the  old  economy  ;  as  Protestant- 
ism still  exhibits  the  impression  of  Roman  Catholic  teaching;  as 
Buddhism  is  not  entirely  free  from  Brahminism ;  so  Greek  philosophy 
was  not  entirely  emancipated  from  the  theology  or  mythology  of  the 
poets. 

In  respect  to  eschatological  truth,  it  may  be  said  in  favor  of  the 
poetical  theology,  that  it  was  far  more  rational  and  accorded  better 
with  Scriptural  teaching  than  it  did  in  its  cosmology  or  ontology. 
Its  perspective  of  the  future  was  more  vivid,  just,  and  truthful  than 
its  historical  conception  of  the  genesis  of  matter  and  man,  or  its  the- 
ological notion  of  God.  Even  this  concession  to  the  merits  of  the 
poetical  theology  must  be  understood  with  the  qualification  that  it  ap- 
plies only  to  generic  principles,  and  not  to  the  details  of  the  eschato- 
logical conception.  Concerning  the  doom  of  the  wicked  and  the  hap- 
piness of  the  righteous,  this  theology  is  outspoken,  reciting  at 
length  the  horrors  of  hades  and  the  glories  of  the  abode  of  the  gods, 
and  impressing  upon  the  Greek  mind  the  necessity  of  righteousness 


340  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

as  the  condition  of  entrance  into  that  elysian  abode.  Its  purpose  was 
legitimate ;  its  details  of  description  provoked  in  the,  philosophic 
mind  a  doubt  of  the  existence  of  such  worlds.  The  poet  located 
heaven  and  hell  with  all  the  confidence  of  knowledge,  which  added 
to  the  impressiveness  of  his  teaching,  but  philosophy  questioned  the 
locations. 

Heaven  was  located  above  the  sky;  hell  sometimes  in  the  in- 
terior of  the  earth,  sometimes  not  far  below  the  surface.  This  is 
specific,  but  not  more  specific  than  the  remorse  that  must  fill  the  cup 
of  woe  of  the  vicious  and  ungrateful.  A  judgment-seat,  judges,  de- 
grees of  suffering,  degrees  of  reward,  were  revealed  by  Homer  as  if 
he  were  inspired;  and  to  these  general  principles  of  immortality, 
judgment,  rewards,  and  punishments,  no  exception  can  be  taken. 
The  philosopher — Plato,  in  particular — rejected  Homer,  not  because 
of  the  inherent  absurdity  of  these  principles,  for  he  adopted  them 
himself,  but  because  of  the  superstitious  excrescences  that  had  gathered 
around  them.  In  the  statement  of  doctrinal  principles  Homer  was 
clearer  thau  the  inferior  poets  who  followed  him,  and  who,  instead 
of  enforcing  the  principles,  buried  them  in  a  mass  of  foolish  crudi- 
ties. The  poet  fore-glimpsed  the  truth  and  announced  it ;  the  philoso- 
pher stripped  it  of  mythology ;  the  Apostle  Paul  amplified  it  on 
Mars'  Hill,  revealing  the  doctrines  of  immortality,  resurrection,  and 
judgment,  as  Athens  had  never  received  them  from  poets  or  philoso- 
phers. It  was  all  in  the  same  line,  however;  the  poetical,  the 
philosophical,  and  the  apostolical,  were  three  successive  stages  of  revela- 
tion, the  last  being  complete  and  authoritative,  because  divinely  in- 
spired, as  the  others  were  rationally  conjectured. 

Thus  the  old  philosophy  sustained  an  intimate  relation  to  Chris- 
tianity. It  reflected  its  teachings  and  prepared  the  way  for  the 
apostolic  proclamations  to  such  an  extent  that  Prof.  Draper  says: 
"Christianity  was  essentially  a  Greek  religion."  This  conclusion, 
plausible  because  of  the  relation,  is  not  justified  by  the  facts,  nor  is 
the  conclusion  of  Prof.  Lindsey,  that  Christianity  is  the  offshoot  of 
Judaism.  Neither  Greek  philosophy  nor  Judaism  can  be  ignored  in 
an  estimate  of  Christianity  ;  both  contributed  to  it,  the  one  a 
philosophic  spirit,  the  other  religious  truth ;  but  it  contains  elements, 
truths,  a  spirit  not  found  in  either,  derived  from  a  source  not  com- 
mon to  them.  The  bearings  of  philosophy  on  religion,  and  its  mis- 
sionary work,  must  be  prominently  recognized  in  a  just  historic 
account  of  the  introduction  of  Christianity  ;  but  the  special,  differ- 
entiating truths  of  Christianity,  however  anticipated  by  the  old 
religions  or  the  old  philosophies,  had  for  their  source  a  Messianic 
character  unknown  to  both,  the  reformer  of  all  religions  and  philoso- 


MISTAKES  OF  THE  MODERN  SPIRIT.  341 

phies,  the  Teacher  of  all  truth,  and  the  Savior  of  all  who  would 
believe  in  him.  In  its  highest  position,  as  in  its  last  analysis, 
Christianity  stands  alone,  supreme,  .intended  for  no  creature  but  man,  in- 
debted to  no  source  but  God. 

lu  this  survey  the  relation  to  Chi'istianity  of  the  ancient  Oriental 
philosophies,  more  particularly  the  Greek  and  Hindu,  has  been  con- 
sidered, but  modern  philosophy  sustains  a  missionary  relation  that  it 
may  be  profitable  briefly  to  study.  A  visitor  from  Jupiter  to  the 
earth  might  be  impressed  with  the  hostility  of  modern  science  and 
philosophical  research  to  religion  in  general,  and  to  Christianity  in 
particular ;  but  a  protracted  stay  and  a  close  view  of  what  is  going  on 
would  lead  him  to  suspect  that  modern  materialists  are  doing  a  great 
work  for  the  religion  they  would  overthrow.  The  Bible  has  been 
assailed  by  every  scientific  weapon  that  could  be  manufactui'ed  ;  every 
new  science  has  been  developed  into  a  force  against  it;  geology, 
chemistry,  psychology,  biology,  and  physiology,  have  been  employed 
against  revealed  religion,  and  at  times  with  telling  effect,  staggering 
the  faith  of  the  elect,  and  creating  rejoicing  at  the  gates  of  hell. 
The  attitude  of  modern  philosophy,  embracing  the  scientific  spirit 
of  the  age,  to  Biblical  truth,  is  one  of  opposition,  but  it  is  one  of 
support  also,  not  cordial,  fraternal  support,  but,  by  virtue  of  its  dis- 
coveries and  concessions,  a  bulwark  of  defense  for  a  truer  Chris- 
tianity than  was  bequeathed  us  by  the  former  ages.  For,  while  its 
questionings  of  certain  religious  announcements  have  led  to  the 
abandonment  of  certain  fossilized  interpretations,  as  that  concerning 
the  antiquity  of  the  earth,  it  has  also  led  to  a  verification  of  the 
more  essential  truths  of  Christianity,  as  atonement  and  responsibility. 

If  Christian  theology  has  erred  at  all,  it  has  erred  in  the  scope 
and  magnitude  of  its  undertakings,  rather  than  in  its  hostility  to 
physical  research  and  discovery.  Undertaking  to  settle  all  questions, 
scientific  as  well  as  religious,  it  failed,  and  under  the  papal  rcgiim 
it  obstructed  pure  and  undefiled  scientific  venture,  paralyzing  aspira- 
tion, and  limiting  the  area  of  knowledge.  The  modern  spirit,  free 
from  papal  bondage,  has  entered  upon  an  exploration  of  facts  on  its 
own  account,  and  in  its  progress  of  discovery  it  has  been  compelled 
to  diflTer  with  standard  ecclesiastical  systems  of  chronology,  and  with 
geologic  and  astronomic  theology  in  general ;  and,  emboldened  by  its 
success,  it  is  not  surprising  that  it  has  at  last  assailed  the  spiritual 
side  of  Christianity.  Aiming  to  correct  the  scientific  notions  of  the- 
ology, it  has  gone  to  the  other  extreme  of  trying  to  overthrow  its 
spiritual  teachings.  This  is  another  task,  however,  and  of  quite 
different  proportions,  and  it  will  fail,  just  as  theology  failed  i/i  its 
attempt  to  teach  science.     It  can  not  monopolize  all  questions  any 


342  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

more  than  theology.  While  philosophy,  through  scientific  agency,  is 
correcting  the  scientific  weakness  of  religion,  Christianity  is  slowly  in- 
jecting religious  truth  into  philosophy.  At  all  events,  this  is  the  drift 
of  the  struggle  for  supremacy  at  the  present  time  between  the  two 
forces.  Certain  it  is,  that  the  spiritual  truths  of  Christianity,  assailed 
in  every  possible  way,  remain  unchanged  and  unharmed,  and,  indeed, 
in  a  sense  confirmed,  by  philosophic  investigation,  so  far  as  philosophy 
can  confirm  things  spiritual. 

One  evident  effect  of  the  modern  struggle  is  that  the  theologians 
have  been  aroused  to  a  strong  defense  of  the  citadel  of  Christianity. 
This  was  necessary,  on  the  ground  of  dissatisfaction  with  old  state- 
ments of  truth,  and  with  uncertain  and  scientifically  inconsistent  in- 
terpretations of  fact  aud  doctrine.  The  cry  of  heresy,  the  spirit  of 
loyalty,  the  power  of  the  creed,  and  the  influence  of  Church  polity 
had  held  the  multitudes  to  a  uniform  acceptance  of  all  the  forms  of 
truth,  and  prevented  independent  inquiry  and  rational  proof.  While 
this  spirit  of  quietness  reigned  there  was  no  original  searching  for 
foundations,  except  at  the  peril  of  penalty  ;  but  a  general  attack  on 
the  line,  even  querulous  and  acrimonious  as  it  was,  incited  to  calm, 
heroic,  profound  response  from  the  other  side. 

The  final  result  has  not  been  announced  ;  but  thus  far  the  strug- 
gle has  established  a  difference  between  religion  and  philosophy,  that 
each  h^s  its  sphere,  and  that  mutual  invasions  are  no  longer  justifi- 
able. This  is  a  gain  for  both,  especially  for  religion.  As  in  Wesley's 
time,  the  bad  odor  of  the  philosophy  of  Hume,  Hobbes,  and  others 
drove  the  religionists  to  prayer,  study,  and  conflict  for  the  truth,  so 
now  the  infectious  spirit  of  philosophy  excites  to  a  thoughtful  com- 
parison of  the  two  systems,  and  the  relative  position  of  each  as  a  fac- 
tor in  the  civilizing  processes  of  mankind.  Without  doubt  scientific 
philosophy  will  win  laurels  in  the  field  of  ideas,  and  discover  princi- 
ples essential  to  and  underlying  human  progress  ;  meanwhile  Chris- 
tianity will  demonstrate  its  separate  and  divine  origin,  acquiring  in 
our  world-life  a  conquering  influence,  and  at  last  exercising  indis- 
puted  dominion  over  the  ages. 


UNIVERSALITY  OF  THE  RELIGIOUS  IDEA.  343 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

THE     RELIQIOUS    CONCEPT. 

M  THIERS  is  ou  record  as  saying,  "  Whether  true  or  false, 
,  sublime  or  ridiculous,  man  must  have  a  religion."  The  ne- 
cessity for  religion,  or  satisfaction  of  the  moral  nature,  is  as  impera- 
tive as  the  necessity  for  food,  or  the  maintenance  of  the  physical  life. 
The  ground-plan  of  religion  is  the  religious .  idea,  or  the  religious  bias 
of  humanity,  the  study  of  which  wfll  reveal  it  as  one  of  the  intense 
and  differentiating  peculiarities  of  man. 

To  the  statement  that  the  religious  idea  is  universal,  or  that  one 
of  the  contents  of  consciousness  is  a  religious  concept,  exceptions  have 
been  raised  by  Sir  J.  Lubbock,  Prof  R.  Owen,  Hooker,  Moffat,  and 
others,  who  cite  barbarous  tribes,  altogether  twenty-eight  in  number, 
who,  in  addition  to  living  without  a  religion,  have  no  knowledge  of 
God,  and  from  whose  minds  a  sense  of  the  supernatural  has  entirely 
faded  away.  Accepting  these  statements  as  correct,  an  argument  of 
no  inconsiderable  force  may  be  raised  against  the  common  view  of  an 
innate  recognition  of  God  in  the  race,  and  of  the  integrity  and  force 
of  the  religious  convictions  of  men.  So  direct  an  assault  on  an 
established  theological  proof  of  ,the  existence  of  the  moral  sense,  and 
the  citation  of  instances  against  it,  compelled  a  re-examination  of  the 
alleged  instances,  with  the  following  favorable  results,  as  tabulated  by 
Prof.  A.  Winchell :  As  to  seven  tribes,  the  information  is  superficial 
and  insufficient ;  as  to  nine  tribes,  the  information  is  contradicted  by 
overwhelming  evidence  to  the  contrary  ;  as  to  nine  other  tribes,  the 
religious  life  is  nothing,  but  the  idea  of  the  supernatural  is  recognized 
as  fundamental  to  existence  ;  as  to  three  tribes — the  Gran  Chacos  of 
Soutli  America,  the  Arafuras  of  Vorkay,  and  the  Audamaners — the 
mind  is  a  religious  vacuum.  Of  the  vast  number  of  tribes,  nationali- 
ties, peoples,  and  tongues  composing  the  human  family,  three  small 
tribes  have  been  found  in  whom  not  a  solitary  religious  idea,  feeling, 
or  affection  seems  to  exist.  Perhaps  an  exhaustive  attempt  at  the 
discovery  of  the  religious  principle  in  them  might  be  rewarded 
with  success. 

The  exception  granted,  the  general  statement  that  the  religious 
concept  is  universal  remains.  Wherever  man  is,  there  is  a  worshiper, 
or  a  thinker  of  supernatural  things.  Superstition,  gross,  carnal, 
cruel,  is  an  index  to  the  existence  of  a  religious  faith,  which,  in  its 


344  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

unenlightened  and  perverted  form,  is  a  demonstration  of  its  power. 
Superstition  is  a  bad  definition  of  religion,  but  it  is  the  proof  of  the 
religious  principle.  Nothing  can  be  made  against  the  idea  itself  by 
quoting  the  irregularities,  complexities,  barbarisms,  and  cruelties 
which  it  has  provoked;  on  the  contrary,  a  wrecked  religion  is  the 
evidence  of  the  religious  principle.  The  natural  appetite  for  food  and 
drink  may  be  perverted  into  gluttony  and  intemperance,  but  the  folly 
and  excess  of  appetite  furnish  as  strong  proof  of  its  existence  as  its 
moderation  and  proper  exercise. 

Going  back  as  far  as  history  will  take  us,  and  then  reading  the 
proceedings  of  the  prehistoric  ages  in  hieroglyphs,  and  on  cuneiform 
tablets  and  the  tombs  of  sages,  it  is  easy  to  conclude  that  religion  has 
been  a  dominant  influence  in  all  the  centuries,  and  that  all  peoples 
have  subscribed  to  certain  forms  of  worship,  and  paid  homage  to  the 
deities  understood  by  them.  The  universality  of  religion  is  proof  of 
the  universality  of  the  religious  idea,  and,  according  to  a  canon  of  philos- 
ophy, whatever  is  universal  is  native  to  man.  A  universal  conscience 
proves  that  it  is  natural  to  man,  just  as  universal  speech  proclaims  it 
as  a  characteristic  of  man.  The  religious  idea  may  be  assigned  to  the 
category  of  universal  ideas,  the  exception  noted  having  no  more  value 
than  idiocy,  if  quoted  against  man  as  an  intellectual  being,  or  dumb- 
ness, if  quoted  against  language  as  his  characteristic. 

Putting  it  on  a  level  with  other  universal  ideas,  it  must  be  as 
authoritative  as  others,  and  entitled  to  the  development  and  satisfac- 
tion which  its  nature  solicits  and  reqyires.  But,  at  the  risk  of  seem- 
ing to  exaggerate  its  significance,  we  go  a  step  farther,  and  afiirra 
that  it  is  more  mdhoritative  than  any  other,  and  should  be  developed 
and  satisfied,  though  all  others  suffer  hunger,  dwarf,  and  die. 
Back,  beneath,  over  all  instincts,  intuitions,  natural  and  rational 
principles,  is  the  religious  concept  strongest,  the  most  vital,  the  only 
eternal,  principle  in  man.  The  greatest  idea  in  man,  it  is  the  most 
liable  to  perversion,  and  is,  therefore,  the  greatest  source  of  danger, 
as  well  as  the  greatest  source  of  development.  Perverted,  man  is  a 
wreck  ;  developed,  man  is  a  sovereign.  Other  universal  ideas  operate 
in  a  well-defined,  limited  sphere,  but  this  idea  ranges  through  all  the 
spheres  of  human  thought,  and  expands  by  contact  with  the  greater 
thoughts  of  God.  Moreover,  in  the  developed  or  undeveloped  man 
other  universal  ideas  are  subordinated  to  the  religious  idea,  which  is 
always  supreme,  unless  smothered,  starved,  paralyzed.  The  religious 
idea  speaks,  and  appetite  is  restrained,  the  thought  of  responsibility 
is  awakened,  a  rule  of  right  is  sought,  the  conscience  is  courageous  in 
its  impelling  power,  the  judgment  is  clear  in  its  discriminating  decis- 
ions, and   the   soul   bows   in   prayer  before  its  Maker.     Other   ideas 


PRODUCING  CAPACITY  OF  THE  IDEA.  345 

may  suggest  moral  duties,  or  moral  obligations  may  arise  from  an  ob- 
servation of  the  relationships  of  men,  and  a  sense  of  right  may  seem  to 
originate  in  the  midst  of  social  conflicts ;  but  the  religious  idea  is  su- 
preme in  its  germiuating,  discriminating,  and  impelling  power,  and 
commands  the  whole  life. 

The  producing  capacity,  or  the  spontaneous  growth  of  the  religious 
concept,  is  marvelous,  indicating  a  high  mission,  and  establishing  the 
claim  of  its  superiority.  It  is  crowding  the  world  with  religious  in- 
stitutions; it  builds  altars  and  temples;  without  a  knowledge  of 
the  true  God,  it  will  make  gods  for  itself;  without  the  true  Bible, 
it  writes  religious  documents  of  its  own ;  without  true  prophets,  it 
raises  up  those  professing  to  be  the  inspired  servants  of  the  Most 
High ;  without  the  Cross,  it  induces  sacrifices  for  sin  ;  and  in  its  lowest 
form  it  fails  not  to  impress  itself  on  the  customs,  laws,  beliefs,  and 
moral  life  of  a  people.  The  religious  idea  is  the  soui'ce  of  the  relig- 
ious ideas  of  the  many  religions  to  which  history  points,  and  which 
still  exist.  Brahminism  is  a  religion  of  ideas  traceable  to  the  re- 
ligious idea.  Buddhism  is  a  religion  of  ideas  ;  Taoism,  Parseeism, 
and  Shintoism  are  religious  ideas,  born  of  the  idea.  In  these  we  see 
a  perverted  development  of  the  idea,  which,  however,  is  not  extin- 
guished in  the  development,  but  exists  as  the  controlling  influence, 
waiting  for  right  development  in  the  order  of  time.  The  religious 
norm  is  Christianity,  to  which  the  old  religions  wall  finally  accommo- 
date themselves,  and  religious  ideas  will  yield  to  the  exactions  of  the 
true  religious  idea. 

This  concept  is  not  on  the  w^ay  to  extinction.  Religious  ideas, 
expressing  themselves  in  the  tortured  types  of  paganism,  may  wither 
and  expire,  but  the  idea  is  imperishable.  Strauss  asks,  "Have  we 
still  a  religion?"  The  more  important  question  is.  Have  we  the  re- 
ligioiis  ideaf  Given  the  Idea,  and  Religion  follows.  The  idea  is  not 
a  latent  force;  it  never  was,  it  never  can  be,  inactive;  it  must  always 
be  producing.  It  may  be  misdirected  ;  it  may  be  at  variance  with 
modern  thought;  but  it  is  on  hand  everywhere  and  at  all  times,  pro- 
ducing religions,  and  ready  for  the  right  religion.  Other  ideas, 
active,  growing,  intelligent,  conserving,  are  yet  neither  so  omnipotent 
nor  prolific.  The  love  of  order,  liberty,  and  fraternity,  the  instinct 
of  patriotism,  breaks  out  in  various  forms  of  government;  the  spirit 
of  sympathy  rears  philanthropic  institutions ;  but  Churches,  Bibles, 
priesthoods,  prayers,  sacrifices,  songs,  faiths,  stand  forth  as  the  pecu- 
liar witnesses  to  the  power  of  an  idea  dominant  throughout  the  ages. 

If,  therefore,  the  religious  concept  is  universal,  authoritative,  and 
productive,  it  is  entitled  to  a  consideration  which  no  other  idea  may 
invoke.     Rising  above  others,  like   Mont  Blanc  above  surrounding 


346  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

peaks  and  ranges,  to  its  height  we  propose  to  go,  and  from  its  summit 
survey  the  inalienable  characteristics  of  the  idea,  and  its  relation  to 
manhood,  civilization,  and  destiny.  Not  a  little  difficult  is  the  task, 
however, 'first  to  take  the  idea  out  of  its  relations,  to  isolate  and  ex- 
amine it  and  describe  it,  and  then  portray  its  relations,  with  their 
significance  and  value.  This  must  be  done,  if  the  idea  itself  receive 
a  just  philosophic  treatment.  The  universality  of  the  religious  con- 
cept has  been  affirmed.  No  account  of  the  fact,  no  history  of  the 
origin  of  the  fact,  was  given.  The  only  explanation  of  the  statement 
is,  that  the  religious  idea  is  constitutional,  an  inalienable  characteristic 
of  man.  It  belongs  to  him  alone.  Animals  are  not  equipped  with 
it.  It  is  his  glory,  and  is  the  key  to  his  possibilities.  It  is  the 
measure  of  his  strength  and  the  index  to  his  immortality.  It  opens 
up  the  supernatural  to  his  vision,  and  clothes  him  with  supernatural 
power.  The  constitutional  idea  links  him  with  the  constitution  of 
all  things,  by  virtue  of  which  he  sustains  a  pantheistic  relation  to 
the  universe  and  God.  Under  the  direction  of  the  idea,  he  has  his 
hands  on  every  thing,  and  his  eyes  continually  open  upon  the  unseen. 
That  its  objective  point  is  God,  no  one  will  deny;  that  it  postulates 
immortality,  all  must  admit;  that  it  echoes  the  thought  of  personal 
responsibility,  all  by  experience  know ;  that  it  enjoins  prayer,  faith, 
sacrifice,  humility,  honesty,  history  attests,  and  individual  life  fully 
corroborates.  The  religious  idea,  swinging  out  into  eternity,  brings 
back  eternal  things  to  the  soul.  This  is  its  purpose,  or  it  is  purpose- 
less. The  establishment  of  relations  between  man  and  God  is  the 
end  of  its  administration,  its  only  function.  The  religious  idea  is, 
therefore,  not  only  the  basis  of  religicn,  but  also  the  root-idea  of  hu- 
manity, the  key  to  character,  the  source  of  possibility.  To  know  man 
adequately,  more  than  his  religion  must  be  known  ;  his  religious  nat- 
ure, or  the  religious  roots  of  character,  must  be  analyzed  and  under- 
stood. Back  of  religion  is  the  idea  that  produced  it,  as  back  of  the 
steamship  are  Watt  and  Fulton. 

Auguste  Comte,  a  positivist,  examining  the  historic  growth  of  the 
race,  propounded,  as  its  explanation,  the  "law  of  the  three  stages," 
through  which,  according  to  his  judgment,  it  had  passed.  The  first 
stage  is  tJieological ;  the  second,  metaphysical;  the  third,  positive  or  sci- 
entific. While  he  hoped  to  demonstrate  that  the  intellectual  growth 
of  the  race,  beginning  with  theological  conceptions,  is  toward  a  posi- 
tive or  scientific  affirmation  of  truth,  and  ultimately  away  from  the 
religious,  it  is  singular  that  he  concedes  the  theological  spirit  to  be  the 
earliest  historic  human  force,  the  foundation  of  the  first  social,  polit- 
ical, and  moral  institutions  in  the  world.  History  compels  this 
acknowledgment,  for  it  is  a  fact  that  the   idea   of  the   supernatural 


ORIGIN  OF  RELIGIONS.  347 

appeared  among  tlie  earliest  manifestations  of  human  activity.  Comte 
intei-prets  it  as  a  superstitious  or  fictitious  idea,  the  outgrowth  of 
ignorance  and  fear ;  but  its  existence  he  frankly  acknowledges.  As  to 
his  interpretation,  it  does  not  concern  us ;  for  even  fear  could  not  ex- 
cite it  if  it  did  not  exist,  and  ignorance  of  the  supernatural  would  not 
likely  lead  to  it  if  there  was  nothing  in  the  nature  of  man  to  correspond 
to  it.     The  theologic  spirit  is  primary,  antecedent,  and  constitutional, 

Strauss  discusses  his  question,  "Have  we  still  a  religion?"  for  the 
purpose  of  annihilating  the  religious  instinct,  and  proceeds  to  ex; 
plain  the  rise  of  religions,  or  the  reign  of  the  supernatural  idea 
among  men,  by  attributing  both  the  idea  and  its  expression  to  natural 
causes.  He  quotes  Hume  to  the  efiect  that  man  adopted  religion, 
not  from  a  "  disinterested  desire  of  knowledge  and  truth,"  but  because 
he  fancied  it  might  aid  him  in  his  material  conflicts,  or  from  a  spirit 
of  selfishness.  This  fells  short  of  the  truth.  Oppressed  by  a  sense 
of  want  and  helplessness,  man  was  driven  by  his  religious  nature  out 
of  himself  to  form  an  alliance  with  the  Supreme  Power,  that  he 
might  conquer  in  conflict  and  reign  as  a  sovereign.  It  was  a  sense 
of  need  that  drove  man  to  God  ;  but  the  sense  of  need  is  the  religious 
sense  awakened  or  in  power,  and  the  impulse  to  seek  God  is  the 
prompting  of  the  active  religious  idea.  The  thought  of  self-interest 
thrives  in  the  presence  of  the  religious  idea;  it  is  legitimate;  it  is 
the  thought  of  deliverance,  development,  eternal  happiness. 

Strauss,  looking  at  the  early  religions,  sees  in  them  the  play  of 
ignorance  and  the  sway  of  a  supernatural  fear  of  nature.  Polytheism 
was  not  an  unnatural  type  of  religious  faith.  In  the  intellectual 
progress  of  man,  and  as  his  acquaintance  with  nature  increased,  the 
polytheistic  sentiment  weakened;  and,  as  he  reflected  on  the  unity 
of  the  world,  as  he  did  in  Greece,  or,  as  he  claimed  the  atteutions 
of  a  personal  Ruler,  as  did  the  Jews,  the  drift  of  thought,  both  phil- 
osophical and  religious,  was  toward  the  "serried  form"  of  monothe- 
ism. Polytheism  is  the  religion  of  ignorance;  monotheism  is  the 
religion  of  reflection;  but  it  is  "only  an  ancient  Christian-Hebrew 
prejudice  to  consider  monotheism  the  higher  form  of  religion."  It  is 
evident  that  Strauss  means  that,  if  one  religion  is  superior  to  another, 
of  which  he  is  not  certain,  all  religions  are  the  products  of  human 
fears,  or  human  reason,  and  barren  of  divine  elements,  and,  therefore, 
without  any  authority. 

The  supernatural  character  of  religion  is  not  now  in  question ; 
but,  if  Strauss  is  correct  in  his  analysis  of  religions,  he  confirms  the 
position  taken  in  this  chapter,  that  the  religious  idea  is  constitutional. 
Polytheism  and  monotheism  are  proofs  that  it  is  an  organic  idea  of 
human  nature. 


348  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHBISTIANITY. 

Strauss  undertakes  at  some  length  to  expose  the  anthropomorphic 
origin  of  the  concept  of  a  personal  God  and  the  doctrine  of  a  future 
life,  two  fundamental  conceptions  of  any  religion  ;  and,  having  satis- 
fied himself  tliat  these  doctrines  are  the  result  of  philosophic  specula- 
tion, religious  hopes,  and  rational  fears,  he  concludes  that  the  world 
is  without  a  divine  religion.  To  contest  this  conclusion  is  not  now  our 
purpose.  The  alleged  discovery  of  an  anthropomorphic  origin  or 
center  of  great  religious  doctrines,  is  substantial  proof  of  the  constitu- 
tionality of  the  religious  idea.  It  is  in  man  to  think  supernatural 
things,  and  to  project  supernatural  conceptions.  We  do  not  say 
supernatural  truths,  for  the  religious  idea  needs  enlightenment ;  with- 
out enlightenment,  it  runs  into  superstition ;  but,  enlightened  or 
not,  it  exhibits  in  its  highest  activity  a  supernatural  animation,  and 
issues  religions,  superstitious  or  otherwise. 

That  this  concept  is  constitutional,  is  more  a  question  of  fact  than 
speculation.  To  testimony  we  appeal.  Of  South  African  tribes, 
ignorant,  debased,  vicious.  Dr.  Livingstone  says:  "There  is  no  ne- 
cessity for  beginning  to  tell  even  the  most  degraded  of  these  people 
of  the  existence  of  a  God  or  a  future  state — the  facts  being  uni- 
versally admitted."  Mungo  Park  represents  the  Mandingo  Africans 
as  in  possession  of  the  same  beliefs.  Says  Adolf  Pictet:  "If  there 
ever  had  been,  or  if  there  still  anywhere  existed,  a  people  entirely 
destitute  of  religion,  it  would  be  in  consequence  of  an  exceptional 
downfall,  which  would  be  tantamount  to  a  lapse  into  animality."  Sir 
John  Ross  reports  the  sense  of  a  personal  God  in  the  Arctic  High- 
landers. Dr.  McCosh  says:  "The  idea  of  God,  the  belief  in  God, 
may  be  justly  represented  as  native  to  man."  Ritter  holds  that  the 
idea  of  God  is  original  to  the  mind.  Herbert  Spencer  says:  "Re- 
ligious ideas  of  one  kind  or  another  are  almost,  if  not  quite,  universal." 

Darwin  asserts  the  existence  of  "  numerous  races  who  have  no 
idea  of  one  or  more  gods  and  who  have  no  words  in  their  language 
to  express  them."  Sir  John  Lubbock  says,  "  It  has  been  asserted, 
over  and  over  again,  that  there  is  no  race  so  degraded  as  to  be 
entirely  without  a  religion — without  some  idea  of  a  deity.  So  far 
from  this  being  true,  the  very  reverse  is  the  case."  Both  Darwin  and 
Lubbock  have  been  disputed,  and  the  instances  they  report  have, 
upon  further  examination,  been  turned  against  them.  Dr.  W.  B. 
Carpenter  declares  that  the  attempts  made  by  sopie  travelers  to  prove 
that  some  nations  are  destitute  of  the  religious  principle  have  been 
"based  upon  a  limited  acquaintance  with  their  habits  of  thought  and 
with  their  outward  observances  ;"  and  Herder  asserts  that  "  traces  of 
religion,  however  different  its  garb  may  be,  are  found  even  among 
the   poorest   and   rudest   nations   on   the   verge  of  the  earth."      The 


A    FRAME-WORK  OF  CO-ORDINATE  IDEAS.  349 

weight  of  authority  is  against  the  disputants  ;  the  cases  cited  by  them 
have  been  overthrown ;  and  the  conclusion  that  the  religious  idea  is  con- 
stitutional is  buttressed  by  historical,  scientific,  ethnological,  theo- 
logical, and  philosophical  proofs  not  easily  demolished  or  answered. 

Dissection  of  the  constitutional  religious  idea  will  disclose  a  frame- 
work of  co-ordinate  facts,  principles,  and  ideas  that  will  aid  mate- 
rially in  our  comprehension  of  man's  religious  nature.  What,  then, 
does  the  religious  idea  include  ?  What  does  it  exclude  ?  In  sum^ 
marizing  man's  natural  equipment,  we  must  remember  all  that  be- 
longs to  it.  There  are,  besides  the  religious  idea,  the  exponent  of 
religion,  an  intellectual  idea,  synonymous  with  the  intellectual  nature, 
and  an  emotional  id^a,  synonymous  with  the  emotional  nature. 
Does  the  religious  concept  include  or  exclude  the  intellectual  and 
emotional  ?  To  claim  that  it  excludes  them  is  to  leave  it  to  itself, 
with  independent  functions  capable  of  producing  religion  without 
them  ;  to  insist  that  it  includes  them  is  to  reduce  them  to  subsidiary 
elements  in  the  human  constitution.  The  religious  idea  is  great,  so 
overshadowing  all  other  constitutional  forces  that  no  injustice  is  done 
in  including  them  within  its  own  territory  and  within  the  sphere  of 
its  operations.  Human  nature,  like  Ezekiel's  wheels,  is  a  combina- 
tion of  ideas,  one  included  in  another,  and  each  sufficiently  different 
in  peculiarities  to  be  easily  identified.  Intellectual  activity  is  presup- 
posed in  moral  activity.  One  without  the  other  is  impossible.  JMoral 
distinctions,  moral  issues,  moral  acts  require  the  intervention  of  intel- 
lectual discrimination  and  intellectual  purpoi^e. 

The  Will  is  the  central  faculty,  the  sign  of  personality,  and  is  in- 
volved in  every  moral  act  of  man.  The  powei-  of  self-determination 
is  a  constitutional  power ;  a  volitional  exercise  is  a  constitutional  ex- 
ercise ;  and  responsibility  can  be  predicated  only  on  the  possession 
and  exercise  of  a  will  free,  independent,  and  conscious.  Uixler  the 
direction  of  such  a  Will  the  mind  thinks,  plans,  decides,  acts. 
Primarily,  it  may  be  spoken  of  as  an  intellectual  faculty,  but  such  is 
its  relation  to  moral  character  that  it  may  be  elevated  to  the  rank  of 
a  moral  faculty.  Its  chief  function  is  moral,  not  intellectual.  The 
decisions  of  the  Will  are  in  most  cases  the  decisions  of  the  moral 
nature.     It  must,  therefore,  be  included  in  the  religious  idea. 

The  Judgment  the  psychologist  will  mark  an  intellectual  faculty, 
yet  it  deals  with  moral  questions,  determines  moral  choices,  and  ex- 
ercises all  the  functions  of  a  moral  faculty.  It  belongs  to  the  re- 
ligious idea. 

The  Imagination  may  play  in  the  aesthetic  realm,  or  roam  over 
the  fields  of  thought,  but  it  takes  the  moral  nature  witli  it,  and  im- 
presses it,  either  elevating  or  contaminating  it. 


350  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

The  Memory,  crowded  with  evil  impressions,  may  reproduce  them 
to  the  consternation  of  the  moral  principle  and  assail  it  with  the 
sharp  edge  of  unholy  remembrances. 

It  is  not  asserted  that  every  intellectual  faculty  is  a  religious 
faculty,  or  religion -inspiring,  but  it  is  asserted  that  every  intellectual 
faculty  is  closely  related  to  the  religious  constitution  of  man,  and  in  its 
exercise  is  tributary  to  moral  character.  The  religious  idea  is  not 
without  intellectuaf  foundations  ;  the  religious  constitution  is  in  a 
sense  the  intellectual  constitution  ;  a  religious  act  is  an  intellectual 
act ;  religion  is  the  human  mind  in  worship. 

In  like  manner  it  may  be  established  that  the  religious  concept  has 
emotional  foundations,  or  sustains  a  direct  relation  to  the  emotional 
structure  and  the  active  life  of  man.  By  emotional  structure  we  mean 
the  affections,  appetites,  passions,  the  whole  range  of  human  feeling  as 
by  the  intellectual  structure  we  mean  the  whole  range  of  human 
thinking.  Both  in  their  highest  and  lowest  activity,  the  affections 
take  a  moral  complexion  and  the  result  of  their  exercise  is  always 
apparent  in  the  moral  nature.  In  proportion  as  the  afiectional 
nature  inclines  to  worthy  objects  the  moral  nature  is  strengthened  ; 
as  it  lingers  in  the  vicinity  of  base  objects  the  moral  nature  is 
weakened  and  contaminated.  Love  of  truth,  and  preference  for 
error,  are  affectional  as  well  as  intellectual  exercises.  Love  of  the 
beautiful,  love  of  order,  proportion,  harmony,  unity,  and  aversion  for 
their  contraries  are  more  nearly  exclusive  affectional  acts,  while  love 
of  the  pleasures  of  appetite  is  a  purely  affectional  exercise.  The 
malevolent  affections,  such  as  jealousy,  revenge,  envy,  hatred,  as  well 
as  the  benevolent,  such  as  sympathy,  the  forgiving  spirit,  humility, 
and  benevolence,  are  strictly  affectional  and  religious. 

In  whatever  direction  the  affectional  nature  goes,  or  to  whatever 
objects.it  attaches  itself,  whether  intellectual,  sesthetic,  social,  pas- 
sional, or  moral,  it  affects  the  religious  principle  and  produces  re- 
ligious results.  More  even  than  the  volitional,  the  affectional 
nature  is  an  adjunct  of  the  religious  idea,  since  its  activities 
spring  directly  from  the  moral  character  or  result  in  molding  and 
transforming   it. 

The  religious  concept  is  grounded  in  feeling  as  well  as  thinking, 
in  affection  as  well  as  reflection.  Its  emotional  character  philosophers 
concede,  but  are  wont  to  deny  its  intellectual  character.  Religion  is 
an  emotional,  not  an  intellectual  condition  ;  it  is  a  fluctuating,  super- 
ficial thing,  like  the  emotions  themselves.  It  is  a  mistake  to  regard 
religion  as  an  exclusive  emotional  or  affectional  state  ;  and  it  is  equally 
erroneous  to  suspect  that  it  is  unsound  or  unsafe  because  of  the  pres- 
ence of  the  emotional   element.     The   appetites   and   passions  swing 


EDUCATION  OF  THE  CONSCIENCE.  351 

back  and  forth,  or  rise  and  fall,  while  the  affectional  nature  remains 
the  same  in  spite  of  the  variety  and  fluctuation  of  its  manifestations. 
The  be!?evolent  affections  often  change  with  objects  and  conditions, 
but  the  benevolent  nature  abides  in  its  intensity  and  integrity.  So 
the  emotional  or  affectional  element  of  religion,  varying  in  intensity, 
and  expressing  itself  in  superstitious  or  refined  ritualisms,  exists  always 
and  in  all  men.  Lake  Erie,  with  all  its  storms,  its  shallows,  and  its 
deeps,  is  Lake  Erie  still.  The  emotional  foundation  of  religion  is  not 
its  weakness,  but  its  strength. 

The  claim  that  the  religious  concept  rests  on  religious  foundations, 
or  is  the  outgrowth  of  certain  religious  elements  in  human  nature, 
as  distinguished  from  the  intellectual  and  emotional,  is  consistent  in 
itself,  and  requires  special  recognition.  The  religious  in  man  is  the 
foundation  of  the  religion  of  man.  That  great  moral  faculty,  commonly 
denominated  conscience,  speaks  for  the  religious  principle  as  nothing 
else  in  human  nature.  It  is,  in  a  sense,  the  religious  principle,  for 
without  it  religion  is  impossible. 

The  origin  of  conscience  baffles  the  evolutionist,  who  can  not  ex- 
plain it  by  the  theory  of  development.  Conscience  per  se  is  a  struc- 
tural principle,  an  original  and  necessary  moral  function  of  man. 
Without  conscience  he  is  not  man.  The  pagan,  the  savage,  the 
Hottentot,  exhibits  proofs  of  its  existence,  in  whom,  however,  it  is 
found  in  an  imperfect  and  undeveloped  state,  requiring  enlighten- 
ment, education,  training  before  it  will  act  in  harmony  with  an  in- 
fallible standard  of  righteousness.  The  function  of  couscience  is  re- 
ligious, but  it  will  not  create  a  religion  absolutely  right ;  it  does  not 
originate  the  ideas  of  right  and  wrong,  but  enforces  them  as  soon  as 
taught  or  discovered.  The  religion  of  conscience  may  be  the  religion 
of  superstition  ;  but  in  such  an  event  the  conscience  needs  enlighten- 
ment. It  supports  religious  ideas  ;  it  supports  religions ;  it  is  re- 
ligious in  its  impulses,  promptings,  and  enforcements.  In  its  unde- 
veloped state,  however,  it  will  turn  to  one  religion  as  quickly  as  to 
another;  hence,  the  need  of  education. 

To  affirm  that  the  religious  notion  is  intuitional  is  nearly  the 
same  thing  as  to  aflfirm  that  it  is  constitutional ;  but  the  thought  is 
reproduced  here  briefly  to  note  the  strength  of  the  intuitional  idea  in 
its  relation  to  religion.  Prof  Bowne  designates  innate  ideas  as  the 
"raw  rudiments  of  consciousness,"  or  undeveloped  but  original  con- 
cepts in  human  history.  This  quite  agrees  with  our  thought  that  the 
native  religious  elements  in  man  are  undeveloped,  whether  we  mean 
by  "religious  elements"  the  intellectual,  emotional,  or  the  purely  in- 
tuitional, or  the  contents  of  consciousness,  or  the  authority  of  con- 
science,    It  amounts  to  this,  that  the  religious  concept,  fundamental, 


352  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

universal,  intuitional,  is  in  a  "raw"  state,  and  requires  enlightened 
development  to  perform  the  specific  functions  assigned  it. 

One  has  only  to  examine  the  religious  intuitions,  or  trace  the  his- 
tory of  their  development,  or  the  development  of  religious  ideas,  to 
be  satisfied  that  in  their  original,  primitive  condition,  they  are  unde- 
veloped, but  prophetic  of  final  authority.  The  faith-principle  is 
intuitional,  which,  in  its  original  state,  will  attach  itself  to  superstition 
as  readily  as  to  supernatural  truth.  Under  guardianship  and  training 
it  may  become  a  heroic  characteristic,  as  in  Abraham  and  Paul. 
The  sense  of  responsibility  to  a  Supreme  Power  is  intuitional,  but  is 
in  a  "raw"  state  in  the  undeveloped  man.  He  is  oppressed  with 
the  thought  that  he  will  be  called  to  an  account,  and  he  trembles  in 
view  of  the  future ;  hence,  he  is  ready  for  a  religion  that  either  quiets 
that  sense  of  responsibility,  or  shows  how  one  can  prepare  to  meet 
all  the  demands  against  him  both  now  and  hereafter.  To  refer  this 
sense  of  responsibility  to  religious  education  will  not  do,  for  it  precedes 
religious  teaching,  and  leads  to  it.  It  is  in  man  to  believe ;  it  is  in 
man  to  fear  the  higher  powers ;  it  is  in  man  to  acknowledge  respon- 
sibility ;  it  is  in  man  to  suspect  that  he  will  live  after  death.  Immor- 
tality is  an  intuitional  suggestion ;  all  religions'  are  full  of  it,  but  they 
have  perverted- it.  It  is  in  man  to  suspect  the  existence  of  one  Su- 
preme Being.  Human  nature  is  theistic  in  its  intuitional  outgoings, 
but  in  the  undeveloped  condition  they  may  embrace  polytheism  or 
pantheism  ;  theism  is  the  sign  of  trained  intuitions. 

The  ideas  of  faith,  responsibility,  duty,  sacrifice,  prayer,  immor- 
tality, and  God,  are  the  output  of  the  religious  idea;  they  are  proofs 
of  its  existence.  With  or  without  revelation,  the  religious  nature 
will  run  to  these  things ;  without  revelation  the  ideas  will  appear  ec- 
centric and  irregular,  and  religions  will  be  superstitions ;  with  revela- 
tion, Christianity  will  supplant  every  superstition. 

Superstition  is  a  perversion  of  the  religious  concept ;  Christianity 
secures  its  proper  development  and  fulfillment.  Incidentally  it  may 
be  observed  that  Christianity  itself  is  a  development  of  religious 
ideas,  as  the  monotheistic  and  Messianic  ideas  are  suggested  and  re- 
vealed in  the  Old  Testament,  but  brought  out  in  their  vivid  relations 
more  clearly  in  the  New  Testament.  If  Christianity,  or  the  religion 
of  divine  ideas,  is  a  development,  it  is  not  strange  that  the  religious 
concept  should  itself  be  subject  to  a  like  process ;  and  this  we  find  to 
be  the  fact.  Both  the  religious  idea,  and  the  religion  that  satisfies  it, 
have  been  under  a  law  of  development  in  their  unfoldings  and  en- 
largements. Imperfect  in  the  beginning,  they  have  developed  into 
perfect  conditions,  the  one  as  an  intuitional  conviction,  the  other  as 
a  system  of  truth. 


LIMITATIONS  OF  THE  RELIGIOUS  IDEA.  353 

An  analysis  of  the  religious  idea  shows  it  to  be,  first,  universal 
and  authoritative ;  second,  intellectual ;  third,  emotional ;  fourth,  re- 
ligious; fifth,  intuitional;  sixth,  imperfect,  "raw,"  undeveloped. 

We  proceed  to  notice  the  value  of  the  religious  concept,  or  its  • 
power  to  produce  a  true  religion.  Distinguishing  between  the  idea 
and  its  products,  we  now  pass  from  one  to  the  other,  discussing  the 
product  abstractly  rather  than  concretely.  If  the  ground-work  of  a 
true  religion  is  not  in  man,  then  it  must  be  external  to  him,  or  he 
must  abide  in  darkness  and  dfeath.  It  is  conceded  that  the  religious 
idea  will  evolve  into  religion ;  but  will  it  evolve  into  a  right  religion  ? 
In  the  study  of  this  question,  foreshadowed  by  previous  paragraphs, 
we  must  not  forget  the  Artesian  principle,  which  allows  water  to  rise 
no  higher  than  its  source.  Religion  will  not  exceed  in  value  or  char- , 
acter  the  source  from  which  it  springs.  Within  the  limitations  of 
the  religious  idea  will  be  found  the  essentials  of  a  religion  ;  the  re- 
ligious product  of  that  idea  will  consist  of  rational  principles,  intu- 
itional suggestions,  theistic  and  eschatological  ideas,  all  of  them 
valuable,  all  essential. 

For  the  most  part,  all  the  old  religions  partake  of  these  ideas, 
and  have  prepared  the  way  for  a  religion  truer  than  themselves.  In 
addition  to  the  theistic  idea,  coupled  with  eschatological  considera- 
tions, many  of  them  have  inculcated  some  of  the  virtues  that  belong 
to  the  better  religion,  and  all  of  them  profess  to  be  supported  by  a 
philosophic  foundation.  Theories  of  creation,  both  of  man  and  the 
universe;  hospitality,  benevolence,  honesty,  virtue,  truth;  responsi- 
bility to  the  Supreme  Ruler,  and  the  doctrine  of  future  rewards  and 
punishments,  find  a  place  in  Brahminism,  Buddhism,  Mohammedan- 
ism, Shintoism,  and  all  the  religions  of  the  pagan  world.  Even  of 
deism,  pantheism,  naturalism,  the  same  observation  is  true  in  a  quali- 
fied sense.  Responsibility,  virtue,  immortality,  echo  from  the  temples 
of  such  religions.  The  test-question  is,  are  these  the  best  the  religious 
idea  can  produce?  Without  revelation,  the  religious  idea,  acting 
alone,  has  evolved  into  these  various  types  of  religion  ;  and,  as  speci- 
mens of  its  power  or  tendency,  they  are  valuable.  Evidently,  the 
religious  idea  has  done  its  best  in  these  religions.  It  has  had  time, 
opportunity,  favoring  conditions  to  do  better  ;  the  necessity  for  a 
better,  that  is,  a  right  religion,  began  with  man's  religious  decline. 
But  the  religious  idea,  weak,  though  fundamental,  imperfect,  though 
universal,  has  at  no  time  produced  a  right  religion;  never  has  it 
satisfied  the  religious  demand  of  the  world.  Neither  the  intuitions, 
nor  emotions,  nor  intellectual  faculties,  nor  the  absolutely  religious 
instincts  combined,  have  suggested  an  adequate  religion ;  they  have 
demanded  it,  but  could  not  produce  it.  We  have  written  of  the 
23 


354  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

break-down  of  philosophy;  we  now  write  of  the  break-donm  of  the 
religious  idea.  Man  is  not  a  successful  religion-maker.  Even  the 
philosophic  Kant  grovels  on  a  low  level  of  religion  when  he  says 
that  its  chief  purpose  is  to  sanction  moral  duties.  Philosophy  has  no 
right  idea  of  it.  A  religion  not  of  man  is  the  world's  necessity ;  a 
religion  from  man's  Maker  is  the  impei'ative  need ;  a  religion  of 
revelation,  and  not  of  discovery  or  human  invention,  is  the  cry  of 
the  hour. 

In  this  extremity,  Christianity  may  be  presented  as  a  religion 
adapted  to  the  religious  nature  of  man  ;  a  religion,  though  not  the 
product  of  the  religious  idea,  great  enough,  flexible  enough  to  meet 
the  demands  of  that  idea.  In  a  general  sense,  it  may  be  said  that 
Christianity,  properly  studied  and  lovingly  received,  stimulates  the 
religious  nature  to  growth  and  development  far  beyond  what  it  would 
attain  by  self-motion  or  self-activity.  The  religious  nature,  vital  and 
eternal,  is  susceptible  of  eternal  development.  What  shall  touch  it, 
uncoil  it,  and  send  it  out  into  the  eternal  realm  ?  Its  tendency  to 
self-development  is  often  arrested  by  obstacles  seemingly  superior  to 
it ;  its  area  of  growth  is  seemingly  within  the  horizon  of  one's  natural 
view ;  and  it  often  grows  into  deformed  shapes,  and  with  limited  re- 
sources at  its  command.  For  a  proper  and  healthy  stimulus  it  must 
look  to  an  outside  source.  Christianity  is  a  stimulating  religion. 
As  the  sun  pours  its  light  and  heat  into  the  vegetable  world,  giving 
life,  form,  and  beauty  to  it,  so  Christianity  enlightens,  warms,  and 
develops  the  religious  nature  into  life,  activity,  and  moral  beauty. 
It  stimulates  the  whole  being  by  its  truths,  adaptations,  provisions, 
promises,  supports.  It  is  the  source  of  religious  revivals,  which  result 
in  the  opening  of  the  religious  nature,  or  the  restoration  of  moral  life 
to  man.  Other  religions  are  wanting  in  this  power.  Mohammed  en- 
forced his  religion,  not  by  its  inherent  stimulating  property,  but  by  the 
sword,  or  the  law  of  force.  Other  religions  depend  on  external  aids — 
Christianity  depends  upon  its  inherent  vitalizing  spirit. 

Other  religions,  developing  what  they  find  in  man,  bring  nothing 
new  to  man ;  Christianity  adds  to  man's  religious  resources  and  inspi- 
rations. It  is  a  stimulus  to  activity  ;  it  is  an  addition  to  his  posses- 
sions. The  contents  of  the  religious  concept  in  its  natural  state  do 
not  include  all  religious  ideas  ;  there  is  much  beyond  it.  Messiah- 
ship,  atonement,  reconciliation,  resurrection,  judgment,  justice,  and 
mercy ;  a  Savior,  a  divine  Friend — the  religious  concept  is  barren  of 
these  notions.  These  notions  Christianity  brings  to  men,  and  presents 
them  as  necessary  truths,  the  basis  of  a  religious  life,  and  as  they  are 
accepted  other  religions  perish. 

Nor  is  this  the  total  of  the  contributions  of  Christianity  to  the 


THE  SUPREME  RELIGION.  355 

religious  nature.  It  makes  clear  to  the  consciousness  what  was  accepted 
before  with  some  uncertainty,  or  was  liable  to  perversion.  Natural 
as  is  the  theistic  notion,. other  religions  perverted  it;  it  could  not 
take  care  of  itself ;  it  needed  something  ;  Christianity  purified  it,  or- 
ganized it  into  a  fact  of  belief,  revealed  God,  and  settled  the  ques- 
tion. As  to  a  future  life,  other  religions  have  assumed  it,  but  loaded 
the  belief  with  superstitions  dark,  repulsive,  painful,  false.  A  ray 
of  light  shines  from  the  upper  world  through  Christian  revelation, 
and  man  is  satisfied. 

In  bringing  to  men  truths  they  do  not  have,  revealing  God  as 
they  have  not  known  him,  revealing  the  future  as  it  has  not  been 
discerned,  and  revealing  redemption  as  it  was  only  foreshadowed,  but 
never  defined,  Christianity  may  claim  to  be  a  new  religion.  More, 
it  may  insist  that  it  is  a  religion  from  God.  In  addressing  man  at^i 
all,  it  may  claim  his  attention  ;  in  invigorating  his  nature,  it  is  em " ' 
tied  to  his  gratitude;  in  adapting  itself  to  his  condition,  it  should  be 
embraced  by  him  without  delay  ;  in  saving  his  soul,  it  deserves  his 
consecration,  and  the  service  of  his  life. 

Christianity  is  the  supreme  religion.  Its  origin,  its  truths,  its 
philosophy,  its  ethical  system,  its  claims,  its  progress,  its  power,  must 
be  considered  in  detail  if  its  real  character  be  understood.  What 
Christianity  is,  what  it  proposes  to  do,  what  are  its  relations  to  other 
religions,  and  how  it  conserves  human  interests,  it  will  be  pleasant  to 
attempt  to  ascertain.  Its  history  is  marvelous,  a  splendid  record  of 
contests  with  the  dragon  ;  it  knows  what  fire  is ;  it  has  met  death, 
hell,  and  the  grave.  Its  influence  is  ever  widening ;  millions  believe 
in  it  as  the  power  of  God  unto  salvation  ;  millions  would  die  for  it  in 
opposition  to  paganism  and  materialism. 


CHAPTER   XVII. 

THE    APOSTLE     FAUI,. 


IN  his  lecture  on  "Numbers,"  that  noted  English  thinker,  Mr. 
Matthew  Arnold  advances  the  theory  that  the  multitudes  are  cor- 
rupt, selfish,  and  ignorant,  and  that  the  hope  of  the  world's  progress 
and  regeneration  is  in  the  genius,  the  leadership,  the  providential 
work  of  the  "  few,"  or  the  "  remnant,"  to  use  the  expressive  word  of 
the  Scriptures.  Plato  himself  discovered  this  fact,  but  Christ  an- 
nounced it  in  laconic  form  when  he  said,  "Many  are  called, 
but   few    chosen."     To  the   few,  chosen  of  God,    chosen  by  reason 


356  PHILOSOPHY  AN-D  CHRISTIANITY. 

of  natural  fitness,  chosen  because  they  would  perform  the  divine 
tasks,  the  world  is  indebted  for  inventions,  discoveries,  governments, 
philanthropies,  reformations,  moralities,  inspirations,  and  religions. 
The  one  "  chases,"  controls,  instructs  a  tliousaud ;  the  one  is  on  the 
throne,  the  many  are  subjects ;  the  one  foresees,  the  multitudes 
follow  ;  the  one  orders,  the  others  obey ;  the  one  inspires,  the  major- 
ity keep  step  to  his  music. 

Paul  takes  his  place  among  the  "  few,"  ranking  with  them  in  no- 
bility of  character,  persistency  of  purpose,  severity  of  method,  and 
range  of  achievement.  He  is  not  of  the  "  many,"  either  scaled  by 
his  aspirations  or  weighed  in  the  balances  of  the  divine  ideals. 
From  the  "many"  he  stands  apart,  rising  higher,  as  Mount  Tabor 
rises  above  the  plains.  He  is  one,  not  two ;  he  is  not  lost  in  the 
multitude. 

The  opinion  of  Chrysostom  that  Paul  is  little  understood  and  im- 
perfectly known  in  the  Christian  world  is  proof  of  the  general  indif- 
ference which  usually  obtains  among  the  multitudes  respecting  the 
greatness  of  their  heroes  and  the  value  of  their  labors  and  achieve- 
ments. Out  of  this  obscurity  Paul  is  sure  to  come,  for,  next  to  the 
Son  of  Man,  he  is  the  world's  greatest  religious  teacher,  if  not  the 
world's  greatest  moral  hero,  and  history  will  gradually  recognize  his 
relations  to  all  religious  movements,  and  necessarily  to  the  world's 
civilization.  As  no  other  man,  he  is  the  representative  of  Christ's 
truths;  as  Plato  stands  for  Philosophy,  so  Paul  may  properhj  stand 
for  Christianity.  So  many-sided  was  he  in  character,  so  versatile  in 
endowments,  so  wise  in  the  selection  of  methods,  so  energetic  in  the 
execution  of  plans  and  purposes,  so  forcible  a  teacher  of  truth,  and 
such  an  example  of  the  system  itself,  that  as  an  exponent  of  religion 
he  eclipsed  his  brethren  of  the  apostolic  college,  and  has  inspired  the 
Church  of  the  ages  by  his  example  of  heroism  and  devotion  to  the 
mission  of  the  Master.  To  know  this  representative  as  he  actually 
lived,  toiled,  and  died ;  to  understand  his  original  relations  to  the  old 
faith  and  his  adopted  relations  to  the  new  system  of  truth;  to  trace 
his  career  through  its  vicissitudes  of  labor  and  suffering ;  to  observe 
his  environments,  what  effect  they  had  on  him,  and  what  impression 
he  made  on  them  ;  to  study  his  adaptations  to  the  different  spheres  in 
which  he  is  found,  his  skill  in  meeting  emergencies,  his  courage  in 
the  presence  of  danger,  and  his  patience  and  calmness  in  trial  and 
darkness ;  to  comprehend  the  designs  of  his  life,  the  great  religious 
plans  committed  to  his  keeping,  and  the  faith  that  stimulated  him 
while  working  them  into  historic  results ;  to  reveal  his  personal  expe- 
riences of  salvation,  and  the  ground  of  his  Christian  life — are  matters 
of  no  little  importance,  and  deserve  our  most  careful  consideration. 


BIRTH-PLACE  OF  PAUL.  367 

Over  the  question  of  his  birthplace  it  is  needless  to  indulge  in 
speculation  ;  for  while  Jerome  reports  that  he  was  born  at  Giscala, 
there  is  every  reason  to  believe  that  this  is  an  unfounded  conjecture, 
and  that  Tarsus,  a  Roman  city  of  Cilicia,  was  the  place  of  his  nativ- 
ity.^ The  most  convincing  evidence  of  this  fact  is  that  Paul  himself 
alludes  to  it  in  his  defensive  address  from  the  steps  of  the  fort- 
ress of  Antonia.  Owing  to  negligence  in  preserving  genealogical 
records,  Homer's  birthplace  has  been  in  dispute  for  ages,  no  less 
than  seven  cities  claiming  the  honor ;  but  the  Jews  were  careful  to 
record  their  family  history,  and  were  able  to  trace  their  ancestral 
lines  back  to  the  patriarchs.  More  than  once,  Paul  prided  himself  as 
having  descended  from  the  tribe  of  Benjamin  as  proof  of  his  Hebrew 
relationship,  and  when  his  life  was  in  jeopardy  he  referred  to  his 
Roman  citizenship  as  proof  of  being  foreign-born,  and  that  it  entitled 
him  to  the  protection  of  the  Roman  Government. 

In  the  double  sense,  therefore,  he  was  a  Jew  and  a  Roman,  a  Jew 
by  parentage,  a  Roman  by  birthplace  ;  a  Jew  descended  from  one  of 
the  tribes,  a  Roman  citizen  because  in  some  way  his  father  had  ob- 
tained the  rights  and  liberties  of  such  citizenship,  transferring  them 
to  his  son,  who  never  forgot  them  in  his  holy  zeal  for  another  king- 
dom, whose  interests  he  sought  to  conserve. 

The  city  of  Tarsus  was  one  of  the  ancient  cities  of  Asia  Minor. 
It  was  situated  twelve  miles  from  the  Mediterranean  coast,  on  the 
bank  of  the  Cydmas,  its  veritable  site  being  now  occupied  by  a  Turk- 
ish town  called  Tersoos.  An  Assyrian  king  founded  it  about  one 
hundred  years  after  Solomon,  from  which  time  until  long  after  Paul's 
day  it  continued  to  flourish  as  one  of  the  important  commercial  cen- 
ters of  the  East.  Cicero  resided  here  during  his  governorship  of  the 
province.  Augustus  reorganized  its  government,  and  Mark  Antony, 
with  the  approval  of  the  Emperor,  made  it  "  free,"  or  instituted 
"home  rule"  in  the  province;  but  it  was  long  afterward  before  the 
people  were  endowed  with  the  rights  and  immunities  of  Roman  citi- 
zenship, (in  referring  to  Tarsus  Paul  speaks  of  it  as  "  no  mean  city," 
implying  distinction  as  a  city  of  the  Roman  Empire,  and  also  imply- 
ing the  commercial  enterprise  and  general  public  spirit  of  its  inhabit- 
ants, the  educational  pursuits  and  privileges  of  young  and  old,  the 
elegant  taste  and  artistic  zeal  of  its  upper  classes,  and  the  prevailing 
love  of  progress,  virtue,  and  truth  in  the  mixed  population  of  the 
Cilician  capital  J  He  meant  to  honor  it;  he  did  not  defame  it|  he 
spoke  of  its  bazaars,  its  schools,  its  temples,  its  synagogues,  its  palaces, 
its  statues,  its  ships,  its  soldiers,  and  its  eagles.  In  such  a  city  of 
wealth,  splendor,  equipage,  and  culture  he  was  born,  and  many  a  year 
he  spent  within  its  limits,  engaged  in  the  common  occupation  of  tent- 


358  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

making,  and  quietly  prepared  himself  for  the  providential  career  that 
he  finally  began  and  so  brilliantly  completed. 

According  to  trustworthy  suppositions  he  was  born  A.  D.  3,  or 
at  least  during  the  first  decade  of  the  Savior's  life.  The  one  is  born 
in  the  obscure  village  of  Bethlehem  ;  the  other  in  the  splendid  city 
of  Tarsus.  The  one  sleeps  the  first,  night  in  a  manger  ;  the  other  in 
a  palace ;  but  the  manger  and  the  palace  are  alike  in  the  sight  of 
the  Lord.  Paul  is  a  chosen  vessel  to  bear  the  treasures  of  grace  to 
the  households  of  kings,  and  distribute  the  gifts  of  salvation  among 
the  poor  and  the  lowly.  He  is  not  called  to  make  atonement  for 
sin,  as  was  Christ,  but  he  is  called  to  teach  the  truth  as  it  is  in  Jesus. 
What  was  his  preparation  for  the  providential  mission  ?  In  phys- 
ical appearance  he  was  not  prepossessing  as  a  man,  nor  calculated  to 
impress  men  that  he  could  speak  with  authority,  or  act  with  courage. 
Small  of  stature,  bald-headed,  afflicted  with  strabismus,  without  a 
pleasing  voice,  evidently  without  oratorical  accomplishments,  he  was 
not  apparently  fitted  for  the  high  office  of  the  apostleship.  If  chosen 
at  all,  it  must  be  for  other  than  physical  reasons.  Paul  himself 
draws  no  very  complimentary  picture  of  his  person  or  his  speech  in 
his  Epistles,  and  Ave  are  bound  to  believe  that  possibly  irritable  in 
temper,  repulsive  in  manners,  and  imperious  in  conduct,  he  was, 
Plato-like,  somewhat  disagreeable  in  the  exercise  of  authority,  and 
not  very  congenial  as  a  companion.  After  his  conversion  he  was  a 
different  man,  patient,  obliging,  attractive.  Of  his  boyhood  life  there 
is  no  special  report  further  than  that  he  fished  in  the  streams,  roamed 
over  the  hills,  practiced  horseback  riding  on  the  plains,  and  indulged 
in  the  sports,  festivals,  and  associations  common  to  the  times  and  to 
the  city  in  which  he  lived. 

The  early  years  of  his  life  were  spent  in  his  native  city.  What 
were  his  educational  opportunities  in  Tarsus?  What  did  he  learn  in 
her  schools,  from  her  people,  from  the  prevailing  religion,  and  what 
was  the  measure  of  parental  influence  upon  him,  and  what  direction 
was  given  in  those  days  to  his  future?  Like  Socrates,  he  exhibits 
no  love  of  nature,  being  absorbed  with  higher  thoughts,  and  anxious 
to  know  rather  the  origin  of  things  than  things  themselves.  He  is 
not  a  student  of  nature  ;  he  inquires  not  for  facts,  forms,  phenomena ; 
he  is  not  in  the  fields  gathering  flowers ;  he  hammers  not  the  rocks, 
forcing  them  to  tell  their  secrets ;  he  is  not  an  observer ;  he  can  not 
be  an  empiricist.  All  this  is  evident  in  the  Jewish  youth  of  Tar- 
sus. During  the  play -hour  he  mingles  with  his  school-mates;  but  when 
alone  he  meditates,  not  on  things,  but  on  truth.  Neither  plain,  nor 
sea,  nor  sky ;  neither  the  earth,  nor  the  mountains,  nor  the  stars,  ar- 
rest the   gaze,  or  capture  the  thought  of  this  wretchedly  built  phys- 


CLASSICAL  EDUCATION  OF  PAUL.  359 

ical  pupil  of  the  Cilician  schools.  He  is  introspective  by  nature, 
quietly  thoughtful  from  habit ;  he  seeks  subjects,  not  objects.  ' 

If  he  did  not  spend  years  iu  the  schools  of  Tarsus,  it  was  not  be-  1 

cause  of  any  deficiency  of  scholarship  in  their  teachers,  or  because  of  j 

a  limited  curriculum  of  study,  or  because  it  was  not  honorable  to 
graduate  from  any  of  its  numerous  halls  of  learning.     The  colleges  of  ' 

Tarsus  were  not  excelled  by  those  of  Alexandria,  Athens,  or  Rome.  j 

Here,  then,  for  a  brief  period,   the  provincial   Saul  is  a  school-boy.  , 

Certain  it  is,  that,  after  acquiring  a  knowledge  of  the  alphabet,  he 
seeks  a  knowledge  of  mathematics.  He  is  a  born  mathematician  ;  his 
Epistles    are   mathematical  truths.     In    these   days  he  develops  the  j 

logical  faculty,    perhaps  disputing  with  professor  and   student,   and 
triumphing  in  every  intellectual  contest.      He  studies  metaphysics, 
poetry,  and  art,   for  the   youth   of  nineteen  centuries  ago  was  lim- »^    ] 
ited  to  mathematics,  metaphysics,  poetry,  and  art.     He  studied  the  i 

Greek  language,  which  was  the  language  of  the  people,  and  may  have  j 

become  familiar  with  Greek  authors,  Greek  systems  of  philosophy, 
and  Greek  ideas  of  life.  This  probability  Canon  Farrar  disputes  on 
the  general  ground  that  his  Epistles  contain  no  allusions  to  such  au-  | 

thors  or  such  subjects,  forgetting  that  just  as  he  ostracized  himself 
from  nature,  so  also  he  may  have  cut  loose  from  Grecian  influence. 
If  he  was  sent  at  thirteen  years,  of  age  to  Jerusalem  to  complete 
his  education,  it  is  certain  he  did  not  master  these  authors  or  sub- 
jects before  going  ;  but,  as  he  spent  several  years  in  his  native  city 
after  his  graduation  in  Jerusalem, jit  is  more  than  probable  that  he 
familiarized  himself  with  Grecian  and  Roman  literature,  inasmuch  as 
no  other  was  accessible,  and  because  a  knowledge  of  it  was  necessary  ' 

fully  to  prepare  him  to  meet  sophist,  philosopher,  or  teacher  in  pub-  j 

lie  discussion  or  private  conversation.  He  is  dialectical,  like  a  philoso- 
pher ;  he  alludes  to  the  wisdom  of  the  Greeks;  he  quotes  their  poets,  j 
and  on  Mars'  Hill  confounds  Stoic  and  Epicurean.  He  denounces  ] 
science,  "  falsely  so-called,"  and  cautions  the  Colossians,  lest  any  man 
spoil  them  through  philosophy ;  that  is,  by  sophistical  reasonings,  such 
as  a  Gorgias  might  impose,  with  which  he  had  become  acquainted  in 
Tarsus.  These  sufficiently  indicate  that  Paul's  philosophical  educa- 
tion at  Tarsus  followed,  if  it  did  not  precede,  his  religious  instruction 
at  Jerusalem. 

The  parental  influence  in  the  Jewish  family  was  usually  exclusive 
and  supreme.     It  decided  the  occupation,  the  marriage,  and  the  re-  i 

ligion  of  the  children.  These  decisions,  it  is  true,  were  in  harmony 
with  public  customs,  orders,  institutions,  and  laws ;  but  the  prepara- 
tion of  a  child  for  such  decisions  was  a  part  of  the  home-training, 
and  relieved  the  grown-up  son  of  some  embarrassments.     In  no  fam-  , 


360  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

Uy,  perhaps,  was  the  governing  influence  more  patent  or  more  potent 
in  'the  education  of  the  children  than  in  Saul's  childhood  home. 
Tarsus  was  a  pagan  city,  tolerant  of  the  Jewish  religion  because  it  was 
a  "  free  "  city,  but  enforcing  pagan  ideas  in  the  schools  and  encourag- 
ing the  superstitious  worships  of  the  times,  so  far  as  it  enforced  any 
worship  or  religion  at  all.  From  such  religious  influences  Saul's  par- 
ents were  anxious  to  rescue  their  only  sou.  There  is  nothing  on 
record  that  they  objected  to  the  Greek  language,  or  to  the  courses  of 
study  in  the  schools ;  but  the  religious  atmosphere  of  the  city  was 
poisonous,  and  the  public  religion  repulsive  to  their  taste  and  faith. 
On  this  ground,  if  on  no  other,  they  determined  that  their  sou  should 
go  to  Jerusalem,  where  his  education  might  be  completed  in  a  school 
equal  to  any  in  Tarsus,  and  his  religion  be  uncoutaminated  with  pagan 
teaching  and  example.  At  thirteen  years  of  age  he  enters  Jerusalem, 
a  student  excited  by  the  glowing  descriptions  he  had  heard  iu  his 
home  of  the  city  of  God,  and  a  devout  believer  in  the  faith  of  Abra- 
ham. The  turning-point  in  his  life  had  come,  or  was  now  passed. 
Both  his  education  and  religion  are  guaranteed.  He  is  not  a  pagan ; 
he  is  a  Hel)rew.     He  is  not  a  Greek ;  he  is  a  Jew. 

During  the  college  life  of  Saul  in  Jerusalem  it  is  difficult  to  de- 
termine which  exerted  the  controlling  influence  in  the  development 
of  his  character,  the  educational  environment  or  the  religious  spirit, 
or  whether  they  were  co-equal  in  power  and  relation.  In  intellectual 
endowment  the  young  man  had  few  superiors,  and  soon  exhibited  an 
aptness  to  study,  a  facility  in  acquiring  knowledge,  and  an  original 
and  persevering  habit  of  inquiry  that,  while  astonishing  his  instruct- 
ors, revealed  to  them  the  man  of  the  future.  In  the  school  of 
Gamaliel  he  early  took  the  highest  rank,  both  as  a  student  and  a 
dialectician,  often  engaging  with  Gamaliel  himself  in  the  discussion 
of  the  most  abstruse  problems,  and  reasoning  with  such  penetrating 
force  and  sublime  reverence,  that  it  was  generally  believed  a  mighty 
advocate  of  Judaism  was  being  raised  up  in  the  person  of  Saul.  His 
was  a  large  brain ;  his  intellect  seemed  avaricious  for  truth ;  and, 
stimulated  in  its  pursuit  by  parental  teaching,  liy  profound  discussion, 
and  especially  by  the  natural  bent  of  his  genius,  it  is  not  surprising 
that  he  excelled  the  disputants  of  the  school,  and  er^erged  as  a 
young  giant.  In  these  days  his  logical,  that  is,  philosophical,  powers, 
acute  as  those  of  Socrates,  soonest  appeared,  and  were  more  promi- 
nently developed;  he  was  usually  inductive  in  his  methods  of  inquiry, 
but  a  lurking  deductive  tendency  finally  displayed  itself,  and  became 
the  ruling  principle  of  his  mental  action.  Attributing  to  a  process 
of  revelation  the  great  doctrinal  truths  of  his  Epistles,  he  was  as 
ready  to  settle  fundamental  questioiis  hj  logic  as  by  revelation.     In  him- 


PREPARATION  FOR  THE  APOSTOLATE.  361 

self  he  was  philosophical;  as  an  instrument  he  was  a  revealer;  but  liis  ^ 
revelations  are  philosophical  in  content  if  not  in  form. 

In  religious  opportunities  Jerusalem  was  in  advance  of  Tarsus. 
The  Hebrew  religion  was  the  public  religion,  paganism  being  confined 
to  the  public  functionaries,  of  whom  the  majority  were  appointees  of 
the  Roman  government.  In  fact,  the  religious  condition  of  the  two 
cities  was  reversed.  In  Tarsus  paganism  was  the  public  religion,  the 
Jewish  faith  being  tolerated ;  in  Jerusalem,  Judaism  was  the  re- 
ligion of  the  people,  while  paganism  was  confined  to  limited  official 
circles.  In  Tarsus  a  superior  secular  education  was  possible ;  in 
Jerusalem  a  superior  religious  education  was  certain.  Hence,  Saul's 
religious  education  is  assured,  because  he  is  in  Jerusalem.  He  is 
"brought  up"  in  Jerusalem  in  the  faith;  what  is  commenced  in 
Tarsus  is  completed  in  the  Holy  City;  acquiring  the  Greek  in  Tar- 
sus, he  acquires  the  Hebrew  in  Jerusalem,  and  emerges  as  a  scholarly 
rabbi,  a  defender  of  the  Judaic  religion,  and  hostile  to  the  rising  faith 
of  the  Redeemer.  Paganism  in  Tarsus ;  Judaism  in  Jerusalem.  Be- 
hold in  Saul  the  scholar,  the  rabbi,  the  advocate,  the  religionist.  The 
two  schools  have  done  their  work. 

Saul's  real  preparation  for  the  apostolate,  which  is  his  final  historic 
position,  is  by  no  means  complete  ;  but  his  preparation  as  an  apolo- 
gist for  the  old  faith  has  been  sufficiently  indicated  in  these  lines  to 
justify  a  glance  at  his  work  as  such  apologist.  Passing  the  prelimi- 
nary period  of  birth,  youth,  and  education,  therefore,  he  stands  be- 
fore us  an  equipped  advocate  of  Judaism,  and  almost  without  an 
equal.  Prior  to  his  day  Jewish  teachers,  in  defending  their  faith, 
were  compelled  to  assail  different  forms  of  paganism,  with  the  differ- 
ent instruments  of  their  religion,  for  single  errors  must  be  combated  ^ 
with  single  or  specific  truths,  and  not  with  all  that  religion  teaches. 
Idolatry  must  be  met  by  monotheism  ;  the  immorality  of  the  Roman 
Empire  must  be  met  by  the  ethical  laws  of  the  Mosaic  economy  ; 
Sabbath  desecration  must  be  counteracted  by  the  Sabbath  law ;  and 
general  sinfulness  must  be  condemned  on  the  ground  of  individual  re- 
sponsibility to  God  in  the  last  day.  The  idea  of  an  attack  on  a  single 
error  by  a  single  truth  is  philosophical,  and  the  method  is  usually 
successful.  In  the  time  of  Gamaliel,  however,  the  defense  of  Juda- 
ism implied  an  attack  on  an  entirely  different  form  of  religion  ;  more, 
it  implied  a  conflict  with  a  supremely  new  idea  of  religion  ;  it  implied  ^ 
a  conflict  with  a  new  religion,  one  not  pagan  in  its  dogmas  or  prac- 
tices, one  not  inferior  to  Judaism  in  its  claims  or  teachings,  one 
above  Judaism  in  its  tone,  purposes,  and  agencies.  Fighting  with 
paganism  was  like  cannonading  pebbles  ;  fighting  with  Christianity 
was  like  an  attempt  to  pull  down  the  stars  on  one's  head. 


362  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISriANITY. 

It  is  significant  that  in  that  period  of  history,  until  Saul's  appearance, 
Judaism  had  no  logical  or  heroic  defender,  and  Christianity  no  positive 
or  dialectical  assailant.  Herod  haughtily  ridiculed  the  Christ,  and 
Pilate  ordered  his  execution,  but  these  were  social  and  civil  acts,  and 
not  in  the  interest  of  any  religion.  Saul  is  the  exponent  of  Jewish  >J 
hatred,  in  logical  form,  of  Christianity,  and  stands  as  its  philosoph- 
ical opponent.  It  is  noteworthy  that  he  is  usually  represented  as  a 
persecutor  of  the  new  religion,  employing  the  brutal  weapons  of 
cruel  opposition  to  limit,  if  not  prevent,  its  threatening  ascendency 
in  the  Jewish  world,  and  that  he  is  quite  willing  to  go  far  and  near 
to  accomplish  his  purpose.  This  is  the  lowest  aspect  in  which  his 
early  apologetic  career  can  be  viewed.  It  requires  neither  genius  nor 
courage  to  be  a  persecutor ;  any  depraved  man  can  be  such.  Saul 
was  more  than  a  persecutor.  He  was  the  philosopher  of  Judaism.  - 
His  opposition  to  Christianity  was  neither  from  depravity  of  nature 
nor  cruelty  of  impulse,  but  on  grounds  religious  in  form,  but  philo- 
sophical in  principle.  His  was  the  persecution  of  the  philosopher ;  "* 
it  was  logic  reduced  to  stones  or  kindled  into  fire.  Educationally, 
he  was  fitted  for  just  such  opposition  ;  and,  religiously,  he  was  bound 
to  the  extreme  of  self-defense. 

Yet,  scanning  his  career  as  a  high-toned  persecutor,  it  does  not 
appear  that  he  employed  educational  means  in  defense  of  the  old  or 
resistance  of  the  new  faith.  He  never  engages  in  forensic  discussions 
with  the  apostles  on  the  diflPerences  of  the  two  economies  ;  he  iiever 
issues  parchments  in  explanation  of  the  two  faiths ;  he  never  appar- 
ently examines  that  which  he  assails,  for  believing  in  the  old  it  is 
impossible  that  the  new  religion  can  be  true  ;  he  attacks  the  new  by 
violence,  and  means  to  stamp  ^it  out  by  personal  force  and  legal  ad- 
vantage. The  ground  of  his  persecution  is  philosophical ;  the  method  - 
of  his  persecution  is  physical,  brutal.  Any  method  may  be  employed 
to  accomplish  the  philosophical  purpose,  so  thought  Saul ;  but  this  is 
unphilosophical.  If  a  project,  purpose,  or  end  be  philosophical,  the 
method  by  which  it  is  promoted  must  be  philosophical.  This  was 
Saul's  break-down,  the  break-down  of  method.  Under  the  influence 
of  Judaism,  and  reckless  of  method,  he  could  imprison  helpless 
women  without  compunction,  and  sanction  the  murder  of  devout  dis- 
ciples without  a  thought  of  wrong.  Saul's  personal  attitude  is  the 
attitude  of  prejudice,  because  his  religion  is  insuflScient  to  deliver 
him  from  it,  and  because  his  method  of  activity  is  such  as  to  keep 
it  alive  and  give  it  edge  and  power.  The  need  of  another  religion 
might  be  founded  on  Saul's  relation  to  the  old  faith,  and  its  effect 
on  him. 

Saul's  career  as  the  antagonist  of  Christianity  is  of  short  duration. 


NECESSITY  OF  SAUL'S  CONVERSION.  363 

He  meant  to  make  short  work  of  the  new  faith,  little  thinking  that  his 
zeal,  his  genius,  his  spirit  of  leadership,  and  the  dialectical  habit  of  his 
mind,  would  be  employed  for  twenty  years  in  the  defense  of  that 
which  he  seemed  ambitious  to  destroy.  He  was  permitted  to  exercise 
his  powers  in  the  wrong  direction,  as  a  prophecy  of  what  he  could  do 
when  he  should  turn  in  the  right  direction.  Viewing  his  conversion 
as  a  providential  event,  it  was  a  strategic  move  to  deprive  Judaism 
of  its  chief  advocate,  and  reinforce  Christianity  by  the  very  agency 
which  threatened  to  extirpate  it.  The  conversion  of  Gamaliel  would 
not  have  been  of  so  great  service  to  the  rising  faith  as  that  of  Paul. 
Education,  scholarship,  genius,  logic,  religious  faith,  and  religious 
zeal,  may  be  regarded  as  a  legitimate  and  absolutely  imperative  part 
of  the  equipment  of  an  apostle  ;  but,  with  these  and  nothing  more,  • 
Saul's  preparation  had  been  markedly  incomplete.  His  religious  atti- 
tude toward  Christianity  must  be  changed  before  he  can  proclaim  or 
defend  it ;  his  moral  nature  must  undergo  the  transforming  power  of 
Christianity  before  he  can  define  or  recommend  it.  No  change  is  re- 
quired in  his  education ;  the  change  required  is  religious.  No  other  ^ 
school  must  he  needs  attend  but  the  school  of  Christ. 

The  conversion  of  Saul,  like  any  case  of  conversion,  was  a  most 
wonderful  event  in  its  character,  circumstances,  processes,  and  extent 
of  results.  There  is  in  Scripture  no  other  conversion  so  fully  re- 
ported, and  human  history  furnishes  no  instance  that  parallels  it.  It 
stands  alone,  and  properly;  for,  as  Saul  had  represented  Judaism,  so 
thereafter  he  must  represent  Christianity,  both  as  a  system  of  truth, 
and  as  the  source  of  regenerating  power.  This  he  can  not  do  without 
positive  experience.  It  is  imperative  that  he  pass  through  Christian- 
ity, or  rather  that  Christianity  pass  through  him,  that  he  may  know 
what  it  is  and  what  it  can  do.  No  such  necessity  is  imposed  by  any 
other  religion.  An  intellectual  acquaintance  with  its  truths,  or  with 
itself  as  a  system  of  truths,  and  a  belief  in  them,  is  all  that  religion 
required  until  Christianity,  which,  in  addition  thereto,  required  a 
spiritual  apprehension  of  its  truths,  and  a  spiritual  experience  of  their 
meaning  and  power.  Conversion,  according  to  Christianity,  is  not 
merely  an  intellectual  change,  or  a  change  of  belief,  or  a  change  of 
sentiments,  or  a  change  of  truths.  Important  as  such  change  is,  and 
involved  in  conversion  as  it  is,  it  is  not  conversion.  Nor  may  it  be 
defined  as  a  change  of  relations  to  religion  ;  for,  while  such  change 
is  a  condition,  it  is  not  the  essence,  of  the  religious  life.  Regenera- 
tion, involving  external  relations  or  conduct,  and  internal  relations 
or  the  intellectual  attitude,  is  richer  in  its  spiritual  content,  and  more 
comprehensive  in  its  spiritual  range,  than  either.  It  has  reference  to 
a  new  life  in  man ;  it  is  an  organic  spiritual  life  that  did  not  previ- 


364  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHPJSTIANITY. 

ously  exist.  When  it  occurs,  it  equals  a  new  birth,  so  great  is  the 
chauge  in  character.  The  old  life  dies;  the  new  life  begins.  With 
its  occurrence,  every  thing  changes;  the  man  is  new — new  in  his 
seutimeuts,  new  in  his  faith,  new  in  his  external  relations,  new  in  his 
intellectual  apprehensions,  new  in  his  spiritual  life.  Language  can 
not  adequately  portray  the  change;  it  can  only  declare  that  it  has 
taken  place. 

This  change  Christianity  requires  of  its  subjects ;  it  never  required 
any  thing  less ;  it  did  not  require  less  of  Saul.  In  his  case,  however, 
the  order  of  change  is  the  reverse  of  that  which  usually  takes  place 
in  one  who  fully  accepts  the  Lord  Jesus  Christ  as  the  Savior.  Fre- 
quently, the  external  change,  or  change  of  relation,  and  the  internal 
change,  or  change  of  sentiment,  belief,  appreciation,  precede  the 
spiritual  change,  or  change  of  nature  wrought  by  supernatural  power. 
It  sometimes  happens  that  intellectual  conversion  takes  place  long 
before  spiritual  conversion,  and,  as  a  rule,  the  former  precedes  the 
latter.  Saul,  however,  was  spiritually  converted  before  his  intellectual 
judgment  of  Christianity  changed  or  conformed  to  the  spiritual  ideal 
of  life.  His  intellectual,  that  is,  philosophical,  attitude  toward 
Christianity  made  it  impossible  for  him  calmly  and  thoroughly  to 
examine  the  spiritual  truths  of  the  new  religion,  and  without  exam- 
ination he  could  not  receive  it.  In  his  case,  therefore,  there  is  no 
attempt  on  his  part  to  inform  himself  of  the  essential  meaning  of 
Christianity,  and  no  providential  agency  employed  to  arrest  his  thought 
or  convince  his  judgment.  Hence,  the  suggestion  of  a  psychological 
explanation  of  his  conversion  made  by  Pfleiderer  is  unwarranted,  for 
not  a  single  precedent  psychological  condition  is  involved  in  it. 
There  is  no  previous  examination  of  Christianity ;  there  is  no  previous 
change  in  the  mental  attitude  of  Saul  respecting  Christianity;  there 
is  no  psychological  conversion  antedating  the  spiritual  revolution  in 
his  life.  The  psychological  conversion  is  subsequent  to,  and  the  re- 
sult of,  the  spiritual  conversion.  The  primary  change  occurring  first, 
secondary  changes  immediately  followed.  The  external  relation  of 
Saul  to  the  new  religion  at  once  conformed  to  the  new  life  begotten 
in  him  by  the  Spirit  of  God.  Separation  from  Judaism  was  the  in- 
evitable result  of  a  change  of  affection  toward  it,  or  an  absence  of 
attachment  for  it.  An  inward  preference  for  Christianity  seizing 
him,  he  was  bound  by  the  expulsive  power  of  the  new  affection  to 
abandon  the  old  faith  and  declare  for  the  new.  Christianity,  rooting 
itself  in  the  soul-life,  does  more  than  manipulate  the  sentiments ;  it 
molds  the  affections,  and  wins  the  subject  in  spite  of  mental  remon- 
strance or  social  resistance.  Saul  found  himself  a  changed  man ;  as 
a  result,  his   relations  to  Judaism  and  Christianity  regulated  them- 


ACCOUNTS  OF  THE  CONVERSION.  365 

selves,  and  his  intellectual  attitude  harmonized  with  his  spiritual 
experience. 

Sometimes  the  conversion  of  Paul  is  referred  to  as  a  miracle,  but, 
as  it  seems  to  us,  in  forgetfulness  of  what  constitutes  a  miracle,  and 
of  what  conversion  is,  its  purpose  in  this  case,  and,  in  the  larger  sense, 
its  design  in  the  economy  of  Christianity.  Unless  every  conversion 
is  a  miracle,  this  particular  conversion  can  not  be  explained  as  a 
miracle.  In  its  important  features,  it  does  not  differ  from  conversions 
in  general ;  in  the  order  of  preparation  for  conversion,  Saul's  experi- 
ence difiers  from  the  majority;  in  the  "accessories"  of  the  event, 
there  are  some  unusual,  if  not  miraculous,  signs  or  displays,  but  these 
must  not  be  identified  with  the  event  itself.  Pentecost,  or  the  great 
spiritual  baptism  of  the  infant  Church,  was  in  no  sense  miraculous, 
though  the  appendages  of  the  occasion  were  very  striking,  and  even 
miraculous.  Saul  was  converted  by  the  Holy  Ghost,  just  as  every 
human  being  must  be  who  is  converted ;  his  apprehensions  of  Christ 
were  changed  as  Christ  manifested  himself  to  him ;  and,  surrendering 
immediately,  and  accepting  without  debate  the  entire  truth  of  Christ, 
he  was  converted.  The  divine  agencies  employed  in  the  conversion  of 
others  were  likewise  employed  in  the  conversion  of  the  man  of  Tarsus. 
There  is  no  difference  in  agency ;  it  is  the  same  power,  the  same 
wasdom,  the  same  glory.  The  difference  between  his  conversion  and 
that  of  others  is  the  difference  of  antecedent  preparation,  or  order  of 
change,  and  the  difference  in  the  method  of  spiritual  manifestation 
and  attendant  paraphernalia.  The  conversion  itself  was  the  spiritual 
change  wrought  by  the  divine  Spirit,  with  only  a  difference  of  order 
in  preparation  and  method  in  manifestation.  The  differences  are 
minor ;  the  event  itself  is  the  principal  thing. 

Of  this  conversion,  three  accounts  are  given  in  the  New  Testa- 
ment, substantially  agreeing  to  the  most  minute  particulars.  Luke 
relates  it  quite  fully  in  the  ninth  chapter  of  the  Acts  of  the  Apostles, 
and  Paul  himself  reports  it  in  detail,  first,  in  the  temple  in  Jerusalem, 
and,  second,  before  Festus  and  Agrippa  in  Csesarea.  The  salient 
points  are  discovered  at  a  glance.  Embittered  because  of  the  rapid 
progress  of  Christianity,  and  fearing  its  future  ascendency  in  the 
world,  the  Rabbi  resolves  upon  an  immediate  and  decisive  inaugura- 
tion of  agencies  for  its  suppression.  It  does  not  appear  that  this 
movement  against  the  disciples  of  the  Lord  is  prompted  by  a  concerted 
action  of  the  school  of  Gamaliel,  or  by  any  consultation  with  the 
priests  of  Jerusalem.  Saul  is  originator  of  the  scheme  of  opposi- 
tion. All  he  asks  is  a  commission  from  the  authorities  to  proceed. 
Obtaining  the  requisite  letters,  and  selecting  his  body-guard,  he  hastily 
and  joyfully  departs  from  Jerusalem  on  his  way  to  Damascus,  with 


366  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

the  avowed  purpose  of  rescuing  Judaism  from  its  new  and  dangerous 
environment,  of  extinguishing  the  new  religion.  The  journey  is  a 
difficult  one.  The  crossing  of  the  Anti-Lebanon  range  is  wearisome, 
because  slow  and  unattractive.  At  last  the  party  begin  to  descend 
the  eastern  slopes,  from  which  the  wide-extended  plain  in  which 
Damascus  is  situated  is  plainly  visible.  Practically,  the  journey  is 
ended  ;  a  ride  of  three  hours,  and  the  gates  of  the  embowered  city 
will  open  to  the  footsteps  of  the  arch-oppressor.  The  jaded  horses  are 
spurred,  for  the  leader  of  the  company  is  anxious  to  suppress  the  re- 
ligious revolution,  the  head-quarters  of  which  have  been  transferred 
to  Damascus.  They  ride  rapidly,  and  without  solemnity.  It  is  a  ride 
of  victory.  Over  that  road  the  writer  himself  has  traveled,  and 
halted  where  Saul  halted  about  the  noon-hour.  Just  beyond  is 
the  city. 

Human  calculations  sometimes  fail,  human  endeavors  sometimes 
are  for  nought.  In  a  moment  the  city  fades  from  Saul's  sight,  the 
mountain  journey  is  forgotten,  and  all  earthly  things  are  unknown  to 
this  ringleader  of  persecutors.  He  falls  as  if  the  mountain  behind 
had  rolled  upon  him ;  he  hears  a  voice,  but  it  is  not  that  of  man  ;  he 
sees  a  face,  but  it  is  not  that  of  one  who  belongs  to  the  earth. 
Helpless,  blind,  reserved,  and  calm,  Saul  is  a  prisoner  of  the  higher 
powers.  Helpless  as  a  child,  he  is  conducted  into  the  city  slowly  and 
with  reverent  step.  The  hilarity  of  one  hour  ago  is  superseded  by  a 
solemnity  that  the  body-guard  themselves  share ;  the  malicious  scheme 
of  their  leader  withers  in  his  hands  like  poisonous  flowers,  and  is  for- 
ever cast  aside ;  and  on  he  goes  to  the  appointed  house  of  Judas,  on 
the  street  called  Straight,  to  receive  instruction.  What  a  change ! 
Expecting  to  enter  the  city  with  a  shout,  he  goes  with  prayer  on  his 
lips ;  thinking  to  enter  the  gates  with  delight,  he  enters  as  a  blind 
man,  not  knowing  whither  others  may  lead  him ;  intending  to  slaughter 
the  disciples,  he  is  at  once  ushered  into  their  company,  and  is  depend- 
ent on  them  for  comfort  and  instruction.  Ananias,  living  on  one  of 
the  crooked  streets  of  the  city,  was  deputed  by  the  Holy  Ghost  im- 
mediately to  proceed  to  the  house  of  Judas,  where,  finding  Saul,  he 
laid  his  hands  on  him,  and  he  received  his  sight  and  also  the  Holy 
Ghost.  Here  is  a  double  vision ;  temporal  sight  restored,  and  spirit- 
ual sight  fully  given.  Saul  is  numbered  with  the  disciples,  and  known 
thereafter  as  Paul. 

The  inquiry  as  to  the  time  of  Paul's  conversion  is  pertinent,  since 
some  writers  hold  that  the  work  of  regeneration  was  performed  and 
completed  on  the  plain,  and  that  the  subsequent  baptism  received  at 
the  house  of  Judas  was  a  second  or  distinct  spiritual  work ;  while 
others  insist  that  regeneration  in  its   initial   stages   occurred    at  the 


APOSTOLIC  EQUIPMENT  OF  PAUL.  367 

noon-hour,  and  was  completed  at  the  end  of  three  days  on  the  visita- 
tion of  Ananias  to  Saul.  There  seems  to  be  no  sufficient  reason  for 
doubting  that  conversion  actually  took  place  on  the  plain,  for  Saul 
surrendered  to  Christ,  and  became  obedient  as  a  child.  By  that  act 
he  renounced  Judaism,  abandoned  his  mission  to  Damascus,  and  de- 
sired at  once  to  enter  upon  the  service  of  the  Master.  As  Dr.  W. 
M.  Taylor  expresses  it,  ' '  the  spiritual  crisis  was  over  before  Ananias 
appeared,"  and  the  Christian  life  was  already  a  reality  to  Saul. 

Believing  this  position  invulnerable,  it  remains  to  interpret  the 
spiritual  baptism  at  the  house  of  Judas.  What  was  it,  or  what  did 
it  signify  ?  It  signified  either  a  second  work  of  the  Spirit,  commonly 
called  sanctification,  or  a  special  sph-'diuil  preparation  for  the  apostolic 
office;  the  latter  seems  the  more  rational  interpretation.  To  be  sure, 
if  regeneration  was  experienced  on  the  plain,  it  might  seem  as  if 
sanctification  was  the  after-experience  in  the  city.  This  is  possible, 
and,  within  certain  limits  of  view,  probable ;  but  when  it  is  remem- 
bered that  Paul  was  a  chosen  vessel  to  bear  the  great  Name  to  the 
Gentiles,  and  that  he  must  suflTer  many  things  for  Christ's  sake,  it  is 
natural  to  infer  that  the  baptism  was  a  preparation  for  apostolic  life. 
It  is  true  that  sanctification  will  prepare  the  minister  for  ministerial 
life,  as  it  does  the  average  Christian  for  the  Christian  life;  but  be- 
yond these  religious  conditions  is  that  peculiar  state  or  prerogative 
which  inheres  in  the  apostolic  or  ministerial  office,  for  which  special 
education  is  required.  If,  then,  we  teach  that  the  ceremony  at  the 
house  of  Judas  was  the  induction  of  Paul  into  his  apostolate,  and 
that  the  spiritual  baptism  then  received  was  the  full  and  final 
apostolic  equipment  of  the  candidate,  it  is  because  the  record  of  the 
event  will  bear  the  interpretation  without  doing  injustice  to  the  other. 

The  effect  of  the  spiritual  transformation  on  Paul  was  as  deep 
and  radical  as  the  transformation  itself.  It  was  all-important  that  he 
should  recognize  the  supernatural  character  of  the  change  through 
which  he  had  passed,  or  its  loftiest  benefit  had  not  been  appropriated. 
Judaism  did  not  emphasize  the  doctrine  of  regeneration  as  the  con- 
dition of  entrance  into  the  kingdom  of  God.  The  old  administration 
was  content  with  its  elaboration  of  the  doctrine  of  the  Fatherhood  of 
God,  and  imposed  upon  men  those  duties  that  grew  out  of  faith  in 
divine  providence.  Spiritual  change,  as  formulated  by  the  New 
Testament  teachers,  was  but  dimly  apprehended  by  the  old  economists, 
many  of  whom,  in  particular  Joseph,  Moses,  Elijah,  Samuel,  and 
Daniel,  were  as  saintly  in  their  lives  and  as  enthusiastically  devoted 
to  religion  as  Peter,  James,  and  John,  of  later  times.  But  the  Jew 
of  Paul's  day,  darkened  by  traditions,  and  stunted  in  his  growth,  had 
no  correct  conception  of  what   is   known   as  spiritual   regeneration. 


368  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

Saul  himself  was  a  bigoted  Pharisee,  "a  zealous  formalist,  and  a  heioic 
guardian  of  the  old  faith ;  but  his  was  not  a  biogenetic  faith.  He 
must  experience  regeneration ;  he  must  not  only  be  converted  by  su- 
pernatural power,  but  the  inward  change  must  be  supernatural.  The 
change  occurring,  it  separated  him  from  the  old  faith,  as  restored  health 
separates  from  diseased  conditions.     The  new  faith  became  his  life. 

In  this  change  the  beginning  of  Paul's  relation  to  Christianity  is 
apparent.  He  did  not  embrace  it  from  a  previous  knowledge  of  its 
merits,  or  from  a  long-standing  conviction  of  its  truth ;  he  had  not 
discussed  it  with  Peter,  as  Luther  and  Dr.  Eck  discussed  the  two 
phases  of  the  Christian  faith,  and,  being  vanquished,  had  yielded  the 
old  and  accepted  the  new  faith ;  he  had  not  been  persuaded  by 
friends,  or  even  warned  by  Providence  that  any  truth  of  Christianity 
was  vital  to  his  happiness  or  usefulness ;  but  he  is  changed  by  the 
power  that  makes  for  righteousness,  and  he  would  sooner  have  de- 
nied himself  than  deny  the  Lord  who  mercifully  overwhelmed  him 
with  light.  He  recognized  the  supernatural  character  of  his 
transformation. 

Its  more  manifest  effect  was  the  reconstruction,  not  only  of  certain 
temporai-y  plans,  but  also  of  his  entire  life-plan,  which  hitherto  had 
been  devoted  to  the  maintenance  of  Judaism.  From  the  moment  of 
his  equipment  for  the  apostleship  he  entered  upon  it,  severing  the 
ties  that  bound  him  to  the  Judaic  dispensation,  and  renouncing  al- 
legiance to  those  duties  which  he  had  voluntarily  assumed.  Paul  is 
more  than  a  disciple — he  is  henceforth  a  preacher  of  the  religion  he 
aimed  to  destroy.  By  his  education  and  general  training ;  by  his  knowl- 
edge of  Judaism  a-nd  his  acquaintance  with  the  Jewish  nation  ;  and  by 
his  relations  to  the  Gentile  world,  he  is  fitted  for  a  public  career,  and  at 
once  engages  in  public  tasks  and  duties.  By  his  conversion,  so  deep 
and  so  thorough ;  by  his  obedient  and  trustful  spirit ;  by  his  heroism 
and  consecrated  zeal,  he  is  qualified  to  proclaim  Christianity  to  all  the 
world,  and  begins  to  preach  in  Damascus,  the  very  city  that  was  to 
witness  the  extinction  of  the  truth  that  now  filled  his  heart.  He  does 
not  wait  to  be  examined,  licensed,  or  put  on  probation,  but  goes 
forth  to  declare  the  revelation  of  Christ  to  him.  It  w^as  always  the 
boast  of  Paul  that  he  received  his  call  from  the  Lord ;  that  he  preached 
not  by  the  will  of  man,  and  that  what  he  taught  was  that  which  he  re- 
ceived from  God.  This  made  him  confident  in  spirit  and  invincible 
in  argument.  He  preached,  not  his  sentiments,  nor  the  traditions  of 
others,  but  what  came  to  him  through  the  channels  of  regeneration 
and  revelation.  No  other  such  instance  is  known  to  the  Church.  As 
to  the  ministry,  vox  ecclesice  is  considered  supreme ;  but  no  Church 
votes  him  a  license,  and  no  apostles  ordain  him  to  the  sacred  oflfice. 


SCIENTIFIC  EXPLANATION  OF  CONVERSION.  369 

In  a  sense  he  is  above  organizations,  orders,  institutions,  for  he  is  in 
charge  of  the  Christ  whom  he  persecuted.  He  stands  pre-eminently- 
above  the  apostles,  and  is  the  noblest,  because  the  truest,  exponent  of 
Christianity. 

It  is  not  surprising  that  so  complete  and  radical  a  change  in  his 
character  and  conduct  should  give  rise  to  various  explanations  of  the 
alleged  conversion  ;  nor  is  it  surprising  that,  since  it  was  a  genuine 
conversion,  all  explanations  that  eliminate  the  supernatural  element 
utterly  fail  to  satisfy  the  inquirer.  Baur  says  that  "in  his  sudden 
transformation  from  the  most  vehement  adversary  into  the  most  reso- 
lute herald  of  Christianity,  we  can  see  nothing  short  of  a  miracle." 
It  was  not  a  miracle,  for  conversions  are  occurring  constantly ;  but  it 
impresses  scholarly  men  as  something  wonderful,  as  catastrophic  in 
human  history,  to  be  explained  only  by  supernatural  intervention, 
and  is  therefore  of  the  nature  of  a  miracle.  The  fact  of  the  con- 
version can  not  be  denied.  It  is  a  matter  of  record  in  profane  as  in 
sacred  history,  in  Jewish  as  in  Christian  Avritings.  It  viiist  therefore 
be  explained.  Several  theories  have  been  propounded  for  the  clearing 
up  of  the  profound  mystery  which  is  involved  in  the  historic  event. 

The  ' '  scientific  "  explanation  excites  interest.  If  the  event  has 
any  natural  ground,  or  was  a  purely  rationalistic  process,  and  can  be 
made  so  to  appear,  then  the  supernatural  feature  will  disappear ;  but, 
even  if  such  a  solution  is  possible,  it  does  not  alter  the  stupendous 
fact  of  Saul's  changed  attitude  and  career.  The  career  of  Paul  is  mar- 
velous, even  if  the  offspring  of  the  naturalistic  spirit.  Renan, 
espousing  the  suggestions  of  Baur  in  particular,  and  assuming  to  be- 
lieve that  Luke's  account  and  Paul's  as  well,  of  the  conversion-scene, 
is  a  mythological  narrative,  clothes  the  event  with  natural  drapery, 
and  transposes  it  into  an  effect  of  atmospheric  conditions  and  phys- 
ical environment.  He  assumes  a  thunder-storm  in  progress  on  the 
plain.  Saul,  now  across  the  mountains,  with  city  in  sight,  is  be- 
wildered with  expectation  of  victory ;  his  head  is  turned  ;  the  sun 
pours  down  its  heat  upon  his  excited  brow ;  he  babbles  like  one  with 
fever  ;  he  reels  on  his  horse  as  if  sun-struck  ;  the  lightnings  flash  and 
his  ophthalmic  eyes  suffer  and  start  with  tears ;  the  thunder  roars,  and 
he  falls  to  the  ground.  All  this  is  possible.  These,  however,  are 
external  conditions ;  these  are  physical  states,  to  obtain  which  Renan 
drew  on  his  imagination,  for  the  Scriptural  account  does  not  contain 
them.  It  makes  no  reference  to  a  storm,  or  that  Saul  was  bewil- 
dered, or  sick,  or  sun-struck.  Besides,  if  the  atmospheric  conditions 
were  such  as  he  describes,  the  men  with  Saul  must  have  suffered 
likewise,  or  been  affected  in  a  similar  way  ;  but,  while  he  fell  to  the 
earth,  they  stood;   while  he  saw  Jesus   Christ,  they  "saw  no  man;" 

24 


370  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

while  he  talked,  they  were  speechless;  while  they  heard  a  voice  they  un- 
derstood it  not.     It  is  at  least  strange  that  no  one  is  affected  as  is  Saul. 

If  Saul's  condition  was  the  result  of  physical  causes,  then  a  phy- 
sician would  have  been  called  so  soon  as  the  party  arrived  in  the 
city ;  but  it  seems  that  physical  remedies  were  not  sought  either  by 
himself  or  his  friends.  Saul  understood  himself,  and  preferred  the 
retnedy  of  discipleshv\ 

A  singular  feature  of  the  proceeding  on  the  plain  is  the  conversa- 
tion that  ensued  between  Saul  and  his  invisible  interlocutor.  A  "voice" 
is  heard  by  the  men  with  Saul.  They  did  not  pronounce  it  thunder,  as 
does  Renan.  "  Who  ever  heard  the  thunder,"  asks  Dr.  Schaff,  "  speak 
in  Hebrew  or  in  any  other  articulate  language  ?"  Thunder,  light- 
ning, sun-stroke,  ophthalmia,  these  are  natural  phenomena;  but  the 
"  voice,"  the  conversation,  the  obedient  purpose,  the  changed  attitude, 
the  extinct  rebellion  in  Saul,  the  spiritual  preference,  the  love  of  dis- 
cipleship,  and  the  new  life  of  that  hour,  are  signs  of  a  spiritual 
phenomenon,  not  to  be  explained  by  the  legerdemain  of  a  storm,  or 
the  heroic  vacillation  of  a  feverish  sinner. 

The  unsoundness  of  the  physical  theory  of  Saul's  conversion  being 
discovered,  the  Tiibingen  school  of  rationalists  have  proposed  a 
pyschological  explanation  of  it,  which,  superior  to  the  other  in  that 
it  interprets  it  as  an  intellectual  or  subjective  process,  is  as  inade- 
quate as  the  other,  and  to  be  abandoned  as  quickly  and  as  rationally 
as  one  abandons  the  other.  Holsten  is  the  principal  defender  of  this 
theory.  It  is  alleged  that  Saul,  all  his  lift-time,  Avas  subject  to 
visions  and  delusions,  which  prepared  him  for  the  great  hallucination 
to  which  he  finally  submitted.  On  his  way  to  Damascus  he  was 
reticent,  introspective,  meditating  on  the  testimony  of  Stephen, 
and  absorbed  with  the  great  designs  of  the  crucified  Christ,  as  they 
had  reached  his  ears.  In  this  self-forgetting  state  of  mind,  wonder- 
ing if,  after  all,  the  new  Master  might  not  be  the  promised  Messiah, 
and  silently,  but  perceptibly,  gravitating  toward  such  a  belief,  he 
found  himself  within  sight  of  the  oldest  city  in  the  world  ;  and,  in- 
stinctively and  religiously  revolting  against  the  mission  he  had  planned 
respecting  the  Lord's  disciples,  he  swooned  as  if  sun-struck,  but  was 
really  stunned  by  his  conscience  and  overcome  by  remorse  of  guilt. 
During  the  swoon,  or  trance,  he  had  a  supposed  vision  of  the  Lord, 
and  heard  his  voice  and  conversed  with  him,  the  result  being  a  per- 
manent modification  of  religious  belief  and  a  new  direction  to  his  sub- 
sequent life. 

The  difference  between  the  physical  and  the  psychological  theories 
is  that  the  former  attributes  the  conversion  to  external  causes, 
while  the  latter  attributes   it  to  internal  conditions.     The  one  is  ob- 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  EXPLANATION  OF  CONVERSION.     371 

jective,  the  other  subjective  ;  the  one  refers  the  event  to  the  influence 
of  nature,  the  other  to  human  or  mental  activity.  Neither  attributes  it 
to  the  supernatural,  or  involves  a  single  supernatural  element.  The 
event  is  a  natural  or  human,  and  not  a  supernatural,  event.  If,  how- 
ever, the  conversion  was  a  purely  subjective  event,  it  establishes  that 
Saul  was  the  victim  of  his  own  delusion,  and  not  the  victim  of  an- 
other's hallucination.  He  was  self-deceived,  others  did  "not  deceive 
him.  He  saw  a  form,  a  face,  but  it  was  unreal,  it  was  the  invention 
of  a  highly  excited  imagination  ;  he  heard  a  voice,  but  it,  too,  was 
unreal,  it  was  the  echo  of  his  own  thought.  Saul  must,  therefore,  be 
viewed  as  an  unbalanced  heretic,  erring  by  reason  of  his  imagination, 
drifting  suddenly  into  mysticism  because  unable  to  restrain  the  activ- 
ity of  his  idealistic  faith, — all  of  which  is  contraiy  to  the  temperament, 
education,  career,  and  profession  of  Saul,  who  is  understood  to  have 
been  a  man  with  little  or  no  imagination,  with  no  poetic  fervor,  with 
no  training  in  mystical  lore ;  a  man  disciplined  by  danger,  cool  in 
emergency,  and  never  given  to  delirium,  either  in  his  religious  or  so- 
cial life.  To  establish  the  theory  will  require  a  new  portraiture  of 
Saul,  a  blotting  out  of  his  well-known  characteristics,  and  the  inven- 
tion of  a  man  entirely  different  fi-om  the  Apostle  to  the  Gentiles. 

Equally  fatal  to  the  theory  is  the  consideration  that  had  Saul  in  a 
moment  of  excitement  abjured  Judaism,  from  the  temporary  belief 
that  Christianity  is  the  final  religion,  he  would  afterward,  when 
reason  was  again  installed,  have  reviewed  his  hasty  action  and  re- 
turned to  the  embrace  of  the  old  faith.  If,  when  in  a  delirium  or 
dream,  Christianity  appeared  to  him  true,  when  rational  and  self- 
restrained  it  might  have  appeared  false,  in  which  event  he  would  have 
abandoned  it.  But  it  seems  that  in  his  rational  moments,  as  in  the 
delirium,  he  declared  for  Christ  on  the  ground  that  he  had  both  seen 
and  heard  him';  and  there  was  no  disposition,  after  his  examination 
of  the  two  religions,  to  confess  haste  or  error  in  turning  from  one  to 
the  other.  Even  if  it  could  be  granted  that  the  conversion,  being 
psychological,  was  a  delusion,  it  can  not  be  said  that  the  subsequent 
rational  judgment  of  Saul  respecting  Christianity  was  a  delusion,  or  the 
error  of  his  imagination. 

Prof.  Reuss,  of  Strassburg,  detecting  the  weakness  of  the  psycho- 
logical theory,  pronounced  the  conversion  an  "  unsolved  psychological 
problem  ;"  but  it  is  not  a  psychological  any  more  than  it  is  a  physical 
problem.  It  is  a  supernatural  problem,  lifted  out  of  the  circle  of  the 
physical  and  the  psychological,  the  only  solution  of  which  is  the 
actual  manifestation  of  Christ  to  Saul,  and  the  work  of  his  Spirit  in 
the  heart  of  the  Hebrew.  If  Paul's  testimony  to  the  event  is  insuf- 
ficient to  establish  it,  his  career  in  defense  of  it  is  unanswerable  ;  his 


372  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

after-life  is  au  irresistible  argument  for  the  truth  of  Christianity. 
Behold  the  scholar  and  the  Christian;  behold  the  educated  and  the 
converted  man !  Education  and  religion  are  his  special  equipments 
for  his  life-work,  which  is  foreshadowed  in  the  revelation  to  Ananias 
that  Saul  is  chosen  as  the  Apostle  to  the  Gentiles. 

In  addition  to  these  equipments  Paul's  endowments,  or  his  tem- 
peramental" and  natural  heritage  must  be  catalogued,  in  order  fully 
to  comprehend  the  adaptation  of  the  man  to  his  providential  assign- 
ment. He  was  not  chosen  wholly  on  the  ground  of  his  scholarship  or 
conversion,  but  also  because  of  certain  natural  forces  or  qualities 
which,  independent  of  scholarship  and  religious  training,  constituted 
the  elemental  man,  but  which,  refined  by  culture  and  restrained  and 
directed  by  religion,  constituted  him  the  incessant  toiler,  the  invinci- 
ble hero,  and  the  unrivaled  apostle  in  the  Christian  Church.  Of 
the  moral  qualities  native  to  the  man,  none  is  more  conspicuous  than 
his  sincerity  of  conviction  and  -transparency  of  purpose,  which  always 
governed  him,  whether  as  a  Pharisee  or  a  Christian.  He  wore  no 
mask,  and,  free  from  self-deception,  scorned  to  deceive  others.  He 
was  not  an  enigma,  working  in  the  dark,  and  with  an  unsettled  pur- 
pose in  life.  He  had  a  distinct  duty  before  him,  and  proclaimed  it 
everywhere.  He  was  known  as  the  sincere  and  positive  defender  of 
what  he  believed  and  taught  as  the  truth.  Such  a  man  could  not  be 
negative  or  neutral,  but  was  always  on  one  side  or  the  other  in  every 
issue.  Outspoken,  honest,  and  conscientious,  he  struck  heavy  blows 
for  his  cause,  and  defended  it  from  conviction.  If  he  aroused  antag- 
onism, he  also  was  honored  for  the  simplicity  of  his  aims  and  the 
earnestness  of  his  methods.  In  his  plans,  labors,  discussions,  and  ag- 
gressions he  would  refer  to  the  approbation  of  his  conscience  as  proof 
that  he  worked  from  a  high  motive,  and  with  a  desire  to  promote  the 
reign  of  righteousness  in  the  world. 

He,  however,  was  more  than  the  moral  man ;  he  was  sincere, 
honest,  transparent,  and  tremendously  in  earnest ;  but  his  religious 
spirit  eclipsed  the  moral  side  of  his  life.  He  went  beyond  the  ethical 
into  the  positively  religious.  None  was  more  scrupulous  in  the  ob- 
servance of  the  Jewish  festivals,  in  the  repetition  of  the  Talmudic 
traditions,  and  in  the  use  of  the  Jewish  rituals,  than  Saul.  In  his  self- 
defense  before  his  countrymen  and  before  magistrates  he  boasted  of 
his  constant  obedience  of  Jewish  law,  of  his  practice  of  benevolence 
under  the  tithe  system,  of  his  manifold  works,  sacrifices,  and  prayers, 
as  prescribed  by  the  temple  party,  and  of  his  intense  appreciation  of 
Judaism.  As  his  moral  impulses  expressed  themselves  in  a  sincere 
and  transparent  life,  so  his  religious  spirit  expressed  itself  in  and 
through  the  national   religion  of  Palestine,  to  which  he  was  more 


PAUL'S  INTELLECTUAL  TEMPERAMENT.  373 

devoted  than  the  rabbis  of  the  schools.  To  be  sure,  he  was  only  cere- 
monially, and  not  therefore  sufficiently,  religious  ;  but  he  was  devout, 
reverent,  truth-loving,  the  antagonist  of  error,  and  the  hater  of 
wrong.  He  believed  in  holiness,  as  Moses  taught  it;  in  fraternity, 
as  Abraham  exemplified  it ;  in  justice,  as  Joshua  enforced  it ;  in  re- 
pentance, as  David  illustrated  it ;  in  wisdom,  as  Solomon  used  it ;  in 
foresight,  as  the  prophets  exhibited  it ;  in  courage,  as  Elijah  demon- 
strated it ;  in  consistency,  as  Daniel  lived  it ;  in  monotheism,  as 
Habakkuk  taught  it;  in  worship,  as  Nehemiah  enjoined  it;  and  in 
the  coming  Messiah,  as  Isaiah  and  Micah  had  foretold  the  fact.  Saul 
was  the  old  dispensation  over  again.  He  was  the  incarnation  of  the 
patriarchs,  the  judges,  the  kings,  and  the  prophets.  His  was  the  religion 
of  the  fathers  in  human  life  again.  Saul  was  moral,  he  was  religious 
by  nature.  This  was  a  strong  point  in  his  character,  and  biased  him 
in  the  choice  of  a  life  profession. 

Intellectually,  it  is  not  enough  to  say  he  was  superior  to  John  the 
Baptist,  who  may  have  been  his  school-mate  in  Jerusalem,  or  superior 
to  Gamaliel,  who  was  the  professor  of  law  in  the  University  of  Jeru- 
salem, or  superior  to  the  men  of  "his  age  ;  he  Avas  a  giant,  without  a 
rival  in  his  day,  without  an  equal  since  his  time.  His  was  a  broad- 
gauge  mind,  apprehending  truth  in  all  aspects  and  relations,  and  cov- 
eting knowledge  as  if  it  were  his  individual  inheritance.  A  truth- 
seeker,  the  Aveakness  of  error  soon  disclosed  itself  under  his  analytic 
process,  and  retired  from  his  presence  ;  half-truths  yielded  to  his  logic, 
and  quit  the  field  without  a  conflict.  Severely  logical,  he  w^as  un- 
compromising when  the  truth  Avas  found,  and,  with  the  aid  of  revela- 
tion, he  Avas  ahvays  sure  to  find  it.  What  Paul  Avas  in  his  apostolic 
life,  as  a  logician  and  teacher,  he  Avas  in  an  embryonic  state  in  his 
youth  and  early  manhood.  He  Avas  the  logical  youth,  the  mathe- 
matical man,  the  intellectual  teacher,  the  doctrinal  apostle. 

His  national  spirit,  or  love  of  his  people,  was  rare  in  its  integrity 
and  ungovernable  in  its  expression.  It  is  altogether  probable  that 
Palestine,  like  Cilicia,  was  Avithout  the  poAver  to  affect  him,  for  the 
aesthetic  sense  either  did  not  exist  or  Avas  never  aAvakened  in  him  ;  but 
his  people  aroused  his  patriotism,  their  history  kindled  his  pride  and 
enthusiasm,  and  their  religion  received  his  reverence  and  devotion. 
His  is  not  the  attachment  to  country,  but  love  for  a  people.  In  this 
one-sided  patriotism  Avas  his  special  fitness  for  the  apostolate,  Avhich 
required  him  practically  to  forsake  his  country  but  not  his  people. 
His  love  of  locality  was  not  strong ;  hence  he  itinerated  Avithout 
regret ;  he  longed  not  for  particular  spots  or  scenes  ;  he  was  at  home 
every AA'here — in  Rome  as  in  Damascus,  in  Athens  as  in  Antioch,  in 
Ephesus  as  in  Jerusalem.     Palestine  did  not  charm  ;  localities  did  not 


374  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

fascinate.  But  in  all  places  he  met  his  "kinsmen  according  to  the 
flesh,"  to  whom  he  was  eager  to  preach  Christ  and  him  crucified. 
Even  when  he  turned  to  the  Gentiles,  shaking  from  his  feet  the  dust 
of  the  cities  of  Israel,  he  never  forgot  the  Jewish  race,  but  prayed  for 
their  repentance  unto  life.  Still,  remembering  that  the  last  shall  be 
first,  and  the  first  last,  he  devoted  his  energies  to  the  indoctrination 
of  the  Gentile  world,  which,  however  steeped  in  heathenism,  was 
more  susceptible  to  spiritual  influence,  and  really  anxious  for  the 
light  of  the  new  truth. 

In  a  very  eminent  degree  Paul  was  possessed  of  the  genius  of 
leadership,  another  qualification  for  his  apostolate.  It  is  trifling  with 
his  career  to  accuse  him  of  ambition,  and  discreditable  to  his  history 
to  impeach  him  of  a  love  of  place ;  for,  while  able  to  meet  the  re- 
quirements of  exalted  station,  it  does  not  appear  that  place  was 
sought,  or  that  he  was  unhappy  when  dispossessed  of  it.  As  a 
Pharisee,  he  occupied  the  highest  rank  ;  socially,  he  was  admitted 
into  the  most  refined  and  cultured  households  ;  and  as  a  religious 
teacher,  none  was  more  respected,  and  none  received  larger  emolu- 
ment or  nobler  honor.  Eecognition,  place,  honor,  estate,  all  were 
his  so  long  as  he  was  a  Pharisee.  All  were  lost  so  soon  as  he  pro- 
fessed faith  in  the  Messiah.  Eecognition,  except  in  the  form  of  per- 
secution, is  denied  him  ;  honors  are  withheld,  and  the  position  he  oc- 
cupied declared  vacant ;  estates  collapse  at  his  feet,  and  the  world 
recedes  in  his  presence.  It  has  nothing  to  offer  him,  and  robs  him  of 
that  which  it  formerly  conferred.  Surely  ambition  dies  when  it  has 
nothing  to  feed  on,  and  love  of  place  perishes  when  it  disappears 
from  the  vision  of  man.  It  was  not  innate  ambition  that  qualified 
Paul  for  leadership. 

The  energy  of  Paul  was  sui  generis.  It  was  the  energy  of  jjersonality.  It 
was  not  the  expression  of  animalic  force,  but  the. outburst  of  his  intel- 
lectual and  religious  life  in  consolidated  action.  One  sees  it  in  Elijah, 
Luther,  Cromwell,  Mohammed,  Knox,  Hildebrand,  Csesar,  and  Char- 
lemagne. It  is  the  inside  life  turned  into  outside  events.  It  is  the 
substance  of  the  heroic,  the  guarantee  of  achievement.  Paul  was  sur- 
pliced  with  heroism.  His  was  the  energy  of  lightning;  his  the  en- 
thusiasm of  fire.  Dr.  Schaff  reports  that  "he  combined  Semitic 
fervor,  Greek  versatility,  and  Roman  energy."  In  him  centered 
the  aristocracy  of  power,  the  royalty  of  courage,  and  the  gener- 
osity of  light. 

One  may  sometimes  arrive  at  a  knowledge  of  physical  forces  by  a 
study  of  them  from  two  stand-points.  For  instance,  one  may  deter- 
mine the  beneficence  of  electricity  by  the  destruction  it  is  able  to 
accomplish ;  that  is,  the  useful  or  helpful  power  of  electricity  may 


KEY  TO  LEADERSHIP.  375 

be  suspected  from  its  power  to  do  harm.     In  like  manner,  one  may 
also  predicate  the  utility  of  fire  from  its  ability  to  destroy.      In  such 
cases  destruction  is  the  measure  of  the  conservative  value  of  force. 
By  such  a  rule  men  may  sometimes  be  judged  ;  that  is,  their  power 
for   mischief  is   the  measure  of  their   power  for  good,  their  evil  life 
affords  a  basis  of  calculation  of  what  their  righteous  life  may  become. 
The  actual  in  one  direction  is  the  suggestion  of  the  possible  in   the 
opposite  direction,  as  the  swing  of  the  pendulum  on  one  side  indicates 
the  possible,  if  not  certain,  ascent  on  the  other.   Constantine,  a  pagan 
ruler,  then  a  Christian  king ;  Luther,  a  Catholic,  then  a  Protestant ; 
John  Bunyan,  a  prisoner  in  the  cell,  then  a  writer  of  Christian  alle- 
gory ;  Peter,  the  fisherman,  then  an  apostle, — illustrates  the  rule  by 
which  one  kind  of  life  is  the  key  to  another  possible  kind   of  life. 
The  most  conspicuous  example  of  history  is   the  apostle  Paul,  who, 
in    his  Pharisaical   life,  was  courageous  from   conviction,  shrewd   in 
schemes   of  destruction,   despotic   in   their  execution,  self-reliant   in 
emergencies,    and    usually  triumphant   in    his    purposes.     The  frag- 
mentary biography  of  the  Pharisee  indicates  a  persevering,  resolute, 
iron-clad,  and  successful  man.     Such  a  record  is  the  key  to  his  pos- 
sibilities as  a  Christian.     Given  to  leadership  in  the  one  sphere,  he  is 
competent  for  it  in  the  other.     The  very  qualities  that  rendered  him 
a  terror  to  the  infant  Church,  qualified  him  for  aggressive  movements 
in  its  behalf,  and  rendered  him  an  object   of  dread  to  the  temple 
party.     The  Jew  knew  that  a  leader  had  gone  when  Saul   became  a 
Christian.     Of  his  weaknesses  few  are  recorded  against  him,  though 
it  is  allowed  that  he  partook  of  imperfection  and  grieved  over  it,  as 
other  men  grieve  over  their  infirmities.      He  was  a  man  of  temper,  as 
is  evident  from  his  treatment  of  Peter  and  his  quarrel  with  Barnabas ; 
but  the  weakness  of  the  man  was  the  measure  of  his  strength.  Temper 
is  personality  on  fire.     No  hero  equals  the  Son  of  man  in  moral  per- 
fection.      Abraham,     Moses,    David,    John,    Peter,    and    Paul    are 
eclipsed  by  the  Sun  of  Righteousness.     Granting  imperfection  to  the 
hero  of  Cilicia,  no  one  will  question  his  fitness  for  leadership  or  his 
adaptation  to  the  apostolate. 

In  a  previous  paragraph  we  say.  Behold  the  scholar  and  the 
Christian  !  we  now  say.  Behold  the  man  I  His  preparation  for  the  high 
office  of  apostleship  is  now  complete  ;  complete  because  he  is  a  scholar ; 
complete  because  he  is  a  Christian  ;  complete  because  he  is  a  man.  His 
future  is  assured,  because  there  are  poured  into  it  the  rich  treasures  of 
scholarship,  the  eternal  forces  of  religion,  and  the  plenary  glories  of 
a  model  manhood. 

The  revolution  in  Paul's  history  was  twofold  in  character ;  it  was 
religious,  arising   from   spiritual  regeneration,  it  was  intellectual  or 


376  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

doctrinal,  arising  from  the  new  experience  and  the  new  revelation. 
The  religious  revolution,  already  reported,  preceded  the  intellectual 
revolution  now  to  be  considered.  A  psychological  conversion  did  not 
antedate  or  prepare  the  way  for  the  spiritual  conversion  ;  the  reverse 
actually  occurred.  Hence,  Paul's  ideas  of  the  Christian  religion  were 
primarily  shaped  by  his  unexpected  religious  experiences;  his 
thoughts  are  religious  because  his  experiences  are  religious;  his 
doctrines  are  spiritual  because  he  first  apprehended  the  truth  in  its 
relation  to  himself  In  studying  Plato  one  is  constantly  impressed 
that  his  "Ideas"  are  supreme  and  constitute  the  essence  of  phi- 
losophy ;  so  in  studying  Paul  one  can  not  escape  the  conviction  that 
his  "Ideas"  are  the  ground  of  Christian  thought  and  constitute  the 
essence  of  the  truest  theology.  Paul's  Ideas,  therefore,  must  be 
sought  out,  separated  from  all  other  ideas,  and  indorsed  as  the  con- 
tents of  the  religion  of  the  Master. 

No  injustice  is  done  others  in  claiming  that  Paul's  intellectual 
work  stands  alone,  is  unequaled  by  that  of  any  other  apostle,  and 
must  be  regarded  as  the  all-sufficient  exponent  of  the  mind  of  God 
in  the  revelation  of  truth.  He  was  set  apart,  not  merely  as  an 
apostle,  to  be  a  herald  of  messages  or  worker  of  miracles,  or  as  a 
missionary  of  the  new  faith,  but  also  as  a  theologian,  a  teacher  of 
truth,  an  expounder  of  mysteries,  and  a  revealer  of  the  wisdom  of 
God  in  his  religious  plans  respecting  this  world.  Others  wrought 
miracles  ;  others  preached  ;  others  wrote  ;  but  he  was  commissioned 
to  formulate  the  divine  truth-ideals  in  theologic  form,  for  the  use  of 
the  Christian  Church  and  the  enlightenment  of  the  unsaved  Avorld. 
In  this  direction  he  went  farther  than  any  other  sacred  writer,  hold- 
ing up  the  light  a  little  higher,  and  calling  with  a  still  louder  voice 
to  mankind  to  believe  in  the  Lord  Jesus  Christ.  The  characteristics 
of  the  Pauline  theology ;  the  merits  of  his  interpretations ;  the 
harmony  of  his  views  with  those  of  the  Master  ;  the  range  of  his  in- 
tellectual vision,  and  the  spiritual  truths  that  he  unfolds,  making 
clear  what  was  obscure,  strengthening  what  seemed  to  be  weak,  and 
defending  what  was  liable  to  attack ;  are  enough  to  engage  the 
closest  thought  of  the  profoundest  inquirer  for  a  life-time. 

Paul's  ideas  are  divine  ideas.  He  affirms  as  much  when  he  says, 
"The  Gospel  which  was  preached  of  me  is  not  after  man.  For  I 
neither  received  it  of  man,  neither  was  I  taught  it,  but  by  the  revela- 
tion of  Jesus  Christ."  This  affidavit,  conscientiously  made,  is  im- 
portant; for  it  clearly  signifies  that  he  was  not  educated  or  disciplined 
into  a  belief  of  Christianity,  or  that  he  had  received  it  second-hand, 
or  borrowed  it  in  any  sense  from  man.  The  apostles  were  not  his 
principal  instructors ;    lie  had  no   privmry  teachers.      He   acquired  a 


STEPHEN'S  INFLUENCE  ON  PA  UL.  377 

knowledge  of  the  truth  in  no  circuitous  way,  in  no  school-like  way, 
in  no  alphabetical  way ;  nor  had  he  imbibed  it  as  a  popular  senti- 
ment, but  received  it  as  an  inspiration  from  God.  Not  by  laying  on 
of  hands,  not  by  any  physiological  process  of  communicating  spiritual 
things,  did  he  enter  into  sympathy  with  the  truth  or  an  honest 
adoption  of  it.  Nor  does  it  appear  that  by  a  rationalistic  process  he 
■wrought  out  the  truth,  or  planned  to  discover  it,  or  found  it  as  other 
men  find  the  truth.  To  him  the  truth  unsought  came ;  upon  him  it 
fell  as  light  falls  upon  the  earth,  as  rain  falls  upon  the  grass.  In 
this  respect  he  is  alone.  No  philosopher  obtains  truth  except  by 
seeking  it;  no  human  mind  receives  spiritual  truth  except  through 
sympathy  with  it  and  ardent  searching  for  it.  Paul  is  authoritative, 
not  as  a  discoverer  of  truth,  but  as  the  receiver  of  truth  ;  he  is  the 
echo  of  the  divine  voice ;  he  is  the  truth.  Less  than  this  can  not  be 
granted ;  more  than  this  is  not  required. 

However,  the  inspirational  attitude  of  Paul,  as  a  teacher  of  truth, 
must  be  understood  as  including  all  those  complex  influences  which 
joined  in  his  education  and  prepared  him  to  be  a  receiver  of  truth. 
Not  every  man  can  receive  as  much  as  Paul ;  not  every  mind 
can  comprehend  as  much  as  Paul.  A  gulf  is  larger  than  a  rivulet ; 
Paul's  gulf-mind  took  in  more  than  the  creek-mind  of  Jude.  Paul 
was  intellectually  prepared  for  revelations.  Certain  other  influences, 
doctrinal  and  otherwise,  also  entered  into  his  preparatory  life,  which, 
not  recognized  perhaps  at  the  time  by  himself,  contributed  to  that 
large  theological  grasping  so  noticeable  in  his  later  utterances  and 
writings.  Among  these  unrecognized  forceful  influences  may  be 
placed  the  theologic  teaching  of  Stephen  in  his  address  for  his  life 
before  the  Sanhedrim,  Saul  hearing  it  and  excited  to  wrath  by  it. 
The  address,  as  a  literary  performance,  was  masterly  ;  as  an  argu- 
ment, it  was  unanswerable  ;  as  a  revelation  of  truth,  it  was  full  of 
surprises,  and  provoked  the  bitterest  resentment  in  the  minds  of  those 
educated  in  Judaism.  It  is  altogether  probable  that  Saul,  then  about 
thirty -five  years  old,  reviewed  the  address  in  his  own  mind,  and  saw 
for  the  first  time  the  radical  difference  betAveen  the  faith  of  Christ 
and  the  religion  of  the  Sanhedrim.  The  knowledge  of  this  difference, 
instead  of  leading  him  to  further  inquiry,  only  infuriated  him  the 
more,  and  really  provoked  his  contemplated  massacre  of  the  Christians 
in  Damascus.  Too  much  preparatory  influence,  however,  has  been 
attributed  to  Stephen  in  Saul's  conversion.  Augustine  declared  that  if 
Stephen  had  not  prayed,  Paul  had  not  been  converted  ;  and  Pressense 
holds  that  Stephen  made  so  powerful  an  impression  on  Paul  that  he 
inaugurated  a  system  of  persecutions  in  order  to  quiet  the  tempest  of 
his  soul.     This  is  conceding  far  too  much  ;  the  concession  is  a  specu- 


378  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

lation.  There  is  no  evidence  that  Stephen's  address  influenced  the 
psychological  attitude  of  Paul,  and  indirectly  led  to  his  conversion  ; 
but  it  is  plain  that,  conversion  having  taken  place,  Stephen's  theo- 
logic  influence  on  Paul  begins  to  be  felt,  as  he  recalls  his  testimony 
and  remembers  his  martyrdom  in  its  behalf.  The  truth  reported  by 
Stephen,  Paul  now  believes  and  adopts.  In  his  missionary  addresses 
to  the  Jews,  in  his  doctrinal  epistles  to  the  Churches,  and  in  his 
prayers  everywhere,  Paul  draws  on  the  phraseology  of  Stephen,  or 
employs  some  of  the  religious  ideas  of  his  address,  showing  that, 
while  uninfluenced  by  him  at  the  time,  he  recognized  in  his  converted 
state  the  majesty  of  Stephen's  utterances  and  the  inspiration  of  the 
truths  he  then  announced.  Not  denying  the  influence  of  Stephen,  it 
is  proper  to  insist  that  it  had  no  educational,  no  theologic,  power  on 
Paul  until  after  the  revelation  of  the  Messiah  to  him  at  the  time  of 
his  conversion.  Abraham  Lincoln's  addresses  on  the  rights  of  slaves, 
or  the  inalienable  right  of  all  men  to  freedom,  in  the  years  1856-1S60, 
fell  on  dull  ears  in  our  great  South-land ;  but  after  the  abolition  of 
slavery  even  the  South  perceived  the  great  truths  that  had  been  pre- 
viously uttered,  and  accepted  them  as  basal  thoughts  of  the  nation's 
life.  Truth  does  not  always  have  an  immediate  effect  on  an  unpre- 
pared mind ;  it  rarely  has  any  effect  on  such  a  mind,  except  to  in- 
flame it  with  hostility  against  it.  Stephen's  thoughts  reappear  in 
Paul's  Christian  theology,  and  yet  not  to  the  extent  or  in  any  way  to 
compromise  the  original  claim  of  the  apostle  that  he  received  the 
truth  from  Jesus  Christ.  Stephen's  thoughts  or  truths,  though  heard 
before  the  trip  to  Damascus,  came  to  Paul  as  influencing  thoughts 
after  the  trip  had  been  concluded,  and  were  rather  confirmatory  than 
suggestive  of  the  original  revelation. 

Paul's  claim  to  original  revelation  from  Jesus  Christ  is  sustained 
by  the  fact,  which  he  himself  relates,  that,  after  a  brief  sojourn  in 
Damascus,  he  retired  to  Arabia,  where  it  is  altogether  probable  he  spent 
nearly  three  years  in  seclusion  and  meditation  upon  his  new  and  great 
life-work.  Just  where  he  went,  and  whether  or  no  he  communicated 
during  that  period  with  any  human  being,  are  matters  to  which  he  does 
not  allude,  nor  any  one  else ;  but  the  inference  is  that  he  spent  the  time 
in  a  review  of  the  Hebrew  Scriptures  in  their  Messianic  features  and 
references,  and  in  a  study  of  his  new  experiences  and  of  the  prepara- 
tion required  for  his  new  position.  Evidently,  he  knew  but  little  of 
the  Scriptures  in  their  references  to  the  birth,  works,  career,  and 
death  of  the  Messiah,  or  he  had  discovered  their  fulfillment  in  Jesus 
of  Nazareth.  That  he  devoted  himself  in  his  solitude  to  the  thorough 
examination  of  the  Scriptures  on  these  points  is  all  but  certain,  as 
such  knowledge  was  absolutely  necessary  to  his  future  career  as  an 


PAUL'S  THEOLOGICAL  EDUCATION.  379 

apostle.  Moreover,  it  is  not  extravagant  to  claim  that,  during  the 
period  of  seclusion,  the  Lord  Jesus  again  visited  him,  not  as  a  re- 
prover or  to  discuss  the  question  of  duty  with  him,  but  as  the  glori- 
ous revealer  of  truth,  and  communicated  to  him  many  of  the  doctrines 
so  elaborately  presented  in  Paul's  Epistles.  To  be  sure,  the  facts  of 
the  incarnation,  the  baptism,  the  transfiguration,  the  miracles,  the 
crucifixion,  the  resurrection,  and  ascension  of  Christ,  may  have  been 
reported  to  Paul  by  the  disciples  of  Damascus ;  but  the  doctrinal  in- 
terpretations growing  out  of  such  facts,  such  as  regeneration,  justifica- 
tion, atonement,  faith,  love,  and  redemption,  may  have  been  inspira- 
tions,  or  the  result  of  personal  fellowship  with  Christ.  Arabia  proved 
to  be  a  theological  school  to  Paul,  in  which  the  only  teacher  was  the 
Master  himself.  In  Jerusalem,  Gamaliel  taught  him  Judaism;  in 
Arabia,  Christ  taught  him  Christianity.  The  proof  that  the  Arabian 
influence  was  helpful,  whether  the  result  of  jaersonal  meditation  or 
divine  revelation,  or  both,  as  we  judge  it  to  have  been,  is  in  the  im- 
proved tone  of  his  preaching,  or  rather  the  positive  affirmation  of  the 
Messiahship  of  Christ  after  his  return  to  Damascus.  To  him  Christ 
was  the  Son  of  God,  not  only  because  the  prophecies  of  the  Old  Tes- 
tament were  fulfilled  in  him,  but  also  because  Christ  revealed  himself 
as  such  to  Paul,  both  at  his  conversion  and  while  he  was  in  Arabia. 
From  careful  study  of  the  sacred  books,  Paul  concluded  the  doctrine 
must  be  true ;  but  by  revelation  he  l<new  it  to  be  true.  The  theolog- 
ical education  of  Paul  is  comtantly  iviproving,  because  the  revelations  are 
continually  inoxasing. 

The  human  element  in  Paul's  education  thus  far  is  insignificant. 
Grant  that  Stephen's  influence  was  considerable — it  came  later  in  life ; 
grant  that  the  disciples  of  Damascus  poured  into  his  ears  some  of  the 
truths  of  the  new  dispensation — his  time  with  them  was  short,  and  he 
occupied  most  of  it  in  preaching  ;  so  that  he  makes  good  his  claim  that 
the  truth  came  to  him  directly  from  Jesus  Christ,  If  any  human  in- 
fluence made  any  impression  upon  him,  and  if  any  divinely  called 
teacher  was  instrumental  in  his  theological  instruction,  such  influence 
was  felt  when  he  returned  to  Jerusalem  a  Christian  man,  and  such 
instrumental  teacher  was  the  apostle  Peter.  Even  his  relationship  to 
Peter  must  not  be  exaggerated ;  for  Paul  abode  in  Jerusalem  only 
fifteen  days,  spending  part  of  the  time  in  securing  recognition  among 
the  Christians,  some  of  the  time  in  visiting  with  James,  the  Lord's 
brother,  and  not  a  little  of  the  remainder  of  time  in  disputing  in  the 
synagogues,  and  publicly  affirming  that  Jesus  is  the  Christ.  Appar- 
ently, Paul  must  or  might  have  learned  much  from  Peter,  James, 
Barnabas,  and  others  in  the  Holy  City ;  he  might  have  visited  Geth- 
semane,  and  listened  to  its  story  of  sorrow ;  he  could  have  gone  to 


380  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

Calvary,  and  heard  in  his  heart  the  dying  shout  of  the  Redeemer, 
and  lingered  long  enough  at  the  sepulcher  to  see  the  Victor  rise ;  he 
could  have  walked  over  to  the  Mount  of  Olives,  and  witnessed  by 
faith  the  ascension  of  the  Lord;  and,  retracing  his  steps,  he  could 
have  tarried  on  the  Pentecostal  site  until  the  holy  baptism  had  been 
repeated  in  him.  Paul  may  have  been  a  sight-seer  in  Jerusalem,  and 
Peter  may  have  been  his  dragoman !  We  shall  not  insist  that  this  is 
the  case,  because  there  are  sufficient  reasons  for  believing  that  the 
reverse  is  true.  What  Peter  taught  him,  or  Avhether  Paul  received 
any  thing  from  him,  or  from  any  other  in  Jerusalem,  or  whether  Paul 
enlightened  Peter  and  the  infant  Church,  are  questions  not  settled  in 
the  Scriptural  narrative.  Naturally,  one  would  suppose  that  Peter 
would  communicate  to  Paul  a  full  account  of  Christ's  birth,  ministry, 
and  death ;  and  yet  there  is  no  record  that  the  interview  of  the  two 
apostles  had  any  religious  significance.  Perhaps  Paul  impressed  upon 
Peter  that  Christianity  was  larger  in  its  intent  than  Judaism,  and 
that  both  should  bear  it  to  the  Gentile  world  ;  perhaps  Paul  related 
his  conversion,  his  revelations  in  Arabia,  and  the  plan  of  his  life-work 
as  an  apostle ;  perhaps  Paul  declared  the  independence  of  his  apostle- 
ship,  and  his  amenability  only  to  Jesus  Christ.  During  this  visit,  it  is 
not  clear  that  Paul  is  particularly  instructed  by  any  body,  but  merely 
comforted  or  confirmed  in  his  faith,  while  he  may  have  instructed 
Peter  and  the  Christians  of  Jerusalem  in  the  broader  things  of  God. 

The  providential  fellowship  of  Paul  and  Luke  was,  in  the  religious 
sense,  more  advantageous  to  the  latter  than  the  former,  though,  from 
the  social  stand-point,  it  was  mutually  helpful  and  comforting;  and, 
inasmuch  as  Luke  was  a  physician,  and  Paul,  especially  after  his  en- 
counters with  mobs,  was  physically  dilapidated  and  ever  on  the  border 
of  a  break-down,  the  services  of  the  former  were  as  necessary  as  they 
were  refreshing.  The  religious  alliances  of  Paul  with  Timotheus, 
Aquila,  Luke,  and  others,  should  not  be  so  interpreted  as  to  convey 
the  impression  that  he  was  to  the  smallest  extent  indebted  to  them 
for  spiritual  knowledge  or  the  revelation  of  truth,  for  he  was  the 
Gospel  father  of  many  of  his  friends,  and  the  instructor  of  those  who 
had  been  longer  in  the  faith  than  himself  His  religious  experience 
developed  a  social  hunger,  which  was  appeased  only  by  Christian 
fellowship,  which  he  ever  sought  and  only  rarely  obtained.  From  all 
the  data  on  the  subject,  the  conclusion  is  warranted  that  Paul  was 
not  inducted  into  a  knowledge  of  the  Christian  religion  by  man,  but 
received  religious  truth,  as  he  had  spiritual  experience,  from  Jesus 
Christ.  The  proof  that  Paul's  ideas,  whatever  they  are,  are  divine, 
is  complete. 

To  ascertain  just  what  he  received,  or  to  state  the  contents  of  the 


CONFLICT  WITH  JUDAISM.  381 

Pauline  theology,  is  our  next  business.  In  order  to  a  complete  tri- 
umph in  his  day,  Christianity  was  compelled  to  contest  the  rights, 
teachings,  and  pur])oses  of  three  organic  religious  ideas,  because  they 
were  out  of  harmony  with  its  spirit,  and  incapable  of  union  with  it  on 
the  grounds  of  rational,  not  to  say  revealed,  truth.  The  necessary 
threefold  conflict  of  Christianity  with  the  opposing  forces  in  human 
society  is  a  key  to  the  revelation  made  to  Paul,  and  an  explanation 
of  his  apostolic  career.     These  conflicts  were  with — 

1.  Judaism,  a  divinely  ordained  religion. 

2.  Paganism,  in  its  multiform  organisms,  or  Gentilism. 

3.  Philosophy,  or  Culture,  religious  and  otherwise. 

The  conflict  of  Christianity  Avith  Judaism  has  the  appearance  of  a 
conflict  of  the  supernatural  with  the  supernatural,  for  the  inspirational 
element  abounds  in  the  one  as  in  the  other;  and  that  the  one  had  a 
divine  mission  is  as  evident  as  that  the  other  is  ordained  for  the  ac- 
complishment of  a  divine  purpose.  Why  the  conflict,  then?  The  re- 
lation of  Judaism  to  Christianity  it  is  not  at  all  difficult  to  define ;  but 
the  Jew,  because  of  perversity  of  judgment,  never  would  recognize 
the  relation,  and  has  obstinately  opposed  that  form  of  religion  which 
in  its  inmost  spirit  is  but  the  fulfillment  of  his  holiest  faith.  In 
Paul's  case,  the  religious  revolution,  otherwise  his  conversion,  did  not 
consist  in  a  mere  exchange  of  religious  dogmas;  it  was  really  less  an 
abandonment  of  certain  Judaic  sentiments,  than  a  right  interpretation 
of  them  and  the  discovery  of  their  fulfillment  in  the  new  religion. 
Uninterpreted,  and  especially  misinterpreted,  Judaism  in  the  hand 
of  the  Jew  became  a  weapon  of  self-destruction ;  rightly  interpreted, 
it  opened  the  way  to  the  Lord  Jesiis  Christ.  Fortunately,  Paul  was 
impressed  to  put  a  right  interpretation  upon  it,  and  began  immediately 
after  conversion  to  declare  its  propsedeutic  office  and  relation  to  Chris- 
tianity. It  was  none  the  less  divine  because  it  was  not  a  final  religion. 
John  the  Baptist  was  none  the  less  an  inspired  herald  because  Christ 
succeeded  him.  Judaism  was  the  preliminary  form,  or  advertisement, 
of  the  final  faith,  and  dropped  out  of  sight  so  soon  as  it  was  fulfilled. 

This  was  Paul's  dictum  everywhere,  on  account  of  which  he 
was  persecuted  in  every  city,  and  suffered  many  things  for  Christ's 
sake.  Because  of  this  definition  of  Judaism,  the  Jews  of  Damascus 
organized  to  slay  him,  and  he  departed  by  night  from  the  city,  escap- 
ing by  being  let  down  "by  the  wall  in  a  basket."  Because  of  the 
espousal  of  Christianity  on  this  basis,  the  Jews  of  Jerusalem  deter- 
mined to  kill  him,  and  he  again  fled  to  another  place  of  safety.  In 
Asia  Minor  as  in  Syria,  and  in  Macedonia  as  in  Italy,  the  Jews 
exhibited  toward  him  a  malicious  spirit.  Judaizing  teachers  insisted 
on  the  observance  of  the  Mosaic  ritual  as  a  condition  of  salvation, 


382  ■    PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

and  obstructed  the  work  of  the  apostle  by  tantalizing  methods  and 
false  devices.  The  priests  and  elders  were  far-seeing  enough  to  dis- 
cover that  in  proportion  as  the  new  faith  spread  the  old  faith  must 
decline,  and  so  were  violent  in  their  denunciation  of  Jews  who  })assed 
from  the  tutelage  of  the  one  into  the  experience  of  the  other.  When 
it  was  impossible  to  prevent  the  defection  of  their  own  people,  or  the 
Gentile  multitudes  from  embracing  the  Messianic  religion,  they  were 
ready  to  compromise  on  the  basis  of  a  mixed  religion ;  that  is,  the 
Christian  must  be  a  believer  in  some  of  the  Mosaic  traditions  and  an 
observer  of  some  of  the  Judaic  ceremonies. 

A  conflict  on  these  lines  was  inevitable.  It  must  be  settled  once  for 
all  to  what  extent  the  Judaic  spirit  shall  affect  the  Christian  life,  or 
whether  it  shall  not  entirely  disappear,  giving  place  to  the  higher 
truth  of  Christianity,  which  shall  be  supreme  in  its  authority  over 
man.  The  Jews  were  troubled ;  Jewish  Christians,  reverential  in 
feeling  toward  the  old  dispensation,  were  agitated  ;  Gentile  Christians, 
recognizing  no  obligation  to  Judaism,  were  aroused  ;  and  the  apos- 
tles themselves,  eager  perhaps  to  unite  the  two  faiths,  or  bridge  the 
distance  between  them,  were  anxious  for  a  settlement  of  the  difiicult 
problem.  After  many  triumphs  in  Gentile  fields,  Paul  hastens  to 
Jerusalem  to  report  to  a  council  of  apostles  and  elders  the  work 
of  grace  among  the  Gentiles,  and  to  discuss  the  necessity  of  the 
circumcision  of  Gentile  converts,  and  how  far  Jewish  laws  and 
usages  should  prevail  in  the  Christian  Church.  It  was  a  remarkable 
council,  both  for  the  character  of  the  disputants  and  the  decisions 
finally  reached.  The  fate  of  Christianity  was  involved  in  the  issiie. 
The  council  was  divided  in  opinion  in  the  beginning,  but  was  har- 
monious in  its  conclusions,  affirming  the  position  of  Paul,  who  de- 
nied the  necessity  of  the  circumcision  of  the  Gentiles,  but  did  not 
object  to  it  in  the  case  of  Jewish  Christians.  He  had  taken  Titus, 
a  Gentile  convert,  with  him,  and  demanded  his  exemption  from  the 
barbarous  rite  of  the  Jews.  In  this  new  position  Peter  loyally  and 
fervently  supported  him  ;  James  indorsed,  but  with  no  enthusiasm  ; 
and  the  council,  by  a  large  majority,  decreed  the  exemption  of  Gen- 
tile converts  from  circumcision  and  all  other  Jewish  obligations. 
Christianity  broke  with  Judaism  on  a  fundamental  point,  and  was 
relieved  of  future  embarrassments.  AVe  see  in  Paul  no  compromising 
spirit,  no  jutting  out  of  "liberal  Christianity"  when  an  essential 
principle  is  involved,  and  no  disposition  to  yield  what  had  been 
gained.  Clearing  the  Christian  Church  of  Jewish  influence,  which 
was  Paul's  open  purpose,  he  intended  that  it  should  rest  on  a  Chris- 
tian idea,  to  which  all  other  ideas,  laws,  and  usages  should  fully  con- 
form.    The   concession   of  circumcision   to  Jewish  Christians,  which 


CONFLICT  WITH  OENTILISM.  383 

was  agreed  to  by  the  apostles,  was  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  the 
favor  of  the  Jews;  but  Paul  knew  that  if  it  did  not  involve  them  in 
future  trouble  it  would  soon  expire.  He  himself  agreed  to  it  on 
the  ground  of  expediency,  and  because  it  did  not  sacrifice  the  main 
principle. 

The  dominant  idea  in  the  Christian  Church,  according  to  Paul,  is 
Messiahship.  This  appeared  in  his  experience,  and  it  must  be  authori- 
tative in  the  Church.  The  idea  itself  meant  separation  from,  because  it 
was  the  fulfillment  of,  Judaism.  Paul  knew  Judaism.  He  knew  its 
heartlessuess,  its  lack  of  spiritual  power,  the  insignificance  of  its  barren 
forms,  the  intellectual  limitation  of  its  highest  truths,  and  the  inertia  of 
the  whole  economy.  None  knew  it  better  than  Paul.  None  was  more 
anxiou^  to  save  the  Gentile  world  from  it  than  he.  It  was  the  leaven 
of  hypocrisy,  the  ministration  of  death.  The  Messianic  idea  is  in- 
spiration itself.  As  a  truth,  it  is  the  key  to  all  other  religious  truth ; 
as  the  central  fact  of  Christianity,  it  is  the  illumination  of  all  it 
teaches  or  contains.  Paul  knew  the  meaning  of  Messiahship,  and  was 
anxious  that  it  should  prevail.  In  breaking  with  Judaism,  therefore, 
he  severed  a  vital  relation.  In  preferring  Christ  to  Moses,  he  es- 
chewed the  formal  type  of  religion  for  a  life-saving  system ;  he 
abandoned  ceremonies  for  truths,  and  a  dull  faith  for  a  triunii^hant 
experience ;  he  emerged  from  darkness  into  light.  The  primary  idea 
of  the  Pauline  theology  is  Messiahship,  with  its  cognate  truths. 

In  his  religious  advances  he  found  it  also  necessary  to  break 
with  Gentilism,  or  with  its  organic  religious  systems,  which,  unlike 
Judaism,  were  not  fulfilled  in  Christianity.  The  conflict,  therefore, 
was  not  a  conflict  of  interpretation,  but  a  conflict  for  mastery  involv- 
ing the  destruction  of  the  one  and  the  vindication  of  the  other.  It 
involved  not  the  oppositions  of  truths,  so-called,  but  the  opposition 
of  truth  and  error.  It  meant  the  surrender  of  the  one  to  the  other. 
Paganism,  with  its  organic  systems,  its  effete  ideas,  its  forlorn  hope, 
confronted  the  apostle  everywhere,  and  stubbornly  and  irrationally 
disputed  the  truth  he  proclaimed.  He  must  needs  introduce  new 
ideas  into  the  public  thought  of  the  Gentile  world,  and  compare  the 
old  worn-out  systems  of  religion  with  that  of  the  Son  of  God.  New 
ideas  must  demolish  old  ideas ;  a  new  system  of  truths  must  entirely 
subvert  the  old  systems  of  error.  The  antagonism  is  direct,  because 
the  difference  is  immeasurable.  Long  before  Paul  preached  the  ser- 
mon in  Antioch  of  Pisidia,  he  had  revealed  in  divers  places  the  subject- 
matter  of  Christianity,  as  a  system  of  truth;  but  as  this  discourse  is 
quite  fully  reported,  it  may  be  quoted,  along  with  others,  as  reflect- 
ing the  Pauline  conception  of  Christianity  in  its  relation  to  the  Gen- 
tile world.     In  addition  to  the  positive  affirmation  of  the  Messiahship 


384  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

of  Christ,  supported  by  indisputable  proofs,  Paul  distinctly  enounces 
and  logically  elaborates  the  doctrine  of  justification  by  faith  and  the 
foro-iveness  of  sins,  founded  on  the  atonement  of  the  crucified  Lord. 
Thouo-h  the  sermon  was  formally  preached  to  the  Jews,  many  Gen- 
tiles heard  it,  and  before  Paul  quitted  the  city  he  repeated  it,  or 
amplified  the  great  doctrines  to  the  Gentiles,  assuring  them  of  eternal 
life  and  an  equal  right  to  all  the  provisions  of  the  divine  kingdom 
if  they  only  believed  in  Christ.  Here  is  an  advance  in  theology. 
In  the  conflict  with  Judaism  Paul  brings  prominently  into  view  the 
Messiahship  of  Christ ;  in  the  ctmflict  with  paganism  he  brings  for- 
ward the  doctrines  of  atonement,  justification,  forgiveness,  just  what 
no  Gentile  relio-ion  had  taught  or  foreshadowed.  But  these  did  not 
constitute  the  sum  of  Christian  doctrines  employed  by  PauHn  con- 
flict with  and  for  the  overthrow  of  the  Gentile  spirit.  At  Lystra,  in 
particular,  he  discusses  theistie  truth  as  if  it  were  all-important,  and 
yet  secondary  to  others.  In  his  various  epistles  other  doctrines  are 
emphasized,  sxich  as  man's  Mplessness  or  sinfulness,  spiritual  freedom  or 
deliverance  in  Christ,  repentance  toward  God,  tJw  available  efficacy  of 
prayer,  the  leadership  of  the  Spirit,  the  resurrection  of  the  dead,  the  judg- 
ment-seat of  Christ  or  hitman  responsibility,  the  immortality  of  the  soul, 
and  eternal  rewards  and  retributions.  All  these  are  prominent,  not  in 
any  one  epistle,  because  neither  the  Gentile  nor  Jewish  Christians 
needed  instruction  in  every  thing,  but  according  as  a  Church  or 
people  were  unenlightened  along  these  lines,  or  were  in  dispute  over 
these  doctrines,  Paul  wrote  and  preached.  The  Messiahship  of  Christ 
is  the  center  to  which  Paul  ever  points  the  Jew  ;  but  the  other  doc- 
trines constitute  the  circumference  of  religious  truth,  which  he  exposes 
to  the  view  of  the  Gentile  world.  This  is  enlargement,  this  is  prog- 
ress, both  for  Christianity  and  the  world. 

Another  conflict  awaited  Christianity,  for  which  it  seemed  quite  as 
well  prepared  as  for  those  through  which  it  had  passed.  Judaism  was 
firm  and  self-reliant,  because  it  was  in  a  sense  supernatural ;  Gentilism 
was  pliable,  because  it  was  ignorant  and  weary  with  itself;  but  philos- 
ophy was  obstinate,  because,  regarding  religions  as  superstitions,  it 
recognized  no  special  merit  in  Christianity,  and  attempted  to  ridicule 
it  out  of  existence  when  its  babbling  defenders  first  announced  it. 
In  Macedonia,  Epicureanism,  gone  to  seed  in  Atheism,  disputed  the 
great  doctrines  of  the  resurrection  and  the  judgment;  in  Rome  Sto- 
icism, pi-etentious  in  its  love  of  virtue,  co-operated  not  with  Chris- 
tianity in  the  suppression  of  crime  or  the  moral  education  of  the  peo- 
ple. With  both  systems  of  philosophy,  or  with  the  cultured  classes 
throughout  the  Roman  Empire,  Paul  came  in  contact,  and  was  required 
to  defend  his  religion,  not  by  an  appeal  to  prophecy,  as  was  his  wont 


CONFLICT  WITH  PHILOSOPHY.  385 

among  the  Jews,  nor  by  showing  the  worthlessness  of  prevailing  relig- 
ions and  the  adequacy  of  the  new  religion,  as  he  did  to  the  Gentiles, 
but  by  a  rational  exposition  of  the  truth,  and  a  demonstration  of  the 
facts  on  which  his  religion  rested.  Logic,  not  prophecy ;  facts,  not 
traditions ;  truths,  not  beliefs,  are  wanted  in  a  strife  with  culture. 
For  such  a  conflict  Paul  was  prepared ;  for  he  was  familiar  with  the 
philosophical  thought  of  the  times,  and  was  the  man  to  preach  to 
Epicureans,  Stoics,  Platonists,  or  others  wherever  he  found  them.  The 
philosophical  method,  no  less  than  philosophical  thought,  influenced 
Paul  not  a  little,  the  traces  of  which  are  on  exhibition  in  his  Epistle 
to  the  Hebrews,  and  in  that  wonderful  sermon  he  preached  at  Athens. 
The  influence  of  Alexandrian  philosophy  on  Paul,  Canon  Farrar  fully 
concedes ;  the  influence  of,  or  acquaintance  with,  Grecian  and  Roman 
systems  of  thought,  is  quite  as  apparent. 

In  this  conflict  with  philosophy,  what  is  the  instrument  that  Paul 
handles  the  most  skillfully  ?  what  is  the  idea  with  which  he  pushes 
his  way  into  the  cultured  thought  of  the  East?  It  is  not  Messiahism; 
it  it  not  atonement  and  justification  through  Jesus  Christ ;  it  is  mono- 
theism first,  but  finally  it  is  the  great  doctrine  of  the  resurrection  of  the 
Lord  Jesiis  Christ.  To  the  Corinthians,  Athenians,  and  others  tinc- 
tured with  philosophic  wisdom,  he  expatiates  more  on  these  two  tiniths 
than  on  any  other ;  he  is  as  strong  as  Moses  in  the  defense  of  the 
theistic  notion  ;  but,  as  the  Christian  religion  rests  on  another  idea, 
he  gives  less  attention  to  the  one  than  to  the  other.  In  the  presence 
of  the  philosophers  of  Athens,  he  dwells  at  length  upon  the  doctrine 
of  the  resurrection  as  fundamental,  and  insists  at  all  times  that  Chris- 
tianity stands  or  falls  as  this  doctrine  is  true  or  false.  Messiahship 
is  a  prophetical  question — hence,  talk  to  the  Jews  on  that  line; 
atonement  is  a  religious  question — hence,  talk  to  the  Gentiles  about 
it ;  resurrection  is  a  legal  question,  a  philosophical  question,  a  ques- 
tion of  facts,  arguments,  logic — hence,  talk  to  the  philosophers  about 
it.  Messiahship  is  a  Jewish  question ;  justification  is  a  Gentile  ques- 
tion ;  resurrection  is  a  philosophical  question.  In  this  order  Paul's 
ideas  grew,  were  revealed,  and  developed,  the  first  gradually  losing 
its  importance  in  the  practical  value  of  the  second,  and  the  second 
being  valuable  only  as  the  third  had  final  demonstration.  The  initial 
truth  of  Christianity  is  Messiahship,  but  the  basal  truth  is  Resurrection. 
From  its  introductory  phases  Paul  rapidly  passed  to  its  fundamental 
excellences,  as  separating  from  the  Jews  he  mingled  with  the  Gen- 
tiles, and  discovered  the  relation  of  the  doctrine  of  the  resurrection 
to  final  triumph. 

Nature's  kingdoms  or  systems,  however  complex  in  their  develop- 
ment and  extensive  in  their  variety,  seem  to  rest  upon  single  truths 

25 


386  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

or  simple  facts.  Far-reacliing,  mysterious  complexity  is  but  the  evo- 
lution of  a,  perhaps,  not  distant  original  simplicity.  As  in  California, 
the  Sequoia  gigantea,  or  mammoth  tree,  springs  from  a  seed  no  larger 
than  the  mustard,  so  nature  everywhere  unfolds  from  small  to  great, 
exhibiting  in  its  ever-varying  modes  of  life,  and  in  its  transfigured 
expressions  of  beauty,  the  existence  of  a  single  purpose,  and  in  its 
myriad-typed  phenomena  illustrates  well  the  simplicity  of  its  begin- 
nings. With  all  its  endless  manifestations  of  form  and  growth, 
chemistry  declares  that  the  conspicuous  element  of  nature,  found  in 
every  thing  and  vitalizing  every  thing  is  oxygen;  or,  following  Mr. 
Huxley,  we  should  be  compelled  to  say  that  the  base  of  nature  is 
protoplasm,  thus  reducing  the  universe  in  its  last  analysis  to  a  single 
germ.  Botany's  sign-manual  is  a  leaf;  the  index  of  geology  is  a 
grain  of  sand ;  of  astronomy,  a  fixed  star. 

In  like  manner,  the  base  of  the  highest  religion  known  to  man  is 
a  single  but  sublime  truth.  Notwithstanding  the  truths  of  religion, 
embracing  as  they  do  the  mysterious  problems  of  the  Infinite,  relat- 
ing to  all  things  past,  present,  and  future,  and  including  all  the  per- 
manent necessities  and  strange  possibilities  of  the  human  soul,  are 
many,  and  glisten  with  celestial  light,  and  are  sources  of  comfort 
and  inspiration  to  the  sous  of  men  ;  yet  faith  in  them  is  dependent 
upon  a  prior  faith  in  one  truth  which  underlies  the  whole  system  of 
religion. 

So  Paul  instructs  us  in  these  words  that  "if  Christ  be  not  raised, 
your  faith  is  vain  ;"  that  is,  that  the  resurrection  of  our  Lord  is  the 
ground-work  of  all  Christian  faith ;  that  while  other  truths  are  radiant 
as  the  stars,  all-quickening  and  all-inspiring  as  the  angels,  possessing 
an  acknowledged  loftiness  of  grandeur,  they  rise  and  fall  with  one 
truth,  and  their  destiny,  their  future  power  as  truths,  depends  upon 
the  glory  of  the  resurrection. 

At  Baalbec,  Syria,  the  traveler  will  observe  the  ruined  Temple  of  the 
Sun,  once  a  structure  of  granite  and  marble,  the  mystery  of  masonry 
and  architecture,  still  a  lesson-teacher  in  its  dilapidation,  still  artist- 
ically beautiful  in  its  fragments,  and  reflecting  perfectly  the  strength 
and  design  of  its  ancient  builders.  In  defiance  of  Time's  cruel  touch, 
six  noble  columns,  majestic  in  form,  heroic  in  purpose,  bearing  the 
marks  of  antiquity,  dare  to  stand.  The  temple  would  have  been  in- 
complete without  them ;  but,  though  necessary,  they  are  not  the 
foundation.  Resting  upon  these  broad-shouldered  columns  are  capi- 
tals, massive,  ornamental,  essential  to  the  grandeur  of  the  pagan 
temple  ;  but  they  are  not  the  foundation.  A  part  of  the  wall,  too, 
remains,  consisting  of  stones  so  immense  in  size  that  the  moderns  are 
puzzled  to  know  how  they  were  elevated  to   their  places;    but  the 


PILLARS  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  387 

walls  and  these  stones  in  them,  resisting  all  attempts  at  destruction, 
are  not  the  foundation.  Columns,  cornices,  walls,  all  essential  to  the 
beauty,  dignity,  and  strength  of  the  temple,  and  yet  all  dependent 
upon  the  solid,  unseen,  well-proportioned  masonry  under  ground. 

So  the  temple  of  religion,  consisting  of  doctrinal  walls,  buttresses, 
columns,  friezes,  and  niches,  rests  upon  the  all-supporting  foundation 
of  one  underground  truth. 

Let  us  contemplate  this  one  truth  from  this  stand-point — the 
stand-point  of  Scripture.  The  resurrection  of  our  Lord  furnishes  ad- 
equate proof  and  sufficient  support  of  a  religion  professedly  divine. 
To  a  philosopher  or  theologian  a  blade  of  grass  may  demonstrate  the 
existence  of  a  Creator ;  but  to  each  a  planet,  in  the  regularity  of  its 
motions  and  the  solidity  of  its  framework,  is  a  more  definite  demon- 
stration of  his  existence.  So,  while  there  are  other  truths  that  have 
convincing  power,  and  are  really  the  available  and  working  facts  and 
hypotheses  of  Christianity,  this  one  truth  is  the  granite  rock  beneath 
all,  and  the  inspiration  of  all.  An  examination  of,  or  an  inquiry  into, 
other  truths,  as  to  their  sustaining  or  weight-bearing  influence,  will 
satisfy  this  Pauline  conclusion. 

Is  not  prophecy  a  pillar  of  Christianity?  It  is.  Does  it  not 
demonstrate  the  inspirational  character  of  revealed  religion  ?  It  does. 
Daniel  in  Babylon  and  John  on  Patmos,  with  prescient  sense  opened, 
give  us  the  keys  to  the  world's  greatest  movements,  from  before  the 
appearance  of  a  Redeemer  to  the  end  of  time,  unqualifiedly  proving 
their  familiarity  with  the  purposes  of  the  divine  wisdom.  On  such 
a  rock  as  prophetic  truth,  surely  Christianity  can  establish  itself,  chal- 
lenging all  opposition.  Prophecy  is  a  pillar,  but  not  the  foundation, 
of  the  temple.  Jesus  himself  frequently  assumed  a  prophet's  role, 
delivering  his  teachings  in  prophetic  forms;  but  the  fate  of  religion 
and  the  faith  of  Christendom  do  not  rest  upon  prophetic  truth  in 
general,  nor  in  particular,  except  on  that  one  which  Christ  uttered  in 
reference  to  his  resurrection. 

We  pass,  then,  to  miracles,  the  splendid  attestation  of  divine 
power,  the  scintillations  of  the  divine  enthusiasm  in  manifold  forms 
of  beauty  and  benevolence.  He  that  by  a  word  quelled  stormy  Gali- 
lee ;  he  that  gave  sight  to  blind  Bartimeus ;  he  that  spoke  Lazarus 
back  into  life, — must  be  the  Son  of  God ;  and  surely  Christianity 
may  quietly  repose  upon  these  tremendous  facts  and  awe-inspiring 
events  of  the  Master's  life.  We  can  not,  nor  would  we  if  we  could, 
underrate  the  value,  or  misunderstand  the  motive,  in  the  use  of 
miraculous  power  on  the  part  of  Christ,  for  it  is  confessedly  super- 
natural ;  and,  besides,  the  Savior  himself  referred  to  his  works  as  the 
conclusive   evidence  that  his  Messiahship  was  not  an    unwarranted 


388  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

assumption.  Yet  upon  no  miracle  of  his  miraculous  life,  save  the  last, . 
does  the  fate  of  Christianity  turn.  Not  to  the  blasted  fig-tree  on 
Olivet ;  nor  to  Nain,  where  the  widow's  son  was  raised  ;  nor  to  Gadara, 
where  the  demon-possessed  man  was  set  free, — do  the  finger-boards  of 
the  Gospel  point  us,  but,  as  Paul  shouts,  to  the  sepulcJier! 

The  incarnation  of  Jesus  is  the  initial  mystery  of  the  New  Testa- 
ment, appealing  to  faith's  mysterious  recognition.  The  birth  of  our 
Lord,  heralded  by  angel's  song,  is  indeed  a  startling  event,  essential 
to  all  that  followed.  "God  manifest  in  the  flesh"— this,  says  the 
searching  mind,  is  the  basis  of  all  belief.  No,  even  this  initial  fact 
of  the  Gospel  becomes  a  worthless  and  transparent  myth,  without 
persuasive  power,  unless  the  alleged  resurrection  was  a  literal  achieve- 
ment. The  fate  of  religion,  according  to  Paul,  lies  not  in  its  origin, 
but  in  its  end;  not  in  incarnation,  even  as  a  proven  fact,  but  in 
resurrection  as  its  terminal  glory,  as  a  Joppa  orange-tree  is  tested, 
not  by  its  flourishing  roots,  but  by  its  oranges.  The  manger  of  Jesus 
is  nothing  to  the  world  if  his  grave  is  not  empty  on  the  third  day. 

What  a  marvelous  scene  is  that  at  the  Jordan !  Hastening  from 
Galilee,  the  Master  receives  baptism  at  the  hands  of  the  weird 
preacher  of  the  wilderness,  the  Father  speaking  approval  as  by  a 
voice  in  the  over-hanging  cloud ;  the  divine  Spirit  alighting  in  the 
form  of  a  dove  upon  the  Master's  head ;  and  the  Son  of  God  is  thus 
glorified  in  the  sight  of  men.  In  that  baptismal  scene  the  Trinity 
appears  on  exhibition,  a  pantomimic  type  made  visible.  On  this 
scenic  truth,  potent  with  affirmation,  may  religion  securely  stay  itself; 
this  is  foundation  enough.  "No!  no!"  says  Paul,  and  he  points  to 
the  sepulcher,  saying,  "If  Christ  be  not  raised,  your  faith  is  vain." 

See  the  Son  of  man  in  fierce  struggle  with  the  world's  Adversary 
on  the  rugged  heights  of  Mount  Quarantania,  the  conqueror  of  the 
first  Adam  striking  death-filled  blows  upon  the  head  of  the  second. 
How  heroic  the  Master!  How  patient;  how  submissive!  In  the 
end,  how  defeated  the  foe!  How  paralyzed  is  Satan!  Surely  Chris- 
tianity will  plant  itself  upon  this  matchless  victory,  proclaiming  the 
sinless  character,  the  perfect  humanity,  of  Jesus  as  the  corner-stone 
of  all  truth,  the  key  to  his  godhead.  Go  to  that  sepulchei'  first, 
says  Paul. 

But  we  will  gather  at  the  foot  of  Hermon,  catch  a  glimpse  of  the 
transfigured  face  of  the  Carpenter's  Son,  listen  to  the  echoing  words 
of  Moses  and  Elias,  and  then  say:  Religion  has  its  foundation  in 
supernatural  things.  Hermon  is  its  source.  Again,  the  apostle 
brings  us  back  to  the  sepulcher,  where  glows  a  light  and  shines  a 
glory  eclipsing  that  of  Hermon. 

We  have  found  the  indestructible  support  of  the  Christian  religion, 


THE  SEPVLCHER!     THE  SEFULCHER !  389 

suggest  others,  in  the  martyrdom  of  Christ's  friends  and  followers,  in 
the  pitiless  death  of  John  the  Baptist,  in  the  crushed  but  crowned 
life  of  Stephen,  and  in  the  decapitation  of  Paul  himself.  Martyrdom, 
furuishing  a  bloody  page  in  the  world's  history,  is  considered  a  glorious 
and  almost  irrefutable  testimony  to  Gospel  truth;  but  it  must  be  re- 
membered that  error  has  had  its  martyrs,  and,  besides,  martyrdom  has 
this  weakness,  that  it  is  the  testimony  of  the  martyr  to  what  he 
believes  is  true,  not  necessarily  to  what  is  true. 

Martyrdom  is  the  expression  of  one's  faith,  not  necessarily  the  cer- 
tificate of  truth.  But,  if  the  martyrdom  of  Christ's  followers  is  an 
unsatisfactory  foundation,  it  may  be  supposed,  and  it  has  been 
affirmed,  that  the  self-sacrifice  of  Jesus  is  all  that  could  be  desired  for 
a  basis  of  religion.  And  did  not  Paul  himself  write:  "  But  God  for- 
bid that  I  should  glory,  save  in  the  cross  of  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ?" 
What  glory!  what  power!  what  redemption  is  symbolized  by  the 
cross !  No  tragedy  so  mournful,  so  pathetic ;  no  death  so  heroic,  so 
sublime.  Religion  without  Calvary  is  religion  without  redemption. 
Is  this  not,  then,  the  one  truth  necessary  to  religion?  We  answer  by 
an  illustration.  The  river  Jordan  rises,  according  to  one  writer,  at 
Dan  ;  according  to  another,  its  fountain-head  is  at  Csesarea  Philippi. 
The  first  writer  intends  to  be  correct ;  the  second  writer  is  correct. 
The  two  soui'ces  are  only  four  miles  apart,  the  fountain  at  Dan  being 
supplied  by  water  from  the  mountain  spring  at  Csesarea  Philippi. 
So  Calvary  and  the  sepulcher  are  within  sight  of  each  other,  and  are 
equally  related,  and  it  is  not  surprising  that  one  Christian  will  shout 
the  praise  of  Calvary  as  Salvation's  source,  while  anothei-,  going  back 
of  it,  piloted  by  the  apostle,  will  discover  that  the  fountain-head  of 
power  and  glory  is  the  abandoned  sepulcher — in  other  words,  the  fact 
of  the  Lord's  resurrection. 

Let  us  stand  a  moment  on  the  southern  shoulder  of  the  Mount  of 
Olives ;  let  us  hear  Jesus'  last  earth-words ;  let  us  behold  him  as  he 
spreads  his  open  palms  in  blessing  ;  listen,  and  we  shall  hear  angel 
wings,  and  soon  see  the  beatific  forms  of  angels  themselves ;  look,  and 
we  shall  witness  a  descending  and  an  ascending  cloud,  bearing  away 
the  deathless  body  of  our  Lord.  Event  unrivaled  !  Pageantry  un- 
eclipsed  by  that  of  Elijah's  ascension !  Here  on  Olivet's  heavenly 
brow,  where  the  prismatic  colors  of  eternity  are  playing,  will  we  lay 
the  foundation  of  our  faith.  No  !  No  !  No  !  shouts  Paul ;  the  sepul- 
cher! the  sepulcher!  "If  Christ  be  not  raised,  your  faith  is  vain;" 
your  faith  in  all  the  occurrences,  teachings,  life,  and  death  of  Christ 
is  vain,  a  self-deceiving  hope,  a  misery-producing  thought,  unless  he 
vacated  the  tomb  on  the  third  day. 

So  not  in  any  event  in  that  manifold  and  exceptional  life;  not  in 


390  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

his  birth ;  not  in  his  baptism  or  temptation ;  not  in  his  transfiguration 
or  ascension ;  not  in  Calvary's  awful  fote,— is  the  corner-stone  of  our 
religion  to  be  found.  These  all  add  beauty  and  dignity  to  the  temple, 
which  is  indeed  incomplete  without  them,  but  these  incomparable  and 
unapproachable  truths  are  nothing  without  the  one  all-supporting  fact 
of  the  resurrection. 

In  keeping  with  the  preceding  thought,  it  is  clear  to  all  that  the 
resurrection  of  the  Lord  must  be  viewed  as  the  final  proof  of  his 
mission  and  religion.  In  the  inspired  records,  we  reach  a  limit  to 
almost  every  proceeding,  human  and  divine ;  we  view  the  last  act  in 
the  drama  of  history,  prophecy,  creation,  and  redemption.  With  the 
creation  of  man,  the  creative  work  of  the  Almighty  ceases;  with  the 
destruction  of  the  first-born  in  Egypt,  the  miracles  of  Moses  before 
Pharaoh  are  suspended.  In  these  and  like  events  in  Scripture,  the 
last  act  is  the  greatest,  the  highest  water-mark  of  power  and  wisdom 
is  reached.  So  in  the  establishment  of  Christianity  in  the  work  and 
person  of  Jesus  Christ,  the  last  miracle  is  the  greatest ;  the  last  pic- 
ture is  the  most  beautiful ;  the  last  event  is  all-powerful  and  highest. 
Not  even  the  ascension,  though  glorious  enough,  had  any  such  glory, 
any  such  demonstrative  excellence  and  power,  as  the  resurrection. 
Other  events,  other  miracles,  are  efficient  in  the  line  of  evidences ;  but, 
adopting  a  word  of  Joseph  Cook,  the  resurrection  is  sufficient. 
Hermon  is  efficient  in  its  display  of  celestial  beams ;  the  resurrection 
is  sxffieient  as  an  output  of  upper-world  glory.  The  baptism  is  efficient 
as  a  temporary  approval  from  God ;  the  resurrection  is  Christ's  ever- 
lading  vindication  before  man.  Calvary  is  efficient  as  an  atonement; 
the  resurrection  sufficient  for  all  there  is  of  religion. 

Paul's  ideas  are  not  indistinct  or  unknown.  In  the  attempt  to 
catalogue  them  we  have  been  impressed  with  the  range  of  his 
thought,  which  is  as  wide  as  the  Gospel  itself,  embracing  all  the 
idiomatic  truths  of  the  new  religion.  No  sacred  writer  equals  him  in 
the  completeness  of  his  revelations.  The  synoptists  are  narrators, 
not  expositors  or  interpreters.  They  construct  nothing,  they  add 
nothing  to  what  they  know  or  have  heard.  They  are  reporters,  ex- 
pressing no  opinion  of  sayings  or  doings.  In  his  gospel,  John  breaks 
away  from  this  historical  position,  and  utters  as  profound  thought  as 
ever  Paul  entertained,  but  he  shrinks  from  a  venture  into  mysteries 
so  soon  as  he  discovei's  his  inability  to  grasp  them.  In  the  Apocalypse 
he  is  favored  with  visions  of  the  future,  by  which  he  is  distinguished 
from  Paul,  who  was  not  a  seer,  or  vision-monger,  but  a  dealer  in  facts 
and  the  foundation-truths  of  the  new  kingdom  of  God.  Paul  sees 
truths,  not  visions.  He  is  intensely  individual  in  this  truth-telling, 
system-building  task,  turning   all   the   currents  of  his   thinking  into 


CHARACTERISTICS  OF  THE  APOSTLE.  391 

divine  channels,  and  standing  for  truth  against  the  world.  Appointed 
as  the  truth-teller,  he  thunders  it  until  the  stars  quake,  and  flashes  it 
until  its  light  fairly  consumes  the  erroi-s  of  opposing  systems.  He 
roams  in  the  fields  of  revelation,  gathering  up  all  that  has  been 
spoken,  studying  all  that  has  been  written,  seeking  for  all  that  has 
been  withheld,  and  communicating  all  to  mankind,  from  Caesar's 
household  to  the  mobs  of  Lystra  and  Ephesus.  In  the  exegesis  of 
divine  wisdom  he  addresses  the  individual,  as  in  letters  to  Timothy  and 
Philemon,  and  the  Churches,  as  in  the  Epistles  to  the  Thessalouians 
and  Philippians ;  in  discourses,  as  in  that  before  Agrippa  and  on  the 
staircase  in  the  tower  of  Antonia ;  in  conversations,  as  in  that  on  the 
wrecked  ship  and  with  the  brethren  at  the  Three  Taverns ;  in  songs, 
as  in  the  jail  at  Philippi ;  and  in  prayers, '  as  he  bids  adieu  to  the 
disciples  at  Ephesus.  Addressing  all  classes,  and  speaking  on  all 
occasions,  he  applied  truth  as  it  was  needed,  always  prescribing  it  in 
the  old  form  if  adapted  to  existing  conditions,  or  submitting  it  in  an 
entirely  new  way,  which  either  provoked  inquiry,  aroused  antagonism, 
or  issued  in  repentance  and  reformation.  No  subject  related  to  his 
mission,  whether  philosophical,  ethical,  moral,  social,  or  religious, 
escaped  his  hand,  but  was  developed  with  a  surprising  boldness,  and 
enforced  with  the  authority  of  a  teacher  from  God.  It  was  God's 
truth,  not  man's,  as  it  fell  from  his  lips  or  dropped  from  his  pen  ;  it 
was  God's  business  of  which  he  was  the  representative ;  hence  the 
fullness  of  his  revelations,  the  equipoise  of  his  purposes,  the  consum- 
mate skill  of  his  applied  logic,  the  transparency  of  his  courage,  the 
steadfastness  of  his  faith,  and  the  tragic  tone  of  his  life. 

Hence  the  career  of  Paul,  both  as  a  teacher  and  a  missionary, 
a  brief  survey  of  which  can  not  be  avoided.  The  converted  Pharisee 
was  not  a  dreamer,  a  sentimentalist,  a  mystic ;  his  religion  was  not 
the  religion  of  the  beautiful,  or  the  religion  of  the  reason,  but  the 
product  of  supernatural  influence  in  his  soul.  It  was  fire,  of  which 
enthusiasm,  tremendous  activity,  and  heroic  achievement  were  the 
outward  signs.  Religion  is  not  alone  introspective,  it  has  external 
relations ;  it  is  a  religion  of  service,  of  doing,  of  conquest.  Paul  was 
not,  could  not  be,  a  silent  force,  a  neutral  disciple,  a  negative  Chris- 
tian. He  was  positive,  self-assertive,  and  armed  with  the  despotic 
power  of  truth.  Naturally  a  man  of  energy,  of  which  his  career  as  a 
Pharisee  is  proof,  when  he  espoused  the  Christian  movement  he  gave 
to  it  all  his  possibilities,  augmenting  himself  by  the  supernatural  en- 
dowments suddenly  conferred,  and  became  a  conspicuous  leader  and 
the  chief  apostle  in  the  early  Church.  Not  often  do  the  logical  and 
the  emotional  faculties  cohere  or  unite  in  a  single  mind ;  but  in  Paul 
they  happily  combined,  so  that  it  is  a  question  which  was  the  stronger, 


392  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

the  keen,  logical  faculty,  which  enabled  him  to  answer  all  opposers 
and  extinguish  all  errors,  or  that  pathetic  and  energetic  spirit  which 
often  terminated  in  the  holiest  courage,  and  at  times  resistlessly  bore 
him  on  to  the  destined  result.  If,  as  the  author  of  "Ecce  Homo" 
intimates,  enthiisiasm  is  the  key-note  to  the  life  of  Christ,  certainly  it 
is  the  undertone  of  Paul's  vivid  and  successful  career  for  Christ ;  for 
so  great  was  his  passion  for  man  that,  as  he  spoke,  the  idols  on  the 
Acropolis  trembled,  and  Felix's  and  Nero's  household  were  made  to 
pause  and  consider.  Such  results  are  not  the  proofs  of  eloquence  or 
genius,  but  the  signs  of  an  inspired  enthusiasm,  which  the  face  of 
kings  could  not  repress,  nor  the  mobs  of  Jews  at  all  silence  or 
overcome. 

The  apostolate  of  Paul  was  to  the  Gentile  world.  Not  refusing 
to  declare  the  new  Gospel  to  his  countrymen,  but  the  rather  anxious 
that  they  might  be  saved,  he  nevertheless  was  commissioned  as  the 
apostle  to  the  Gentiles,  differing  in  this  respect  from  the  original 
apostles,  Avho,  except  Peter,  were  limited  in  their  labors,  until  Paul's 
proclamation  of  independence,  to  the  "cities  of  Israel."  It  required 
not  a  little  logic  to  convince  the  apostolical  college  that  the  grace  of 
life  in  Jesus  Christ  should  henceforth  be  offered  to  all  men  ;  and, 
had  it  not  been  for  the  logic  of  events,  it  is  almost  certain  that  the 
logic  of  truth  had  not  then  prevailed.  Peter  was  for  a  season  the  rep- 
resentative of  the  new  idea,  but  was  superseded  by  Paul,  who  cham- 
pioned a  "liberal  Christianity,"  and  discerned  the  greatness  of  the 
redemptive  idea  in  its  j-elation  to  the  race.  Paul's  enlarged  Christian 
idea  produced  a  momentary  convulsion  throughout  the  Church ;  it 
was  the  rending  of  the  veil  again;  it  was  tearing  it  into  pieces.  But 
this  idea  of  the  world's  emancipation  was  Christ's  idea,  which  the 
Church  but  dimly  understood.  Revealed  to  Paul,  he  must  declare 
it;  he  can  not  be  narrow  or  exclusive;  and,  while  willing  to  recog- 
nize the  authority  of  the  brethren  at  Jerusalem,  he  would  have  broken 
with  them  and  gone  his  way  as  an  independent  apostle,  had  the  di- 
vine programme  been  curtailed  or  the  powers  of  his  commission  been 
abridged.      The  world  shall  have  the  Gospel. 

Henceforth  he  bears  a  world-wide  Gospel  to  a  sin-weary  race.  He 
is  an  evangelist  of  the  highest  type.  He  is  not  a  settled  pastor,  but 
an  itinerant,  by  the  terms  of  his  commission,  traveling  from  country 
to  country,  entering  new  provinces  and  old  cities,  planting  Churches 
everywhere,  and  organizing  Christian  communities  throughout  the 
vast  Roman  empire.  He  was  a  trained  organizer;  he  was  methodical 
in  his  pursuits,  knowing  how  to  divide  his  time,  appropriate  agencies, 
and  accomplish  tasks  not  possible  to  one  of  less  regularity  and  habit. 
He  was  qualified   to  superintend   the   largest  missionary  operations. 


ANTIOCH  A  MISSIONARY  CENTER.  393 

and  upon  no  one  could  the  "care  of  all  the  Churches"  have  rested 
so  safely  as  upon  him.  His  vision  was  open  to  the  most  distant 
fields,  and  his  resources  seemed  equal  to  all  emergencies.  Other 
apostles  labored  and  died  in  foreign  countries  for  the  faith,  but  the 
missionary  journeys  of  Paul  eclipse  the  united  efibrts  .of  the  twelve. 

For  an  account  of  the  missionary  work  of  the  apostle  we  are 
obliged  to  depend  upon  "The  Acts  of  the  Apostles,"  as  recorded  by 
Luke,  which  Renan  appropriately  designates  the  "second  idyl  of 
Christianity,"  the  first  being  "furnished"  by  the  "Lake  of  Tiberias 
and  its  fishing  barks."  In  the  time  of  James,  or  before  the  dispersion 
of  the  apostles,  Jerusalem  was  the  capital  of  Christianity ;  but  as 
Paul  rose  to  supremacy  Antioch  iu  Syria  virtually  became  the  head- 
quarters of  the  Christian  Church,  or,  as  Farrar  says,  the  "second 
capital  of  Christianity."  Not  that  Jerusalem  Avas  abandoned  by  Paul, 
for  he  visited  it  no  less  than  five  different  times,  but,  as  a  historic 
fact,  it  lost  its  prestige  as  a  Christian  center,  and  divided  its  impor- 
tance with  other  cities.  Jewish  Christianity  recognized  Jerusalem  as 
its  center ;  Gentile  Christianity,  drifting  away  from  Jewish  influence, 
centered  itself  first  at  Antioch,  where  the  Christians  received  their 
name,  and  later  at  Ephesus,  as  Antioch  declined. 

Antioch  is  the  misssonary  center,  the  birthplace  of  the  missionary 
enterprise,  of  the  early  Christian  Church.  From  the  Syrian  City,  as 
Renan  observes,  Christianity  "launches  out  into  the  wide  world,"  in- 
stinct with  a  purpose  to  conquer  the  race  and  mold  it  after  its  like- 
ness. Two  men,  Paul  and  Barnabas,  after  much  prayer,  initiate  the 
task  ;  for,  bidding  adieu  to  the  disciples,  they  start  westward,  trusting 
only  in  Him  who  commanded  them  to  go.  Renan  does  not  ridicule 
the  small  beginning,  but  credits  these  men  with  sincerity,  and  ac- 
knowledges a  solemnity  of  ideal  in  their  lives,  however  much  he  may 
doubt  the  success  of  the  movement  they  have  inaugurated.  Tracing 
them  in  their  voyages  and  travels,  he  affirms  that  they  followed  the 
"road  of  Jewish  emigration;"  but  this  is  only  partly  true,  for  in  Asia 
Minor  they  traveled  often  where  there  were  no  roads,  and  among 
cities  without  inter-relations  or  communication.  Paul  was  an  original 
missionary,  not  building  on  other  men's  labors,  but  organizing  new 
movements,  and  going  where  he  had  not  been  preceded  by  religious 
teachers. 

In  this  apparently  wandering  but  providential  life  he  usually  trav- 
eled on  foot,  supporting  himself  by  the  labor  of  his  hands,  especially 
by  the  trade  he  had  learned  when  a  youth,  and  was  not  dependent 
on  Churches  or  communities.  This  gave  him  influence,  for  he  could 
not  be  accused  of  mercenary  motives  in  the  preaching  of  the  Gospel. 

The  first  missionary  tour,  consuming  about  one  year  and  a  half, 


394  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

was  largely  confined  to  the  cities  of  Asia  Minor,  in  which  Churches 
were  organized,  and  the  breach  between  Judaism  and  Gentile  Chris- 
tianity was  greatly  widened.  From  Autioch  they  proceeded  to  the 
island  of  Cyprus,  where,  after  preaching  in  the  cities  of  Salamis  and 
Paphos,  they  embarked  for  Perga,  and  without  delay  hastened  to  An- 
tioch  in  Pisidia,  Iconium,  Lystra,  and  Derbe,  meeting  with  fierce 
opposition  at  every  point,  except  at  Derbe,  from  Avhich  they  returned 
to  Autioch  in  Syria. 

The  significance  of  the  tour  is  not  in  the  results  achieved.  These 
were  small  enough,  and  secured  at  the  hazard  of  life.  Paul's  work 
was  introductory ;  it  was  a  trial,  not  of  himself,  but  of  Christianity 
in  contact  both  with  the  Judaic  and  Gentile  spirit.  He  felt  his  way 
into  the  conflict,  and  came  out  satisfied,  though  he  had  been  stoned 
nearly  to  death  at  Lystra.  Commissioned  to  the  Gentiles,  he 
preached  at  first  in  these  cities  to  the  Jews,  in  order  to  convince  them 
that  Jesus  is  the  Messiah  ;  but,  arriving  at  Antioch  in  Pisidia,  he 
threw  of  the  mask,  and,  as  the  Apostle  to  the  Gentiles,  assured  them 
of  the  same  Gospel  privileges  he  had  offered  the  Jews,  and  urged 
them  to  unite  in  Church  fellowship,  and  accept  Jesus  as  their  Savior. 
He  did  not  condemn  the  Jews,  but  he  had  reached  the  point  when  he 
was  no  longer  under  obligation  to  preach  to  them,  or  neglect  the  Gen- 
tiles in  their  behalf;  henceforth,  we  shall  see  and  hear  him  as  a 
Gentile  preacher.  His  personal  separation  from  the  Jews  was  re- 
ligious, and  not  on  ethnic  or  national  grounds,  and  this  separation 
was  a  marked  product  of  this  missionary  tour. 

More  striking  still  was  the  actual  opening  of  the  Gospel  to  the 
Gentile  world.  The  intermittent  efforts  of  Peter  must  be  recognized 
as  providential  indications  of  a  purpose  to  confer  upon  foreign  na- 
tions the  Gospel  rights  which  were  supposed  primarily  to  belong  to 
the  Jews;  but  under  Paul  that  purpose  steadily  and  rapidly  evolved 
into  actual  results,  and  finally  became  the  great  aim  of  the  Apostolic 
Church.  As  the  Master  had  said,  "The  first  shall  be  last,  and  the 
last  first,"  meaning  that  the  Jcav  should  hear  the  Gospel  first,  and  the 
Gentiles  last,  but  that  the  Gentiles  would  receive  it  first  and  the  Jew 
last,  the  time  had  come  for  the  fulfillment  of  the  statement.  In 
Christ's  time  the  Jew  was  treated  as  the  heir  of  the  kingdom  of  God ; 
in  Paul's  time  the  Gentile  was  promoted  to  the  same  heirship,  and 
entered  upon  the  Gospel  inheritance,  and,  as  a  consequence,  the 
Churches  that  were  organized  were  Gentile  Churches,  and  the  leaven- 
ing power  of  the  Gospel  spread  more  and  more  throughout  the  Gen- 
tile world.  The  actual  Gentile  movement  toward  Christ  begins  after 
Paul  strikes  the  shores  of  Asia  Minor,  the  Jew  receding  in  importance 
with   the   progress  of  the  tour,  and   finally  disappearing  altogether. 


PAUL'S  SECOND  MISSIONARY  TOUR.  395 

Perhaps  the  turning  to  the  Gentiles  was  the  exasperating  cause  of 
Jewish  hatred  to  Paul.  His  conversion,  his  declaration  of  Christ  as 
the  Messiah,  and  his  renunciation  of  Judaism  was  interpreted  in  no 
friendly  spirit  in  Jewish  circles ;  but  that  he  should  aim  to  undermine 
Judaism  and  install  Christianity  as  the  religion  of  all  mankind,  in- 
viting all  nations  to  the  enjoyment  of  the  same  divine  rights,  was  an 
offense  tenfold  more  aggravating,  and  whetted  to  intensity  all  that 
hostility  that  broke  out  against  him  in  his  work  of  religious  propa- 
gandism.  But  as  the  Gentile  world  was  larger  than  the  Jewish  world, 
so  the  Gospel  economy  was  better  than  the  Jewish  economy,  and 
Pav;l  dared  every  thing  in  publishing  it,  first  to  the  Jews,  and  then 
to  the  Gentiles. 

Five  years  intervene  between  the  first  and  the  second  tours  of  Paul. 
Leaving  Antioch,  he  proceeds  by  the  shortest  route  to  Derbe,  begin- 
ning the  second  tour  where  he  closed  the  first,  as  if  it  were  his  inten- 
tion to  carry  forward  the  work  from  that  point  eastward  until  he  had 
explored  the  whole  country,  and  proclaimed  the  Gospel  in  every  city. 
But  as  his  "goings"  were  under  the  superintendence  of  the  Holy 
Spirit,  he  soon  found  that  eflfectual  doors  were  opened  to  him  in  other 
and  entirely  new  fields,  and  that  he  must  be  ready  to  enter  them. 
From  Derbe  he  revisits  Lystra,  and  then  plunges  into  Galatia,  a 
province  inhabited  by  a  wild  and  superstitious  people,  to  whom  he  dis- 
courses of  Christ,  and  whose  hearts  he  wins,  and  then  hurries  to  Troas 
on  the  western  coast.  A  new  programme  is  now  suggested  to  his 
thought.  He  is  impressed  that  he  must  introduce  the  Gospel  into  Eu- 
rope ;  Gentile  Christianity  exercises  its  controlling  influence  upon  him  ; 
and  so  he  sails  as  the  first  Gospel  message-bearer  to  the  continent  of 
Europe.  Now  he  is  at  Neopolis  ;  then  at  Philippi ;  anon  we  find  him 
in  Thessalonica ;  suddenly  he  turns  his  steps  to  Athens;  and  for  two 
years  Corinth  listens  to  the  religious  zealot,  quite  as  much  impressed 
by  his  eloquence  as  astonished  at  his  doctrine.  The  tour  is  completed 
by  a  stop  at  Ephesus  and  a  direct  journey  to  Jerusalem. 

In  its  extent,  and  in  the  character  of  the  work  performed,  the 
second  tour  was  even  more  remarkable  than  the  first.  Hitherto 
the  Gospel  herald  had  confined  his  ministry  to  Asia ;  now  Europe 
seemed  as  anxious  to  hear  the  divine  message  and  greeted  the  apostles, 
not  with  stones,  but  with  arguments  and  more  apparent  consideration. 
In  this  respect  Europe  was  a  more  promising  field  than  Asia,  and 
Paul's  report  of  labor  in  the  Macedonian  cities  was  doubtless  as 
thrilling  as  it  was  encouraging,  and  the  results  were  as  stimulating 
as  they  were  providential.  Greece  and  the  south-east  quarter  of  Eu- 
rope were  renowned  for  art  and  culture.  Philosophy  still  dominated 
the  public  thought,  and  statues  still  graced  the  temples  and  adorned 


396  PHIL OSOPH  Y  AND  CHR  IS TIANIT Y. 

the  palaces  of  their  chief  cities.  Asia  Miuor  obstructed  the  apos- 
tle's progress  with  Jewish  prejudices  and  pagan  vices;  Southern  Eu- 
rope offered  the  resistance  of  culture  to  Christianity.  Paul  is  on  Plato's 
ground  at  last,  and  must  contend  ivith  him.  At  Lystra  stones ;  at  Eph- 
esus  beasts;  at  Athens  philosophers.  In  Antioch  Christianity  con- 
tested with  pagan  religions ;  in  Damascus  and  Jerusalem  with  Juda- 
ism ;  in  Asia  Minor  with  pagan  corruption  ;  in  Europe  with  scholastic 
thought.  These  contests  were  necessary  to  exhibit  the  nature  of  Chris- 
tianity and  indicate  its  claims. 

What  was  the  result  of  the  European  tour?  In  Philippi  a  jail, 
but  finally  a  Church ;  in  Thessalonica  and  Corinth  large  Christian 
Churches;  in  Athens  confusion  among  the  philosophers  and  the 
conversion  of  a  number  of  people.  Mars'  Hill  is  more  famous  than 
Plato's  Academy.  The  latter  has  disappeared;  the  former,  a  huge 
rock,  with  its  chiseled  steps,  still  remains.  Its  situation  is  remark- 
able, and  afforded  Paul  a  splendid  opportunity,  which  he  improved, 
for  pointing  out  the  errors  of  philosophy  and  explaining  and  defend- 
ing the  great  truths  of  Christianity.  To  the  right  of  Mars'  Hill 
rises  the  Acropolis,  on  which  the  Parthenon  and  other  temples  dedi- 
cated to  gods  and  goddesses  were  standing  and  still  exist  in  a  ruined 
state;  to  the  left  is  the  Pnyx,  where  Demosthenes  thundered  his 
philippics,  and  where  the  multitudes  grew  patriotic ;  in  the  rear  is 
the  market-place ;  in  front,  and  at  his  feet,  was  the  city  of  Athens, 
containing  perhaps  one-half  million  of  people.  Not  far  away  is  the 
temple  of  Theseus ;  beyond  is  the  old  cemetery ;  and  one  mile  to  the 
north  is  Plato's  Academy. 

This  was  Paul's  environment  in  Athens,  amid  which  he  pronounced 
the  sermon  that  made  him  famous  as  the  apologist  of  Christianity, 
and  to  which  Athens  never  replied.  Idolatry  and  philosophy  were 
vanquished  on  Mars'  Hill.  Athens  did  not  respond  with  stones,  as 
did  Asia  Minor ;  nor  with  a  jail,  as  did  Philippi ;  nor  with  beasts,  as 
did  Ephesus  ;  nor  with  arrests,  as  did  Jerusalem  ;  but  with  intellectual 
vanity  and  a  promise  of  investigation.  Philosophy  is  investigation. 
Asia  persecutes  the  Gospel ;  Europe  investigates.  In  these  behold  the 
Asia  and  Europe  of  to-day  ! 

Paul's  third  and  final  missionary  tour  is  made  from  Antioch, 
rather  for  the  purpose  of  confirming  his  work  than  of  extending  it. 
He  visits  x\.sia  Minor  and  the  Churches  in  Europe,  explaining 
doctrines  and  mysteries,  instituting  forms  of  discipline  or  Church 
order,  settling  theological  differences  between  Jews  and  Gentiles,  and 
organizing  Christian  communities  into  active  forces  for  the  propaga- 
tion of  the  Gospel.  New  Churches  spring  up  in  his  path,  and  new 
cities  are   visited   and    instructed   in   the  Gospel,   but  his  principal 


PAUL'S  APPEAL  TO   C^SAR.  397 

work  seems  to  be  supervision,  establishment,  organization,  centraliza- 
tion, and  indoctrination.  In  this  sphere  of  labor  he  was  not  less 
active  or  less  successful  than  when  engaged  in  the  moi'e  aggressive 
conflicts  with  the  opposition  to  the  Gospel.  He  now  appears  as  the 
administrator,  the  Church  parliamentarian,  the  episcopal  head  of 
Christendom,  responsible  only  to  Jesus  Christ,  and  yet  concedes  the 
nominal  authority  oi'  the  original  Church.  In  this  tour,  of  which 
the  central  point  is  Ephesus,  where  he  remains  three  years,  he  seems 
to  have  gathered  up  the  fragments,  reduced  disorderly  and  ignorant 
societies  to  subjection,  instructed  them  in  doctrine,  usages,  and  duties, 
and  crystallized  the  Christian  spirit  within  the  confines  of  two  conti- 
nents. As  distinguished  from  the  other  tours,  the  chief  products  of 
this  last  missionary  journey  are  Church  order  and  Church  life. 

On  to  Jerusalem  to  observe  the  feast  of  Pentecost  is  Paul's  next 
ambition,  and  thitherward  he  tarries  at  Troas,  Miletus,  Tyre,  Ptole- 
mais,  and  Cajsarea,  listening  in  Philip's  home  to  the  ominous  prophecy 
of  Agabus  respecting  what  should  befall  him  at  Jerusalem,  but  with- 
out discouragement  he  proceeded  and  arrived  in  the  Holy  City  in 
time  for  the  great  celebration. 

'Another  journey  is  before  Paul.  It  is  a  missionary  tour  also,  but 
unlike  the  others,  it  is  a  journey  to  death  ;  he  rides  on  his  coffin 
from  Jerusalem  to  Rome — a  victor  nevertheless.  Mobbed  by  blood- 
thirsty Jews,  arrested  at  the  instance  of  the  high-priest,  and  hurried  to 
the  fortress  of  Antonia,  it  seems  that  the  end  has  suddenly  come ;  but 
he  has  a  chance  or  two  for  his  life.  He  is  tried  before  the  Sanhedrim, 
more  as  a  heretic  and  blasphemer  than  a  violator  of  civil  law, 
and,  just  when  sentence  might  have  been  pronounced  upon  him,  he 
providentially  divides  the  legal  body,  bringing  the  Pharisees  to  his 
defense  and  rescue.  Forty  men,  infuriated  by  the  result,  bind 
themselves  with  an  oath  to  kill  Paul ;  but  this  plan  is  circumvented 
by  the  Roman  officer,  who  immediately  arranges  for  the  transfer  of 
his  prisoner  to  Csesarea.  Here  he  is  tried  before  Felix  who  reserves 
judgment ;  and  Festus,  his  official  successor,  delays  a  settlement,  which 
leads  Paul  to  appeal  to  Csesar,  which  is  the  determining  point  in  this 
crisis.  To  Rome  he  must  therefore  go.  During  the  voyage  he  is 
shipwrecked  at  Malta ;  but  this  is  only  an  incidental  obstruction, 
perilous  at  the  time,  but  in  no  wise  a  fatal  hindrance.  On  he  goes, 
and  at  last  arrives  in  the  "  Eternal  City."  From  the  "  Holy  City  to 
the  Eternal  City!"  One  step  more,  and  the  "Celestial  City"  will 
open  its  gates  to  the  hero. 

Paul's  imprisonment  in  Rome;  the  law's  strange  delay  in  his  case; 
the  time  improved  in  preaching  to  both  Jews  and  Gentiles  ;  his  sup- 
posed acquittal  on  legal  grounds  ;  his  hasty  journey  to  Macedonia  and 


398  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

Asia  Minor  agaiu  ;  liis  more  rapid  vi.sit  to  Spain  ;  liis  re-arrest  and 
return  to  Rome ;  the  deatii  sentence  passed  upon  liim  and  its  bloody 
execution  just  outside  the  city, — are  matters  not  historically  estab- 
lished, but  the  probabilities  are  that  these  events  occurred.  Curiosity 
would  be  satisfied  if  the  missing  pages  in  the  biography  of  so  illustri- 
ous a  toiler  could  be  found ;  but  the  iiicomplete  record,  as  we  have  it, 
is  the  key  to  a  very  complete  life,  which,  after  all,  is  the  important 
point  to  be  remembered. 

Our  preparation  for  an  estimate  of  Paul  in  the  varied  aspects  of 
his  character  and  life,  as  a  thinker,  a  writer,  a  worker,  a  martyr,  an 
example,  and  an  influence,  is  sufficiently  extended  to  justify  an  im- 
mediate attempt  in  that  direction. 

It  is  needless  to  remind  the  reader  that,  on  the  whole,  and  not- 
withstanding critical  opinion  has  endeavored  to  deprive  Paul  of  his 
true  historic  position,  and  has  either  underrated  or  overrated  his  re- 
lations to  Christianity,  the  general  verdict  of  the  centuries  is  an 
appreciation  of  his  apostleship  and  a  widening  of  his  fame  as  the 
hero  of  God.  In  eulogy  of  him  Monod  pronounces  him  "  the  greatest 
benefactor  of  our  race,"  while  Renau  discovers  only  an  ordinary  man 
in  the  apostle  to  the  Gentiles.  Canon  Farrar  says  that  men  did  hot 
"  recognize  his  greatness,"  nor  is  it  certain  that  he  is  yet  fully  recog- 
nized in  his  leadersliip  of  thought  and  in  his  influence  in  the  world. 
The  Jew  is  his  vilifier ;  the  skeptic  is  his  critic  ;  the  philosopher  is 
his  investigator  ;  the  Churchman  is  his  historian  ;  the  theologian  is 
his  interpreter ;  the  Christian  is  his  admirer  and  believer. 

From  these  various  sources,  religions,  skepticisms,  histories,  phi- 
losophies, and  theologies,  varying  opinions  and  inferences  might  be 
drawn ;  but  it  is  gratifying  that  the  preponderance  of  testimony  is  in 
complete  harmony  with  our  own  opinion  that  Paul  was  the  greatest 
man  that  ever  lived. 

As  a  thinker  he  has  been  fairly  considered  in  previous  paragraphs ; 
but  a  slight  reference  to  his  scholarship,  his  logical  powers,  his  intel- 
lectual vision,  and  psychological  constitution  is  imperative  at  this 
point,  since  so  graceful  a  Avriter  as  Renan  has  impeached  his  intel- 
lectual standing  by  declaring  him  "  unlearned,"  unpoetical,  as  having 
"injured  science,"  and  as  incapable  of  becoming  a  "man  of  learn- 
ing." This  is  a  criticism  born  of  that  general  prejudice  to  Chris- 
tianity which  has  actuated  the  French  writer  in  all  his  assaults  upon 
Christian  truth,  and  which  blinds  him  to  the  recognition  of  those 
qualities  which  constituted  Paul  the  marked  man  of  his  age  and  the 
chief  apostle  of  the  Church.  A  Jew  might  join  Renan  in  depre- 
ciation of  Paul,  but  an  honest  student  of  Paul's  writings  must  accord 
him,  not  only  genius,  but   inspiration,  not  only  acute   perception  of 


LOGICIAN  AND  WRITER.  399 

truth,  but  supernatural  knowledge  of  it.  When  Renan  asserts  that 
Paul's  revelations  were  his  own  "  whims,"  he  means  to  strike  at  the 
revelations  and  at  the  apostle,  implying  that  the  two  stand  or  fall 
together :  and  they  do ;  but  he  is  the  first  critic  to  reduce  truth  to  a 
whim.  The  revelations  of  Paul,  deprived  of  inherent  supernaturalism, 
and  viewed  merely  as  the  original  products  of  his  inflamed  imagina- 
tion, in  which  Renan  says  he  was  deficient,  or  of  his  profoundest  psy- 
chologic research,  which  every  epistle  establishes,  are  accepted  even  in 
rationalistic  circles,  of  which  Baur  is  a  leader,  as  stupendous  announce- 
ments and  superior  to  the  average  discoveries  of  philosophic  thought. 
The  theism  of  Paul ;  the  doctrine  of  Messiahship ;  the  law  of  Atone- 
ment; the  theory  of  justification;  the  explanation  of  sin ;  the  certainty 
of  resurrection  ;  the  penalties  and  rewards  of  the  Judgment,— are  not 
whims,  or  all  the  sacred  writers  were  whimsical,  and  Christ  himself 
may  be  pronounced  a  whim.  Renan  might  have  recognized  Paul  in 
his  intellectual  greatness  without  compromising  his  final  opinion  of 
the  place  he  should  occupy  in  history. 

In  natural  order  Paul  appears  as  the  writer,  different  in  style  or 
rhetoric,  as  he  is  different  in  thought  or  substance,  from  all  inspired 
penmen.  Recalling  the  fact  that  he  was  a  truth-teller,  one  might  sup- 
pose that  he  would  employ  the  historical  style,  but  he  was  not  a 
narrator  ;  hence  the  style  is  not  historical.  He  was  not  imaginative ; 
hence  the  style  is  not  poetic.  He  was  not  seer-like  ;  hence  the  style 
is  not  prophetical  or  apocalyptic.  He  deals  not  with  scientific  facts, 
except  incidentally ;  hence  the  style  is  not  of  the  schools,  or  scho- 
lastic. He  writes  not  for  sensational  effect ;  hence  the  style  is  not 
oratorical.  He  writes  not  to  protect  any  supposed  weaknesses  in 
Christianity  ;  hence  the  style  is  not  sophistical.  What  is  left  ?  He 
is  set  for  the  announcement  of  truth  ;  hence  the  style  is  declarative  ; 
he  must  explain  the  truth  ;  hence  the  style  is  didactic  ;  he  must 
defend  the  truth  ;  hence  the  style  is  logical.  Paul's  commission  was 
to  prove,  as  well  as  preach,  the  Gospel.  Preaching  is  proving.  Of  all 
Bible  writers,  Paul  is  the  chief  logician,  importing  reason  into  re- 
ligion and  abstracting  superstition  from  it,  thereby  refuting  the 
common  suspicion  that  Christianity  is  unfriendly  to  i-eason.  The 
Pauline  idea  of  religion  is  superlatively  rationalistic.  Prior  to  Paul, 
religion  is  a  narration,  a  history,  a  catalogue  of  facts;  under  Paul, 
religion  is  logic,  order,  reason ;  in  Paul,  religion  is  spiritualized  per- 
ception, it  is  the  divine  reason.  First,  historians,  reporters  ;  second, 
the  logician  ;  this  is  the  order  of  the  sacred  writers.  Hence,  in  Paul's 
fourteen  epistles  we  find  arguments  for  all  the  truths  of  the  Christian 
religion,  and  a  methodical  attack  on  all  the  errors  of  philosophy, 
idolatry,  and  sin.     "The  world  by  wisdom   knew   not  God,"   is  his 


400  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

text  against  philosophy  ;  "  What  agreement  hath  the  temple  of  God 
with  idols?"  is  his  text  against  idolatry;  the  "wages  of  sin  is 
death,"  is  his  text  against  sin.  In  Paul  we  have  an  instance  of  the 
inspiration  of  reason,  while  in  others  there  is  the  inspiration  of 
memory,  or  the  inspiration  of  affection,  or  courage.  Inspired  reason 
is  superior  to  academic  reason ;  hence,  Paul  is  superior  to  Plato.  He 
did  not  dream,  or  speculate,  or  inquire  ;  he  knew.  This  accounts  for 
the  brevity  of  the  Pauline  Epistles,  the  equal  of  which  no  literary 
annals  furnish.  Logic  needs  few  words,  truth  fewer.  History,  poetry, 
science,  philosophy,  requires  a  vocabulary.  Truth  clothes  itself  in 
monosyllables.  Paul  is  brief,  but  incisive  ;  compact,  but  full ;  his 
words,  like  himself,  are  short  but  perpendicular. 

For  the  preservation,  as  well  as  the  dissemination,  of  truth,  Paul 
chose  the  epistolary,  as  Plato  chose  the  dialogistic,  style.  "The 
epistolary  form,"  says  Canon  Farrar,  "is  eminently  spontaneous, 
personal,  flexible,  emotional."  That  the  apostle  took  to  this  form  of 
composition  because  it  suited  his  mental  taste,  is  not  clear ;  but  that 
he  adopted  it  because  it  was  the  common  method  of  communication, 
and  because  it  admitted  of  a  certain  freedom  which  the  scholastic 
style  prohibited,  seems  reasonable  enough.  Into  these  "  encyclical 
epistles"  he  pours  profoundest  convictions,  and  through  them  re- 
veals the  highest  and  holiest  truths,  but  always  so  as  to  impress  the 
heart  while  he  storms  the  mind,  and  compels  the  submission  of  both, 
to  the  ideal  idea  he  is  unfolding.  Luther  regarded  his  utterances  as 
"  living  creatures,  with  hands  and  feet,"  which  is  only  another  way 
of  saying  that  Paul's  words  are  life- words. 

The  authenticity  and  genuineness  of  some  of  the  epistles  ascribed 
to  Paul  have  been  called  in  question,  not  by  one  writer  only,  but  by 
several,  as  by  the  critics  of  the  Tubingen  school,  and  by  skeptics  like 
Renan ;  and  not  for  one  reason  only,  but  for  many,  among  which 
may  be  noted  certain  internal  deficiencies  of  style,  or  incoherency  or 
aimlessness  of  argument,  and  the  external  impossibilities  of  their 
composition  at  the  time  and  by  the  apostle.  Little  general  objection 
is  made  to  the  Epistles  to  the  Romans,  the  Corinthians,  and  the 
Galatians ;  Hilgenfeld  is  also  willing  to  accept  the  First  Epistle  to 
the  Thessalonians,  and  the  Epistles  to  the  Philippians  and  to  Phile- 
mon, holding  in  doubt  all  the  others ;  Renan  accepts  the  Second 
Epistle  to  the  Thessalonians  and  that  to  the  Colossians ;  so  that,  of 
the  fourteen  bearing  the  apostle's  signature,  even  the  critics,  ration- 
alists, and  skeptics  concede  the  Pauline  authorship  of  nine,  and  resist 
the  claims  of  the  others  on  grounds  not  at  all  historically,  philosoph- 
ically, or  doctrinally  sufficient, 

According  to  Renan,  the  epistles  of  the  apostle  were  edited  after 


KENAN'S  OBJECTIONS  TO  FIVE  EPISTLES.  401 

his  execution  by  unknown  hands,  and  suffered  materially  in  the  pro- 
cess, the  editors  determining  what  was  Pauline  and  what  was  not ; 
and  he  declares  that  they  re-arranged  the  contents  of  some  of  the 
epistles,  presenting  them,  not  as  Paul  actually  wrote  them,  but  as  the 
editors  believed  he  wrote  them.  He  insists  that  the  Epistle  to  the 
Romans,  under  such  editorial  supervision,  is  objectionable  ;  but  waiv- 
ing the  objection,  he  admits  the  general  authenticity  of  the  epistle. 
The  same  remark  applies  to  the  eight  other  epistles,  whose  authen- 
ticity he  does  not  dispute. 

Slight  technical  objections  might  be  urged  against  these  accepted 
epistles,  such  as  the  theory  of  anti-Christ  in  the  Second  Epistle  to  the 
Thessalonians,  and  the  apparent  Gnosticism  in  the  Epistle  to  the 
Colossians;  but  Renan  does  not  urge  them,  because  the  ingrain 
thoughts  of  the  epistles  are  Pauline. 

As  to  the  Epistle  to  the  Ephesians,  Renan  suspects  that  it  is  a 
perverted  copy  or  imitation  of  the  Epistle  to  the  Colossians,  since  the 
Gnosticism  in  the  one  appears  in  the  other ;  and  he  affirms  that,  as 
it  is  addressed  to  converted  heathen,  it  was  not  designed  for  the 
Church  at  Ephesus,  which  was  largely  composed  of  Jewish  Christians ; 
but  this,  in  part,  is  speculation,  and  can  not  weigh  against  the  repu- 
tation of  the  epistle. 

The  two  Epistles  to  Timothy,  and  the  one  to  Titus,  Renan  pro- 
nounces "  apochryphal."  They  are  fabrications,  full  of  "Latinisms" 
and  ecclesiasticisms ;  the  language  is  not  Paul's ;  the  hierarchical 
spirit  is  not  Paul's. 

His  chief  objection  to  the  Epistle  to  the  Hebrews  is,  that,  while 
traditionally  attributed  to  Paul,  and  containing,  as  he  admits,  Paul's 
ideas,  the  style  is  not  Paul's,  and,  therefore,  the  document  must 
be  rejected. 

Reduced  to  briefest  statement,  the  critical  opposition  of  Renan  to 
the  authenticity  of  five  of  Paul's  epistles  may  be  expressed  by  such 
words  as  editorship,  technicality,  imitation,  fabrication,  and  rhetoric. 
Editorship  does  not  invalidate  authorship — it  really  implies  the  genu- 
ineness of  the  epistles ;  technicality  makes  not  against  any  of  them, 
since  it  implies  only  a  speck  on  the  mirror  of  truth ;  imitation  is  only 
a  confirmation  of  the  original  epistle  ;  fabrication  is  a  serious  word, 
but,  as  applied  to  three  epistles,  it  is  without  foundation.  Timothy" 
and  Titus  were  Paul's  disciples  in  Christ  and  companions  in  travel, 
to  whom  it  would  be  natural  to  write  when  separated  from  them,  and 
the  "ecclesiastic  spirit"  of  these  epistles  is  in  keeping  with  the 
ministerial  relations  both  these  sons  in  the  Gospel  sustained  to  the 
Church.  The  rhetoric  of  the  Epistle  to  the  Hebrews  is  its  fascination  ; 
its  philosophic  Christianity  is  an  exhibition  of  the  advanced  state  or 


402  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

knowledge  of  Paul,  which  found  its  fittest  expression  in  Alexandrian 
allegory  or  hyperbole.  None  of  the  objections  seems  fatal  to  the 
claim  of  the  Pauline  origin  of  the  fourteen  epistles. 

Accepting  them  as  genuine,  what  a  writer  was  Paul!  To  the 
Romans,  he  writes  like  a  theologian ;  to  the  Corinthians,  he  writes 
like  an  archbishop  and  a  philosopher  ;  to  the  Galatians,  he  writes  like 
an  earnest  teacher;  to  the  Ephesians,  he  writes  like  a  self-composed 
advocate ;  to  the  Pliilippians,  he  writes  like  a  joyous  Christian  ;  to 
the  Colossians,  he  writes  like  a  philosophical  Christian  ;  to  the  Thessa- 
lonians,  he  writes  like  an  eschatological  Christian;  to  Timothy,  he 
writes  like  a  father  and  Church  parliamentarian  ;  to  Titus,  he  writes 
like  a  beloved  pastor ;  to  Philemon,  he  writes  like  an  affectionate 
brother ;  and  to  the  Hebrews,  he  writes  like  a  scholar  and  a  philoso- 
pher. What  variety  of  style ;  what  variety  of  truth  ;  what  variety 
of  purpose  ;  what  variety  of  result ! 

Considering  Paul  as  the  ivorker,  he  is  as  remarkable  for  his  devo- 
tion to  duty  as  for  the  sincerity  of  his  religious  convictions,  and  quite 
as  successful  in  one  sphere  of  labor  as  another.  When  the  first  ray 
of  light  penetrated  his  darkened  mind,  his  first  inquiry  was  in  rela- 
tion to  service,  in  the  words,  "  What  wilt  thou  have  me  to  do?"  No 
sooner  did  the  scales  fall  from  his  eyes  in  the  house  of  Judas  than 
he  began  to  proclaim  that  Jesus  is  the  Christ,  and  this  principally  to 
the  Jews  in  Damascus ;  and,  until  life's  tragic  close,  he  was  the  faith- 
ful and  obedient  apostle,  striving  to  lay  foundations  that  others  might 
build  thereon. 

He  is  the  incessant  preacher  of  "  Christ  and  him  crucified;"  he  is 
an  itinerant,  a  Christian  traveler,  a  flaming  evangelist,  spreading 
the  news  of  the  Gospel  from  continent  to  continent,  and  anxious  to 
oflTer  life  to  the  isles  of  the  sea.  His,  as  we  have  observed,  was  not 
a  settled  pastorate ;  he  could  not  settle.  His  longest  pastorate  was  at 
Ephesus,  rounding  out  in  three  full  years ;  but  the  city  was  the  head- 
quarters or  capital  of  the  Christian  Church  for  Asia  Minor  and  Eu- 
rope, on  which  account  he  deemed  it  advisable  to  tarry  longer  there 
than  elsewhere.  In  a  certain  sense,  the  Gospel  must  anchor  on  the 
shores  of  time;  but  John  reveals  an  angel  fitjing  with  the  Gospel 
through  the  heavens,  and  shouting  to  the  earth  to  hear  the  message  of 
the  Lord.  Others,  like  James,  may  settle  in  Jerusalem ;  but  Paul, 
like  the  angel,  will  fly  from  nation  to  nation  to  declare  the  tidings 
of  salvation.  What  religious  histories,  written  and  unwritten,  are 
embalmed  in  the  words,  Jerusalem,  Antioch,  Ephesus,  Corinth,  Phil- 
ippi,  Athens,  and  Rome  !  These  cities  represent  Paul's  life,  the  Gos- 
pel's conquering  march,  and  are  the  prophetic  land-marks  of  its  tri- 
umph in  all  the  world.     Renan  intimates  that  the  success  of  Paul 


PAUL  A  CHURCH-FOUNDER.  403 

in  Asia  Minor  was  largely  owing  to  the  religious  credulity  of  the  peo- 
ple ;  but  his  explanation  of  success  is  very  like  Gibbon's,  in  that, 
recognizing  the  effects,  the  causes  are  only  obscurely  or  remotely  ap- 
prehended. That  the  iuhabiteiuts  of  Galatia,  in  particular,  were  su- 
perstitious, must  be  believed  ;  but  not  more  superstitious,  nor  more 
wedded  to  mythological  and  traditional  stories,  than  the  Athenians; 
and  yet  Galatia  received  the  Gospel,  while  Athens,  on  the  whole, 
did  not.  Nor  must  it  be  forgotten  that  it  should  add  to  the  credit 
of  the  Gospel,  if  it  can  relieve  a  gross,  ignorant  people  of  their  dull 
and  heartless  superstitions;  for  the  philosophic  spirit  did  not  pilot 
Athens  into  liberty  therefrom,  nor  is  it  in  the  power  of  civilization  to 
extinguish  religious  error;  but  the  Gospel  rescues  a  people  from  re- 
ligious barbarisms,  and  enlightens  them  in  ethical  duties,  and  saves 
them  from  sin.  Granted  that  the  Gospel  will  deliver  from  these 
things,  and  we  shall  not  trouble  ourselves  with  the  skeptic's  explana- 
tion.    Wanted — facts,  not  explanations;  wanted— effects,  not  causes. 

Whatever  may  be  said  of  Paul's  work  in  other  directions,  he  will 
always  be  recognized  as  the  principal  Church-founder  of  his  day. 
Churches  were  not  built,  but  Christian  societies  were  organized,  dis- 
ciplined, and  supervised,  by  the  apostle ;  and  his  interest  in  them 
never  ceased,  for,  absent  from  them,  he  communicated  with  them  by 
epistles,  and,  in  his  third  journey,  devoted  himself  specially  to  confirm 
them  in  the  truth.  Again,  Eenan  exhibits  his  inability  to  recognize 
the  merits  of  Paul,  by  declaring  that  "his  Churches  were  either 
slightly  substantial  or  denied  him,"  and  that  they  soon  fell  to  pieces, 
and  their  founder  was  forgotten.  Yet  the  Pauline  Churches  of  Asia 
Minor  introduced  new  elements  into  Oriental  life  that  have  never 
disappeared  ;  and,  because  they  were  established,  we  have  not  only 
Paul's  epistles,  but  John's  addresses  to  the  "seven  Churches  of  Asia." 
The  Churches  do  not  exist,  but  the  epistles  they  evoked  constitute 
the  substantial  documents  of  Christianity.  The  outcome  of  Paul's 
Church-planting,  Renan  seems  to  forget.  Let  the  Churches  go — the 
epistles  addressed  to  them  are  our  inheritance. 

In  studying  Paul  as  a  worker  no  allusion  has  been  made  to  the 
miracles  he  wrought,  or  their  relation  to  his  mission,  for  the  reason 
that  the  miracle  Avas  an  incidental  factor  in  his  history,  and  employed 
only  in  emergencies.  His  first  miracle,  which  occurred  at  Paphos, 
a  city  of  Cyprus,  Renan  ridicules  and  rejects,  but  he  rejects  all 
miracles.  Elymas  is  stricken  blind,  and  the  people  are  stricken  with 
fear,  and  the  Word  of  God  prevails.  In  Philippi  a  maniac  girl  is  re- 
lieved of  the  incurable  trouble,  and  consternation  follows  ;  the  people 
believe  in  God.  Paul's  equipment  for  missionary  work  was  not  the 
miracle-working  power.     His  equipment  was   educational   and  relig- 


404  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

ious ;  the  gift  to  work  a  miracle  was  exceptional,  and  only  occasion- 
ally granted.  He  could  not  exercise  it  at  pleasure;  he  could  not 
cure  Epaphroditus  of  his  illness;  he  could  not  extract  the  thorn 
from  his  own  flesh.  He  was  a  poor  miracle-worker;  he  was  not 
called  to  work  miracles,  and  the  few  recorded  of  him  arose  from 
necessity,  and  were  possible  because  of  immediate  supernatural  en- 
dowment and  immediate  divine  direction  to  proceed.  Hence,  the 
apostle  is  not  presented  as  a  miracle-performer,  nor  is  his  career  or 
success  to  be  explained  on  that  basis,  or  by  any  thing  kindred  to  it. 
He  is  the  spiritually  equipped  worker,  and  sufficient  for  all  things.  ^ 
Just  when  Paul  assumed  the  title  of  "apostle,"  or  whether  it 
was  conferred  upon  him  in  an  informal  way  by  the  brethren,  are 
matters  not  of  record  ;  but  it  is  evident  that  after  the  council  in  Je- 
rusalem, which  decided  the  emancipation  of  the  Gentiles  from  Jewish 
thralldo'm,  Paul's  ascendency  was  recognized.  His  discipleship  had 
been  fully  established,  Barnabas  vouching  for  it  in  the  beginning; 
and  now  his  apostleship  seems  to  be  fully  approved,  yet  not  without 
some  embarrassment  and  possibly  resistance.  Perhaps  the  secret  rea- 
son for  the  separation  of  Barnabas  from  Paul  was  the  growing  jeal- 
ousy of  the  former  respecting  the  growing  power  of  the  latter ;  for  it 
was  about  this  time  when  Paul,  flushed  with  his  victory  at  Jerusalem, 
quite  willingly  consented  to  do  independent  work.  The  positions  of 
Paul  and  Barnabas  are,  therefore,  reversed  ;  Paul  is  master,  Barnabas 
is  co-operator  or  follower  of  others.  Penan  complains  of  this  usurpa- 
tion on  the  part  of  Paul ;  but  it  is  an  instance  of  the  survival  of  the 
fittest.  Paul  was  a  born  leader;  Barnabas  was  a  good  worker,  but 
not  an  original  sviperintendent. 

Renan  also  grieves  over  the  exaltation  of  Paul,  and  the  diminished 
or  fading  splendors  of  Peter,  who  he  declares  was  the  greatest  of 
apostles.  Paul  is  nothing;  but,  "talk  to  me  of  Peter,"  says  the 
Frenchman,  "  who  bends  the  heads  of  kings,  shatters  empires, 
walks  upon  the  asp  and  the  basilisk,  treads  under  foot  the  lion  and 
the  dragon,  and  holds  the  keys  of  heaven."  Peter  wrote  two  epistles 
of  comparatively  minor  value ;  Paul  wrote  fourteen  epistles,  every  one 
packed  with  supernatural  truth.  Peter  labored  chiefly  in  Syria;  Paul 
in  Syria,  Asia  Minor,  and  Europe.  Peter  was  a  bigot  after  conver- 
sion;  Paul  a  philanthropic  Christian  from  the  moment  of  his  miu 
birth.  Peter  was  a  Jewish  Christian  until  Paul  opened  to  his  vision 
the  world-wide,  world-embracing  ideal  of  Jesus  Christ ;  Paul  was  a  Gen- 
tile Christian  from  the  beginning,  broad-gauged,  humanity-loving,  race- 
saving.  Renan,  influenced  by  Catholic  tradition,  shakes  the  bones  of 
Peter  at  the  Christian  Church  ;  we,  influenced  by  a  Protestant  faith, 
point  to  the  crown  of  Paul  as  the  inducement  to  walk  in  his  footsteps. 


A  CONSCIENCE-GOVERNED  MAN.  405 

Paul,  as  the  exemplar  of  Christianity,  is  a  very  interesting  study. 
Human  at  all  times,  even  under  inspiration,  he  is  not  to  be  thought 
of  as  faultless,  but  it  is  small  business  to  dwell  on  his  deficiencies  to 
the  exclusion  of  his  excellences.  An  artist  might  discover  some 
slight  defect  in  one  of  the  figures  in  the  dome  of  St.  Peter's,  but 
such  defect  would  not  overthrow  the  reputation  of  Angelo  as  an  art- 
ist. Imperfection  in  human  character,  refined  by  grace,  is  not  a 
demonstration  of  the  failure  of  Christianity  to  effect  its  blessed  work. 
Acknowledging,  without  detailing,  supposed  weaknesses  in  Paul,  he  is 
nevertheless  an  exemplar,  not  eclipsed  by  any  contemporary  or  by  any 
modern  saint.  Even  the  sun  has  its  ecliptic,  or  more  nearly  analogical, 
its  black  spots,  but  it  shines  and  enlightens  the  world.  When  Renan 
disputes  Paul's  saintship,  and  charges  him  with  being  harsh,  severe, 
and  repelling,  he  exhibits  his  prejudice,  and  advertises  an  evil  pur- 
pose in  blackmailing  so  illustrious  a  character  in  the  Christian  Church. 
Few  men  have  so  often  quoted  the  conscience  for  the  regulation  of 
conduct  as  Paul,  who  in  his  wildest  moods  [of  persecution  verily 
thought  he  was  doing  God's  service.  Thus  reasoned  he,  showing  that 
he  aimed  to  have  reference  to  a  standard  of  righteousness,  even  be- 
fore his  relations  to  the  old  faith  had  been  dissolved.  In  later  life 
he  had  reference  always  to  the  Gospel  order  and  the  Gospel  ideal  of 
life,  and  as  his  conscience  was  educated  in  Christian  responsibility  he 
obeyed  its  signals  or  communications  with  unfailing  persistency  and 
a  steady  purpose. 

But  as  a  conscience-governed  man  is  not  the  highest  type  of  hu- 
man character,  inasmuch  as  the  conscience  is  not  infallible,  so  Paul 
is  seen,  not  at  his  best,  until  he  is  the  subject  of  spiritual  leader- 
ship, and  is  a  divine  instrument  for  the  fulfillment  of  divine  pur- 
poses. He  is  the  righteous  man  who  is  under  the  sovereignty  and 
regnancy  of  the  divine  Spirit.  He  is  a  God-governed  man.  Paul 
belongs  to  this  class.  It  is  as  a  religious  man,  divinely  guided,  di- 
vinely used,  performing  the  duties  of  a  divinely  called  and  a  divinely 
endowed  man,  that  he  is  man's  example.  It  was  bold  in  him  to  say 
to  the  Philippians,  "Those  things  which  ye  have  both  learned,  and 
received,  and  heard,  and  seen  in  me,  do."  He  appealed  to  his  life 
as  an  example  of  Christianity. 

Renan,  disposed  at  least  once  to  do  his  subject  justice,  recognizes 
the  man  of  action  in  Paul,  comparing  him  to  Luther,  and  also  dis- 
covers in  him  that  "peculiar  characteristic"  in  a  great  soul  to 
"  grow  great  and  -expand  without  ceasing,"  comparing  him  in  this 
respect  to  Alexander.  This  is  the  limit  of  his  recognitions.  Luther 
resembles  him  ;  Alexander  is  like  him.  He  is  the  man  of  force, 
he  is  a  conqueror,  he  is  a  commander.     Because  he  is  Alexander  or 


406  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

Luther  over  again,  Reuan  might  have  placed  him  above  Peter  and 
the  other  apostles,  but  he  reduces  him  below  them.  Paul  was 
the  man  of  his  age,  the  man  of  character,  the  man  of  conscience,  the 
man  of  Christianity. 

Paul,  as  a  martrjr,  is  a  tender  subject,  full  of  inspiration.  His 
death  is  an  argument  in  favor  of  his  religion.  Death  brought  no 
terror  to  his  great  soul.  When  stoned  at  Lystra ;  when  mobbed  in 
Jerusalem  ;  when  shipwrecked  in  the  Bay  of  Malta ;  when  a  prisoner 
in  Philippi;  he  could  say,  "None  of  these  things  move  me."  No 
danger  appalled  him ;  no  prospect  restrained  his  enthusiasm  ;  no  suf- 
fering quieted  his  activity.  Believing  in  the  sanctifying  power  of 
tribulation,  he  expected  it  to  come,  and  submitted  to  it  with  all  hu- 
mility and  grace.  When,  therefore,  under  sentence  of  death,  he 
could  write,  "I  am  ready  to  be  offered  up."  His  life-work  finished, 
he  calmly  waited  for  the  heavenly  reward.  Suffering  the  martyr's 
fate,  he  received  the  martyr's  crown. 

His  influence— will  it  ever  die?  If,  as  Renan  concedes,  he  is  the 
representative  of  a  "marching  and  conquering  Christianity,"  and  if 
Christianity  continues  to  march  on  and  conquer,  the  name  of  Paul 
will  have  a  fixed  place  in  history,  and  his  influence  will  abide  in  the 
heart  of  the  world.  Determined,  if  possible,  to  uproot  that  influence 
from  Christian  nations,  the  French  critic  represents  that,  until  the 
Reformation,  Paul  was  well-nigh  forgotten,  but  that  Luther  rescued 
him.  Protestantism  championed  him,  and  a  "new  era  of  glory  and 
authority "  for  him  ensued ;  but  that  the  reign  of  Paul  is  now  draw- 
ing to  a  close.  It  is  true  the  Reformation  superseded  Peter  Avith 
Paul,  and  the  highest  type  of  Christianity  has  since  prevailed  in  the 
world ;  and  if  Paul  is  declining  we  are  not  aware  of  it.  Renan  is 
anxious  for  his  decline,  and  imagines  that  it  has  taken  place.  When 
Jesus  shall  decline,  then  Paul  shall  decline. 

Paul  is  more  than  the  representative  of  apostolic  Christianity, 
which,  in  its  original  terms  and  purposes,  was  Jewish,  and,  therefore, 
inferior  to  that  which  the  Master  taught  and  designed  to  perpetuate. 
He  stands  apart  as  the  representative  of  all  the  revelations  of  the 
divine  Teacher,  and  as  the  expounder  of  all  the  truths  which  the 
Christian  religion  is  supposed  to  embody.  From  the  original  apostles 
a  historic  Christianity  emanates;  from  Paul,  a  vital  Christianity. 
From  the  twelve,  a  synoptic  Gospel ;  from  Paul,  a  systematic  religion. 
From  the  one,  a  miscellaneous  Christianity;  from  the  other,  a  doctrinal 
Christianity.  Renan  suggests  that  Paul  is  responsible  for  bad  the- 
ologies, and  that  he  imported  metaphysics  into  religion.  The  Gospels 
are  alphabetical  schools;  Paul  is  a  theological  university. 

Paul  introduced  the  Gospel  to  the  Gentile  world,  opened  the  door 


THE  KEY  TO  GOSPEL  PROPAGANDISM.  407 

that  had  always  beeu  shut,  and  laid  the  foundation  for  a  universal 
Christian  civilization.  Sectional  or  race  religions  were  as  common  as 
the  reeds  on  the  banks  of  the  Jordan.  A  universal  religion  Avas  not 
even  a  conception  or  abstraction.  Christianity  revealed  the  concep- 
tion ;  the  apostles  disputed  over  it ;  the  Jews  pronounced  it  heretical, 
fanatical ;  while  Paul  embraced  it,  and  put  it  into  execution.  Peter 
did  go  to  the  house  of  Cornelius,  but  Paul  invaded  the  Roman  em- 
pire with  it,  and  turned  the  world  "  upside  down."  The  Gospel  to  tJie 
Gentiles  meant  neiv  government,  new  customs,  new  social  and  moral  idens ; 
it  meant  the  destruction  of  paganism,  and  the  uplifting  of  tJie  sons  of  Ja- 
pheth  into  a  Christian  civilization.  Hence,  in  calculations  respecting 
the  forces  underlying  the  world's  progress,  the  Gospel  can  not  be 
omitted,  and  Paul  can  not  be  forgotten. 

Paul  built  the  bridge  between  Judaism  and  Christianity.  No 
apostle  so  grieved  over  the  defection  of  the  Jews,  and  their  inability 
to  appreciate  the  Gospel,  as  did  Paul.  Loving  them,  he  preached  to 
them,  and  predicted  that,  recovering  from  their  deception  and  ex- 
tinguishing their  prejudices,  they  will  at  last  embrace  the  rejected 
Messiah.  On  Paul's  prophecies,  teachings,  and  suggestions,  and  affec- 
tionate remonstrances,  may  be  based  the  hope  of  their  return  into  the 
kingdom  of  God ;  and  then  shall  the  end  come.  Paul  stands  midway 
between  Jew  and  Gentile,  to  unite  both  in  the  love  of  Christ;  and, 
when  it  is  accomplished,  he  will  be  acknowledged  as  the  chief  instru- 
ment in  the  consummation. 

Paul  gives  to  the  Christian  Church  the  key  to  Gospel  propagan- 
dism^  and  reveals  the  plan  by  which  the  world  will  be  brought  to 
Christ.  Christ's  commission  is  "Go."  Paul's  life  was  an  execution 
of  the  commission.  Christ  commands ;  Paul  obeys.  Christ  gives  us 
orders;  Paul  gives  us  methods.  From  Christ  we  learn  what  to  do; 
from  Paul,  how  to  succeed.  The  itinerating  plan  of  conquest,  which 
gave  Asia  Minor  and  Europe  to  Paul,  will  conduct  the  world  to  the 
Savior.     Is  not  Paul  the  exponent  of  Christianity  ? 


408  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 

THE    PROVINCE    OE     CHRISTIANITY. 

CHRISTIANITY  is  the  philosophy  of  the  cUvim  activity  expressed 
iu  goverumeutal  relations  to  the  uuiverse  and  the  creatures  who 
inhabit  it.  It  is  not  a  speculation  touching  these  relations,  but  a 
revelation,  supported  by  all-sufficient  testimony,  both  internal  and 
external,  addressed  to  the  intelligence  of  the  human  race.  According 
to  its  own  terms,  it  is  more  than  an  inquiry  concerning  the  truth ;  it  is 
the  truth.  Its  specific  purpose  is  the  revelation  of  truth,  or  the  media- 
tion between  reason  and  truth.  Its  province  is  the  province  of  mediated, 
necessary  truth,  in  which  it  proposes  solutions  for  speculations,  and  rev- 
elations for  discussions.  It  states  and  settles  the  questions  of  the  ages, 
taking  them  up  where  philosophy  lays  them  down,  and  unfolds  them 
by  methods  peculiar  to  itself,  and  satisfactory  to  the  human  mind. 

In  a  preliminary  sense,  it  is  necessary  to  determine  if  Christianity 
includes  all  truth,  or  truth  of  a  peculiar  kind  ;  for  if  restricted  to  one 
truth,  or  one  kind  of  truth,  our  duty  will  be  to  separate  such  truth 
from  all  others,  and  then  consider  it  in  its  fullness  and  relations.  To 
define  the  limitations  of  religion,  or  to  prescribe  the  inquiries  of  Chris- 
tianity, involves  a  knowledge  of  Christianity  itself,  to  which  no  one 
has  perfectly  attained.  Of  Christianity  we  think  we  know  something ; 
but,  as  its  stretches  out  into  the  infinite  realm,  including  the  contents 
of  divine  wisdom,  and  glorying  iu  supernatural  wonders,  it  is  not 
certain  that  the  human  mind  can  properly  mark  its  boundaries,  or 
even  declare  its  purposes.  To  affirm  that  Christianity  is  the  religion 
of  the  illimitable  is  to  open  the  door  to  mysteries  without  number, 
and  to  put  it  beyond  human  understanding ;  to  affirm  that  its  prov- 
ince is  clearly  defined,  requires  one  to  point  out  the  boundary  lines, 
which  in  some  directions  are  either  obscure  or  too  distant  to  be 
observed.  ' 

Recognizing  the  difficulty,  we  dispose  of  it  by  announcing  that 
there  are  at  least  two  fields  of  inquiry  proper  for  religion  to  occupy. 
The  one  is  the  field  of  the  natural  or  phenomenal  world ;  otherwise 
the  physical  universe.  To  what  extent  Christianity  may  undertake 
to  interpret  nature  will  be  shown  in  succeeding  pages ;  it  is  enough 
now  to  state  that  a  religious  interpretation  of  nature  is  justifiable, 
and  that  Christianity  is  supported  by  the  natural  world  may  be 
made  apparent.     The  two  are  so  related  that  one  may  be  turned  to 


PHYSICAL  BASIS  OF  TRUTH.  409 

the  defense  of  the  other.  The  mutual  relations,  the  differences,  and 
the  resemblances  between  natural  and  spiritual  truth  have  escaped 
discovery  or  acknowledgment,  both  in  scientific  and  religious  cir- 
cles, involving  them  in  needless  controversy  and  hopeless  disunion. 
Truth  is  without  limitations,  but  the  scientific  relation  to  truth 
is  one  aspect,  and  the  religious  relation  to  truth  is  another.  The 
diflference  is  not  in  the  truth,  but  in  the  relations  of  science  and  re- 
ligion to  it. 

Studying  nature  in  its  lower  aspect,  as  the  region  of  facts,  to- 
gether with, its  laws,  forms,  foi'ces,  uses,  systems,  and  adaptations,  the 
sciences  are  established ;  but  the  scientific  view  of  nature  is  not  a 
complete  interpretation  of  its  spirit  or  end.  To  ascertain  the  spirit 
and  purpose  of  nature  it  must  be  viewed  from  another  stand-point ; 
and  as  Christianity  interprets  the  spirit  of  nature,  so  nature  is  found 
to  reflect  Christianity.  Paul  declares  that  the  invisible  things  of  the 
Godhead  are  indicated  in  the  visible  creation ;  that  is,  nature  is  a  dem- 
onstration of  the  theistic  hypothesis,  and  of  infinite  truth.  Hence, 
the  theologian  may  inquire  of  nature  for  testimony  to  Christian  truth, 
as  well  as  the  scientist  for  the  facts  of  science.  If  chemistry,  geology, 
physiology,  zoology,  botany,  meteorology,  and  biology  issue  from  nat- 
ure, as  scientific  truths,  so  do  theism,  depravity,  regeneration,  atone- 
ment, immortality,  resurrection,  heaven,  and  hell  as  religious  truths. 
Christianity,  as  well  as  science,  has  a  liliysical  basis,  which,  however, 
must  be  sought  to  be  found. 

To  establish  its  truths  Christianity  invades  the  natural,  demanding 
a  knowledge  of  its  facts,  laws,  and  forces,  and  appeals  to  the  mind 
through  the  natural  in  proof  of  its  revelations  of  higher  truth.  This 
process  is  in  the  interest  of  religion,  and  not  in  the  interest  of  science. 
Nature  is  tributary  to  religion,  as  it  is  to  science,  but  each  has  its 
own  interpretations,  inquiries,  purposes.  These  inquiries  establish  the 
limitations  of  the  scientific  and  religious  interpretations  of  nature. 
The  limitations  of  Christianity  are  the  limitations  of  its  inquiries, 
which  concern  religious  truth  ;  the  limitations  of  science  are  the  lim- 
itations of  its  inquiries  which  concern  physical  truth.  Neither  in- 
vades the  other  ;  there  is  no  collision  of  inquiry ;  both  co-exist  in  the 
same  field,  are  supported  by  the  same  facts,  and  establish  one  truth 
in  its  two-faced  variety  of  matter  and  spirit. 

The  other  field  of  inquiry  is  the  supernatural,  or  the  spiritual  uni- 
verse, of  which  Christianity  is  the  purported  revelation.  It  is  a  vast, 
unbounded  empire  of  realities,  distinct  from  the  natural,  but  whose 
spirit  often  strikes,  invades,  is  incorporated  with,  the  natural,  illu- 
minating it  and  explaining  it.  The  peculiar  province  of  Christianity 
is  to  reveal  the  spiritual,  not  only  in  its  connections  with  the  natural, 


410  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

but  also  in  its  independent  character  and  eternal  essence.  Purely  re- 
ligious truths  are  essentially  superhuman,  having  their  roots  in  the 
unseen  or  spiritual  universe,  and  descending,  in  their  growth,  into 
human  history,  according  to  man's  needs  and  sympathies.  As  the 
spiritual  is  associated  in  mysterious  ways  with  the  natural,  justifying 
an  interpretation  of  the  natural  from  the  spirituj^  stand-point,  so  the 
spiritual  is  associated  with  the  human,  justifying  an  interpretation  of 
man  from  the  stand-point  of  Christianity. 

Christianity,  in  the  lowest  sense,  is  ^  the  religion  or  philosophy  of 
the  natural,  hut  in  the  highest  sense  it  is  the  religion  or  philosophy 
of  the  supernatural.  As,  however,  it  has  its  limitations  when  applied 
to  the  natural,  So  it  has  its  limitations  when  applied  to  the  supernat- 
ural. It  does  not  reveal  all  the  supernatural.  There  is  a  vast  un- 
known in  the  spiritual  universe.  Questions  without  number,  with 
reference  to  eternal  things,  Christianity  does  not  answer  ;  it  is  beyond 
its  province  even  to  attempt  to  answer  them.  The  existence  of  a 
supernatural  world,  of  supernatural  truth,  of  a  supernatural  spirit, 
Christianity  makes  known,  but  it  does  not  define  the  boundaries  be- 
tween the  natural  and  supernatural,  nor  does  it  indicate  the  processes 
of  supernatural  manifestations,  nor  the  exact  differentia  of  the  super- 
natural. The  doctrine  of  regeneration  is  a  revealed  truth;  the  in- 
strument of  regeneration  is  the  Spirit  of  God  ;  the  process  of  regener- 
ation is  unknown  and  unknowable.  In  like  manner  the  truths 
revealed  relate  to  doctrines,  experiences,  instruments,  purposes,  and 
results,  while  processes  are  hidden,  or,  at  the  most,  only  inferred. 
The  supernatural  is  revealed  with  limitations. 

The  circle  of  Christianity  is  not  large  enough  to  include  all  truth, 
except  in  the  subsidiary  sense  that  it  includes  all  revealed  truth.  Its 
relation  to  the  natural  and  supernatural  is  a  relation  of  limitation; 
its  purpose  is  neither  wholly  natural — that  is,  scientific — nor  super- 
natural— that  is,  altogether  religious.  It  includes  both  and  differs 
from  both. 

Christianity  is  the  only  truth  ;  it  is  more  than  a  single  province 
of  truth.  The  province  of  Christianity  is,  in  the  very  highest  sense, 
the  province  of  truth.  There  are  truths  not  in  themselves  definitely 
religious,  as  there  are  religions  not  definitely  true,  both  of  which 
sustain  relations  to  the  truth  of  truths,  and  must  be  estimated  in  an 
interpretation  of  Christianity.  AVhat,  then,  it  may  be  asked,  is  the 
relation  of  Christianity,  as  the  truth  of  truths,  to  other  truths,  other 
religions,  other  systems?  In  the  discovery,  explanation,  and  an- 
nouncement of  truth,  have  philosophy  and  Christianity  agreed,  or  is 
there  any  relation  whatever  between  them  as  systems  of  similar 
truths?     In  its  attitude  of  hostility  to  Christianity,  materialism  has 


DIFFERENCE  OF  METHOD.  411 

held  very  little  in  common  with  religion ;  but  as  to  fundamental 
truth,  theistic,  ethnic,  and  eschatological,  philosophy  might  readily, 
and  without  stultification,  accept  the  teachings  of  Christianity,  be- 
cause they  are  not  incompatible.  From  Thales  to  Herbert  Spencer 
the  great  problems  of  creation,  being,  mind,  and  the  future  have  en- 
gaged the  most  serious  philosophic  investigation,  as  also  they  consti- 
tute the  most  serious  revelations  of  Christianity.  In  this  respect  the 
province  of  Christianity  and  the  province  of  philosophy  are  one  and 
the  same.  In  method  of  discovery,  development,  and  presentation 
of  truth  the  two  systems  are  radically  different ;  hence  the  hostility, 
which  is  primarily  a  hostility  of  method  only.  The  oneness  of  Chris- 
tianity and  philosophy  is  the  oneness  of  pursuit ;  the  difference  of 
Christianity  and  philosophy  is  the  difference  of  method.  Out  of  the 
difference  of  method  grows  the  difference  of  result. 

It  is  precisely  this  difference  of  method  that  accounts  for  the  fail- 
ure of  the  one  and  the  success  of  the  other.  Respecting  the  greatest 
truths,  philosophy  has  failed  in  its  explanations  and  declarations,  pro- 
ducing as  monuments  of  its  incompetency  the  wretched  and  ghostly 
forms  of  materialism  and  agnosticism,  while  Christianity,  pulsating 
with  a  divine  energy,  announced  the  sublimest  doctrines  with  a  faith 
born  of  knowledge,  and  a  fullness  that  proves  it  to  be  a  revelation 
from  God.  The  province  of  Christianity  is  philosophical  in  the  sense 
that,  taking  up  philosophical  truth  in  its  nakedness  and  wretched- 
ness, it  gives  it  a  new  body,  clothes  it  with  a  supernatural  beauty, 
and  breathes  into  it  a  supernatural  life.  Under  this  transforming 
process  whatever  is'^absurd  in  philosophy  is  cast  out,  and  its  truth  passes 
over  in  a  new  and  true  form  into  the  religious  realm.  Philosophic 
Realism,  absurd  in  its  very  nature,  is  lost  in  the  rational  conception 
of  the  existence  of  absolute  ideas,  or  inherent  ideals  of  mind  ;  that  is, 
the  separate  existence  of  ideas,  outside  of  mind,  is  supplanted  by  the 
doctrine  of  inherent  ideas  of  absolute  mind.  Epicurean  atheism  is 
succeeded  by  Christian  theism ;  Pythagorean  transmigration  is  given 
up  for  revealed  immortality  ;  Alexandrian  mysticism  fades  into  Gos- 
pel spirituality  ;  evolutionary  ethics  is  replaced  by  supernaturalistic 
law  ;  and  the  truth  of  a  personal,  providential  superintendence  of 
worldly  affairs  roots  out  pessimism  and  the  whole  troop  of  philosophic 
falsehoods  and  errors. 

Christianity  is  philosophical,  not  only  in  its  truth,  but  equally  in 
its  consistency  and  certainties.  Mansel  objects  to  the  attempt  to  sup- 
port religious  truth  by  rationalistic  foundations,  which  is  the  same  as 
saying  that  he  denies  to  Christianity  a  philosophic  consistency  and 
certainty.  He  is  not  the  first  who  would  deprive  religion  of  a  philo- 
sophical basis,  nor  tlie  first  to  concede  certain  contradictory  elements 


412  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

in  the  Christian  notion  of  the  Absolute  and  Infinite,  and  that  religious 
truth  must  be  accepted  on  other  grounds  than  that  of  philosophic  co- 
herency* and  rationalistic  transparency.  So  far  forth  as  it  is  a  state- 
ment of  truth,  Christianity  is  a  revelation ;  so  far  forth  as  it  demon- 
strates its  truths,  whether  by  an  appeal  to  the  natural,  experimental, 
historical,  archseological,  or  to  the  inner  consistency  of  truth,  it  pur- 
sues a  philosophic  method,  and  is  so  far  a  philosophy.  The  truth  of 
revealed  religion  is  supposed  to  rest  upon,  and  to  be  vindicated  by, 
moral  evidence,  while  the  application  to  it  of  philosophical  tests  or 
principles,  by  which  a  mathematical  certainty  may  be  reached,  is 
considered  presumptive,  and  the  attempt  pronounced  a  failure.  Yet 
it  is  clear  that  Christianity  may  submit  to  such  a  test  without  danger 
to  it  as  a  whole,  or  to  any  part  of  it.  The  concession  that  the  proofs 
of  Christianity  are  moral,  and  can  not  be  philosophical,  is  damaging 
in  the  extreme.  Dealing  with  philosophical  truth,  it  may  be  exposed 
to  philosophical  tests ;  and,  as  philosophical  truth  demonstrates  itself 
to  a  mathematical  certainty,  abjuring  moral  evidence,  so  Christianity 
may  demonstrate  itself  to  a  mathematical  certainty,  employing  moral 
evidence  with  reserve,  and  then  only  incidentally.  The  truth  of 
revelation  is  as  open  to  demonstration  as  the  truth  of  philosophy. 
Revelation  itself  is  a  demonstration.  Christianity  is  the  demonstration 
of  the  supernatural,  as  philosophy  is  the  demonstration  of  the  natural. 
One  is  as  complete  as  the  other  ;  one  is  as  mathematically  certain  as 
the  other.  Christianity  teaches  this  view,  or  it  would  not  be  taught 
here.  In  his  introductory  word  to  Theophilus,  Luke  says  he  writes 
his  Gospel  that  he  might  "know  the  certainty  of  those  things  wherein 
thou  hast  been  instructed."  Christianity  is  a  certainty,  a  consistency, 
a  rational,  philosophic,  supernaturally  demonstrated  system  of  truth. 
It  is  truth  revealed  ;  therefore,  of  unquestionable  certainty,  more  re- 
liable than  any  mathematically  demonstrated  truth.  Incarnation  is 
as  well  established  as  any  historical  event  recorded  by  Gibbon  or 
Macaulay.  Atonement  may  be  demonstrated  as  clearly  as  any  prob- 
lem in  Euclid.  Independently,  however,  of  historical  tests  of  the 
historic  data,  and  of  logical  or  mathematical  proofs  of  the  doctrinal 
truths  of  Christianity,  the  whole  is  addressed  to  human  intelligence 
on  the  superior  ground  of  a  supernatural  revelation,  which  has  in  it 
every  element  of  certainty  and  every  assurance  of  absolute  verity. 
On  common  philosophic  grounds,  the  truth  of  Christianity  may  be 
fully  demonstrated;  on  its  own  ground,  it  makes  itself  transparently 
true,  and  is  above  all  suspicion.  This  is  the  highest  achievement — to 
make  truth  transparent,  to  make  it  appear  what  it  is,  to  relieve  it  of 
all  illusion  and  error,  to  fasten  it  upon  the  mind  as  incontrovertibly 
and  eternally  true.     In  its  philosophical  relations  and  demonstrations, 


BRAHMINISM  A  PROPHECY..  413 

Christianity  undertakes  to  accomplish  this  work,  adding  the  super- 
natural proof  of  its  chiim  as  a  levehition. 

In  the  same  spirit,  Christianity  disposes  of  the  truths  that  other 
religions  claim  as  their  exclusive  propert}',  appropriating  them  when 
in  harmony  with  itself,  fulfilling  their  own  predictions  respecting  the 
appearance  of  divine  teachers,  and  uprooting  the  errors  and  supersti- 
tions that  have  characterized  them,  and  unfitted  them  for  the  very 
purposes  for  which  they  were  established.  The  old  religious  were 
prophecies  of  the  new,  in  that  they  contained  many  truths  or  sugges- 
tions, which,  like  those  of  philosophy,  required  elaboration,  trans- 
parency, systematic  and  orderly  development  into  unity,  before  they 
could  exercise  the  native  power  in  them,  or  before  they  could  be  ac- 
cepted at  their  full  value.  Gold  in  the  ore  is  not  as  valuable  as  gold 
minted.  Truth  in  the  ore,  such  as  it  was  in  the  old  religions,  is  not 
as  valuable  as  truth  cleansed  from  error,  and  lifted  out  of  its  crude 
environment  into  a  stately  attitude  of  independence  and  beauty. 
Christianity  brought  to  light  the  hidden  truths  of  the  old  religious, 
and  introduced  them  in  new  forms  to  the  attention  of  the  world.  In 
this  work  it  revealed  the  value  of  truth,  but  it  was  quite  as  distinct 
a  revelation  as  had  it  revealed  the  truth  directly  from  God.  To  re- 
veal, explain,  and  elaborate  old,  e.vistent,  but  hidden  and  misunder- 
stood, truths  is  as  necessary  as  to  reveal  new  and  entirely  unknown 
truths.  In  either  case  the  result  is  truth,  and  the  method  is  the 
same — revelation. 

Brahminism,  a  system  of  religious  dreams,  furnishes  a  striking 
illustration  of  this  statement.  Among  its  essential  teachings  are  those 
respecting  gods,  incarnations,  trinities,  sacrifices,  and  divine  teachers, 
the  whole  a  crude  prophecy  of  the  leading  doctrines  of  Christianity, 
for  the  latter  proclaims  Incarnation,  the  Trinity,  Atonement,  and 
Messiahship,  as  fundamental  ideas,  as  essential  facts,  without  which 
religion  is  impossible.  Brahminism  is  an  antecedent  religion,  of  which 
Christianity  is  a  full  revelation  or  development.  The  Persian 
prophets  predicted  the  birth  of  a  divine  child  from  a  virgin,  and  the 
Athenians  in  Paul's  day  ereeted  an  altar  to  the  "Unknown  God," 
the  prophecy  of  the  one  and  the  altar  of  the  other  pointing  to  two 
great  truths  of  Christianity.  In  the  one,  these  truths  are  in  an  em- 
bryonic state  ;  in  the  other,  they  are  developed.  The  old  religions 
were  the  forerunners  of  the  new.  Christianity  was  a  reformation  of 
old  forms,  as  well  as  a  revelation  of  new  ideas.  It  was  a  development 
of  old  truth,  as  well  as  the  announcement  of  new  truth.  The  aim 
of  all  religions  is  the  same,  as  the  anxieties  of  the  world  in  all  ages 
have  been  the  same.     The  same  problems,  the  same  hopes  and  fears, 


414  PBILOSOPHY  AND  CHHISTIANITY. 

the  same  ideas,  mure  or  less  clear,  have  interested  the  race  from  the 
begiiiniug;  and  the  religion  that  solves  the  problems,  satisfies  the 
hopes,  and  evolves  the  ideas  into  great  transparent  realities,  must 
finally  reign  in  the  world  nntil  it  ends.  The  early  religions  undertook 
to  pilot  the  race  in  the  dark,  but  hoped  fiar  the  morning,  and  an- 
nounced its  coming.  Trench  observes:  "  These  dim  prophetic  antici- 
pations, the  dreams  of  the  world,  so  far  from  helping  to  persuade  us 
that  all  we  hold  is  a  dream  likewise,  are  rather  that  which  ought 
to  have  preceded  the  world's  awaking.  These  parhelia  do  not  pro- 
claim every  thing  else  to  be  optical  illusions,  but  announce  and  wit- 
ness for  a  sun  that  is  traveling  into  sight." 

The  relationship  of  religions  is  an  acknowledged  fact.  Holding 
to  similar  truths,  one  prepared  the  way  for  another,  or  gave  birth  to 
another,  as  Brahminism  to  Buddhism,  and  all  prepared  the  way  for 
Christianity,  which,  recovering  old  truth  from  its  superstitious  en- 
vironment, joined  it  to  new^  truth  as  it  descended  from  heaven.  The 
relationship  of  religions  does  not  imply  the  necessary  unity  of  relig- 
ions, only  so  far  forth  as  the  characteristic  of  truth  is  its  unity.  The 
unity  of  religions  is  the  unity  of  the  truth  in  them.  James  Freeman 
Clarke  speaks  of  Christianity  as  "  one  of  the  good  religions,"  and 
W.  H.  Channing  alludes  to  it  as  "  one  of  many  religions,  all  essen- 
tially divine."  These  are  misleading  statements,' for  the  independ- 
ent and  supernatural  character  of  Christianity  is  a  great  fact,  and 
must  not  be  ignored ;  nor  must  other  religions  be  permitted  to 
occupy  the  rank  of  divine  religions,  else  in  what  respect  is  Christian- 
ity any  better  than  preceding  religions  ?  Christianity  is  a  development 
of  the  old ;  it  is  also  a  revelation  of  the  new.  As  a  development,  it 
is  superior  to  the  old  ;  as  a  revelation,  it  is  independent  of  them. 

However,  it  is  clear  that  the  province  of  Christianity  is,  in  its 
broadest  sense,  the  province  of  all  religions,  undertaking  nothing  not 
common  to  them,  but  succeeding  wherein  they  failed.  It  is  a  new 
religion  in  doing  that  which  other  religions,  having  the  same  ends  in 
view,  could  not  realize  or  accomplish.  The  province  of  Christianity 
is  definitely  the  province  of  religion. 

It  has  Deen  stated  that  its  work  is  limited,  both  in  its  revelations 
of  the  natural  and  supernatural ;  that  its  relation  to  philosophy  is 
fraternal  and  helpful,  its  purpose  being  the  recovery  of  truth  from 
philosophic  uncertainty,  and  its  assertion  in  transparent  and  divine 
forms ;  and  that  its  relation  to  religion  is  the  same,  its  purpose  being 
the  development  of  all  the  truths  they  contain.  In  addition,  it  has 
been  hinted  that  Christianity  is  a  revelation  of  truths  not  found 
either  in   nature,  philosophy,  or  religions,  and   that  it  has  special 


RE  VELA  TION  A  ME  THOD.  4 1 5 

functions,  or  a  special  niitsiuu.  Witli  this  specialty  of  Christianity 
it  is  important  to  become  acquainted. 

Christianity,  separated  from  other  religions,  is  the  religion  of  su- 
pernatural truth,  or  of  necessary  spiritual  truth,  made  known,  not  by 
philosophic  methods,  nor  by  ordinary  religious  methods,  but  solely  by 
revelation.  The  province  of  paganism  is  the  province  of  superstition ; 
the  province  of  philosophy  is  the  province  of  speculation;  the  province 
of  Christianity  is  the  province  of  revelation.  This  is  its  distinguishing 
feature ;  this  it  is  that  isolates  it  from  philosophies  and  religions,  not- 
withstanding their  oneness  of  aim  and  points  of  agreement ;  this  it  is 
that  places  Paul  above  Plato. 

The  method  of  revelation,  for  it  is  a  method  only  of  communicat- 
ing truth,  justifies  itself  by  the  singular  and  stupendous  fuct  that 
what  is  called  necessary  spiritual  truth  can  be  found  only  in  the  Book 
alleged  to  contain  a  revelation.  The  question  of  revelation  might  be 
waived,  if  the  truths  of  the  book  were  accepted  as  genuine;  but  a; 
denial  of  revelation  is  implicit  with  a  denial  of  the  truths  supj)osed 
to  be  revealed.  Practically,  there  is  no  difference  between  faith  in 
revelation  as  a  niefhod  of  communicating  truth,  and  faith  in  the 
truths  alleged  to  be  the  result  of  revelation.  Faith  in  the  method 
and  faith  in  the  result  are  one  and  the  same,  and  a  defense  of  the 
one  is  equal  to  a  defense  of  the  other.  Whether  the  Book  may  be 
said  to  contain  a  revelation  of  truth,  or  is  the  truth  itself;  whether  it 
is  plenarily,  dynamically,  or  mechanically  inspired,  or  inspired  only 
so  far  as  the  truth  is  concerned ;  whether  it  is  substantially  or  in 
every  particular  true, — it  is  not  important  to  decide.  The  main 
point  is,  that  Christianity  is  a  revelation  of  necessary  spiritual  truth ; 
this  is  its  province — a  province  not  occupied  by  philosophy  or  other 
religions. 

To  the  method  of  revelation  it  has  been  objected  that  it  refutes 
itself  by  an  alleged  want  of  transparency  in  the  truth  it  undertakes 
to  reveal,  and  that  obscure  truth,  or  truth  obscurely  presented,  is  in- 
consistent with  truth  alleged  to  be  revealed.  The  objection  arises 
from  a  mistaken  view  of  the  method  itself,  or  the  function  of  in- 
spiration. Kevelation  is  not  synonymous  with  full  disclosures,  ex- 
plicit explanations,  and  perfect  illuminations  of  truth.  That  is  a 
revelation,  in  a  Biblical  sense,  that  serves  to  open  the  way  to  knowl- 
edge, or  furnishes  the  key  to  a  limited  knowledge  of  supernatural 
truth.  The  Bible  is  a  glass  through  which  one  sees  the  truth  ;  it  is 
a  telescope  which  he  points  to  the  spiritual  universe,  and  through 
which  he  sees  the  universe  ;  but  he  sees  it  not  perfectly,  although  he 
sees  it. 

Again,  a  revealed  truth  may  be  so  obscurely  expressed,  or  hidden 


416  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

from  view,  as  to  require  no  inconsiderable  effort  to  find  it,  or  to  rec- 
ognize it  when  found ;  it  is  nevertheless  in  a  state  of  revelation. 
Oxygen  was  not  discovered  until  within  about  a  century,  but  it  was 
iii  the  atmosphere  when  Plato  was  inhaling  it  in  Athens,  and  when 
Abraham  snuffed  the  air  in  Chaldea.  Prophetic  truth,  wrapped  in 
symbols ;  Messianic  truth,  hidden  in  poetic  metaphors ;  monotheistic 
truth,  unseen  in  the  ashes  on  patriarchal  altars;  eschatological  truth, 
opening  its  gates  but  a  little  in  the  metaphysics  of  apostles ;  soteri- 
ological  truth,  adumbrated  in  types  and  shadows  and  services  of 
prophets  and  disciples  ;  all  necessary  spiritual  truth  is  in  the  great 
book,  hidden  or  obscure  perhaps,  but  it  is  there,  to  be  found,  un- 
folded, appropriated,  used.  If  it  were  not  there,  the  claim  of  revela- 
tion would  be  false  ;  no  difference  how  it  is  there,  hidden  like  pearls 
in  the  deep,  or  blazing  like  suns  in  the  firmament,  as  it  is  there,  the 
claim  of  revelation  is  true. 

Moreover,  some  truths  of  revelation  are  declared  as  mysteries, 
never  to  be  explained;  they  are  to  be  known  as  unknmvahle,  and 
they  are  revealed  as  such.  The  secret  thoughts  of  Deity  ;  the  pro- 
cesses of  spiritual  work ;  the  doctrines  of  atonement,  immortality, 
resurrection,  heaven,  and  hell,  are  involved  in  mystery.  As  the 
working  facts  of  Christianity,  they  are  powerful  and  sufficient ;  as 
the  mysteries  of  revelation,  they  are  accepted,  and  the  soul  is  silent 
in  their  presence.  In  respect  to  mysteries,  revelation  leaves  us  in 
ignorance  ;  a  paradox  not  difiicult  of  explanation  when  all  that  it 
includes  and  excludes  is  remembered.  For  instance,  Christianity  is 
a  revelation  of  the  monotheistic  idea  concreted  in  a  personal  God, 
but  in  such  a  way  that,  while  it  enlightens,  it  also  darkens.  The, 
revelation  of  God  is  incomplete.  He  is  known  and  unknown. 
"Verily,  thou  art  a  God  that  hidest  thyself,"  is  consistent  with  "he 
that  hath  seen  me  hath  seen  the  Father."  A  liidden  and  a  visible, 
a  seen  and  an  unseen  God,  is  revealed  in  the  sacred  books.  All  other 
doctrines  are  mingled  light  and  darkness,  because  of  the  one  purpose 
of  religion. 

The  limitations  of  Christianity  are  not  in  contradiction  of,  but 
rather  in  harmony  with,  the  idea  of  revelation  There  are  necessary 
spiritual  truths,  which  it  is  the  province  of  Christianity  to  disclose, 
but  back  of  these  there  are  supernatural  truths,  equally  necessary  to 
God's  ideal  purposes,  but  not  necessaiy  to  man's  existence,  develop- 
ment, or  destiny,  that  Christianity  does  not  disclose.  Truths  in  no 
way  related  to  human  interests  find  no  place  in  revelation.  Such  truths 
may  address  the  intelligence  of  redeemed  souls  in  the  next  life,  but, 
having  no  reference  to  redemptive  or  providential  purposes  in  this 
life,  they  are  not  revealed,  and  Christianity  is  in  no  wise  weakened 


THEISM  FUNDAMENTAL.  417 

by  not  revealing  them.  Only  the  absolutely  necessary  spiritual  truth 
can  be  the  subject  of  revelation. 

If  this  is  the  province  of  revelation ;  that  is,  if  it  is  circumscribed 
by  necessary  truth,  the  province  of  Christianity  can  not  be  larger, 
different,  or  superior,  for  the  province  of  one  is  the  province  of 
the  other.  Whatever  is  consistent  with  the  idea  of  revelation,  whether 
limitation,  obscurity,  or  imperfection,  is  consistent  also  with  Christian, 
ity  as  the  religion  of  revelation.  If  revealed  truth  is  true,  then  Chris- 
tianity is  true  ;  if  one  is  false,  the  other  is  false.  The  two  are  identical 
in  substance,  and  share  the  same  fate  of  ill  or  good. 

Now,  as  the  necessary  spiritual  truths  of  revelation  are  super- 
natural, or  such  as  are  beyond  the  intellect  to  discover,  originate,  or 
explain  by  natural  or  scientific  principles,  so  the  truths  of  Christian- 
ity are  supernatural  in  character,  and  must  rank  above  all  other 
truth  either  in  philosophy  or  religions.  The  necessary  truths  of  Chris- 
tianity maybe  classified  as  follows:  I.  Theistic;  II.  Governmental; 
III.  Anthropological;  IV.  Soteriological ;  V.  Eschatological.  This  list 
may  not  include  all  that  belongs  to  the  religious  concept,  but  it  com- 
prehends the  vital  and  sovereign  facts  of  Christianity,  with  which  we 
are  more  immediately  concerned. 

Respecting  these  necessary  truths,  it  may  be  asked,  Are  they  truths? 
Are  they  sufficiently  revealed  ?  Assuming  that  they  are  truths,  reve- 
lations, inspirations,  we  can  proceed ;  otherwise,  the  whole  system  of 
Christianity  as  a  revelation  must  be  defended,  which  is  beyond  our 
present  purpose.  The  defense  of  revealed  truth  is  not  so  much  re- 
quired as  a  statement  of  what  is  revealed  truth,  or  its  separation  from 
all  other  truth,  and  its  own  exaltation.  Theistic  truth  occupies  the  first 
place  in  the  category  of  necessary  or  primary  supernatural  truth,  since, 
without  a  personal  God,  the  universe  is  inexplicable,  and,  without  a 
knowledge  of  God,  religion  is  impossible.  Atheism,  agnosticism,  posi- 
tivism, and  materialism,  rise  up  in  frenzied  horror  against  the  the- 
istic conception,  which  has  its  roots  both  in  human  consciousness  and 
in  supernatural  revelation.  Aside  from  these,  it  is  supported  by  onto- 
logical,  cosmological,  and  psychological  arguments,  which  have  never 
been  answered,  except  as  speculation  seems  to  answer  truth.  To 
abandon  such  a  conception,  grounded  in  consciousness,  science,  phi- 
losophy, and  revelation,  can  not  be  done,  except  as  one  abandons  all 
tests  of  truth,  and,  therefore,  all  truth.  Our  statement  of  theistic 
truth  does  not  require  an  investigation  of  the  proofs  of  the  existence 
of  God,  but  merely  that  the  fact  of  the  divine  existence  is  a  part  of 
the  subject-matter  of  revelation,  and  fundamental  to  the  religion  based 
upon  revelation. 

The  theistic  idea  is  not  the  sole  product  of  Christianity,  for  it 
27 


418  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

existed  in  the  world  long  before  the  advent  of  the  incarnate  Teacher, 
and,  with  all  the  superstition  that  environed  it,  it  exercised  a  con- 
trolling influence  on  the  old  religions,  if  it  did  not  produce  them. 
Tracing  the  career  of  the  idea  until  Christianity  appropriated  and 
ennobled  it,  it  appears  like  a  homeless  and  fugitive  idea,  the  skeleton 
of  a  great  truth,  without  plan,  or  a  historic  purpose,  left  to  itself  to 
do  a  tentative  work,  and  then  to  be  taken  up  finally  by  a  religion 
that  would  honor  it,  and  give  it  a  crown  and  a  throne.  Many 
truths  now  credited  to  Christianity  were  floating  ages  before  the 
Messiah  taught  them  in  the  public  mind,  like  seeds  in  the  wind, 
which,  dropping  here  and  there,  took  root,  grew,  and  bore  fruit  in 
worships,  ceremonies,  and  religions.  The  idea  of  God,  prayer,  sacri- 
fice, resurrection,  immortality,  judgment,  and  eternal  settlements, 
were  not  unknown  prior  to  Christianity,  but  they  were  dreams,  su- 
perstitions, speculations,  eventuating  into  truths  through  the  reality 
of  inspiration.  Occasionally  a  strong-minded  teacher  would  arise,  as 
if  touched  by  the  divine  hand,  and  commissioned  to  do  something 
new,  and  a  religion,  embodying  these  ideas,  would  be  framed;  but 
the  teacher  himself  ignorant,  they  were  sure  to  be  clothed  with  ab- 
surdities, fantasies,  and  cruelties.  Hence  the  need  of  a  clear  revela- 
tion of  truths  whose  existence  had  been  inspiringly  suspected  for  ages. 
Dreams,  suspicions,  speculations,  and  superstitions  before  Christ ; 
afterward,  truths  no  longer  in  shadows,  but  sunbeams  striking 
within  the  horizon  of  human  vision. 

The  theistic  idea  must  be  interpreted  by  this  historic  plan  or  rule 
of  the  development  of  Christian  ideas.  Its  history  is  the  history  of 
dreams  ending  in  realities,  of  superstitions  converted  into  facts,  of 
speculations  metamorphosed  into  truths.  Scarcely  a  tribe  of  men, 
however  barbarous,  or  stupid  even  to  religious  insensibility,  has  been 
found  that  has  not  entertained  the  idea  of  a  Supreme  Power  and  the 
correlative  idea  of  worship.  All  nations,  however  thick  their  moral 
darkness  and  all-pervading  their  superstitions,  have  quarantined  their 
coasts,  so  to  speak,  against  the  infection  of  atheism,  and  have  wor- 
shiped either  man-made  idols,  the  sun  and  stars,  or  the  objects  of 
nature,  meanwhile  waiting  for  a  divine  teacher,  or  a  revelation  of  the 
true  God.  Neither  the  old  religions,  fastening  themselves  to  the 
theistic  idea,  nor  the  old  philosophies,  speculating  on  the  probabilities 
of  a  First  Cause,  were  able  to  take  the  idea,  strip  it  of  vagueness, 
vitalize  it  with  the  eternal  breath,  decorate  it  with  divine  beauty,  and 
present  it  to  the  race  as  the  holiest  of  supernatural  truths.  For  this 
consummation  of  the  idea  the  race  anxiously  waited  for  ages  ;  every 
ceremony  was  a  prayer,  every  sigh  a  hope,  and  every  thought  a  de- 
sire for  revelation ;  but  priests  and  philosophers  made  no  response,  or 


MONOTHEISM  THE  SPECIALTY  OF  REVELATION.       419 

only  such  response  as  sunk  them  deeper  in  the  pit  of  ignorance. 
The  anxiously  sought  truth  Christianity  at  last  disclosed,  shooting  its 
light  like  early  morning  rays  over  the  Oriental  world,  and  revealing 
not  only  God,  but  also  the  universe  and  its  infinite  contents,  to  the 
joy  of  a  race  of  men  sometime  to  become  the  sons  of  God.  This  was 
the  function  of  Christianity,  its  specialty,  the  revelation  of  God,  and 
all  that  the  idea  carried  with  it.  It  revealed  him  by  appropriation 
and  assimilation  of  the  idea  of  God,  so  long  in  the  world ;  it  revealed 
him  by  a  close  and  particularizing  enumeration  of  his  attributes;  it 
revealed  him  in  the  character  of  an  infinite  personality;  it  revealed 
him  as  the  First  Cause,  Omnipotent  Kuler,  Universal  Benefactor,  and 
gracious  Redeemer;  it  revealed  him  as  absolute  and  unconditioned 
being,  and  in  anthropomorphic  relations  and  characteristics,  that  he 
might  the  more  readily  be  apprehended.  It  sounded  his  name 
throughout  the  universe,  and  turned  the  pessimism  of  the  ages  into 
the  laughter  of  eternal  praise. 

We  say  this  is  a  revelation ;  philosophy  can  explain  its  presence 
in  the  world  on  no  other  hypothesis.  The  pre-Christian  idea  of  God 
has  surrendered  to  the  Christian  idea,  which  now  dominates  as  the 
true  and  only  idea  in  civilization.  It  is  the  theistic  representation  of 
Christianity  that  is  quenching  the  superstitions  of  the  old  religions, 
and  piloting  philosophy  out  of  its  speculations  into  the  region  of 
reality.  This  is  a  necessary  spiritual  truth,  for  the  particular  revela- 
tion of  which  the  world  must  forever  be  indebted  to  the  great  religion 
of  the  Nazarene. 

As  an  adjunct  of  the  theistic  conception,  the  governmental  idea 
of  the  world,  or  the  reign  of  a  'providential  spirit  both  in,  nature  and 
human  history,  deserves  special  consideration.  Its  truest  representa- 
tion belongs  to  Christianity.  Viewed  from  the  stand-point  of  philos- 
ophy, the  government  of  the  Supreme  Power  is  a  centralization  of 
weakness,  imbecility,  indifference,  and  cruelty;  philosophers  them- 
selves in  their  opinions  swinging  between  fatalism  and  pessimism  on 
the  one  hand,  and  pantheism  and  deism  on  the  other.  Herbert 
Spencer  concedes  to  the  unsearchable,  indiscernible,  and  unknowable 
God,  a  benevolent  spirit  working  in  the  universe  for  the  attainment 
of  the  best  ends;  but  the  attribute  thus  philosophically  framed  or 
conceived  is  different  from  the  attribute  of  infinite  goodness  which 
the  Scriptures  declare  to  be  the  glory  of  God.  The  evolutionist  inter- 
prets the  government  of  the  world  as  strictly  of  and  within  itself;  it 
is  under  a  system  of  law,  self-instituted  and  self-administered.  The 
reign  of  personal  authority  in  nature  is  disputed  and  scorned.  Hart- 
mann,  accepting  the  existence  of  a  Supreme  Power,  regards  it  totally' 
unconscious,  both  as  to  its  own  existence  and  as  to  the  world's  gov- 


420  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

ernment,  implying  the  reign  of  a  most  absolute  and  undeviatiug 
fatalism  in  human  history.  Schopenhauer  went  farther  in  eliminating 
rational  impulses  from  the  intellectual  or  personal  center  of  the  uni- 
verse, turning  the  eternal  throne  into  a  play-house  for  the  ghost  of  an 
idea,  and  robbing  the  universe  of  a  much-needed  personal  ruler. 
Materialism,  positivism,  agnosticism,  pessimism,  and  atheism,  in  single 
attempts  or  unitedly,  have  failed  to  frame  a  satisfactory  theory  of  the 
government  of  the  world ;  and  yet  this  is  a  necessary  truth,  quite  as 
necessary  to  philosophy  as  religion. 

The  old  rehgions,  imbibing  the  spirit  of  the  old  philosophies,  did 
not  advance  much  beyond  them,  and  if  they  posited  a  bolder  concep- 
tion, it  was  so  involved  in  superstition  as  to  fail  of  recognition  as  a 
new  truth,  so  that  neither  from  the  one  nor  the  other  emerge  comfort- 
ing views  of  divine  Providence,  or  accurate  representations  of  the 
divine  government. 

To  Christianity  one  must  go  for  the  truth,  or  be  without  it.     Ac- 
cording to  its  tenets,  God's  government  is  both  general  and  particular, 
having  in  view  the  development  of  man   and  the  execution  of  the 
divine  ideal  in   the   universe.      Tyranny  is  not   found   in   Christian 
theology  as  the  exponent  of  the  divine  administration.     As  reflected 
by  Christianity,  among  the  first  notions  one   receives  of  the  divine 
government  is  its  paternal  character,  or  the   divine   interest   in  the 
human  family,  or  the  alliance  of  God  with  man.     This  general  truth, 
comforting  and  inspiring,  has  illustration  in  the  history  of  the  race, 
which,  with  all  its  vicissitudes  and  apparent  lapses  and  uncertainties, 
is  a  history  of  progress  toward  definite  ideals,   a  proof  that  God  is 
directing  the  world,  a  proof  that  the  Father  cares  for  his  children. 
This  idea  of  progress  is  as  scientific  as  it  is  Scriptural,  as  philosophic 
as  it  is  theologic;  ^nd,  accepted  as  Scripturally  interpreted  or  defined, 
man's  entire  history  becomes  an  illumination  of  a  divine  project,  is 
seen  to  be  the  fulfilling  of  a  divine  ideal.     This,  however,  is  not  its 
chief  glory.     Its  general  purposes,  however  honorable   and   electrify- 
ing, are  lost  to  the  view  when  the  relation  of  the  divine  government 
to  individual  lives  is   detected  and   emphasized ;  in  other  words,  the 
special  providential  government  of  God,  as  it  is  unfolded,  is  seen  to 
transcend  the  general,  world-wide,  age-long  government  of  the  throne. 
This  distinction  modern  philosophy  is   incompetent   to   recognize ;  as 
to  the  two  facts  or  governments,  it  denies  one  at  the  same  time  that 
it  rejects  the  other.     To  Christianity  alone  is  man   indebted  for  the 
supreme  thought  of  a  personal  government,  and  a  special  providential 
spirit  in  human  life. 

This    is    set    forth    in    the    Scriptures    in    a    threefold    manner: 
1.    Providence    respecting    the   call    and    mission  of    the    prophets; 


THE  SIGNIFICANCE  OF  PROPHECY.  421 

2.  Providence  respecting  the  assignments  of  particular  men  to 
different  spheres  of  usefulness;  3.  Providence  respecting  individual 
life  in  all  its  details.  As  one  of  the  pillars  of  Christianity, 
prophecy  still  stands  unshaken  and  unharmed.  The  mystery  of  the 
prophetic  gift,  equal  to  the  mystery  of  the  miracle-working  power, 
has  never  had,  nor  can  it  have,  any  philosophical  explanation  ;  the 
root  of  the  gift,  or  the  process  of  inspiration,  is  not  in  psychology; 
the  only  explanation  of  the  power  to  announce  future  events  is  that 
it  is  an  endowment  of  the  Almighty.  Daniel,  looking  down  the  ages 
from  a  palace  in  Babylon,  first  sees  and  then  portrays  the  rise  and 
fall  of  kingdoms  in  a  certain  historic  order,  which,  as  time  moves  on, 
is  fulfilled  to  the  letter ;  Isaiah,  with  eyes  opened  upon  a  particular 
event,  announces  the  day  when  the  reign  of  the  Messiah  shall  begin ; 
Micah  designates  the  humble  place  of  his  birth  ;  Daniel  foretells  the 
tragedy  of  his  crucifixion  ;  and  David  sings  of  the  glories  of  resurrec- 
tion and  ascension.  To  attempt  to  explain  these  prophetic  disclosures 
by  psychological  methods  would  be  very  like  an  attempt  to  explain 
the  trade-winds  by  the  same  methods.  There  are  natural  things  that 
can  not  be  explained  by  psychology ;  there  are  supernatural  tilings  in 
whose  presence  philosophy  is  dumb,  and  prophecy  defies  the  ingenuity 
of  the  evolutionist  to  solve  it  on  any  other  than  a  divine  hypothesiSo 

In  some  subtle  way  God  took  possession  of  the  prophets,  opened 
their  eyes,  and,  unfolding  to  their  gaze  a  panorama  of  events  ages 
distant,  ccjmmanded  them  to  write  that  the  world  might  know,  not  so 
much  what  would  happen,  as  that  God  is  present  with  men,  as  ruler, 
inspirer,  and  friend.  This  is  personal  providence  on  a  grand  scale, 
the  like  of  which  is  not  seen  in  the  annals  of  philosophy,  and  of 
which  philosophy  can  give  no  rational  account.  Christianity,  the  re- 
ligion of  inspiration,  refers  the  prophetic  impulse  to  a  divine  source, 
appealing  to  the  prophetic  parchments  and  their  contents  in  proof 
thereof. 

The  divine  government  is  equally  personal  in  its  superintendence 
of  the  special  vocations  of  the  great  moral  heroes  of  history.  Moses, 
divinely  called  to  be  leader  of  the  Israelites,  towers  like  some  great 
mountain,  conspicuous  for  the  handwriting  of  God  upon  his  brow ; 
Joshua,  hearing  the  divine  voice,  when  others  imagine  the  Avind  is 
blowing,  steps  into  his  shoes,  a  worthy  successor  of  the  great  law- 
giver ;  Elijah,  in  cave  or  mountain,  commissioned  by  the  angel  of 
the  Lord,  flames  through  Syria  as  a  herald  of  the  divine  administra. 
tion,  awakening  terror  in  royal  palaces,  and  then  ascends  by  a  new 
route  to  the  skies  ;  Zerubbabel,  of  forecasting  genius,  chosen  by  the 
directing  Mind  in  the  heavens,  rebuilds  the  temple  in  superior  glory, 
on    the    sacred     summits    of    Moriah  ;     Paul     hears    a    voice    near 


422  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

Damascus,  obeying  Avhich  he  is  prepared  for  the  shipwreck  in  the 
Mediterranean,  and  the  loftier  hurricane  in  the  tribunal  of  Nero ; 
John,  charmed  by  the  sweet  invitation  of  the  Master,  is  ready  for 
Patmos,  Ephesus,  heaven  ;  Peter,  leaving  the  fishing  smack  at  the 
command  of  the  divine  One,  emerges  on  Pentecost,  shakes  Jerusalem, 
and  suspends,  head  downward,  from  the  cross.  Supernatural  calls 
these;  supernatural  lives;  supernatural  histories.  No  divine  call  is 
heard  in  the  porch  of  Zeno,  or  lings  through  the  vaulted  chambers 
of  the  Academy  of  Plato;  not  even  the  Peripatetics,  with  faces 
toward  the  sky,  see  visions,  or  hear  the  echoes  of  heaven.  Special 
inspirations  to  duty  are  unknown  outside  of  Christianity. 

Of  still  more  importance  to  the  race,  Christianity  teaches  the 
most  minute  providential  care  of  the  individual  life,  enforcing  it  by 
an  exhibition  of  the  divine  regard  for  smaller  things  than  human  in- 
terests, and  then  representing  every  providential  plan  as  intended  to 
promote  those  interests.  Not  a  sparrow  falls  to  the  ground  without 
your  Father — men  are  of  more  value  than  many  sparrows  ;  the  hairs 
of  one's  head  are  numbered — a  trifle  this,  but  typical  of  that  which 
is  not  a  trifle  ;  the  steps  of  a  good  man  are  ordered  by  the  Lord  ; 
he  will  guide  by  his  counsel  into  truth  and  into  life  everlasting.  By 
such  revelations  the  idea  of  divine  providence  is  imbedded  in  the 
heart  of  humanity  ;  and  the  governmental  truth  of  Christianity, 
unique,  merciful,  fascinating,  rises  into  view  as  a  fit  corner-stone  of 
a  religion  designed  to  satisfy  human  aspiration  and  to  quiet  the  pessi- 
mistic forebodings  of  an  otherwise    irreligious  world. 

The  anthropological  truth  of  Christianity,  isolated  from  philo- 
sophic representations,  is  special  in  its  content,  and  of  the  nature  of 
an  independent  revelation  of  self-knowledge  and  self-interest.  It  in- 
cludes the  genesis  of  man,  with  the  cognate  questions  of  his  antiquity 
and  relation  to  the  natural  world,  or  the  physiological  aspects  of  the 
race ;  all  psxjcliolorjical  problems,  as  the  nature  of  mind,  the  processes 
of  intellectual  activity,  the  laws  of  cognition  and  perception,  the  re- 
lation and  interaction  of  soul  and  body,  and  the  immortality  of  the 
.  soul ;  all  moral  problems,  as  man's  positive  moral  state,  the  genesis  of 
depravity,  the  origin  of  ethical  relations  and  duties,  the  nature  and 
extent  of  human  responsibility,  and  the  historic  resources  of  human 
restoration  to  greatness  and  perfection.  No  inquiry,  raised  by  phi- 
losophy concerning  man,  is  ignored  by  the  new  religion  ;  on  the  con- 
trary, all  its  inquiries,  physiological,  psychological,  ethical,  ethnical, 
and  religious,  are  espoused  by  it  and  answered  in  its  own  way  and 
with  sufiicient  fullness  for  its  purpose.  In  these  respects  its  function 
is  intensely  scientific ;  that  is,  it  asks  for  facts,  and  must  have  them ; 
it  goes  where  evolution   goes ;  it  may   be   found  in   company  with 


SOTERIOLOGICAL  SUGGESTIONS.  423 

geology,  chemistry,  botany,  physiology,  and  psychology.  Concerning 
God,  it  is,  philosophically  tJieological ;  concerning  the  government  of  the 
world,  it  is  theologically  phUosophical ;  concerning  man,  it  is  scientifically 
anthropological,  and  anthropologically  theological  Christian  anthropology 
and  scientific  anthropology  are  the  hemispheres  of  the  same  globe  of 
truth  ;  they  fit  together,  one  is  necessary  to  the  other. 

Of  necessary  spiritual  truths,  which  it  is  the  province  of  Chris- 
tianity to  unfold,  none  are  of  greater  moment  or  more  nearly  related 
to  human  interests,  than  those  which  pass  as  soteriological,  or  such 
truths  as  include  atonement  and  regeneration  as  the  sources  of  re- 
covery from  the  efi^ects  of  sin.  Ethical  systems,  for  instance,  Aris- 
totle's, Hegel's,  Spencer's,  have  an  honored  place  in  philosophy  ;  but 
philosophy  is  without  the  soteriological  spirit,  and  is  incapable  of  de- 
vising a  soteriological  system.  Such  a  system,  the  content  of  which 
is  the  redemptive  purpose  and  project,  belongs  to,  and  must  come 
from,  religion  alone,  and  the  best  system  can  emanate  only  from  the 
best  religion.  In  a  pessimistic  mood  the  philosopher  may  point  to 
the  evils  of  life,  but  he  can  provide  no  remedy  for  them  ;  he  may 
sit  down  in  ashes  and  mourn,  but  he  can  not  rise  with  songs  in  his 
mouth,  and  shout  deliverance  from  all  his  troubles ;  he  can  go  down 
into  dungeons  of  despair,  but  he  can  not  ride  Ezekiel's  wheels  of 
light,  or  ascend  into  Paul's  third  heavens  of  vision.  Stoicism,  educa- 
tional purification,  social  ostracism,  the  pursuit  of  philosophy — these 
have  been  suggected  as  remedies  for  sin,  but  a  trial  of  them  has 
demonstrated  their  utter  inadequacy.  Nor  have  the  old  religions 
succeeded  any  better  in  soteriological  suggestions,  although  they  have 
prescribed  more  definitely  for  the  healing  of  the  soul's  infirmities. 
Penances,  sacrifices,  ceremonies,  ablutions,  avail  nothing.  To  Chris- 
tianity alone  the  race  must  turn,  not  only  for  a  remedy,  but  also  an 
adequate  remedy  for  sin.  An  explanation  of  atonement,  an  analysis 
of  its  process,  and  the  manner  in  which  it  is  applied  and  made 
eflfective  in  human  salvation,  are  questions  that  must  finally  be 
studied  ;  but  at  present  it  is  sufficient  to  declare  atonement  as  the 
primal  force  in  the  world's  moral  regeneration.  In  the  life  and  death 
of  Jesus  Christ ;  in  his  teachings  and  miracles ;  in  his  example  and 
institutions ;  in  his  agony  and  triumph ;  in  his  resurrection  and 
ascension  ;  the  remedy  for  sin  is  complete.  It  is  the  only  remedy 
that  has  justified  itself  in  human  history,  the  only  remedy  that  puts 
hope  into  the  heart,  and  brings  salvation  to  the  soul.  The  specialty 
of  Oiristianity  is  atonement  for  sin,  or  the  redemption  of  man  from 
sin.  It  is  a  revelation  of  the  redemptive  idea,  the  redemptive  pro- 
cess, and  the  redemptive  result,  crowning  its  purpose  with  achieve- 
ment, and  lifting  the  earth  into  the  heavens. 


424  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

Among  the  necessary  spiritual  truths  which  Christianity  must 
make  known,  if  they  are  known  at  all,  are  those  relating  to  the  future, 
commonly  denominated  eschatological.  Death  is  a  grim  fact.  To  live 
again  is  a  hope  ;  the  ages  echo  with  the  song  of  immortality,  and  reveal 
it  as  a  conviction  of  the  race  ;  all  religions  avow  belief  in  another 
life,  but  cloud  the  faith  with  superstition.  The  idea  then  is  in  the 
ages,  and  in  the  heart  of  man.  As  usual,  philosophy  treats  this 
most  vital  question  with  mditierence,  or,  in  its  more  positive  form,  re- 
jects the  thought  of  conscious  existence  aftei  death.  Epicurus 
argued  against  it,  while  Socrates  was  inspired  with  a  touching  faith  in 
its  certainty.  Emerson  presents  immortality  as  the  guess  of  the  soul, 
while  the  materialists  announce  the  probability  of  the  dissolution  of 
the  spiritual  fabric  with  the  body.  Enveloped  with  the  uncertainties 
of  philosophy  and  the  superstitions  of  religion,  the  Gospel  dawns 
upon  the  world,  bringing  immortality  to  light,  and  opening  a  way 
into  the  other  life.  It  relieved  the  old  idea  of  superstition  and  made 
it  a  truth,  it  relieved  it  of  uncertainty  and  made  it  a  fact. 

In  natural  order  the  great  truths  of  resurrection,  judgment, 
heaven  and  hell  follow  ;  they,  too,  are  brought  out  of  darkness  into 
light,  out  of  mystery  into  transparency,  out  of  uncertainty  into  reality. 
Christ  speaks,  and  the  eternal  world  opens  to  the  gaze  of  man  ;  Paul 
speaks,  and  the  dead  live ;  Peter  speaks,  and  the  world  is  in  ashes ; 
John  speaks,  and  hell's  lake  of  fire  flashes  its  heat  into  the  future, 
and  heaven's  gates  of  pearl  open  to  receive  the  martyrs  of  God.  The 
eschatology  of  Christianity  is  of  the  nature  of  a  divine  revelation  of 
facts,  events,  and  destinies,  impossible  to  be  foreknown  except  as  they 
are  communicated.  The  communication  of  such  truth  is  one  of  the 
functions  of  the  new  religion. 

The  province  of  Christianity  is  now  sufficiently  foreshadowed  to 
warrant  a  discussion  of  its  truths.  It  is  the  ])rovince  of  the  natural 
and  the  supernatural,  with  limitations ;  of  the  natural,  chiefly  as  it 
reflects  the  supernatural,  and  of  the  supernatural,  chiefly  as  it  reflects 
the  divine  purposes  in  their  relation  to  the  universe  and  the  creatures 
who  inhabit  it.  In  its  more  definite  undertakings  it  assumes  the  solu- 
tion of  the  theistie  prnhJem,  the  presentation  of  the  divine  administration  in 
its  providential  aspects,  the  settlement  of  all  anthropological  questions,  em- 
ploying scientific  helps  when  necessary  to  such  settlement,  the  discovery  of 
the  soteriological  resources  of  the  race,  and  the  announcement  of  a  future 
life,  with  rewards  and  punishments  conditioned  upon  man's  present  life;  in 
other  words,  it  undertakes  to  furnish  an  abridged  history  of  the  di- 
vine ACTIVITIES  in  the  creation  of  the  loorld,  the  introductivn  of  man,  the 
recovery  of  man  from  the  moral  lapse  of  his  early  career,  and  the  final  dis. 
position  of  man  and  the  universe.     Great  problems  these,  to  solve  which 


JEWISH  OR  GENTILE  CHRISTIANITY.  425 

it  invokes  the  aid  of  inspiration,  and  presents  its  truths  in  their  final 
form,  not  as  philosophic  speculations  nor  as  religious  superstitious,  but 
as  revelations  of  the  truth-giving  God. 


CHAPTER  XIX. 

THE    T\?VO    CHRISTIANITIES. 

IS  there  in  form  or  name  more  than  one  Christianity?  Narrowing 
the  question  to  one  line  of  thought,  does  the  New  Testament  re- 
veal or  contain  two  Christianities  ?  Some  Jewish  writers  contend  that 
the  religion  that  Jesus  drew  up,  originated,  or  imposed,  was  only  an  im- 
provement or  purification  of  Judaism ;  that  he  contemplated  only  the 
reform  and  not  the  extinction  of  the  Hebrew  system  ;  and  that,  judg- 
ing by  the  synoptists,  there  is  no  evidence  that  he  went  beyond  this 
design.  They,  therefore,  speak  even  friendly  of  his  work,  styling  his 
religion  "  Jewish  Christianity,"  and  go  so  far  as  to  say  that  in  the 
first  century  the  Jews  and  Christians,  understanding  that  the  differ- 
ences that  separated  them  related  to  the  Messiahship  of  Christ,  were 
not  hostile,  but  mutually  helpful  in  the  propagation  of  the  essentials 
of  both  faiths.  They  assert  also  that  the  early  Christians  embraced 
many  of  the  teachings,  observed  many  of  the  ceremonies,  and  held 
sacred  and  inviolable  all  the  laws  of  the  Jews,  and  that  had  it  not  been 
for  the  perversions  of  Paul  the  breach  between  them  had  never  oc- 
curred. Paul's  Christianity  they  contemptuously  style  Pauline,  Hel- 
lenistic, or  Gentile  Christianity,  in  opposition  to  original  or  Jewish 
Christianity. 

Here,  then,  is  an  issue,  based  upon  an  alleged  difference  between 
religion  as  tauglit  by  Christ  and  religion  as  taught  by  Paul.  Is 
Pauline  Christianity  a  perversion  of  original  Christianity  ?  Did  Paul 
or  the  apostles  institute  a  religion  derived  in  part  from  and  suggested 
by  the  great  Teacher,  but  in  many  essentials  original  with  themselves? 
Is  Paul  the  original  teacher,  the  fountain-head  of  what  is  popularly 
known  as  Christianity?  Has  the  Church  drifted  away  with  Paul 
from  what  Christ  revealed,  taught,  and  established?  Paul's  fourteen 
epistles,  written  in  less  than  thirty  years  after  the  death  of  the  Mas- 
ter, make  up  the  greater  portion  of  the  New  Testament,  and  are  ex- 
plicit in  their  statements  of  truth ;  they  are  literary  marvels,  and  as 
professed  inspired  documents  contain  supernatural  truths  that  place 
Paul  beyond  those  who,  like  him,  addressed  epistles  to  the  Churches; 
and  it  goes  without  proof  that,  next  to  the   Master  himself,  Paul  is 


426  PHILOi^OPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

highest  in  authority,  as  he  is  of  all  the  apostles  most  definite  in  his 
experience,  and  the  clearest  and  fullest  in  his  theology.  We  would 
not  detract  from  him  as  a  teacher,  theologian,  exemplar  ;  his  life  was 
a  sacrifice  for  the  truth ;  his  death  the  grandest  of  martyrdoms  ;  and 
his  memory  sacred  on  earth  and  vital  in  heaven.  Called  out  of  due 
time,  he  stands  forth  the  conspicuous  head  of  the  apostolic  Church, 
teaching  more,  suffering  more,  accomplishing  more,  than  any  other 
of  the  illustrious  baud. 

But  did  he  originate  Christianity,  or  any  part  of  it  ?  Did  he  su- 
persede Christ,  or  do  his  epistles  abound  with  truths  contradictory  of 
those  taught  by  the  Master,  or  different  in  any  sense  from  them? 
We  are  quite  as  much  interested  in  the  settlement  of  the  problem  as 
the  Jews  themselves,  for  it  involves  more  than  the  reputation  of  the 
apostle  ;  it  involves  the  integrity  of  the  Christian  religion.  If  Paul- 
ine Christianity  is  a  fungus  growth  or  an  antagonistic  system,  or  orig- 
inal with  Paul,  we  desire  to  know  it,  for  the  popular  supposition  is 
that  it  is  merely  an  expansion  of  original  Christianity. 

The  scope  of  the  problem  is  such  that  we  must  first  understand 
what  original  Christianity  is  before  we  can  ascertain  if  Pauline  Chris- 
tianity is  a  perversion  or  no.  Was  Christ's  religion,  or  system,  Jewish 
in  complexion,  in  essential  truth,  and  in  final  design?  Was  he  the 
founder  of  a  new  system  of  religion,  or  a  reformer  of  the  existing 
religion  ?  In  heralding  him  to  the  Jewish  nation,  John,  the  fore- 
runner, said,  "Now  also  the  ax  is  laid  at  the  root  of  the  tree" — 
not  at  the  branches,  but  at  the  root ;  he  is  not  a  pruner,  but  a  de- 
stroyer. It  is  true  he  came  not  to  destroy  the  law,  but  the  gross  par- 
aphernalia of  Judaism  and  the  inadequate  parts  of  the  system  he  was 
quite  ready  to  overthrow.  As  a  religion  he  was  disposed  to  supplant 
it.  Nowhere  is  he  denominated  a  reformer  or  purifier  of  the  old 
faith.  The  other  John  says,  "  The  law  was  given  by  Moses,  but 
grace  and  truth  came  by  Jesus  Christ."  The  two  religions  were  dif- 
ferent, as  their  two  personal  exponents  were  different,  and  if  conflict 
between  them  was  not  intended  and  was  unnecessary,  it  grew  rather 
out  of  the  perversions  of  Judaism  than  out  of  the  perversions  of  Chris- 
tianity. If  Christ  did  not  array  himself  against  the  old  systems,  and 
disclaimed  a  hostile  motive  for  his  career,  its  defenders  antagonized 
him  to  the  death,  and  so  compelled  their  own  overthrow.  Without 
such  antagonism  it  is  possible  that  Judaism  would  have  been  trans- 
formed into  the  new  faith,  but  it  resisted  transformation,  reformation, 
and  purification,  and  destruction  was  the  dernier  ressort  of  the  Master. 
Jesus,  therefore,  pursues  his  career  independently  ;  he  teaches  with 
authority  ;  he  reveals  truth  according  to  his  own  wisdom  and  pleas- 
ure ;  he   demonstrates  his  power  by  occasional  miraculous  displays ; 


THE  GOSPELS  FRAGMENTARY.  427 

he  institutes  a  ministry,  founds  a  Church,  commits  his  message  of  re- 
demption to  the  world,  and  retires  to  wait  until  his  soul  shall  be 
satisfied  with  the  fullest  achievement. 

Now,  at  his  death,  what  trutlis  do  we  find  controlling  the  minds 
of  the  apostles  ?  What  is  the  system  of  religion  that  appears  after  his 
three  years  of  itinerant  ministry  ?  Do  we  find  every  thing  in  it  that 
is  taught  by  Paul  ?  Is  it  a  complete  system  of  religion  ?  Was  Paul 
needed  at  all  ?  No  one  can  understand  fully  the  merits  of  Christian- 
ity without  canvassing  these  questions,  as  they  bring  to  light  some 
facts  Avhich  must  forever  hush  the  cry  of  antagonism  between  Paul 
and  Christ. 

What  Christianity  was  at  the  ascension  of  Christ  we  can  only 
know  from  the  four  Gospels,  written  by  Matthew,  Mark,  Luke,  and 
John.  We  can  not  accept  suggestions  from  Jewish  writers,  nor  will 
we  infer  any  thing  from  the  record  of  the  epistles  of  the  apostles 
themselves.  Confined  to  the  four  Gospels,  what  was  Christianity? 
No  one  will  pretend  to  afiirm  that  these  Gospels  are  more  than  mere 
fragments  of  history,  or  that  they  contain  more  than  the  briefest  re- 
port of  the  sayings  and  doings  of  Christ.  Christ  himself  wrote 
nothing,  save  once  on  the  ground,  and  that  was  never  read,  and  what 
we  have  as  his  utterances  came  through  others.  We  do  not  doubt 
the  genuineness  of  the  Gospels,  but  it  is  well  enough  to  remember 
just  what  they  are  and  what  they  teach.  They  are  fragments,  or  the 
framework  of  Christianity.  Besides  this,  they  reveal  no  system  of 
religion,  no  theological  plan,  no  formal  creed.  We  are  prone  to  talk 
of  systems  and  plans  and  theologies,  but  the  Gospels  are  only  sug- 
gestive of  them — they  are  innocent  of  a  system.  The  truth  is  from 
God,  but  the  system  of  arrangement  is  always  man-made.  As  in 
nature,  so  in  religion.  Scientific  facts,  truths,  and  principles  are 
found  in  irregular  masses  and  confused  heaps  and  fragmentary  forms 
everywhere — this  is  nature's  method  ;  but  sciences,  as  systems,  are 
man-made.  Take  botany.  Flowers,  ferns,  trees,  are  distributed  over 
the  globe  promiscuously,  but  the  botanist  constructs  the  science  of 
botany  out  of  them.  So  zoology  is  a  human  structure,  while  the 
animals  abound  in  all  latitudes.  In  some  such  way,  divine  truths 
are  imbedded  in  the  Bible.  They  are  without  system  or  order  of  ar- 
rangement. In  the  Gospels,  especially,  there  is  no  development  of 
truth.  Hints,  scanty  revelations,  mere  statements,  great  fragments — 
these  are  numerous,  and  very  suggestive  of  what  is  beyond  or  un- 
derneath. At  the  same  time,  there  are  occasional  complete,  clear-cut 
statements,  that  are  satisfactory  and  comprehensive. 

Now,  it  is  out  of  this  disorderly  array  of  truths,  these  great  hints, 
these  fragments,  that  a  consistent  and  orderly  statement  of  what  Chris- 


428  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

tianity  is  must  be  made.  Theology  is  the  gathering  up  of  this  mass  of 
truths,  aud  putting  them  into  order,  and  labeling  them  with  definite 
names.  The  relation  of  theology  to  Christianity  is  the  relation  of  zo- 
ology to  the  animal  kingdom,  and  of  botany  to  the  flora  of  the  globe. 

Paul  was  the  first  Christian  theologian  who  undertook,  under 
divine  direction,  to  shape  the  utterances  of  the  Teacher  into  a  con- 
sistent whole,  to  form  a  Scriptural  theology,  and  to  employ  terms 
and  indicate  relations  that  were  in  advance  of  what  seemed  to  be  in- 
herent in  Christianity  as  laid  down  by  the  Founder,  This  grew  out 
of  the  nature  of  the  task  itself,  and  was  inevitable.  But,  as  we  shall 
see,  between  Christ  as  the  Teacher,  aud  Paul  as  the  theologian  or  in- 
terpreter, there  was  no  divergence,  but  a  oneness  of  spirit  and  pur- 
pose that  rather  relates  than  divides  them. 

Christ  originated  Christianity  ;  Paul  formulated  it.  He  took  up 
the  fragments,  aud  they  multiplied  in  his  hands ;  he  caught  glimpses 
of  the  unshapely  masses  of  truth,  and  reduced  them  to  order,  and, 
in  the  reduction,  developed  them  in  all  their  proportions ;  so  that,  in 
Paul's  vision,  Christ's  truths  seem,  if  possible,  a  little  larger,  if  not 
more  beautiful,  thau  in  their  own  author's  hands.  This,  too,  was  in- 
evitable and  necessary.  Looking  into  the  apostolic  ranks,  one  can 
see  that,  of  all  men  to  undertake  the  analysis,  development,  applica- 
tion, or  theological  expression,  of  Christianity,  as  it  came  from  the 
Master's  hands,  Paul  was  the  most  fitted,  by  nationality,  education, 
temperamental  constitution,  and  inspiration.  Prof  Fairbairn  says, 
that  "God  made  Paul  for  the  moment,  the  moment  for  Paul."  Of 
Jewish  parentage,  he  had  inherited  the  ancestral  fervor  and  intense 
devotional  spirit  of  the  Hebrews;  he  was  also,  doubtless,  proud  of  his 
social  connections,  and  believed  in  the  superiority  of  the  old  faith. 
Born  in  a  Greek  city,  he  came  in  contact  with  the  Gentile  world, 
aud  saw  its  wonderful  needs  and  its  wonderful  capacities ;  and  as  no 
other,  he  seemed  able  to  bridge  the  great  chasm  between  the  Jews 
and  the  Gentiles.  "In  his  single  mind  two  races  and  two  worlds 
met" — he  was  the  instrument  of  both.  In  this  broad  relationship, 
Paul's  fitness  for  the  task  of  elaborating  the  great  and  folded  truths 
of  the  new  religion  must  rest. 

Just  how  great  is  the  indebtedness  of  the  Church  to  Paul,  for  his 
elaboration  of  doctrine,  can  not  be  measured,  except  by  a  survey  of 
the  particulars  of  the  elaboration.  In  this  it  will  be  discovered  that 
he  departed  not  from  the  original  teachings  of  the  Master,  nor  sug- 
gested any  thing  that  had  not  been  previously  taught,  and  left  in  a 
sketchy  or  fragmentary  form.  Paul's  work  was  completed  in  thirty 
years  after  the  scene  on  Calvary — his  epistles  written,  his  great  mis- 
sionary tours  accomplished,  his  religious  assault  upon  the  household 


PAUL'S  LOYALTY  TO  JESUS.  429 

of  Cjesar  effected,  and  his  death  outside  the  city  of  Rome  a  veritable 
fact — a  time  too  short  for  the  introduction  of  a  religion  different 
from  that  that  had  been  announced ;  a  period  scarcely  long  enough 
to  even  corrupt  the  teachings  of  the  Church,  which  were  well  un- 
derstood even  before  Paul's  conversion.  Moreover,  Paul's  highest 
interest  centered  in  Christianity  as  he  had  received  it.  His  re- 
markable conversion  could  have  no  other  effect  than  to  win  him  over 
to  the  support  of  the  religion  he  had  so  maliciously  opposed,  and 
whose  extinction  he  had  sought  to  accomplish.  Converted,  saved, 
the  instinct  of  gratitude  would  bind  him  forever  to  the  Savior,  and 
his  greatest  desire  must  have  been  to  know  more  about  him,  and  to 
glory  in  nothing  so  much  as  in  Jesus,  and  him  crucified.  This  inter- 
est would  make  him  a  friend,  and  not  a  corrupter,  of  the  religion 
that  had  redeemed  him.  To  suppose  otherwise,  or  to  allow  for  a 
moment  that  Paul  undertook  to  establish  a  religion  himself  and  sup- 
plant Christ,  or  that  he  went  so  far  as  to  modify  and  reconstruct 
Christianity,  so  as  to  appear  as  great  as  the  original  Teacher,  presup- 
poses some  things  that  we  should  be  loath  to  concede.  It  implies 
that  Paul  was  a  schemer,  a  man  filled  with  an  ambition  to  secure 
both  power  and  fame,  and  that  he  would  forsake  one  religion  to  be- 
come the  founder  of  another,  whenever  opportunity  offered.  This 
presupposition  is  not  in  accordance  with  Paul's  character,  as  it  is  de- 
scribed. The  scheming,  ambitious  spirit  is  certainly  not  manifest  in 
his  abandonment  of  Judaism,  which  entailed  the  loss  of  estate,  posi- 
tion, endowment,  and  social  influence.  Ambition  is  the  source  of 
restlessness  and  fluctuation  of  purpose,  but  Paul  is  an  example  of 
firmness  truly  admirable.  Never  does  he  waver  in  his  loyalty  to 
Christ ;  never  does  he  change  his  purpose  to  preach  the  Gospel ; 
never  does  he  shrink  at  sacrifice ;  never  does  he  hesitate,  debate, 
cringe,  apologize,  or  forsake  the  divine  course  before  him.  In  this 
heroism,  equal  to  that  of  Moses,  and  superior  to  that  of  the  other 
apostles,  there  is  not  the  slightest  exhibition  of  ambition. 

What  is  decisive  of  the  question  is  the  fact  that  his  marvelous 
successes,  as  an  apostle,  were  along  the  original  line  of  Christian  truth, 
and  because  he  stood  forth  as  the  defender  of  the  character  and  mis- 
sion of  Christ.  On  no  other  ground  can  his  historic  career  be  ex- 
plained. It  was  Christ  in  him  that  gave  him  triumph  throughout 
Achaia.  What  was  it  that  made  him  the  successful  antagonist  of 
Judaism?  Surely  not  a  religion  of  his  own,  but  the  Christianity  of 
the  period.  What  was  it  that  carried  him  from  the  isles  to  the  conti- 
nents, that  led  him  to  brave  all  danger,  and  to  be  fearless  in  death? 
Surely  not  that  he  might  be  the  founder  of  a  new  faith.  He  dis- 
claims all  such  pretensions  when  he  says,  "  Was  Paul  crucified  for  you?" 


430  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

"Who  then  is  Paul?"  His  great  career  is  built  upon  his  devotion 
to  Christ,  and  not  upon  an  independent  purpose  of  his  own,  and  the 
greatest  injustice  is  done  him  even  to  suspect  him  of  a  purpose  to 
originate  a  religion  himself,  to  say  nothing  of  the  injury  done  to 
Christianity  by  supposing  that  the  Pauline  form  of  it  is  different  from 
its  original  form. 

We  shall  now  examine  Paul's  specific  elaboration  of  Christian 
doctrine,  showing  that  it  is  in  no  sense  a  departure  from  what 
Christ  himself  taught.  We  begin  with  the  greatest  notion  of 
theology,  the  largest  thought  of  the  Scriptures,  the  being  and  char- 
acter of  God.  Prior  to  the  revelation  of  God  through  Christian 
teachers,  tlie  world's  idea  of  Deity  was  dismal,  obscure,  unsatisfactory 
in  the  extreme.  Outside  of  the  Jews,  that  idea  was  mythological,  and, 
therefore,  unreal.  Zeus  was  a  mythological  creature.  Among  the  Jews 
the  idea  took  a  personal  form,  and  yet  God  was  banished  from  or 
had  not  taken  personal  relations.  He  dwelt  in  the  dark,  he  was  un- 
seen, he  was  heard  on  Sinai,  or  manifested  himself  in  a  moving  cloud, 
or  through  a  solitary  code.  The  Jewish  people  had  no  intercourse 
with  Deity.  They  spoke  of  him  as  a  Father,  but  distant ;  as  a  law- 
giver, but  severe  in  enforcement ;  as  a  leader,  but  pitiless  and  un- 
merciful. The  best  Jewish  idea  was  a  gross  mixture  of  unpaternal 
and  paternal  conceptions.  God  was  far  off.  In  this  atmosphere  the 
Jew  dwelt,  and  out  of  it  into  a  better  there  was  no  way  until  the 
Christ  came,  one  of  whose  stupendous  purposes  was  to  bring  God 
nearer  to  humanity  and  in  more  sympathetic  relations  to  the  race. 
He  was  styled  Emmanuel,  or  God  with  us,  and  Christ  said  to  Philip, 
"  He  that  hath  seen  me  hath  seen  the  Father."  This  revelation  of 
God  in  Clirist  was  to  destroy  mythology,  and  show  wherein  the  Ju- 
daic conception  fell  short  of  the  whole  truth,  and  so  bring  the  world 
closer  to  God,  as  it  had  brought  God  nearer  to  man.  The  purpose 
was  realized  in  the  incarnate  life  of  Jesus  Christ,  which  should  have 
been  recognized  by  the  Jews.  That  it  was  not  is  evident  from  their 
crucifixion  of  Christ.  That  it  was  not  is  proof  that  so  blinded  were 
the  Jews  to  spiritual  truths,  a  subsequent  elaboration  of  the  great 
fact  was  indispensable.  At  this  point  Paul's  work  begins,  and  right 
heroically  does  he  perform  it.  Nowhere  does  it  appear  that  he  con- 
tradicts the  assumption  of  Christ,  but  everywhere  he  proclaims  him 
as  the  Son  of  God,  the  power  of  God,  the  wisdom  of  God ;  every- 
where he  proclaims  that  Jesus  is  Lord,  the  equal  of  the  Fatlier,  to 
be  honored  and  worshiped  as  the  Father  ;  everywhere  he  declares 
that  Jesus  is  the  Christ,  that  by  him  were  all  things  created,  that  he 
is  before  all  things,  and  that  all  things  are  put  under  his  feet.  Christ 
is  general,  Paul  is  specific;    Christ  is  universal,  Paul  is  particular; 


PAULINE  CONCEPTIONS  OF  CHRIST.  431 

Christ  claims  to  be  Father,  Paul  asserts  that  he  is  Creator,  Upholder, 
Benefactor,  Lord,  and  Ruler. 

But  in  this  Pauline  amplification  of  the  Deity  of  Christ  there  is 
nothing  not  implied  in  and  required  by  the  position  that  Christ  as- 
sumed for  himself.  The  claim  of  William  to  be  king  cf  Germany 
includes  all  that  the  title  and  position  imply,  without  specifying  the 
particulars.  Christ  intended  all  that  Paul  has  so  minutely  affirmed. 
The  apostle  was  an  analyist,  dissecting  the  darkest  mysteries,  pene- 
trating to  the  essence  of  the  divinest  sayings,  unfolding  the  narrow- 
est promises,  and  expanding  into  life-likeness  the  smallest  forms  of 
truth.  Who  charges  that  Paul  transcended  the  prerogatives  of  his 
position,  or  gave  to  Christ's  words  a  meaning  foreign  to  them  ?  In 
the  same  methodical  manner  Paul  writes  of  Christ  himself,  loading 
him  down,  as  it  were,  with  new  titles,  and  inventing  phrases  descrip- 
tive of  his  character  and  work  that  could  not  have  been  born  in  a 
mind  not  in  entire  sympathy  with  its  subject.  It  is  along  this  line 
that  Jewish  writers  are  disposed  to  urge  their  strongest  objection  to 
Pauline  Christianity.  They  must  concede  that  the  Pauline  devel- 
opment of  the  idea  of  God's  character  is  correct;  but  in  the  attempt 
to  demonstrate  that  Christ  is  the  Messiah  and  Redeemer,  they  in- 
sist that  Paul  went  beyond  what  Christ  himself  warranted.  This, 
therefore,  deserves  to  be  noticed,  for  it  is  the  dividing  line  between 
Christianity  and  Judaism,  and  it  is  vehemently  asserted  that  Paul 
is  responsible  for  the  division  or  breach.  What  did  Christ  claim  for 
himself?  Did  he  not  assume  to  be  the  Messiah  ?  Did  he  not  always 
represent  himself  as  the  Savoir?  Are  we  mistaken  here?  Did  not 
the  prophecies  receive  fulfillment  in  him?  It  is  a  broad  question — 
Is  Christ  the  Messiah  in  truth,  or  is  he  the  figure-head,  the  product 
of  Pauline  Christianity  ?  What  find  we  in  the  Gospels  ?  He  for- 
gives sins ;  he  works  miracles  ;  he  invites  men  to  come  unto  him  for 
rest ;  he  says  he  is  the  way,  the  truth,  and  the  life  ;  in  Nazareth  he 
declares  Isaiah  to  be  fulfilled  in  him  ;  his  parables  are  disguised  rep- 
resentations of  his  Messiahship  ;  he  predicts  his  crucifixion  and  the 
atonement ;  he  appeals  to  his  works ;  he  lives,  labors,  dies,  all  to 
to  make  sure  that  the  world  may  be  saved.  It  is  difficult  to  take 
any  other  view  when  reading  the  four  Gospels.  Now,  did  Paul  go 
beyond  this  ?  Did  he  not  represent  Christ  in  all  his  offices  so  fully 
that  no  one  can  charge  him  with  ambiguity  or  insufficiency,  and  yet 
in  the  elaboration  did  he  draw  a  single  conclusion,  or  enforce  a  single 
statement  not  authorized  by  the  Gospels  themselves?  With  Paul 
Christ  had  the  pre-eminence.  Wherever  he  went  he  was  present  in 
spirit,  and  proved  that  Jesus  is  the  Christ ;  that  is,  the  Messiah ; 
and  everywhere  he  was  anxious  to  declare  that  Jesus  Christ  came  into 


432  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

the  world  to  save  sinners.  It  seems  to  have  been  given  Paul  to  dis- 
cern the  great  offices  of  Christ  as  no  other  had  discerned  them,  and 
he  dwells  upon  them  with  intensest  enthusiasm,  producing  conviction 
in  the  multitudes,  and  terrifying  even  the  rulers  of  all  countries.  John 
exalts  Christ  as  divine,  but  Paul  exalts  him  as  the  wouderful  Savior. 
If,  indeed,  there  is  a  "  plan  of  salvation,"  we  are  indebted  to  Paul 
for  the  statement  of  it.  The  Gospels  reveal  Jesus  as  the  Savior,  but 
Paul  expatiates  on  the  method  by  which  salvation  is  secured.  He  is 
the  great  logician  of  the  New  Testament,  and  he  often  aimed  to 
prove  how  God  could  be  just,  and  yet  the  justifier  of  him  who  be- 
lieved in  Jesus.  Paul  reduced  his  theology  on  this  subject  to  a  science. 
He  not  only  preached  the  Gospel,  but  proved  it.  The  whole  idea 
of  salvation  in  Jesus  Christ  received  logical  treatment  at  his  hands. 
His  epistles  are  burdened  with  arguments  in  support  of  it.  The 
necessity  of  redemption ;  the  inadequacy  of  the  Judaic  system ;  the 
prophetic  mission  of  Christ ;  the  divinely  sustained  character  of 
Christ ;  the  impregnable  fact  of  the  resurrection  of  Christ ;  and  the 
certainty  of  salvation  in  Christ,  arising  from  his  own  unanswerable 
experience  of  it,  constituted  a  few  of  the  points  on  which  the  apos- 
tle rejoiced  to  speak  and  write.  Paul  amplified,  but  did  not  originate, 
modify,  or  pervert  Christian  doctrine. 

If  we  consider  Christ's  teachings  concerning  man,  his  natural  con- 
dition, his  spiritual  possibilities,  his  depravity,  and  the  necessity  of  a 
regenerating  change,  and  then  study  Paul  on  the  same  line  of 
thought,  we  shall  find  perfect  harmony,  the  latter  but  the  echo  of 
the  former.  Christ  knew  what  is  in  man,  and  taught  his  greatness 
Avhen  he  asked  the  famous  question,  "  AVhat  shall  it  profit  a  man  if 
he  shall  gain  the  whole  world  and  lose  his  own  soul  ?"  He  showed 
his  estimate  of  humanity  by  himself  taking  its  form  and  living  among 
men  for  a  generation.  "  The  word  was  made  flesh  and  dwelt  among 
us."  The  incarnation,  on  one  side  a  humiliation  of  the  divine,  was 
on  the  other  a  glorification  of  the  human,  and  declared  to  the  uni- 
verse the  infinite  worth  of  man.  Then  his  death  for  man,  and  atone- 
ment for  his  sins,  is  proof  that  in  the  mind  of  Christ  man  is  inex- 
pressibly valuable,  and  must  be  redeemed,  even  if  it  cost  tlie  treasures 
of  heaven.  We  affirm  that  the  life  and  death  of  Christ,  without 
mentioning  particular  acts  or  particular  teachings,  demonstrate  quite 
as  much  the  loftiness,  majesty,  and  dignity  of  human  character  as  the 
benevolence  and  virtue  of  the  divine  character  of  Jesus. 

In  this  estimate  of  humanity  does  Paul  surpass  Christ  ?  Does  he 
teach  any  thing  different,  any  thing  contradictory?  Or  do  we  not 
find  that  he  repeats,  only  in  another  form,  just  what  Christ  himself 
had  taught  ?     The  Pauline  exaltation  of  man  is  not  mythological,  is 


SHIP  WRECK  OF  THE  RACE.  433 

not  exaggerated  fancy,  is  not  different  from  that  of  Christ.  If  he 
does  write  that  man  was  made  a  little  lower  than  the  angels,  that 
Adam  was  formed,  uot  generated,  it  is  because  he  truly  antici- 
pated the  "  development"  theory  eighteen  huudred  years  in  advance 
of  it,  and  blocked  its  way  by  the  announcement  of  the  high-born 
origin,  the  creation  of  man.  If  he  writes  that  "  when  I  was  a  child 
I  spoke  as  a  child,  I  understood  as  a  child,  I  thought  as  a  child  ;  but 
when  I  became  a  man  I  put  away  childish  things,"  it  is  because  he 
saw  the  evolution  theory  true  as  applied  to  man's  development  in 
knowledge.  As  to  man's  origin,  he  was  a  creation  ;  as  to  his  history, 
he  is  a  development.  Evolution  is  false  as  applied  to  origin  ;  true, 
as  applied  to  history.  But  is  this  anti-Biblical?  Is  this  new  to  Chris- 
tianity ?  Is  this  Pauline  construction  of  man  singular  and  apostate  ? 
Nay,  rather  it  is  in  keeping  with  Christ's  ideal  of  humanity,  both  as 
to  origin  and  character. 

So,  when  we  pass  to  man's  dishonored  moral  condition,  the  two 
teachers  are  in  perfect  accord.  Surely  no  one  will  insist  that  Jesus 
misunderstood  this  condition,  or  misinterpreted  it,  or  failed  to  reveal 
it.  It  was  he  who  said,  "  The  Sou  of  Man  is  come  to  seek  and  to 
save  that  which  was  lost."  The  ground  of  his  coming  was  the  fact 
that  man  was  not  only  in  immediate  danger  of  perishing,  but  in  a 
sense  had  already  perished  ;  that  he  was  not  liable  to  be  lost,  but  is 
lost.  His  mission  was  not  to  prevent  destruction,  but  to  deliver  from 
it.  This  of  itself  indicates  a  want  of  righteousness  in  man  too  appall- 
ing to  be  fittingly  portrayed.  In  all  his  teachings,  planniugs,  and 
works  the  underground  thought  seems  to  be  the  painful  recognition 
of  the  moral  disabilities  of  men,  the  shipwreck  of  the  race.  It  is  not 
the  ship  in  the  storm,  hut  the  ship  gone  down  in  the  storm.  This  is 
the  picture,  and  it  saddened  the  heart  of  the  Son  of  Man  as  he 
contemplated  it. 

In  announcing  the  mission  of  Jesus  to  Joseph  the  angel  said, 
"  He  shall  save  his  people  from  their  sins."  Sin  is  in  the  way,  salva- 
tion is  a  necessity,  and  Jesus  is  the  Savior.  The  great  fact  of  sin  is 
revealed  by  the  biographer  of  Christ  as  the  burden  that  he  would 
roll  away,  and  he  often  forgave  sin  to  show  his  power  and  indicate 
his  mission.  One  sick  of  the  palsy  he  both  healed  and  pardoned  ;  to 
the  woman  taken  in  adultery  he  extended  forgiveness;  and  to  the 
woman  who  entered  the  house  of  a  Pharisee  he  offered  the  word  of 
pardon.  He  cast  out  devils  frequently,  illustrating  his  purpose  to 
cast  the  evil  si)irit  out  of  the  hearts  of  men.  He  lived  and  died  that 
he  might  reveal  and  perfect  the  way  for  man's  rescue,  and  restoration 
to  a  normal  spiritual  condition. 

The  Pauline  epistles  are  not  more  specific  touching  these  things 
28 


434  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

than  the  Gospels  themselves.  Paul,  however,  discourses  on  deprav- 
itv,  or  the  ruin  of  man,  revealing  human  helplessness  to  a  degree 
startling  and  decisive.  He  declares  that  men  are  ' '  dead  in  trespasses 
and  sins,"  and  in  his  Epistles  to  the  Romans  and  Galatians  he  shows 
the  antagonism  of  the  spirit  and  the  flesh,  proving  how  completely 
jnan  is  under  the  dominion  of  sin  until  he  is  brought  under  the  do- 
minion of  grace,  and  even  then  how  the  flesh  lusts  against  the  spirit, 
until,  through  the  sanctification  of  the  truth,  man  has  complete  rest 
from  its  power.  Expatiating  on  this  condition,  he  turns  to  the  neces- 
sity of  a  Savior,  and  finds  that  Jesus  Christ  came  into  the  world  to 
save  sinners.  Over  this  he  rejoices,  and  declares  he  will  glory  in 
nothing  save  the  cross  of  the  Lord  Jesus  Christ.  Paul  does  not 
originate  the  doctrine  of  depravity,  nor  does  he  promulgate  the  atti- 
tude of  Christ  as  a  Savior  for  the  first  time.  These  are  facts  funda- 
mental to  the  biographical  Gospels,  and  are  the  authentic  testimony 
that  they  were  taught  by  Christ,  and  they  WDuld  remain  even  if  Paul 
had  not  alluded  to  them.  Both  recognized  man  as  a  sinner,  and  both 
proclaimed  Christ  as  the  Savior. 

Concerning  the  doctrine  of  regeneration,  or  Christian  experience, 
and  the  witness  of  the  Spirit,  Christ  precedes  Paul,  as  he  does  on  every 
other  doctrine.  In  his  conversation  with  Xicodemus,  Christ  declares 
for  regeneration,  and  this  by  the  Spirit.  In  his  Epistle  to  Titus,  Paul 
speaks  of  the  "  washing  of  regenej-ation,  and  renewing  of  the  Holy 
Ghost."  Both  teach  spiritual  regeneration.  Christ  promised  the 
Spirit  that  he  would  come  and  guide  unto  truth,  convict  men  of  sin, 
and  dwell  in  his  disciples,  revealing  the  things  of  Christ  to  them. 
Paul  writes  of  a  spiritual  religion,  saving  that  "  the  Spirit  beareth 
witness  with  our  spirit  that  we  are  the  children  of  God." 

It  is  here  that  Christianity  divides  with  Judaism,  and.  indeed, 
with  all  other  religions.  In  its  intense  spirituality,  in  its  independ- 
ence of  material  machinery,  in  its  spiritual  truths,  spiritual  precepts, 
spiritual  experiences,  and  spiritual  destiny,  it  is  lifted  far  above  other 
religious.  Breaking  away  from  ceremonies,  feast-days,  and  all  the 
visible  display  of  Judaism,  Paul  entered  into  the  spiritual  conceptions 
of  Christianity,  enforcing  them  upon  the  attention  of  the  Jews  by  sac- 
rifices, by  zeal  in  their  behalf,  by  benevolence,  by  tenderly  uttered 
svmpathies,  by  unparalleled  services.  It  was  this  change  from  the 
visible  to  the  invisible,  from  the  physical  appendages  or  externalism 
of  religion  to  its  spiritual  essence  and  power,  that  the  Jews  did  not 
understand,  and  that  irritated  them  to  the  last  degree.  Paul  empha- 
sized the  spiritual  elements  ;  he  saw  that  every  thing  else  in  religion 
must  be  subordinate  to  its  spiritual  aim  ;  and  hence,  crude  enough  as 
Christianity  appeared  in  the  hands  of  the  fishermen,  under  Paul  it 


RESURRECTION  INTERPRETED.  435 

assumed  a  spiritual  tone,  and  rose  at  once  into  a  spiritual  religion. 
But  this  was  its  appointed  function,  as  it  was  spiritual  in  nature. 

Earlier,  when  the  apostolic  mind  was  slow  to  apprehend  spiritual 
ideas,  Christ  did  not  develop  them.  He,  however,  deposited  them, 
and  they  afterward  germinated  under  Pauline  cultivation.  The  acorn 
had  become  a  tree,  but  not  a  different  tree  from  what  the  acorn  indi- 
cated. Paul,  as  a  teacher  of  Christianity,  had  an  advantage  over  the 
apostles,  and  made  large  use  of  it  in  his  advocacy  of  the  religion  of 
the  Master.  One  may  embrace  Christianity  as  a  system  of  truth,  and 
defend  it  on  logical  or  rational  grou.ids,  without  an  experience  of 
its  power,  or  a  knowledge  of  its  possibilities.  He  may  finally  acquire 
an  experience,  but  it  is  better  to  begin  with  an  experience  and  advo^ 
cate  from  that  standpoint,  than  to  begin  with  logic  and  end  with  ex- 
perience. The  apostles  had  their  experience  last,  and  Paul  had  his 
first.  To  them  Christianity  was  a  new  religion,  doctrinal,  personal 
in  that  it  had  a  recognized  founder,  bnt  more  of  a  philosophical 
system  that  had  to  be  tested  and  proved.  To  Paul,  it  was  from  the 
beginning  an  experimental  religion,  spiritual,  personal,  persuasive, 
powerful,  adapted  to  human  needs,  and  sufl5cient  unto  salvation. 
They  preached  the  truth,  he  preached  an  experience.  He  is  the  only 
apostle  who  relates  his  experience,  and  he  relates  it  to  governors  and 
priests  and  ofiicers  and  the  multitude,  and  great  is  the  power  that  at- 
tends it.  This  is  just  what  Christ  contemplated,  an  experimental,  spir- 
itual Christianity,  eclipsing  the  material  religious  of  the  times  and  draw- 
ing men  into  the  refinement  and  purity  of  something  better.  But  in 
this  we  do  not  see  that  Paul  is  a  usurper,  or  that  he  teaches  what  Christ 
did  not  contemplate,  or  that  Christian  experience  is  not  an  essential 
doctrine  of  the  Scriptures,  nor  the  blessed  privilege  of  the  believer. 

Passing  into  e^chatology,  we  have  no  reason  to  believe  that  the 
Pauline  epistles  contain  any  thing  not  warranted  by  the  Gospels  ;  or, 
that  their  author  pretended  to  be  an  independent  reader  of  things 
future.  On  the  contrary,  we  discover  the  utmost  harmony  between 
them,  and  are  thankful  for  the  additional  light  Paul  has  shed  on  some 
of  the  problems  that  must  finally  confront  all  men.  Touching  the 
resurrection  of  the  body,  Christ  announced  it,  not  as  an  entii'ely  new 
thought,  for  the  Pharisees  already  held  to  it,  but  he  made  it  more 
prominent  as  a  doctrine  than  it  was  in  Judaism.  Martha  expressed 
belief  in  the  resurrection  of  Lazarus  at  the  last  day.  This  was 
Phariseeism,  and  this  also  was  Christianity.  Both  to  substantiate  his 
power,  and  to  foreshadow  the  possibility  of  a  general  resurrection, 
Christ  raised  three  persons  from  the  dead,  Lazarus  being  one  of  them. 
He  sometimes  spoke  of  persons  coming  up  out  of  their  graves,  and 
promised  to  raise  the  disciples  at  the  last  day.     Resurrection  !     If  it 


436  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY, 

did  not  seem  like  an  original  doctrine  with  Christ,  it  was  because  the 
people  were  already  familiar  with  it.  But  Christ  did  not  explain  the 
resurrection,  nor  relieve  it  of  mystery,  nor  answer  the  difficult 
questions  it  raises.  The  only  mystery  growing  out  of  the  resurrection 
that  he  shed  light  upon  was  with  reference  to  the  marriage  relation  in 
the  future  state  in  answer  to  a  question  by  the  Sadducees ;  but  that 
had  reference  to  the  resurrection-life,  rather  than  to  the  resurrection 
itself.  From  Christ  we  also  learn  that  the  resurrection  will  occur  at 
the  last  day,  and  yet  he  is  not  specific.  Whether  it  shall  be  the  event 
that  shall  close  up  the  present  dispensation,  or  signal  the  end  of  the 
world,  or  whether  there  will  be  a  period  between  the  resurrection 
and  the  end,  he  does  not  intimate.  And  concerning  two  resurrections 
he  is  equally  silent.  How  it  is  to  be  accomplished,  whether  it  will 
be  gradual  or  instantaneous,  and  with  what  bodies  the  dead  shall  come 
he  does  not  discuss,  he  does  not  reveal.  Perhaps  all  these  questions 
were  satisfactorily  disposed  of  in  dialogue  with  the  apostles,  so  thai, 
they  declared  the  resurrection  with  understanding  wherever  they  went, 
but  the  Gospels  are  barren  of  information. 

Evidently  the  Church  craves  information  in  all  these  directions, 
whether  wisely  or  not  is  another  question.  In  all  ages  of  the  Chris- 
tian era  men  have  asked  questions,  and  in  Paul's  time  there  was  a 
disposition  to  deny  the  resurrection.  This  denial  Paul  had  to  meet, 
and  providentially  it  led  him  into  a  discussion  of  the  subject  in  many 
of  its  phases,  especially  with  reference  to  the  character  of  the  resur- 
rection body,  and  the  time  of  the  resurrection,  the  two  factors  over 
which  the  greatest  anxiety  has  suspended.  Christ's  revelation  of  the 
fact  of  resurrection  was  all  that  was  necessary ;  Paul's  discussion  of 
the  character  of  the  resurrection  was  opportune  and  supplemental. 
For  ages  the  thought  of  a  material  resurrection,  the  natural  body  re- 
appearing in  all  its  numerical  proportions,  flesh  and  blood  again 
revivified,  the  physical  man  fully  restored,  was  accepted  as  the 
genuine  interpretation  of  the  Scriptural  idea  of  resurrection.  To  this 
interpretation,  however,  numerous  and  cogent  objections  have  been 
raised,  both  by  those  who  denied  the  resurrection,  and  by  those  who 
believed  the  Scriptures.  The  drift  of  the  Christian  mind  in  the 
early  centuries  was  toward  crude  material  conceptions  of  spiritual 
truth,  and  a  physical  resurrection  was  the  outcome  of  exegesis, 
and  the  instrument  of  terror  or  hope  as  it  was  applied  by  theologians 
to  sinners  and  saints.  Out  of  this  fog  the  Church  seems  to  have  ad- 
vanced, but  it  is  because  of  Paul's  teaching.  Christianity  is  spiritual. 
Even  so  literal  a  fact  as  resurrection  is  spiritual.  The  natural  body  is 
sown,  but  a  spiritual  body  is  raised.  For  the  soul  in  this  life  there 
is  a  natural,  a  physical  body  ;  for  the  voul  in  the  other  life  there  is  a 


IMMORTALITY  DISCLOSED.  437 

spiritual  body.  Flesh  and  blood  can  not  inherit  the  kingdom  of 
heaven.  How  clear  such  a  statement !  The  wonder  is  that  any  con- 
fusion ever  existed  on  a  subject  tliat  was  lifted  into  transparency  by 
jspostolic  revelation. 

80  with  reference  to  the  time  of  the  resurrection.  Paul  takes  a 
small  gold  leaf,  and  hammers  it  out  until  in  its  expanded  state  it 
covers  a  great  deal  of  ground  ;  that  is,  it  makes  clear  what  before 
was  almost  an  ambiguous  hint.  He  declares  that  "the  Lord  shall 
descend,  .  .  .  and  the  dead  in  Christ  shall  rise  first."  Paul  is 
as  definite  in  eschatological  as  in  soteriological  teaching  ;  he  is  reliable 
and  invaluable.  Without  quoting  further,  it  is  evident  that  in  the 
mind  of  Paul  the  second  coming  of  Christ  and  the  resurrection  of 
the  dead  will  be  simultaneous  events  ;  that  one  purpose  of  the  next 
coming  will  be  to  raise  the  dead.  This  certainly  is  definite  informa- 
tion. Moreover,  in  his  Epistle  to  Timothy,  he  says:  "I  charge  thee, 
therefore,  before  God,  and  the  Lord  Jesus  Christ,  who  shall  judge  the 
quick  and  the  dead  at  /lis  appearing" — second  coming,  resurrection, 
and  judgment  here  affirmed  as  events  in  close  order.  Other  passages 
are  at  hand  confirming  the  general  revelation  on  this  line  ;  but  as  they 
will  be  considered  later  we  omit  them  in  this  connection.  Resurrection 
and  judgment  are  associated  together  in  this  passage.  Paul's  revela- 
tions are  like  an  extensive  panorama,  which,  beginning  with  hints  and 
promises,  opens  out  into  vast  vistas  of  scenery,  alike  gratifying  and  com- 
plete. Surely  Paul  has  rendered  a  service  to  the  Church,  both  by  ex- 
planation of  obscure  truth  and  revelation  of  things  not  before  revealed. 

Concerning  immortalitiL  there  is  the  same  straightforward  state- 
ment from  Paullis  is  manifest  in  all  his  utterances  touching  revealed 
truth.  Christ,  indeed,  assured  the  disciples  of  another  life,  and  re- 
vealed both  heaven  and  hell  by  paral)le  and  direct  teaching,  so  that 
he  should  not  be  misunderstood ;  but  Paul  takes  up  all  these  primary 
revelations  and  elaborates  them  into  fullness.  With  him  there  is  no 
uncertainty.  Immortality  is  a  fact.  He  answers  Job's  question, 
"If  a  man  die  shall  he  live  again?"  by  declaring  that  all  men  must 
appear  before  the  judgment-seat  of  Christ  to  give  an  account  far  the 
deeds  done  in  the  body.  In  his  preaching  to  Felix  and  Agrippa,  he 
announced  the  future  in  such  terms  as  to  strike  terror  to  the  hearts 
of  his  pagan  judges.  Contemplating  his  own  departure,  he  sjwke  of 
the  joy  immortal  before  him,  saying:  "To  live  is  Christ,  but  to  die 
is  gain."  Then,  passing  to  the  rewards  and  retributions  of  eternity, 
he  is  as  outspoken  as  the  Master,  and  as  full  in  his  statements. 
Christ  promises  mansions,  and  Paul  speaks  of  "  the  liouse  not  made 
with  hands  eternal  in  the  heavens."  Christ  promises  a  reward  even 
to  those  who   are   late   in   entering  the  kingdom.     Paul   glories  in 


438  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

crowns  that  shall  never  fade  away.  Christ  tells  of  Dives  and  Lazarus, 
the  beo-o-ar ;  while  Paul  discloses  the  banishment  of  the  wicked  to  the 
horrors  of  Tartarut*,  and  the  triumphs  of  the  righteous  in  the  Para- 
dise of  God.  The  two  teachers  are  one  on  immortality,  and  agree 
concerning  the  judgment-seat,  and  the  final  issues  of  the  judgment. 
One  looks  as  far  into  the  future  as  the  other.  Christ  restrains  him- 
self in  revelation,  foreshadowing  the  whole  by  parable  and  teaching; 
Paul  is  palsied  in  utterance,  telling  all  he  can  ;  and  in  the  end  both 
stand  on  the  same  level  as  teachers  of  the  same  truth,  as  comforters 
of  the  children  of  men. 

In  this  brief  survey  of  Paul's  work  we  see  how  true  he  was  to  the 
Master's  teaching  on  all  subjects.  He  derived  what  he  taught  from 
original  sources.  He  never  appears  as  the  supplanter,  but  as  the 
supplemental  teacher.  We  see,  also,  how  much  the  Church  is  in- 
debted to  him  for  faithful  exposition  of  truth  in  itself  beyond  human 
delivery,  and  dark  until  made  transparent  by  him.  We  see  how  un- 
just the  insinuation  that  he  in  any  sense  intended  to  become  the 
founder  of  Christianity,  and  finally  see  that  Paul  without  Christ  was 


CHAPTER  XX. 

PHILOSOPHICAI.    OERMS    IN    CHRISTIANITY. 

NOT  a  few  agree  with  Wolf,  that  religious  truth,  however  occult 
in  itself,  or  from  what  source  obtained,  should  rest  on  a  philo- 
sophical basis,  and  meet  the  philosophical  tests  usually  applied  to  all 
truth.  Understanding  Christianity,  the  most  zealous  dogmatist  will 
not  object  to  so  reasonable  a  proposition,  for  it  gives  no  undue  ad- 
vantage to  philosophy  and  involves  no  concession  on  the  part  of 
religion.  Religion  and  philosophy  are  so  closely  allied  in  their  aims, 
and  are  so  similarly  affected  by  final  results,  that  one  may  expect  to 
find  religion  in  philosophy  and  philosophy  in  religion.  Diverse  in 
method  and  form  of  statement,  they  are  not  antagonistic  systems, 
intending  to  destroy  each  other. 

In  a  very  broad  sense,  it  may  be  aflSrmed  that  religion,  even  in  its 
crudest  form,  is  philosophical;  for  the  idea  of  religion  is  truth,  and 
truth  implies  those  fundamental  questions  with  which  philosophy  has 
concerned  itself  since  the  human  mind  began  to  think.  If  truth  is 
philosophical,  it  is  also  religious;  and  so  soon  as  it  is  contemplated 
its  religious  and  philosophical  character  appears. 

In  a  different  sense,  religion  is  philosophical  in  its  adaptation  to 


CONFLICT  OF  METHODS.  439 

the  moral  necessities  of  the  race ;  that  is,  its  greatest  truths  are  so 
formulated  as  to  be  of  efficient  service  in  moral  emancipation  and 
spiritual  discipline.  For  example,  the  existence  of  God  is  so  ex- 
pressed in  the  sacred  writings,  that  man  rises  to  the  conception  of 
God  as  a  Father,  a  Protector,  a  Guide,  a  Helper,  a  Teacher,  which 
is  an  improvement  over  the  single  conception  of  God  as  a  Creator. 
The  single  conception  of  philosophy  of  a  Supreme  Power  as  the  iu- 
augurator  of  cosmical  order  and  life,  expands  in  the  Bible  into  a 
complex  conception  of  that  Power  in  all  its  manifold  and  personal 
relations  to  the  children  of  men.  In  this  enlargement  of  conception, 
religion  is  still  philosophical ;  for  the  conception  of  causalitj^  involved 
in  world-building  is  philosophical,  but  its  development  into  a  personal 
form  involves  religious  revelation.  The  genesis  of  the  conception  is 
philosophical ;  the  consummation  of  the  conception  is  religious,  and 
of  practical  value  to  human  life.  In  its  philosophical  form,  it  is 
morally  useless ;  in  its  religious  form,  it  is  inspiration  itself. 

To  the  claim  that  Christianity  is  philosophical  in  content  and  pur- 
pose, an  objection  or  two  might  be  noted,  more  to  vindicate  the  claim 
than  to  silence  the  objection,  although  the  latter  disappears  as  the 
former  is  established.  Philosophy  proceeds  on  the  assumption  that, 
as  its  data  are  wholly  within  the  realm  of  the  natural,  the  methods 
of  investigation  pursued  must  also  be  natural,  and  the  results,  there- 
fore, will  be  natural ;  while  Christianity,  compassing  the  supernatural 
as  well  as  the  natural,  assumes  that  its  methods  of  investigation  may 
be  supernatural  as  well  as  natural,  and  the  results  will  correspond; 
in  other  words,  one  largely  proposes  natural  methods  aud  natural 
truths,  the  other,  supernatural  methods  and  supernatural  truths. 
One  opposes  the.  supernatural  as  a  method,  in  proportion  as  the  other 
insists  upon  it. 

Christianity  is  a  religion  of  inspiration,  of  supernatural  truth;  it 
comes  not  forth  as  the  product  of  human  inquiry,  research,  or  dis- 
covery. Without  the  same  ground,  all  religions  profess  to  be  more 
than  human,  incline  to  the  claim  of  supernatural  content ;  so  that  the 
objection  makes  against  all  religions,  if  it  makes  against  any.  It 
strikes  at  the  foundation  of  all.  If,  for  the  ascertainment  of  truth, 
the  supernatural  method  is  ruled  out  as  un philosophical,  it  remains 
that  a  knowledge  of  supernatural  truth  is  impossible,  which  leads  to 
agnosticism  or  open  infidelity.  By  natural  methods,  we  arrive  at  a 
knowledge  of  natural  truths  ;  by  supernatural  methods,  we  obtain  a 
knowledge  of  supernatural  truths.  The  method  and  the  truth  which 
it  seeks  are  mated.  A  natural  method  and  a  supernatural  truth 
would  be  unequally  yoked  together. 

Insisting   that   inspiration   is  essential   to   the  communication  of 


440  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

religious  truth,  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  such  truth  has  a  hu- 
man as  well  as  a  divine  side  ;  and  the  human  phase  of  religion  may 
be  as  philosophical  as  the  human  phase  of  philosophy  itself  Leave 
out  the  highest  truths,  the  supernatural  phases  of  Christianity,  and  it 
will  appear  that  the  human  elements  are  as  philosophical  in  character 
as  the  same  elements  in  philosophy.  Much  of  the  geology,  chronol- 
ogy, astronomy,  botany,  and  zoology,  or  the  science  of  the  Bible,  be- 
longs to  the  human  phase  of  revelation,  or  constitutes  its  natural 
elements,  in  contradistinction  to  those  spiritual  truths  which  constitute 
it  a  moral  guide  to  the  race.  This  divi-sion  of  truths  into  human  and 
divine,  or  scientific  and  spiritual,  while  geruiane  to  outside  religions, 
and  an  aid  in  explaining  their  errors,  we  shall  not  urge  with  reference 
to  Christianity,  since  its  spiritual  truths  are  scientifically  true,  and 
its  scientific  truths  sustain  spiritual  relations  that  will  be  manifest  be- 
fore the  end  of  this  volume  shall  have  been  reached.  Accepting 
both  kinds  of  truth,  as  constituting  the  inspired  record,  and  one 
kind  as  inspired  as  the  other,  it  is  evident  that,  if  the  inspirational 
method  is  unphilosophical  as  applied  to  one  truth,  it  is  unphilosoph- 
ifJal  as  applied  to  the  other.  If  unphilosophical  at  all,  the  whole 
record  goes — the  scientific  as  well  as  the  spiritual,  the  spiritual  as 
well  as  the  scientific. 

Tlie  difficulty  will  be  very  much  reduced  if  the  distinction  between 
method  and  truth  be  observed,  for,  even  if  a  supernatural  method  be 
objectionable  to  philosophy,  a  supernatural  truth  may  be  very  accept- 
able ;  that  is,  an  inspired  truth  is  not  necessarily  an  unphilosophical 
truth,  even  though  an  inspired  method  for  its  ascertainment  may  be 
rejected  as  unphilosophical.  Truth  is  truth,  supernatural  or  natural; 
truth  is  truth,  method  or  no  method,  supernatural  method  or  natural 
method.  Truth  is  not  philosophical  in  proportion  to  its  natural  cf)n- 
tent,  but  in  proportion  to  its  trueness,  whether  the  content  be  natural 
or  supernatural.  All  objection,  therefore,  to  truth  is  unphilosophical; 
supernatural  truth,  as  such,  is  as  philosophical  as  natural  truth. 

To  the  objection  made  against  the  supernatural  method,  we  might 
be  indifferent,  since  it  is  immaterial  how  one  gets  the  truth,  super- 
naturally  or  otherwise.  The  only  duty  is  to  get  the  truth.  However, 
the  supernatural  method  is  as  legitimate  as  the  natural  method,  and, 
in  the  sphere  of  religion,  more  legitimate,  for  it  is  the  only  method 
by  which  a  knowledge  of  truth  can  be  obtained.  Seeing  that  super- 
natural truth  is  not  the  subject-matter  of  discovery,  but  must  be  made 
known  by  revelation,  if  known  at  all,  the  inspirational  method  be^ 
comes  legitimate,  and  the  whole  system  of  religion  deduced  from  it 
philosophical.  If,  then,  revelation  is  not  unphilosophical,  the  terms 
in  Avhich  Biblical   truth  is  formulated  are  not  unphilosophical.     We 


TRUTHS,  NOT  SYSTEMS.  441 

shall  see  this  in  a  moment.  Philosophy  is  given  to  logical  processes, 
the  analysis  of  inquiries,  the  details  of  proofs,  and  inferences  from 
facts;  and,  if  these  fail,  it  resorts  to  rationalistic  speculation  and 
metaphysical  hypothesis.  Many  of  its  conclusions  are,  therefore, 
conjectural;  some  of  them  are  inharmonious  with  the  axioms  of 
religion  ;  a  few  are  incoherent  and  absurd.  At  least  in  method, 
Christianity  stands  alone,  reaching  its  conclusions  without  any  cir- 
cumlocution of  speculation,  and  even  without  the  framework  of  a 
syllogism.  Religious  truth  is  the  conclusion  of  the  divine  viind,  without 
the  intellective  processes  by  which  it  is  reached.  The  Bible  is  not 
a  book  of  reasons,  but  a  book  of  truths;  it  is  not  a  book  of  spec- 
ulations, but  a  book  of  conclusions.  It  states  truth,  without  the 
analysis  of  truth,  without  pushing  off  into  latitudes  not  real.  Chris- 
tianity is  not  speculative,  it  is  not  rationalistic,  it  is  not  metaphysic ; 
it  is  truth,  it  is  light,  it  is  the  sun.  Whatever  it  is,  the  method  by 
which  it  is  what  it  is  rises  or  falls  with  it.  Tiie  two  at  last  are  in- 
separable. To  strike  at  one  is  to  strike  at  both  ;  to  vindicate  one  is 
to  vindicate  both. 

Equally  futile  is  the  objection  that  Christianity,  as  found  in  the 
New^  Testament,  is  not  a  system  of  truth  at  all,  but  a  medley  of  moral 
teachings  or  rules,  and,  therefore,  violative  of  all  philosophical  order 
and  unity.  The  charge  that  New  Testament  Christianity  is  unsystem- 
atized truth,  we  admit;  the  inference  that,  on  that  account,  it  is  un- 
philosophical  truth,  we  deny.  For  systematic  theology,  we  must  go 
outside  the  New  Testament;  for  systematic  Judaism,  we  must  go  out- 
side the  Old  Testament.  Neither  Judaism  is  reduced  to  system,  nor 
Christianity,  in  the  Book  that  reveals  it.  This  is  not  unphilosophical, 
for  the  idea  of  philosophy  is  not  system  ;  it  is  h-uth.  Truth  is  one  thing, 
system  another.  Any  system  is  legitimate,  provided  it  is  the  frame- 
work of  truth ;  but  let  truth  come,  even  if  it  come  without  any  system 
at  all.  System  ranks  with  method,  and  both  are  below  truth.  Plato 
had  no  system  ;  at  least  no  one  has  discovered  it.  Emerson  is  with- 
out system.  Philosophy  is  systemless  from  beginning  to  end.  It  can 
not  be  otherwise.  Truth  precedes  system,  is  the  content  of  all  sys- 
tem, and  must  first  be  given  or  found  before  system  can  be  formed. 
Plato  was  after  truth,  not  after  system.  Paul  was  after  truth,  not 
after  system.  The  sum  of  philosophic  investigation  since  the  time  of 
Plato  is  a  number  of  half-truths,  fragments  of  thought,  arcs  of  ideas, 
and  certain  hints,  that,  taken  altogether,  might  constitute  a  system. 
The  New  Testament  writers  have  done  more  than  the  philosophers, 
for  all  the  truths  necessary  to  a  complete  system  they  have  revealed  ; 
all  the  doctrines,  all  the  ideas,  all  tlie  thoughts,  necessary  to  the  circle 
of  Christian   thought,    are    declared    by   them.     What  is  wanted   is 


442  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

assortment,  combination,  a  theologic  structure  out  of  the  materials  at 
hand.  It  is  like  building  a  pyramid  with  the  stone  on  the  ground. 
Unfortunately  for  philosophy,  it  not  only  lacks  system;  it  also  is 
wanting  in  the  material  necessary  to  an  orderly,  rational,  and  com- 
prehensive system  of  the  highest  truths.  The  chief  question,  then, 
is,  not  whether  Christianity  is  a  8yster,i  of  truth,  but,  is  it  tridhf 

The  answer  to  this  question  involves  a  brief  analysis  of  the  philo- 
sophic content  of  other  religions,  by  comparison  with  which  not  only 
the  difference  between  the  true  and  the  false  will  appear,  but  also  the 
character  of  Christian  truth  will  be  made  manifest.  Beginning  with  those 
religions  that  antedate  Christianity,  or  contemplating  those  that  arose 
at  a  later  period,  we  shall  see  that  they  grappled  with  philosophical 
problems  even  more  than  with  those  that  are  distinctively  religious. 
Their  aims  were  philosophical,  not  religious.  This  is  true  of  Brnh- 
minism.  Buddhism,  and  the  early  Persian  and  Egyptian  faiths.  The 
diagnostic  of  the  later  pagan  religions,  such  as  Hindu  Eclecticism,  is 
almost  exclusively  philosophical.  The  impressive  inference  to  be 
drawn  from  this  patent  fact  is,  that,  because  these  religions  dealt  so 
largely  with  the  philosophical  aspects  of  truth,  they  failed  as  relig- 
ions. If  this  is  a  correct  inference,  it  points  out  clearly  the  path 
religion  is  to  pursue ;  it  declares  that  religious  truth  has  a  mission  of 
its  own,  and  that  the  philosophical  aspect  must  be  subordinate.  Re- 
ligion makes  shipwreck  of  itself  if  it  is  more  devoted  to  philosophical 
experiment  than  the  fulfillment  of  religious  functions.  The  Hindu 
race  took  up  very  early  the  questions  that  Plato  and  his  successors  ex- 
pounded more  rationally  and  beautifully,  but  why  should  the  religious 
mind  take  to  the  philosophical  investigation  of  religious  truth?  In 
the  case  of  the  Hindu  this  was  a  necessity,  for  what  passed  for  truth 
was  error  ;  it  did  not  satisfy  the  intellectual  demand  ;  it  did  not 
awaken  the  religious  nature  ;  hence,  the  scholarly  Hindu,  wrecked  by 
religion,  sought  the  life-boat  of  philosophy. 

In  its  philosophical  ventures,  however,  Brahminism  was  as  com- 
plete a  failure  as  it  was  in  its  religious  teachings.  Its  mood  toward 
truth  of  any  kind  was  altogether  unsatisfactory.  It  solved  nothing ; 
it  finished  no  intellectual  undertakings  ;  it  dissipated  no  darkness, 
either  as  a  religion  or  philosophy.  Its  incarnations  and  regenerations 
are  but  scaffbldings  of  ideas,  standing  alone,  without  relation  to  genu- 
ine truth,  except  as  all  fragmentary  conceptions  may  be  considered 
adumbrations  of  final  truth,  as  contained  in  the  Christian  religion. 
In  its  gropings  it  so  often  stumbled  that  at  last  it  fell  into  the  em- 
brace of  an  intense  superstition,  without  self-illumination,  and  but 
slowly  disposed  to  yield  to  light  from  outside. 

To  the   average  Brahmin  the  Vedas   are  the   source  of   inspired 


UL  TRA-PA  NTHEISM.  443 

truth.  He  can  not  be  persuaded  that  the  Bible  is  superior  to  the  sa- 
cred writings  of  his  fathers ;  he  persuades  himself  that  the  Vedas 
preceded  the  Bible,  and  are  the  original  sources  of  all  truth.  Many 
truths  in  the  Vedas  are  found  in  the  Bible.  This  is  not  a  coinci- 
dence, but  to  unbiased  minds  a  proof  that  the  truths  of  the  Hebrew 
writings  early  dominated  Eastern  thought,  and  impregnated  the  most 
superstitious  religions.  Without  doubt  the  Vedas  borrowed  from  the 
Bible ;  the  Bible  borrowed  nothing  from  the  Vedas.  Because  of  the 
borrowed  divine  truths  in  the  sacred  writings  of  the  Hindu  race 
Brahminism  has  survived  the  ages;  truth  is  a  living  force,  and  has 
maintained  more  than  one  erroneous  religion.  Pure  error  would  im- 
mediately die,  but,  mixed  with  truth,  it  seems  sometimes  to  be  as 
immortal  as  truth  itself.  The  divorce  or  separation  comes  at  last, 
error  fleeing,  truth  triumphing.  Thus  it  will  happen  that  truth  will 
gradually  separate  itself  from  all  error  in  paganism,  and  false  relig- 
ions will  be  no  more. 

Indebted  to  the  Bible  as  the  Vedas  are  1>  i  religious  truth,  they 
are  not  indebted  to  it  for  philosophical  suggestions.  Not  that  Brah- 
minism is  barren  of  the  philosophical  spirit ;  on  the  contrary,  it  is 
excessively  philosophical,  and  is  original  in  its  philosophical  suggestions. 
This  relieves  the  Bible  of  a  load  of  responsibility,  which  a  true  re- 
ligion can  not  afford  to  carry.  In  their  highest  conceptions  the  Vedas 
descend  to  an  undisguised  pantheism,  confounding  creation  with  the 
Creator,  blotting  out  all  the  distinctions  between  an  independent,  un- 
caused, eternal  personality,  and  the  physical  work  of  his  hands,  and 
leaving  the  world  destitute  of  personal  rule,  and  without  a  federal 
government.  The  universe  is  God  ;  God  is  not  in  nature,  but  is  nature. 
Brahminism  means  this  as  its  ultimate  teaching,  no  difference  what 
metaphysical  distinctions  it  drnws  respecting  Deity,  no  difference  what 
personal  functions  it  allots  to  Brahma,'  Vishnu,  and  Seva.  In  its  philoso- 
phy Brahminism  is  pantheistical.  In  this  form  it  explains  nothing  and 
confuses  every  thing.  It  unites  what  forever  should  be  separated,  and 
separates  what  forever  should  be  united.  It  demolishes  the  dis- 
tinction between  cause  and  effect,  overruling  all  laws  of  order,  introduc- 
ing all  the  liabilities  of  chance,  or  the  still  more  revolting  consequences 
of  fate  in  the  government  of  the  world. 

The  weight  of  objection  to  this  doctrine  is  that  what  is  true  in 
the  philosophical  sense  is  also  true  in  the  religious  sense  ;  that  is,  if 
pantheism  is  philosophically  true,  it  must  be  religiously  true.  It  can 
not  be  true  in  philosophy  and  false  in  religion.  Hence,  Brahminism 
is  pantlieistical  in  the  religious  sense ;  but  a  pantheistic  religion  is 
virtually  a  self-contradiction,  as  a  pantheistic  philosophy  is  an  ab^ 
surdity.      Pantheism   and   prayer  are  incompatible ;    pantheism  and 


444  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

atoueineut  can  not  co-exist  in  any  religion  ;  pantheism  and  forgive- 
ness are  foreign  to  eacli  other ;  pantheism  and  providence  are  unre- 
lated ideas  ;  pantheism  and  revelation  are  inharmonious  terms  ;  pan- 
theism and  spiritual  influence  can  not  be  made  to  agree;  pantheism 
and  redemption  are  impossible.  Pantheism  is  destructive  of  tlie  con- 
natural elements  of  religion,  and,  therefore,  can  not  stand  for  the 
religious  idea;  it  can  not  represent  that  which  it  subverts. 

In  its  teachings  concerning  matter  Brahminism  is  as  curiously 
involved  in  absurdity  as  it  is  in  its  teachings  concerning  God. 
Briefly,  the  Brahmin  holds  that  matter  is  an  illusion;  it  does  not  ex- 
ist ;  it  is  without  substance.  In  this  conclusion  it  is  the  parent  of 
that  form  of  modern  philosophy  known  as  transcendentalism,  of 
which  our  Emerson  is  the  exponent.  The  illusion  theory  is  the  car- 
dinal doctrine  of  a  form  of  idealism,  adopted  by  the  Eleatics,  and  ac- 
cepted in  these  days  by  a  coterie  of  thinkers  around  Boston  and 
London.  Thus  the  old  has  become  the  new,  modern  thought  wor- 
ships an  idea  that  had  its  birth  on  the  banks  of  the  Ganges  three  thou- 
sand years  ago,  and  the  Brahmin  rejoices  in  the  vindication.  This 
philosophical  interpretation  of  matter,  applied  religiously,  leads  to 
the  rankest  atheism  ;  for,  if  nature  is  God,  and  nature  is  an  illusion, 
then  God  is  an  illusion  or  nothing.  Pantheism  on  its  religious  side 
does  not  symbolize  atheism,  but  on  its  ^philosophical  side  it  can  not 
avoid  it ;  it,  therefore,  is  even  more  dangerous  to  the  religious  idea 
than  any  other  known  form  of  religion. 

Its  teachings  respecting  the  soul  are  equally  incredible,  and  un- 
founded in  history  or  experience.  The  soul  is  supposed  to  be  a  frag- 
ment of  the  Deity,  to  whom  it  returns  when  separated  from  the 
body,  and  in  whom  its  individual  consciousness  is  forever  lost,  or  by 
transmigration  it  is  permitted  to  assume  new  types  and  conditions  of 
existence,  from  which  it  finally  passes  into  the  state  of  Brahm  him- 
self. Religiously,  this  is  repugnant  to  the  moral  sense  ;  philosoph- 
ically, it  is  without  foundation,  either  in  reason,  experience,  or 
observation.  History  records  no  such  transmigrations,  and  in  the 
nature  of  things  they  are  impossible.  Even  if  possible,  they  are  in- 
consistent with  the  natural  dignity  of  human  character,  and  are  out 
of  harmony  with  the  highest  destiny  of  man.  It  is  not  our  purpose 
to  philosophize  on  the  Vedic  revelations,  but  rather  to  state  them, 
believing  that  the  inconsistencies  of  the  Brahminical  religion  will  ap- 
pear in  these  revelations,  aud  that,  when  Paul  says  the  "  world  by 
wisdom  knew  not  God,"  we  may  refer  to  this  and  all  other  false  re- 
ligious for  illustration  and  vindication. 

The  same  conclusion  will  be  reached  if  we  turn  to  Buddhism,  a 
later   religion   of  the  East — in   fact,  a  protesting  religion  against  the 


BUDDHISTIC  DEAD-WEIGHTS.  445 

vagaries  of  Brahminisra.  It  was  annouuced  by  Gautama  in  the 
tenth  century  before  Christ,  coming  forth  as  a  reformation  or  trans- 
migration of  the  religious  idea,  and  with  seeming  providential  guar- 
antees, and  in  the  name  of  a  divine  autliority.  Brahminism  was 
unsatisfying ;  it  was  irrational ;  it  was  wanting  in  inspiration  ;  it  was 
a  load.  In  his  pretestings,  recommendations,  and  religious  reve  a- 
tions  one  would  suppose  that  Gautama  would  substitute  activity  for 
inertia,  establish  new  methods  of  religious  service,  declare  truths 
adapted  to  human  necessities,  ordain  new  religious  forms  and  institu- 
tions, inhibit  old,  worn-out  customs  and  practices,  introduce  new  mo- 
ralities and  philanthropies,  and  elevate  moral  life  to  a  higher  level. 

Here,  again,  disai)pointment  is  the  result.  What  truths  did  it 
announce  and  what  evils  did  it  suppress?  AVhat  is  the  fruit  of  Bud- 
dhism ?  With  higher  aims,  is  it  certain  that  its  uplifting  power  was 
any  greater?  Recognizing  the  superiority  of  some  of  its  teachings, 
the  total  impression  that  this  religion  makes  is  that  it  did  not  disturb 
the  moral  inertia  of  history,  or  tend  to  the  religious  development  of 
the  race.  The  rule  we  apply  in  determining  its  historic  place  among 
religions,  and  its  relative  value  as  a  religion,  is  not  to  inquire  the 
specific  value  of  any  single  truth  it  may  have  espoused,  but  to  take 
the  sum  of  its  historic  impression.  It  must  be  judged  as  a  whole,  and 
not  by  its  parts.  By  this  rule  it  ranks  little  above  that  against  which 
it  protested,  and  falls  short  of  meeting  the  religious  demands  of  the 
race.  TJioucjh  not  quite  so  tortuous  as  that  of  Brahnhiism,  its  course  ivas 
equally  narrow  and  shallow;  though  more  refined,  its  conceptions  were  as 
confused  and  perplexing ;  though  more  energizing  in  action,  its  final  effects 
were  relapses  into  imipidity  and  lethargy. 

The  theistic  notion  it  dealt  with  summarily  by  robbing  the  Su- 
preme Being  of  consciousness  and  personality,  leaving  only  a  Supreme 
Force,  omnipresent  and  eternal,  in  possession  of  the  reins  of  the 
world's  government.  It  quickly  sunk  to  the  atheistic  level,  and  is 
the  parent  of  that  scientific  dictum  of  modern  times  which  reduces 
all  existences  to  the  vibrations  of  force,  and  elevates  it  to  supreme 
command  in  the  universe.  If  the  transcendentalism  of  modern  times 
may  be  traced  to  Brahminism,  the  scientific  hallucination  of  modern 
times  concerning  Force  may  be  traced  to  Buddhism.  Modern  errors 
are  the  newly  dressed  dogmas  of  Oriental  nations. 

In  respect  to  matter.  Buddhism  put  itself  in  a  dilemma  from 
which  it  has  never  been  extricated.  It  proclaimed  the  eternity  of 
matter,  but  was  inclined  to  doubt  the  reality  of  matter.  The  Bud- 
dhist desired  to  break  with  the  Brahmin  at  this  point,  but  did  not 
know  how  to  do  it.  The  theory  of  illusion  is  irreconcilable  with 
the  theory  of  eternity.     Holding  to  the  latter,  the  ancient  Buddliist 


446  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

could  easily  have  disavowed  the  former,  and  completed  his  separation 
from  the  Brahmin  ;  but  he  was  not  independent  enough  in  thought 
to  take  the  step,  and  so  did  not  advance  beyond  the  established  re- 
ligious tradition. 

The  Buddhist  conception  of  man  is  as  vulnerable  as  the  Brahmin- 
ical  concej)tion,  for  it  recognizes  in  him  only  a  temporary  individual- 
ity, to  be  lost  in  the  life  of  the  Infinite  Force,  which  is  regarded  as 
the  chief  boon  of  mortals.  Accepting  the  old  doctrine  of  transmi- 
gration, the  Buddhist  looks  forward  to  a  period  when  re-embodiments 
in  various  forms  shall  cease,  and  conscious  being  be  swallowed  up 
in  the  greater  activity  of  the  Supreme  Power.  Individuality  shall 
lose  its  crown  in  eternal  self- forge tfulness. 

Philosophically  and  religiously,  what  is  the  value  of  Buddhism  ? 
It  settled  no  philosophical  question  ;  it  threw  no  light  on  the  aged 
darkness  of  truth  ;  it  opened  no  new  path  to  mystery  ;  it  was  a  blind 
guide,  leading  the  blind  into  errors  as  great  as  those  it  aimed  to 
correct.  As  a  religion  its  aim  was  purer  than  that  of  its  rival,  but  it 
revealed  no  new  truth ;  and  if  it  awakened  new  desires,  it  was  as  in- 
competent to  satisfy  them.  The  hopes  it  raised  turned  to  ashes,  and 
its  music  became  a  dirge. 

Forgetting  the  pagan  faiths,  and  turning  to  other  religions,  with 
different  aims,  the  investigator  will  find  temporary  relief  from  the 
nightmare  which  the  former  provoked.  Temporary  relief,  we  say,  for 
all  religions,  except  Christianity,  are  essentially  false,  notwithstanding 
their  relation  to  the  true  religion,  and  the  spiritual  contents  of  their 
revelations.  This  is  certainly  true  of  Mohammedanism,  which,  far 
from  being  pagan  in  spirit  or  purpose,  is  as  far  from  being  Christian 
in  content,  design,  or  method.  Measured  carefully,  it  is  as  much  in- 
ferior to  Christianity  as  it  is  superior  to  paganism  ;  but  its  superiority 
on  one  side  is  more  than  balanced  by  its  inferiority  on  the  other.  It 
is,  therefore,  an  untruth,  in  that  it  is  not  more  than  a  half-truth.  As 
to  its  philosophical  solutions,  they  are  repugnant  to  the  scientific 
sense,  and  contradictory  of  scientific  fact ;  and  if,  in  any  respect, 
they  are  an  improvement  on  the  Hindu  conception  of  the  universe  or 
of  matter,  it  is  proof  of  the  influence  of  the  Hebrew  Scriptures  and 
of  the  spirit  of  the  age  on  the  mind  of  the  great  prophet,  who  was 
inaugurator  of  the  new  religion.  The  science  of  the  Al  Koran  is 
"  science  falsely  so-called,"  as  it  teaches  that  the  earth  is  balanced  by 
the  weight  of  the  mountains,  and  that  shooting-stars  are  red-hot 
stones  thrown  by  angels.  If  these  were  minor  or  incidental  teach- 
ings, they  would  not  be  quoted  ;  but  they  reflect  the  character  of  the 
geology  and  astronomy  of  the  sacred  book  of  the  Mohammedan,  who 
is  as  much  required  to  accept  its  science  as  its  religion. 


THE  ANTHROPOMORPHIC  IN  MOHAMMEDANISM.        447 

The  strong  or  essential  doctrine  of  Mohammedanism  is  its  exposi- 
tion of  the  theistic  idea,  showing  at  this  point  its  superiority  to  all 
pagan  notions  of  the  Supreme  Being.  Fortunately  for  the  Oriental 
nations,  Mohammedanism  was  a  complete  break  from  all  the  old  re- 
ligions touching  this  fundamental  truth,  for  Mohannned  accepted  the 
Old  Testament  as  his  guide,  and  represented  God  in  his  true  charac- 
ter, as  a  personal  being,  endowed  with  all  the  attributes  enumerated 
by  Moses.  This  gave  him  advantage  as  a  leader,  which  he  was  not 
slow  to  improve.  The  theistic  idea  was  an  improved  idea,  and  had  in- 
spiration in  it ;  and  under  its  influence  the  multitudes  joined  him  in  his 
attacks  upon  idolatry,  idealism,  pantheism,  and  all  the  fancies  of  the 
old  religions.  It  brought  the  East  to  its  knees  before  God,  who  gov- 
erned all  nations,  who  observed  human  actions,  who  would  punish  all 
wickedness,  and  reward  all  virtue. 

Persistent  in  the  enforcement  of  this  conception,  as  was  Moham- 
med, the  conception  itself,  as  finally  formulated,  was  compromised  by 
an  excess  of  anthropomorphic  elements  introduced  into  it ;  it  was  low- 
ered to  gross  human  standards  of  what  God  ought  to  be,  and  not 
what  he  is,  as  taught  in  the  Scriptures.  Determined  to  break  with 
Christianity,  as  he  had  broken  with  Paganism,  Mohammed  rejected  the 
doctrine  of  the  Trinity,  and  stood  out  as  an  independent  religious 
teacher,  accepting  only  a  few  truths  from  the  sources  around  him. 
He  gained  on  the  old  religions  by  the  doctrine  of  monotheism,  but 
fell  back  from  the  new  by  his  anthropomorphism  and  denial  of  the 
Xrinity  ;  and  to-day,  as  in  his  time,  the  faith  he  instituted  is  quite  as 
much  opposed  to  the  new  as  to  the  old. 

If  in  like  manner  we  should  analyze  the  old  religions  ot  Egypt,  or 
question  the  ancient  systems  of  belief  in  China,  as  to  particular 
teachings  respecting  God,  nature,  and  man,  we  should  find  that, 
holding  to  some  truths  that  might  be  approved,  and  exhibiting  a  sin- 
cerity that  ignorance  always  creates,  they  were  defective  in  those 
truths  that  are  essential  to  a  perfect  philosophy  and  a  redemptive  re- 
ligion. All  religions,  ancient  and  modern,  would  repeat  the  same 
story  of  imperfection,  inadequacy,  and  incompleteness. 

The  sum  of  this  survey  of  religions  is  that  religion  is  instinctively 
'philosophical,  in  that  it  grapples  with  philosophical  problems,  or,  in 
better  form,  its  connatural  ideas  are  per  se  philosophical.  The  two 
can  not  be  separated  ;  to  be  religious  is  to  be  philosophical. 

The  conclusion  is  also  warranted  that,  whatever  their  value  as 
religions,  they  have  failed  in  their  philosophical  departments,  partly 
owing  to  want  of  data,  partly  to  irrational  methods,  partly  to  explain 
the  mysteries,  or  state  exactly  what  pertains  to  such  departments.  This 
failure  is  universal.     No  uninspired  religion  has  developed  a  compe- 


448  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

tent  philosopliy ;  not  one  has  solved  one  philosophical  problem  in  u 
philosophical  manner.  From  the  philosophical  departments  of  relig- 
ion have  come  the  idealism,  transceudeutalism,  pantheism,  material- 
ism, pessimism,  atheism,  aud  those  scientific  heresies  wliich  modern 
science  has  appropriated  and  palmed  off  as  its  own. 

We  fiuall}^  couQlude  for  the  necessity,  either  of  another  philosophy, 
or  another  religion  which  shall  philosophically  succeed  where  others 
have  failed,  aud  demonstrate  that  man  must  go  to  that  religion  for 
his  philosophy,  rather  than  to  outside  philosophy  itself. 

This  brings  us  to  the  consideration  of  the  phUosophical  character  of 
Ckristianity,  the  only  religion  that  meets  the  requirements  of  philos- 
ophy, and  the  only  philosophy  that  suggests  a  true  basis  for  religion. 
Before  analyzing  the  radical  elements  of  this  religion,  it  will  be 
necessary  to  take  a  general  view  of  its  relation  to  philosophy,  that 
its  exact  position  may  be  understood.  First,  Christianity  is  in  its 
contents  a  system  of  religious  truth;  it  is  a- religion;  it  is  not  a 
philosophy.  We  say  this  just  as  we  say  water  is  a  liquid;  it  is 
not  a  gas!^  Philosophical  truth  abounds  in  Christianity,  but  in  itself 
it  is  a  religion;  its  purpose  is  religious,  its  methods  are  religious, 
its  effects  are  religious.  Second,  Christianity  is  a  philosophical  relig- 
ion; it  is  the  only  philosophical  religion  among  men.  As  we  have 
seen,  the  metaphysical  researches  of  other  religions  have  been  fruitful 
of  deep-seated  errors,  involving  unjust  misconceptions  of  God,  na- 
ture, and  man,  and  have  prevented  moral  and  intellectual  progress. 
Christianity  holds  not  a  religious  truth  that  is  not  philosophically 
true ;  its  highest  truths  accord  with  the  highest  reason ;  its  philos- 
ophy harmonizes  with  its  religion.  Christianity  harmonizes  its  ele- 
ments as  nature  harmonizes  gases,  liquids,  and  solids;  the  result  is 
order,  stability,  development.  Third,  Christianity  disposes  of  philo- 
sophical problems  as  it  disposes  of  religious  problems,  namely,  btj 
revelation.  Its  religious  truths  are  not  more  inspired  than  its  philo- 
sophical, and  its  philosophical  not  more  than  its  religious  truths. 
The  truth  relating  to  the  origin  of  the  worlds,  the  creation  of  man, 
the  range  of  the  flood,  and  the  final  conflagration  of  the  planets,  is  as 
much  inspired  as  the  truth  relating  to  regeneration,  prayer,  faith, 
immortality,  marriage,  and  the  Sabbath.  The  difference  is  in  the 
class  of  truths;  the  source  is  the  same.  Hence,  the  infiillibility  of  the 
philosophical  revelations  of  Christianity.  By  these  philosophical 
revelations  the  religious  revelations  stand  or  fidl ;  for,  if  it  can  be 
shown  that  the  one  is  uncertain  and  unreliable,  discredit  is  also 
thrown  upon  the  other.  Fourth,  Christianity  is  the  final  test  of  all  sys- 
tems of  philosophy.  There  must  be  a  final  court  of  appeal,  or  truth 
is  at  the  mercy  of  prejudice.     Either  Christianity  must   be  tested 


COSMOLOGICAL  TRUTHS.  449 

by  philosophy,  or  philosophy  must  be  tested  by  Christianity.  If  re- 
ligions may  be  weighed  in  her  scales ;  if  all  religious  truth  may  be 
judged  by  her  ideal  standard  of  truth ;  if  its  own  philosophy  may  be 
tested  by  its  own  religion  ;  surely  philosophical  systems,  pretending  to 
investigate  that  which  primarily  belongs  to  the  domain  of  religion, 
must  submit  also  to  that  religion  whose  tests  are  ideal  and  final.  In 
another  form  it  might  be  added  that  the  final  religion  must  originate, 
dictate,  and  enforce  the  final  philosophy ;  and  then  the  two  will  per- 
fectly agree,  and  Christian  philosophy  will  be  the  synonym  of  the 
Christian  religion. 

With  this  general  understanding  of  the  relations  or  kinship  sub- 
sisting between  philosophy  and  Christianity,  it  will  be  interesting  to 
search  for  those  final  forms  of  philosophical  truth  that  are  concealed 
or  disclosed  in  the  Book  of  Revelation. 

Among  the  common-place  truths  of  Christianity  is  that  which  re- 
lates to  cosmological  history,  or  the  creation  and  development  of  the 
universe.  Without  exception,  the  sacred  writers  reveal  God  as  the 
philosophic  ground  of  all  existence,  and  explain  the  worlds  by  the 
principle  of  causality  in  association  with  personality.  They  recognize 
will,  purpose,  and  power,  in  conjunction  in  the  creation  of  matter 
and  its  organization  into  systems  of  worlds.  This  principle  of  cos- 
mology is  the  rubric  of  the  Christian  religion.  Accepting  this  prin- 
ciple as  the  key  to  cosmological  history,  the  Christian  thinker  has  a 
starting-point;  he  starts  from  God,  the  all-suflScient  source.  Imme- 
diately, he  opens  the  door  on  one  side  into  geology,  and  on  the  other 
into  astronomy,  arranging  the  facts  of  these  sciences  in  harmony  with 
the  principle  of  causality,  and  explaining  physical  development  by 
law  ordained  by  the  Establisher  of  all  things.  Neither  philosophy 
itself,  nor  any  pseudo  religion,  began  at  this  starting-point.  All  be- 
gan with  nature  and  aimed  at  God.  Christianity  begins  with  God 
and  aims  at  the  universe. 

This  principle  of  cosmology  involves  the  incidental  factor  of 
chronology,  carrying  us  back  to  a  period  when,  atomless,  non-existent, 
and  unanticipated  by  any  antecedent,  the  worlds  were  made  by  the 
power  of  God.  Millions  of  years  do  not  disturb  the  principle.  Any 
chronology,  long  or  short,  doubtful  or  positive,  may  be  asserted  with- 
out shaking  the  principle.  At  one  time  the  conservatism  of  Christian 
thought,  or  rather  the  importance  attached  to  cosmological  chronology, 
was  such  as  to  disallow  this  interpretation  ;  but  Christianity  is  as 
scientific  in  its  science  as  it  is  religious  in  its  religion,  and  it  sinks 
the  lower  question  into  the  higher,  regarding  the  principle  of  creation 
more  important  than  the  chronology  of  creation.  Over  the  chronol- 
ogy of  the  birth  of  the  worlds  there  can  be  little  contest  between  the 

29 


450  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

friends  of  religion  on  the  one  hand  and  the  friends  of  philosophy  on 
the  other,  since  it  is  a  subordinate  question.  In  its  narrow  sense, 
world-birth  is  a  geological  question ;  in  a  larger  sense  it  is  astronom- 
ical ;  in  the  whole  sense,  it  is  theological,  implying  God  himself  and 
his  relation  to  matter.  Settled  in  any  sense,  however,  it  is  settled  in 
all ;  for  truth  is  a  unit,  and,  given  a  key  to  the  origin  of  any  world, 
it  will  unlock  the  mystery  of  all  worlds. 

An  outside  or  secular  philosophy,  disregarding  the  theistic  hy- 
pothesis, has  sought  to  explain  the  cosmic  systems  either  by  independ- 
ent processes,  or  by  self-executing  laws,  or  by  the  operation  of  "second 
causes,"  or  at  all  events  by  a  Power,  impersonal,  unconscious,  and 
synonymous  with  the  forces  at  work  in  nature.  It  is  not  charged 
that  the  nebular  hypothesis  and  the  "development"  theory  exclude 
the  theistic  idea,  but  they  fall  short  of  a  full  recognition  of  divine 
intervention  in  world-building,  involving  the  subject  in  deeper 
mystery  than  is  possible  in  the  light  of  the  Christian  principle  of 
cosmology.  Christian  belief  has  insisted  on  the  exercise  of  creative 
power  in  the  origin  of  matter,  and  the  exercise  of  wisdom  in  the 
planning  of  the  solar  systems,  and  has  been  unfriendly  to  a  compro- 
mise with  scientific  hypothesis  along  these  lines.  The  difference 
involves  on  the  one  side  the  reign  of  personality  in  the  universe,  and 
on  the  other  the  self-potency  and  self-sufficiency  of  matter  in  the 
process  of  world-building.  The  issue  compasses  two  extremes,  or  the 
opposite  heights  of  the  pendulum  of  human  thought,  from  one  of 
which  we  look  upon  all  things  as  from  a  throne,  and  from  the  other 
of  which  we  behold  the  universe  as  from  a  polar  point.  Scientific 
thought,  recognizing  the  cheerlessness  of  the  atheistic  assumption,  is 
rapidly  veering  toward  the  Christian  principle  of  cosmology,  and 
adapting  its  "development"  theories  to  the  Biblical  revelations. 

Descending  to  the  smaller  questions  of  science,  such  as  the  Mosaic 
order  of  creation,  the  time  of  man's  appearance  on  earth,  the  origin 
or  introduction  of  language,  and  the  law  of  heredity,  as  it  affects  the 
race,  similar  battles  have  been  fought,  but  in  a  less  violent  spirit  and 
without  permanent  disaster  to  the  truth,  for  the  settlement  of  the 
greatest  problem  signifies  the  settlement  of  all  other  problems.  A 
theistic  triumph  is  tlie  triionph  of  all  truth.  Viewing  the  conflict  over 
the  lesser  questions,  one  is  impressed  that  the  outside  scientist  has 
been  assailing  ecclesiastical  interpretations  rather  than  Biblical  truths, 
and  that  neither  ecclesiastic  nor  scientist  has  intelligently  considered 
what  those  truths  are,  or  at  least  has  not  sounded  them  to  their 
depths,  and  has  mistaken  the  direction  of  their  currents.  It  may, 
therefore,  be  assumed  that,  as  the  old  dogmatic  interpretations  are 
modified,  and  scientific  theories  are  molded  in  the  light  of  facts  and 


GEOLOGICAL  HYPOTHESES.  451 

Biblical  hints,  a  reconciliation  between  philosophy  and  Christianity 
will  take  place,  and  the  true  result  will  be  secured,  namely,  the 
Biblical  stand-point  of  creation  will  have  amplest  vindication.  Until 
this  is  realized,  the  chasm  must  remain,  and  unbelief  touching  the 
higher  verities  of  religion  will  boast  of  its  iutrenchments  and  point  to 
its  victories.  Contention  over  Biblical  truth  there  will  be  ;  but,  as 
the  testing  of  truth  means  the  testing  of  error  also,  so  an  analysis  of 
revealed  truth  will  be  followed  by  an  analysis  of  all  other  so-called 
truth,  by  which  error  will  at  last  be  made  transparent  and  the  truth 
be  set  apart  from  it.  The  conflict  is  in  the  interest  of  truth,  and  it 
ought  to  go  on  until  the  true  shall  be  victorious  over  the  false. 
Error  can  not  long  resist  the  truth,  nor  long  abide  after  a  defeat. 

As  an  example,  it  has  been  affirmed  in  certain  circles  that  the 
geology  of  the  Pentateuch  is  incomplete  in  detail  and  incorrect  in  its 
substantial  facts;  yet  no  theorist  proposes  entirely  to  dispense  with 
the  Mosaic  manual.  This  manual  has  been  interpreted  so  variously 
that  one  is  obliged  to  conclude  that  it  is  not  a  superficial  document, 
or  it  would  be  interpreted  in  one  way  only,  or  be  entirely  rejected. 
The  effort  of  the  scientific  mind  is  so  to  interpret  the  geological  reve- 
lation as  to  harmonize  with  scientific  discovery,  the  product  being 
at  least  six  theories,  Avhich  are  here  noted :  1.  The  theory  of  Literal 
Agreement ;  that  is,  the  chief  geological  divisions  of  the  globe  are 
supposed  to  agree  with  the  six  divisions  of  Moses.  This  is  straight, 
clear,  definite.  2.  The  Restitutionary  Hypothesis;  that  is,  the  geo- 
logical material  existed  before  the  inaugurated  movements  of  the  six 
days,  and  was  arranged,  or  restored  to  order,  beauty,  and  system  dur- 
ing that  period.  The  Mosaic  "week"  was  a  week  of  organization 
and  reconstruction.  3.  The  Diluvian  Hypothesis  ;  that  is,  the  pres- 
ent geological  order  must  be  referred  to  the  Deluge,  the  original  order 
having  been  entirely  subverted.  4.  The  theory  of  Ideal  or  Substantial 
Agreement;  that  is,  the  Mosaic  account  is  true  as  a  general  repre- 
sentation, but  is  not  scientifically  accurate.  5.  The  Epochal  theory ; 
that  is,  the  Mosaic  "day"  refers  to  an  epoch  in  geologic  movement. 
6.  The  Allegorical  theory ;  that  is,  the  Mosaic  account  is  the  idea  of 
development  in  a  picture,  the  idea  being  more  important  than  the 
facts,  the  picture  more  beautiful  than  the  frame ;  hence,  the  account 
is  the  narrative  of  an  idea,  and  not  the  relation  of  facts. 

It  will  be  observed  that  none  of  these  theories,  however  widely 
they  differ  from  one  another,  seriously  antagonizes  the  Biblical  account, 
or  eliminates  the  Mosaic  idea  of  creation ;  as  experiments  at  interpre- 
tation they  are  valuable,  since  they  show  that  a  truth  may  be  looked 
at  from  many  sides  and  not  suffer  from  the  inspection.  One  might 
accept  any  of   the  above  interpretations,  and  be   in  harmony  with 


452  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

Moses.  Many  German  thinkers  take  kindly  to  the  theory  of  Sub- 
stantial Agreement,  because  of  its  elasticity,  but  this  is  the  chief  ob- 
jection to  it;  the  Bible  is  never  speculative,  suggests  no  tentative 
theories  or  working  hypotheses,  does  not  state  truth  substantially,  but 
positively  and  absolutely.  If  its  geology  is  substantially  true,  its  spir- 
itual teachings  may  be  regarded  as  substantially  true,  which  would 
open  the  door  to  speculation,  fanaticism,  superstition.  Revelation, 
like  mathematics,  must  be  one  thing  or  another. 

Whatever  objection  may  be  raised  against  the  other  theories,  they 
are  free  from  this  weakness;  they  are  positive,  even  if  defective. 
But  it  is  not  so  much  to  discuss  theories  as  to  show  that  the  Penta- 
teuch has  given  rise  to  the  prevailing  philosophical  explanations  of 
the  geological  movements,  or  of  the  order  of  the  creative  week  and 
its  results.      The  Pentateuch  is  tJie  source  of  geological  truth. 

Passing  from  origins  to  destinies,  Christianity  is  as  prophetic  as  it 
is  historic ;  it  points  to  the  end  as  well  as  the  beginning,  surpassing 
philosophy  in  the  one  respect  as  it  does  in  the  other,  and  yet  is 
strictly  philosophical  itself.  Ordinarily,  philosophic  inquiry  confines 
itself  to  the  ascertainment  of  causes  or  beginnings ;  rarely  does  it 
consider  effects  or  ends.  A  whole  philosophy,  however,  must  range 
from  one  to  the  other,  and  explain  one  as  well  as  the  other.  Chris- 
tianity foresees  the  end  of  all  things,  declaring  that  the  earth  shall 
be  burned  up,  reduced  to  a  cinder,  or  purified  and  transformed  by 
fire.  This  is  a  definite  revelation,  sustained,  too,  by  nature  itself, 
and,  therefore,  is  doubly  true.  The  earth  is  a  store-house  of  com- 
bustibles, waiting  for  the  torch  of  the  last  day,  when  the  conflagration 
of  the  mountains  and  oceans  will  be  immediate  and  universal.  Oxygen 
is  the  great  promoter  of  combustion,  and  is  found  in  combination 
with  the  solids  and  liquids  of  the  globe.  The  greater  portion  of  sub- 
stances consists  of  this  gas.  Water  needs  only  to  be  resolved  into 
oxygen  and  hydrogen,  when  the  oceans  can  be  converted  into  roaring 
seas  of  flame.  Besides,  the  interior  of  the  earth  is  supposed  to  be  a 
raging  furnace  of  fire,  sending  out  its  forked  to«gues  through  volcanic 
craters  and  heated  springs  in  testimony  of  its  existence.  The  earth 
can  burn ;  its  constitution  affirms  its  possible  destruction  by  fire. 
Astronomy  records  several  instances  of  the  conflagration  of  stars. 
Will  it  not  by  and  by  add  to  its  record  the  conflagration  of  the  earth  ? 

This  is  the  revelation  of  Christianity  ;  this  is  the  prophetic  possibility 
of  nature.  Does  science  accept  it?  In  some  quarters,  the  destiny  of 
the  earth  has  been  under  consideration,  various  theories  having  been 
presented,  and  all  agreeing  on  the  probable  destruction  of  the  globe. 
One  theory  is  to  the  eflTect  that  the  earth  will  freeze  to  death,  the  sun 
failing  to   supply  it  with  heat;  another  is,  that  the  earth  is  slowly 


CHRISTIAN  PSYCHOLOGY.  463 

approaching  the  sun,  or  the  sun  the  earth,  and  in  time  the  earth  will 
wheel  into  the  orbit  of  the  sun  and  be  consumed.  Some  have  pre- 
dicted its  destruction  by  collision  with  comets  or  planets,  and  others 
that  the  laws  which  regulate  its  activities  and  secure  its  preservation 
will  be  suspended,  and  the  earth  fail  with  age  and  infirmity ;  but  its 
destruction,  whether  by  one  method  or  another,  is  now  a  conclusion 
of  science  as  well  as  religion.  Christianity  reveals  more  than  the 
fact  of  destruction;  it  declares  the  mamier  or  instrumental  cause  of  the 
destruction,  which  science  now  recognizes  as  probable.  In  this  Chris- 
tianity does  not  sustain  science,  but  science  sustains  Christianity. 

For  a  true  philosophy  of  the  cosmical  system,  which  includes  the 
genesis  of  matter,  the  origin  of  worlds,  and  the  destiny  of  the  uni- 
verse, or  for  a  key  to  geology,  chemistry,  and  astronomy,  the  investi-. 
gator  must  first  and  last  acknowledge  his  indebtedness  to  the  revealed 
truths  of  Christianity,  which,  in  their  scientific  content,  are  as  rational 
as  in  their  spiritual  content,  and,  therefore,  as  serviceable  to  science 
as  to  religion. 

A  turning-point  is  now  reached.  As  the  sphere  of  philosophy 
extends  beyond  the  physical  domain,  so  the  philosophical  in  Chris- 
tianity embraces  more  than  a  category  of  physical  truths.  As  nature 
is  the  key-word  to  all  physical  truth,  so  man  is  the  key-word  to  all 
intellectual,  if  not  spiritual,  truth.  Man  stands  for  higher  truth,  as 
nature  stands  for  lower  truth ;  and,  by  so  much  as  he  is  greater  than 
nature,  by  as  much  is  the  truth  he  represents  greater  than  the  truth 
of  nature.  Man  thinks ;  he  has  a  conscience ;  he  recognizes  moral 
distinctions;  he  determines  the  difference  between  the  me  and  the 
not-me.  All  the  diflferences  or  idiosyncrasies,  which  distinguish 
human  from  brute  intelligence,  all  those  achievements  which  prove 
the  superiority  of  man,  and  all  those  graces  and  virtues  that  lend 
dignity  to  human  character,  are  proper  subjects  for  the  contemplation 
of  the  theologian  and  philosopher.  What  is  man  ?  asks  David.  The 
answer  of  modern  philosophy  has  been  given  in  this  volume.  It 
strikes  at  the  divine  in  humanity.  The  answer  of  Christianity  is, 
that  man  is  a  twofold  being ;  he  is  constituted  with  a  body  which  is 
physical  and  will  perish,  and  a  soul  which  is  intellectual  and  spiritual, 
and,  therefore,  immortal;  and  these  are  mysteriously  united  for  all 
the  purposes  of  a  brief  time-life,  and  then  separated,  that  the  soul 
may  enter  into  everlasting  relati9ns  with  another  life.  Such  a  view 
of  man  invests  him  with  sacredness  and  nobility,  and  points  to  un- 
limited possibilities  of  development  and  achievement.  On  this  founda- 
tion, man's  place  in  nature,  in  the  spiritual  realm  and  in  eternity, 
can  be  fixed,  and  a  philosophy,  building  up  on  these  premises,  will 
abide.     A  true  philosophy  must  recognize  the  intellectual  in  distinc- 


454  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

tion  from  the  physical,  and  the  immortal  in  opposition  to  the  mortal. 
Epicurus  denied  the  immortality  of  *the  soul,  but  Paul  emphasizes  it 
as  one  of  the  first  principles  of  religion.  Nor  is  this  a  religious  truth 
only,  to  be  accepted  because  revealed ;  it  is  also  a  philosophical  truth, 
which  Plato  demonstrated,  and  to  be  accepted  because  demonstrated. 
Immortality  is  as  inherent  as  memory,  imagination,  conscience,  or 
will;  it  is  not  a  conferred  gift,  but  an  essential  attribute  of  soul. 
The  genesis  of  soul  is  the  genesis  of  immortality. 

The  philosophic  spirit  of  Christianity  is  manifest  in  its  recognition  of 
the  reign  of  evil  in  the  universe,  and  in  the  revelation  of  a  positive  method 
for  its  extinction.  Homer  does  not  use  the  word  "sin,"  or  any  equiv- 
alent, in  the  Iliad,  for,  to  the  ancient  poets,  and  the  fable-makers, 
wrong-doing  was  a  trifle,  in  some  instances  it  was  godlike,  for  did  not 
the  gods  commit  crimes?  While  philosophy  struck  mythology  from 
history  as  a  baseless  fabric,  and  condemned  its  ethical  notions  as  ab- 
surd and  injurious,  it  can  not  be  said  that  philosophy  occupied  a 
safe  ethical  ground,  or  that  it  comprehended  all  that  is  involved  in 
the  existence  and  reign  of  evil.  If  to  the  ancient  philosopher 
mythology  was  fiction,  to  the  Christian  thinker  of  to-day  Manicheism 
and  Gnosticism,  as  "philosophical  explanations,  appear  equally  untrue 
and  inapplicable.  What  then  ?  Christianity  reveals  the  philosophy 
of  evil,  not  in  a  mythological  way,  not  as  a  speculation,  but  as  it  re- 
veals all  truth,  by  the  declaration  of  its  character,  as  the  opposite  of 
holiness,  and  by  the  declaration  of  its  origin  in  a  spirit  of  disobedi- 
ence to  the  law  of  righteousness.  It  does  not  locate  evil  in  matter, 
but  defines  it  as  the  abnormal  condition  of  mind,  as  enmity  to  law. 
As  an  act,  evil  is  the  voluntary  flow^  of  mind  in  a  forbidden  channel ; 
as  a  result,  it  is  the  disorder  consequent  on  disobedience. 

The  ethical  remedy  of  Christianity  is  atonement,  forgiveness,  and 
regeneration  ;  a  remedy  as  philosophical  as  it  is  religious,  because 
available  and  sufficient. 

Christianity  is  philosophical  in  its  biological  principles.  The  principle 
of  life  is  a  profound  secret,  the  scientist  being  as  ignorant  of  it  as 
the  average  theologian.  Life  is  invisible  ;  its  manifestations  we  alone 
can  observe  and  know.  Still  we  know  there  is  such  a  something  as 
Life,  or  something  that  we  call  Life.  Now,  it  would  be  dogmatic  in 
the  Christian  thinker  to  announce  that  Christianity  makes  a  full  ex- 
position of  liie,  or  that  it  resolves  ^ts  chief  mystery,  and  dissipates 
all  the  darkness  which  invests  it ;  it  does  not  clear  the  subject,  but  it 
throws  a  halo  around  it ;  it  does  not  exjilain  its  essence,  but  it  con- 
ducts to  its  source. 

Christianity  is  not  azoic  in  any  sense ;  it  is  Life,  because  its 
Founder  is  Life.     To  him  all  life  may  be  traced,  and  from  him  all 


KEY- WORDS  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  455 

life  has  come ;  but  the  mystery  of  life  still  remains.  The  universe  is 
the  embodiment  of  a  principle  of  life,  which  is  called  Energy  ;  the 
human  race  is  the  embodiment  of  a  principle  of  life,  which  is  called 
Salvation ;  and  one  is  as  philosophical  as  the  other.  Philosophy 
recognizes  the  one  ;  Christianity  imports  the  other.  The  law  of  bio- 
genesis, or  life  from  pre-existent  life,  or  lower  life  impregnated  with 
higher  life,  reigns  in  the  physical  universe  and  accounts  for  its  de- 
velopment; the  same  law  reigns  in  religion,  accounting  for  Regener- 
ation, and  all  the  mysteries  of  spiritual  development.  Physical 
development  and  spiritual  development  are  under  the  same  law  of 
life.  Hitherto  spiritual  life  has  been  interpreted  by  the  scientific 
thinker  as  a  sentimental  condition,  independent  of  natural  laws,  and 
secured,  if  at  all,  by  supernatural  influences  which  science  knew 
nothing  about  and  whose  existence,  therefore,  it  was  inclined  to  im- 
peach. But  biogenesis  is  as  much  a  law  of  the  spiritual  realm  as  of 
the  natural ;  regeneration  is  as  natural  as  it  is  spiritual ;  and  the 
life  of  the  universe  is  only  the  symbol  of  the  life  of  the  eternal 
world.      Christianity  is  the  true  philosophy  of  biological  law. 

In  like  manner,  it  may  be  shown  that  Incarnation,  Atonement, 
Justification,  Sanctification,  Faith,  Joy,  Liberty,  and  Prayer,  are 
philosophical  principles,  or  philosophical  conditions,  realized  by  philo- 
sophical methods,  and  manifested  in  a  philosophic  order  in  the 
Christian  life.  That  is  to  say,  whatever  Christianity  is,  it  is  philo- 
sophical;  whatever  Christianity  does,  it  does  philosophically;  what- 
ever mysteries  it  withholds,  they  are  philosophical  mysteries ;  what- 
ever revelations  it  submits,  they  are  philosophical  revelations. 

If  nature  is  the  key-word  to  physical  truth,  and  man  the  key- 
word to  intellectual  truth,  God  is  the  key-word  to  sjnritual  truth,  to  all 
truth,  physical,  intellectual  and  spiritual.  God  is  the  key-word  to 
nature,  man,  and  himself;  the  key  to  the  secrets  of  the  universe, 
the  key  to  the  treasures  of  the  spiritual  world.  Philosophy  has  sadly 
erred  in  trying  to  open  the  doors  without  the  key ;  it  has  not  opened 
them.  Christianity  opens  all  things,  explains  all  forms,  reveals  all 
laws,  and  is  the  sum  of  all  truth.  As  in  philosophy  the  greatest 
problem  is  God,  so  in  Christianity  the  greatest  revelation  is  God. 
Christianity  is  the  revelation  of  God.  It  is  not  a  problem  ;  it  is  a 
revelation.  It  is  not  a  theory  ;  it  is  a  truth.  As  a  truth  it  is  more 
philosophical  than  a  theory,  for,  while  philosophy  runs  to  theory,  it 
ought  to  be  grounded  in  the  truth,  which  truth  is  Christianity.  The 
theistic  truth  of  Christianity  embraces  all  other  truths ;  hence,  the 
revelation  of  one  is  the  revelation  of  all.  On  this  highest  truth  a 
philosophy  is  possible  ;  on  this  highest  truth  a  religion  is  possible  ; 
on  this  highest  truth  the  unity  of  philosophy  and  religion  is  possible. 


456  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

Philosophy  without  Christianity  is  uncertain,  and  its  discoveries 
must  be  partial  and  accidental ;  Christianity  without  philosophy  is 
truth  without  theory,  and  must  abide  forever.  Christianity  is 
philosophy. 


CHAPTER  XXI. 

CHRISTIANITY    THE    KEY  TO    THE    PHENOlVtENA-L 
\VOF4LD. 

GIORDANO  BRUNO,  an  Italian  philosopher  of  the  sixteenth 
century,  represented  the  world  as  a  "living  being,"  with  reason 
as  its  regnant  faculty.  Gorgias,  the  ancient  Sophist,  imbibed  the 
Eleatic  notion  of  the  non-existence  of  matter,  declaring  that  nature 
is  without  reality.  Horace  Bushnell,  adopting  the  etymological  sug- 
gestion of  the  word  "nature,"  as  something  aboid-to-be,  speaks  of  it 
as  "that  created  realm  of  being  or  substance  which  has  an  acting, 
a  going  on,  or  process  from  within  itself,  under,  and  by  its  own 
laws."  Pascal  affirms  that  "nature  is  an  image  of  grace;"  and 
Henry  Drummond  undertakes  to  establish  the  identity  of  natural  and 
spiritual  laws,  or  that  the  Religious  and  Natural  realms  are  under  the 
same  code  of  laws. 

These  differences  in  opinion  respecting  the  physical  world  make 
it  clear  that  a  purely  philosophical  explanation  of  matter  will  be  un- 
satisfactory, and  also,  that  a  religious  theory,  unless  fully  buttressed 
by  revealed  truth,  can  not  hope  for  recognition.  It  is  not  sentiment, 
it  is  not  theory,  that  is  wanted.  It  is  truth,  and  truth  only,  that 
will  satisfy  the  rational  mind  in  its  search  for  explanation  of  the 
phenomenal  world. 

To  assume  that  the  phenomenal  world  may  be  understood  does  not 
imply  that  any  direct  revelation  of  its  character,  purpose,  and  destiny 
has  been  made,  or  that  an  understanding  has  been  fully  wrought  out ; 
but  it  does  imply  that  by  searching,  comparing,  asking,  and  prompt- 
ing nature  to  respond,  a  satisfactory  schedule  of  its  contents  and  pur- 
poses may  be  framed.  The  certainty  of  explanation  lies  in  the  possi- 
bility of  explanation.  Chemistry,  astronomy,  geology,  and  physiology 
were  all  scientific  possibilities  long  before  they  became  trustworthy 
systems  of  truth.  So  the  whole  realm  of  nature,  like  any  department 
thereof,  may,  under  analysis,  or  by  the  application  of  principles  used 
in  the  testing  of  higher  truth,  be  interpreted  or  be  induced  to  reveal 
all  that  it  contains.  It  is  here  assumed  that  in  the  light  of  Chris- 
tianity the  phenomenal  world  may  be  properly  understood;   but  the 


IMPERFECT  EXPLANATIONS.  457 

assumption  is  not  made  without  qualifications.  Believing  that  phi- 
losophy has  failed  in  its  attempt  to  explain  nature,  it  must  be  ad- 
mitted that  by  its  aid  many  mysteries  have  been  simplified,  many  laws 
discovered,  and  human  knowledge  has  been  increased.  To  that 
source  the  debt  of  the  thinker  is  not  small.  Philosophy  must  not  be 
reproached  for  not  doing  what  it  is  unable  to  do. 

If  the  task  of  explanation  has  been  committed  to  Christianity,  it  is  not 
because  its  prophets  and  apostles  were,  as  men  of  genius,  scholarship,  and 
wisdom,  superior  to  philosophers  and  scientists,  but  because  they  were 
the  instruments  of  the  divine  Spirit  in  revealing  the  hidden  truths  of 
the  ages.  The  ground  of  the  claim  here  set  forth  is  not  the  superior- 
ity of  the  sacred  writers,  but  the  superiority  of  the  truth  itself.  Even 
in  this  respect  our  claim  must  not  be  extravagant.  Science  is  very 
imperfect  in  its  contents  ;  it  reveals  facts,  but  accounts  for  nothing  ; 
it  discloses  the  composition  of  things,  but  does  not  explain  the  things 
themselves.  It  tells  the  properties  of  oxygen,  but  does  not  tell  how 
oxygen  came  to  be,  or  what  it  is.  It  eulogizes  chemical  affinity, 
points  out  its  uses,  but  does  not  define  it.  Of  crystallization  as  a  law 
it  says  something  ;  as  a  force,  it  says  nothing. 

Now,  if  philosophy  stops  short  of  explanation,  though  it  expounds 
laws  and  principles  ;  if  science  scarcely  goes  beyond  the  facts,  though 
it  is  enthusiastic  in  its  search  for  them  ;  does  not  Christianity,  discard- 
ing the  instruments  of  philosophy  and  science,  essay  a  task  far  be- 
yond its  power  and  range  when  it  proposes  to  illuminate  the  phenom- 
enal world,  and  declare  the  secrets  it  has  contained  since  its  foundations 
were  laid  ?  To  guard  against  disappointment  it  should  be  stated  that 
the  revelations  of  Christianity  touching  the  phenomenal  world  are  by 
no  means  complete  ;  they  fall  short  of  what  curiosity  requires,  and 
even  Reason  complains  of  the  apparent  paucity.  Ignorance,  there- 
fore, prevails  even  in  the  circles  of  Christian  thought.  This  leads  us 
to  observe  that  the  light  of  Christianity  is  a  peculiar  light ;  like  the 
light  of  the  sun,  it  is  a  mystery,  but,  like  that  light,  it  is  light  to 
those  who  have  eyes.  Science  gives  facts  without  explanations ; 
Christianity  is  an  explanation  without  the  facts.  It  is  one  thing  to 
take  knowledge  of  the  facts ;  it  is  another  thing  to  take  knowledge 
of  the  explanation.  One  may  see  darkness  ;  it  is  not  always  certain 
that  one  may  see  light.  Science  can  not  explain  Christianity ;  Chris- 
tianity explains  science — that  is,  its  facts. 

It  makes  nothing  against  the  explanation  that  it  is  imperfect,  so 
long  as  the  imperfection  lies  chiefly  in  the  want  of  details,  or  in  its 
application  to  single  objects.  It  grapples  with  the  whole,  with  mag- 
nitude, not  with  atoms.  It  comprehends  the  All,  not  a  single  point. 
It  explains  not  the  pebble  in  which  there  is  all  of  geology,  but  it 


458  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

explains  the  heavens,  out  of  which  all  science,  all  philosophy,  all 
religion  must  come.  It  explains  not  the  leaf,  which  is  botany,  but 
the  globe,  which  is  universal  truth;  not  the  insect,  which  is  "  natu- 
ral history,"  but  the  human  race,  which  is  divine  history.  Dealing 
seldom  with  single  facts,  but  always  with  broad  principles;  omitting 
the  details  of  the  total  result,  but  comprehending  the  total  result, 
the  interpretation  of  Christianity  at  first  appears  imperfect,  but  at 
last  it  is  sufficient. 

First,  touching  the  genesis  of  the  physical  universe,  Christianity 
speaks  a  definite  word  on  which  it  rests  its  scientific  character.  Over 
this  question  what  contests  have  occurred !  What  solutions  have  as- 
serted themselves  !  How  the  philosophical  eye  has  strained  itself  to 
catch  a  glimpse  of  the  beginning  !  What  ponderous  theories,  what 
pessimistic  hypotheses,  what  materialistic  statements,  what  agnostic 
settlements,  have  appeared,  each  and  all  to  be  succeeded  by  others 
less  objectionable  in  form,  but  quite  as  deficient  as  explanations ! 
Listening  to  the  babel  of  scientists,  we  hear  of  monads,  atoms,  spon- 
taneous motion,  eternity  of  matter,  germs,  laws,  forces,  protoplasm, 
bioplasm,  evolution — words  suggestive  of  tension,  perplexity,  athe- 
ism, materialism  ;  Avords  with  the  mildew  of  night  upon  them.  The 
elimination  of  a  Divine  Power  from  the  universe,  or  the  endowment 
of  nature  with  a  self-creating  energy,  dispensing  entirely  with  the  neces- 
sity of  personal  superintendence,  impious  as  it  may  seem  to  the  devout, 
has  been  attempted  by  materialistic  philosophy ;  indeed,  the  Nebular 
hypothesis,  as  propounded  by  Laplace,  and  evolution,  as  expounded 
by  Spencer,  seem  not  to  require  the  mediation  of  a  personal  Creator. 
When  Napoleon  inquired  of  Laplace  why  he  did  not  recognize  God 
in  his  Mecanique  Celeste,  his  reply  was,  "  I  have  no  need  of  such  a 
hypothesis."  However,  it  must  be  confessed  that  the  Nebular  Hy- 
pothesis and  Evolution  are  not  in  themselves  incompatible  with  the 
theistic  notion  ;  they  seem  to  be  atheistic,  and  are  employed  as  sup- 
ports of  the  atheistic  sentiment,  but  as  methods  of  the  divine  working 
in  creation  they  are  not  per  se  atheistic.  As  a  "  working  hypothesis," 
no  objection  is  made  to  the  Nebular  theory,  or  any  other  theory  ap- 
parently contrary  to  the  theistic  conception,  provided,  when  the 
experiment  of  solving  mysteries  by  it  has  been  honestly  made,  the 
result  shall  be  honestly  declared. 

Materialistic  philosophy,  in  its  eagerness  to  interpret  nature,  be- 
gins with  the  atheistic  assumption,  to  which  no  objection  is  raised, 
provided  it  will  reject  the  assumption  when  required  by  the  facts 
so  to  do.  Christian  thinkers,  quite  as  anxious  to  read  nature,  be- 
gin with  the  theistic  assumption  to  which  materialists  should  not 
object,  provided  its  friends  will   agree  to  abandon   it  so  soon  as  its 


ORDER  OF  THE  PHENOMENAL   WORLD.  459 

unavailability  is  discovered.  Truth  gains  a  double  advantage  by  the 
double  assumptions  ;  it  will  be  vindicated  finally  by  both,  and  as 
truth  is  more  important  than  any  theory,  every  theorist  should  be 
encouraged  to  press  on  to  a  conclusion,  for  truth  is  waiting  for  a 
settlement. 

How  the  worlds  were  made  is  a  mystery,  more  because  God  is  a 
mystery  than  that  matter  is  mysterious.  Understand  God,  and  his 
works  and  methods  are  understood.  It  is  because  he  is  in  shadow 
that  his  methods  are  still  obscure.  However,  the  method  of  world- 
building  may  finally  be  known,  since  he  is  becoming  better  known  ; 
it  "doth  not  yet  appear,"  we  may  now  say.  AVe  stand  ready  to  ac- 
cept any  theory  or  method,  whether  the  Nebular  hypothesis  or  any 
other,  that  is  compatible  with  the  theistic  notion,  for  Christianity  re- 
veals the  Maker  of  the  world,  even  though  it  does  not  reveal  the 
method  of  the  Maker's  activities. 

If  the  method  of  creation  is  obscure,  incomprehensible  even  to  the 
scientific  mind,  the  order  of  creation  is  transparent,  and,  as  given  in 
Genesis,  is  almost  complete.  No  scientist  has  improved  on  Moses  in 
the  discovery  of  the  plan  of  creation,  which,  beginning  with  light, 
terminates  Avith  man.  Without  extending  this  thought,  it  may  be 
stated  that  Christianity  is  both  a  key  to  the  authorship  of  the  world 
in  a  personal  Creator  and  to  the  order  pursued  by  him  in  creation. 
This  is  the  dawn  of  day  ;  this  is  an  approximate  settlement  of  the  fun- 
daviental  problenu. 

As  lower  problems  are  always  involved  in  the  higher,  and  as  the 
solution  of  the  lower  is  determined  by  the  solution  of  the  higher,  we 
may  now  proceed  to  the  lower  and  specific  questions  arising  from  the 
fact  of  a  phenomenal  world,  remembering  that  its  authorship  and 
order  have  been  defined  in  the  terms  of  the  Christian  religion. 

The  phenomenal  world  is  a  great  mystery.  He  who  undertakes 
to  define  the  essence  of  matter,  or  report  all  her  secrets,  will  be  over- 
whelmed by  the  magnitude  of  his  task,  and  probably  be  willing  to 
surrender  it  to  others  before  he  shall  have  concluded  it.  Between  a 
property  of  matter  and  the  spirit  of  matter,  or  the  law  of  its  being, 
there  is  a  wide  difference  ;  and  it  is  not  understood  that  philosophy, 
while  successful  in  detailing  the  one,  has  thrown  any  light  upon  the 
other.  Forms  of  matter  may  be  described  ;  many  of  its  laws  may 
be  enrolled  in  our  categories ;  the  beauties  of  the  physical  dress  of 
matter  may  be  discovered  ;  the  curiosities  and  combinations  of  matter 
may  be  exhibited  and  preserved  ;  but  matter  itself,  the  idea  of  mat- 
ter, the  being  of  matter,  separate  from  its  concrete  types,  eludes  the 
gaze  of  the  most  intrepid  explorer  of  nature,  and  refuses  to  ac- 
quaint man  with  its  mystery.     Does  matter  exist?     If  so,  what  is  it? 


460  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

In  the  presence  of  this  question  philosophy  is  either  dumb  or  divided 
and  confused. 

Nor  let  us  hastily  conclude  that  the  Christian  thinker  is  free  from 
embarrassment  as  he  is  asked  this  question.  Confronted  at  the  gate- 
way of  the  phenomenal  world  with  the  becoming,  or  non-being,  he 
can  not  speak  with  any  more  assurance  or  perceive  with  any  greater 
delicacy  of  vision  the  essential  spirit  of  matter ;  but  Christianity  is 
the  pass-word  to  the  inner  sanctuary  of  things,  and  by  this  he  may 
enter  and  declare  the  secrets  of  the  hidden  world.  Perhaps  not  all 
the  secrets  ;  but  such  as  are  essential  to  intellectual  comfort  he  may 
understand.  Christianity  leaves  us  not  in  total  darkness,  nor  is  na- 
ture in  an  eclipse  when  the  Sun  of  righteousness  shines  upon  it.  In 
its  light  we  see  deeper  than  forms,  we  see  more  than  properties,  we 
apprehend  more  than  laws,  we  comprehend  nature  as  the  idea  of  God 
reduced  to  physical  conditions  and  impregnated  with  his  lofty  pur- 
poses. Nature  is  a  panorama  of  divine  ideas,  or  the  reality  of  divine 
thought,  cognizable  in  visible  form.  As  Christianity  is  the  divine  idea 
itself  in  spiiitual  form,  it  is  not  unreasonable  to  anticipate  that  the 
divine  idea  in  physical  form  will  agree  with  it.  Agreement  may  be 
predicated  on  the  assumption  that  the  divine  idea  is  not  self- 
contradictory,  but  self-luminous  and  self-harmonious  ;  hence,  the  di- 
vine idea  in  nature  must  agree  with  the  divine  idea  in  Christianity,  or 
Christianity  and  nature  are  one.  This  is  the  same  thing  as  saying 
that  the  theology  of  nature  corresponds  to  the  theology  of  Christianity, 
and  that  what  one  is  in  essence  the  other  is  also,  the  only  difference 
between  them  being  the  frame- work  which  supports  them. 

Now,  if  this  view  is  correct,  Christianity  will  have  a  strong  defense 
in  nature,  and  nature  will  have  a  satisfactory  explanation  in  Christian- 
ity ;  but  it  is  not  the  value  of  the  view  that  at  this  moment  concerns 
us.  We  are  impressed  to  know  if  the  representation  of  the  relations 
of  Christianity  and  nature  is  true  ;  if  the  supernatural  and  the  natural 
are  one ;  if  either  exists  without  the  other.  Bishop  Butler's  remark- 
able treatise  on  "The  Analogy  of  Religion  to  the  Constitution  and 
Course  of  Nature "  is  suggestive  of  the  harmony,  the  kinship,  the 
identity  of  the  two  kingdoms  of  God.  His  "Analogy"  has  never 
been  answered,  because  the  facts  employed  can  not  be  disputed,  and 
the  argument  founded  on  them  is  remorselessly  logical.  In  the  analogy 
is  a  path  to  the  explanation  of  nature.  We  shall,  therefore,  walk 
therein.  Shakespeare  speaks  of  "  sermons  in  stones,"  but  there  are 
sermons  in  the  stars,  sermons  in  the  trees,  sermons  in  the  oceans,  ser- 
mons in  every  thing.  Nature  is  the  great  sermon  or  expositor  of 
Christianity,  as  Christianity  is  the  great  sermon  or  expositor  of  na- 
ture.    Christianity  is  the  apocalypse  of  natural  religion. 


DIVINE  ATTRIBUTES  SUGGESTED.  461 

By  nature  is  meant  the  phenomenal  universe,  which  includes 
space,  time,  motion,  law,  and  force,  as  well  as  the  solid  forms  of  mat- 
ter, or  that  concrete  realm  of  non-being  which  is  the  outward  expres- 
sion of  being.  Phenomena  are  illustrations  of  Christian  truths ;  this 
is  the  thought. 

Consider  space.  Like  God,  it  can  not  be  adequately  defined  ;  like 
God,  it  is  without  parts;  like  God,  it  is  everywhere,  occupied  or  un- 
occupied. Space,  then,  is  a  mirror  of  the  Infinite  so  far  forth  as  it  is 
a  suggestion  of  certain  qualities  we  attribute  to  the  Infinite.  It  does 
represent  to  human  thought  the  idea  of  omnipresence,  and  also  the 
idea  of  bodiless  spirit.  Though  it  does  this  imperfectly,  it  does  it. 
Space  is  the  allegory  of  an  infinite  idea. 

Consider  time.  The  reality  of  time  is  an  independent  philosophical 
question  ;  as  a  moral  factor,  or  as  related  to  any  truth  of  Christianity, 
it  is  the  exponent  of  the  eternity  of  God,  for  a  limited  duration  is 
possible  only  because  there  is  an  unlimited  duration  from  which  it  is 
derived.  Time  is  the  reflex  of  eternity.  This  may  not  be  satisfac- 
torily conclusive,  but  it  is  the  weakness  of  analogical  argument  in 
general  that  it  is  not  equal  to  demonstration. 

Consider  motion.  Dispensing  with  the  laws  of  motion,  the  fact 
of  motion  is  a  sign  or  proof  of  the  existence  of  some  definite  char- 
acteristic of  the  divine  Being.  It  is  inconceivable  that  there  was  a 
time  when  motion  was  not,  for  a  motionless  universe  implies  uni- 
versal inertia,  which  is  absurd.  If  there  was  a  time  when  God  only 
existed,  our  conception  of  him  requires  us  to  believe  that  he  was  active 
for  and  in  himself,  for  a  motionless  Deity  is  as  inconceivable  as  a  mo- 
tionless universe.  In  this  view  motion  is  eternal.  It  belongs  to  the 
nature  of  God,  and  a  universe  is  impossible  without  it.  This,  how- 
ever, is  not  exhaustive.  Motion  is  everywhere  perceived  or  unper- 
ceived,  felt  or  unfelt,  representing  not  only  the  ceaseless  activity  of 
the  Deity,  but  the  omnipresence  of  the  Supreme  Power.  It  is  in 
space ;  every  star  quivers  with  motion  ;  every  atom  is  a  reservoir  of 
motive  forces;  the  universe  is  in  motion,  it  is  a  motion.  This  is  the 
foreshadowing  of  the  universality  of  the  divine  Presence. 

Thus  space,  time,  and  motion  join  in  suggesting  the  attributes  of 
spirituality,  omnipresence,  and  eternity,  as  belonging  to  one  who  is 
above  all  things,  who  is  God. 

Likewise,  if  we  consider  some  of  the  laws  and  forces  of  nature, 
we  shall  find  adumbrations  of  the  attributes  of  the  Infinite,  or  reve- 
lations of  the  divine  intelligence  and  the  divine  government,  such  as 
the  preceding  did  not  suggest.  Whether  law  is  the  method  of  action, 
or  the  course  of  a  process,  or  the  sign  of  a  purpose,  certain  it  is  that 
the  laws  of  nature  are  singularly  uniform  in  action  and  always  con- 


462  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHEIS'IIANITY. 

ducive  to  specific  results.  The  laws  of  uature  are  not  failures.  In- 
terfered with,  they  may  not  accomplish  what  otherwise  would  follow, 
but  they  never  break  of  themselves. 

Gravitation  may  be  overcome,  but,  unrestrained,  it  honors  the 
center  of  the  earth  by  bowing  to  it  as  if  it  were  in  authority.  So 
stable  is  law,  and  so  reliable  are  the  forces  of  nature,  that  calcula- 
tions based  upon  them  are  not  likely  to  deceive,  unless  the  calcula- 
tions themselves  are  erroneous.  The  stability  of  law  points  to  the 
immutability  of  the  divine  character,  and  is  an  assurance  that  the 
divine  promises  will  be  fulfilled.  The  laws  of  nature  have  their 
counterpart  in  the  promises  of  the  Gospel. 

Another  analogy  or  suggestion  springs  up  at  this  point.  The  law 
of  crystallization  results  in  crystals ;  the  law  of  attraction  and  repulsion 
in  planetary  motion ;  the  law  of  capillary  attraction  in  growth ;  the 
law  of  cohesion  in  solidity  ;  and  every  other  law  fulfills  itself  in  a 
product  consistent  with  its  governing  influeuce.  This  secures  order  in 
the  universe,  and  it  expresses  the  wisdom  of  the  mind  that  devised 
it.  Law  is  wisdom.  A  divine  order,  or  a  beneficent  arrangement, 
is  as  much  a  reflection  of  the  divine  wisdom,  as  power  in  nature  is 
expressive  of  the  divine  power,  or  motion  of  the  divine  activity. 

Equally  expressive  of  some  divine  attributes  are  the  forvis  of  viat- 
ter,  which  to  us  are  antecedent  signs  of  ideal  thoughts ;  but  which 
in  themselves  are  the  products  of  the  divine  idea  respecting  matter. 
That  matter  should  assume  any  form  at  all  is  significant  of  a  former; 
but  when  it  seeks  a  variety  of  forms  the  spherical,  triangular,  and 
rectangular,  the  thinker  is  compelled  to  pause  and  inquire  the  mean- 
ing thereof.  Either  matter  at  its  own  instance  selects  a  particular 
form,  or  an  unseen  hand  puts  it  in  shape,  and  sends  it  forth  on  duty. 
Why  the  drop  of  water  prefers  the  spherical,  no  one  has  explained ; 
why  a  star  has  center  and  circumference  no  one  knows.  Matter 
runs  in  molds,  and  reappears  in  all  the  splendid  forms  of  the 
natural  world. 

It  is  the  idea  of  Thomas  Hill  that  these  forms  are  after  geometrical 
ideals,  which  borders  on  the  Pythagorean  conception  that  geometry 
is  the  content  of  nature.  To  this  suggestion,  rational  and  explicit, 
we  subscribe.  Nature  "is  the  crystallization  of  mathematical  princi- 
ples; the  phenomenal  world  is  an  algebraic  equation.  Whence  the 
principles  or  ideals  ?  Account  for  these,  and  the  mystery  is  dissolved. 
Plato,  in  contemplating  the  genesis  of  matter,  held  forth  the  doctrine 
of  "ideas"  as  the  pre-existent  condition  of  matter,  worlds,  and  being; 
that  by  ideas  the  Deity  was  governed,  and  incorporated  them  in  all 
existences ;  that  he  is  the  great  Idea  himself,  and  conformed  all  things 
to  that  idea;  hence,  unity,  beauty,  adaptation,  and  utility,   as  the 


RELATION  OF  NATURAL  AND  REVEALED  RELIGION.     463 

constituents  of  the  universe.  The  thought  of  Plato  is  magnificent,  its 
value  is  incalculable.  Ideas  imply  mind,  and  executed  ideals  imply 
intellective  action.  If  nature  is  a  concreted  ideal,  or  a  reduction  of 
thought  to  physical  form,  it  implies  intellectual  activity  on  a  stupen- 
dous scale ;  it  implies  infinite  mind.  Thus  the  forms  of  matter,  less 
important  than  the  fact  of  matter,  or  the  reality  of  being,  have  their 
explanation  in  the  Christian  doctrine  of  the  activity  of  eternal  thought, 
which  is  the  sign  of  an  infinite  mind. 

Tiie  lesson  from  color  is  a  confirmation  of  the  same  doctrine.  What 
is  color?  Is  it  a  variation  of  light?  Whence  light?  God  said  :  "Let 
light  be ;  and  light  was."  As  this  is  the  origin  of  light,  so  is  it  the  ori- 
gin of  color,  for  without  light  color  is  impossible.  Color  is  not  without 
its  uses,  is  implicit  with  a  divine  idea.  Form  is  one  source  of  beauty ; 
color  is  another,  addressing  and  refining  the  sesthetic  sense  in  man, 
and  pointing  to  the  sesthetic  attribute  in  the  divine  character.  Given 
one  color  only,  and  the  physical  world  would  be  unendurable.  Given 
seven  colors,  and  it  is  beautiful. 

The  distribution  of  color  in  nature  must  have  been  made  accord- 
ing to  a  law  in  harmony  with  the  sesthetic  sentiment,  or  according  to 
sesthetic  law.  For  instance,  the  firmament  is  blue;  the  forests  in  the 
Spring-time  are  green,  and  in  the  Autumn  turn  brown;  the  snow 
is  ivhite;  sunsets,  landscapes,  mountain  scenery,  the  fields  of  grain, 
and  gardens  of  flowers,  exhibit  color  in  all  its  variety  and  combina- 
tion, addressing  the  eye,  and  ministering  to  the  taste  of  man.  The 
CBsthetics  of  nature  signify  the  cedhetics  of  the  divine  character,  revealing 
the  beauty,  perfection,  and  harmony  of  God. 

Surely  the  relation  of  natural  and  revealed  religion  is  not  an  ac- 
cidental, much  less  an  unmeaning,  relation.  Christianity  reflects  its 
doctrines  in  nature,  and  nature,  like  a  mirror,  gives  them  back  again; 
this  is  fellowship,  this  is  unity.  The  two  are  one.  In  space,  time, 
and  motion,  we  catch  a  glimpse  of  spirituality,  omnipresence,  and 
eternity;  in  laws  and  forces  the  foreshadowings  of  infinite  wisdom 
and  a  providential  government  are  manifest ;  in  the  forms  of  matter, 
burnished  with  living  colors,  there  are  the  reflections  of  wisdom, 
beauty,  and  perfection.  Nature  is  a  confirmation  of  the  theistic  hy- 
pothesis on  which  Christianity  rests,  on  which  all  philosophic  thought 
must  eventually  rest. 

Admitting  that  nature  furnishes  a  chapter  of  facts  for  the  support 
of  the  theistic  idea,  it  is  sometimes  hinted  that  it  throws  but  little  if 
any  light  on  the  spiritual  doctrines  of  Christianity ;  or,  that  what 
constitutes  it  a  separate  and  independent  religion  has  no  confirmation 
in  the  analogies  of  nature.  To  this  suspicion  let  us  at  once  give  at- 
tention.     The    argument    from    analogy   is   worth    nothing    in    thia 


464  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

discussion  if  it  does  not  establish  faith  in  the  idiosyncrasies  of  Chris- 
tianity, or  give  support  to  those  truths  not  found  in  other  religions. 
However,  to  be  effective  analogy  must  not  be  pressed  too  far,  nor  be 
made  to  include  every  thing.  It  is  not  now  affirmed  that  nature  is  a 
reflection  or  confirmation  of  every  spiritual  truth  in  the  New  Testa- 
ment, much  less  of  all  its  facts,  although  an  elaborate  analysis  of  the 
contents  of  natural  and  revealed  religion  might  result  in  a  vindica- 
tion  of  certain  truths  supposed  hitherto  to  stand  upon  an  independent 
basis,  and  without  any  support  whatever  in  nature ;  but  it  is  affirmed 
that  nature,  as  a  wJiole,  is  an  arch  beneath  Christianity,  as  a  whole. 
The  one  is  not  contrary  to  the  other;  the  one  is  the  secret  defender 
of  the  other.  Bishop  Butler  did  not  support  every  doctrine  by  anal- 
ogy ;  nor  is  it  necessary.  If  it  can  be  shown  that  the  drift  of  natural 
truth  is  toward  spiritual  truth,  or  one  is  the  index  to  the  other,  the 
point  is  gained. 

As  we  have  seen,  nature  drifts  toward  the  theistic  hypothesis.  As 
we  shall  now  see,  the  constitution  of  the  world  is  the  index  to  the 
doctrine  of  a  moral  government,  with  all  implied  in  it,  in  the  uni- 
verse. A  drifting  of  human  government  toward  moral  government 
is  discovered  in  the  general  approval  of  virtue  and  the  general  con- 
demnation of  vice  among  men  ;  but  the  drifting  of  natural  law  toward 
moral  law  is  seen  in  the  fixed  sanctions  of  virtue  and  the  unchange- 
able condemnation  of  vice  in  the  constitution  of  things.  Man's  atti- 
tude toward  virtue  and  vice  may  be  arbitrary,  arising  from  self-interest, 
while  nature's  attitude  on  ethical  principles  is  unpartisau,  universal, 
and  eternal.  The  spirit  of  justice  is  in  the  world,  regulating,  or  sug- 
gesting the  regulation  of  affiiirs,  according  to  the  principle  of  equity. 
Whence  came  it?  Back  of  education,  back  of  governmental  policies, 
back  even  of  religious  impulses,  must  the  searcher  go  for  the  genesis 
of  the  spirit  and  principle  of  justice.  In  spirit  the  government  of  the 
world  is  a  picture  of  exact  justice ;  it  is  the  perfect  adjustment  of  re- 
lations or  conformity  to  an  ideal  of  order.  Justice,  as  a  principle,  is 
as  inherent  in  the  constitution  of  things  as  is  the  ethical  idea  itself. 
It  is  as  fundamental  to  nature,  to  the  reality,  the  regularity,  and 
order  of  the  physical  universe,  as  it  is  to  the  religious  spirit,  that  is 
to  say,  religion.  What  is  justice?  Defining  it  with  reference  to 
men,  Plato  says  it  is  non-interference  with  other  men's  affairs,  wliich  is 
deeper  than  it  seems.  It  implies  abstinence  from  wrong,  which  in 
its  inner  content  implies  the  doing  of  right.  Justice  is  right-doing, 
but  right-doing  involves  liberty,  order,  fraternity,  equality,  humanity; 
but  this  is  the  ethical  concept  transferred  from  nature  to  society. 
Nature  abhors  wrong-doing;  it  never  does  a  wrong.  Nature  is  the 
synonym  of*  right-doing,  involving  the  concrete  ideas  of  the  ethical 


NATURAL   IMAGES  OF  MORAL  IDEAS.  465 

concept.  Likewise,  truth  is  one  of  the  symbols  of  nature.  Myste-  , 
rious  nature  is,  but  never  deceptive.  It  is  not  a  huge  lie.  Its  laws 
are  the  images  of  truth;  its  forces  are  truth-conserving  forces;  its 
forms  are  the  truthful  representations  of  divine  ideals.  Nature  is  re- 
liable. Nature  acknowledges  responsibility  to  a  Supreme  Ruler,  and 
obeys  every  mandate.  Hence,  the  idea  of  government  springs  from 
the  faithfulness  and  integrity  of  nature. 

In  like  manner,  virtue,  courage,  honesty,  and  goodness,  are  thor- 
oughly portrayed  in  the  unwritten  constitution  of  the  world,  suggest- 
ing the  primary  ideas  of  authority,  honor,  sobriety,  and  righteousness, 
in  the  moral  government  that  is  seen  to  prevail. 

This  analogy,  the  natural  foreshadowing  the  moral,  is  one  of  the 
most  formidable  the  materialist  confronts.  Everywhere  the  proclama- 
tion of  justice,  truth,  and  righteousness  rings  in  his  ears;  everywhere 
the  terror  of  penalty  rolls  across  the  path  of  the  wrong-doer;  and 
continually  the  thought  of  responsibility  weighs  down  the  heart  of  the 
obdurate,  and  checks  him  in  contemplated  crime.  It  is  the  voice  of 
nature  speaking  through  her  laws,  forces,  and  forms,  the  moral  truths 
of  God ;  it  is  nature  certifying  to  the  double  doctrine  of  rewards  and 
punishments  in  the  moral  realm.  If  a  natural  world  suggests  a  moral 
world,  and  a  natural  government  a  moral  government,  then  natural 
penalties  and  blessings  suggest  moral  penalties  and  rewards.  If  the 
analogy  is  worth  any  thing,  it  is  worth  this  much ;  but  if  it  is  worth 
so  much  it  is  a  conformation  of  just  what  Christianity  itself  foretells 
as  the  issues  of  moral  government. 

Another  great  doctrine  of  Christianity  is  the  removal  of  evil  by 
redemptive  agencies,  the  chief  of  which  is  the  personal  influence  and 
power  of  Jesus  Christ.  Does  nature  reflect  this  doctrine?  Here  the 
analogy  has  its  limitations,  but  it  is  not  wanting  in  satisfactory  ele- 
ments, or  in  direct  reference  to  the  Christian  idea.  The  trend  of 
nature  is  toward  the  doctrine,  even  the  method  of  removal  being 
foreshadowed  in  the  course  of  its  development.  If  it  does  not  point 
to  Christ  as  underneath  all  things,  it  does  sustain  the  idea  of  sacrifice 
as  the  condition  of  growth,  prosperity,  life ;  if  it  does  not  foreshadow 
a  person  on  the  altar,  it  points  to  altar  and  executioner ;  if  it  does 
not  proclaim  atonement  by  law,  it  practices  it  as  the  essential  of  its 
history,  and  prepares  the  way  for  its  holier  exhibition  in  religion. 
Herbert  Spencer  insists  on  the  evanescence  of  evil  through  evolution- 
ary processes;  declares  that  nature  proposes,  by  methods  entirely  its 
own,  to  expel  evil  as  an  incumbrance ;  and  believes  that  righteousness 
will  some  time  prevail.  This  is  the  objective  ideal  of  the  Gospel,  to 
be  realized,  however,  not  through  natural  agency,  but  by  Gospel 
agency.     By  its  evolutionary  process,  entirely  inadequate  in   itself, 

30 


466  PHILOSOPHY  A^D  CHRISTIANITY. 

nature  typifies  the  redemptive  process,  which  is  all-sufficient  for  the 
purpose.  Evolution  is  the  promise,  or  the  sign  of  redemption  in 
Jesus  Christ. 

Christianity  posits  the  extinction  of  evil  on  the  vital  influence  of 
the  personal  sacrifice  of  the  Son  of  God.  Is  this  the  doctrine  of 
nature?  Sacrifice  is  a  doctrine  of  nature,  so  vital  to  nature  that  it 
could  not  survive  without  it ;  hence  its  religious  bearing.  Without 
light,  atmosphere,  and  soil,  the  vegetable  world  must  perish,  which  is 
the  same  as  saying  that  the  vegetable  woi'ld  lives  at  the  expense  of 
other  worlds.  Without  sacrifice  neither  tree,  nor  flower,  nor  grain, 
nor  fruit  had  been,  nor  will  be.  In  like  manner  the  animal  world 
either  preys  upon  itself,  or  upon  the  vegetable  world ;  every  animal 
lives  at  the  expense  of  some  other  animal,  or  some  other  form  of  life. 
To  a  still  greater  extent  man  is  dependent  on  all  the  worlds  around 
him.  He  can  not  live  alone.  He  is  not  independent  of  any  world. 
He  lives  because  other  worlds  lie  at  his  feet  dead.  Every  living 
thing  is  indebted  to  some  other  living  thing  for  life.  There  is  nothing 
that  is  adequate  to  life  alone.  Life  means  that  something  has  died. 
The  thread  of  sacrifice  runs  through  nature,  is  found  in  every  department, 
and  links  the  kingdoms  together.  An  evolutionary  system  of  redemption, 
without  sacrifice  as  its  chief  corner-stone,  would  not  be  in  harmony 
with  nature.  The  redemptive  system,  as  wrought  out  in  Jesus  Christ, 
harmonizes  with  the  sacrificial  order  of  nature ;  in  one  a  Thing  is 
sacrificed  ;  in  the  other  a  Person ;  in  one  physical  blessings  result ; 
in  the  other  spiritual  life. 

So  far.  Nature  is  in  accord  with  the  teachings  of  Christianity. 
The  two  agree  touching  fundamental  truths,  and  this  is  all  that  is 
necessary.  Agreement  or  non-agreement  on  other  lines  will  not 
affect  the  analogy  herein  exhibited,  or  the  argument  drawn  from  it. 
The  agreement  established  is  almost  equal  to  a  demonstration,  for  it 
is  cumulative,  gathering  strength  as  it  is  unfolded,  and  substantiating 
the  last  truth  with  more  certainty  than  the  first.  Beginning  with  the 
theistic  hypothesis  it  confirms  the  Jewish  faith  ;  ending  with  atone- 
ment in  Jesus  Christ  it  confirms  the  Christian  faith.  By  virtue  of 
these  analogies,  nature  has  a  moral  explanation  in  Christianity,  as  by 
virtue  of  the  theistic  notion  it  has  a  philosophical  explariation  in 
Christianity. 

If  it  is  suggested  that  the  so-called  analogies  or  teachings  of 
nature  were  not  observed  in  other  ages,  and  have  not  impressed  the 
scientific  thinkers  of  modern  times,  and,  therefore,  the  inferences  de- 
duced are  to  be  received  with  reservation,  it  is  sufficient  to  reply  that 
this  does  not  destroy  the  force  of  such  teachings  or  contradict  the 
analogies.     The  pulpit  sometimes  alludes  to  the  common  fact  of  day 


UNITY  OF  SUBSTANCE.  467 

succeeding  uight  as  a  fair  illustration  or  hint  of  the  resurrection,  and 
it  makes  not  against  it  that  Solon  and  Cicero  never  drew  such  an  in- 
ference from  the  fact.  The  rejection  of  an  analogy  must  be 
grounded  in  something  better  than  the  rejecter's  ignorance  of  the 
matters  involved.  It  is  confessed  that  the  interpretation  of  nature  is 
not  easily  made ;  without  the  light  of  Christianity  it  is  questionable 
if  it  can  be  understood  in  any  true  or  lofty  sense.  The  discovery  of 
an  analogy  is  due  to  an  acquaintance  with  both  nature  and  religion, 
and  can  not  arise  from  a  knowledge  of  one  only.  Analogy,  like  com- 
parison, implies  two  objects,  and  it  can  not  be  drawn  except  as  the 
person  drawing  it  understands  both  objects.  If  Solon  did  not  see  any 
analogy  in  the  unfolding  of  the  butterfly  from  the  chrysalis  to  the 
resurrection  ;  if  Cicero  saw  no  hint  of  it  in  the  re-appearance  of  day 
after  night,  it  chiefly  proves  that  while  they  were  familiar  with  one 
set  of  facts  they  knew  nothing  of  the  other;  that  is,  they  knew  the 
physical  facts,  but  were  ignorant  of  the  resurrection.  Hence,  they 
could  not  draw  an  analogy.  Given  both  sides  and  analogy  is  possible, 
pertinent.  As  an  equation  is  possible  with  two  sides,  so  analogy  is 
possible  when  both  objects  are  understood.  The  analogy  of  nature  to 
Christianity  must,  therefore,  remain  .  an  indubitable  evidence  of  the 
truth  of  the  latter,  and  a  key  to  the  secrets  of  the  former. 

A  more  specific  study  of  the  phenomenal  world  is  now  required, 
and  is  possible  in  the  light  of  Christianity.  Let  us  contemplate 
the  universe  as  a  whole.  There  is  one  universe,  and  one  only. 
Worlds  many,  systems  of  worlds  complex,  laws  governing  them 
numberless,  but  after  all  one  univei'se,  identical  in  subtance,  motion, 
spirit,  purpose.  Astronomy  is  a  wilderness  of  facts,  but  order  reigns 
throughout  the  vast  domain  of  the  firmament,  and  points  to  a  single 
organizing  mind,  and  to  a  single  fulfilling  purpose.  The  larger  the 
realm  of  the  worlds  the  more  amazing  the  thought  of  its  unity,  but 
it  grows  upon  the  mind  as  the  proofs  of  it  become  conspicuous.  How 
unity  is  consistent  with  such  far-reaching  complexity ;  what  the  idea 
of  unity  comprehends  or  foreshadows  ;  what  general  laws  contribute 
to  the  fulfillment  of  the  single  programme  evidently  being  carried  out 
in  the  universe  ;  in  what  unity  actually  consists ;  these  are  phases  of 
the  subject  that  press  themselves  forward  for  attention. 

What  is  the  unity  of  the  universe  ?  It  is  a  unity  of  substance.  The 
proof  is  from  chemistry.  Of  the  seventy  elements  of  which  matter 
is  composed,  the  chemists  report  not  more  than  twelve  which  are 
common,  and  of  the  twelve  only  three  or  four  are  universal,  and 
even  these  they  are  disposed  to  reduce  to  one.  The  one  may  be, 
must  be,  complex,  but  it  is  one  evidently.  If  the  universe  is  the 
procession   of  one   substance,  so  divided,  energized,  and   manipulated 


468  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

by  divine  wisdom  as  to  produce  the  heavens  and  the  earth,  and  it  is 
found  in  all  organic  and  inorganic  bodies,  the  interpretation  of 
nature  is  simplitied  and  the  theistic  notion  of  Christianity  scien- 
tifically confirmed.  To  this  conception  of  unity  any  objection 
founded  on  the  variety  in  nature  must  be  regarded  superficial,  for 
variety  is  compatible  with  unity.  Carbon  is  the  principal  element  of 
diamond,  graphite,  and  charcoal,  substances  so  difi'erent  as  seemingly 
to  contradict  the  notion  of  unity,  but  not  different  after  all.  Fixing 
the  mind  on  the  varieties  of  the  human  race  one  must  pronounce 
against  unity  until  one  learns  that  in  instinct,  blood,  social  impulse, 
and  religious  desire  the  human  family  is  a  uuit.  "Of  one  blood," 
says  Paul,  all  nations  were  made.  The  unity  of  the  race  is  a  unity 
of  blood,  a  "physiological  unit,"  to  quote  Herbert  Spencer. 

If  variety  makes  not  against  unity,  it  may  be  supposed  that  the 
absolute  differences  between  the  kingdoms  of  nature  can  not  be  recon- 
ciled with  the  theory  of  the  "  unit;"  as  the  animal  kingdom  is  ap- 
parently in  no  wise  related  to  the  mineral  kiugdom  ;  an  elephant  can 
not  be  one  with  the  emerald.  To  undertake  to  reconcile  differences 
between  specific  objects  might  be  entertaining,  but  it  is  unnecessary, 
for  if  it  can  be  demonstrated  that  all  nature,  with  its  subdivisions, 
kingdoms,  ranks,  originated  from  one  substance,  the  problem  of  dif- 
ference is  settled  with  it.  Difference  is  another  word  for  variety. 
Nature  had  a  beginning ;  if  a  single  beginning,  then  it  is  proper  to 
speak  of  a  physical  unit  containing  the  possibilities  of  the  universe. 
Chemistry  inclines  to  a  physical  unit,  and  has  gone  far  enough  to  in- 
timate that  hydrogen  is  that  unit.  This  is  getting  back  to  a  first 
principle,  to  the  "beginning." 

If  hydrogen  is  the  siihstance-unit  of  the  physical  universe,  all 
things,  theoretically  at  least,  must  be  resolvable  into  hydrogen,  or 
into  elements  kindred  to  it.  This  will  explain  the  emerald  and  the 
elephant,  the  eagle  and  a  grain  of  sand.  Inquiring  into  stellar  con- 
ditions the  idea  of  unity  has  received  such  encouragement  as  prac- 
tically to  be  indorsed  by  all  thinkers,  materialistic  and  Christian, 
Hydrogen  is  a  constituent  of  the  earth,  the  sun,  and  all  the  stars. 
Sodium  enters  into  the  composition  of  all  the  worlds.  Iron,  magne- 
sium, and  calcium  abound  in  all  the  orbs.  "  The  dust  of  our  streets," 
says  Winchell,  "  is  ignited  to  starry  suns  in  Arcturus  and  the  Pleiades." 
The  scientific  proclamation  of  the  substantial  unity  of  the  worlds 
is  an  advance  step  toward  the  resolution  of  the  problem  of  the  origin 
of  the  worlds,  for  one  in  substance  they  must  have  had  a  similar  origin. 

Passing  to  the  harmony  of  forces  in  nature,  the  observer  will  be 
justified  in  assuming  a  unity  of  purpose  in  the  universe,  which  has 
some  bearing  on  Christian  truth,  as   we  shall  shortly  see.     Storms, 


NATURE  A  SYMBOL  OF  HUMANITY.  469 

earthquakes,  accidents,  and  diseases,  in  the  judgment  of  the  pessi- 
mist, are  proofs  of  a  disorderly  government,  of  a  government  without 
ends.  If  the  world  has  a  ruler,  he  is  a  tyrant,  remorselessly  crushing 
the  majority,  and  delighting  in  the  agony  of  his  subjects.  Pessimism 
is  dyspeptic  philosophy  ;  it  looks  at  one  side  only,  and  does  not  see 
that  clearly.  Admitting  friction  as  the  result  of  a  play  of  forces,  the 
total  result  is  harmony  ;  admitting  suffering  in  the  realm  of  nature,  its 
beneficent  use  is  moral  elevation  ;  admitting  conflict,  the  stability  of 
nature  is  assured.  Nature  exists  for  ends  ;  either  for  itself,  or  for 
man,  or  for  its  Maker.  Descending  to  the  lowest  mechanical  view 
of  nature,  that  it  exists  for  itself  and"  is  unrelated  to  man,  here  is 
the  idea  of  purpose,  not  high  purpose,  but  purpose  surely.  To  ac- 
cept such  a  teleology,  however,  one  must  know  first  that  nature  is 
conscious  of  such  an  end,  otherwise  the  end  is  valueless.  Nature  is 
beautiful,  but  if  beautiful  for  herself  only,  she  must  be  consciously 
beautiful,  which  can  not  be  admitted.  The  ends  of  nature  are  be- 
yond herself;  she  exists  not  for  herself  Nature  is  because  man  is,  be- 
cause God  is. 

The  relation  of  nature  to  man  is  a  teleological  relation  ;  other- 
wise nature  is  absolutely  dumb,  barren  of  interest,  a  clod.  In  the 
spirit  of  self-flattery  man  will  insist  that  the  earth  was  made  solely 
for  himself;  but  he  remembers  that  the  first  man,  representing  the 
race,  was  commanded  to  conquer  the  earth  and  exercise  dominion 
over  it.  It  is  beneath  him  ;  it  is  his  footstool ;  it  is  his  servant ;  it  is 
to  minister  to  him.  Its  beauty  and  bounty  are  for  him  ;  the  mount- 
ains rise  and  the  oceans  roll  for  him ;  the  sun  shines  and  the  earth 
rotates  because  he  is  here  ;  the  soil  yields  its  harvests  and  the  trees  bear 
fruits  because  he  desires  them.  The  subordination  of  nature  to  hu- 
manity, or  the  ministry  of  the  phenomenal  world  to  the  development 
of  humanity,  is  one  of  the  revelations  of  Christianity,  placing  man 
and  nature  in  right  relations  and  for  worthy  ends. 

Nor  is  this  a  full  expression  of  the  teleology  of  nature.  Every 
man  is  related  to  some  "  district"  in  nature,  as  Emerson  intimates; 
that  is,  one  being  a  botanist  in  spirit,  he  will  find  botany  in  nature  ; 
another  being  a  zoologist,  he  will  find  zoology ;  one  a  chemist,  chem- 
istry will  appear.  Whatever  the  mind  is  there  will  b«  a  field  in 
nature  to  correspond  to  it  and  minister  to  it.  In  this  sense  man  is  a 
representative  of  nature,  or  nature  is  but  humanity  concreted  in  an- 
other form.  Nature  is  the  symbol  of  mind ;  it  is  the  exponent  of 
thought.  Without  mind,  nature  is  impossible.  The  two  are  counter- 
parts ;  one  fits  the  other  because  one  is  the  mirror  of  the  other.  Nature 
stands  for  man  ;  man  stands  for  nature.  Humanity  emphasizes  itself  in 
nature,  as  Christianity  reflects  itself  in  the  laws  and  forms  of  matter. 


470  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

To  stop  here,  however,  would  fall  short  of  an  exhaustive  teleological 
interpretation  of  nature,  which  exists  not  for  man  alone.  Related  to 
him  as  nature  is,  the  exponent  of  his  being,  as  we  have  seen,  never- 
theless nature's  highest  end  is  the  glorification  of  its  divine  author. 
If  it  represent  human  thought,  it  also  Represents  divine  thought ;  if 
it  is  the  symbol  of  the  human  mind,  it  is  the  counterpart  of  the  divine 
mind.  Nature  is  the  outcome  of  a  divine  plan  framed  in  the  begin- 
ning, and  working  for  divine  results.  The  vast  universe  is  rushing 
on  in  fulfillment  of  a  stupendous  plan — one  plan  harmonious  and  con- 
sistent throughout  its  labyrinth  of  details  ;  one  plan  that  embraces  the 
stars  and  protects  the  sparrow ;  one  plan  that  belts  Saturn,  turns  the 
Euphrates  from  its  channel,  and  pricks  Vesuvius  into  flame ;  one  plan 
that  guides  a  leaf  in  its  fall,  gives  Niagara  its  brim,  and  tosses  the 
rain-drop  from  the  cloud.  God  is  in  nature ;  nature  is  the  arcana  of 
divine  thoughts.  Nature  stands  for  God  ;  God  .stands  for  Nature.  In 
its  ambassadorial  capacity  Nature  is  human  and  divine,  representing 
the  character  of  the  one  and  the  will  of  the  other. 

In  world-building  the  ideals,  whether  of  forms,  laws,  or  constit- 
uents, were  few,  perhaps  reducible  to  one,  just  as  all  substances  are 
one  and  all  purposes  but  developments  of  one  purpose.  A  unity  of 
ideal  is,  therefore,  next  in  order.  To  explain  :  We  cite  the  form  of 
a  planet,  which  is  spherical.  This  is  the  form  of  all  the  worlds,  the 
asteriods,  the  comets,  the  firmament  itself ;  it  is  likewise  the  form  of 
their  orbits  ;  motion  itself  is  largely  circular  ;  and  even  small  things, 
as  a  drop  of  water,  the  human  eye,  a  tree,  a  flower,  observe  with 
some  variation  the  regulation  form.  Even  the  laws  of  nature  con- 
serve the  spherical  tendency,  as  falling  lead  turns  into  shot.  Evi- 
dently the  mathematical  idea  of  the  divine  mind  is  the  spheroid, 
which  involves  orbits,  attraction  and  repulsion,  distances,  harmonies, 
all  that  astronomy  contains,  all  that  the  multiplied  sciences  can  reveal. 

Another  ideal  is  the  stability  of  species  under  which  the  animal 
kingdom  has  grown  up  with  definite  limitations,  as  to  number  and 
distinct  lines,  as  to  difference  and  separation.  One  species  can  not 
merge  into  another  ;  it  either  dies  or  remains  forever  separate.  God's 
ideal  can  not  be  broken  or  obscured  ;  it  stands  out  plainly  in  the  his- 
tory of  the,  animal  creation.  Going  back  no  further  than  the  infu- 
soria, animal  life  has  evolved  in  a  regular  and  undisturbed  order, 
according  to  law  and  within  its  originally  prescribed  limitations. 
Scientific  efl!brts  to  break  down  the  barriers  have  resulted  in  failure, 
and  established  the  reign  of  law.  So  the  vegetable  kingdom  is  an 
evolution,  according  to  the  law  that  like  shall  produce  like,  as  the 
oak  must  produce  oak.  The  fig-tree  can  not  produce  olive  berries ; 
like  can  not  produce  unlike.     Evolution  is  nothing  but  the  ideal  work- 


NATURE  ANTI-POLYTHEISTIC.  471 

ing  itself  out  in  the  law  of  like  producing  like,  securing  stability,  order, 
and  progress  in  the  different  realms  of  nature. 

In  the  generalization  of  the  universe,  a  specific  ideal  of  form  gov- 
erned the  divine  mind  ;  and  in  the  particularization  of  earth-life,  a 
specific  ideal  of  law  was  in  operation.  Development  is  wholly  after 
ideals — can  not  proceed  without  them.  In  any  event,  unity  is  the 
result.  Of  this  unity  in  the  manifold,  a  unity  toward  which  all  de- 
velopment tends,  and  which  embraces  all  things,  we  must  make 
something,  because  it  means  something.  Perplexed  a  moment  over 
it,  Christianity  comes  to  our  relief,  interpreting  it  in  a  beautiful  and 
religious  way,  and  solving  all  the  j^roblems  growing  out  of  it  without 
complications  or  tedious  processes.  On  all  its  pages  it  proclaims  the 
existence  of  one  God,  the  Maker  of  all  worlds,  ascribing  to  him  all 
power,  wisdom,  and  goodness,  and  revealing  him  in  his  personal  rela- 
tions to  the  smallest  things  that  exist.  Now,  if  the  universe  were 
made  to  reaffirm  this  doctrine — if  its  specific  teleological  aim  were  to 
establish  the  divine  existence,  it  seems  that  it  succeeds  perfectly. 
The  unity  of  the  universe,  whether  considered  as  to  substance,  pur- 
pose, or  ideal  law,  is  a  vindication  of  the  monotheistic  conception  of 
the  sacred  Scriptures.  Everywhere  in  the  empire  of  nature,  the  im- 
pression of  a  master  mind  is  visible.  Whatever  the  variety  of  forms 
or  complexity  of  forces ;  whatever  the  details  of  organic  and  inorganic 
manifestations  ;  however  mysterious  the  laws  of  activity  and  growth, — 
the  intelligent  observer  always  concludes  on  the  unity  of  the  supreme 
or  presiding  genius  of  creation.  Polytheism  he  rejects,  because  nature 
nowhere  teaches  it.  Nature  is  the  Testament  he  reads,  and,  reading, 
he  believes  in  one  God. 

The  unity  of  substance — of  stars  and  specks  of  granite,  of  suns 
and  shells  and  blades  of  grass,  of  Neptune  and  the  earth — how  was 
it  ^possible  if  gods  many  were  on  thrones  ?  From  one  God  came  one 
universe,  and  one  universe  from  one  substance ;  this  is  harmony,  this  is 
truth.  Equally  decisive  is  the  unity  of  purpose  in  the  manifold,  for 
from  a  many-centered  source  must  issue  many-formed  plans ;  but  one- 
ness of  mind  is  compatible  with  oneness  of  purpose.  The  unity  of 
ideal,  or  the  organized  development  of  the  universe,  according  to  a 
single  ideal — how  was  this  possible  if  two  supreme  powers  were  in 
command?  Either  the  universe  is  mindless,  or  one  supreme  mind 
dictated  the  phenomenal  world.  Were  the  former  true,  we  should 
be  sorry  to  know  it ;  were  the  former  true,  it  could  not  be  known, 
for  the  appearances  of  nature  are  against  it.  The  unity  of  the  universe 
is  the  phenomenal  sign  of  the  unity  of  God.  From  this  conclusion  there 
is  no  escape,  either  in  religion  or  philosophy;  to  this  truth  both  must 
forever  cling. 


472  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

Next,  the  beauty  of  nature  has  a  very  satisfactory  explanation  in 
Christianity.  The  relation  of  the  sublime  to  religion,  or  of  religion 
to  the  beautiful,  is  acknowledged ;  but  the  explanation  of  the  relation 
is,  as  heretofore  given,  philosophical,  rather  than  religious.  The 
word  "beauty"  includes  the  total  effect  of  order,  form,  proportion, 
harmony — every  thing  that  goes  to  make  up  the  idea  itself,  or  con- 
tributes to  the  impression  of  the  sublime.  An  object  may  be  beauti- 
ful in  form  only,  or  grand  from  its  magnitude,  or  attractive  from  its 
delicacy  and  minuteness.  Yosemite  Valley  turns  the  traveler  into  a 
worshiper ;  Niagara  Falls  subdues  the  visitor  into  silence ;  an  Autumn 
leaf  speaks  eloquently  of  approaching  age,  and  mellows  the  spirit  into 
sobriety  and  humility ;  a  rose  inspires  a  botanist  to  classify  it  and  an 
artist  to  paint  it ;  and  unsesthetic  minds  can  hardly  resist  the  charm 
of  a  sunset,  or  the  loveliness  of  a  landscape,  or  the  grandeur  of  the 
heavens.  Matter,  through  its  form,  or  qualities,  or  relations,  ad- 
dresses the  sesthetic  nature  of  man  and  satisfies  it.  The  sesthetic 
faculty  in  man  is  proof  of  the  sesthetic  world  external  to  inan. 
Thomas  Starr  King  regarded  materialism  as  vicious,  in  that  it  brushes 
the  halo  from  nature  and  shaves  the  twdnkle  from  the  stars.  If  the 
idea  of  God  is  repugnant  to  materialism,  it  is  not  surprising  that  any 
striking  evidence  of  that  idea  is  also  repugnant  to  materialism.  This 
is  the  turning-point  in  the  thought :  materialism  shuts  its  eye  to  the 
beautiful,  or  rather,  has  no  eye  for  the  sublime  in  nature,  while 
Christianity  appropriates  it,  discovering  in  a  decorated  universe  an 
additional  proof  of  the  mighty  God.  Jesus  saw  in  the  lily  more 
beauty  than  in  the  gorgeous  vestments  of  Solomon. 

The  idea  of  the  grand,  the  sublime,  is  congenial  to  Christianity ; 
it  glows  with  the  supernatural;  now  and  then  a  miracle  bursts  forth 
•from  its  mysteries,  and  wonders  multiply  with  its  revelations.  The 
beautiful  in  nature  is  matched  by  the  beautiful  in  Christianity ;  Jhe 
wonders  of  nature,  by  the  wonders  of  Christianity;  the  sublime  of 
the  natural,  by  the  sublime  of  the  spiritual  and  heavenly.  The 
beautiful  in  the  one  is  the  key  to  the  beautiful  in  the  other. 

The  interpretation  of  nature  is  not  complete.  In  these  pages  we 
have  frequently  referred  to  the  laws  and  forces  of  the  phenomenal 
world,  as  if  they  had  an  independent  existence — as  if  they  stood  apart 
from  matter,  but  were  incorporated  with  it  as  the  condition  of  physical 
government.  Given  an  explanation  of  natural  law^s,  and  nature 
itself,  so  far  forth  as  it  is  worth  considering,  is  explained.  One 
thing  is  certain,  that  a  knowledge  of  these  law^s  has  been  but  slowly 
obtained,  and  not  all  are  yet  understood.  Perhaps  the  future  will 
bring  to  light  laws  of  which  we  now  have  no  thought.  Whether  new 
laws  will   be  added   to  the  list  or  not,  it  is  a  singular  fact  that  the 


INTIMACY  OF  THE  NATURAL  AND  SPIRITUAL.         473 

laws  now  recognized  were  discovered  by  believers  in  God,  and  not  by- 
infidels,  atheists,  rationalists,  or  materialists.  This  is  a  triumph  of 
Christianity  in  a  new  field,  and  in  a  new  and  unexpected  way. 
This  statement  may  be  denied  or  be  regarded  as  too  exclusive,  but 
we  challenge  the  materialist  to  overthrow  it  by  proof  of  the  contrary. 
Newton  discovered  the  law  of  gravitation  ;  Franklin  gave  us  electricity 
in  bottles;  both  Avere  believers  in  God.  Materialists  and  scientists 
opposed  to  Christian  theology  have  discovered  facts  and  announced 
theories ;  but  we  are  now  speaking  of  laws.  Prof  Tyudall  never 
discovered  a  law.  Darwin  suggested  the  ' '  law  "  of  the  survival  of 
the  fittest,  but  it  is  a  theoty.  liackel  constructs  theories,  and  oflfers 
them  as  laws.  Looking  at  the  list  of  those  Avho  have  revealed  laws, 
the  names  of  atheists  and  materialists  will  be  conspicuously  absent. 

Now,  this  means  something.  It  looks  as  if  it  means  that  Chris- 
tianity qualifies  the  scientist  for  discovery,  and  materialism  disqualifies 
for  such  work.  It  looks  as  if  God  has  committed  the  revelation  of 
the  secrets  of  his  universe  to  those  who  are  in  sympathy  with  him- 
self, just  as  he  committed  the  truths  of  his  spiritual  kingdom  to  those 
who  believed  in  him.  Nature,  opaque  and  reserved  to  those  who  see 
not  the  divine  foot-prints  in  her  paths,  turns  lovingly  to  those  who 
believe  in  her  divine  authorship,  and  pours  forth  into  their  hands  the 
hidden  treasures  of  her  kingdom.  If  this  be  true,  then  Christianity 
and  nature  are  on  intimate  terms,  the  precise  character  of  their 
relationship  being  hitherto  a  matter  of  conjecture,  but  now  the 
subject  of  revelation. 

Socrates,  discerning  the  intimacy  of  the  natural  and  spiritual 
worlds,  said  that  the  laws  below  are  sisters  of  those  above ;  Bacon, 
more  practical,  but  keen-sighted  enough,  said  that  nature  and  truth 
are  like  print  and  seal ;  and  Swedenborg,  mystical  to  the  extreme, 
and  seeing  in  things  terrestrial  the  symbol  of  things  celestial,  invented 
a  system  of  correspondences  intended  to  express  the  hidden  relation- 
ship ;  and  recently,  Henry  Drummond  has  sought  to  establish  the 
identity  of  natural  and  spiritual  laws,  or  that  the  spiritual  was  pro- 
jected into  the  natural,  and  rules  all  phenomena.  In  common  with 
the  above,  Fourier,  a  French  socialistic,  styles  social  force  as  Passional 
Attraction,  and  regards  the  "Newtonian  principle  of  attraction  appli- 
cable to  the  social  and  mental  worlds."  In  these  theories,  Ave  see  a 
disposition  to  link  the  natural  and  the  spiritual,  and  to  explain  one 
by  the  other.  To  explain  the  spiritual  by  the  natural  might  land  us 
in  materialism  ;  to  explain  the  natural  by  the  spiritual  will  surely 
open  up  Christianity  to  our  contemplation  ;  and,  so  far  forth  as  these 
theories  are  an  attempt  to  explain  the  lower  by  the  higher,  they 
deserve  approval,  and,  perhaps,  should  be  adopted. 


474  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

The  theory  of  the  identity  of  natural  and  spiritual  laws,  as  pro- 
pounded by  Drummond,  can  not  be  dismissed  by  materialism  as 
conjecture,  or  by  theology  as  revolutionary,  for  it  is  of  the  nature  of 
a  revelation.  The  ground-thought  of  the  theory  is  the  naturalness  of 
the  supernatural  and  the  superuaturalness  of  the  natural,  or  the  unity 
of  the  natural  and  spiritual  worlds,  which  is  a  great  if  not  a  true 
thought,  and  to  be  candidly  considered,  whether  accepted  or  rejected. 
If  natural  laws  are  ' '  blood  relations  "  of  the  spiritual  laws,  the  mys- 
tery of  the  universe  disappears,  or  deepens  into  the  supernatural, 
which,  as  Christianity  is  supernatural,  must  tend  to  confirm  it.  "Law 
in  the  visible,"  says  Drummond,  "is  the  invisible  in  the  visible." 
The  spiritual  world  existed  first;  the  natural  world  was  created  in 
its  image ;  the  laws  of  the  higher  were  let  down  for  governmental 
purposes  into  the  lower.  Hence,  while  the  higher  explains  the  lower, 
the  lower  may  be  the  key  to  the  higher.  Gravitation,  biogenesis, 
growth,  death,  and  life,  have  their  counterparts  in  the  spiritual  world ; 
more,  they  are  spiritual  laws  transferred  to  the  natural  sphere.  Drum- 
mond resists  the  suggestion  that  possibly  natural  laws  are  analogous 
to  spiritual  laws,  by  saying  "it  is  not  a  question  of  analogy,  but  of 
identity."  The  entire  code  of  natural  laws,  embracing  chemical 
aflSnity,  crystallization,  capillary  attraction,  action  and  reaction,  re- 
flection, refraction,  and  combustion,  is  a  transcript  of  laws  that  ob- 
tain in  the  spiritual  world,  or  were  initiated  into  existence  in  the 
realm  of  the  supernatural. 

Such  is  the  theory.  Much  may  be  said  in  its  favor ;  it  is  on  the 
side  of  Christianity  and  a  thunder-blow  to  materialism.  If  the  theory 
is  true  the  natural  and  spiritual  Avorlds  are  one,  and  need  not  be 
considered  apart ;  they  are  one  in  their  government,  one  in  law.  Ma- 
terialism admits  the  unity  of  the  physical  universe,  but  accord- 
ing to  this  theory  and  under  the  principle  of  continuity  the  natural 
and  spiritual  are  one.  The  two  are  hemispheres;  the  seen  and  the 
unseen  are  one  world. 

Prof.  Drummond  urges  that  in  this  view  religion  has  a  new  "cre- 
dential," a  "new  basis,"  being  supported  scientifically  as  hitherto  it 
has  been  supported  dogmatically.  This,  we  think,  is  true,  and  is 
good  reason  for  accepting  it.  While  religion  can  thus  be  made  to  rest 
upon  a  scientific  basis,  science  Avill  be  compelled  to  be  reconciled  to 
religion.  Science  will  assail  the  dogmatic  basis ;  the  scientific  basis  it 
can  not  disturb.  At  present  this  view  of  nature  is  not  championed 
by  theology,  but  science  opposes  theology  because  it  refuses  an  ex- 
planation of  spiritual  truth  from  a  scientific  stand-point.  However, 
as  the  spiritual  world  is  understood  to  be  a  world  of  order,  governed 
by  law,  and  as  spiritual  truth  is   understood   to  be    adumbrated  by 


DIVINE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  PHENOMENAL.        475 

natural  truth,  so  spiritual  law  will  be  made  amenable  to  natural  law, 
and  spiritual  methods  be  made  to  harmonize  with  natural  methods. 
This  conclusion  will  be  reached  without  any  detriment  to  revealed 
religion  ;  it  will  vindicate  it  and  extinguish  all  traces  of  material- 
ism in  the  thought  of  the  world.  The  drift  is  toward  a  scientific  ex- 
planation of  religious  truth.  The  Duke  of  Argyll  fears  that  the 
natural  is  casting  out  the  supernatural,  but  the  fact  appears  to  be 
that  the  supernatural  is  casting  out  the  natural.  Bushnell  declares  the 
supernatural  to  be  compatible  with  the  natural,  and  that  God  governs 
the  world  by  a  supernatural  method,  which  is  the  same  thing  as  say- 
ing that  the  natural  is  supernatural.  Paul  settles  it  when  he  says, 
"The  things  which  are  seen  are  temporal,  but  the  things  which  are 
not  seen  are  eternal."  The  eternal  rules  the  temporal,  is  incorporated 
with  it,  and  will  exist  after  it  has  passed  away.  The  identity  of 
natural  and  spiritual  laws  establishes  the  reign  of  the  supernatural  in 
the  universe,  and  the  subordination  of  matter  to  spirit. 

The  danger  at  this  point  is  the  tendency  to  idealism,  which  reduces 
matter  to  nothing  by  exalting  law,  spirit,  personalty,  or  something  to 
dominion  over  it,  but  this  kind  of  idealism  is  the  idealism  of  Chris- 
tianity,    The  unseen,  whether  law  or  spirit,  is  eternal. 

As  Christianity  is  unfolded  and  its  principles  are  applied  to  the 
natural  world,  the  problem  of  explauation  of  its  relations  and  activities 
is  emancipated  from  many  difficulties,  and  the  solution  rendered  more 
probable. 

Nature  and  Christianity  harmonize  in  their  moral  lessons,  which  is 
proof  of  a  very  intimate  relationship;  and  that  they  are  under  one 
government  and  are  endowed  with  similar  functions  and  purposes. 
The  perishability  of  the  phenomenal  world  is  an  appalling  fact  to  be  ex- 
plained only  on  moral  grounds,  and  as  having  moral  ends  in  view.  Globes 
cease  to  revolve ;  comets  burst ;  nature  decays ;  and  terrestrial  life  is 
on  a  march  to  the  tomb.  The  delicate  flower  fades,  the  ripest  fruit  per- 
ishes, and  the  stateliest  work  of  God  is  reduced  to  dust.  What  is  the 
explanation?  Materialists  run  off  into  pessimism,  saying  the  world  is 
misgoverned  and  wrong  is  on  the  throne ;  fatalists  say  it  is  the 
natural  order,  and  'must  be  borne  with  patience  and  without  regret; 
but  the  one  walk  as  in  the  night,  the  other  amid  arctic  blasts.  Chris- 
tianity relieves  the  scene  of  darkness  and  cold.  It  explains  the  in- 
evitable destiny  of  nature  with  a  clearness  that  is  satisfactory,  and 
with  a  dignity  that  is  assuring.  The  divinest  philosophy  of  matter  is 
that  of  Paul,  who  pronounces  things  "seen"  "temporal,"  and  things 
unseen  eternal.  Matter  is  phenomenal,  perishable ;  the  invisible  is 
real,  eternal.     The  moral  lesson  is  to  cling  to  the  eternal. 

Emerson  defines  the  end  of  nature  to  be  moral ;  that  is,  its  econ- 


476  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

omy  is  adapted  to  discipline  man,  and,  as  discipline  is  the  con- 
dition of  development,  it  is  adapted  to  the  highest  purposes  of 
humanity.  The  moral  idea  of  nature  is  grounded  in  its  constitution 
and  exhibited  in  its  relations  to  man.  But  this  transcendental  notion 
harmonizes  with  the  orthodox  representation  of  the  present  life  that 
it  is  a  probation,  or  a  moral  trial,  all  its  sufferings,  frictions,  and 
oppositions  having  in  view  the  moral  discipline  and  spiritual  culture 
of  man.  The  becoming  is  tlie  grindstone  of  being;  the  phenomenal  is 
turned  to  the  refinement  and  spiritual  sharpening  of  the  intellectual 
and  moral ;  the  visible  burnishes  or  brings  to  light  the  invisible. 

Dropping  to  a  practical  level,  or  at  least  emerging  from  the  mys- 
ticism of  philosophy,  we  quote  with  approval  the  sentiment  of  Adam 
Smith,  that  nature  is  organized  in  "benevolent  wisdom,"  having  for  its 
chief  purpose  the  promotion  of  human  happiness  and  the  suppression 
of  misery.  Averaging  the  works  of  nature,  and  recognizing  an  evil 
bias  in  physical  government,  still  there  is  an  overbalancing  propensity 
to  good  which  in  the  fullness  of  the  ages  serves  to  secure  happiness 
and  repress  misery.  This  is  a  check  to  pessimism,  which  sees  a  pre- 
ponderance of  evil  in  the  universe,  or,  failing  to  strike  the  average, 
fixes  its  thought  exclusively  on  evil,  the  disciplinary  compensations  and 
the  all-sufficient  counteractions  not  being  recognized.  Too  much  is 
made  of  evil  as  an  argument  for  misgovernment;  it  is  a  proof  of  benev- 
olent wisdom  that  good  may  be  wrought  out  through  suffering,  and 
that  the  highest  ends  may  be  secured  through  the  opposition  or  in- 
strumentality of  evil.  The  objective  interpretation  of  nature,  dis- 
covered in  its  relationship  to  ends,  is  a  subject  of  vast  interest,  since 
it  involves  both  religion  and  philosophy.  Thus  far  it  is  on  the  side 
of  religion. 

Pantheism  interprets  nature  philosophically  in  the  interest  of 
itself  as  a  religion.  Let  us  look  at  the  interpretation  of  a  false  re- 
ligion in  contrast  with  that  of  the  true  religion.  The  study  of  its 
origin  carries  us  back  into  the  misty  periods  of  Asiatic  history,  for 
the  Eastern  mind  has  always  been  given  to  mythological  conceptions 
of  nature,  God,  and  man,  resulting  in  systems  of  religion  and  phi- 
losophy that  are  marvels  as  mere  systems,  but  of  "i-elative  value  only 
as  truths.  Looking  into  the  phenomenal  world  the  Eastern  mind 
saw  the  presence  of  a  governing  spirit,  apprehending  it  in  its  exhi- 
bitions of  power  and  wisdom  ;  but  instead  of  separating  the  Ruler 
from  the  world,  the  two  were  united  and  pronounced  one.  Person- 
ality was  lost  in  phenomena.  Nature  is  God,  is  the  pantheistic 
creed.  Outside  of  nature,  there  is  no  power ;  nature  is  power,  nature 
is  wisdom  ;  nature  is  justice.  The  blindness,  the  stupidity  of  this 
centralized  conception  is  so  apparent  that  one  wonders  if  it  could 


COLOSSAL  EXPLANATION  OF  NATURE.  477 

control  a  thoughtful  miud  ;  but  it  is  both  a  religious  and  a  philo- 
sophical sentiment.  Pantheism  is  still  an  interpretation  of  nature, 
closely  allied  to  the  scientific  interpretation  which  reduces  the  world 
to  the  mechanism  of  law.  In  fact,  what  is  the  mechanical  view  of 
the  world,  which  eliminates  God,  but  a  form  of  pantheism  ?  Hiickel 
says  the  religion  of  the  future  will  be  the  religion  of  nature,  which 
is  saying  that  there  is  no  God  but  nature.  Pantheism,  therefore,  is 
the  legitimate  fruit  of  mechanism  as  advocated  by  the  materialists. 

The  Greeks  had  a  way  of  looking  at  nature  that  rivals  any 
modern  attempt  at  sentimental  expression,  and  if  Christian  theism 
were  to  be  abandoned,  or  the  Christian  exposition  of  matter  were 
superseded,  the  mythology  of  the  Greeks  would  be  as  satisfactory  to 
us  as  any  thing  yet  suggested.  Nature's  forces  were  deified  and 
worshiped,  so  that  while  a  supreme  god — Zeus — was  acknowledged,  the 
universe  was  apportioned  to  gods  many,  as  Jupiter  had  the  earth, 
Neptune  the  sea,  and  Pluto  the  infernal  regions  ;  there  was  also  a 
god  of  agriculture,  a  god  of  war,  gods  representing  all  of  nature's 
forces,  and  human  conditions.  This  polytheistic  interpretation  in- 
spired a  reverence  for  nature  which  pantheism  can  not  inspire.  To 
be  sure,  it  had  its  disadvantages,  and  was  superseded,  but  it  recog- 
nized nature  as  the  product  of  godlike  force,  and  saw  a  deific  in- 
fluence in  superintendence  of  nature.  Whether  polytheism  is  to  be 
preferred  to  all  anti-theism  is  a  question  which  Ave  should  not  be  long 
in  deciding.  The  issue,  however,  in  these  days  is  not  between  an 
outgrown  philosophic  conception  and  a  religious  view  of  nature,  but 
rather  between  anti-theistic  philosophic  conceptions,  and  the  theistic 
apprehension  of  the  world.  To  the  latter  both  religion  and  phi- 
losophy now  tend,  and  all  religions  and  philosophies  in  conflict  with 
it  must  su])side.  The  final  cause  of  nature  is  moral,  theistic.  To 
teach  man  the  wisdom  and  power  of  God ;  to  illustrate  to  him  the 
divine  goodness  and  the  divine  love  of  order ;  to  impress  upon  him 
the  certainty  of  retribution  for  violation  of  higher  law  and  the  ex- 
pectation of  reward  for  fidelity  to  truth  ;  to  wean  hie.  mind  from  tem- 
poral things,  and  a%val<en  in  him  a  love  of  the  eternal;  this  is  the  colos- 
sal explanation  of  natnre  found  in  Christianity  and  found  in  no  other 
religion  or  philosophy.  With  this  explanation,  we  must  be  reverent 
in  the  presence  of  nature ;  we  must  worship  in  her  temples,  but 
avoid  worshiping  the  temple  ;  we  must  believe  in  her  teachings  but 
avoid  making  them  the  sole  truths  of  religion  ;  we  must  at  last  look 
away  from  nature  to  the  religion  she  reveals,  emphasizes,  and  proves, 
to  him  by  whom  and  for  whom  all  things  consist. 


478  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 


CHAPTER   XXII. 

<rHE    THEODICY  OK    CHRISTIANITY. 

BUCHNER  is  spoDSor  for  the  charge  that  Christianity  has 
originated  more  crimes  than  it  has  hindered,  a  charge  akin  to 
that  which  makes  liberty  responsible  for  slavery,  and  life  responsible 
for  death.  The  implication  is  that  the  prevalence  of  the  Christian 
religion  contributes  to  human  misery,  notwithstanding  its  pretense  of 
ability  to  relieve  it,  and  that  God,  as  revealed  in  the  Scriptures,  is  in 
some  way  seriously  involved  in  the  existence  and  dominancy  of  evil. 
On  the  contrary,  it  is  conceivable  that  the  actual  state  of  the  world 
is  not  inherently  depraved,  and  that  whatever  imperfection  exists  is 
quite  incompatible  with  the  known  designs  of  the  great  Ruler,  who 
in  his  own  time  will  extinguish  it,  and  demonstrate  the  ascendency 
of  his  reign  in  the  universe.  Just  what  is  conceivable  is  actually  the 
fact,  as  we  shall  discover. 

Christianity  is  an  explanation  of  evil,  as  respects  its  origin, 
nature,  purposes,  and  destiny,  and  equally  an  explanation  of  man's 
moral  condition,  as  affected  by  evil,  and  as  it  may  be  improved  by 
religion.  It  relieves  God  from  responsibility  for  sin ;  it  relieves 
humanity  from  a  traditional  opprobrium  which  has  long  paralyzed  its 
self-effort  for  moral  elevation  ;  it  relieves  theology  from  falsehood  and 
crudity ;  it  relieves  Christianity  from  any  voluntary  participation 
in  human  degradation  and  sorrow.  If  it  is  assumed  that  the  existence 
of  evil  can  be  vindicated  from  the  revelations  of  Christianity,  and 
that  its  mission  is  related  to  the  progress  of  the  world,  according  to 
the  intent  of  religion,  some  of  our  readers  will  doubtless  be  startled, 
and  imagine  that  a  problematical  reason  for  evil  has  been  discovered. 
We  shall  not  assume  so  much ;  we  shall  assume  nothing.  The  awful- 
ness  of  evil  can  not  be  overrated,  its  existence  can  not  be  palliated ; 
but,  inasviuch  as  it  is,  if  it  can  be  shown  that  it  is  in  the  power  of 
God  to  employ  it  in  divine  purposes,  and  as  an  auxiliary  force  in  the 
development  of  his  kingdom,  a  reason  for  its  being  may  be  an- 
nounced. Its  origin  is  bad,  but  its  instrumental  mission  or  uses  may 
possibly  be  made  under  the  divine  control  subservient  to  divine  ends. 

A  superficial  view  of  man's  environment  or  of  his  natural  char- 
acter as  inherited,  and  debased  by  a  w^ong  development,  is  not  likely 
to  captivate  the  senses,  or  satisfy  the  thinking  of  an  honest  soul.  A 
close  scrutiny  of  his  environment,  inherently  deficient  in  means  of 


HEREDITY  NOT  AN  EXPLANATION.  479 

alleviation,  has  produced  the  extremes  of  pessimism  and  atheism.  No 
thoughtful  or  sympathetic  mind  will  deny  any  fact  of  evil,  any  want 
of  adaptation,  any  dissonance  in  life,  pointed  out  by  the  pessimist 
or  observer.  We  are  quite  willing  to  admit  the  history  of  evil  and 
even  to  add  to  what  he  has  angrily  declared  to  exist.  It  is  useless  to 
hide  the  facts,  as  glaring  as  day,  and  to  regard  them  as  temporary 
blemishes,  for  they  are  deep-rooted,  universal,  and  as  painful  as  the 
intensity  of  life  will  permit.  Even  the  blind  see  crookedness  in  the 
ways  of  the  world.  Smoke  eclipses  the  sun,  and  the  race  walks  on 
edges  in  darkness.  The  earth  rocks  like  a  ship  in  a  tempest  and 
reels  like  a  drunken  man  in  the  mountains.  It  almost  shakes  itself 
out  of  its  orbit,  so  wide-spread  are  its  convulsions.  Peace  is  on  a 
visit  to  another  planet.  War  reigns  here ;  war  with  the  elements, 
war  with  law,  war  with  disease,  war  with  ignorance,  war  with  death. 
Underneath  the  apparently  fixed  order  of  things  there  is  a  kind  of 
nihilism  at  work,  if  not  to  destroy,  at  least  to  torment,  and  render 
abortive  the  best  attempts  of  the  race  to  rise  to  nobler  things. 
Irregularity,  confusion,  distress,  failure,  are  the  common  items  of 
human  experience.  Csesar  is  on  the  throne.  Job  sits  on  an  ash-heap ; 
Dives  is  in  his  palace,  Lazarus  is  in  rags  at  the  gate.  Exaggeration 
of  human  experience  in  its  distressful  content  is  impossible.  Let  the 
pessimist  paint  the  picture  dark — we  shall  undertake  to  add  a  darker 
shade.  Let  him  write  gloom  on  the  ground — we  will  engrave 
it  on  the  stars. 

But  what  of  it  all?  What  of  midnight?  Is  there  no  day?  Facts 
first,  then  explanations.  The  origin  of  evil  is  a  problem  by  itself; 
the  uses  of  evil,  or  its  possible  helpfulness  in  the  world's  upward 
movements,  may  be  made  to  appear  in  the  light  of  its  history.  It  is 
the  ^ises  of  evil  that  now  concern  us.  The  origin  of  evil  is  the 
subject-matter  of  explanation  ;  but,  if  its  uses  can  be  made  clear, 
man's  unhappy  lot  will  have  a  partial  explanation.  Let  it  not  be 
supposed,  however,  that  Christianity  is  obscurely  silent  on  the  original 
problem,  for,  if  its  revelations  are  not  transparent,  they  are  more 
satisfactory  than  any  thing  propounded  by  philosophy.  What,  for- 
sooth, does  philosophy  propose  as  its  theodicy?  Does  it  point  to  the 
laws  of  heredity  as  the  cause  of  vice?  Heredity  is^onJfu^ajmethod.M^ 
transmission  of  the  evil  tendency;  it  is  not  an  explanation  of  the 
origin  or  nature  of  the  tendency.  M.  Caro,  of  the  French  Academy, 
contradicts  the  theory  of  heredity  as  explanatory  of  the  passage  of 
the  sinful  tendency,  insisting  that  personality  or  individuality  can  not 
be  inherited,  but  temperament  and  physical  types  only  may  pass  from 
generation  to  generation.  If  evil  is  the  taint  of  personality,  and  the 
origin  of  personality  is  not  in  heredity,  then  the  origin  of  evil  is  not 


480  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIAMTY. 

via  heredity.  This  is  a  new  idea  in  philosophy,  but  it  is  invulnerable, 
and  djspnses  of  heredity  as  the  genesis  of  sin.  The  broader  theory  of 
evolution  is  sometimes  summoned  to  account  for  the  introduction  of 
evil,  but  it  applies  only,  if  at  all,  to  the  development  of  the  vicious 
nature,  and  not  to  its  beginning.  Pitiful,  indeed,  are  the  attempts 
of  philosophers  to  reveal  the  foundations  of  the  evil  government  in 
the  universe,  and  equally  insufficient  their  account  of  its  historic  con- 
volutions. To  Christianity  the  inquirer  must  turn  for  explanations 
of  the  firstappeai-ance  of  diabolisjp  in  the  universe ;  if  disappointed 
here,  the  hope  of  explanation  must  be  abandoned. 

For  the  Bible  explanation  of  evil,  it  is  not  claimed  that  it  is  alto- 
gether complete  or  transparent,  since  it  is  wanting  in  certain  data 
that  belong  to  the  initial  stages  of  its  history,  or,  what  is  more  im- 
portant, it  is  wanting  in  specific  statement  concerning  the  original 
impulse  to  evil.  Carlyle  says  original  sin  is  the  vanishment  of  the 
conception  of  God  from  men's  minds.  God  is  absent  from  human 
thought — this  is  the  beginning  of  sin.  Given  the  source,  and  the 
stream  follows.  Christianity  is  a  revelation  of  such  facts  as  are  abso- 
lutely necessary  to  individual  redemption  ;  it  does  not  seek  to  satisfy 
curiosity,  or  make  known  that  which,  however  important  to  intel- 
lectual development  hereafter,  is  not  important  to  moral  living  here. 
For  this  reason,  the  explanation  is  allegorical,  incomplete,  hiutful, 
but  not  a  revelation  that  satisfies.  However,  evil  had  a  definitejje- 
ginuing,  a  point  of  dppn.rtnre,  ir  tlip  pnrth's  history-.  That  at  one 
time  it  broke  out  in  heaven,  is  proof  that  its  possibility  has  run 
parallel  with  eternal  righteousness.  Theoretically,  it  may  do  to  say 
it  has  always  existed,  as  the  opposite  of  the  idea  of  right,  and  this 
without  any  blemish  on  the  divine  government.  If,  as  Dr.  Whedon 
says,  the  power  to  sin  implies  no  imperfection  in  character,  so  the 
possibility  of  evil,  inherent  in  the  constitution  of  things,  inherent  in 
the  idea  of  existence,  implies  no  imperfection  of  government  or  things. 
Possibilities  are  without  moral  qualities.  T}\e  possibiJ.rtf)i  of  evil  ?',s  not 
an  evil.  Evil,  as  a  possibility,  is  eternal.  From  possibility  it  de- 
scended into  reality,  heaven  first  feeling  its  touch  when  it  undertook 
to  despoil  the  throne  of  the  great  King,  but,  failing  in  its  purpose,  it 
began  its  destructive  work  in  the  earth,  where  it  still  abides  to  torture 
the  innocent  and  wreak  its  vengeance  on  the  family  of  God.  Its  in- 
troduction to  our  globe  is  related  in  the  Scriptures,  of  which  various 
interpretations  have  been  given ;  but,  however  understood,  certain  it 
is  that,  from  the  hour  when  Eve  coqueted  with  the  serpent,  evil  has 
been  the  tremendous  fact  in  human  history.  The  account  is  true  in 
essence,  and  a  solemn  satisfaction  is  the  product  of  faith  in  it. 

The  more  vital  problem  is  the  relation  of  evil  to  human  life. 


EVIL  THE  PRODUCT  OF  LAW.  481  1 

Whether  the  universe,  all  worlds,  all  creatures,  are  corrupted,  or  are 
the  victims  of  au  evil  spirit,  we  kuQW  not ;  it  is  enough  to  know  that  j 

humanity  groans  and  waits  for  deliverance.  HumaiLJlisiiii^--is_the 
joint  produc^  of  good  and  evil  forces  in  ceaseless  operation^ Jih.gjm£ 
now,  and  then^the  other,  apparently  in  the  ascendant,  but  together 
working  out  the  one  magnificent  result  of  human  progress,  and  the  i 

reign  of  the  divine  principle  in  the  world's  afiairs.     As  the  ocean  tide  i 

includes  both  ebbing  and  flowing,  so  human  history  includes  retarda-  , 

tion  as  well  as  progression.     History  is  the  arena  or  play-ground  of  j 

antagonistic   forces,  each  bent~on~the  exactly  opposite  idea  of  the  I 

other.     One  is  good,  the  other  is  evil.     To  explain  the  relation,  inter-  ; 

action,  and  counteraction  of  these  forces,  or  the  presence  of  evil  in 
history,  the  framer  of  a  theodicy  is  under  obligation.     In  essaying  such  i^ 
a  task,  it  is  not  incumbent  upon  us  to  explain  every  incident  of  evil, 
every  fact  of  suffering,  every  accident  or  injustice ;   but  rather  to  con- 
sider the  whole  in  the  light  of  certain  principles,  under  which  the  details  , 
of  life  may  be  grouped.     Without  these  principles,  it  will  be  impos- 
sible to  explain  any  thing;  with  them,  it  may  be  diflacult  to  explain           \ 
a  particular  incident.     But,  as  gravitation  explains  all  falling  bodies, 
so  these  principles,  it  is  believed,  will   explain   evil   as  a  whole.     If 
they  do  not,  we  shall  have  to  surrender  the  task  and  settle  into  the           ] 
ignorance  of  mystery. 

Of  the  missi^i  of  evil,  inferred  from  the  uses  to  which  Providence  | 

devotes  it,  we  submit  a  tentative  explanation.     The  word  ".evil"  we  ^^ 
use  in  a  generic  sense,  including  in  it  all  the  irregularities,  disorders,  i 

incongruous  complications,  and  chaotic  conditions  of  man's  natural 
life,  arising  from  his  environment,  as  well  as  the  ignorance,  false-  j 

hoods,  oppositions,  cruelties,  bad  governments,  false  religions,  and  sins  I 

justly  chargeable  to  himself.     It  signifies  the  aggregate  of  disorders  | 

in  man's  world-life,  the  physical,  intellectual,  and  moral  obstructions  ] 

to  his  happiness,  development,  and  destiny.     By  the  mission  of  evlL  '! 

in  this  largest  sense,  we  mean  its  moral  ends,  or  the  providential  em- 
ployment of  evil  as  an  instrument  in  the  securing  of  moral  results,  . 
possibly  not  attainable  by  other  methods.  ; 

In  our  observations  of  God's  government  of  the  world,  we  are  apt 
to  overlook  the  fact  that  evil  is'  under  the  restraints  of  law,  or,  to  j 

express  it  in  another  form,  that  evil  is  the  product  of  law.     This  is  a  j 

perfectly  safe  proposition,  when  examined  in  the  light  of  its  supports. 
Acknowledging  the  existence  of  God  and  the  reign  of  a  providential  **      J 
government,  the  idea  of  chance  is  inadmissible  as  an  explanation  of 
any  thing.     Accident  is  unknown  in  a  providential  government.     No  ! 

event  happens  that  is  not  the  result  either  of  direct  divine  supervision  j 

or  of  the  operation  of  fixed  and   beneficent  laws.     Evil,  therefore,  ] 

31  ; 

I 


482  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

must  be  the  decreed  result  of  divine  Providence,  which  is  a  rejectable 
hypothesis,  or  the  natui'al  product  of  laws  and  forces,  and,  therefore, 
both  in  bondage  to  them  and  an  orderly  produced  result,  which  ap- 
proximates the  truth  if  it  does  not  declare  it  wholly.  Nature's  irreg- 
ularities or  disorders  do  not  happen  except  in  harmony  with  law, 
and  are  the  products  of  law.  The  inconstant  wind,  sweeping  over  a  " 
prairie,  is  as  much  the  product  of  law  as  the  trade  wind,  which  has  a 
meteorological  mission.  The  tempest  at  sea  is  as  methodical  in  its 
procedure  as  the  tides.  Nature's  laws  will  produce  poisons,  as  well  as 
agreeable  and  nutritious  fruits.  Zoology  points  out  monsters  of  the 
forest ;  ichthyology  tells  of  fishes  without  eyes ;  and  natural  history 
reveals  insects  with  a  stinging  apparatus.  All  these  are  as  much  the 
products  of  laws  as  animals  that  are  useful,  as  fishes  with  eyes,  as  in- 
sects that  are  harmless.  Calamities,  resulting  fi'om  a  supposed  viola- 
tion of  nature's  laws,  are  in  the  line  of  nature's  order,  and  as  lawful 
as  her  benedictions.  To  say  that  the  explosion  of  a  steam  boiler  is 
the  result  of  violated  law  is  a  very  superficial  explanation,  for,  while 
it  may  involve  the  carelessness  of  the  engineer,  the  explosion  occurred 
in  obedience  to  law.  It  is  not  an  anti-lawful  result.  The  Ashtabula 
bridge  disaster  was  the  result  of  the  law  of  gravitation. 

Approaching  a  little  nearer  the  line,  the  diseases  from  which  man 
suffers  are  not  chance  results,  but  the  products  of  law,  a  study  of 
which  enables  the  physician  to  master  them  and  rescue  the  patient. 
The  diagnosis  is  along  the  line  of  causation — the  track  of  law ;  the 
prognosis  is  along  the  line  of  effects,  recognized  through  the  lens  of 
law.  Fever  has  its  laws  ;  consumption,  rheumatism,  neuralgia,  ague, 
all  occur  in  obedience  to  law.  Intermittent  heart-beats  result  from 
law,  quite  as  much  as  the  regular  pulse. 

Evidently,  the  disorders,  the  sufferings,  the  irregularities  in  human 
history  are  the  consequences  of  law,  and  not  of  lawlessness.  This 
does  not  involve  God  in  close  partnership  with  evil,  but  is  an  evidence 
that  he  is  on  the  throne,  and  that  evil  is  under  divine  restraint.  It 
has  the  bandage  of  law  about  it.  Evil,  as  the  result  of  divine 
caprice,  would  be  intolerable;  but  evil,  so-called,  as  the  result  of  law, 
does  not  invalidate  the  benevolence  of  the  Deity.  Evil  is  not  arbi- 
trary, therefore ;  it  arises  from  the  constitution  of  things,  and  can  not 
well  be  avoided. 

Many  of  the  sufferings  of  mankind  are  due  to  natural  environ- 
ment, which  consists  of,  or  abounds  in,  disorders  and  irregularities, 
that  issue  in  a  regular  succession  from  the  operation  of  fixed  laws, 
and  are  inevitable.  They  constitute  a  part  of  human  history,  from 
the  necessities  of  the  situation,  a  situation  divinely  ordered  and 
pre-arranged. 


HISTORY  A  PROVIDENTIAL  DEVELOPMENT.  483 

If  the  foregoing  is  at  all  rational,  one  may  be  justified  in  suspect- 
ing that  evil,  in  its  broadest  sense,  as  a  constitutional  disorder,  has  a 
place  assigned  it  on  the  divine  programme  of  the  world. 

Let  us  see  how  far  the  suspicion  is  correct.  The  teleology  of  evil 
can  not- be  expressed  by  fatalism,  or  Calvinism,  or  by  any  short-hand 
method.  If  evil  is  the  result  of  law,  it  anticipates  an  end,  for  law 
strives  toward  an  end  and  always  means  an  end.  It  is  a  scientific 
theory  that  progress  is  an  end  of  nature  ;  its  rule  is  the  "  survival  of 
the  fittest ;"  it  proclaims  that  through  gradual  processes,  intricate  and 
long-continued,  and  even  obstinate  and  persistent,  the  world  will  ar- 
rive at  an  improved  condition.  Nature,  history,  man,  unite  in  pro- 
claiming the  end  of  the  world-life  to  be  progress.  To  this  theory  we 
subscribe  in  full  faith.  Now,  does  evil  in  any  wise  interfere  with  the 
execution  of  the  historic  idea  or  plan  of  progress  ?  In  still  narrower, 
yet  stronger,  phrase  does  evil  successively  check  the  natural,  historic, 
providential  program  of  progress?  We  do  not  ask  if  evil  retards 
human  progress,  for  it  does  retard  it,  as  we  see  it,  or  if  it  would  not 
entirely  prevent  progress,  were  it  not  overcome,  for  it  undoubtedly 
would  stay  the  world's  march.  But  evil  as  a  friction  or  retarding 
obstacle,  and  evil  as  the  extinguisher  of  progress,  are  quite  different 
things.  The  former,  evil  is  ;  the  latter,  it  is  not.  Notwithstanding 
the  obstacles  to  progress,  history  on  the  whole  reports  progress  ;  the 
gains  exceed  the  losses  ;  the  friction  movements  are  overcome  by  the 
radical  pi^gressive  currents;  and  the  world  rises  slowly,  comparing 
with  joy  its  present  with  its  past.  What  does  this  signify  ?  That  the 
designs  of  Providence  can  co-exist  with  evil  and  evolve  into  success ; 
that  in  spite  of  it  and  by  its  aid  God's  purpose  will  triumph  ;  that  the 
divine  idea  of  the  world  will  round  out  in  complete  and  concrete 
beauty,  notwithstanding  evil,  like  a  mountain,  stands  in  its  path  and 
disputes  its  success.  Evil  is  not  a  hindrance  to  the  execuUon  of  the  provr 
idential  idea.  This  is  the  broad  view  of  evil.  If  not  a  final  or  fatal 
hindrance,  it  may  prove  to  be  a  co-operating  force  in  the  progress 
of  the  world. 

The  particular  view  is  almost  personal.  What  is  t.bp  rp.lntinn  n£ 
evil  to  the  individual?  To  what  uses  may  it  be  applied  in  the  pro- 
phetic development  of  human  character?  If  evil  will  not  prevent  the 
fulfillment  of  the  providential  idea  respecting  the  world  as  a  whole,  will  it 
interfere  with  the  providential  idea  respecting  the  individual  ?  The  de- 
velopment of  the  individual  is  a  wholesome  possibility.  He  has  a  mind 
that  may  be  expanded,  a  soul  that  needs  cultivation.  To  secure  his  de- 
velopment two  methods  suggest  themselves :  1.  By  an  uninterrupted  flow 
of  truth  into  the  mind  ;  2.  By  struggle.  The  first  method  God  has  not 
ordained  ;  the  second  method  is  universal.     Being  universal,  we  are 


484  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

moved  to  say  it  is  providential  or  natural,  arising  from  man's  environ- 
ment, and  his  own  inherited  deficiencies  of  sloth,  passion,  ignorance, 
and  depravity.  Either  the  environment  must  be  changed,  and  man's 
nature  be  different,  or  struggle  with  the  environment,  and  struggle 
with  one's  self  must  surely  follow.  Struggle  is  the  logical  necessity.  ^ 
But  struggle  iinplies  a  world  of  evil,  so-called.  Ignoraut,  a  struggle 
for  knowledge  is  imperative ;  environed  with  laws,  forces,  solid  forms 
of  matter,  a  struggle  for  acquaintance  with  laws  and  mastery  of  forces 
is  indicated  ;  possessed  of  passions  and  appetites  anxious  for  excessive 
gratification,  a  struggle  for  self-control  and  purity  is  foreshadowed.  Ed- 
ucation, righteousness,  order,  life,  signify  struggle.  Bread,  health,  soci- 
ety, government,  all  mean  struggle.  The  condition  of  man  is  the  condi- 
tion of  discipline,  the  thoroughness  of  which  is  made  to  depend__on 
the  strength  and  acuteness  of  the  forces  summoned  a^gaiust  him.  The 
use  of  obstacles,  the  virtue  of  discipline,  is  conceded  in  some  depart- 
ments of  life.  Poverty  is  pronounced  a  blessing  when  it  leads  a 
young  man  to  self-eflTort,  developing  independence,  integrity,  courage, 
faith,  genuine  manhood.  Webster  was  indebted  to  his  obstacles,  and 
Jesus  to  his  temptations.  Stones  in  one's  path  often  prove  to  be  step- 
ping-stones to  the  heights. 

If  the  general  principle  is  true,  then  its  application  must  be  true. 
If  poverty,  opposition,  persecution,  are  the  conditions  of  develop- 
ment, then  suflTering,  temptation,  sickness,  and  sorrow  may  open  the 
life  in  its  manifold  possibilities.  If  discipline  or  developn^pnt  be  the 
end  of  evil,  it  in  a  sense  justifies  evil  as  a  providential  instrument  in 
human  history. 

Another  general  fact  which  has  not  had  full  consideration  in  the- 
ology  is  the  self-destroying  poxver  of  evil,  or  the  providential  restriction 
imposed  upon  it,  and  the  providential  provisions  for  its  extinction. 
Satan  is  in  chains,  and  within  the  range  of  the  chains  his  power  is 
tremnicIous7"aiKrits  exercise  is  dreadfully  apparent.  But  we  mean 
more  than  a  general  circumscription.  Among  the  divine  plans  for  the 
upbuilding  of  the  world  in  righteousness  not  one  is  more  conspicuous 
than  that  which  in  the  long  run  arrays  evil  against  evil,  and  pro- 
duces its  destruction.  In  this  way  error  dies  amid  its  worshipers. 
Evil  destroys  evil,  as  one  nail  drives  out  another.  War  is  organized 
barbarity,  a  type  of  evil,  but  the  American  war  of  1861-1865  resulted 
in  the  extinction  of  slavery.  Great  evils  arise,  rooting  themselves  in 
customs,  legislation,  and  social  forms,  and  even  take  a  religious  name 
and  threaten  the  subversion  of  our  ideals  of  government,  and  we 
wonder  how  they  will  be  circumvented  and  overthrown.  Sometimes 
by  righteous  methods,  sometimes  by  the  peaceful  exercise  of  civil  au- 
thority ;  but  often  mammoth  evils  go  down  by  the  resisting  power  of 


EVIL  DESTROYING  EVIL.  485 

other  evils,  as  the  pirates'  ship  goes  down  in  the  storm.  Purgatives 
may  be  evils,  but  they  expel  disease  ;  counter-irritants  may  be  severe, 
but  they  draw  enemies  from  the  vitals.  The  French  revolution  was 
a  dreadful  evil,  but  it  was  a  remedy  for  a  worse  evil.  This  provi- 
dential method  we  may  not  fancy,  since  it  involves  suffering,  but  it 
is  a  providential  method,  and  often  explains  the  rise  and  fall  of  evils. 

In  still  another  aspect  *evil  will  <'ppp<<f  ns  q  pT-ntrirlcntinl  instru- 
ment for  beneficent  ends.  Let  us  take  the  world  as  it  has  been,  as  it  is, 
full  of  wicked  men,  plotting  for  empire,  the  subjugation  of  the  races, 
and  the  conquest  of  the  hemispheres.  Who  or  what  can  resist  the 
surgings  of  political  evil,  the  tides  of  ungodly  ambition,  that  carry  the 
Neros  and  Napoleons  far  toward  success?  The  frame-work  of  villainy 
is  visible  in  the  schemes  of  statesmen  and  rulers  and  Avarriors.  What 
can  overthrow  them  but  Providence,  by  methods  that  may  entail  suf- 
fering, and  at  the  same  time  conquer  the  lusts  of  men?  Evil  may 
not  only  be  employed  in  resisting  evil,  but  in  resisting  evil  men.  It 
was  an  evil  that  chained  Napoleon  on  St.  Helena,  and  rid  Europe  of 
its  enemy.  Caligula  went  out  by  the  assassin's  blow.  The  sword  was 
drawn,  and  Belshazzar  and  his  drunken  lords  perished.  The  fatal  cup 
of  intemperance  was  drunk,  and  Alexander,  who  had  despoiled  the 
eastern  hemisphere,  was  himself  a  corpse.  The  worms  seized  him, 
and  Herod  was  dead.  The  winds  blew,  and  the  Spanish  Armada 
was  no  more,  and  England  was  saved.  If  there  must  be  evil,  God 
can  use  it  in  the  restraining  of  the  wicked,  in  the  punishment  of  the 
guilty,  and  even  in  the  extinction  of  the  gross  evils  that  afflict 
mankind. 

Looking  again  at  the  world  as  it  is,  with  false  religions  in  the  as- 
cendency in  the  East,  and  bad  governments  in  power,  it  is  evident 
that  Providence  has  his  hand  upon  them,  and  is  turning  them  to  ad- 
vantage in  the  execution  of  his  purposes.  However  evil  may  have 
been  introduced,  it  was  introduced,  and  contaminated  the  springs  of 
human  history.  The  natural  man  is  ignorant,  selfish,  cruel,  without 
the  capability  of  self-government,  without  apprehension  of  spiritual 
truths.  The  lower  forms  of  government,  such  as  despotism  and  aris- 
tocracies, grew  out  of  man's  natural  condition,  and  were  inevitable; 
and,  without  the  Bible,  false  and  superstitious  religions  were  equally 
inevitable.  It  would  be  presumption  to  deny  to  these  political  forms 
of  despotism  any  virtue  or  mission  ;  it  would  be  the  extreme  of  bigotry 
to  deny  even  to  false  religions  a  place  in  the  divine  program.  Des- 
potism and  superstition,  with  all  their  crimes  and  cruelties,  have  been 
providentially  linked  with  the  world's  destinies,  and  have  been  used 
in  the  preservation  of  the  religious  idea  amid  ages  of  darkness,  and 
in  preparing  the  world  for  the  reception  of  the  Gospel,   and  of  dem- 


486  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

ocratic  ideals  of  government.  God's  truth  has  had  partial  embalm- 
ment in  superstition,  and  heathen  sages  have  piloted  the  heathenish 
millions  through  the  uncertain  past  to  the  hopeful  present.  Thus  in 
these  things  God's  hand  is  seen,  and  his  plan  is  visible. 

From  this  brief  survey  of  the  empire  of  evil,  we  conclude  it  is 
under  the  dominion  of  divine  law  and  restraint,  and  that  disorder, 
irregularity,  disease,  suffering,  poverty,  persecution,  war,  slavery,  in- 
temperance, assassination,  crime,  superstition,  and  despotism ;  yea, 
all  evils  are  reckoned  in  the  category  of  divine  instruments  for  the 
accomplishment  of  divine  purposes,  the  fulfillment  of  which  is  as  cer- 
tain as  that  God  rules.  The  world  exists  for  a  purpose  which  is 
ripening  every  hour,  and  evil,  restrained  and  divinely  directed,  but 
adds  to  its  unfolding  and  perfection.  Through  the  lenses  of  history, 
Scripture,  observation,  and  experience,  we  conclude  that  evil,  how- 
ever originated,  has  now  a  providential  mission,  and  is  in  haste  to 
perform  it,  and  in  the  performance  itself  will  expire. 

In  the  foregoing  analysis  or  explanation  the  direct  reference  is  to 
natural  evil,  as  if  it  were  the  supreme  and  solitary  fact  in  the  uni- 
verse, while  theologians  devote  their  theodicies  to  moral  evil,  the 
reign  of  which  is  as  conspicuous  as  the  reign  of  natural  evil.  The 
question  then  is  relevant :  is  there  any  difference  between  natural  and 
moral  evil?  If  a  difference,  what  is  the  relation  of  the  one  to  the 
other?  Evil  is  evil,  whether  it  be  physical,  intellectual,  or  spiritual; 
it  differs  not  in  essence,  but  in  intensity  only.  The  distinction  be- 
tAveen  the  two  evils  is  one  of  convenience  only ;  it  is  not  founded  in 
any  difference  between  the  evils  themselves,  so  that  an  account  of  one 
will  serve  as  an  account  of  the  other.  Natural  evil  is  only  the  grosser 
form  of  the  wrong  spirit  in  the  universe,  and  attaches  itself  to  physical 
objects,  while  moral  evil  is  the  refined  type  of  the  same  spirit,  afflicting 
the  minds  and  souls  of  men.  If  natural  evil  is  under  law  and  the  prod- 
uct of  law,  so  is  moral  evil.  If  there  are  uses  to  which  natural  evil 
may  be  devoted,  there  are  uses  to  which  moral  evil  may  be  devoted. 
As  showing  the  intimate  relation  of  the  two,  natural  evil  is  often  em- 
ployed to  serve  moral  ends,  and  moral  evils  sometimes  are  made  to 
contribute  to  natural  ends.  It  is  believed  that  cholera  visits  civilized 
countries  once  in  seventeen  yeai's  for  moral  ends;  that  commercial 
panics  are  affected  by  the  spots  on  the  sun ;  that  comets  are  the  van- 
guard of  trouble ;  that  earthquakes  are  intended  to  shake  the  people 
into  a  recognition  of  moral  principles ;  and  that  nature  often  disturbs 
the  race  in  order  to  impress  it  with  the  thought  of  God.  Trenching  on 
superstition  as  these  views  riiay  seem  to  do,  it  can  not  be  resisted  that 
natural  evil  is  often  the  source  of  moral  evil,  and  that  the  two  are 
indissolubly  related.     The  ancient  theologian  was  disposed  to  attribute 


EVIL  A  DISCIPLINE.  487 

all  evil,  both  natural  and  moral,  to  the  forensic  sin  of  Adam ;  and  Mil- 
ton, adopting  the  sentiment,  echoed  it  in  lofty  phrase  until  it  became 
the  current  doctrine  of  the  Church ;  but  is  not  the  truth  exactly  the 
reverse,  namely,  that  moral  evil  is  the  result  of  natural  evil,  and 
that  natural  evil  is  the  result  of  the  constitution  of  things?  Evil  is 
tjie  constitutional  disorder  of  the  univerM.  Moral  evil  is  the  con- 
tagion  of  natural  evil,  the  outgrowth  and  reality  of  constitutional 
possibilities. 

There  was  a  time  when  it  was  important  to  vindicate  the  goodness 
and  holiness  of  God  in  the  presence  of  evil,  for  it  was  assumed  that 
in  some  way  it  compromised  the  perfections  of  the  Deity.  Dr.  A.  T. 
Bledsoe,  seeing  the  inconsistency  of  the  implication,  defends  the  attri- 
butes of  God  in  a  masterly  exposition  of  the  principles  of  the  divine 
government ;  but  it  occurs  to  us  that  such  vindication  is  no  longer 
necessary.  A  mistake  is  made  in  involving  the  divine  perfections  in 
the  problem  ;  the  problem  can  only  include  the  divine  ideas  or  pur- 
poses in  reference  to  the  human  race.  Eliminating  the  perfections, 
and  including  only  the  divine  purposes,  the  relation  of  evil  to 
the  universe  has  an  explanation,  and  that  explanation  is  God's 
vindication. 

If,  instead  of  regarding  evil  as  the  result  of  broken  law,  it  is  re- 
garded as  the  result  of  execided  law,  its  explanation  will  be  still  more 
definite.  Evil  is  sometimes  a  penalty  and  sometimes  a  discipline. 
As  a  penalty,  it  is  always  the  result  of  enforced  law.  A  murderer 
violates  law ;  the  violated  law  does  not  punish  him ;  if  the  punish- 
ment is  the  sting  of  conscience,  then  a  moral  law  is  executed ;  or,  in 
other  words,  an  executed  rather  than  a  broken  law  is  the  source  of 
his  affliction ;  if  he  must  suffer  capital  punishment,  it  is  not  by  virtue 
of  the  law  he  violated.  Another  law,  which  he  did  not  violate  at  all, 
hangs  him.  Wherever  evil  is_  suffered  as  a  penalty,  it  is  by  virtue 
of  executed  ]aw_,_which  implies  the  authority  of  the  law-maker  in 
the  land. 

As  ajiiscipline,  evil_must  be  considered  on  other  grounds.  The 
earlier  Calvinian  schools  were  inclined  to  interpret  evil  only  as  a 
penalty;  but  evidently  this  is  too  narrow  a  view  of  it,  since  infants, 
not  having  sinned,  and  animals,  not  having  violated  any  law,  are  the 
subjects  of  suffering,  the  explanation  of  which  can  not  be  referred  to 
the  word  penalty.  The  final  causes  of  evil  are_not-penal  but  moral. 
Suffering  has  a  missioj^.  It  is  not  inflicted  always  as  a  punishment. 
AdvocaEm^it"'ara~penalty,  the  theologians  had  to  rescue  God  from 
ungracious  imputations,  and  save  the  world  from  pessimism  ;  but  the 
task  was  too  great.  Evil  as  a  discipline,  or  with  moral  ends  in  view, 
makes  a  theodicy  possible.     It  is   the  turning   of  the   immoral  into 


488  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

moral  uses,  as  night  is  made  to  serve  certain  benevolent  purposes 
in  nature. 

Following  the  course  of  evil  in  its  assaults  upon  the  Church,  or 
the  movements  of  Christianity,  one  is  astonished  at  the  beneficent 
result.  As  an  organized  agency  for  the  spread  of  Christianity,  the 
Church  has  been  the  target  of  enmity  since  the  days  of  the  divine 
Founder ;  its  pathway  has  been  marked  with  blood,  and  rts  history  is 
full  of  flame  and  suffering.  Even  in  the  days  of  its  greatest  con- 
quests, paganism  resisted  its  advances  with  defiant  contradiction,  and 
its  progress  has  ever  been  over  obstacles  so  numerous  and  so  great 
that  one  wonders  that  the  Church  is  a  living  institution  to-day,  and 
can  account  for  it  on  no  other  ground  than  that  it  is  stronger  than 
evil.  Think  of  the  martyrdom  that  occupies  so  prominent  a  place  in 
the  world's  history,  of  the  cruel  laAvs  against  Christians,  of  mobs, 
fagots,  dungeons,  and  gladiatorial  sports,  all  directed  and  employed 
for  the  extinction  of  the  rising  faith  and  the  suppression  of  the 
Church.  Evil,  in  its  historic  relations  to  the  Church,  is  seen  on  a 
stupendous  scale ;  organized  and  palpitating  with  hate,  it  undertakes 
to  destroy  the  only  institution  whose  chief  object  is  the  salvation  of 
the  world.  To  explain  evil  as  a  penalty  will  not  explain  its  assaults 
upon  Christianity  or  the  Church,  any  more  than  it  will  explain  the 
sufferings  of  animals  and  infants.  To  assert  that  God  builds  his 
Church  for  high  moral  ends,  and  then  engages  evil  to  try  to  destroy 
it,  as  a  punishment  for  sins  it  never  committed,  is  so  palprble  an  ab- 
surdity that  it  is  mere  trifling  to  notice  it ;  and  yet  certain  old-time 
theologians  embraced  the  absurdity  with  as  much  sincerity  as  if  it  had 
been  a  truth. 

The  explanation  of  the  illicit  relations  of  evil  with  the  Church  is 
in  the  moral  ends  finally  wrought  out  by  Christianity  itself.  The 
testing  of  Christianity  as  a  system  of  religion  was  at  stake  in  these 
historic  oppositions;  they  were  permitted  in  order  to  prove  Christian- 
ity, and  they  did  establish  it  as  true  in  the  eyes  of  the  world. 
Polemical  discussions  of  Christianity  were  insuflftcient  to  vindicate  it 
from  aspersion  and  misconstruction  ;  logical  abstractions  and  analytic 
definitions  of  truth  did  not  overcome  the  doubt  and  rancor  of  the 
opposition  ;  even  the  saintly  lives  of  Christ's  followers  were  robbed 
of  their  force  by  false  report ;  but  the  survival  of  Christianity  in  spite 
of  the  malice  and  trial  of  eighteen  centuries  is  tJw  refutation  of  all  opposi- 
tion, and  the  prophectj  of  its  future.  The  use  of  trial  in  the  establish- 
ment of  religion  is  therefore  justified. 

On  a  smaller  scale,  but  with  the  same  purpose  in  view,  the  Chris- 
tian is  the  subject  of  trial,  and  ripens  only  as_hej§_disdpliil£.d-  The 
Christian  hero  is  impossible  except  in  a  world  of  conflict.     Patience 


DISTINCTIONS  REQUIRED.  489 

is  possible  only  amid  an  irritating  environment.  Virtue  is  possible 
where  vice  is  possible  also.  Right  character  is  possible  only  in  pro- 
portion as  wrong  character  is  possible.  Tlie  afflictions  of  the  right- 
eous are  intended  to  establish  him  in  the  faith,  to  test  hig^jntegrityf 
toprove  to  him  the  truth  of  what  he  believes.  The  whole  brood  of 
evils,  from^artyrdom  down  to  the  slightest  ridicule,  from  flames  to 
a  finger  raised  in  derision,  from  death  to  the  smallest  slander,  is  in- 
tended to  make  strong  the  believer  in  God,  and  to  build  up  the  Church 
with  fire-proof  material,  that  it  may  stand  throughout  all  ages.  Dis- 
cipline  explains  temptation,  affliction,  ignorance ;  it  explains  man's 
pitiful  lot  and  his  hopeful  future.  Drummond  calls  the  evil  in  man 
a  "  retrogade  principle,"  to  overcome  which  even  more  than  atone- 
ment is  necessary.  Atonement  by  Jesus  Christ  is  the  initial  and 
fundamental  support  of  the  Christian  life  ;  but  in  a  sense  the  human 
subject  must  atone  himself  for  sin  and  work  out  his  own  salvation  by 
the  discipline  of  suffering.  What  we  call  evil,  therefore,  may  he  atone- 
ment for  evil,  as  it  certainly  is  discipline  by  evil.  In  one  of  his  voyages 
Captain  Cook  landed  on  one  of  the  Friendly  Islands,  whose  inhabit- 
ants were  so  ignorant  of  the  nature  of  animals  in  general  that  on  see- 
ing the  sheep  and  goats  in  the  ship  they  called  them  birds.  We  smile 
at  their  ignorance,  but  our  ignorance  of  what  are  evils  and  what  are 
not  may  be  as  dense  as  was  theirs  of  the  animal  kingdom.  Disciplin- 
ary events,  or  trials,  helping  men  to  holier  living,  may  not  be  evils  at 
all,  as  sheep  are  not  birds. 

In  the  attempt  to  explain  evil  as  a  discipline,  we  almost  pass  be- 
yond the  border-land  of  evil,  and  find  ourselves  in  another  region 
of  fact.  Suffering  is  not  necessarily  an  evil.  Darkness  is  not  light, 
but  it  may  be  as  useful  as  the  light.  Death  is  not  to  be  compared 
with  life,  but  death  is  not  an  unmixed  evil.  An  extremist  might 
deny  the  existence  of  evil,  but  as  a  disciplinary  instrument  it  over- 
comes the  evil  intent  and  contributes  to  the  world's  progress  and  hap- 
piness. Considering  evil  as  a  penalty  it  is  just,  and,  therefore,  no 
compromise  of  the  divine  government;  as  a  discipline,  admitting 
its  existence  as  evil,  it  vindicates  itself,  and  requires  no  further  ex- 
planation. 

The  relation  of  evil  to  the  theistic  hypothesis  is  of  more  impor- 
tance than  its  relation  to  the  divine  perfections.  Is  evil  consistent 
with  the  idea  of  Deity  at  all  ?  One  studying  the  world  from  the  ma- 
terialistic standpoint  might  conclude  that  it  is  in  anarchy  and  without 
a  moral  ruler;  but  the  reverse  is  the  truth.  That  evil  follows  the  track 
of  causation  is  proof  that  a  higlier  power  has  imposed  upon  it  the  restraints, 
and  given  it  the  direction,  of  law.  With  this  view  the  theistic  hypoth- 
esis is  easily  maintainable.     But  this  is  not  the  all-important  point  at 


ind 

1  to 

lictj 


490  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

this  time.  Evil  exists  as  an  apparent  disturber  of  divine  plans  and 
ideas.  This  is  the  evil  of  evil.  So  far  forth  as  it  succeeds  in  effectin  ' 
fl~c.ollapse"of  a  divine  idea,  it  is  evil ;  but  so  far  forth  as  it  fails 
undermine  a  divine  idea,  evil  does  not  result,  although  the  confl 
with  it  may  be  painful  and  protracted.  If  divine  ideas  are  working 
out  their  lawful  results,  it  is  proof  that  a  divine  being  is  at  the 
helm  of  the  universe.  As  these  plans  broaden  and  eventuate  in 
reality,  evil  is  circumscribed,  defeated,  and  destroyed.  The  shadow 
of  the  Infinite  presses  hard  upon  the  darkness  of  sin,  and  ever  drives 
it  toward  its  last  resting-place.  The  conflict  of  eyil  and  righteous- 
ness is  apparent  in  all  history  and  attested  by  all  experience ;  but,  as 
it  goes  on,  the  turning  of  victory  "on  the  side  of  righteousness  is  vis- 
ible, and  God  comes  out  of  the  shadows  and  dazzles  the  eyes  of  men 
with  the  brightness  of  his  glory.  In  these  triumphs  over  evil  the 
reign  of  divine  authority  is  as  conspicuous  as  the  virulence  of  the 
enmity  that  disputes  it.  Looking  at  the  general  trend  of  human 
history  toward  righteousness  and  the  perpetual  tendency  of  the  world, 
so  to  speak,  to  right  itself,  the  conclusion  of  divine  rule  is  satis- 
factory, and  the  hope  of  the  final  triumph  of  truth  is  well-grounded 
in  those  probabilities  which  the  providential  government  continually 
inspires. 

Evil  has  its  hour,  its  apparent  triumph,  but  its  destruction  is 
foretold  by  the  sacred  writers,  and  is  one  of  the  animating  purposes 
of  Jesus  Christ.  He  came  to  destroy  the  works  of  the  devil.  Wide 
as  has  been  the  desolation  of  evil,  infectious  and  self-propagating  as 
it  is  by  nature,  it  has  been  circumscribed,  and  its  progress  stayed. 
Its  future  disappearance  is  one  of  the  predicted  certainties  of  Chris- 
tianity. A  true  theodicy  has  only  to  recognize  the  purposes  of  God 
respecting  its  manifested  power  in  order  to  escape  metaphysical  incon- 
sistencies and  justify  its  presence  in  the  world.  If  it  is  God's  purpose 
utterly  to  destroy  it,  leaving  no  trace  of  its  existence  in  the  universe, 
he  is  exhaustively  vindicated  from  all  reproach,  and  stands  before 
his  creatures  as  guiltless  of  all  sin.  The  framer  of  a  theodicy  must 
confine  himself  to  divine  purposes,  as  the  key  to  the  divine  character;  but 
ilie  early  theologians  felt  that  the  divine  character  must  on  a  priori 
grounds  he  first  studied  and  suppotied ;  hence,  the  weakness  of  theodicy  in 
general. 

If  it  is  one  of  the  divine  purposes  to  extinguish  evil,  as  Chris- 
tianity affirms  it  is,  a  bold  thinker  might  wonder  why  it  takes  so  long 
to  do  it,  especially  when  the  infinity  of  the  divine  resources  is  con- 
sidered. This  reflects  somewhat  on  the  tardiness  or  inefficiency  of  the 
divine  methods,  and  calls  for  explanation.  No  theodicy  is  possible 
that  attempts  to  build  itself  on  the  divine  administration  alone  or  on 


THE  DIVINE  ALTERNATIVE.  491 

God*3  relation  to  the  world.  Man  is  an  important  factor  in  the  great 
problem,  is  as  essential  to  it  as  God.  The  freedom  of  man  is  the 
explanation  of  the  sloiv  evolution  of  the  world  into  holiness.  Man  is  re- 
sponsible for  present  sin.  With  the  divine  agencies  at  his  command 
and  the  lessons  of  human  experience  as  inspirations,  he  might  re- 
move evil  from  the  face  of  the  earth.  Freedom  invests  man  with 
wonderful  power  and  corresponding  responsibility  ;  it  is  for  him  to 
say  how  long  evil  shall  continue  its  ruinous  work  in  the  world.  This 
goes  back  to  the  constitution  of  things,  and  raises  the  question,  Why 
is  man  free  if  freedom  involves  not  only  the  possibility  of  evil,  birt 
its  certainty?  Before  the  divine  mind  there  was  the  alternative 
to  create  a  race,  holy  in  nature  and  restrained  from  sin,  and,  there- 
fore, mechanically  constrained  to  righteousness,  or  to  create  a  race 
■with  a  free-will,  implying  all  the  possibilities  and  certainties  of  evil, 
with  the  ability  through  grace  to  overcome  it,  and  stand  before  their 
Maker  as  the  voluntary  subjects  of  holiness.  The  divine  Ruler  pre- 
ferred the  latter ;  hence,  man  is  free ;  and,  being  free,  he  sins,  and, 
sinning,  he  delays  God's  idea  of  holiness,  and,  that  idea  delayed,  man 
suffers  and  death  reigns.  God  is  responsible  for  making  men  free ; 
men  are  responsible  for  abusing  their  freedom  to  their  own  degradation. 

Further  examination  enables  us  to  conclude  that  evil,  understood 
in  its  relations  to  time  and  eternity,  has  a  bearing  on  one  of  the  most 
dreadful  doctrines  of  Christianity,  namely,  that  of  hell,  or  future  re- 
tribution, against  which  materialism  has  spoken  with  fierce  and  angry 
tones,  and  in  evident  revolt  against  the  truth.  That  the  doctrine  is 
Biblical,  it  goes  without  saying.  Is  it  a  true  doctrine?  The  scientific 
method  of  proof  would  require  its  vindication  from  natural  religion, 
or  the  teachings  of  nature ;  for,  if  nature  foreshadows  the  principle 
of  retribution,  the  Christian  religion  can  not  be  impugned  if  it 
teaches  it  openly. 

No  scientist  doubts  the  orthodoxy  of  nature  respecting  the  law  of 
suffering  and  punishment.  The  physical  world,  with  its  unchanging 
laws,  is  regarded  by  materialists  as  a  testimony  against  the  doctrine 
of  a  benevolent  Ruler  ;  for  these  laws  are  never  suspended  in  the  in- 
terest of  man,  and  his  history  is  one  of  incessant  struggle  with  them. 
On  the  whole,  nature  is  declared  to  be  against  man.  He,  therefore, 
suffers.  Whether  this  be  a  true  view  or  not,  it  should  prove  to  the 
materialist  that,  if  the  God  of  nature  has  so  arranged  the  physical 
universe  as  to  produce  suffering,  it  makes  not  against  the  God  of  the 
Bible  if  it  is  proven  that  he  has  so  arranged  the  spiritual  universe  as 
to  be  productive  of  suffering  also.  If  the  natural  world  is  ceaselessly 
active  in  inflicting  suffering,  the  spiritual  world  may  be  ceaselessly 
active  in  inflicting  it  also.     The  grim  testimony  of  nature  is  not, 


492  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

therefore,  against  the  doctrine  of  future  retribution,  and  the  God  of 
the  Bible  can  not  be  condemned  any  more  than  the  God  of  nature. 

The  fact  of  evil  in  this  life  may  be  suggestive  of  evil  in  the  next^ 
life.  What  is  the  evil  of  this  life  ?  Natural  evil,  or  the  evil  of  en- 
vironment, the  cause  of  untold  suffering  from  the  cradle  to  the  grave ; 
moral  evil,  or  the  evil  of  personality,  the  cause  of  subjective  misery 
and  death.  The  evil  of  condition  and  character  here  may  portend 
the  evil  of  condition  and  character  there.  If  the  eternal  condition 
has  in  it  the  possibility  of  evil,  it  has  also  the  possibility  of  hell ;  and 
if  it  involves  the  certainty  of   evil,  it  involves  the  certainty  of  hell. 

If  personal  character,  once  formed,  is  irreversible,  having  in  it 
the  potency  of  evil,  what  is  to  hinder  hell  from  becoming  a  personal 
experience?     "Myself  am  hell,"  says  Milton's  Satan. 

What  are  the  conclusions? 

1.  Christianity  fully  recognizes  the  origin,  potency,  and  influence  of 
evil  in  the  universe.  Emerson  makes  little  of  sin,  but  Jesus  Christ 
makes  much  of  it. 

2.  Evil  is  the  possibility  of  the  constitution  of  things,  without  involv- 
ing the  divine  government  in  imperfection  or  reproach. 

3.  As  a  constitutional  disorder,  evil  is  binder  law,  and  is  the  prod- 
uct of  law. 

4.  The  distinction  between  natural  and  moral  evil  is  puerile,  and 
can  have  no  place  in  a  true  theodicy. 

5.  A  constitutional  disorder,  its  final  cause  is  a  providential  pur- 
pose, and,  instrumentally,  it  serves  a  providential  mission. 

6.  Employed  as  an  instrument,  God's  character  is  not  involved  in 
its  activities  or  results.  The  basis  of  theodicy  is  not  God's  character, 
but  God's  purposes. 

7.  Evil  has  a  place  in  the  category  of  realities  as  a  jyenalty,  and, 
as  such,  it  is  just ;  it  must  be  viewed  also  as  a  discipline,  and,  as  such, 
the  gains  from  it  have  exceeded  the  losses ;  it  is  also  a  partial  atone- 
ment for  sin,  which,  joined  to  the  atonement  of  Jesus  Christ,  affords 
an  adequate  remedy  for  the  world's  inclination  to  wrong. 

8.  The  history  of  ev.il  furnishes  proof  of  the  existence  of  God, 
and  its  gradual  extinction  is  evidence  of  the  reign  of  divine  wisdom, 
and  the  authority  of  a  divine  purpose. 

9.  The  continued  existence  of  sin  is  no  reflection  on  the  character 
of  God,  but  is  proof  of  the  freedom  of  man.  Man,  not  God,  is  re- 
sponsible for  sin. 

10.  As  evil  is  the  possibility  of  the  constitution  of  the  universe, 
so  hell  is  the  possibility  of  the  constitidion  of  evil. 


SOCIAL  RECONSTRUCTION.  493 


CHAPTER  XXIII. 

THE    IDEAL.  SOCIETY;    OR  THE    RELATION   OE  CHRIS- 
TIANITY TO   SOCIETY. 

TO  the  thought  of  the  historic  Greeks,  the  millennium  or  golden 
age  of  mankind  had,  long  before  their  day,  arrived  and  departed, 
■never  to  return;  it  was  participated  in  by  their  godlike  ancestors, 
who  were  a  superior  race,  and  specially  favored  by  the  supreme 
powers.  As  to  the  future  of  the  world,  they  anticipated  stagnation 
of  political  forces,  decay  of  the  best  civilizations,  degradation  of  social 
order,  arrest  of  individual  development,  and  the  appearance  of  an 
inferior  race  of  human  beings,  whose  history  would  end  in  colossal 
convulsions  and  final  and  exhaustive  exterminations.  The  tone  of 
Grecian  prophecy  is  leaden,  sepulchral,  uuinvigoratiug. 

Taught  by  a  truer  inspiration,  the  ancient  Jew  reversed  the  dark 
anticipations  of  the  Greek,  holding  that  the  Past  was  the  age  of  in- 
feriority, limitation,  incipiency,  while  the  bow  of  promise  spanned 
the  future,  and  illuminated  the  eye-ball  of  nations.  The  tone  of 
Jewish  prophecy  is  sanguine  and  assuring,  and,  by  its  incorporation 
into  Christianity,  it  has  become  the  stronghold  of  faith  respecting 
man  and  the  future — a  view  that  sweeps  away  pessimism,  stimulates 
philosophy  to  right  thinking,  quickens  the  indifferent  energies  of 
slow-going  peoples,  and  floods  the  world  with  optimistic  thoughts  of 
the  race's  development. 

It  is  not  our  purpose,  at  this  moment,  to  describe  the  future  man, 
or  indicate  the  peculiarities  of  future  civilizations,  under  the  operation 
of  either  philosophy  or  Christianity,  or  both,  as  this  will  appear  in 
the  later  and  larger  discussion  of  the  subject ;  but,  first  of  all,  to  con- 
sider if  an  ideal  state,  in  an  experimental  or  absolute  form,  is  at  all 
possible,  and  whether  it  may  be  realized  sooner  and  more  permanently 
through  Christianity  than  by  any  philosophical  system  or  basis  of  life. 
In  other  words,  must  systems  of  sociology  rest  upon  a  purely  philo- 
sophical or  theological  basis? 

Whether  naturalistic  or  supernaturalistic  agencies  must  be  chief 
in  social  reconstructions,  we  shall  learn  in  this  review.  No  less  than 
eight  distinctive  theoretical  or  experimental  ideas  or  bases  of  human 
society,  a  brief  notice  of  which  can  only  be  given  here,  human  his- 
tory furnishes  for  our  instruction  and  guidance. 

I.     Perhaps  as  prominent  as   any,   and  certainly  more   forceful 


494  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

than  many,  is  the  ecclesiastical  idea  of  human  society.  To  this,  in  the 
general,  and  so  far  as  it  partakes  of,  or  borrows  its  spirit  from,  apos- 
tolic ideals,  no  exception  can  be  taken  ;  but,  in  searching  and  fol- 
lowing the  historic  development  and  application  of  the  idea,  we  come 
in  contact  with  strange  ecclesiasticisms,  embodying  centralization,  in- 
tolerance, and  stagnation,  and  appearing  in  our  day  as  the  monu- 
mental forms  of  bigoted  force.  Three  such  ecclesiasticisms  readily 
occur  to  us.  The  Roman  Catholic  conception  of  human  society 
concreted  in  the  eleventh  century  in  Hildebrand,  than  whom  a  more 
aggressive  and  successful  exponent  of  papal  ideas  and  papal  policies 
never  lived.  Long  before  he  assumed  the  miter,  he  was  the  acknowl- 
edged influence  in  the  circles  of  the  Church,  and  began  even  early  in 
his  monastic  career  to  meditate  upon  a  scheme  for  the  consolidation 
of  political  and  spiritual  power  that  has  not  been  paralleled  in  human 
annals ;  and,  under  his  own  administration,  the  consolidation  was 
virtually  effected.  He  conceived  that  the  pope  should  be  the  ruler 
in  temporal,  no  less  than  in  spiritual,  affaii's  ;  that  he  should  be  the 
head  of  the  Church,  infallible  in  his  ecclesiastical  judgments,  and  that 
all  temporal  rulers  should  pay  him  homage  and  tribute,  and  that  the 
whole  world  should  regard  him  as  its  lawful  potentate  and  as  God's 
vicegerent  on  earth.  The  scheme  was  magnificent  in  outline,  and 
plausible  as  a  proclamation.  It  meant  the  priority  of  the  Church  in 
all  thiugs,  temporal  and  spiritual  ;  it  meant  the  heroic  domination 
of  Christian  ideas  in  civil  governments ;  it  meant  one  source  of  au- 
thority and  uniformity  of  rule  throughout  the  world  ;  it  meant  unity 
of  civilizatio7is,  unity  of  social  structures,  unity  of  religious  worship,  unity 
of  human  respoiviibility.  Vast,  heroic,  magnificent,  as  the  scheme  was, 
it  was  not  without  serious  internal  weaknesses,  which  manifested 
themselve,  like  incurable  diseases,  as  it  was  unfolded  and  executed. 
It  possessed  heterogeneous  elements,  wdiich  interfered  with  its  applica- 
tion ;  it  wrought  out  its  anticipated  unities,  not  by  spontaneous  and 
natural  methods,  but  by  force,  which  alienated  instead  of  cementing 
them;  aggressive  in  its  purpose,  it  became  oppressive  in  its  plans; 
unyielding  to  circumstances,  it  awakened  resistance,  and,  instead  of 
giving  peace,  it  produced  war.  For  a  period  accepted,  human  society 
degenerated  under  its  authority ;  the  Bible  was  unopened  to  the 
masses ;  ignorance  was  a  virtue ;  absolution  from  sin  became  pur- 
chasable ;  martyrdoms  multiplied ;  kings  and  parliaments  violated 
compacts  with  Rome ;  kings  were  unkinged ;  parliaments  were  dis- 
solved ;  human  legislation  was  rebuked,  and  legislators  were  defied ; 
and  such  were  the  tumults,  frictions,  conflicts  of  authority,  general 
degradation  of  the  people,  poverty,  crime,  social  disorders,  persecu- 
tions, and  bigotries  that  it  produced,  that  a  protest  of  the  nations 


POLITICAL  ECCLESIASTICISMS.  495 

was  made  against  it  in  the  form  of  a  Reformation.  The  Roman 
Catholic  idea  of  religious  centralization  has  demonstrated  its  unfitness 
and  inability  in  its  historical  trial. 

Under  Henry  VIII.  the  ecclesiastical  idea  tended  to  a  similar  result, 
but  being  narrower  in  its  range,  and  avoiding  some  of  the  conceded 
errors  of  the  papal  scheme,  it  never  rounded  out  in  complete  develop- 
ment. However,  in  its  thought  of  the  centralization  of  religious 
power ;  in  its  selfish  conception  of  one  visible  Church,  the  sole  ruler 
in  religious  affairs;  and  in  its  claim  of  antecedent  connection  with 
the  apostolic  or  original  Church,  it  was  not  less  vehement  than  its 
predecessor,  the  Roman  Catholic  hierarchy.  As  to  the  supremacy 
of  ecclesiastical  authority  in  temporal  governments,  and  the  subjection 
of  the  people  to  its  social  order,  the  Episcopal  scheme  is  less  ob- 
jectionable than  the  other.  Still,  wherever  the  consolidation  of 
the  temporal  and  spiritual  has  been  at  all  a  possibility,  as  to  some 
extent  in  England,  the  result  has  been  religious  proscription,  a  heter- 
ogeneous civilization,  and  a  divided  government.  Not  under  this 
milder  type  of  Hildebrand's  scheme  is  a  reconstruction  of  society 
desirable,  for  in  effect  it  means  the  same  thing. 

In  the  American  colonies  there  appeared  a  peculiar  ecclesiasticism, 
difl^erent  from  the  preceding  in  some  particulars,  but  kindred  to  them 
by  a  common  idea,  namely,  Puritanism.  Without  recalling  our 
colonial  history,  it  is  sufficient  to  report  that  the  Puritanic  idea  was 
for  a  season  in  power  in  the  New  England  portion  of  the  country, 
and  that  its  chief  purpose  was  to  secure  unity  of  civilization  by  con- 
formity to  enacted  religious  and  social  ideas  and  methods,  all  of  which 
had  to  be  accepted  at  the  peril  of  one's  life.  It  is  not  denied  that 
Puritanism  bore  fruit.  The  claim  that  our  civilization  is  indebted  to 
it  we  care  not  to  dispute.  What  we  now  affirm  is  that  the  Puri- 
tanic idea  can  not  be  the  final  or  beau  ideal  idea  of  society ;  that  its 
very  intolerance  was  suicidal  ;  that  it  was  a  political  and  religious 
scheme  which  in  the  long  run  had  to  be  exchanged  for  something 
better.  What  it  did  with  Roger  Williams  it  would  do  with  all  dis- 
senters. Hence,  it  was  illiberal,  and  denied  to  man  the  right  of 
private  judgment,  and  the  free  exercise  of  all  God-given  privileges. 
Bancroft  speaks  of  it  as  "the  reign  of  the  visible  Church,"  but  it 
was  the  political  rather  than  the  religious  reign  of  the  Church.  Of 
the  theologic  aspects  of  Puritanism  we  shall  not  speak  ;  nor  of  its 
philosophic  bearings  on  human  society  ;  but,  as  a  political  and  social 
force,  it  failed  as  utterly  as  the  ecclesiasticisms  heretofore  mentioned. 
Indeed,  it  actually  perished,  while  the  others  still  maintain  an  ap- 
pearance of  life,  but  under  very  paralyzing  conditions. 

These  three  ecclesiasticisms  in  their   recognition   of  the  unity  of 


496  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

the  race,  the  unity  of  the  Church,  and  the  unity  of  civiHzation  have 
a  justification ;  but  the  weakness  coramon  to  them  all  was  the  at- 
tempted enforcement  of  centralized  political  and  religious  power 
under  the  sacred  guise  of  the  doctrine  of  unity.  Both  religion  and  phi- 
losophy agree  touching  unity  ;  but  these  ecclesiasticisms  secretly  plotted 
for  political  unity,  or  civil  power,  under  the  name  of  religious  unity. 
Of  the  theology  and  the  philosophy  of  the  ecclesiastical  establish- 
ments we  have  not  spoken  adversely ;  it  is  the  social  and  political  re- 
sults that  we  enumerate  as  evidences  of  their  unfitness  as  social  and 
political  forces  in  the  Avorld's  civil  regeneration. 

II.  If  not  on  the  ecclesiastical  idea,  may  not  society  be  reared 
on  the  political  idea  ?  What  the  political  idea  is,  history  defines,  and 
concerning  its  adaptation  to  the  social  state  history  is  equally  positive. 
Certain  political  ideas  must  enter  into  the  constitution  of  the  public 
state,  as  the  duties  of  reciprocity,  the  laws  of  political  economy,  the 
equality  of  civil  rights,  and  the  distribution  of  political  favors,  but 
what  political  form  of  government  will  promote  these  and  other 
political  ends  must  not  be  determined  too  hastily.  An  appeal 
to  historic  political  forms,  the  illustrations  of  the  political  idea,  will 
aid  in  the  solution  of  the  problem.  At  least  three  separate  political 
results  will  reward  our  search  after  historical  examples.  In  the 
early  stages  of  human  society  the  political  idea  took  a  barbarous 
complexion  and  built  itself  up  in  despotic  and  monarchical  forms,  the 
remains  of  which  appear  in  modern  Asiatic  and  African  tribal 
governments.  The  authority  of  might  had  its  final  illustration  in 
the  splendid  civilizations  of  Babylon  and  Egypt,  which  after  a  sturdy 
existence  suddenly  passed  away.  Earlier  than  these  were  the  crude 
political  fabrics  of  savages  and  pagans,  whose  ideas  of  human  rela- 
tionship were  subordinated  to  the  one  thought  of  dominion,  self- 
preservation,  and  self-gratification.  But  neither  the  coarse  nor  the 
refined  political  barbarisms  of  the  ancieut  days;  neither  men  who 
fought  with  clubs  nor  those  who  gracefully  cast  their  spears,  are 
true  types  of  government  or  manhood.  As  far  as  the  animal  king- 
dom of  to-day  is  in  advance  of  cephalopods,  so  far  are  our  political 
forms  beyond  the  barbarian's  idea  of  social  government.  Study 
these  forms,  however. 

The  royal  political  idea,  the  rule  by  divine  right — what  is  this 
but  a  political  deception  ?  The  test  of  a  political  system  is  not  ex- 
actly its  power  to  endure,  for  the  old  pagan  civilizations  endured 
many  centuries,  but  at  last  succumbed  to  the  attrition  of  forces  more 
inherently  pregnant  with  life  than  they.  By  virtue  of  the  royal 
political  idea,  kingdoms  vast  and  civilizations  magnificent  have  been 
the  product ;  and  it  is  idle  to  deny  that  many  of  them  have  seemed 


NAPOLEON'S  SCHEME  OF  CONSOLIDATION.  497 

to  perform  a  providential  mission,  having  fostered  the  great  ends  of 
government:  viz.,  the  education  of  the  people,  the  establishment  of 
religious  worship,  the  reduction  of  temporal  evils,  and  the  promotion 
of  individual  rights.  Conceding  the  superiority  of  the  royal  to  the 
barbarian  policy,  both  in  its  purpose  and  achievement,  it  is  not  clear 
that  the  one  any  more  than  the  other  is  the  ideal  of  human  govern- 
ment. It  is  clear  that  the  royal  idea  must  be  finally  displaced,  as 
one  stratum  is  by  another,  in  the  great  future  of  the  world.  Asia 
and  Africa  furnish  monuments  of  the  barbarians  political  idea; 
Europe  points  to  the  reign  and  ruin  of  the  royal  political  idea.  The 
latter  has  been  on  trial  in  every  European  nation,  to  the  final  disad- 
vantage of  all ;  for  ignorance,  pauperism,  crime,  irreligion,  and  revo- 
lution are  all  but  universal.  At  this  very  hour,  such  is  the  outcry 
against  the  modern  political  idea  of  government  that  thrones  are 
shaking,  kings  trembling,  and  revolutions  are  imminent.  Nihilism 
and  Socialism  are  mocking  the  royal  idea.  Neither  the  authority  of 
might,  nor  the  authority  of  divine  right,  as  crystallized  in  a  govern- 
mental form,  furnishes  a  sufficient  basis  for  the  political  and  social 
structure. 

The  third  political  idea  is  different  from  the  ethers,  both  in  its 
nature  and  extent.  Napoleon  conceived  the  mammoth  project  of  ex- 
tending the  boundaries  of  the  French  Empire  to  the  European  limits, 
of  consolidating  a  continent  under  one  government,  thus  securing 
political  unity  and  uniformity'  of  social  order.  That  in  his  thinking 
he  went  beyond  this  scheme,  which  he  vainly  endeavored  to  realize, 
and  mused  over  the  consolidation  of  all  kingdoms  into  one,  can  not 
be  questioned.  The  conception  of  such  a  consummation  may  be  due 
to  Napoleon's  genius  for  the  entertainment  of  great  ideas ;  but,  as  a 
political  project,  put  in  motion,  and  for  a  time  marching  on  to  suc- 
cess, it  is  perfectly  astounding.  Hildebrand's  scheme  of  consolidation 
was  qua^i  spiritual  and  •  for  spiritual  ends ;  Napoleon's  scheme  was 
political  and  for  political  ends.  Both  were  magnificent;  both  were 
in  process  of  execution ;  both  excited  the  fear  of  the  world ;  both 
failed.  Force  was  the  method  employed  by  both— a  lesson  that  the 
unity  of  the  world  in  ideal  conditions  can  not  be  secured  by  the 
coercive  method.  In  these  we  reach  the  antipodes  of  the  idea  of 
governmental  unity,  the  one  assuming  spiritual  unity  and  the  other 
political  unity,  as  the  ideal  of  human  condition. 

The  dream  of  one  civilization,  or  the  centralization  of  political 
power  in  one  headship,  was  not  original  with  the  French  ruler,  nor 
was  his  attempt  at  its  realization  the  first  made  by  political  dreamers. 
No  less  a  conception  than  universal  rule  and  the  conversion  of  con- 
tinents into  provinces  of  the  Macedonian  Empire  was  the  palpitating 

32 


498  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

hope  of  Alexander  the  Great,  who,  like  the  "he-goat"  of  Daniel, 
waxed  strong  and  pushed  in  all  directions,  conquering  all  nations,  and 
wept  when  there  was  none  to  reduce  to  submission.  At  his  death 
the  massive  kingdom  fell  to  pieces,  a  proof  that  the  experiment  was 
artificial,  and  the  cohesive  spirit  inanimate  and  dead.  A  more  serv- 
iceable illustration  of  a  world-wide  political  unity,  or  conformity  to 
one  governmental  idea,  is  that  of  the  Roman  world  under  Augustus, 
who  made  Roman  citizenship  a  coveted  respectability,  and  Roman 
arms  a  terror  to  the  most  distant  foes.  This  political  achievement  is 
more  nearly  the  analogue  of  Hildebrand's  conception  of  the  univer- 
sality of  spiritual  authority  under  one  headship  than  Napoleon's  bril- 
liant, but  unsuccessful  attempt.  Though  enduring  for  centuries,  at 
last,  from  internal  enfeebling  causes,  it  perished  like  Alexander's 
short-lived  and  more  nominal  universal  sovereignty.  Neither  the 
colossal  experiment  of  founding  a  spiritual  headship  for  the  world, 
nor  the  oft-repeated  attempt  at  organizing  all  nations  into  one  king- 
dom under  one  political  authority,  has  had  permanent  success,  or 
demonstrated  the  feasibility  or  necessity  of  either.  While,  however, 
these  failures  have  been  conspicuous,  it  should  not  be  forgotten  that 
in  the  ideal  society  the  idea  of  unity  must  have  a  place,  and  that 
the  scheme  of  unity,  in  order  to  achievement,  must  be  in  perfect 
harmony  with  the  idea  of  unity.  Both  Hildebraud  and  Napoleon 
failed  in  their  schemes ;  the  idea  still  remains. 

III.  To  what  extent  shall  the  philosophical  idea  dominate  in  human 
society  ?  Is  there  a  philosophical  idea  around  which  government  may 
grow?  We  must  lose  sight  of  the  theological  ideas  of  the  philoso- 
phers, since,  so  far  as  they  are  theological,  they  belong  to  the  domain 
of  religion,  and  will  be  considered  as  such  at  the  proper  time,  as  the 
atheism  of  Epicurus,  the  moral  code  of  Seneca,  the  mythology  of 
Socrates,  and  the  ethics  of  Spencer.  But  the  philosophical  systems 
of  ancient  and  modern  thinkers,  so  far  as  they  relate  to  the  regula- 
tion of  human  life,  and  contain  suggestions  touching  the  governmental 
order  of  society,  we  may  investigate  with  reference  to  their  fitness  as 
social  and  governmental  forces. 

One  example  from  the  ancients,  and  one  from  the  moderns,  will 
be  quite  sufficient  for  our  purpose.  More  than  all  others  of  his  day, 
Plato  undertakes  to  describe  the  ideal  society,  insisting  that  it  will 
be  under  the  influence  of  the  philosophic  spirit,  that  the  governors 
will  be  philosophers,  and  that  laws  will  be  enacted  in  accordance 
with  philosophic  considerations.  A  "philosophic  race,"  he  observes, 
"  must  have  the  government  of  the  state,"  or  miseries  will  never  cease. 

To  this  view,  then,  let  us  appeal.  In  his  Republic  this  philosophic 
social  system  is  revealed  in  all  its  details,  with  much  of  beauty  in  de- 


WRECKED  COMMUNISTIC  ATTEMPTS.  499 

scription,  and  not  a  little  virtue  in  suggestion.  In  his  Laivs  the 
reader  will  find,  indeed,  laws  covering  human  conduct  to  its  minutest 
acts,  and  regulating  life  to  its  smallest  obligations.  Taking  the  two 
together  he  will  find  Plato's  system  entire,  with  its  virtues  and  blem- 
ishes, which  have  been  enumerated  in  the  first  chapter  of  this  book. 

The  admirers  of  Plato's  scheme  have  been  many,  but  attempts  to 
reduce  it  to  practical  operation,  or  to  institute  a  society  in  conformity 
to  certain  supposed  ideal  conditions,  have  been  fruitless,  except  as  they 
demonstrated  the  unwisdom  of  the  scheme  itself.  Sir  Thomas  More's 
Utopia,  like  Plato's  Republic,  was  a  suggestive  ideal,  but  never  re- 
duced to  experiment ;  on  the  other  hand,  the  Harmonites,  a  pious 
people  under  the  leadership  of  Mr.  Rapp,  located  in  Indiana  and 
organized  a  community  under  the  inspiration  of  a  Utopian  conception. 
Far  more  commendable  was  the  experiment  than  Plato's  speculative 
republic;  for  it  maintained  the  family  idea,  divided  labor,  and  exer- 
cised a  common  and  equal  care  over  all  its  subjects.  The  despotism 
of  leadership,  the  unity  of  interest,  the  absence  of  individual  ambi- 
tion, the  repression  of  religious  inquiry,  and  a  forced  social  conform- 
ity were  the  weaknesses  to  which  it  finally  yielded  under  the  more 
pretentious  superintendence  of  Mr.  Owen. 

According  to  Josephus  the  Essenes  were  a  sectarian  organization, 
dominated  by  the  spirit  of  self-abnegation,  and  having  in  view  only 
the  larger  weal  of  the  whole  in  place  of  the  development  and  happi- 
ness of  the  individual.  Provisionally,  too,  it  may  be  allowed  that  the 
early  Christians  adopted,^ and  for  a  brief  period  observed,  a  Utopian 
plan  in  the  surrender  of  their  wealth  to  a  common  fund,  and  in  the 
recognition  of  the  equality  of  each  in  the  social  inheritance.  Whether 
the  philosophical  suggestion  of  an  isolated  or  communistic  organization 
has  been  accepted  and  observed  in  a  religious  or  purely  political  way, 
the  result  in  all  cases  has  been  the  same — the  decline  of  individual 
character,  the  Avithering  of  the  social  functions,  and  at  last  the  de- 
cadence of  the  social  system  itself. 

Very  different,  if  not  the  opposite,  are  the  philosophical  recom- 
mendations of  Herbert  Spencer  touching  the  problems  of  sociology.  The 
author  of  evolution  affects  to  see  in  it  the  key  to  the  development  of  a 
perfect  social  structure  from  which  all  evil  will  be  eliminated,  and  in 
which  the  individual  will  attain  his  largest  consciousness.  He  recom- 
mends no  isolated  organization  for  the  trial  of  his  suggestion  ;  he  recom- 
mends no  trial  at  all  of  his  theory,  but  points  to  history  itself  as  both  an 
illustration  and  a  vindication  of  the  evolutionary  process  in  the  expul- 
sion of  evil  and  the  regeneration  of  the  social  order.  With  skillful 
hand  he  traces  the  slow  evanescence  of  vices,  diseases,  and  disorders  inhu- 
man history,  and  the  natural  working  of  better  agencies  for  the  elevation, 


500  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHPdSTIAKITY. 


education,  and  improvement  of  man,  and  on  the  historic  basis  of 
progress,  whether  the  agencies  to  be  employed  be  enumerated  or 
omitted,  he  justifies  faith  in  future  progress  until  the  social  struc- 
ture will  contain  more  of  good  than  evil,  and  frictions  and  hin- 
drances be  reduced  to  the  smallest  number,  without  power  to  pre- 
vent in  any  individual  life  the  attainment  of  its  true  destiny.  As 
this  view  of  the  future  is  in  accord  with  the  prophetic  purpose  of 
Christianity,  it  can  not  be  resisted ;  but  in  the  consideration  of  the 
agencies  that  must  promote  the  purposes  Mr.  Spencer  is  singularly 
out  of  harmony,  not  only  with  theologians,  but  with  statesmen,  and 
thinkers  of  all  schools,  except  those  of  his  own.  Evading  the  relig- 
ious influence  in  the  culture  and  development  of  man,  it  is  fundamental 
with  him  that  the  law  of  life  is  such  as  in  its  very  nature  to  produce 
aspirations  and  ambitions  for  better  conditions,  and  that,  as  there  has 
been  an  evolution  of  physical  structures,  so  there  will  be  an  evolu- 
tion of  social  structures,  the  last  always  superior  to  that  which 
preceded  it.  By  means  of  natural  agencies,  therefore,  there  will  finally 
appear  a  social  system,  perfect  in  morals,  perfect  in  industrial  energy, 
perfect  in  the  culture  of  men,  accomplishing  ideal  ends  in  an  ideal 
way,  the  whole  the  result  of  the  evolutionary  order  inaugurated  from 
the  beginning.  Conscience,  mind,  and  soul  will  by  evolutionary  pro- 
cesses become  perfect  mechanically  operating  forces,  as  by  similar 
processes  the  human  body  and  physical  organisms  have  attained  their 
present  harmony  and  beauty. 

To  other  philosophic  theories  respecting  society  we  must  omit  all 
reference ;  and  of  these  mentioned  it  is  quite  enough  to  say  that,  as 
Plato's  never  was  reduced  to  practice  in  all  its  details,  so  Spencer's 
has  never  had,  and  never  can  have,  an  independent  trial,  for  even  if 
the  evolutionary  process  be  recognized,  it  must  include  the  religious 
factor,  to  which  modern  society,  if  it  be  superior  to  the  ancient,  is 
indebted  more  than  to  all  other  agencies  combined.  Evolution  with- 
out religion  is  as  speculative  as  materialism  without  God. 

IV.  The  scientific  idea  of  society  is  quite  as  specific  and  individual 
as  any  of  the  preceding.  An  examination  of  what  it  teaches  or  pro- 
poses is,  therefore,  next  in  order.  Mr.  Buckle  is  chosen  as  the  ex- 
ponent of  the  materialistic  interpretation  of  civilization,  for  the  reason 
that,  though  not  its  original  advocate,  he  has  applied  it  Avith  more 
distinctness  and  made  it  more  plausible  than  any  previous  writer  of 
his  school.  According  to  this  apostle  of  materialism,  civilization, 
whether  massive,  as  in  Egypt ;  refined,  as  in  Greece  ;  vacillating,  as 
in  Spain ;  or  vital  and  vigorous,  as  in  Scotland,  is  the  result  of  ma- 
terial forces,  to  which  both  pagan  and  civilized  must  yield  dominion. 
Man  is  not  above  nature.     His  "  conquest  of  nature"  is  a  flattering 


PHYSIOLOGICAL  LAW  OF  CIVILIZATION.  501 

phrase,  whose  interior  meaning  is  that  he  has  put  himself  in  harmony 
with  nature.  Nature's  laws  may  be  discovered,  used  ;  they  are  never  con- 
quered ;  nature's  forces  are  not  overcome,  but  turned  to  the  produc- 
tion of  ends.  By  virtue  of  obedience  to  laws,  forces,  and  material 
conditions,  mankind  rise,  since  they  all  portend  progress,  if  obeyed, 
and  destruction,  if  disobeyed.  Civilizations  have  originated  in  conform- 
ity to  material  forces,  and  disappeared  in  contention  with  or  violation 
of  such  forces,  leaving  their  wrecks  to  tell  the  mournful  story  of  their 
non-adjustment  to  environment  as  the  secret  of  their  downfall.  No 
difference  what  the  civilization,  or  social  structure,  or  governmental 
form,  its  true  test  is  this  of  material  force,  or  the  relation  of  material 
energy  to  governmental  vitality.  Culture  and  religion,  or  the  ideas  of 
divine  providence  and  intellectual  force,  are  subordinate  to  the  uni- 
versal laws  of  natural  order  and  development.  In  this  view  the  lower 
explains  the  higher;  the  higher  is  the  slave  of  the  lower.  The  do- 
minion of  man,  as  lord  of  creation,  is  surrendered  to  the  dominion  of 
nature,  as  the  primal  force  in  all  things.  To  this  kind  of  material- 
ism, reversing  the  historic  order  of  national  development,  and  elim- 
inating religious  agency,  the  most  potent  of  all,  does  the  scientific  idea 
in  Buckle's  hands  conduct  us.  The  refutation  of  the  materialistic 
hypothesis  of  civilization  is  the  history  of  civilization  itself,  which 
points  to  the  decay  of  all  governmental  institutions,  whose  elemental 
strength  was  in  material  force,  or  which,  among  the  instrumental 
causes  of  growth  and  apparent  stability,  was  sovereign.  Not  a  civili- 
zation exists  ivhicli  grounded  itself  exclusively  in  the  lower  forces.  What  is 
true  of  materialistic  civilization  is  also  true  of  civilizations  mixed, 
or  those  in  which,  while  other  elements  were  apparently  constitu- 
tional, the  vital  force  was  physical,  or,  at  the  least,  neither  intellec- 
tual nor  religious.  No  institution  or  government,  without  the  relig- 
ious force,  can  overcome  the  gravity  of  the  lower  forces.  Buckle 
reduces  the  problem  of  national  greatness  to  a  problem  of  geograph- 
ical conditions  ;  but  no  nation  can  stand  long  on  a  little  geography. 
Dr.  J.  W.  Draper  handles  more  astutely  the  scientific  idea  in  its 
reference  to  the  problems  of  civilization,  marshaling  an  army  of  facts 
in  support  of  it,  but  arriving  at  a  conclusion  almost  as  unsatisfactory 
as  that  that  follows  Buckle's  generalization.  Human  society,  in  his 
careful  estimation  of  its  history,  seems  to  observe  a  physiological  law  of 
development,  passing  through  various  stages  from  the  beginning  to 
the  end,  as  an  individual  passes  from  one  period  of  life  to  another 
until  his  mission  is  accomplished.  He  compares  national  life  to  in- 
dividual life,  assigning  to  the  former  :  1.  An  Age  of  Credulity  ;  2.  An 
Age  of  Inquiry  ;  3.  An  Age  of  Faith  ;  4.  An  Age  of  Reason  ;  5.  An 
Age  of  Decrepitude, — which  correspond  to  infancy,  childhood,  youth, 


502  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

manhood,  and  age  in  the  latter.  That  this  physiological  interpretation 
of  civilization  has  its  justification  in  the  history  of  society,  must  be 
admitted ;  for  the  exceptions  to  this  general  order  of  initiation,  prog- 
ress, and  decadence  in  national  life  are  rare  and  unimportant.  We 
make  nothing  in  Dr.  Draper's  interpretation  of  the  omission  of  Chris- 
tianity as  a  vital  principle  in  civilization  ;  for,  granting  that  without 
Christianity  all  great  civilizations  have  decayed,  and  national  forms 
have  existed  only  for  a  period,  it  furnishes  proof  of  the  need  of  a  new 
principle  of  national  existence,  which  shall  have  the  power  to  per- 
petuate a  civilization  until  the  end  of  time.  His  interpretation  re- 
minds one  of  the  Spanish  navy,  whose  ships  could  not  endure  the 
recoil  of  their  own  guns.  Out  of  his  physiological  law  emerges  the 
conclusion  that  civilization  is  in  need  of  a  higher  principle,  which  shall 
arrest  the  tendency  to  decay,  and  promote  national  immortality.  Ev- 
idently this  principle  is  Christianity  itself. 

V.  Still  another  view  of  human  society,  foreign  to  the  Christian 
hypothesis,  is  itself  under  the  reign  of  the  Socialistic  idea.  Two  kinds 
of  Socialism  John  Stuart  Mill  distinguishes — the  one  philosophical, 
represented  by  M.  Fourier  ;  the  other  revolutionary,  represented  by 
the  destructionists  of  all  modern  systems  of  organized  government. 
Of  the  former  he  subscribes  himself  a  friend,  while  confessing  that 
the  peculiar  opinions  of  Fourier  on  marriage  were  independent  of  the 
principles  of  his  industrial  system.  The  virtue  of  philosophical  So- 
cialism is  in  its  regulation  of  the  industrial  interests  of  a  community, 
or  the  adjustment  of  the  differences  and  difficulties  that  occur  between 
capital  and  labor  ;  but  who  will  consent  that  industrial  interests  are 
supreme  ?  that  they  supersede  in  importance  the  domestic  relations, 
public  education,  health,  religious  discipline,  and  the  social  economy? 
Mills's  Socialism  does  not  grasp  the  profounder  interests  of  society  ; 
Fourier's  grasps  but  to  overturn  them  ;  so  that  philosophical  socialism 
is,  on  the  one  hand,  unadapted  to  the  needs  of  society,  and,  on  the 
other,  it  is  a  standing  menace  to  its  peace  and  order. 

From  revolutionary  socialism,  which  proposes  to  destroy  the  pro- 
prietaiy  rights  of  the  individual,  and  substitute  a  central  government, 
which  shall  distribute  the  wealth  of  the  nation  to  the  inhabitants 
thereof,  and  override  all  other  established  institutions,  secular,  moral, 
and  religious,  Mr.  Mill  turns  with  horror,  and  pronounces  it  impolitic 
and  impracticable.  What,  however,  is  the  essential  difference  be- 
tween Fourier  and  Herr  Most,  the  one  philosophical,  the  other  revo- 
lutionary, it  is  difficult  to  discover,  as  the  introduction  of  the  ideas  of 
either  into  governmental  aflTairs  must  result  in  demoralization  and 
denationalization.  A  concession  to  the  Socialistic  idea  can  only  result 
in  social  revolutions,  unsettling  the  settled  principles  of  the  ages. 


WARNJNGS  FROM  ROME.  503 

VI.  More  subversive  of  the  social  ideal  than  any  of  the  preceding 
is,  to  use  a  comprehensive  term,  the  pagan  idea  of  human  society, 
human  institutions,  and  human  achievements.  As  one  of  the  reign- 
ing ideas  in  human  history,  it  has  been  on  trial  the  longest,  dominat- 
ing in  more  countries  than  any  other,  and  with  every  conceivable 
advantage  in  its  favor ;  and  yet  it  does  not  appear  to  have  elevated 
society  from  the  low  level  of  ignorance,  superstition,  degradation,  and 
crime,  or  reformed  the  wicked  masses,  or  inspired  a  desire  for  im- 
provement in  the  sages  and  leaders  of  the  people.  Under  its  poten- 
tial influence  the  social  impulses  withered,  governments  themselves 
stagnated,  and  whole  nations  stood  still,  a  commentary  on  the  weakness 
of  the  idea  itself.  Whether  ancient  Rome,  or  ancient  Greece,  or  mod- 
ern India,  or  modern  China  be  selected  as  the  exponent  of  the  pagan 
principle,  the  facts  and  conclusions  will  be  the  same,  notwithstanding 
some  variations  in  national  development  and  historic  relations  may  be 
discovered.  Pagan  Rome,  inheriting  a  national  principle,  profoundly 
aggressive  and  apparently  vital,  expanded  and  outgrew  its  earlier 
self,  becoming  a  terror  to  its  own  provinces,  and  threatened  to  absorb 
what  little  remained  outside  of  itself.  That  this  mammoth  empire 
should  dissolve,  separating  into  fragments  so  small  that  not  one  can 
be  identified,  and  for  the  most  part  itself,  once  the  political  absorbent, 
now  absorbed  by  other  national  forms,  is  a  standing  fact  of  history. 
For  the  detailed  causes  of  its  overthrow,  correctly  given  by  Mr.  Gib- 
bon, the  reader  is  referred  to  the  history  of  "  The  Decline  and  Fall 
of  the  Roman  Empire  ;"  but  for  the  present  it  is  sufficient  to  point  to 
two  remaining  monuments  of  the  social  character  of  ancient  Rome  as 
evidence  of  its  internal  weakness  and  certainty  of  decay,  and  to  warn 
modern  society  against  the  revival  of  the  pagan  spirit. 

The  Coliseum  has  too  often  been  described  by  travelers  to  require 
any  extended  reference  here;  its  monumental  meaning  we  alone 
desire  to  reveal.  A  vast  structure,  an  elliptical  figure  whose  exter- 
nal circumference  measured  five  hundred  and  seventy-six  yards,  and 
diameter  two  hundred  and  five  yards;  with  arched  corridors,  one 
hundred  stairways,  and  four  principal  entrances ;  which  seated  eighty- 
seven  thousand  people,  and  furnished  standing-room  for  twenty 
thousand  more;  is  in  ruins,  only  one-third  of  it  remaining.  Having 
personally  inspected  it,  the  impressions  it  made  upon  us,  as  a  sign  of 
civilization  happily  ended,  we  can  never  forget,  but  we  as  readily 
recall  them  as  when,  looking  down  from  the  disfigured  and  crumbling 
galleries  into  the  arena,  we  fancied  we  witnessed  the  gladiatorial  scenes 
of  other  days  re-enacted,  and  felt  horror-stricken  and  profoundly  dis- 
gusted. Here  the  gladiators  entered  ;  there  the  wild  beasts  sprung 
from  behind  the  gates;  noi  distant,  a  passage-way  for  the  dead  was 


504  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

kept  open  ;  and  on  butcheries  of  man  and  beast,  on  contests  between 
slaves,  and  on  the  higher  contests  between  faiths,  represented  by- 
Christian  and  pagan  antagonists,  Rome  comjilacently  looked  and  ap- 
plauded. Rooms  for  the  emperor  and  his  family,  from  which  the 
proceedings  in  the  arena  could  be  viewed ;  seats  for  the  patricians ; 
and  accommodations  for  the  multitude,  signified  the  intense  interest 
of  royalty  and  the  common  people  in  the  brutal  scenes  of  the  Coli- 
seum. Let  the  decaying  structure  stand  for  a  civilization  which 
had  in  itself  the  seeds  of  decay ;  let  the  structure  itself  be  one  seed 
of  decay. 

Pagan  Rome,  crystallized  into  cruelty,  exhibited  an  equally  ruin- 
ous tendency  in  another  aspect  of  its  social  life.  The  Baths  of  Cara- 
calla,  now  a  splendid  mass  of  ruins,  contrast  with  the  stately  signs 
of  Roman  coldness  and  inhumanity  in  the  Coliseum.  The  one  is 
repulsive ;  the  other,  attractive.  The  one  drew  the  multitudes  as 
well  as  the  nobles ;  the  other  was  visited  only  by  senators  and  their 
families,  or  those  above  the  plebeians.  Built  of  thin  brick,  the  bath 
houses  contrasted  with  the  rugged  stone  edifice  of  the  gladiators. 
Besides  rooms  for  bathing  purposes,  there  w^ere  lecture  and  reading 
rooms,  and  picture  galleries,  and  every  arrangement  and  every  com- 
fort was  made  to  minister  to  the  voluptuous  and  luxury-loving  spirit 
of  the  higher  classes.  Even  the  statuary  excited  the  licentious  in- 
stincts of  the  visitors.  Here  tired  senators  resorted  for  enjoyment. 
The  sexes  bathed  promiscuously.  Here  patricians  spent  days  and 
nights  in  forgetfulness  of  their  domestic  relations,  immersed  in  the 
unforbidden  pleasures  of  a  higher  licentiousness  than  the  polluted 
masses  knew  any  thing  of;  but  the  law  of  purity  was  as  inexorable 
in  the  one  case  as  in  the  other.  A  civilization  that  is  the  outgrowth 
of  the  licentiousness  of  higher  or  lower  classes  is  in  violation  of  the 
divine  ideal  of  the  social  structure,  and  can  not  survive ;  thus  Rome 
found  herself  undermined  and  enfeebled  by  her  own  vices,  and  ready 
to  perish,  long  before  the  northern  Vandal  struck  her  a  blow.  The 
Coliseum  represents  th'e  coarse  and  brutal  instincts  of  pagan  civiliza- 
tion ;  the  bath-house  represents  the  voluptuous  spirit  of  ancient  life, 
which  was  even  more  ruinous  than  the  other. 

In  the  absence  of  the  religious  principle,  which  is  ever  a  restraint 
on  man's  cruelty,  and  a  cure  for  love  of  pleasure,  the  old  civilizations 
perished,  a  fearful  warning  to  modern  peoples,  who  think  theu"  haj)pi- 
ness  can  consist  only  in  abjuring  righteousness. 

The  symbols  of  ancient  Grecian  civilization,  no  less  pagan  in  its 
essential  significance,  are  the  Parthenon,  a  temple  of  marble,  and 
the  Pnyx,  the  forum  of  oratory  and  eloquence  ;  both  speaking  of  a 
people  and  a  civilization  that  have  perished.     The  disfigured  friezes 


DECLINE  OF  PAGAN  CIVILIZATIONS.  505 

of  the  temple  still  proclaim  the  name  of  Phidias ;  the  consecration  of 
the  building  as  the  temple  of  Minerva  reveals  a  religion  of  gods  and 
goddesses  as  supreme  in  Grecian  life ;  the  building  whose  construc- 
tion was  superintended  by  Pericles  speaks  of  an  age  of  art,  beauty, 
luxury,  philosophy,  and  learning.  The  Pnyx,  with  its  Cyclopean 
boundary  wall,  seems  almost  to  echo  the  eloquence  that  kindled  the 
patriotism  of  the  Greeks,  and  certainly  impresses  the  visitor  with  the 
greatness  of  the  civilization  that  produced  it. 

Perhaps  the  truth  is  not  so  self-evident  that  art,  poetry,  philos- 
ophy, and  eloquence,  unaccompanied  with  a  religious  life,  are  as  dan- 
gerous to  national  stability,  and  as  certain  to  result  in  national 
overthrow,  as  the  bolder  and  more  cankerous  forms  of  inhumanity 
and  licentiousness.  The  Parthenon  is  as  great  a  ruin  as  the  Coliseum ; 
the  Pnyx  is  as  vacant  as  the  bath-house.  Both  social  civilizations, 
the  one  essentially  voluptuous  and  sense-serving,  the  other  essentially 
and  intellectually  aspiring,  fell  into  chaos  from  insufficient  internal 
vitality,  or  the  absence  of  a  lofty,  regenerating,  preserving  religious 
principle. 

The  lesson  is  the  same  if  the  civilizations  of  China  and  India  be 
subjected  to  the  same  analysis.  In  China,  a  principle  of  order  result- 
ing in  national  perpetuity  has  undergirded  the  life  of  the  people ;  but 
order  has  been  gained  at  the  expense  of  progress.  Stagnation  is  the 
characteristic  of  Chinese  civilization  ;  a  fatal  condition,  and  far  re- 
moved from  an  ideal  achievement.  In  India  the  principle  of  caste 
has  governed  so  absolutely  that,  until  the  rigid  protest  of  another  and 
more  vitalizing  civilization  was  heard,  the  nation  was  asleep  and  uncon- 
scious of  power.  Between  the  two  civilizations  one  can  not  choose, 
for  stagnation  is  no  more  destructive  of  progress  than  caste,  and  both 
are  obstacles  to  a  broad  inquiry,  to  the  doctrine  of  the  unity  of  the 
race,  and  to  expansion.  The  pagan  idea  of  society  has  not  in  it  a 
single  ideal  recommendation. 

VII.  There  remains  for  mention  the  Mohammedan  idea  of  society, 
or  a  semi-Christian  principle  of  civilization,  which  has  manifested 
itself  in  that  colossal  government  known  as  the  Turkish  Empire.  In 
India  the  friction  between  exclusively  pagart  ideas,  and  the  Moham- 
medan principle  of  divine  sovereignty  in  human  affairs,  has  prevented 
the  free  and  full  exhibition  of  the  latter  ;  but  in  the  empire  of  which 
it  is  the  almost  exclusive  religion,  just  how  it  has  affected  the  social 
life,  and  whether  it  is  a  sufficiently  vital  principle  for  human  govern- 
ment, may  be  the  more  easily  determined.  No  one  traveling  in 
Syria,  or  the  Turkish  provinces,  would  think  of  preferring  Moham- 
medan civilization  to  the  native  Hindu  types  of  society  ;  for,  while 
the  sovereign  principle  of  Mohammedanism  is  divine,  it  is  insufficient 


506  PHILOSOPHY  AM)  CHRISTIANITY. 

from  its  incompleteness.  Moreover,  the  vitality  of  this  faith  is  not 
the  divine  principle,  but  a  superstitious  corruption,  which  either  robs 
the  principle  of  its  legitimate  functions,  or  supplants  it  entirely  with 
another  prmciple.  It  is  not  the  thought  of  God,  but  tlw  thought  of 
Mohammed  as  the  prophet  of  God,  that  constitutes  the  strength,  and, 
therefore,  the  weakness,  of  this  religious  civilization.  The  divine 
element,  lost  in  the  human,  or  having  only  formal  acknowledgment, 
has  ceased  to  invigorate  the  empire,  and  effected  the  prostration  of 
its  civilization  beyond  recovery.  A  false  religion  is  as  completely 
ruinous  of  social  institutions  and  political  governments,  as  any  form 
of  paganism,  or  the  worst  type  of  socialism.  Turkey  and  Syria, 
Arabia  and  Egypt,  under  the  sway  of  the  Mohammedan  principle, 
are  as  Stagnant  as  China,  and  as  corrupt  as  ancient  Rome,  and  verify 
the  statement  that  another  religious  principle  is  absolutely  necessary 
to  their  political  regeneration. 

After  this  survey  of  civilizations,  ancient  and  modern  ;  after  the 
contemplation  of  societies  in  which  scientific,  philosophical,  and  social- 
istic principles  have  been  put  in  practice  ;  in  view  of  the  study  of 
peoples  governed  largely  by  religious  principles,  mythological,  semi- 
Christian,  and  Christian  ;  and  carefully  considering  the  force  of  polit- 
ical ideas,  as  exemplified  among  barbarians  and  the  enlightened,  what 
conclusions  may  justly  be  announced  ?  Certainly  no  ideal  society, 
government,  or  civilization  has  been  found,  either  in  ancient  or  mod- 
ern times,  in  Christendom  or  in  Heathendom.  Certainly  no  ideal  prin- 
ciples, taken  separately  or  in  their  combination,  sufficient  to  restore 
society  to  an  ideal  condition,  have  been  named,  for  under  the  opera- 
tion of  whatever  is  esteemed  best  there  has  been  decay.  Certainly  no 
ideal  religions,  with  power  to  preserve  from  impurity  and  decline, 
have,  amid  the  heterogeneous  mass  of  faiths  and  worships  we  have 
traced,  declared  themselves.  In  vain  we  seek  ideal  conditions ;  in 
vain  we  ask  for  ideal  principles  ;  in  vain  we  request  ideal  religions. 
Nothing  ideal  emerges  from  the  true  or  false,  the  sincere  or  the  hypo- 
critical, the  permanent  or  transient,  the  stable  or  fluctuating,  the  re- 
ligious or  irreligious,  the  ancient  or  modern,  the  radical  or  conserva- 
tive, the  stationary  or  progressive.  A  search  for  the  ideal  is  like  the 
search  after  the  philosopher's  stone. 

Is  there  no  ideal?  Is  the  thought  of  it  a  dream,  a  mockery,  a 
vanity?  Must  the  restless,  suffering  world  roll  on,  believing  in  a 
better  state,  and  even  pursuing  a  higher  hope,  only  to  find  in  the 
ages  to  come  that  it  has  repeated  its  history,  and  not  advanced  be- 
yond tljp  fathers  ?  We  assume  there  is  an  ideal ;  we  assume  there 
are  ideal  principles,  there  is  an  ideal  religion,  there  must  be  an  ideal 
society  in  the  future.     Whence  the  dissatisfaction  with  social  states. 


RECOGNITION  OF  INDIVIDUAL  RIGHTS.  507 

as  they  are,  if  they  are  final  ?  Why  schemes  of  reconstruction  ? 
Why  Plato's  republican  principles  ?  Why  Socialism  ?  Why  philos- 
ophy? Why  religion?  Why  Christianity?  Nations  and  social 
structures  go  down  that  something  better  may  appear,  and  the  palpi- 
tating principle  of  the  universe  is  progress,  apparent  in  nature, 
history,  civilization,  religion,  and  Christianity.  On  social  dissat- 
isfactions, on  human  aspirations,  on  national  changes,  on  philo- 
sophic and  religious  grounds,  we  predicate  the  ideal,  and  insist  that 
already  ideal  principles  are  at  hand,  and  an  ideal  religion  is  in  force, 
working  silently  but  effectively  for  the  realization  of  the  ideal  society. 
We  refer  to  Christianity,  not  the  corrupt  forms,  or  the  corrupt  relig- 
ious establishments  which  exist  in  its  name,  but  to  those  religious 
truths  and  principles  which,  vitally  incorporated  into  the  life  of  the 
world,  will  regenerate  and  preserve  it.  The  relation  of  Christianity, 
as  the  sovereign  religious  force,  to  the  world's  development  and  the 
world's  fulfillment,  must  be  patiently  and  exhaustively  considered  if 
we  shall  discover  its  ideal  character,  purpose,  and  possibility. 

That  the  requirements  of  the  ideal  state  may  be  apprehended,  and 
whether  any  thing  short  or  outside  of  the  Christian  theory  of  life  is 
adapted  to  promote  them,  it  will  be  necessary  carefully  to  consider 
the  fundamental  needs  of  society  as  they  express  themselves  in  uni- 
versal history. 

First,  the  constant  recognition  of  the  individual  rights  of  every  member 
of  society  is  imperative,  and  an  inviolable  condition  of  the  ideal  state.  The 
very  triteness  of  the  suggestion  may  be  in  the  Avay  of  an  appreciation 
of  its  value ;  but  its  repeated  and  long-continued  disregard  in  all 
social  states,  not  excepting  those  supposed  to  be  under  the  reign  of 
Christian  sentiment,  is  the  apology  for  its  insertion  here.  Fully  to 
compi-ehend  human  rights,  their  nature,  number,  and  expediency  of 
exercise,  one  must  be  thoroughly  acquainted  with  certain  ethical  as 
well  as  natural  principles,  which  no  religion,  save  that  of  which  the 
Divine  Master  is  the  inspiration,  has  completely  embodied  and  mag- 
nified. With  a  knowledge  of  these  principles,  the  conclusion  is  un- 
answerable that  a  violation  of  rights  is  a  violation  both  of  nature  and 
ethics,  and  so  subversive  of  hum&n  welfare. 

Studying  human  conditions  in  the  light  of  these  principles,  a 
thorough  reformation  of  social  and  political  ideas  is  imperative ;  such 
a  reformation  as  must  result  in  the  subordination  of  ideas  hitherto 
held  supreme.  By  the  terms  of  nature,  and  equally  by  the  authority 
of  ethics,  war  is  precluded  from  the  ideal  state.  Mankind  constitute 
a  brotherhood,  cemented  together  by  the  unity  of  their  origin,  and 
organized  into  societies  for  the  conservation  of  justice,  equality,  and 
happiness.     In  violation  of  the  ideal  of  universal  peace,  Plato,  in  his 


508  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

ideal  republic,  provides  for  the  military,  assiguiug  to  the  soldier  a 
place  only  a  little  lower  than  that  of  the  governor,  and  dignifying 
the  profession  of  arms  far  above  that  of  the  tradesman  or  laborer.  Pat- 
terned after  a  true  ideal,  no  society  will  need  the  soldier,  whose  chief 
business  is  to  enforce  the  wishes  of  his  government,  regardless  of  the 
ethical  considerations  involved.  The  ideal  excludes  the  military, 
eliminating  the  spirit  of  conquest,  oppression,  and  political  prejudice 
from  national  policies.  Under  this  teaching  standing  armies  melt 
into  fragments,  or  disappear  altogether,  as  snow-flakes  under  the  sun; 
swords  become  plowshares,  spears  are  turned  into  pruning-hooks ; 
race  oppressions  and  national  vituperations  cease  ;  and  a  millennial 
peace  spreads  its  white  mantle  over  the  whole  earth.  Surely  this  end 
is  not  unworthy  of  the  religion  that  proposes  to  secure  it. 

Nature  protests  against  the  spirit  of  caste  in  society,  but  offers  no 
remedy.  The  differences  in  men,  arising  from  their  creation,  upon 
which  ranlis  and  gradations  have  been  founded,  we  can  not  wholly 
ignore ;  but  we  can  avoid  the  extreme  and  fanatical  conclusions,  dis- 
rupting society,  and  breeding  mischief  and  misery,  of  which  these 
natural  differences  have  been  made  the  burden-bearers.  The  cure  for 
the  caste-spirit  is,  omitting  the  differences,  to  fix  the  eye  on  the  re- 
semblances, or  the  common  and  equal  rights  of  men,  under  nature 
and  the  true  religious  conception  of  man.  Life  is  a  common  right ; 
liberty  is  inalienable  and  universal ;  the  end  or  purpose  of  life— self- 
development — ought  to  be  sacred,  and  interference  with  it  should  not 
be  tolerated.  If  one  have  the  right  to  live  at  all,  he  has  the  right  to 
live  for  the  highest  ends  of  life.  Any  thing  that  strikes  at  the  end 
strikes  at  the  beginning  of  life,  the  reason  of  being  at  all.  Conced- 
ing the  idea  of  equality,  how  it  strikes,  not  only'  at  certain  social  con- 
ditions, as  caste,  slavery,  and  communism,  but  more  forcibly  still  at 
certain  philosophical  principles,  the  inculcation  of  which  has  resulted 
in  the  conditions  which  have  proved  to  be  the  weaknesses  of  civ- 
ilized life. 

Caste  is  the  curse  of  the  Orient,  the  fruit  of  the  old  religions  and 
philosophies  that  knew  not  the  mind  of  God  concerning  the  race,  or 
the  great  doctrine  of  the  unity  of  majikind.  Slavery  in  the  early  days 
was  not  an  artificial  institution,  but  the  logical  result  of  such  religions 
and  philosophies.  The  liberty  of  man  was  submerged  in  the  idea  of 
the  inequalities  of  men.  The  restoration  of  liberty  belongs  to  the  re- 
ligion that,  looking  deeper  than  differences  in  men,  discerns  equality 
and  unity  as  the  superior  factors  in  the  consideration  of  the  interests 
of  the  human  race.  Under  the  domination  of  an  ideal  idea,  caste  and 
slavery  must  quietly  or  forcibly  be  ejected  from  the  ideal  state. 

In  other  directions  the  rights  of  man  have  been  unjustly  curtailed 


PROCLAMA  TIONS  OF  NATURE  AND  RELIGION.  509 

on  philosophical  grounds,  while  nature  and  religion  unite  in  a  repu- 
diation of  the  justifying  argument.  The  range  of  individual  rights, 
as  defined  in  the  Gospel,  is  broad  enough  to  include  both  sexes ; 
but  no  philosophy  or  religion  has  gone  so  far  as  to  concede  to  woman 
an  equal  share  in  natural  rights ;  hence  she  has  suffered,  and  society 
has  never  risen  to  its  proper  height.  By  an  evident  providential  ar- 
rangement, which  is  perplexing  to  the  materialist,  it  so  happens  that 
in  the  matter  of  births  of  human  beings  the  proportion  of  males  to 
females  is  106  to  100 ;  that  is,  a  slight  majority  of  males  preponderates, 
since  they  are  more  exposed  to  climate,  hai'dship,  and  war,  showing 
that  the  divine  design  is  to  preserve  the  sexes  in  equal  numerical 
proportions.  By  no  system  of  marriage — by  no  enforced  violations 
of  nature's  suggested  ordei- — must  this  proportion  be  disturbed.  Both 
polygamy  and  celibacy  go  down  beneath  the  order  of  nature ;  but  of 
all  religious  Christianity  alone  appropriates  nature's  hint,  or  "  Do- 
rically  harmonizes"  with  nature's  teaching,  discerning  that  monogamy 
is  the  inexorable  law  of  God.  With  Plato's  community  of  women 
this  idea  comes  in  direct  collision.  Under  the  philosopher's  perverted 
conception  woman  lost  her  marital  right,  and  home  its  divine  sacred- 
ness.  Such  is  the  relation  of  the  family  to  government,  individual  char- 
acter, and  social  progress  that,  if  it  lose  its  solemnity,  or  compromise 
its  unity,  immorality  will  abound,  the  safeguards  of  public  virtue  will 
be  reduced,  and  society  will  become  a  nest  of  iniquity.  In  the  ideal 
state,  Plato's  community,  the  polygamy  of  Mohammedanism,  and  the 
celibacy  of  the  Roman  Catholic  priesthood  can  have  no  existence, 
being  repugnant  to  the  law  of  monogamy,  founded  in  the  fact  of  the 
equal  proportion  of  the  sexes. 

Summarizing  individual  rights  in  the  light  of  an  ideal  'principle,  or 
arranging  them  under  the  co-operating  proclamations  of  nature  and  relig- 
ion, it  is  easy  to  see  that  war,  caste,  slavery,  polygamy,  and  celibacy  must 
be  expelled  from  society,  and  peace,  unity,  equality,  freedom,  and  monogamy 
must  be  everywhere  installed. 

In  an  ideal  society,  the  problem  of  edxication  will  have  definite  and 
satisfactory  solution.  The  woful  ignorance  of  man,  not  only  of  real 
being,  but  of  phenomena,  or  the  manifestations  of  being ;  not  only 
of  things,  but  of  forces  likewise  ;  not  only  of  effects,  but  of  causes, — 
is  at  once  acknowledged.  He  is  steeped  in  ignorance,  incessantly 
violating  law,  right,  duty,  and  self-interest.  He  is  blindfolded,  yet 
walking  toward  the  sun.  He  is  the  heir  of  darkness  and  all  its 
fruits,  of  which  crime  and  calamity  are  the  most  universal.  He  is 
the  sport  of  laws  he  does  not  understand,  the  victim  of  penalties  he 
can  not  foresee.  He  needs  truths,  knowledges,  vastuess  of  vision, 
magnificent   illuminations,   eternal    revelations.     Until    every  man's 


510  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

eyes  are  opened  to  the  truth  ;  until  all  know  universal  law  and  its 
penalties ;  until  nature  and  the  supernatural,  being  and  non-being, 
are  grasped  by  the  intellective  forces  ;  until  the  mind  arrives  at  the 
summits  of  philosophical  research  and  moral  wisdom, — there  will  be 
room  for  the  play  of  ignorance,  which  may  j^rove  to  be  the  fly  in  the 
ointment,  or  the  spark  in  the  magazine.  Danger  lurks  in  ignorance. 
Plato  is  the  advocate  of  education,  as  a  moral  restraint,  the  means 
of  reformation,  and  the  basis  of  a  well-ordered  society ;  but  his  edu- 
cational system  is  not  of  public  utility,  for  he  confines  it  to  the 
guardians  of  the  state,  and  limits  acquirements  to  gymnastics,  music, 
the  military  art,  and  philosophy,  a  curriculum  that  a  modern  uni- 
versity would  pronounce  inadequate  to  self-culture  and  self-develop- 
ment. For  artificers,  agriculturists,  and  tradesmen,  Plato  provides  no 
education  at  all,  deeming  it  quite  unnecessary  to  skill,  etiiciency,  or 
success  in  their  pursuits.  Thus  education,  in  his  estimate,  is  for  a 
class,  and  that  the  smallest,  only!  This  is  Platonism,  Avhich  is  the 
key  to  all  philosophical  systems  of  education,  the  chief  objection  to 
which  is  a  limited  curriculum,  confined  to  a  limited  class. 

The  opinion  has  gained  currency  that  universal  education  is  not 
desirable,  since  ueitlier  the  industrial  pursuits  nor  the  commercial  in- 
terests of  society  demand  it.  The  error  of  the  opinion  lies  in  the 
estimate  of  education  as  a  mere  instrument  in  matters  of  acquisition 
or  worldly  pursuit,  whereas  education  is  self-development,  having  re- 
spect wholly  to  the  internal  life  of  man.  As  an  instrument,  it  is 
useful ;  as  a  development,  it  is  essential.  The  man  requires  educa- 
tion, whether  his  pursuit  can  be  prosecuted  with  or  without  it. 
Co-education,  compulsory  education.,  and  universal  education,  are  the 
triple  ideas  that  must  enter  into  any  great  or  effective  system  of  educor 
tion;  for  an  ideal  state  is  impossible  in  which  ignorance  and  intelli- 
gence co-exist  in  about  equal  proportions,  or  in  which  the  multitudes 
walk  in  darkness,  while  the  guardians  alone  walk  in  the  light.  For 
fear  of  misguiding,  it  must  be  added  that  education  alone  is  not  a 
sufficient  remedy  for  the  afflictions  of  the  Christian  state,  for  it  may 
obtain  with  a  perversion  of  morals  and  spiritual  blindness,  and  be  in- 
operative as  a  regenerating  force.  Nana  Sahib,  an  incarnation  of 
cruelty,  was  broad-brained  and  a  cultured  gentleman.  Voltaire  was 
educated  ;  likewise,  Gibbon ;  but  education  saved  neither  from  spir- 
itual imperfection.  These  admissions  or  hints  are  of  force  in  showing 
that  other  agencies  besides  those  named  will  be  required  for  the  fos- 
tering of  the  purposes  and  ends  of  the  best  society. 

The  industrialism  of  society  must  have  recognition  and  regulation, 
according  to  nature  and  the  dictates  of  a  Christian  philanthropy. 
The  majority  of  men  are  engaged  in  agricultural,  commercial,  and 


TEE  LOGIC  OF  SOCIAL  INJUSTICE.  511 

mechanical  pursuits,  developing  the  physical  resources  of  their  coun- 
try, and  making  the  blind  forces  and  agencies  of  matter  tributary  to 
human  happiness  and  destiny.  By  his  industries,  man  is  obeying  the 
commandment  to  subdue  the  earth,  and  acquiring  dominion  over 
every  created  thing. 

Shall  man's  environment  subdue  him,  or  shall  he  subdue  his  en- 
vironment? Such  a  question  he  can  not  escape  ;  its  issue  is  in  the 
line  of  personal  supremacy  or  personal  degradation,  and,  therefore, 
intensely  religious.  That  this  problem  involves  difficulty,  no  one 
acquainted  with  it  will  doubt.  Dangers,  prolific  and  threatening, 
attend  the  acquirement  of  personal  authority,  or  the  reign  of  mind 
over  matter.  What  means  shall  be  adopted  to  avert  disaster  or  shock 
during  the  processes  of  development,  is  no  small  question.  No  sub- 
ject more  profoundly  stirs  the  masses  than  that  of  national  industrial- 
ism, or  the  relation  of  labor  to  civilization,  requiring  genius,  philo- 
sophical discernment,  and  statesmanship  perfectly  to  settle  it.  For 
among  the  discontented  masses  of  the  nation  is  a  volcanic  spirit, 
whose  mutterings  of  a  cruel  purpose  are  distinctly  heard,  and  which, 
thoroughly  aroused  and  in  action,  may  engulf  wide-spread  interests, 
and  even  involve  in  peril  the  national  life. 

In  the  settlement  of  a  j^roblem  so  far-reaching  in  its  consequences, 
and  in  the  adjustment  of  relations,  hitherto  strained,  between  capital 
and  labor,  there  will  be  opportunity  for  the  exercise  of  justice, 
patience,  a  spirit  of  philanthropy,  and  a  regard  for  religion.  In  the 
Old  World,  the  oppression  of  the  laborer  has  been  degrading  in  the 
extreme,  the  only  escape  from  it  being  in  emigration  to  free  Amer- 
ica, where  labor  has  dignity  and  remuneration.  This  is  not  the 
greatest  evil  of  low  wages — emigration — but  it  has  engendered  a  dis- 
satisfaction with  society,  whose  pillars  rock  with  the  commotion  of  a 
general  indignation  against  further  outrage  and  oppression.  Com- 
munism, socialism,  nihilism,  a  brood  of  evils,  reduced  from  theoretical 
conceptions  to  practical  experiments,  are  the  logical  reactions  of  an 
exacting  age,  and  menace  the  age  itself.  Either  the  social  structure, 
as  constituted,  or  nihilism,  is  wrong ;  the  animating  spirit  of  one  or  the 
other  needs  purification.  In  its  present  organized  form,  social  struc- 
tures of  the  most  liberal  type  are  not  altogether  favorable  to  the 
laborer.  Injustice,  with  seeming  parade  of  justice  ;  lines  of  division 
between  the  upper  and  lower  classes,  so-called,  becoming  more  dis- 
tinct ;  hereditary  titles  and  official  honors  confined  to  the  patricians ; 
wages  graduated  according  to  the  caprices  of  Avealthy  proprietors ; 
the  mechanic  deprived  of  social  privileges ;  the  hours  of  labor  extend- 
ing into  the  night ;  Sunday  desecrated  by  mercenary  requirements — 
aU  these  are  indications  of  a  perverted  social  order,  and  the  causes  of 


512  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

an  impending  conflict  that  may  rend  the  social  structure  that  tolerates 
divisions,  oppressions,  and  violations  of  right.  In  America,  socialism 
has  been  under  restraint,  manifesting  itself  only  in  occasional  "  strikes," 
haughty  discussions,  and  proposed  reckless  legislation,  which,  however 
objectionable  and  un-American,  are  the  deep  foreshadowings  of  a 
chronic  complaint  with  industrial  regulations. 

It  is  not  our  province  to  propose  a  cure  for  these  evils,  a  matter  that 
more  properly  belongs  to  the  political  economist ;  but,  recognizing  the 
disorders  of  society,  we  shall  be  justified  in  appealing  for  relief.  In 
this  emergency,  philosophy  has  nothing  to  otter,  or  what  it  offers  is, 
as  has  been  more  than  once  proved,  insufficient.  It  is  settled  that 
communism  can  not  enter  the  ideal  society,  but  how  to  keep  it  out  is 
the  question.  Plato's  teachings  are  communistic;  John  Stuart  Mill  is 
a  conservative  socialist;  Fourier  is  a  most  fanatical  socialist;  but, 
from  the  refined  and  philosophic  communism  of  Plato  and  Mill  to  the 
revolutionary  socialism  of  Europe  is  but  a  single  step.  The  theory 
of  the  one  is  the  practice  of  the  other ;  the  ideal  of  Plato  is  the  real 
of  Europe.  In  the  construction  of  an  ideal  state,  therefore,  it  is  not 
clear  that  either  ancient  or  modern  philosophy  can  help  us.  Herbert 
Spencer's  social  system  is  an  evolution,  not  yet  evolved— n  growth  to- 
ward supposed  ideals,  but  not  the  realization  of  them.  But  are  there 
no  industrial  ideal  principles  that  can  at  once  be  adopted?  Must 
society  tardily  grow  into  true  ideas  of  justice,  benevolence,  philan- 
thropy, and  as  tardily  outgrow  the  tendencies  to  nihilism?  Verily, 
the  radical  cure  of  these  disorders  is  in  the  principles  of  the  Christian 
religion,  the  adaptation  and  efficiency  of  which  for  the  purposes  re- 
quired will  hereafter  be  portrayed  at  length. 

Next,  it  is  incumbent  on  us  to  give  place  to  the  moralities,  or  a 
working  and  producing  ethical  system,  in  the  ideal  state.  On  wrong, 
injustice,  and  moral  misrule,  the  State  can  not  long  exist.  Between 
the  public  life  and  the  ideal  ethical  order,  there  must  be  concord; 
the  relation  must  be  musical.  In  the  people  there  must  be  a  love  of 
the  right,  so  that  wroug  will  create  friction,  disturbance,  and  con- 
vulsion. In  such  a  society,  resistance  to  wrong  will  not  be  theatrical 
or  simulated,  but  intensely  aggressive  and  victorious.  The  chief  good 
will  be  sought  in  the  direction  of  righteousness.  Immorality,  coarse 
or  refined,  is  as  destructive  of  the  State  as  ignorance  or  communism, 
and  to  be  extinguished  quite  as  speedily.  If  education  must  be  con- 
fined to  the  minority,  morality  must  be  universal ;  the  lowest  classes 
must  be  as  moral  as  the  highest,  or  irreparable  mischief  is  inevitable. 
To  prevent  an  increase  of  criminals,  and  a  new  troop  of  dangers,  a 
higher  standard  of  moral  life  must  be  raised.  In  devising  or  seeking 
a  system  of  morality,  it  is  not  so  important  that  it  be  philosophically 


ALTRUISTIC  ETHICS.  513 

perfect  and  adapted  to  master  minds,  as  that  it  shall  be  universal  in 
its  application,  restraining  iniquity  in  whatever  form  it  appears,  and 
inculcating  righteousness  in  all  classes  of  society.  Ethics  for  the 
multitude ;  ethics  for  the  elite.  Philosophy  devises  ethics  for  the 
latter  ;  but  a  broader  system  must  be  reared,  which  shall  be  adapted 
to  both,  as,  morally,  there  is  no  difference  between  them. 

In  need  of  a  broad  and  efficient  system  of  morality,  where  shall  it 
be  found  ?  In  need  of  ideal  standards  of  right,  who  will  proclaim 
them?  Philosophical  or  naturalistic  morality  runs  to  low  definitions 
of  right,  justice,  and  truth,  and  frames  narrow-minded  views  of  duty 
and  human  responsibilty.  Zeno,  more  penetrating  than  his  contem- 
poi-aries,  declared  that  rightness  and  wrongness  inhere  in  actions; 
but  so  profound  an  idea  did  not  prevail  in  the  academies  of  his  day. 
Epicurus  determined  the  morality  of  human  action  by  its  power  to 
produce  happiness;  and  Aristotle  suggested  that  virtue  consists  in 
the  observance  of  the  mean  between  extremes,  which  is  the  theory  of 
temperance  or  moderation  in  life.  No  swinging  to  excesses,  nO  fanat- 
icism, but  a  well-balanced  purpose  or  action,  avoiding  excess  on  the 
one  hand  and  deficiency  on  the  other,  is  moral  or  virtuous,  and  entitled 
to  reward.  Generosity  is  neither  extravagance  nor  parsimony,  but 
the  middle  point  between  them.  In  ancient  philosophical  circles  the 
Aristotelian  definitions,  succeeded  by  the  Epicurean  system,  had  for  a 
long  period  full  sway,  and  a  molding  effect  on  teaching  and  practice. 
For  the  wider  circle  of  the  multitude  the  metaphysics  of  ethics  was 
not  required  ;  but  an  incorporation  of  principles  to  which  the  common 
mind  could  respond  was  a  necessity. 

Not  less  delusive  and  incapacitated  are  the  modern  philosophical 
suggestions  touching  the  ethical  problem.  From  his  definition  of  jus- 
tice as  a  mere  conformity  to  local  legal  ideas,  James  Mill  rose  to  the 
conception  of  the  essential  element  or  secret  bond  of  all  moralities, 
seeing  in  them  only  a  conformity  to  the  idea  of  utility,  or  a  serving 
of  self-interest  in  the  performance  of  the  so-called  duties  of  life. 
Hume's  conception  of  morality  entirely  agrees  with  this  of  Mill. 
Utility  is  the  ideal  of  life,  the  test  of  all  virtues,  the  standard  of  all 
actions.  Herbert  Spencer's  ideal  morality  is  of  a  purely  naturalistic, 
as  opposed  to  a  purely  supernaturalistic,  type,  consisting  of  growths 
rather  than  revelations.  It  is  scientific  morality,  as  distinguished 
from  spiritual  or  religious  morality,  realized  as  the  issue  of  social  col- 
lisions, compromises,  and  final  co-operations.  Altruism,  the  core  of 
Spencerian  ethics,  destroyed  Rome,  Egypt,  Persia,  and  Greece ;  and 
it  is  difficult  to  avoid  believing  that,  if  adopted,  it  will  destroy  mod- 
ern civilizations.  Morality  reduced  to  utility,  or  whose  chief  idea  is 
centripetal,  i.  e.,  personal  selfishness,  must  go  outside  of  history  and 

33 


514  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

human  experience  to  justify  itself  to  this  age,  for  under  the  sway 
of  such  systems  the  old  civilizations  tottered  to  their  ruin.  In  Chris- 
tianity alone  will  one  find  an  ethical  system  that  elevates  while  it 
restrains,  and  preserves  while  it  prohibits. 

In  this  schedule  of  the  necessities  of  the  ideal  state,  no  reference 
has  as  yet  been  made  to  the  form  of  government,  or  the  civil  and 
political  complexion  which  it  must  finally  assume  for  the  security  of 
the  ideal  ends  before  it.  Evidently,  the  form  of  government  must  be 
in  harmony  with  the  purposes  to  be  accomplished  by  it.  Legislation 
and  politics  must  have  reference  to  the  conservation  of  individual 
rights,  the  extension  of  education,  the  regulation  of  the  industrial  in- 
terests, and  the  authority  of  ethics,  overlooking  which  the  government 
must  fail  of  a  vindication  of  its  existence. 

What,  then,  shall  be  the  form  of  government  for  the  ideal  society? 
Of  existing  or  superseded  forms  of  political  authority,  none  is  perfect, 
none  ideal,  if  that  be  necessary.  A  tyranny  is  at  once  rejected,  being 
incompatible  with  all  the  ends  of  government.  Oligarchy,  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  rich,  is  the  reign  of  a  class  who  are  oppressive  in  spite 
of  a  purpose  to  be  considerate,  and  must,  therefore,  be  rejected.  The 
fate  of  the  aristocracy,  the  government  of  the  few,  is  the  same. 
Monarchy,  the  most  popular  old-world  form  of  political  government, 
we  can  not  eulogize  as  ideal,  since  it  is  proscriptive  of  the  ruled,  and 
tends  to  a  too  ambitious  exaltation  of  the  rulers.  Virgil  taught  the 
Romans  to  salute  Augustus  as  divine,  an  early  illustration  of  the  idea 
of  the  divine  right  of  kings.  If  divine  in  person,  they  must  have 
divine  authority.  From  such  an  extreme  a  recoil  was  certain,  and  it 
has  come,  royalty  occupying  a  much  reduced  position  in  the  estima- 
tion of  men,  and  no  longer  receiving  celestial  honors.  Government 
is  of  God — governors  are  men.  Plato  stoutly  opposes  pure  democracy, 
which  is  always  in  danger  of  anarchy.  Historic  governmental  forms 
are  not  ideals. 

What  then  ?  What  is  the  beau  ideal  of  the  civil  power  ?  Is  there 
such  a  thing  as  ideal  politics?  If  our  ideal  society  is  not  to  be  a 
picture  of  the  imagination,  but  a  reality  on  the  footstool,  its  principles 
must  be  moral,  its  virtues  human,  its  methods  available,  its  form  tan- 
gible. Not  an  airy,  sentimental,  aristocratic  form,  weakened  by 
Platonic  effeminacies,  but  a  republican,  or  representative  form  of 
government,  cohering  by  the  virtues  of  its  citizens,  and  perpetuating 
itself  in  the  world's  life,  as  its  greatest  moving  force,  is  that  for  which 
we  now  appeal.  It  is  not  a  philosopher's  government  that  is  sug- 
gested ;  nor  is  metaphysical  statesmanship  advocated ;  nor  can  political 
sestheticism  rule  in  this  ideal.  Face  t©  face  with  the  basal  idea  of 
the  ideal,  we  submit  the  proposition  that  the  Christian  State  is  iixe  ideal 


THE  CHURCH  SPIRIT  FUNDAMENTAL.  515 

State;  in  other  words,  tliat  essential  Christianity  is  the  elemental  life 
of  the  ideal  society.  Going  immediately  below  the  surface,  this 
means  that  religion  shall  be  the  principal  exponent  of  the  social  order 
and  the  outward  sign  of  its  inward  life.  In  PJato's  republic  religion 
is  not  an  apparent  feature,  since  not  more  than  two  or  three  religious 
allusions  are  made,  and  more  to  appease  popular  faith  than  from  a 
recognition  of  its  value.  In  no  philosophical  system  for  the  improve- 
ment of  society  is  religion,  except  in  the  broad  sense  of  a  morality, 
regarded  as  vital,  or  so  much  as  important.  In  social  structures, 
barren  of  religious  essentials,  the  moralities  and  philanthropies  occupy 
conspicuous  places,  but  rather  as  instruments  of  comfort  and  progress 
than  as  ideal  experiences  and  achievements.  The  difference  between 
the  philosopher's  ideal  of  society,  and  that  here  formulated,  is  the 
difference  between  the  presence  and  the  absence  of  religion. 

The  extent  to  which  Christianity  shall  enter  into  the  life  of  the 
State,  and  whether  it  shall  be  regnant,  giving  complexion  to  juris- 
prudence, education,  manners,  morals,  industries,  and  dictating  the 
tone  of  civilization,  or  become  a  silent  but  reflective  influence,  are 
fundamental  considerations,  the  vital  points  of  the  subject  itself.  To 
make  a  general  declaration  of  faith,  or  political  policy,  in  answer  to 
the  above,  we  submit  that  Christianity  will  introduce  to  the  notice  of 
the  State  all  the  institutions,  ideas,  moral  forces,  and  moral  benefits 
embodied  in  the  word  Church — a  word  foreign  to  philosophical 
systems.  In  its  final  workings  it  will  be  evident  that  it  will  be  aim- 
ing to  convert  the  State  into  the  Church  and  in  a  sense  to  convert 
the  Church  into  the  State  ;  that  is  to  say,  Christianity  will  Church  the 
world.  This  is  a  definite  purpose,  requiring  and  providing  all  re- 
formatory and  redemptive  agencies,  and  laying  foundations  as  strong 
as  the  everlasting  hills  for  the  future  society  of  man.  Christianity 
has  a  twofold  object,  as  its  permanent  aim :  1.  The  inward,  relating 
to  the  regeneration  of  man ;  2.  The  outward,  expressing  itself  in  an 
organized  Church.  With  the  second  only  have  we  now  to  do.  The 
authority  of  Christianity,  and  how  it  shall  be  exercised,  whether  dis- 
tinct from  State  forms  and  State  ethics,  and,  therefore,  a  rival  or 
twin  power,  or  in  unison  with  them,  forming  an  iron  and  clay  com- 
bination, deserves  careful  consideration.  It  is  the  old  question,  never 
satisfactorily  solved,  of  State  Churchism,  or  a  free  and  independent 
Church.  Monarchies  prefer  Church  establishments,  and  maintain 
them  at  vast  expense ;  but  very  much  is  lost  to  the  Church  itself  by 
the  secular  association.  In  England  the  Church  is  more  of  a  political 
institution  than  is  consistent  with  its  design,  working  out  political 
rather  than  religious  schemes,  and  enforcing  religious  teachings  by 
machine  methods,  which  are  always  inimical  to  spiritual  elevation  and 


516  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

intelligent  living.  The  dissenting  spirit  is  strong,  making  itself  felt 
in  the  organization  of  independent  religious  societies,  which  for 
activity  and  efficiency  have  already  eclipsed  the  moss-bound  Church 
orders  of  the  kingdom.  What  is  true  of  England  is  also  true  of 
Germany,  and  will  be  true  of  Roman  Catholic  countries  when  inde- 
pendent action  shall  be  tolerated. 

The  evils  of  State  Churchism  are  greatly  to  be  deplored.  What- 
ever the  advantage  to  the  State,  the  Church  suffers  inevitable  loss  in 
vigor,  spirituality,  and  activity.  The  State  secularizes  the  Church ; 
the  Church  fails  to  regenerate  the  State.  Thus  it  was  in  the  days  of 
Constantino,  when,  notwithstanding  the  splendor  of  his  reign  and  the 
apparent  advance  of  Christianity,  it  lost  in  moral  tone,  and  society 
became  as  a  turbid  pool.  In  the  ideal  State  the  Church  must  be  free 
and  so  separate  from  the  civil  power  that  the  functions  of  each  may 
be  performed  without  the  interference  of  the  other,  both  conserving 
by  independent  methods  the  common  idea  of  unity,  progress,  and 
happiness.  Shall  there  be  two  influences  in  power?  Shall  both 
Church  and  State  rule?  Rule  they  can  not  if  united — can  they  rule 
if  separated?  Each  is  an  organism,  blending  in  the  pursuit  of  the 
public  good,  but  working  towards  it  by  machinery  of  its  own. 
Given  a  republican  government  and  a  free  Church :  the  product  is  an 
IDEAL  SOCIETY.  The  double  reign  of  Church  and  State  is  paralleled 
by  the  double  rotation  of  the  earth,  the  one  around  its  own  axis, 
the  other  around  the  sun.  The  magistrate  is  not  the  priest — the 
priest  is  not  the  magistrate.  No  monarchy,  no  theocracy,  no  State 
Churchism — a  dual  government,  whose  politics  is  ethically  sound, 
whose  religion  is  politically  democratic  ;  this  is  the  ideal  State  and 
none  other. 

That  Christianity  is  vital  to  the  ideal  society  has  been  more  than 
once  intimated,  and  little  needs  to  be  added  in  proof  of  it.  What- 
ever is  vital  to  the  State,  Christianity  promotes  and  preserves.  What 
is  the  great  fear  of  nations?  Internal  decay,  external  opposition; 
strife  within,  assault  from  without.  The  former  is  the  greater  peril. 
Niebuhr  says,  "  No  nation  ever  died  except  by  suicide."  Political 
intrigue,  public  corruption,  the  loss  of  individual  virtue,  the  decline 
of  the  family  institution,  the  love  of  vicious  luxuries,  and  variation 
from  righteousness  have  been  more  effectual  in  national  overthrows 
than  organized  external  war  against  a  people.  National  immorality 
is  the  prelude  of  national  extinction.  The  Grecian  cities  united  were 
invincible ;  divided,  they  were  conquered.  From  internal  decay  and 
external  assault;  from  national  vices  and  foreign  wars,  Christianity 
will  save  the  State.  Were  the  world  a  Church,  the  sword  would  be 
a  relic,  for  war  is  not  a  Church  force,  or  a  Church  condition.    Where 


ORGANIC  EFFECTS  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  517 

the  Church  is,  there  is  the  holiness  of  peace,  and  the  peace  of  holi- 
ness. To  this  ideal  condition  the  world  is  slowly  drifting  ;  nations 
even  from  the  low  level  of  economic  reasons  are  considering  the  ex- 
pediency of  abolishing  standing  armies  and  submitting  international 
difierences  to  arbitration.  Both  Kant  and  the  elder  Mill  favored  an 
international  code  for  the  guidance  of  international  affairs,  under  the 
influence  of  which  they  anticipated  the  elimination  of  international 
evils ;  but,  like  other  philosophical  schemes,  the  code  was  never 
adopted.  Christianity  is  in  force,  working  out  its  legitimate  and 
beneficent  suggestions  in  the  world's  advance  toward  peace.  Saving 
the  State  from  external  or  foreign  assault,  it  saves  it  from  internal 
gloom  and  decay  by  the  repression  of  popular  vice,  and  the  intro- 
duction of  virtue.  In  these  respects  Christianity  is  vital  to  the 
ideal  State. 

In  the  very  nature  of  the  organization  of  society,  the  liberty  of 
the  individual,  or  the  sovereignty  of  personality,  is  an  essential  of  its 
growth  and  preservation.  The  freedom  of  vocation ;  the  sacred  right 
of  marriage  ;  the  choice  of  religion ;  the  possession  of  property  ;  the 
exercise  of  suffrage  ;  the  right  to  public  office  ;  all  these  and  more 
belong  to  free  men.  But  the  assertion  of  individual  rights  is  incon- 
sistent with  caste,  slavery,  despotism,  polygamy,  and  the  "inhuman- 
ities "  of  man.  However,  Christianity  is  the  assertion  of  individualism ; 
one  of  its  magical  words  is  "  brotherhood,"  as  opposed  to  the  world's 
word — "bondage."  Christianity  is  emancipation,  unity,  freedom, 
development.  Under  it  man  is  the  heir,  not  the  slave,  of  the  race 
to  which  he  belongs. 

In  the  matter  of  industrialism  the  necessity  for  harmony  between 
capitalists  and  laborers  is  self-evident.  Harmony  or  communism — one 
or  the  other.  Christianity  casts  its  vote  in  favor  of  harmony.  Fa- 
voring justice,  curbing  the  greed  of  men,  instilling  patience,  invig- 
orating human  sympathies,  and  sanctifying  human  toil,  it  prepares 
the  way  for  reconciliation  between  classes,  mutually  jealous  and  hos- 
tile, undermining  the  communistic  spirit  by  its  sweet  ministry  of 
love.  Divorce  religion  and  labor,  and  the  latter  sinks  into  material- 
ism. Without  religion,  labor  deals  with  matter  as  a  thing;  religion 
inspiring,  it  deals  with  matter  as  an  expression  of  God's  power  and 
wisdom,  and  the  laborer  rises  ever  into  thoughts  of  God. 

Practically,  Christianity  will  have  an  influence  in  determining  the  re- 
wards of  labor,  and  international  policies  respecting  international  trade. 
In  the  Christian  state  man's  toil  will  have  just  remuneration,  wages  being 
assessed  according  to  the  principles  of  political  economy,  which  consid- 
ers the  welfare  of  the  whole  rather  than  the  advantage  of  the  few.  Mo- 
nopolies will  not  flourish ;  the  poor  will  acquire  property ;  and  life  will  be 


518  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

agreeable  to  all.  Home  trade,  such  as  agriculture,  mercantile  business, 
and  the  manufacturing  interests  of  communities,  will  be  regulated  by 
the  moralities  of  the  ordained  religion  of  the  state,  which  will  promote 
good  will,  the  harmonious  adjustment  of  conflicting  enterprises,  and  an 
orderly  progress  in  all  departments  of  civil  life.  As  to  foreign  trade, 
or  the  law  governing  exports  and  imports,  a  partisan  spirit  will  not  dic- 
tate free  trade  or  protective  tariffs,  but  the  conflicting  doctrines  or  poli- 
cies will  be  harmonized  on  the  basis  of  a  large  philanthropy,  which  re- 
gards other  peoples  besides  one's  own,  and  the  world  as  well  as  one's 
own  section  of  it.  Equalization  of  international  rights  touching  trade, 
or  philanthropy  rather  than  a  local  patriotism,  which  sometimes  de- 
generates into  systematic  selfishness,  will  have  larger  consideration  in 
the  future  than  it  is  possible  to  have  now  among  partisans;  and  to 
that  future  we  refer  the  whole  question. 

That  Christianity  is  the  friend  of  education  none  will  hesitate  to 
admit,  except  those  who  confound  the  Roman  Catholic  religion  with 
the  divine  system  of  the  Master.  Christian  governments  are  favora- 
bly disposed  to  popular  education,  proving  that  Christianity  is  some- 
thing more  than  a  religion,  or  that,  as  a  religion,  it  stimulates  to 
thought  and  intellectual  achievement.  This  stimulation  it  effects  by 
the  force  of  its  truths  concerning  God  and  man;  by  its  eternal 
order  of  righteousness ;  by  its  system  of  laws ;  by  its  detail  of  du- 
ties ;  by  its  visions  of  destiny.  In  Christianity  itself,  its  revelations 
of  being,  cause,  order,  life,  and  ends,  is  the  ground-Avork  and  inspira- 
tion of  education.  It  makes  the  ideal  man,  without  which  the  ideal 
state  is  impossible,  for  it  is  only  an  aggregation  of  ideal  units,  of 
ideal  human  beings.  The  fact,  too,  must  not  be  obscured,  that  the 
ideal  state  does  not  produce  the  ideal  man,  but  the  ideal  man  pro- 
duces the  ideal  state.  With  him,  the  State  is  certain.  The  primary 
object  of  Christianity  is  not  the  production  of  Christian  communities 
and  nations,  but  Christian  men  and  women,  of  whom  Christian  com- 
munities and  nations  may  be  organized.  It  deals  with  the  individ- 
ual. It  enjoins  the  moralities ;  it  approves  and  fosters  the  philan- 
thropies ;  it  ordains  religious  regeneration,  or  religious  character. 
This  is  the  summit  of  idealistic  manhood,  reached  through  the  divine 
stepping-stones  of  Christianity.  The  ideal  man,  sustaining  a  divine 
relation  to  the  universe,  becomes  in  society  the  center  of  the  moralities, 
the  philanthropies,  and  the  spiritualities.  He  is  grounded  in  God,  and 
God  in  him. 

Naught  but  Christianity  produces  such.  Produced,  he  makes  the 
State,  the  community,  the  family,  the  Church.  The  ideal  State  con- 
cretes in  ideal  men  made  real  by  the  Christian  forces.  Had  J.  S. 
Mill  discerned  the  ideal  in  the  real  of  the  Christian  religion  he  had 


IDEAL  PURPOSE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  519 

never  despaired  of  the  world,  and  never  proposed  a  philosophical  re- 
construction of  it. 

In  the  presence  of  those  who  see  the  approaching  day  of  the  Chris- 
tian State,  under  whose  sway  moral,  social,  and  political  evils  will 
retire,  and  a  heavenly  life  of  wisdom,  justice,  purity,  and  develop- 
ment prevail,  pessimism  dwindles  into  absurdity,  materialistic  theo- 
ries vanish  like  a  nightmare,  and  Christianity  arises  as  the  force  and 
inspiration  of  the  actualized  social  ideal.  Hasten,  the  new  day! 
Welcome,  the  Christian  State ! 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 

THE     F>KRKE:CTI0N    ok     IVIAN   the     IDEAl,    OB"    CHRIS- 
TIANITY. 

IT  is  reported  from  Liberia  that  some  of  the  natives  are  able  with 
unaided  eyes  to  behold  the  satellites  of  Jupiter,  so  marvelous  is 
their  power  of  vision.  A  vision  equally  acute  is  required  to  descry 
the  distant  or  future  man  in  his  harmoniously  developed  character 
and  life,  as  it  shall  appear  under  Christian  rule  and  in  complete 
subserviency  to  the  will  of  God.  As  a  human  description  of  the 
future  man  as  the  result  of  the  natural  order  of  things,  must  par- 
take to  some  extent  of  conjecture,  and  be  based  upon  inferences 
from  empirical,  historical,  and  philosophical  studies,  it  is  im- 
portant that  the  best  helps,  and  even  divine  assistance,  be  invoked 
if  the  ideal  man  be  truly  prefigured.  Looking  upon  him  through 
the  telescope  of  Christianity,  and  knowing  that  its  revelations  are 
accurate,  and  conclusions  therefrom  will  be  reliable,  the  task  of  de- 
scription will  be  simplified,  and  faith  in  the  attainment  of  the  ulti- 
mate purpose  of  Christianity  will  be  strengthened. 

If  Christianity  has  an  ideal  object  of  pursuit,  or  is  controlled  by 
a  single  supreme  purpose,  however  manifold  its  incidental  and  col- 
lateral purposes  may  be,  the  inference  is  that,  as  indicated  by  its 
teachings  and  as  already  manifested  in  its  history,  its  ideal  purpose 
is  the  moral  perfection  of  man.  At  the  present  moment  it  is  suffi- 
cient to  know  that  it  has  before  it  an  ideal  idea  without  knowing 
definitely  the  contents  of  that  idea.  Speaking  philosophically,  the 
teleology  of  Christianity  is  a  theme  worthy  of  the  philosopher's  con- 
sideration, for  it  is  high  enough  for  his  vision,  deep  enough  for  his 
;)lumb-line,  and  moral  enough  for  employment  of  his  conscience  and 
intuitions.     Without  risk  we  assume  that  it  is  inspired  by  the  thought 


520  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

of  achievement,  that  the  motivity  of  religion  is  the  realization  of  the 
ideal  in  human  history,  and  that  its  inner  life  is  in  some  way  adapted 
to  promote  it. 

Possibly  it  is  assuming  too  much  when  we  affirm  that  its  ideal 
purpose  relates  to  man,  but  if  it  relate  to  other  beings  only  it  can  not 
concern  us.  Man  is  interested  in  it  only  as  it  is  interested  in  him. 
If  it  relate  to  others,  rather  than  to  himself,  he  may  admire  its 
beauty,  and,  discerning  the  hidden  wisdom  of  its  truths,  be  ready  to 
eulogize  it  as  a  divine  product;  but  he  can  not  be  interested  in  it. 
TJie  fascination  of  Christianity  arises  from  its  relation  to  the  race,  its 
adaptation  to  human  needs,  its  moral  lielpfulness  in  extremity,  and  its 
delivering  power  from  the  bondage  of  sin.  That  Christianity  is  a  rev- 
elation of  God  none  must  deny;  but  it  must  be  something  more. 
Primarily,  its  function  is  both  to  reveal  God  to  man,  and  to  conduct 
man  to  God;  it  is  to  create  a  Godward  impulse  in  humanity,  and 
leaven  it  with  a  heavenly  life.  Its  work  is  for  man  and  in  man  to  the 
glory  of  God  in  Jesus  Christ,  \yhatever  other  ends  it  promotes,  or 
seeks  to  make  known ;  however  much  it  contributes  to  the  ascendency 
of  other  ideas  and  truths;  its  chief  end  is  the  elevation,  development, 
and  perfection  of  man. 

This  view  magnifies  man  as  the  creature  of  God,  and  magnifies 
Christianity  in  proportion  as  its  ideal  end  relates  to  man.  If  man  is 
not  included  in  the  mission  of  Christianity,  if  his  development  is  not 
the  chief  end  of  Christianity,  Christianity  is  worthless.  Perhaps  this 
assumption  of  man's  exalted  position  in  the  universe  is  owing  to  that 
vanity  which  humanity,  even  in  its  degradation,  has  always  arrogated 
to  itself,  but  which  it  will  overcome  as  it  is  more  enlightened.  The 
evolutionist,  renouncing  the  tendency  to  self-flattery,  takes  an  entirely 
diflferent  view  from  the  above,  regarding  man  as  very  low  in  the  scale 
of  being,  and  destined  to  disappear.  His  is  not  a  comforting  revela- 
tion to  the  race.  Quoting  history,  he  informs  us  that  the  scientific 
thinker  in  the  splendid  days  of  Egyptian  supremacy  conceived  that 
the  earth  is  the  center  of  the  astronomic  universe,  and  that  all  the 
planets  revolve  around  it,  and  in  a  sense  exist  for  it.  Even  Greece 
and  Rome  accepted  the  flattering  astronomy ;  but  Copernicus  extracted 
the  romance  from  it,  and  pointed  out  that  the  earth  is  one  of  the  small- 
est of  orbs,  and  that  it  probably  ministers  to  others,  and  will  some 
day  expire.  Without  emotion  the  evolutionist  also  informs  us  that 
the  vanity  which  places  man  at  the  head  of  creation,  eulogizing  him 
as  the  first  creature  of  the  Almighty,  destined  to  development  and 
dominion,  will  be  punctured  by  and  by,  and  man  will  see  himself 
as  he  is,  an  atom,  a  worm,  a  clod,  with  no  destiny  but  decline,  with 
no  future  but  oblivion.     Between  the  cold,  forlorn,   non-progressive 


MAN  FIRST  AND  LAST.  521 

assumption  of  evolution,  and  the  warm  and  inspiring  teaching  of 
Christianity,  cue  must  make  choice.  Is  the  thought  of  man's  great- 
ness a  vanity?  Is  the  hope  of  progress  an  idle  sentiment?  Is  man 
at  the  head  or  foot  ?  Christianity  places  him  at  the  head ;  evolution,  at 
the  foot. 

Christianity  is  the  only  religion  that  foresees  for  man  the  devel- 
opment of  his  moral  and  intellectual  possibilities,  prescribing  the 
method  of  such  development,  and  providing  the  means  by  which 
it  may  finally  be  attained.  It  is  the  only  religion  that  is  committed 
to  the  doctrine  of  progress ;  that  looks  forward,  not  backward ;  that 
sings  of  millennial  days,  and  plans  for  the  triumph  of  order  and  the 
reign  of  wisdom.  Contemplating  the  world  in  sin  and  darkness,  it 
comes  as  the  breaker  of  the  yoke  of  sin,  and  as  a  light  shining  in 
darkness,  a  purpose  no  other  religion  ever  espoused,  a  work  no  other 
ever  performed.  No  one  who  reads  the  pages  of  the  New  Testament 
will  deny  that  its  first  principle — regeneration — is  a  preparation  for 
progress,  and  that  its  last  eulogy  is  pronounced  upon  the  man  who 
has  risen  from  the  dust  to  the  throne.  The  teleology  of  Christianity, 
therefore,  relates  to  the  development  of  man  into  an  ideal  character. 

Nor  is  this  among  the  final  recitations  of  Christianity,  but  really 
its  first ;  or,  representing  it  otherwise,  the  creation  of  man  was  the 
prophecy  of  his  history,  as  it  has  unfolded  into  complex  character- 
istics, and  as  it  now  points  to  an  unending  development  and  refine- 
ment of  his  possibilities.  Studying  the  account  in  Genesis,  it  appears 
that  man  was  last  in  the  series  of  creative  acts,  and  then  suddenly  it 
appears  that  he  was  first ;  in  other  words,  there  are  two  accounts,  ap- 
parently contradictory  in  their  chronological  relations,  to  be  explained 
only  on  the  ground  of  two  authorships,  or  rejected  entirely.  It  falls 
not.  within  our  province  to  attempt  a  reconciliation  of  these  accounts, 
further  than  to  state  that,  viewed  from  the  standpoints  from  which 
they  are  given,  they  are  the  same  in  substance,  and  consistent  as  a 
revelation  of  a  historic  act.  The  difference  in  chronology  makes  not 
against  the  authenticity  of  the  record,  but,  on  the  other  hand,  adds 
to  its  value.  Considering  the  double  account  as  written  by  one  hand 
from  .opposite  points  of  thought,  we  see  that  man  was  the  supreme 
subject,  whom  the  sacred  writer  desired  to  represent  in  more  than  one 
relation.  As  one  may  write  the  history  of  the  United  States  from 
A.  D.  1620  to  1886,  or,  beginning  with  1886,  write  backward  to 
1620,  so  the  Mosaic  account  concerning  man  seems  to  be  written  in 
both  orders;  in  the  one,  man  is  last,  in  the  other  he  is  first. 
"Whether  first  or  last,  however,  he  is  the  pre-eminent  character  of 
creation,  occupying  the  larger  thought  of  the  writer  who  records  the 
creation.     As  last,  man  stands  conspicuously  enough   in  the  series, 


522  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

waiting  until  the  earth  is  ready  for  an  inhabitant  before  he  appears, 
and  then  he  comes  forth  with  a  commission  to  subdue  all  things  to 
himself.  Last,  he  is  greatest.  As  first,  he  precedes  all  things,  as  if 
independent  of  them,  contented  with  the  presence  of  God.  It  is  not 
easy  to  determine  whether  as  first  or  last  he  appears  the  greater,  for 
he  is  great  no  difference  when  made,  or  how  made.  He  either  begins 
or  ends  the  creative  series ;  introduces  the  panorama,  or  gives  it  the 
finishing  beauty;  and  is  as  pre-eminent  in  the  one  case  as  in  the 
other.  According  to  the  original  account,  therefore,  man  is  related 
to  the  world's  beginning,  and  the  world's  beginning  in  both  instances 
is  subordinated  to  his  position  and  destiny. 

The  assignment  to  such  a  position  in  the  creative  series  implies 
not  only  the  greatness  of  the  creature,  but  also  an  equally  conspicuous 
future  in  the  development  of  the  series.  Representing  him,  not  as 
an  evolved  being,  but  as  created  and  divinely  endowed,  Christianity 
continually  awakens  in  man  the  thought  of  his  high  origin,  and  the 
hope  of  a  destiny  that  shall  correspond  to  it.  He  was  created  in  the 
divine  image  because  a  divine  future  lay  before  him.  His  creation 
is  implicit  with  eternal  development.  Reasoning  from  analogy,  this  is 
patent  from  the  divine  order  in  the  world's  upbuilding,  both  of 
what  we  see  and  what  we  can  not  see.  According  to  the  theory  of 
evolution,  the  different  kingdoms  of  nature,  ever  subject  to  the  laws 
of  growth,  exhibit  a  historic  series  from  preliminary  stages  to  com- 
plete or  stationary  forms,  showing  sometimes  a  leisurely  development, 
and  then  a  very  rapid  march  to  a  given  point,  but  in  all  cases  observ- 
ing a  specific  and  fixed  order  of  history.  From  lichens  and  mosses 
the  vegetable  kingdom  has  evolved  into  flowers  and  forests,  beautify- 
ing the  rugged  earth,  and  ministering  to  the  sesthetic  element  in 
man.  From  fishes  and  reptiles  the  animal  kingdom  has  developed 
into  mammoths,  useful  quadrupeds,  and  all  other  individuals  embraced 
in  zoology.  Now,  the  striking  fact  in  these  kingdoms  is,  not  merely 
development  after  a  fixed  order,  but  development  ivith  reference  to  a 
final  purpose;  in  other  words,  the  motive  of  the  development  is  the 
end  or  purpose  foreseen  from  the  beginning.  At  every  stage  of  their 
development  these  kingdoms  pointed  futureward,  not  aimlessly,  not 
ignorantly,  but  prophetically  of  a  higher  order  of  life  or  form.  The 
lichen  was  the  prophecy  of  the  forest,  and  the  reptile  of  the  whole 
animal  kingdom.  These  prophecies  of  nature's  kingdoms  related  not 
so  much  to  general  development  as  to  development  of  a  particular 
kind,  and  for  the  realization  of  a  particular  end,  incorporated  with 
the  world's  forces,  and  regulating  them  from  the  beginning. 

But  so  manifest  a  historic  development  has  its  limits ;  almost  uni- 
versal, it  does  not  apply  to  man ;  and,  since  it  does  not  apply  to  man, 


THE  MASTERPIECE  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  523 

another  development  or  order  of  life  must  be  predicated  to  account  for 
his  place  in  the  universe.  According  to  the  Biblical  revelation,  the 
work  of  creation  ceased  with  man ;  nor  does  it  point  to  another  and 
more  highly  organized  being,  as  the  result  of  a  development  of  the 
original  man.  Man  is  the  chief  product  of  creative  skill  and  wis- 
dom ;  he  will  not  become  extinct  by  a  natural  order,  and  give  place 
to  a  superior  being.  Creation  not  only  stops  with  man,  but  centers  in 
him  its  most  delicate  workmanship,  and  the  most  delightful  proph- 
ecies of  his  greatness.  He  is  the  masterpiece  of  divine  power  and 
goodness.  He  is  to  develop,  not  out  of  himself  or  into  another  being, 
but  into  himself,  as  the  rational  exponent  of  God's  idea  of  being.  He 
is  to  develop,  not  into  a  grander  being,  inasmuch  as  he  is  gran- 
deur itself. 

In  this  presupposition  we  are  but  following  the  well-worn  path  of 
Bible  teaching;  but,  well-worn  as  the  idea  is,  it  can  not  be  too  often 
reiterated  that  creation  centers  and  exhausts  itself  in  man. 

Besides,  the  path  terminates  in  the  highway  of  Christianity  which 
confirms  and  completes  the  original  idea  of  man's  creation.  It  is  the 
only  religion  that  confirms  the  history  of  man's  origin  and  will  com- 
plete the  prophecy  of  his  destiny.  Taking  him  up  where  creation 
leaves  him  Christianity,  centering  in  him  all  its  recuperative  forces, 
undertakes  to  build  him  up  into  a  concrete  model  of  life.  It  has  no 
other  mission  than  to  fulfill  the  original  purposes  of  his  creation. 
The  masterpiece  of  creation,  he  will  appear  finally  as  the  masterpiece 
of  Christianity.  As  at  the  first  creation's  forces  centered  in  him, 
so  at  the  last  the  forces  of  Christianity  center  in  him,  undertak- 
ing to  do  for  him  what  the  former  failed  to  do,  that  is,  to  furnish 
him  with  adequate  resisting  power  against  evil  and  to  develop  his 
spiritual  nature  into  perfection.  The  thought  is  overwhelming  that 
Christianity  focuses  its  power  in  man  for  his  development,  for  it 
means  that  all  righteous  self-effort  will  be  supplemented  by  divine 
agency  and  that  the  race  need  not  despair ;  it  means  the  employment 
of  all  the  supernatural  influences  of  Christianity  in  the  great  task  of 
human  development.  Unaided  in  such  a  task,  humanity  must  fail; 
yea,  it  will  perish ;  aided  by  the  divine  forces,  humanity  will  bloom 
with  spiritual  beauty  and  bear  fruit  unto  holiness.  Whatever  Chris- 
tianity is,  whatever  it  can  do,  the  pledge  is  that  humanity  shall  be 
the  recipient  of  its  favor,  and  rise  to  the  height  of  its  promises.  Not 
man  as  the  masterpiece  of  creation,  but  man  under  Christianity,  more, 
Christianity  in  man,  guided  by  it,  developed  by  it,  developed  into  it, 
this  is  the  future  man,  this  is  the  highest  man. 

Under  Christianity,  as  under  no  other  system  of  religion,  man  is 
attaining  to  dominion  of  the  earth  and  is  bold  enough  to  anticipate 


524  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

final  and  undisputed  possession  of  its  forces  and  facts,  'f  hat  physical 
dominion  is  one  of  the  contemplated  ends  of  his  creation  will  be 
admitted  at  once  by  readers  of  Genesis,  and  by  students  of  his 
adaptations,  functions,  and  possibilities.  The  progress  toward  dominion 
it  is  confessed  has  been  exceedingly  slow,  not  at  all  in  proportion  to  his 
capacity  for  dominion ,  nor  sufficiently  satisfying  of  his  ambition  or  needs. 
For  the  most  part,  nature  has  had  dominion  over  him,  subjecting  him 
to  lav.s  he  did  not  understand,  and  playing  with  him,  as  a  tempest 
with  a  yacht,  or  the  wind  with  a  fly.  His  intellectual  dullness  in 
the  presence  of  nature  was  as  apparent  as  his  spiritual  darkness  in 
the  presence  of  God.  Until  the  dawn  of  Christianity,  or  until  its 
influence  began  to  be  felt  on  the  human  intellect,  nature  was  unsub- 
dued, inspiring  man  with  dread  which  expressed  itself  in  religious 
superstition  ;  the  stars  were  worshiped  ;  fire  was  deified  ;  comets  were 
the  heralds  of  evil ;  animals  and  reptiles  received  human  homage  ; 
and  in  ignorance  of  the  reign  of  law  man  subscribed  to  fate  and 
drifted  into  pessimistic  darkness,  or  a  heartless  faith.  Nature  won 
the  victory  ;  man  was  a  slave. 

With  the  new  torchlight  in  his  hand,  man  has  advanced  in  his 
conquest  over  nature,  asserting  as  he  goes  his  right  to  dominion,  and 
making  it  good  by  a  courage  that  must  excite  the  admiration  of  the 
upper  powers.  He  is  ascertaining  the  limits  of  the  empire  of  nature ; 
he  is  anxious  to  know  what  are  the  laws  of  this  empire,  and  is  per- 
sistent enough  to  demand  a  full  revelation  of  them ;  he  is  acquaint- 
ing himself  with  the  forms  and  forces,  functions  and  adaptations  of 
nature  ;  he  has  reduced  the  forests  and  exterminated  the  wild  beasts 
that  inhabited  them  ;  he  has  discovered  the  various  poisons  hidden  in 
nature's  garments  and  found  also  an  antidote  for  them  ;  he  is  con- 
ducting himself  as  if  he  were  master  of  the  situation. 

This  is  one  of  his  first  duties  arising  out  of  his  relation  to  the 
universe,  namely,  the  subjugation  of  the  earth  and  the  acknowledg- 
ment of  his  authority  in  the  empire  of  nature.  By  virtue  of  his 
creation  this  duty  was  imposed  upon  him,  but  without  Christianity, 
as  the  stimulating  and  guiding  force  in  conquest,  he  had  failed.  The 
idea  of  dominion  is  congenial  to  the  new  religion  ;  it  fosters  it  in 
every  way  possible  ;  it  dignifies  man  with  a  sense  of  authority  ;  it 
promises  him  royal  prestige  ;  it  exalts  him  to  the  throne.  Hence, 
discoveries  are  not  accidents,  and  inventions  are  not  surprises ;  they 
are  the  natural  results  of  that  inspiration  which  religion  induces  and 
of  that  expectancy  which  it  creates.  The  revelation  of  new  facts, 
the  discovery  of  new  principles,  and  the  employment  of  forces  in 
new  ways,  are  in  perfect  harmony  with  the  designs,  and  in  perfect 
fulfillment  of  the  purposes  of  Christianity. 


DOMINION  IMPLICIT  WITH   DEVELOPMENT.  525 

If  it  is  imagined  that  the  work  of  subjugation  is  external  and 
without  relation  to  man's  personality,  and  can  not  contribute  to  its 
development,  it  is  because  the  relation  of  the  external  to  the  internal, 
or,  more  concisely,  the  relation  of  the  physical  to  the  spiritual,  is 
misunderstood.  Once  examined,  it  will  be  seen  that  dominion  is  im- 
possible without  the  supremacy  of  the  spiritual  over  the  natural ;  it 
implies  such  supremacy.  What  is  dominion?  Is  it  not  the  adjust- 
ment of  man  to  his  environment?  Is  it  not  the  mastery  of  the 
material  by  the  intellectual  and  spiritual  ?  Does  not  conquest  signify 
the  superiority  of  man  to  material  forces  and  laws?  Dominion  and 
the  Vant  of  it  is  the  difierence  between  man,  as  a  barbarian,  and 
man  as  an  enlightened,  civilized,  Christianized  being.  The  barbaric 
man  is  not  a  discoverer  or  inventor ;  the  developed  man  is  both,  and 
great  in  proportion  as  he  is  both.  Over  the  former  nature  has 
dominion ;  the  latter  has  dominion  over  nature.  Thus  the  idea  of 
dominion  is  significant  of  the  idea  of  development ;  in  fact,  they  are 
the  same  thing,  or  one  without  the  other  is  a  solecism.  The  duty  of 
subjugation  is  enforced  by  the  imperative  condition  that  either  man 
must  regulate  his  environment,  or  it  will  regulate  him  ;  he  must  sub- 
due the  external  or  it  will  subdue  him.  The  conflict  is  for  single 
mastery  and  not  for  reciprocal  dominion  ;  one  can  not  share  with  the 
other  the  title  to  authority ;  one  must  subdue  the  other.  This  is 
necessary  to  personal  comfort  and  future  destiny.  Man's  first  work 
is  along  the  physical  line,  external  in  character,  but  profoundly  re- 
lated to  self-development  and  salvation. 

Widening  the  view  a  little,  the  relation  of  the  occupations  of  men  to 
self-culture  and  the  spiritual  life  is  as  vital  as  the  relation  of  the  internal 
and  external  conditions  of  the  race.  As  pursuit  is  related  to  character, 
Christianity  unobtrusively  but  efl^ectually  dictates  to  Christian  na- 
tions those  occupations  which  in  their  ultimate  effects  tend  to  moral 
elevation  and  the  supremacy  of  man.  To  the  superficial  observer 
this  may  seem  more  poetic  than  real,  and  to  the  materialistic  thinker 
it  may  seem  grossly  heterodox.  Upon  careful  inspection  we  find  that 
the  motive  of  self-interest  exercises  a  controlling  influence  in  the 
selection  of  pursuit,  but  self-interest  implies  self-knowledge,  and  self- 
knowledge,  broadened  and  refined  by  Christian  truth,  ordains  just 
those  pursuits  which  contribute  most  to  human  happiness  and  the  gen- 
eral welfare  of  man. 

Studying  the  occupations  of  men,  one  will  see  that  they  are  the 
product  of  human  necessities,  tastes,  environments,  and,  therefore, 
the  providential  result  of  the  general  situation.  Why  agriculture, 
commerce,  art,  business,  legislation,  govei'nment,  industrial  occupation, 
and  the  miscellany  of  pursuits  in  civilized   lands  ?     The  explanation 


526  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

is  at  hand.  As  a  barbarian,  man's  wants  are  few  in  number  and 
simple  in  spirit ;  he  scarcely  needs  a  house,  clothing  is  a  burden,  fish, 
roots,  nuts,  and  herbs  constitute  his  food.  Turn  the  barbarian  into  a 
civilized  man  and  his  wants  immediately  multiply  ;  he  wants  every 
thing ;  he  wants  a  house,  a  wardrobe,  a  pantry  ;  he  wants  a  govern- 
ment and  a  Church ;  he  wants  law  and  education ;  he  wants  the 
universe  and  all  that  it  contains.  He  is  an  organized  want,  incessant 
in  his  demands  on  all  existence  to  minister  to  him.  This  change  in 
aspiration,  this  march  from  simplicity  to  complexity,  this  demand  for 
every  thing,  signifies  that  his  barbarism  has  disappeared  and  a  new 
life  has  taken  possession  of  him.  It  is  this  new  life,  born  of  Chris- 
tian thought,  that  expresses  itself  in  the  multiplied  pursuits  of  men, 
that  runs  out  into  agriculture,  art,  commerce,  education,  government, 
and  religious  activity. 

This,  however,  is  not  the  whole  truth  respecting  the  subject.  It 
can  not  have  escaped  observation  that  the  majority  of  men's  pursuits 
in  their  aggregate  eflfects  do  tend  to  promote  that  self-development 
of  man  which  Christianity  sets  forth  as  its  supreme  aim  and  ideal 
purpose.  The  moral  content  of  human  pursuit  must  not  be  ignored. 
Agriculture  is  a  moral  promoter  of  life,  prosperity,  and  peace ;  com- 
merce contributes  something  to  international  comity,  and  strengthens 
the  doctrine  of  the  unity  of  the  race ;  the  manufacturer  or  inventor 
who  aids  in  expelling  labor  from  the  earth  is  fulfilling  the  command 
to  subdue  nature  and  exercise  authority  over  it ;  the  teacher,  the 
journalist,  and  the  minister,  by  pointing  out  the  avenues  of  truth, 
is  turning  human  thought  to  its  highest  possibility ;  and  by  all  the 
pursuits  of  men  the  world  is  being  lifted  out  of  conservatism,  misery, 
darkness,  and  delusion. 

Another  glimpse  reveals  the  fact  that  those  occupations  which 
have  for  their  direct  object  the  supremacy  of  man  are  in  the  ascend- 
ency, while  those  are  in  a  decline  that  oppose  the  manifest  destiny  of 
human  dominion.  With  the  advance  of  the  philanthropic  spirit, 
the  cultivation  of  the  aesthetic  faculty,  and  the  priority  of  intellectual 
callings,  the  muscular  or  manual  occupations  have  receded,  or  occupy 
the  background  of  human  progress.  Barbaric  pursuits  and  barbaric 
methods  had  a  kind  of  justification  in  the  periods  of  savage  life  or 
during  the  pastoral  epochs ;  but,  as  the  earth  is  subdued,  the  race 
rises  to  philanthropic,  intellectual,  aesthetic,  and  religious  ideals  as  the 
noblest  objects  of  aspiration,  and  regulates  its  activities  accordingly, 
From  the  savage  state  to  the  civilized  condition  the  process  is  purely 
evolutional ;  every  step  is  an  advance ;  every  age  witnesses  a  ten- 
dency to  an  increase  of  human  authority  in  the  realm  of  nature  ;  and 
the  day  is  not  distant  when  man  will  be  perfectly  adjusted   to  his 


THE  CHRISTIAN  IDEAL  OF  GOVERNMENT.  527 

environment  by  the  aid  of  the  pursuits  which  a  Christian  civilization 
originates  and  promotes.  Not  by  Christian  institutions  alone,  but 
also  by  the  sanctificatiou  of  the  secular  pursuits  of  men,  is  the  ideal 
purpose  of  Christianity  being  wrought  out.  The  plow,  the  ship,  the 
locomotive,  the  easel,  the  yard-stick,  the  scales,  and  the  pen  contrib- 
ute to  this  purpose  as  certainly  as  the  Church,  the  school,  and  the 
home ;  that  is,  the  occupation  of  the  race  are  related  to  the  ideal  end  of 
the  race  as  surely  as  tlw  sacred  agencies,  diviyiely  authorized  to  pro- 
mote it. 

Under  Christianity  political  government  is  harmonizing  with  the 
ideal  purpose,  in  that  it  is  gradually  assuming  a  form  consistent  with 
the  largest  liberty  of  the  individual,  and  is  prompting  by  its  conces- 
sions and  auxiliaries  to  the  largest  development.  Where  it  obtains,  or 
has  any  reigning  or  assimilative  power  the  tendency  is  toward  a  dem- 
ocratic form  of  government,  which  is  the  ideal  conception  of  govern- 
ment, as  revealed  in  the  Scriptures ;  and  so  permeating  is  its  influence 
that  it  is  felt  in  lands  where  neither  priesthoods  nor  rulers  are  dis- 
posed to  recognize  it.  Whatever  the  uses  of  other  forms  of  govern- 
ment, and  however  necessary  they  may  have  been  in  the  early  history 
of  the  race,  the  time  has  come  when  the  personality  of  man  requires 
for  its  self-assertion  just  that  liberty  which  the  republican  type  of 
government  insures.  While  under  any  government  genius  may  thrive, 
and  the  scholar  secure  honorable  recognition,  under  many  govern- 
ments the  masses  are  crushed,  and  rise  only  with  an  increase  of  lib- 
erty. So  imperative  is  the  government  of  liberty  that  without  it 
progress  is  slow  and  degradation  is  sure.  Despotisms,  barbaric  laws, 
legal  cruelties  and  oppressions,  have  characterized  the  exercise  of 
civil  authority  from  the  earliest  ages  ;  and,  justified  as  they  may  have 
been  by  reason  of  the  general  ignorance,  they  did  not  promote  cul- 
ture or  develop  character.  Better  forms  were,  therefore,  required. 
To  overthrow  the  old  forms,  however,  was  no  easy  task,  but  it  was 
finally  accomplished  by  the  agencies  or  suggestions  of  Christianity. 
As  Christianity  is  received  the  impulse  to  popular  or  representative 
government,  or  the  breaking  away  from  the  forms  of  tyranny,  be- 
comes intense  and  grows  until  it  secures  its  end  in  democratic  gov- 
ernment. The  political  tendency,  apparently  at  times  to  disorgani- 
zation, nihilism,  anarchy,  is  really  toward  personality,  individualism, 
or  the  assertion  of  human  rights.  Individualism  can  not  have  the 
fullest  play  in  governments,  royal  or  despotic,  as  witness  in  Persia 
and  Spain,  but  flourishes  best  in  those  civil  conditions  which  deny 
to  no  man  any  right  that  belongs  to  another.  This  is  a  hard  lesson 
for  rulers  to  learn,  but  the  people  are  learning  it  through  the  im- 
pregnating political  enthusiasm  of  religion.     As  it  prevails,  caste  and 


528  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

slavery,  long  the  structural  elements  of  society,  disappear,  and  free- 
dom with  aspiration  rules  the  heart  of  man. 

It  is  not  claimed  that  Christianity  definitely  points  out  the  repub- 
lican form  of  government  as  the  ideal  to  which  society  in  its  civil 
constitution  should  conform ;  but  it  inculcates  such  political  princi- 
ples and  favors  such  liberties,  privileges,  and  rights,  that  such  a  form 
of  government  is  a  condition  of  their  enjoyment;  and  by  this  indirect 
method  such  a  form  of  government  appears  to  have  divine  sanction, 
and  to  be  preferred  to  all  others. 

It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  Christianity  is  the  proposed  religion 
of  all  races ;  that  it  is  not  the  religion  of  a  single  nation  ;  but  that 
it  has  in  view,  without  respect  of  persons,  the  elevation  of  all  men 
and  the  conversion  of  all  nations,  going  farther  in  this  particular 
than  any  other  religion  or  any  other  project  devised  by  men.  It  has 
but  one  purpose,  which  includes  all  races  and  nationalities.  That 
purpose  is  to  make  men  free,  politically,  intellectually,  spiritually; 
to  develop  the  personality  of  every  man  ;  to  insure  to  every  man  the 
fulfillment  of  his  greatest  possibilities.  To  be  in  harmony  with  such 
a  purpose,  political  government  must  be  democratic  in  spirit,  guar- 
anteeing the  same  inalienable  rights  to  all  its  subjects,  and  fostering 
the  noblest  aspirations  of  the  national  life. 

As  Christianity  spreads,  taking  root  in  the  governmental  idea,  it 
will  transform  it,  and  the  government  will  become  more  humane  and 
liberal,  and  less  cruel  and  extortionate  ;  and  the  individualism  of  man, 
eccentric  or  orderly,  regular  or  irregular,  will  have  free  course  and  be 
glorified.  This  expansion  of  individual  rights ;  this  guarantee  of 
personality;  this  privilege  of  personal  development,  Christianity  en- 
joins, and  is  enforcing  upon  the  attention  of  rulers  and  people.  This 
means  progress,  and  progress  means  perfection. 

The  latitude  of  our  vision  extends  over  the  relation  of  Christianity 
to  social  customs,  and  social  and  moral  institutions.  Do  these  to  any 
degree  feel  the  impression  of  Christianity?  And  to  what  extent 
are  they  involved  in  the  execution  of  its  ideal  program  ?  Without 
question,  the  social  life  of  man  in  civilized  lands  is  under  the  author- 
ity of  religion,  and  is  in  a  large  degree  molded  by  it.  To  be  sure, 
acknowledgment  of  such  influence,  owing  to  human  pride,  may  be 
reluctantly  made  ;  but,  acknowledged  or  not,  it  is  evident  that  cus- 
toms, manners,  institutions,  neither  distinctively  religious  nor  political, 
have  been  under  the  guardianship  of  religious  teaching,  the  results 
being  seen  in  a  healthy,  moral  tone  in  society  and  popular  approval 
of  refined  sentiment  and  elegant  conduct.  Coarse,  brutal  manners, 
retire  in  the  presence  of  the  Christian  spirit.  Gladiatorial  sports 
ceased  at  the  command  of  Christianity.     If  bull-fighting  is  a  pastime 


P  URIFICA  TION  OF  LANG  UA  GE.  529 

in  Spain,  to  which  the  multitudes  turn  with  delight,  it  is  because 
Christianity  has  not  taken  root  in  public  thought  and  does  not  sit 
on  the  throne.  Cruel  amusements,  whether  they  involve  men  or 
beasts,  religion  condemns  and  will  destroy.  As  for  institutions, 
slavery  went  down  beneath  the  righteousness  of  God;  feudalism  was 
consumed  in  the  blaze  of  a  quickened  public  judgment ;  and  invidious 
social  systems  expire  in  the  light  of  the  truth  that  the  Lord  is  the 
Maker  of  all  men. 

Again :  Under  Christianity  the  languages  of  men  are  undergoing 
such  transformations,  and  are  so  rapidly  approaching  unity,  that  be- 
lief in  a  common  elevation  of  the  race  is  no  longer  chimerical,  and 
the  expectation  of  a  universal  tongue  no  longer  an  idle  dream.  The 
refinement  of  language,  the  multiplication  of  words,  and  the  har- 
mony of  thought  with  the  ideal  purpose  of  religion,  constitute  signs 
of  progress  entirely  due  to  Christian  influence.  Before  any  signal  ad- 
vance in  these  matters  was  observable  human  thought  was  impreg- 
nated with  pagan  ideas,  and  human  speech  was  reduced  to  an 
exponent  of  the  lower  nature  of  man.  We  do  not  fail  to  remember 
that  the  Greek  language  in  the  days  of  Pericles  was  strong  and 
bountiful,  but  the  paganism  of  the  age  was  the  fountain  that  cor- 
rupted it,  and  unfitted  it  for  future  civilizations.  Even  current 
tongues,  under  Christian  thought,  are  not  free  from  coarseness,  blas- 
phemy, and  provincialism,  and  modern  literature  itself  can  not  claim 
to  have  reached  perfection  ;  but  modern  language  is  an  advanced 
language.  It  is  the  representative  of  modern  thought,  which  in  its 
spirit  is  Christian  and  in  its  purpose  progressive.  As  pagan  thought 
has  been  superseded  by  Christian  thought,  so  pagan  words,  phrases, 
and  sentences  have  been  superseded  by  Christian  words,  phrases,  and 
sentences.  Refinement  in  morals  and  manners  has  been  followed  by 
refinement  in  speech,  intercourse,  and  conduct.  The  language  of  the 
street  is  being  exchanged  for  the  language  of  the  home  and  the 
Church.  Language  now  is  the  exponent  of  the  higher  nature  of 
man,  as  before  the  reign  of  Christianity  it  was  the  exponent  of  the 
lower  nature  of  man. 

Hence,  religious  words  have  multiplied,  and  languages  are  taking 
a  religious  cast.  Few  there  are  that  do  not  abound  with  words  re- 
lating to  the  Deity,  the  soul,  worship,  and  eternity.  This  is  eleva- 
tion ;  this  is  sanctification. 

It  is  a  remarkable  sign  of  the  times  and  a  proof  of  the  pervasive 
influence  of  Christianity  that  there  is  a  belief  in  the  final  univers- 
ality of  one  language  in  the  world  ;  that  gradually  the  many  dialects 
will  subside  or  coalesce  with  one  of  the  prominent  languages ;  and  at 
last  all  nations  will  speak  one  tongue.     This  is  not  an  unreasonable 

34 


530  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

hope,  uor  are  the  probabilities  against  it,  for  all  the  languages  are 
one  ;  that  is,  they  are  branches  of  one  trunk,  having  similar  roots  and 
pervaded  by  a  similar  life.  The  kinship  is  unmistakable,  and  unity 
is  possible.  This  hope  is  like  to  other  ideas  that  float  in  thinking 
circles,  such  as  the  unity  of  the  race,  the  unity  of  the  universe,  the 
unity  of  history,  and  the  unity  of  God,  being  founded  on  a  similar 
basis,  and  quite  as  likely  to  become  a  practical  realization.  Under- 
lying all  history,  all  thought,  is  the.  idea  of  unity,  in  accordance  with 
which  is  the  expectation  of  one  language.  But  unity  of  language 
signifies  a  common  elevation  and  the  cementing  of  the  nations  in  a 
great  brotherhood,  by  whose  aggregated  enthusiasm  and  in  the  light 
of  the  great  Gospel  purpose  they  will  together  march  on  to  the 
higher  development  prefigured  in  Christianity. 

The  possibilities  of  man  under  Christianity  may  be  discovered 
from  still  another  standpoint.  The  scientific  spirit  of  man  is  the 
prophecy  of  a  new  development  of  his  intellectual  nature  to  be 
achieved  through  the  agency  of  religious  influence.  The  direct  bear- 
ing of  science  on  the  future  man  and  the  preparation  it  affords  for 
the  fulfillment  of  his  great  ends  are  of  more  consequence  in  this 
study  than  any  thing  that  has  hitherto  received  our  attention,  for,  in 
a  philosophical  sense,  it  relates  to  the  reign  of  mind  in  human  affairs, 
which  supersedes  in  importance  the  reign  of  man  in  nature.  The 
latter  is  an  external  reign  ;  the  former,  an  internal  reign.  The  one 
signifies  dominion  of  the  world  ;  the  other,  self -dominion.  Subduing 
his  environment,  and  regulating  his  occupations  by,  and  conforming 
his  political  governments  to,  the  Gospel  ideal,  the  question  remains, 
what  will  he  make  of  himself?  External  dominion  is  one  thing  ;  in- 
ternal development  another.    Christianity  promises  both,  insures  both. 

Through  the  stimulating  energy  of  religious  truth  the  scientific 
spirit  in  man  has  been  wonderfully  quickened  in  modern  days,  so 
much  so  that  it  has  taken  the  reins  in  its  own  hands  and  is  driv- 
ing at  a  furious  rate,  exciting  not  a  little  alarm  lest  disaster  happen 
to  the  very  interests  it  would  conserve.  We  say,  let  it  go,  or  as 
Paul  said  of  the  ship  in  the  storm,  we  let  her  drive.  Scientific 
enthusiasm  is  not  prejudicial  to  the  best  results  in  the  Christian 
sphere.  Spiritual  truth  supported  by  natural  evidences  is  just  as 
strong  as  if  supported  by  spiritual  evidences.  Natural  evidence  and 
spiritual  evidence  must  at  last  coincide  in  the  defense  of  the  highest 
truth.  It  is  because  scientific  truth  is  in  perfect  harmony  with 
spiritual  truth  that  scientific  evidences  are  as  interesting  as  spiritual 
evidences,  and  no  danger  is  possible  to  either,  since  both  are  one. 

In  these  modern  times  the  scientific  spirit  is  as  evidently  under 
the  administration  of  Christianity  as  are   the  pursuits,  governments. 


SPIRITUALIZATION  GF  THE  SECULAR  LIFE.  531 

arts,  and  institutions  of  men,  resulting  in  the  pronounced  activity  of 
the  investigator,  and  in  the  accumulated  facts  and  principles  of  the 
scientific  student.  One  might  not  think  so  as,  looking  over  the  field, 
he  discovers  materialism,  pessimism,  and  agnosticism,  in  apparent 
possession  of  scientific  thought  and  arrayed  against  the  very  religion 
by  virtue  of  which  their  existence  is  possible.  All  these  antagonistic 
elements  were  anticipated  as  belonging  to  the  evolutionary  stages  of 
scientific  development ;  but  in  process  of  growth  these  excrescences 
will  slough  ofi",  and  science  stand  as  redeemed  thought  allied  to  the 
divine.  In  like  manner  the  occupations  of  men  formerly  included 
piracy,  counterfeiting,  gambling,  and  other  pursuits  not  legitimate, 
but  Christianity  is  trimming  human  pursuit  of  its  illegitimacy,  and 
preserving  only  those  occupations  which  are  right  in  themselves. 
Political  governments  likewise  at  one  time  were  despotic  and  inhuman, 
but  Christianity  is  modifying  and  refining  them.  Similarly,  science 
loaded  down  with  skepticism  and  agnosticism,  Christianity  will  purify 
and  harmonize  its  greatest  truths  with  the  truths  of  religion. 

Philosophy,  seeing  the  inner  content  of  truth,  and  anxious  to  find 
out  the  basis  of  things,  began  wuth  a  theologic  inquiry,  but  its 
answers,  always  barren  of  a  divine  element,  fell  to  the  ground,  and 
yet  they  were  valuable  in  suggesting  the  necessity  of  a  theistic  creed 
as  the  solution  of  all  mystery  and  the  condition  of  all  progress. 
Science  did  not  rise  so  high,  did  not  see  so  far.  She  dug  in  the  dirt 
and  found  diamonds,  but  could  not  properly  estimate  them.  Discov- 
ering facts,  she  could  not  explain  them.  This  is  the  limitation  of 
the  scientific  spirit  as  the  theologic  inquiry  is  the  limitation  of  the 
philosophic  spirit  within  which  the  human  mind  may  find  sufficient 
exercise  for  its  development.     Just  here  man  needs  development. 

Under  scientific  influence  and  with  philosophic  problems  to  solve, 
the  mind  must  enlarge,  both  in  capacity  and  achievement ;  and  as  it 
enlarges  it  must  become  conscious  of  the  still  higher  destiny  that  is 
possible.  Notwithstanding  the  superficial  antagonism  of  the  scientific 
spirit  to  religious  truth,  Christianity  has  appropriated  it  as  an  instru- 
ment of  man's  development,  seeing  that  culture  is  a  part  of  the 
property  of  the  future  man.  Man's  expansion  into  a  cultured  and 
sanctified  consciousness  is  the  primary  object,  the  ideal  purpose  of 
Christianity,  for  the  realization  of  which  it  subsidizes  every  thing. 

Such  being  the  ideal  end,  it  justifies  the  use  and  sanctification  of 
every  thing,  occupations,  governments,  arts,  institutions,  sciences,  and 
philosophies,  that  it  may  the  sooner  be  accomplished.  Some  of  these 
auxiliaries  are  not  religious;  they  seem  secular,  physical,  and  incapa- 
ble of  producing  religious  results  or  contributing  to  the  religious 
ideal.     But  the  spiritualization  of  the  secular  life  of  man,  and  the 


532  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

turning  of  the  natural  to  spiritual  account,  is  one  of  the  secret 
virtues  of  Christianity  and  one  of  its  methods  for  the  success  of  its 
projects.  As  Jesus  rode  into  Jerusalem  on  a  colt,  causing  the 
earthly  to  carry  the  heavenly,  so  he  lays  upon  the  material  the 
burden  of  the  spiritual,  or  appropriates  the  earthly,  the  physical,  the 
secular  for  spiritual  uses  and  spiritual  ends. 

In  view  of  its  resources  and  adaptations,  it  is  proposed  as  a  funda- 
mental thought  that  Christianity  1ms  in  contemplation  the  moral  perfection 
of  man,  the  security  of  which  is  guaranteed  by  the  provisions  of  the 
Gospel  itself.  As  it  is  the  only  religion  whose  ideal  purpose  relates 
to  man's  highest  development,  so  is  it  the  only  religion  that  provides 
for  the  realization  of  the  purpose.  With  any  other  religion  such  a 
purpose  would  appear  sentimental,  dreamy,  an  idle  hope,  since  ade- 
quate power  for  its  execution  would  be  wanting ;  with  Christianity 
the  purpose  is  the  measure  of  the  power,  and  the  power  the  index  to 
the  purpose.  By  that  general  rule  which  limits  results  to  aims,  all 
religions  may  be  judged ;  and  Christianity  stands  or  falls  by  it  also. 
The  results  of  a  religion  never  exceed  its  purposes. 

Inasmuch  as  philosophy  never  contemplated  universality,  it  never 
provided  for  it,  and  never  secured  it.  Brahminism,  never  dreaming 
of  itself  as  a  world-wide  religion,  spread  but  little  beyond  its  birth- 
place. The  internal  thought  of  pagan  religions  has  been  that  they 
were  national,  not  international  or  cosmic  religions ;  hence,  they  were 
satisfied  with  national  recognition,  and  did  not  seek  international  do- 
minion. On  the  other  hand,  Christianity  is  gifted  with  the  universal 
impulse,  and  aspires  to  cosmic  honors;  it  is  not  the  religion  for  one 
'  people  only,  but  for  all ;  it  knows  no  national  boundaries,  no  race 
peculiarities,  no  climatic  influences ;  it  is  world-wide  in  its  aims,  and 
universal  in  its  adaptations.  It  reduces  its  manifold  purposes  to  the 
central  or  ideal  purpose  of  perfecting  every  man  in  Jesus  Christ,  and 
proposes  to  produce  a  race  which  shall  be  the  exponent  of  the  divine 
idea  in  its  creation.  This  is  its  aim,  and,  as  we  study  its  agencies, 
mark  its  historic  steps,  pry  into  its  adaptations  and  mysterious  power, 
we  see  that  it  is  practically  succeeding,  and  that  it  must  fully  succeed. 
Its  purpose  is  not  Utopian,  only  as  the  Gospel  itself  is  Utopian  hi  con- 
tent, promise,  and  potency. 

Look  at  the  Church  as  the  divinely  ordained  agency  of  man's 
spiritual  development.  Of  all  the  institutions  that  have  appeared  as 
the  product  of  religion,  or  as  sanctified  by  it  to  the  welfare  of  man, 
the  Church  deserves  the  most  grateful  recognition,  and  its  work  the 
highest  reward.  Whatever  criticism  it  deserves  on  account  of  its 
imperfection,  it  is  animated  by  no  other  purpose  than  that  which 
constitutes  the  ideal  aim  of  Christianity ;  it  is  one  with   the   Gospel 


THE  GROUND  OF  THE  CHURCH.  533 

purpose.  In  the  lower  sense,  Christianity  is  a  leavener  of  human  so- 
ciety, stimulating  man's  impulse  to  dominion,  directing  and  sanctify- 
ing his  occupations,  inspiriting  and  reforming  his  governments, 
penetrating  and  refining  social  customs  and  manners;  but,  in  the 
higher  sense,  it  concretes  itself  in  a  visible,  organized  institution, 
having  as  its  sole  purpose  the  turning  of  the  eye  of  the  world  to  its 
appointed  destiny  of  moral  greatness.  Christianity  has  been  creeping 
around  and  getting  into  every  thing,  whether  men  would  or  would 
not  have  it ;  but  now  it  comes  forth  as  an  organized  movement  in  the 
Church,  announcing  definitely  its  broad  purpose,  and  striving  delib- 
erately, being  conscious  of  its  power,  for  its  completion  in  the  world's 
redemption. 

The  word  "Church,"  so  familiar  to  all  ears,  implies  more  than  an 
assembly  of  people  ;  it  implies  a  congregation  of  ideas  and  agencies  in 
mutual  fellowship,  and  co-operatiug  for  a  single  result.  Among  its 
ideas  are  those  of  God,  man's  relation  to  God,  man's  relation  to  man, 
man's  responsibility  and  immortality,  from  which  grow  the  great  sys- 
tems of  duty,  morality,  and  religion.  The  gi'ound-plan  of  the  Church, 
its  impulsive  spirit,  its  instrumental  ideas,  are  just  such  as  must 
promote  the  purpose  which  Christianity  has  in  view.  For  the  diffus- 
ion of  truth  and  the  enlightenment  of  men  in  their  highest  interests, 
the  agencies  employed  are  entirely  adequate  and  in  harmony  with  the 
end.  In  proof,  we  point  to  the  living  ministry,  who  cease  not  to 
proclaim  the  existence  of  God,  the  methods  of  the  divine  administra- 
tion, the  moral  character  and  responsibility  of  man,  and  the  necessity 
of  regeneration  and  holiness ;  who  declare  the  will  of  the  Most  High, 
and  the  method  by  which  "reconciliation"  with  God  has  been  eflTected; 
who  emphasize  the  conditions  and  reveal  the  sources  of  developed, 
purified  character;  whose  vision  is  bounded  only  by  eternity,  and 
whose  prophecies  are  only  those  of  God.  The  Church  insists  that  it 
is  a  divine  institution,  with  a  ministry  to  declare  its  relation  to  man's 
development.  Its  holy  sacraments ;  its  Sabbath  days ;  its  sanctuaries 
of  worship;  its  benevolent  societies;  its  Sunday-schools,  prove  that 
in  many  ways  the  Church  has  entered  upon  its  specific  work  of  ^en- 
lightening and  perfecting  man. 

Passing  from  the  institutions  and  external  agencies  of  Christianity 
to  Christianity  itself,  it  is  evident  that,  great  as  is  the  task  imposed 
upon  it,  its  resources,  its  spirit,  and  its  achievements  furnish  the 
guarantee  of  its  future  success.  In  the  carrying  out  of  its  program 
it  is  not  defective,  or  the  mere  echo  of  an  ideal  it  can  not  reduce  to 
practice. 

By  its  own  terms  Christianity  is  the  life  of  man,  the  inherent 
force  of  character.     Speaking  of  Christ,   John   says,    "In   him  was 


534  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

life;"  and  the  Master  says,  "I  am  come  that  they  might  have  life, 
and  that  they  might  have  it  more  abundantly."  Life !  It  is  inspira- 
tion; it  is  growth ;  it  is  development.  To  have  life  "more  abun- 
dantly "  must  signify  more  life,  greater  enlargement,  deeper  experience, 
an  ever-widening  consciousness  of  God.  More  life  is  the  promise  of 
the  Gospel;  more  life  is  the  cry  of  the  soul;  it  means  spiritual  eleva- 
tion, the  opening  of  the  spiritual  faculties,  the  refinement  of  the 
spiritual  tastes,  the  mutual  indwelling  of  God  and  man.  This  whole 
idea  of  life  is  the  product  of  Christianity,  and  its  abundance  is  pro- 
phetic of  new,  better,  and  approximately  perfect  conditions  for  man 
in  this  world.  Life  is  opposed  to  stagnation,  inactivity,  indifference, 
darkness,  death.  It  has  in  it  the  possibility  of  infinite  degrees  of 
moral  excellence.  It  opens  the  door  to  the  eternal  ages.  It  links 
thought  to  eternal  truth.  If  the  life  promised  by  Christ  is  eternal, 
then  the  soul  receiving  it  obtains  an  eternal  impulse,  a  divine  prefer- 
ence, a  longing  for  all  that  is  divine  and  eternal.  He  that  receives 
Christianity  receives  a  life-giving  principle,  and  he  that  receives  the 
life  itself  in  its  abundance  may  calculate  upon  never  reaching  the  limits 
of  growth,  or  exhausting  the  i^ossibilities  of  grace. 

The  ultimate  pi'oduct  of  Christianity  is  the  Christian,  a  new  man, 
with  new  functions,  new  visions  of  life,  new  views  of  himself,  and  an 
increase  of  knowledge  respecting  God.  Out  of  the  old,  sluggish  life 
of  the  world,  which,  reaching  a  certain  low  height,  falls  back  into 
routine  and  insipidity,  the  new  rises  in  spiritual  beauty  and  knows 
no  end  but  that  of  God.  Agesidamus,  a  Pythagorean  philosopher, 
taught  that  the  perfect  man  is  a  "self-sufficient  man,"  but  he  meant 
an  intellectual  sufficiency.  The  "perfect  man"  of  the  Gospels  is 
"self-sufficient;"  sufficient  because  God  dwells  in  him,  because  he  is 
like  God.  He  is  fully  equipped  with  the  divine  resources ;  he  is  not 
wanting  in  any  good  thing ;  he  is  full,  complete.  Such  a  man  Chris- 
tianity is  adapted  to  produce ;  it  does  produce  tlie  self- sufficient  man. 

How  true  it  is  that  "it  doth  not  yet  appear  what  we  shall  be!" 
As  the  barbarian  has  no  pre-supposition  of  a  civilized  life ;  as  the  in- 
fant can  not  comprehend  manhood;  so  man  himself,  civilized.  Chris- 
tianized, can  not  foresee  his  greatest  possibility  or  his  highest  grandeur 
in  Jesus  Christ.  Accepting  Christianity,  which,  gratifying  some  as- 
pirations awakens  others,  he  finds  himself  silently  unfolding,  growing 
larger,  seeing  farther,  until  he  catches  glimpses  of  heights  invisible 
from  the  fogs  below.  He  rushes  on,  leaping  over  the  mountains, 
rising  toward  the  stars,  gladdened  in  his  journey  by  the  music  of 
another  world,  but  is  not  satisfied  until  he  has  arrived  at  its  open 
gates,  whose  keepers  welcome  him  with  the  refrain,  "Man,  thou  art 
immortal !" 


THE  SUPREME  TEST  OF  RELIGIONS.  535 


CHAPTER  XXV. 

<rHK   KRUITS    OF-    CHRISTIANITY. 

GROTIUS  affirms  that  "  the  Christian  religion  .  .  .  is  so  far 
from  doing  any  thing  destructive  to  human  society,  that,  in  every 
particular,  it  tends  to  the  advantage  of  it."  The  value  of  Christianity 
is  on  exhibition  in  its  benefits  to  human  society. 

The  test  of  all  inventions,  discoveries,  institutions,  systems,  civ- 
ilizations, and  religions,  is  their  adaptation  to  human  conditions,  their 
ability  to  meet  human  necessities,  their  tendency  to  promote  human 
happiness,  and  the  security  they  give  for  the  stability  of  promised 
results. 

Truth  itself  can  be  distinguished  from  the  false,  and  safe-guarded 
in  its  conflicts  with  error,  by  appealing  to  the  time-test,  by  quoting 
its  effects,  by  rehearsing  its  history.  History  is  the  supreme  test  of 
all  things.  In  another  form  the  divine  Teacher  announced  the  same 
principle  when  he  said,  "  By  their  fruits  ye  shall  know  them."  Un- 
der the  operation  of  this  rule  the  worth  of  all  philosophies,  all  po- 
litical economies,  all  constitutional  governments,  and  all  religions, 
may  be  fairly  determined. 

It  may  be  insisted  that  many  of  the  principles  of  the  religions  that 
perished,  or  are  in  process  of  extinction,  are  fundamentally  right,  but 
the  answer  is  that  what  is  fundamentally  right  is  productive  of 
good,  is  a  helpful  influence  to  those  who  accept  it.  To  be  sure, 
the  law  of  gravitation  has  sometimes  resulted  in  disaster,  as  notably 
in  the  Tay  bridge  calamity,  and  the  law  of  combustion  has  sometimes 
resulted  in  injury,  as  when  it  laid  Chicago  in  ashes;  nevertheless 
the  laws  are  holy  and  good ;  it  was  a  violation  of  these  laws  that 
resulted  in  evil.  These  different  systems  of  religion  and  politic^  have 
been  productive  of  evil,  not  because  their  teachings  were  violated, 
but  because  they  were  observed,  showing  that  they  were  funda- 
mentally wrong. 

And  this  is  the  trying  test  of  religion;  that  is,  the  effect  of  its 
teachings  when  observed.  Judaism  itself,  feeling  the  touch  of  this 
imperious  test,  surrendered  on  the  ground  of  its  inadequacy  to  con- 
serve the  welfare  of  the  people.  The  law  of  Judaism  received  the 
encomium  of  Paul,  but  he  reminded  the  fathers  that  it  "  made 
nothing  perfect,"  and  so  did  not  accomplish  what  it  undertook  and 
what   was  necessary  to  man's  spiritual  growth  and  culture.     Chris- 


636  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

tianity,  essaying  the  unfinished  task  of  Judaism,  and  assuming  all  the 
prerogatives  of  a  complete  and  competent  religion,  must  submit  to 
the  same  vital  test,  the  rule  of  advantage  to,  or  effect  upon,  human  so- 
ciety. Admitting  that  at  times  and  in  places  the  results  of  its  in- 
fluence have  not  been  satisfactory,  it  can  be  shown  that  superstition, 
fanaticism,  and  common  ignorance  jointly  interfered  with  its  designs 
and  methods,  and  are  responsible  for  any  apparent  miscarriage  of  the 
new  religion  in  its  relations  to  society.  Such  compromises  or  fail- 
ures must  be  separated  from  the  legitimate  and  orderly  fruits  of 
Christianity. 

In  both  the  Old  and  New  Testaments  the  Christian  religion  is  fre- 
quently represented  under  the  similitude  of  a  tree,  as  having  been 
planted,  as  being  guarded  and  cultivated  by  a  husbandman,  as  bud- 
ding, growing,  and  finally  bearing  fruit;  in  short,  as  passing  through 
the  different  stages  of  growth  from  the  seed  to  the  great  fruit-bearing 
tree.  In  Eden  it  is  the  "  tree  of  life."  Conceiving  of  it  in  this  as- 
spect,  the  great  Teacher  compares  it  to  the  mustard-seed,  which, 
though  the  smallest  of  seeds,  germinates  and  becomes  one  of  the 
greatest  of  trees.  John  saw  it  in  bloom  in  his  old  days,  and  de- 
scribed it  as  bearing  twelve  manner  of  fruits,  and  its  leaves  were  for 
the  healing  of  the  nations.  Christianity  a  tree !  Shall  we  say  a  riew 
tree,  the  sequoia  of  theology? 

In  the  days  of  the  Judean  kings  the  religion  of  Moses  was  in  the 
ascendency,  but  in  the  days  of  the  prophets  it  was  without  vigor,  it 
had  lost  its  luster ;  the  old  tree  that  had  borne  fruit  for  Abraham, 
Samuel,  and  David  began  to  decay;  its  leaves  withered  and  fell  to 
the  ground ;  the  trunk  was  knotty  and  worm-eaten ;  time  had  girded 
it  with  a  cut  that  extinguished  its  life;  and  the  venerable  form,  with 
roots  broken,  fell  under  the  blast  of  a  hurricane  from  the  upper 
world,  and  gave  place  to  another.  Judaism,  rotten,  infirm,  pauper- 
ized to  the  last  degree,  fell  with  resounding  echoes  into  the  arms  of 
a  providential  fate  that  crushed  it.     This  is  simple  history. 

Jesus  now  appears  planting  a  new  tree  in  the  old  soil,  grafting 
upon  it  all  the  divine  elements  of  Judaism,  and  imparting  to  it  such 
additional  life-forces  as  have  constituted  it  the  imperishable  rehgion 
of  humanity.  In  careless  speech  it  is  sometimes  said  that  Christian- 
ity is  the  off'-shoot  of  Judaism,  a  position  assumed  by  Prof.  Lindsey 
in  the  Encyclopedia  Britannica,  but  without  warrant  either  in  history  or 
logic.  Christianity  was  not  derived  in  part  or  in  whole  from  the  pre- 
ceding religion ;  it  was  adumbi'ated  by  the  types  or  ritualism  of  the 
once  famous  faith,  but  is  indebted  to  it  for  not  one  of  its  distinguish- 
ing truths.  The  passage  of  the  old  to  the  new  was  the  transforma- 
tion of   certain  eternal  truths,  common  to   all  religions,  or  at  least 


TR  UTH  SELF-BEPENDEN T.  537 

identical  with  the  religious  idea,  into  Christian  forms,  or  the  realities 
of  a  permanent  religion.  Holding  that  incarnation  belongs  spe- 
cifically to  the  one  and  not  to  the  other,  and  that  the  Messianic 
content  of  the  one  is  absent  from  the  other,  Christianity  can 
not  be  accepted  as  an  evolution  of  a  former  religion,  or  the  develop- 
ment of  a  pre-existent  truth.  The  student  of  the  two  religions,  the 
old  and  the  new,  the  extinct  and  the  living,  will  discover  the  re- 
mains of  the  one  in  the  other,  but  as  the  traveler  discovers  frag- 
ments of  the  temple  of  Ephesus  in  the  Mosque  of  St.  Sophia.  Build- 
ing material  abounds  in  all  religions,  but  the  temple  of  Christianity 
is  not  a  reconstructed  edifice,  but  original  throughout  in  plan,  pur- 
pose, and  achievement.  What  it  has  accomplished  through  the 
natural  force  of  its  truths,  by  virtue  of  its  inherent  tendencies  to 
benevolent  expansion,  and  because  of  its  perfect  sympathy  with  the 
highest  human  aspirations,  must  indicate  somewhat  its  character,  re- 
sources, and  possibilities.  We  shall  consider  Christianity  in  two 
relations  only,  the  budding  period  of  its  history  and  the  fruit-bearing 
period,  or  its  positive  eflfects  in  human  society. 

The  budding  period  was  the  period  of  its  beginning,  embracing 
such  truths  as  were  announced  by  the  Master,  together  with  the 
apostolic  development  they  received,  and  such  other  truths  as  logic- 
ally issued  from  such  development.  Embryonic  truth  may  seem  to 
diflfer  from  the  same  truth  when  developed  as  a  man  seems  to  diflfer 
from  a  child ;  but  the  outline  is  the  same,  and  the  substance  differs 
only  in  degree.  Incarnation,  as  an  embryonic  truth,  was  too  mys- 
terious to  be  understood,  and  was,  therefore,  rejected ;  but,  as  a 
developed  truth,  it  is  readily  received ;  its  relation  to  religion  is  one 
of  indisputable  necessity ;  its  value  determines  the  value  of  religion. 
Atonement  suflTered  in  its  embryonic  form,  but,  developed  as  a  vital 
fact,  it  can  not  be  abjured  any  more  than  religion  itself  The  resur- 
rection idea  ran  the  same  gauntlet  with  the  same  result.  With  un- 
developed truths  in  their  hands  the  apostles  started  forth  to  conquer 
the  world,  or  rather  to  enlighten  it  in  those  things  concerning  which 
there  was  more  or  less  ignorance.  Ignorant  themselves  of  the  full- 
ness of  these  truths,  they  must  have  proclaimed  them  imperfectly; 
but,  assisted  by  the  Holy  Ghost,  they  delivered  them  with  power,  and 
success  followed.  Embryonic  truth  has  power ;  any  truth,  or  any 
form  of  truth,  is  powerful;  but  developed  truth  needs  less  the  ex- 
ternal aid  of  the  miraculous  than  the  other.  Hence,  at  a  later  period, 
truth  depended  more  upon  itself,  drew  upon  its  own  contents,  and  was 
inspired  by  its  own  power,  dispensing  with  miraculous  supports  and 
credentials  from  heaven.  A  religion  that  thrives  by  its  inherent  en- 
ergy,  calling   upon    itself   to  enlighten    and   move  the  world,    is  in 


538  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

advance  of  that  religion  that  trusts  more  to  external,  artificial,  or 
miraculous  aids  in  its  defense  or  for  its  propagatiop. 

Without  casting  any  suspicion  on  the  origin  of  the  Christian 
faith,  or  detracting  in  the  least  from  the  excellences  of  the  early 
teachers,  it  may  be  stated  that  the  apostolic  period  was  the  embry- 
onic period  of  religion,  requiring  miraculous  aid,  and  depending  for 
success  upon  divine  interpositions,  such  as  no  subsequent  age  has 
called  for  or  desired.  The  most  intimate  friends  of  Jesus  misunder- 
stood his  teachings ;  they  were  slow  in  apprehending  spiritual  truth  ; 
and  without  special  divine  assistance  they  had  broken  down  in  the 
beginning  of  their  efforts  to  indoctrinate  the  nations.  Peter  succeeded 
on  Pentecost  because  the  Holy  Ghost  managed  him  and  even 
directed  his  utterance.  The  sermon  was  not  Peter's,  but  the  Holy 
Ghost's.  Under  the  supernatural  developments  of  John  and  Paul, 
especially  the  latter,  Christianity  began  to  take  doctrinal  shape ;  but 
in  the  early  stages  it  was  a  chaotic  mass  of  truths — truth  in  the  ore. 
Without  form,  it  was  not  without  power,  but  its  greatest  power  appeared 
when  it  was  reduced  to  system,  and  exerted  itself  through  divinely 
ordered  forms,  and  by  the  ministry  of  its  own  spirit.  It  is  only  as 
the  crudities  of  apostolic  teaching  are  reduced  to,  and  organized  into, 
a  systematic  whole  that  Christianity  appears  in  its  best  light.  While 
it  is  not  the  result  of  evolution  from  pre-existent  religions,  it  is  a  self- 
evolution  from  apostolic  stages  to  final  truth  in  stable  forms.  For 
example,  the  Trinity,  hinted  at  by  the  Savior  and  grasped  at  last  by 
Paul,  was  left  in  a  chaotic  state  by  the  apostles  ;  and  but  for  the  re- 
sultant Church  which  expanded  the  doctrine  into  a  rational  concep- 
tion, it  had  remained  rather  a  grotesque  or  mythological  picture  than 
a  stupendous  revelation  of  the  divine  character.  The  doctrine  of  jus- 
tification by  faith,  unfolded  by  Paul,  did  not  bloom  in  all  its  beauty 
untir  Luther  shouted  it  as  the  basis  of  the  Reformation.  The  free- 
dom of  man,  an  apostolic  truth,  was  smothered  in  its  unfolding  by 
the  more  commanding  fact  of  the  sovereignty  of  God,  and  it  never 
had  the  fullest  theological  defense  until  Arminius  raised  it  as  one  of 
the  pillars  of  the  temple  of  truth.  The  double  thought  of  eternal 
retribution  for  sin,  or  the  existence  and  perpetuity  of  hell,  and  of 
eternal  glory  and  reward  for  virtue  and  godliness,  or  the  perpetual 
duration  of  the  heavenly  life,  was  announced  by  the  apostles,  but  for 
expansion,  and  for  full  understanding  and  discovery  of  the  hidden 
contents  of  so  wonderful  a  truth,  we  owe  much  to  subsequent  scien- 
tific and  religious  inquiry. 

The  apostles,  as  taught  by  the  Master,  foreshadowed  a  complete 
religion  and  delivered  all  necessary  spiritual  truths  to  mankind ;  but 
many  truths  they  gave  in  embryonic  form.     From  them  the  world 


SUBORDINATE  FORCES  IN  CIVILIZATION.  539 

has  received  a  budded  Christianity — a  religion  whose  contents  are  all- 
sufficient,  but  whose  development  is  even  yet  in  its  preliminary 
stages.  Hence,  not  in  the  apostolic  era,  nor  even  in  the  first  three 
centuries  when  its  spread  was  violently  rapid,  and  when  the  heroism 
of  its  defenders  was  never  grander,  will  one  find  Christianity  exerting 
its  most  beneficent  influence,  or  displaying  all  its  possible  potencies. 
Courage,  martyrdom,  joyous  experiences,  enthusiastic  projects,  we 
certainly  shall  find  ;  but  for  the  undermining  power  of  Christianity, 
for  its  inspiration  of  the  intellect,  for  its  wide-spread  and  deep-rooted 
efiect  on  civil  government,  for  its  purification  of  literature,  its  trans- 
formation of  civilization,  and  the  elevation  of  domestic  life  and  social 
manners,  and  for  permanent  and  powerful  accomplishments  in  all  de- 
partments of  life,  we  must  track  its  course  along  the  ages,  pausing 
longest  over  its  career  since  the  German  Reformation.  In  the  apos- 
tolic age  it  wrought  wonders  by  the  aid  of  miracle ;  since  that  age  it 
has  wrought  by  the  force  of  its  truths.  Our  inquiry  is  not,  what 
were  the  effects  of  a  religion  of  miracles  ?  but,  what  are  the  achieve- 
ments of  a  religion  of  truth  f  In  modern  times  Christianity  stands  by 
itself,  vindicating  its  right  to  authority  and  dominion  by  its  superhu- 
man character,  as  exhibited  in  its  spiritual  program,  and  appealing 
to  its  work  as  an  evidence  of  its  genuineness  and  ability  to  do  what 
it  claims. 

In  its  broadest  aspect  Christianity  has  been  productive  of  a  neiv,  if 
not  model,  civilization.  It  must  be  conceded  that  an  advanced  civiliza- 
tion exists ;  that  is,  a  civilization  superior  to  any  thing  either  Rome 
or  Greece  reared  and  promoted  now  obtains  in  the  world.  Whence 
came  it  ?  Without  denying  that  other  influences  besides  Christianity 
have  contributed  to  the  progress  of  mankind,  it  will  appear  on  exam- 
ination that  in  all  the  forward  movements  of  the  race  the  dominant 
force  has  been  religious,  with  certain  subordinate  forces,  of  which 
there  are  many,  working  in  harmony  with  it.  Much  has  been  at- 
tributed to  Stoical  philosophy  as  an  instrument  of  the  regeneration  of 
the  East,  but  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that,  while  it  frowned  on  many 
vices,  it  was  ineflftcient  in  restraining  them,  and  certainly  powerless  in 
destroying  them.  Concede  that  Stoicism  objected  to  wrong,  it  did 
not  introduce  the  right,  or  even  approve  of  it,  as  presented  by  the 
teachers  of  the  new  faith.  Equally  incompetent  to  reform  the  world 
is  the  commercial  spirit  to  which  philanthropists  sometimes  have 
turned  with  expectancy  ;  but  it  has  been  on  trial  for  ages,  resulting, 
it  is  true,  in  a  broader  and  better  view  of  fraternity  and  unity,  as  the 
duty  of  nations  one  toward  another,  but  not  resulting  in  moral  eleva- 
tion or  spiritual  reform. 

Buckle's  theory  of  materialistic  agency  in  civilization,  instituted 


540  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

in  the  interest  of  an  infidelity  that  has  become  reckless  in  its  attacks 
on  Christianity,  loses  sight  of  the  highest  forces  in  existence,  thus 
compromising  itself  by  its  ignorance,  and  forfeiting  respect  by  its  as- 
sumption of  causes  entirely  inadequate  for  the  promotion  of  modern 
civilization.  Cousin  has  demonstrated  that  physical  forces  are  coming 
to  recognize  the  authority  of  man,  and  are  ready  to  contribute  to  the 
realization  of  human  purposes,  which,  in  their  last  analysis,  appear  to 
be  the  ideal  purposes  of  God.  Civilization  is  not  the  product  of  na- 
ture ;  nature  is  under  the  control  of  civilization. 

Whatever  the  relation  of  the  material  forces  to  civilization,  and 
granting  that  they  may  exercise  a  controlling  influence,  it  is  patent 
to  the  student  of  history  that  civilizations  resting  on  such  forces  alone, 
and  in  disregard  of  the  moral  basis,  have  died  of  infirmities  and  dis- 
abilities which,  under  Christian  rule,  would  have  been  restrained,  if 
not  extinguished.  Not  a  little  has  been  written  in  praise  of  the 
ancient  civilizations,  particularly  the  Egyptian,  the  Babylonian,  the 
Grecian,  and  the  Roman,  as  the  exponents  of  material  ideas;  but  it 
is  significant  that  none  of  them  exists  to-day.  Egyptian  civilization 
represented  the  idea  of  force,  combined  with  superstition,  both  being 
manifested  in  pyramids  and  temples,  and  the  worship  of  animals  and 
idols.  All  through  it  was  tainted  with  slavery,  or  the  subjection  of 
man  to  cruel  and  irresponsible  authority.  Yet  this  Cyclopean  civi- 
ilization  was  unable  to  resist  the  tendency  to  decay,  to  which  it  so 
yielded  that  the  relics  of  the  days  of  its  glory  are  few,  indeed.  The 
Babylonian  civilization  was  the  highest  type  of  the  lust  principle,  or  the 
embodiment  of  the  base,  pleasure-loving  spirit  of  man,  and,  though  it 
maintained  itself  for  fifteen  hundred  years,  the  site  of  its  renowned 
capital  can  not  to-day  be  identified  ;  not  only  its  chief  city  perished, 
but  the  whole  empire  disappeared  like  a  spider's  fabric.  Of  superior 
excellence  in  some  respects,  less  brutal  and  more  intellectual,  less 
luxurious  and  yet  not  less  corrupt,  was  the  subsequent  Grecian  civ- 
ilization, representing  the  perfection  of  art  and  the  triumphs,  of  phil- 
osophy ;  yet  was  it  a  civilization  speculating  in  moral  questions  with- 
out determining  their  value,  and  preferring  a  low  level  of  public  life 
while  seeking  to  know  the  Vuth,  and  so  perished.  Roman  civiliza- 
tion, less  philosophical  and  more  practical,  sought  to  represent  justice, 
and  enforce  it  by  methods  peculiar  to  itself  Ambitious  for  universal 
dominion,  and  boastful  of  its  history,  it  pressed  on,  but  wrecked 
itself  on  the  rocks  which  lie  in  the  path  of  nations  that  disregard 
the  first  principles  of  morality,  and  center  their  supreme  thought  on 
themselves. 

The  testimony  of  history  is  that  a  singular  fatality  has  overtaken 
all  civilizations  destitute  of  moral  principles.     The  epitaph  of  such 


THE  DYNAMIC  ELEMENT  OF  SOCIETY.  541 

civilizations  may  be  reduced  to  a  few  words :  they  were  born,  they 
grew,  they  declined,  they  died.  If  materialism  points  with  any  pride 
to  such  civilizations,  it  should  not  be  blind  to  the  lesson  their  history 
discloses,  for  it  makes  plain  that  another  basis  is  required  if  civiliza- 
tions are  to  endure. 

Succeeding  all  these,  or  at  least  different  from  them,  is  what  may 
be  denominated  Christian  civilization,  an  order  of  governmental  life 
that  has  the  promise  of  perpetuity  in  it,  whose  fate  is  not  decay, 
corruption,  and  death.  No  one  can  affirm  that  such  a  civilization  has 
had  equal  chances  with  the  others,  or  that  it  has  not  met  with  obsta- 
cles in  its  attempt  at  development,  for,  all  along  its  history,  it  has 
been  resisted  from  within  and  without ;  within,  since  its  nature  has 
been  misunderstood  by  its  own  subjects ;  without,  since  evil  foresees 
its  downfall  in  the  triumph  of  the  Christian  conception  of  govern- 
ment. The  ideal  Christian  civilization  is  yet  future.  Heretofore,  as 
now,  and  now,  as  heretofore,  material  forces  and  antagonistic  influ- 
ences too  largely  affect  the  spirit  and  purposes  of  our  progressive 
civilizations;  passion,  lust,  brute  force,  slavery,  caste,  ambition,  in- 
temperance, and  all  the  lower  forces,  are  at  work  to  prevent  the  sway 
of  beneficent  authority,  and  the  erection  of  Christian  governments 
among  men.  Yet  such  a  civilization  is  the  demand  of  the  world. 
If  Rome,  in  the  days  of  her  splendor,  needed  more  than  any  thing 
else  a  new  religion,  so  the  world  to-day  needs,  more  than  all  things 
else,  the  inspiring  touch  of  the  Christian  religion.  Into  our  dark 
world  the  light  of  the  new  religion  has  shone,  but  as  by  broken  and 
refracted  rays. 

New  political  governments,  having  in  view  the  suppression  of  vice 
and  the  conservation  of  virtue,  and  especially  regardful  of  the  natural 
rights  of  man,  have  been  and  still  are  a  necessity,  but  they  never 
arise  as  a  philosophic  suggestion,  or  as  the  product  of  the  order  of 
things.  They  come  forth,  if  at  all,  as  the  result  of  the  inspiring 
force  of  Christianity,  although  such  force  may  have  no  definite  recog- 
nition. Often  it  works  so  silently,  its  truths  being  gradually  diffused 
throughout  empires  and  nations,  that  even  statesmen  are  apt  to  forget 
their  controlling  power,  and  take  to  themselves  the  credit  of  the 
advances  in  popular  sentiment  and  political  change.  Disguised  or 
open  in  its  work,  heeded  or  unheeded  in  its  influence,  Christianity  is 
the  dynamic  element  of  the  best  civilizations. 

Christian  government  is  the  political  ideal  of  the  Gospel.  For  cen- 
turies this  ideal  had  no  recognition,  though  Christianity  was  ac- 
cepted in  its  true  character  as  a  divine  religion.  It  was  accepted  as 
a  religion  only,  its  political  genius  being  unknown.  It  was  received 
as  a  spiritual  system,  without  political  bearings  or  suggestions.     It 


542  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

was  seen  to  be  fundamental  to  Church  life ;  but  governmental  forms, 
principles,  and  laws  were  left  to  statesmen  with  political  wisdom. 
Religion  and  politics  were  separable.  The  mistake  of  ignoring  relig- 
ion in  the  framework  of  government  was  at  last  discovered ;  but  no 
sooner  did  it  dawn  upon  the  national  mind  than  the  democratic  idea 
began  to  grow.  Political  heresies  were  investigated,  condemned, 
abandoned.  The  tyrannical  doctrine  of  the  divine  right  of  kings  was 
undermined.  The  trend  of  society  was  toward  the  original  ideal. 
Granting  that  other  influences  were  associated  in  the  subversion  of 
gross  political  sentiments,  which  justified  oppression,  slavery,  and 
debauchery,  still,  more  is  due  to  the  Christian  ideal  than  to  all  other 
agencies  combined.  Without  Christianity,  other  agencies  had  been 
ineffectual;  with  it,  they  accomplished  something,  receiving  more 
credit  than  belongs  to  them.  Buckle's  materialism  never  rose  as  high 
as  the  original  ideal ;  Plato's  best  idea  of  government  was  impossible 
of  realization. 

That  all  governments  are  not  democratic  in  spirit  and  Christian  in 
form,  and  that  so-called  Christian  governments  are  still  politically 
imperfect,  often  enacting  laws  contrary  to  the  public  welfare,  and  re- 
fusing to  legislate  in  harmony  with  Christian  teaching,  establish 
that  religion  has  not  fully  triumphed  in  the  political  thought  of 
society.  In  Christian  lands,  there  are  institutions,  monopolies,  cus- 
toms, and  partisanships,  which  Christianity  does  not  justify,  and 
which  it  will  overcome  as  its  rightful  influence  is  extended  and 
obeyed.  Tyrannies,  race  discriminations,  socialism,  oppression  of 
woman,  ignorance,  poverty,  and  crime  co-exist  with  the  Christian 
religion  in  the  state.  Verily,  this  ought  not  to  be.  The  work  of  cor- 
rection, assimilation,  and  regulation  is  slow,  but  it  is  not  fruitless,  and 
it  will  be  complete  in  due  time.  As  a  political  religion,  as  the  basis 
of  civilization,  Christianity  is  not  a  failure. 

Quite  as  remarkable  as  the  general  effects  of  Christianity  are  the 
special  results  of  its  influence  in  the  world.  Admitting  that,  under 
its  fostering  care,  a  broader  and  a  higher  civilization  has  appeared,  it 
is  equally  noteworthy  that,  in  the  narrower  fields  of  human  effort,  its 
influence  is  no  less  conspicuous,  and  its  power  no  less  manifest.  In 
the  lowest  sense,  it  is  the  inspirer  of  the  material  activity  of  human 
society.  While  the  force  of  Christianity,  as  a  religion,  has  been  con- 
stantly emphasized,  other  features,  and  this  in  particular,  have  been 
disregarded.  The  result  is,  that  the  ojiinion  prevails  that  its  effects, 
outside  of  religious  thought,  are  incidental  and  insubstantial.  It  is 
time  to  correct  the  misapprehension,  for  the  relation  of  religion  to 
labor,  or  the  occupations  of  men,  is  most  intimate,  and  the  results  of 
the  union  have  been  surprisingly  great.     The  old  religions  threw  no 


MACHINERY  THE  PRODUCT  OF  CHRISTIANITY.         543 

halo  around  physical  toil,  but  degraded  it.  Brute  force  ruled  in  all 
the  realms  of  life.  The  only  birthright  of  man  was  the  birthright  to 
toil.  By  the  terms  of  the  old  covenant,  he  must  eat  his  bread  in  the 
sweat  of  his  face  ;  but  even  so  healthful  a  law  the  old  religious  carnal- 
ized to  the  last  degree.  Man,  as  an  intellectual  being,  as  spiritual 
and  immortal,  and,  therefore,  to  be  educated,  disciplined,  redeemed, 
the  old  faiths  did  not  comprehend.  Hence,  man  became  a  slave,  a 
burden-bearer.  He  was  oppressed,  robbed  of  wages,  reduced  to 
starvation  ;  impossible  results  were  exacted  of  him  ;  the  consequence 
was  the  loss  of  manhood,  the  decline  of  aspiration,  the  extinction 
of  freedom,  the  death  of  hope. 

To  reverse  this  state  of  things,  or  rather,  to  extinguish  the  social 
order,  and  raise  man  from  the  dust,  a  new  religion  was  needed.  As 
Christianity  asserted  itself,  a  sympathetic  religion  was  perceived  to  hover 
over  the  world,  and  the  millions  shouted  for  joy.  Instead  of  adding 
to  burdens,  it  lifted  them  ;  instead  of  enslaving,  it  proclaimed  free- 
dom ;  instead  of  centering  wealth,  it  diffused  it ;  instead  of  merging 
the  individual  in  the  State,  it  defined  his  responsibility.  Under  the 
new  religious  administration,  the  rights  of  property  were  guaranteed 
to  all ;  privateering  on  the  seas,  and  confiscation  on  the  land,  were 
stigmatized  as  robbery,  and  punished  as  other  crimes ;  legislation 
from  the  time  of  Coustantine  was  favorable  to  the  poor  man ;  and  it 
became  evident  that,  so  long  as  the  Golden  Rule  had  authority,  every 
man  would  reap  the  fruits  of  honest  toil. 

This  general  change  of  sentiment  was  followed  by  other  and  far- 
reaching  changes  in  the  social  structure,  that  secured  to  the  common 
people  additional  safeguards  and  privileges,  such  as  the  right  of  suf- 
frage, and  the  right  of  representation  in  national  councils,  especially 
when  taxed.  Nor  were  such  legal  concessions  lost  on  the  laboring 
classes ;  for,  stimulated  by  larger  privileges,  and  strengthened  by  self- 
respect,  they  sought  to  make  labor  honorable  by  a  new  consecration 
to  its  offices.  It  is  a  noteworthy  fact,  whatever  the  explanation,  that 
in  Christian  lauds  the  spirit  of  invention  characterizes  every  depart- 
ment of  human  industry,  reducing  the  difficulties  of  labor,  and  mul- 
tiplying the  comforts,  not  only  of  the  workingman,  but  of  all  classes 
of  society.  To  affirm  that  agriculture  is  indebted  to  Christianity  for 
machinery,  ought  to  be  a  truism.  To  affirm  that  the  inventions  in 
Christian  lands  are  the  product  of  the  Christian  religion,  is  as  true  as 
to  affirm  that  Churches  and  Sunday-schools  are  its  products  also. 
Even  if  this  is  true  indirectly,  it  is  true  enough  for  our  purpose. 
Heathendom  is  not  prolific  in  invention,  and  can  not  manufacture 
the  best  instruments  of  labor.  The  locomotive,  the  telegraph,  the 
sewing-machine,    the   reaper,   the  telephone,   and  the    printing-press 


544  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY.' 

must  be  credited  to  the  Christianity  which  is  the  root  of  the  civiliza- 
tion under  which  such  inventions  are  possible.  Ours  is  a  steam- 
engine  civilization,  in  the  sense  that  the  civilization  produced  the 
engine,  not  the  engine  the  civilization.  Buckle's  material  forces  did 
not  produce  Christian  society,  but  Christianity  developed,  pointed 
out,  and  employed  the  material  agencies  by  wliich  the  world  has  been 
lifted  out  of  stagnation  and  death. 

Moreover,  famines,  which  are  of  frequent  occurrence  in  heathen 
lands,  as  in  India  and  China,  are  impossible  in  Christian  lands. 
National  sympathies  are  too  acute  for  one-half  of  a  nation  to  permit 
the  other  half  to  starve.  Besides,  such  is  our  knowledge  of  soils  and 
seasons,  and  the  relation  of  labor  to  harvests,  that  a  failure  of  crops 
is  an  incident  that  does  not  affect  the  general  welfare.  The  rewards 
of  labor,  the  motives  to  steady,  persistent  toil,  in  a  Christian  country, 
are  different  from  those  in  pagan  countries;  and,  as  a  result,  in  the 
former,  activity  is  manifested  on  a  stupendous  scale,  inventions  that 
almost  accomplish  miracles  multiply,  the  blessings  of  peace  extend, 
the  idle  are  prompted  to  achievements,  the  ambitious  are  restrained 
by  principles,  evils  are  curtailed  by  an  intelligent,  moral,  public  sen- 
timent, and  labor  is  honorable  in  the  sight  of  men.  In  its  sanctifica- 
tion  of  labor,  its  inspiration  of  the  laborer,  its  stimulating  effect  on 
inventive  genius,  its  condemnation  of  idleness,  and  its  prevention  of 
the  evils  usually  associated  with  labor,  Christianity  commends  itself 
to  the  students  of  social  science  and  the  statesmen  of  governments. 

The  story  of  the  effect  of  Christianity  on,  or  its  relation  to, 
literature  and  education,  is  most  wonderful,  whether  considered  only  in 
its  general  aspects,  or  minutely,  and  must  ansiver  all  objection  to  its 
power  to  direct  the  thinking  of  the  world.  With  the  opening  of  the 
Dark  Ages  the  Bible  compulsorily  retired  as  an  inspiring  agency,  or 
was  imprisoned  in  a  cell,  from  which  its  light  did  not  shine  upon  the 
outer  world.  At  the  call  of  Luther  it  came  forth.,  never  to  return  ; 
it  spoke,  and  a  listening  world  heard.  Long  prior  to  the  Reformation 
an  attempt  was  made  to  break  the  spell  of  dullness  which  had  held  in 
thralldom  the  whole  civilized  world,  but  it  was  only  partially  success- 
ful, and  finally  failed.  The  age  of  the  schoolmen  will  be  remembered 
as  an  age  of  scientific  inquiry  under  the  leadership  of  Roger  Bacon, 
of  philosophic  investigation  under  the  patronage  of  Duns  Scotus, 
and  of  unsettlement  of  theologic  dogmas  under  a  host  of  thinkers  ; 
but,  marked  by  spirit,  and  promising  in  the  beginning,  it  was  only 
preliminary  to  the  literary  eagerness  which  became  contagious 
throughout  Christendom  after  Luther  broke  his  chains.  Before 
the  Reformation  Europe  was  without  a  practical  or  intense  intel- 
lectual life ;  since   that  period,  which   secured   the  right  of  private 


CHRISTIANIT  Y  IN  LIT  ERA  T I  llE.  545 

judgment  touching  truth,  and  emancipated  the  intellect  from  all 
dogmatic  grips,  mankind  have  advanced  in  knowledge  to  a  degree 
almost  incredible.  Science,  some  of  whose  advocates  have  had  the 
temerity  to  charge  that  religion  is  hostile  to  its  pursuits,  never  flour- 
ished, never  discovered  so  much  as  since  it  was  given  a  cdrte-bldnghe 
to  ransack  the  universe  for  facts  and  reveal  the  laws  under  which  the 
present  physical  order  exists  ;  philosophy,  piloted  into  the  realm  of 
mysteries  by  Christian  teachers,  has  apprehended  as  never  before  the 
juxtaposition  of  all  truth  to  the  central  idea  of  Christianity  ;  poetry 
turned  to  the  Bible  for  epics  and  songs ;  and  the  whole  range  of  lit- 
erature has  been  electrified  by  the  presence  and  inspiration  of  the 
new  religion.  Geology  has  had  its  expounders  in  Chalmers,  Whe- 
well,  Hitchcock,  and  Pye  Smith,  honored  Christian  nan>es  ;  math- 
ematics has  been  represented  by  Isaac  Barrow,  Roger  Coles,  Matthew 
Stewart,  and  others,  all  defenders  of  the  Bible  ;  and  in  a  general 
way  it  is  enough  to  mention  Faraday,  Samuel  Clarke,  Carpenter, 
Fleming,  Sir  William  Thompson,  Abbe  Picard,  Priestley,  and  Bradley, 
Christian  thinkers  all,  as  the  exponents  of  scientific  truths  and  dis- 
coveries, to  establish  the  indebtedness  of  scientific  thought  to  religious 
influence.  The  same  is  true  touching  poetry.  Neither  Milton  could 
have  written  "  Paradise  Lost,"  nor  Dante  his  "  Inferno,"  had  not  the 
Scriptures  furnished  the  facts  and  suggested  the  purpose  to  use  them. 
Cowper,  Montgomery,  Toplady,  Heber,  and  Charles  Wesley,  the 
authors  of  sacred  hymns,  were  less  indebted  to  their  genius  than  to 
the  Scriptures  for  subjects,  experiences,  truths,  and  melodies. 
The  same  may  be  said  of  Coleridge,  Tennyson,  Longfellow,  and 
Willis  ;  and  even  Byron  wrote  best  when  under  the  inspiration  of 
the  Hebrew  spirit.  Strike  Christian  sentiment  from  modern  poetry, 
and  it  would  be  equal  to  expelling  oxygen  from  the  atmosphere. 

All  literature  has  equally  shared  in  inspirations  from  this  common 
source,  though  the  debt  is  more  obvious  in  some  departments  than  in 
others.  Let  it  be  philosophical,  historic,  ethnic,  religious,  or  scientific, 
the  department  has  been  affected  more  or  less  by  the  commanding 
truths  of  Christianity,  either  modified  by  them,  or  vainly  attempting 
to  modify  them  ;  but  whether  resisting  or  accepting  them,  whether 
harmony  or  struggle  be  the  result  of  contact  with  them,  the  eflfect  is 
marvelous  and  usually  visible.  Skeptical  literature  owes  its  possibility 
to  that  which  it  assails.  Voltaire  was  possible  only  because  twelve 
apostles  lived  and  died  ;  Renan  had  written  nothing  had  not  Christ 
and  Paul  lived  and  taught ;  Hume  never  had  discussed  miracle  had 
not  the  miracle-worker  first  appeared  ;  Matthew  Arnold  writes  because 
there  was  a  Christ. 

Again,  the  incidental  effect  of  the  truths  of  Revelation  in  lit- 
35 


646  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

erature  is  quite  as  impressive  as  the  more  direct  and  positive  in- 
fluence. The  majority  of  books  not  religious  relate  to  subjects  which 
it  has  suggested  and  it  is  difficult  to  write  on  things  entirely  outside  of 
it.  Even  the  novelist  gives  a  Christian  tinge  to  his  stories,  or  im- 
pregnates them  with  Christian  sentiment  as  the  means  of  commend- 
ing them  to  public  opinion.  One  lays  down  "  The  Tale  of  Two 
Cities  "  by  Charles  Dickens  in  tears  because  the  hope  of  the  resurrec- 
tion is  mingled  with  the  execution  of  a  doomed  man,  "  Ben-Hur"  by 
General  Wallace  is  but  a  tale  of  the  Christ.  The  thought  of  God, 
as  developed  in  the  Old  Testament ;  the  character  of  Christ,  por- 
trayed in  such  simplicity  in  the  Gospels  ;  the  thrilling  ideas  of  in- 
spiration, miracle,  prophecy,  retribution,  and  immortality  find  their 
way  into  public  thought,  crowd  the  magazines,  fill  the  newspapers, 
and  multiply  volumes  without  end. 

On  the  other  side,  what  libraries  have  issued  in  defense,  exposition, 
and  elaboration  of  Christianity !  Since  the  invention  of  the  printing 
press  pens  have  been  busy  with  the  discussion  of  the  great  Biblical 
problems,  in  an  attempt  to  elucidate  their  mysteries  or  find  the  limits 
of  human  thought,  and  the  treatises  on  such  subjects  are  practically 
inexhaustible.  At  one  time  the  drift  of  thought  is  toward  the  his- 
torical evidences  of  Christianity  ;  at  another  it  turns  to  the  philo- 
sophical phases  of  religion ;  yesterday  it  discussed  miracle ;  to-day  it 
is  hermeneutical ;  once  it  was  doctrinal ;  now  it  seeks  the  practical 
elements  of  religion  ;  once  it  considered  heaven  and  hell  as  eternal 
states ;  now  it  mutters  purgatory,  an  intermediate  world,  and  a 
second  probation  ;  hitherto  the  mode  of  baptism  was  a  subject  of 
interest ;  at  present  the  meaning  of  Sheol  is  of  more  consequence. 
Thus  the  discussion  of  truth  goes  on,  the  Christian  thinker  having 
gone  beyond  Calvin,  Edwards,  and  Luther  to  clearer  visions  of  the 
divine  revelations. 

For  the  preservation  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  language,  the  world  is  in- 
debted more  to  the  Bible  than  to  the  ordinary  agencies  believed  to 
be  sufficient  to  insure  the  stability  and  purity  of  a  living  language. 
Containing  idiomatic  English,  and  being  read  by  the  people  as  no 
other  book  is  read,  the  Bible  holds  them  to  a  common  speech,  and 
tends  to  create  a  universal  language,  thereby  aiding  the  slow-growing 
doctrine  of  the  unity  of  the  race.  The  great  objection  to  the 
Revised  Version  of  the  N6w  Testament  is  that,  while  it  is  faithful  to 
the  original  Greek,  it  violates  the  idiomatic  Saxon  with  which  the 
public  mind  is  familiar,  and  from  which  it  is  unwilling  to  depart, 
showing  a  disposition  to  make  the  Saxon  the  standard  of  correct 
language.  Careful  linguists  inform  us  that  while  fully  one-third  of 
Gibbon's  books  consist  of  words  not  Anglo-Saxon  in  form  or  origin, 


THE  INSPIRATION  OF  POPULAR  EDUCATION.  547 

and  while  Shakespeare  derives  one-sixth  of  his  words  from  foreign 
sources,  and  Addison  one-eighth,  only  one-tiventy-%inth  of  the  words 
in  the  Bible  have  a  foreign  complexion.  This  speaks  much  for  the 
purity  of  the  English  tongue  and  is  a  guaranty  of  its  future  stability 
and  growth. 

In  the  matter  of  •popular  education  Christianity  must  be  credited 
with  an  influence  so  promotive  of  it  that  in  its  absence,  or  where  it 
is  resisted  the  masses  are  in  ignorance  and  without  mental  aspiration. 
In  reply  to  this  position  reference  is  occasionally  made  to  the 
universities  of  India  and  China,  whose  curricula,  it  is  claimed,  equal 
those  of  the  universities  of  the  United  States ;  but  this  is  not  true ; 
besides,  the  masses  of  those  countries  are  in  the  chains  of  an 
ignorance  harder  to  be  broken  than  the  physical  chains  of  slavery. 
Popular  education  is  unknown  in  the  Orient.  With  shame  it  must 
be  said  that  Christian  countries  have  been  slow  enough  in  providiijg 
for  universal  education  ;  that  in  our  land  the  illiteracy  is  extensive 
and  threatening  the  safety  of  our  institutions;  and  that  in  Roman 
Catholic  countries  it  is  still  more  appalling.  This  unhappy  condition, 
however,  is  the  result  of  a  narrowness  not  born  of  Christianity,  of  a 
prejudice  that  a  false  religion  or  a  blind  judgment  would  sanction, 
but  which  the  new  religion  is  bound  to  overcome.  In  Christian  lands, 
where  religion  has  half  a  chance,  colleges  and  schools  do  flourish, 
ignorance  is  being  limited,  education  is  regarded  as  the  sign  of  man- 
hood, and^^a  general  intellectual  desire  obtains  among  the  people.  In 
England,  Oxford  and  Cambridge  are  the  fruits  of  the  Christian  re- 
ligion. In  the  United  States,  Yale,  Harvard,  Princeton,  Dartmouth, 
Amherst,  Ohio  Wesleyau,  DePauw,  as  universities,  and  hundreds 
of  seminai'ies  and  academies,  were  born  of  Christian  influence.  Per- 
haps all  our  colleges,  save  Girard  College,  are  the  direct  result  of 
Christian  benevolence  and  teaching. 

In  the  matter  of  public  schools  Christian  nations  lead,  Prussia 
standing  at  the  head,  with  the  United  States  second,  and  England 
and  Greece  not  far  behind.  Such  fruits  indicate  the  worth  of  the 
tree  that  bears  them. 

.  Nor  in  this  category  of  effects  would  it  do  to  omit  the  influence  of 
Christianity  on  Art,  for  its  divinest  achievements  have  been  realized 
under  the  inspirations  of  the  true  religion.  Long  before  the  Master 
walked  the  earth  the  fine  arts  flourished  in  the  East,  and,  so  far  as 
genius  directed,  they  were  developed  to  perfection.  In  the  age  of  Per- 
icles sculpture  reached  the  limit  of  beauty  and  finish ;  beyond  the 
models  of  the  artists  of  that  day  no  nation  has  gone.  Egypt,  too, 
devoted  herself  to  figures  of  stone,  chiseling  them  rather  out  of  granite 
than  marble ;  and  Rome,  ever  imitative  of  the  colossal  and  the  beauti- 


548  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

ful,  endeavored  to  excel  her  masters,  and   painted  what  she  could 
not  chisel. 

But,  applying  a  supreme  test,  what  was  the  effect  of  pagan  or 
pre-Christian  art  on  society,  government,  and  religion?  In  a  single 
sentence,  pagan  art  was  the  source  of  the  corruptions  of  social  life 
that  obtained  throughout  the  East,  and  justified  the  terrible  descrip- 
tion of  Rome  as  given  by  Paul  in  his  Epistle  to  the  Romans.  Dr. 
John  Gillie  states:  "  It  is  unnecessary  to  crowd  the  picture,  since  it 
may  be  observed  in  one  word  that  tlie  vices  and  extravagances  which 
are  supposed  to  characterize  the  declining  ages  of  Greece  and  Rome 
took  root  in  Athens  during  the  administration  of  Pericles,  the  most 
splendid  and  the  most  prosperous  in  the  Grecian  annals."  If  asked 
how  ancient  art  became  so  debasing,  and  Avhat  was  its  relation  to  the 
public  life,  the  answer  is,  that  it  appealed  to  the  sensual  in  man,  de- 
veloping the  lower  life,  and  debauching  the  public  taste.  Designed 
to  minister  to  the  aesthetic,  it  forgot  its  mission,  or  confounded  it  in  a 
ministry  to  the  lustful  and  baser  elements  in  humanity.  The  love  of 
the  beautiful,  divinely  inwrought  in  human  nature,  was  supplanted 
by  an  expressed  preference  for  the  carnal,  resulting  in  licentiousness, 
degradation,  and  national  overthrow.  Besides,  the  range  of  ancient 
art  was  exceedingly  limited,  its  subjects  coming  more  frequently  from 
mythology  than  from  nature,  biography,  or  history.  Bacchus,  Venus, 
Apollo,  Ceres,  and  Juno  engaged  the  sculptor's  chisel  oftener  than 
the  heads  of  generals  and  rulers.  Neither  poetry  nor  philosophy  had 
any  elevating  effect  on  art.  In  the  midst  of  pagan  ideas,  it  rose  no 
higher  than  their  level,  and  at  last,  sinking  beneath  that  level,  drew 
all  down  to  its  depths  of  degradation. 

Turn  we  now  to  Christian  art,  whose  range  is  as  extensive  as  his- 
tory, whose  subjects  are  as  numerous  and  various  as  biography, 
nature,  and  the  Bible  can  present.  Pagan  art  largely  devoted  itself 
to  sculpture  ;  Christian  art,  to  painting.  The  best  products  of  Chris- 
tian art  are  representations  of  Bible  scenes,  and  from  the  hands  of 
masters  who  have  lived  within  the  last  three  or  four  centuries,  or 
since  Christianity  has  taken  a  modern  aspect  and  been  endowed  with 
a  modern  energy  and  purpose.  As  specimens,  and  as  indicating  the 
spirit  of  art  since  the  Reformation,  we  need  only  mention  Leonardo 
da  Vinci's  "The  Last  Supper,"  Raphael's  "Transfiguration,"  and 
Michael  Angelo's  "The  Last  Judgment."  That  the  galleries  of 
Europe  are  adorned  with  paintings  of  the  Temptation,  the  Baptism, 
the  Crucifixion,  the  Resurrection,  and  the  Ascension,  is  proof  of  the 
sacredness  of  art ;  and  that  the  Old  Testament  furnished  such  sub- 
jects as  Creation,  Eden,  the  Flood,  the  Ark,  Abraham's  Sacrifice,  the 
Tabernacle,  and  the  Temple,  for  the  painters'  pencils,   is  evidence 


THE  PATRONS  OF  THE  FINE  ARTS.  549 

that  art  has  discarded  mythology,  and  preferred  the  facts  and  events 
of  Bible  times  and  history.  Even  Gustave  Dore,  who  was  not  Chris- 
tian in  faith,  regarded  his  artistic  Christ  as  his  masterpiece ;  and 
certainly  his  representations  of  New.  Testament  events  were  not  below 
par.  Take  Christ  or  the  Bible  out  of  modern  art,  and  it  shrivels 
like  a  wrinkled  parchment. 

To  be  sure,  other  subjects  than  the  religious  have  engaged  the 
thought  and  skill  of  modern  artists ;  military  scenes,  historical  events, 
landscape  views,  and  fancy  sketches,  occupy  the  entire  time  of  many 
celebrated  painters ;  but  it  must  be  allowed  that,  on  the  whole,  art 
is  predisposed  to  the  Christian  idea,  and  is  consecrated  to  the  moral 
elevation  of  the  race.  This  is  the  difference  between  ancient  and 
modern  art,  the  former  degrading,  the  latter  ennobling  man. 

Yet  this  difference  can  only  be  allowed  with  qualification,  for 
Christian  art  is  not  entirely  free  from  pagan  influence ;  and  so  far 
forth  as  pagan  ideas  have  infected  modern  art,  it  has  lost  in  moral 
power ;  while  so  far  forth  as  it  has  confined  itself  to  its  legitimate 
mission  of  moral  instruction,  it  has  promoted  the  objects  of  religion. 
It  must  also  be  conceded  that  those  nations  that  have  fostered  Chris- 
tian art  the  most  are  more  corrupt  than  Protestant  nations  that  have 
not  considered  it  the  handmaid  of  religion,  a  fact  that  needs  ex- 
planation. Germany  is  the  nursery  of  socialism  ;  France,  of  infidel- 
ity ;  Italy,  of  Roman  Catholicism ;  they  patronize  the  fine  arts. 
Neither  England  nor  the  United  States  pays  a  premium  on  the  arts, 
and  yet  both  are  advanced  in  civilization  and  religious  activity  be- 
yond Germany,  France,  and  Italy.  What  account  can  be  given  of 
these  facts?  Is  it  a  credit  to  Christianity  that  it  fosters  the  fine  arts 
at  all?  We  think  it  is.  The  evils  we  speak  of  are  not  inherent  in 
art,  or  inevitable  products ;  some  of  them  are  political  in  their  nature, 
others  are  social,  others  intellectual,  and  some  religious,  and  might  or 
might  not  exist  with  or  without  the  fine  arts.  Pure  art  is  possible, 
and  has  a  mission.  That  it  has  not  been  in  the  ascendant  is  because 
Christianity  has  been  corrupted  by  paganism  and  enfeebled  by  the 
Papacy,  all  its  products  being  more  or  less  modified  by  the  spirit  of 
one  or  the  other.  In  its  Protestant  form,  Christianity  has  rarely  ex- 
pressed itself  in  art,  resigning  its  interest  to  the  Roman  Catholic 
monopoly  of  the  sesthetic  ideals.  For  it  must  be  remembered  that 
the  great  artists  of  modern  times  have  been,  and  are,  Roman  Cath- 
olics, men  who  like  to  paint  Madonnas,  angels,  and  martyrdoms,  and 
who,  going  to  the  Bible  for  their  subjects,  pervert  it  in  the  interest  of 
their  own  faith.  But  if  while  in  bondage  to  Roman  Catholic  teach- 
ing it  has  suggested  the  masterpieces  in  the  Louvre  and  the  Vatican, 
what  would  it  not  do  under  the  purer  guidance  of  Protestant  thought 


550  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY, 

and  liberty?  If  Christianity  has  any  duty  to  perform  respecting  art, 
it  is  to  rescue  it  from  the  superstitious  grasp  of  mediseval  thought, 
and  clothe  it  with  the  uiueteeuth  century  beauty  and  aim. 

Passing  to  architecture,  Christianity,  as  in  other  dej^artments,  has 
exerted  a  prominent  and  wholesome  influence,  traceable  from  the 
days  of  Constantine  down  to  the  present  time.  Religion  has  always 
dictated  temple  architecture,  the  structures  built  in  its  name  being 
the  expression  of  some  dominant  thought,  or  the  embodiment  of  some 
divine  purpose.  Christianity  has  been  the  originating  or  suggesting 
cause  of  the  historic  and  current  styles  of  Church  building  in  Europe, 
as  it  has  been  the  world  over  where  its  presence  has  been  recognized. 
Granting  that  the  Ionic,  Doric,  and  Corinthian  styles  of  columns  had 
a  pagan  origin,  and  have  not  been  eclipsed  for  beauty  by  any  mod- 
ern discovery  or  invention,  it  is  true  to  say  that  Byzantine  architec- 
ture and  ecclesiastical  edifices  constructed  after  the  Greek  or  Latin 
cross  were  possible  only  because  Christianity  was  the  dominant  re- 
ligion, and  the  Church  sought  to  express  that  religion  in  the  forms 
of  its  edifices.  Church  architecture  owes  little  to  pagan  models. 
Back  of  the  Christian  period,  the  temple  was  patterned  after  a  divine 
suggestion,  and  it  is  noteworthy  that  all  succeeding  temple  structures 
are  but  modifications  of  the  original  ideal  given  to  Solomon.  From 
the  dawn  of  the  Christian  era  the  different  styles  of  Church  building, 
the  Roman  Christian,  the  Byzantine,  the  Romanesque,  the  Gothic, 
and  the  Renaissance  have  appeared  as  the  products  of  Christian 
ideas,  representing  to  the  outside  world  the  principal  factors  of  the 
Christian  religion.  It  is  not  claimed  that  Christianity  has  influenced 
the  styles  of  dwellings  as  it  has  those  of  basilicas  and  tombs ;  but 
that  it  has  contributed  to  the  improvement  of  architecture,  and  that 
in  Christian  lands  the  dwelling-house  has  been  beautified,  are  among 
the  facts  that  establish  the  helpful  influence  of  religion  in  the  com- 
mon spheres  of  life. 

Eagerly  we  proceed  to  notice  the  relation  of  Christianity  to  re- 
formatory  movements,  or  its  aid  in  the  removal  and  extinction  of  mam- 
moth public  evils,  for  its  power  must  be  felt  here  if  anywhere.  As 
an  operating  force  Christianity  is  apparently  slow,  working  with  al- 
most careless  interest  in  human  affairs,  but  its  purpose  is  never  ob- 
scured or  unknown,  and  its  final  declaration  is  always  executed.  It 
stands  in  open  hostility  to  all  illegitimacy,  whether  political,  social, 
or  religious ;  it  is  in  alliance  with  no  evil ;  it  is  on  fraternal  terms 
with  no  wrong.  At  the  same  time  it  is  not  a  direct  antagonist,  or 
violent  opposer  of  wrong  in  the  sense  of  a  persistent  and  immediate 
destroyer  of  it.  It  does  not  precipitately  array  its  foi'ces  against  evil 
and  overthrow  it  by  a  single  blow,  but  it  is  an  undermining  force 


UNDERMINING  METHODS  OF  PROVIDENCE.  551 

that,  like  sappers,  requires  time  for  its  work.  Witness  the  long 
reign  of  Mohammedanism  in  the  Orient,  a  single  providential  order, 
a  single  divine  movement  would  extinguish  it;  recall  the  weary- 
despotism  of  feudalism,  it  might  have  been  speedily  overturned  had 
God's  hand  interposed ;  observe  the  slow  decadence  of  slavery  in  the 
^orld— such  a  gigantic  evil  had  subsided  long  ago  had  the  provi- 
dential purpose  ripened  fast ;  see  how  polygamy  has  dominated  the 
Oriental  nations — it  ought  to  give  place  to  the  Scriptural  idea  of  mar- 
riage ;  observe  that  intemperance  has  invaded  society  and  shaken  the 
altars  of  religion  ;  and  the  inquiry  is  pertinent.  Does  God  reign,  or 
is  Christianity  able  to  cope  with  the  great  evils  in  the  world? 

This,  however,  is  a  very  superficial  statement  of  the  case,  or  at 
least  is  not  a  broad  view  of  the  methods  of  God's  government  and 
of  the  agencies  he  employs  for  the  reduction  of  evil.  To  the  remark 
that  Christianity  is  an  undermining  religion  must  be  added  another, 
and  that  is,  that  it  is  an  inspiring  religion,  propelling  to  just  that 
activity  required  for  the'  final  extinction  of  the  evils  that  afilict  the 
world  and  demonstrating  by  this  method  its  positive  inclination  to 
righteousness  and  its  purpose  to  extinguish  all  forces  opposed  to  it, 
For  the  evils  that  infest  human  society,  disturb  its  peace,  and  threaten 
its  safety,  mankind  are  for  the  most  part  directly  responsible  and 
must  themselves  organize  for  their  removal.  God  sends  the  cyclone, 
the  lightning,  the  sirocco,  the  tempest ;  against  these  we  may  pray, 
asking  that  the  divine  hand  be  stayed  ;  but  he  never  sent  intemper- 
ance, or  slavery,  or  Morraonism,  and,  therefore,  is  not  to  be  invoked 
to  put  them  away.      That  belongs  to  men  'to  do. 

Let  us  be  understood.  Moral  evils  originate  with  men  and  must 
be  abandoned  by  men.  The  relation  of  Christianity  to  such  evils  is 
not  that  of  a  destroyer,  but  that  of  an  iuspirer,  quickening  the  re- 
formatory spirit  in  man,  and  prompting  him  to  abolish  evil.  As  the 
destruction  of  evil  is  in  man's  hands,  its  long  reign  in  the  world  is 
explained.  Had  the  Almighty  assumed  the  prerogative  of  Destroyer, 
evil  had  disappeared  long  ago  ;  but  as  man  must  be  destroyer  he 
dallies,  hesitates,  debates,  reluctantly  puts  evil  away,  and  sometimes 
Hfter  advancing  against  it  blackslides  and  returns  to  his  idols.  This 
explains  the  rise  and  fall  of  evils.  By  its  undermining  processes, 
and  its  inspiring  influences,  Christianity  aids  in  the  extinction  of 
evil,  the  amelioration  of  human  ills,  and  the  moral  elevation  of 
society. 

What  has  been  the  result?  The  annals  of  the  Romans  abound 
in  gladiatorial  scenes,  cruel  in  themselves,  and  debasing  of  the  com- 
mon taste ;  slaves,  prisoners,  culprits,  and  Christians  were  compelled 
to  fight  with  wild  beasts  or  with  one  another  in  the  Coliseum   or  in 


552  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

the  theaters ;  emperors,  nobles,  and  patricians  regarding  the  spectacles 
as  amusements  for  their  benefit,  and  encouraging  them  by  their  pat- 
ronage. In  vain  Constantine  endeavored  to  suppress  them ;  in  vain 
were  the  denunciations  of  moral  teachers ;  in  vain  did  pure-minded 
philosophers  condemn.  For  four  centuries  after  the  Incarnation  the 
bloody  exhibitions  continued  with  the  connivance  of  royal  authority 
and  the  support  of  the  higher  classes  of  the  imperial  cities.  How 
were  they  finally  suppressed  ?  Read  the  story  of  the  victory  of  Ale- 
machus,  an  Eastern  monk,  in  the  Flavian  theater,  and  learn  that  the 
extinction  of  the  gladiatorial  spirit  was  due  to  the  courage  of  a  Chris- 
tian. Even  so  feudalism  went  down  under  the  reformatory  demands 
of  the  Gospel.  Likewise  slavery,  though  now  not  an  unknown  evil 
on  the  face  of  the  earth,  has  been  banished  from  Christian  and  civ- 
ilized lands,  never  to  return,  for  it  is  a  historic  sign  of  providential 
progress  that  when  a  national  evil  is  overthrown  it  is  never  restored. 
To  be  sure,  it  cost  something  to  expel  it  from  the  United  States,  as 
the  expulsion  of  any  evil  means  a  struggle  and  sufiering,  but  its  go- 
ing was  a  victory  for  the  Gospel.  Through  the  benevolent  spirit  of 
Christianity  reforms  in  prison  life  have  been  instituted  ;  wretched 
punishments  have  been  abandoned  ;  tortures  have  ceased  ;  and  a  new 
idea  of  penalty  has  modified  criminal  legislation.  The  spirit  of  feud, 
so  rampant  in  the  days  of  chivalry,  and  which  had  something  to  do 
with  the  establishment  of  the  order  of  knight-errantry,  no  longer  broods 
over  the  social  circle  ;  the  duel  is  rare  and  under  ban ;  and  so  rapid  has 
been  the  growth  of  the  philanthropic  spirit,  and  so  universal  the  de- 
sire for  peace,  that  arbitration  is  being  resorted  to  as  the  best  method 
for  the  settlement  of  international  differences  and  difficulties.  Surely 
these  are  no  small  results,  effected  largely  by  the  presence  of  the 
peace-inspiring  religion  in  the  world. 

The  Chridian  home  is  the  fruit  of  the  Christian  religion.  Outside  of 
Christian  lands,  or  where  other  religions  prevail,  the  basis  of  the 
family  institution  is  tyrannical  and  unsafe,  domestic  habits  and  cus- 
toms are  corrupt  and  profligate,  superstition  prostrates  individual  en- 
ergy and  purpose,  and  domestic  sweetness  and  beauty  are  unknown. 
For  the  model  family  or  the  ideal  home  one  will  not  go  to  India,. 
China,  or  Japan.  In  Siam  many  of  the  Chinese  live  in  floating 
houses,  and  are  as  nomadic  as  the  Bedouins,  or  as  the  men  who  in 
primitive  times  clothed  themselves  with  skins  and  dwelt  in  caves. 
In  pagan  and  Mohammedan  countries  the  social  position  of  woman 
is  incompatible  with  a  refined  and  elevated  condition,  her  capabili- 
ties for  a  larger  and  more  helpful  life  are  unrecognized,  her  instincts 
are  smothered,  her  rights  denied,  and  the  home  of  which  she  should 
be  the  center  and  pride  is  little  else  than  a  nursery  of  vice.     Brah- 


THE  MONOGAMOUS  PRINCIPLE  ASSERTED.  553 

minism  and  Buddhism  shut  the  women  up  in  their  zenanas,  cover  their 
faces  with  veils,  screen  the  windows  of  their  apartments  with  lattice- 
work, and  teach  them  that  they  are  degraded  and  without  souls. 
What  sorrow  fills  a  household  when  a  girl  is  born !  No  wonder  that 
polygamy,  with  all  its  related  vices,  is  authorized  in  such  countries, 
and  that  woman  is  a  toy  or  beast  of  burden.  Even  the  Koran  takes 
this  view  of  woman,  sanctioning  the  believez''s  right  to  at  least  four 
wives,  though  the  sheiks  of  the  desert  often  have  many  more.  In 
polygamy,  female  degradation,  and  domestic  cruelty,  the  homes  in 
pagan  lauds  have  had  their  birth. 

As  enunciated  in  the  Scriptures,  the  true  basis  of  marriage  is 
monogamy,  but,  like  every  other  good  principle,  this  doctrine  has 
come  down  the  ages,  opposed  by  malice  and  ignorance,  and  has  run 
the  gauntlet  of  sophistry,  paganism,  superstition,  and  crime.  As  a 
Christian  principle,  it  confronted  the  social  corruptions  of  Rome  in 
the  days  of  Paul  and  Seneca,  when,  indeed,  vice  was  on  the  throne, 
and  innocence  was  a  barren  ideality.  Stoicism  was  absolutely  power- 
less to  check  the  reign  of  the  social  vice  among  the  aristocratic  classes, 
who  lived  only  for  pleasure,  and  sought  it  in  their  own  degradation. 
To  no  lower  depths  of  corruption  could  society  go,  when,  as  Uhl- 
horn  represents,  "friends  exchanged  wives,"  and,  as  Tertullian  re- 
marks, "  they  marry  only  to  be  divorced."  This  is  enough.  To  turn 
the  tide  of  infamy,  to  condemn  the  public  licentiousness,  to  restore  the 
idea  of  purity,  to  establish  the  home  in  its  ideal  aspects,  was  an  un- 
dertaking all  other  religious  shrank  from,  as  being  absolutely  un- 
promising of  any  good.  In  this  emergency  Christianity  assumed  the 
task,  entered  upon  it  with  vigor,  demolished  the  altars  of  shame, 
raised  woman  from  the  pit,  and  restored  to  man  his  lost  manhood 
.and  virtue.  The  change  in  the  social  life  of  the  State  was  immediate 
and  unequivocal. 

Thus  has  it  ever  been  when  the  true  principles  of  religion  have  been 
announced,  and  the  sincerity  of  the  conscience  invoked.  Against  the 
domination  of  these  principles  polygamy,  bigamy,  and  lust  have  protested 
with  lecherous  voices,  asserting  their  priority  in  the  social  institution, 
and  even  defending  themselves  as  inviolable  and  legitimate.  In  vin- 
dicating Mormonism,  Joseph  Smith  declared  that  four-fifths  of  man- 
kind believed  in  and  practiced  polygamy,  while  only  one-fifth  held  to 
monogamy.  So  extravagant  a  statement  has  not  gone  uncontradicted, 
but  it  is  confessed  that  the  monogamous  principle  of  Christianity  met 
with  obstruction  from  a  majority  of  the  races  and  peoples  of  the 
globe;  hence  its  triumph  is  all  the  more  conspicuous,  and  indicative 
of  its  power  in  the  regulation  of  the  domestic  life  of  the  world. 

Insisting  that  the   model   home  must  be  founded  on  the  Gospel 


554  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

idea  of  marriage,  and  that  this  idea  is  in  the  ascendant,  it  is  as  noto- 
rious as  it  is  painful  that  in  many  of  the  States  of  Christian  America 
divorce  laws  are  so  numerous  and  so  elastic  that  the  marriage  relation 
can  be  dissolved  without  effort,  and  illegitimate  combinations  there- 
after formed.  This  is  one  of  the  evils  incident  to  the  reign  of  the 
higher  principle  of  marriage,  Avhich  must  be  combated  until  checked 
and  overthrown.  However,  bigamy  and  polygamy  have  no  countenance 
in  law  or  custom  in  these  lands,  and  exist,  if  it  all,  in  violation  of 
law.  Here,  if  anywhere,  the  model  home  may  be  found ;  here 
woman  is  the  helpmeet  of  the  husband,  and  the  mother  is  the  ruler 
of  the  household  ;  here  God  is  worshiped  at  the  domestic  altar,  and 
purity  makes  sacred  both  conjugal  and  filial  relations.  Lyman 
Beecher's  and  Martha  Washington's  homes  were  the  products  of  the 
Christian  idea. 

This  is  the  beginning  of  Christian  society,  with  its  contents  of 
order,  fraternity,  unity,  liberty,  and  philanthropy.  The  great  thought 
that  of  one  blood  God  made  all  tJie  tuitions  of  tfie  earth  is  of  Gospel 
origin,  signifying  the  unity  of  the  race,  and  necessarily  the  equality 
of  man  before  God  and  under  the  Gospel.  In  its  historical  develop- 
ment society  drifted  away  from  the  fundamental  principle ;  as  a  fact, 
it  never  was  organized  on  this  principle,  and  left  to  itself,  it  never 
voluntarily  would  adopt  it  as  the  prime  element  of  governmental 
order  and  life.  In  the  legendary  period  of  Greece  the  theory  was 
advocated  that  men  were  composed  of  gold  or  silver  or  iron,  as  they 
represented  different  virtues,  and  that  dissimilarity  of  character  estab- 
lished a  difference  of  origin,  which  prevented  the  recognition  of  unity 
and  equality  of  rights.  Such  a  spirit  has  always  and  everywhere  pre- 
vailed, except  where  Christianity  arrayed  itself  against  it,  and  breathed 
the  doctrine  of  "one  blood"  into  the  veins  of  human  thought.  In 
India  the  system  of  caste  has  exercised  a  tremendous  power  in  retard- 
ing the  growth  of  the  Gospel  doctrine,  and  in  degrading  the  people 
below  the  level  of  a  common  heritage,  imposing  upon  Christianity 
in  its  attempt  to  uplift  and  reorganize  society  a  task  no  other  re- 
ligion ever  encountered.  In  Judea,  in  Peter's  time,  it  was  difficult 
for  the  Jew  to  recognize  the  Gentile  as  superior  to  a  dog  in  rights  or 
privileges,  the  moral  distance  between  them  being  too  great  for  any 
religion  but  Christianity  to  bridge.  At  the  present  time  heathendom 
is  infected  with  the  suspicion  that  different  men  are  made  of  different 
kinds  of  clay,  entitling  some  to  lower  and  others  to  higher  stations, 
which  suspicion  receives  the  sanction  of  the  popular  religions.  Hence 
the  indoctrinating  the  heathen  nations  on  this  subject  implies  antag- 
onism to  prevailing  religions,  as  well  as  honeycombing  the  entire 
social  structure  with  the  truth. 


POPULAR  ETHICAL  NOTIONS.  555 

In  Christian  lands,  ostensibly  committed  to  this  paragon  of  phil- 
anthropic doctrines,  a  work  remains  to  be  done  before  the  millennium 
shall  have  dawned,  for  a  spirit  of  oppression,  akin  to  caste,  still  men- 
aces the  peace  of  society,  debasing  the  sensibilities  and  corrupting  the 
fountains  of  justice.  In  England  and  Ireland  the  oppression  of  the 
poor  by  land-owners  and  general  misgovernment  of  the  lower  classer 
is  crushing  out  the  life  of  the  people,  who,  in  resistance  thereto,  are 
employing  dynamite  and  studying  the  tactics  of  revolution.  In  the 
United  States  the  spirit  of  monopoly  is  the  great  danger  to  civil  lib- 
erty ;  the  rights  of  the  masses  are  ignored ;  and  the  cry  of  the  social- 
ist, whose  incentive  is  less  a  moral  than  a  physical  want,  is  heard 
from  the  mountains  to  the  sea.  This  is  in  contravention  of  the  Chris- 
tian idea,  to  which  society  must  return  if  it  escape  disorganization 
and  the  terrors  of  nihilism.  Recognizing  the  unity  of  the  race  and 
the  equality  of  man,  caste  will  disappear  from  heathendom,  and  op- 
pression no  longer  curse  Christendom  ;  society  will  rest  securely,  be- 
cause on  a  Christian  basis.  Christian  society  is  one  of  the  perennial 
fruits  of  Christianity. 

In  Christian  lands,  too,  as  nowhere  else,  there  is  a  genuine  and 
popular  enthusiasm  for  morality,  the  evidence  of  the  working  of  the 
ethical  spirit  of  the  Christian  religion.  In  heathen  lauds  the  moral 
condition  of  society  may  be  likened  to  a  stagnant  pool,  sending  forth 
corruption  and  death ;  the  commonest  virtues  have  little  sway  over 
the  multitudes,  and  are  discarded  by  the  aristocracies ;  truth  is  at  a 
fearful  discount  in  China  and  Egypt ;  honesty  is  rare  ;  theft  is  a 
breach  to  be  punished  when  discovered  ;  murder  is  justifiable  for 
causes  without  number ;  and  as  for  patriotism,  benevolence,  humility, 
patience,  brotherly  kindness,  and  the  forgiving  spirit,  they  are  seldom 
seen,  and  even  then  are  usually  the  fruit  of  the  Gospel.  Paganism 
is  the  nursery  of  immorality  ;  its  ethical  standards  are  without  prac- 
tical virtue;  the  popular  ethical  notion  is  the  subject  of  ridicule  and 
satire.  Mohammedanism,  apparently  more  careful  in  ethical  discrim- 
inations, presents  a  one-sided  and  distorted  picture  of  humanity  molded 
by  its  influence. 

How  difl^erent  the  condition  in  Christian  lands!  The  ethical 
notion  is  at  the  basis  of  public  life ;  it  constitutes  the  root  of  individ- 
ual character ;  it  is  the  standard  by  which  all  transactions  and  events 
are  judged.  There  is  a  tendency  to  moral  order,  a  growth  of  the 
moral  sentiments,  a  repression  of  criminal  pursuits,  and  an  inculcation 
of  the  highest  virtues  in  communities  dominated  by  the  Christian 
idea.  Truth,  honesty,  benevolence,  and  patriotism  are  held  in  such 
repute  that  he  who  does  not  practice  them  goes  without  recognition 
or  reward.     Even  in  circles  in  which  Christianity  is  not  formally  ac- 


656  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

knowledged  in  its  religious  character,  the  claims  of  ethical  righteous- 
ness are  authoritative,  and  considered  the  indispensable  condition  of 
happiness  and  progress. 

In  a  very  congratulatory  way  we  may  refer  to  Christianity  as  the 
source  of  the  multiplied  benevolent  agencies  and  institutions  which  have 
been  established  for  the  comfort  and  relief  of  the  unfortunate,  and  for 
the  recovery  of  the  fallen  and  the  outcast.  Asylums  for  the  blind, 
the  insane,  the  deaf  and  dumb ;  poor-houses,  children's  homes,  and 
hospitals  ;  reformatory  schools  and  homes  for  the  diseased  and  vicious ; 
soldiers'  homes,  and  pensions  amounting  to  millions  annually,  tell  not 
only  of  misfortune  and  the  reign  of  disease  and  poverty  in  this  world, 
but  also  of  that  benevolent  spirit  that,  taking  its  inspiration  from  the 
sympathetic  Christ,  provides  relief,  comfort,  education,  and  salvation 
for  the  needy.  Such  institutions  are  almost  unknown  outside  of 
Christendom.  It  is  reported  that  an  asylum  for  the  unfortunate 
among  the  priesthood  exists  in  China,  and  we  observed  a  lunatic  asy- 
lum in  Judea ;  but  it  can  not  be  denied  that  the  benevolent  asylum 
is  the  special  product  of  Christianity.  Were  blind  Bartimeus  living 
in  Ohio  he  would  not  sit  long  by  the  wayside,  but  be  taken  to  Co- 
lumbus, and  clothed,  fed,  educated,  saved.  The  deaf  and  dumb  would 
also  be  transported  thither,  and  even  the  leper  would  be  housed  and 
cured.  For  these  and  all  other  such  benefits  the  world  is  not  a  little 
indebted  to  the  religion  of  the  Nazarene. 

Going  still  higher  in  the  scale  of  beneficent  enterprise,  Christian- 
ity has  impelled  the  Christian  Church,  within  a  century  or  two,  to  or- 
ganize for  the  redemption  of  the  world,  concreting  this  purpose  into  mis- 
sionary societies,  which  are  only  prevented  from  turning  the  earth  into 
a  paradise  again  by  the  unwillingness  of  Christian  people  to  sacrifice 
siufficiently  for  the  attainment  of  the  purpose.  By  so  much  as  the 
Gospel  is  world-wide  in  its  provisions,  truths,  and  benefits,  by  as  much 
■the  Church  is  bound  to  spread  the  tidings  of  salvation  to  the  utter- 
most parts  of  the  earth  ;  and  this  it  will  do  in  the  years  to  come. 
First  relieving  mankind  of  temporary  evils  and  supplying  the  temporal 
wants  of  the  race,  the  Church,  as  it  is  fully  enlightened  in  the  Gos- 
pel, turns  its  endeavor  to  the  positive  spiritual  enlightenment  of  the 
nations,  demonstrating  the  adaptation  of  Christianity  to  all  peoples. 
and  paving  the  way  for  its  universal  dominion  among  them.  Its 
Churches  and  Sunday-schools  planted  everywhere  ;  its  teachers  and 
missionaries  going  to  the  ends  of  the  earth  ;  the  Gospel  proving  itself 
to  be  the  power  of  God  unto  salvation  on  the  banks  of  the  Ganges  as 
on  the  banks  of  the  Mississippi,  and  in  Peking  as  in  Cincinnati;  a 
child  buried  with  Christian  rites  on  the  Sandwich  Islands  as  in  Amer- 
ica ;  the   Sabbath-day  observed  in  Japan  as  in  England  ;  the  Chris- 


THE  NEW  IN  CHRISTIANITY.  557 

tian  secular  school  opened  in  Damascus  as  in  Cleveland,  constitute  a 
few  of  the  many  items  of  the  history  of  the  Gospel  in  this  world,  and 
are  proofs  of  a  divine  plan  to  redeem  all  nations,  and  to  let  heaven 
descend  to  the  earth.  If  we  speak  of  the  universal  conquest  of  Chris- 
tianity through  these  agencies,  predicating  faith  for  the  future  on 
the  history  wrought  out  in  evangelization,  one  may  suspect  us  of 
Utopianism,  or  chai-ge  us  with  being  the  promoter  of  a  fanatical  and 
impracticable  purpose ;  hut  Christianity  is  practical  Utopianism ;  it  is 
realistic  optimism. 

In  the  highest  sense,  Christianity  is  a  religion.  Whatever  its 
achievements  in  the  human  realm,  whatever  the  inspiration  it  lends 
to  human  activity  in  the  realization  of  its  aspirations,  its  greatest ' 
power  is  as  a  religion,  and  its  inexhaustible  possibilities  are  in  the 
religious  realm.  To  trace  its  influence  outside  of  that  realm  is  profit- 
able and  assuring.  We  have  seen  its  effect  on  civilization  and  the 
industrial  pursuits  of  men ;  we  have  observed  its  impregnation  of 
literature  and  refining  tendency  on  art;  we  have  witnessed  its  initia- 
tion of  reforms,  and  its  sovereignty  in  home-life ;  we  have  noted  its 
teachings  of  morality,  its  organization  of  the  benevolent  spirit  into 
societies  for  the  relief  of  the  needy,  broadening  out  into  a  world-wide 
project  for  the  salvation  of  the  race ;  but  its  chief  excellence  is  in  its 
effect  on  human  character,  its  effect  as  a  spiritual  religion.  It  is  the 
religion  of  regeneration,  the  religion  of  faith,  the  religion  of  revela- 
tion, the  religion  of  atonement  and  salvation.  By  its  converting 
power,  it  demonstrates  its  divine  origin ;  by  its  revelations  of  truth, 
it  establishes  its  supernatural  character ;  by  the  satisfaction  it  affords 
its  adherents,  it  proves  its  sufllciency ;  by  its  ability  to  deliver  men 
from  sin,  to  support  them  in  death,  and  open  immortality  to  final 
vision  and  expiring  life,  it  may  claim  to  be  from  God. 

If  a  religion  may  be  tested  by  its  fruits,  Christianity  is  the  eternal 
sentiment  of  God. 


CHAPTER  XXVI. 

<rHE    NE^?V    IN    CHRISTIANITY. 

WHEN  Roger  Bacon  pushed  his  scientific  inquiries  into  the  secrets 
of  nature,  revealing  facts  that  astonished  the  ignorance  of  his 
times,  and  laid  the  foundation  for  a  broad  philosophy  in  the  future, 
it  was  believed  that  he  was  in  league  with  Satan,  the  retribution  for 
which  was  ten  years  in  a  dungeon  in  Paris.     In  a  later  day,  and  for 


558  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

the  still  milder  offense  of  publishing  a  treatise  on  logic  in  English, 
Sir  Thomas  Wilson  likewise  suffered  incarceration  at  the  hands  of  the 
papal  authorities — a  proof  that  the  spirit  of  progress  was  considered 
heretical,  sinful,  and  hurtful,  and  should  be  quenched  in  its  incipi- 
ency,  and  by  the  punishment  of  its  advocates. 

The  present  is  a  different  age,  imbued  with  a  different  purpose, 
branding  ignorance,  instead  of  knowledge,  as  the  foe  of  happiness, 
and  rewarding  instead  of  decapitating  those  who  open  doors  hitherto 
shut  to  explorer  and  thinker.  Golgotha  now  stares  conservatism  in 
the  face ;  it  stands  no  longer  in  the  path  of  the  truth-finder.  Zeal 
for  knowledge  is  wide-spread,  and  is  the  key  to  the  progress  of  the 
nineteenth  century.  The  demand  everywhere  is  for  the  new,  arising 
from  a  dissatisfaction  with  the  old,  because  of  its  imperfections,  its 
traditional  burdens,  its  inconsistent  teachings,  and  its  degrading 
power.  Lord  Bacon  said,  truth  is  the  daughter  of  time,  not  of 
authority.  Time  is  the  bearer  of  new  truths ;  authority  is  a  tyrant 
in  the  realm  of  thought.  Truth,  not  tyranny,  is  the  cry  of  the  hour. 
Outside  of  religion,  especially  in  science,  history,  and  philosophy, 
investigation  has  not  only  been  rapid,  but  it  has  succeeded  in  crowd- 
ing into  outer  darkness  many  errors  almost  sacred  from  age,  and 
establishing  faith  in  nature  on  entirely  new  foundations.  In  the 
circles  of  religious  thought,  despite  the  conservative  tendency,  a 
change  is  apparent  in  opinion,  touching  the  necessity  of  a  re-opening 
of  questions,  and  a  larger  exploration  of  fundamental  truth. 

With  the  purpose  to  ascertain  all  there  is  in  Christianity,  to  ex- 
pose its  hidden  foundations,  and  examine  its  rare  claims,  so  well 
attested  by  historic  evidence,  we  are  in  entire  sympathy  ;  and  this 
sympathy  is  grounded  in  the  general  fact  that  Christianity,  as  yet,  is 
substantially  an  undeveloped  religion.  Neither  exhausted  on  the  one 
hand,  nor  completed  on  the  other,  it  remains  for  this  or  succeeding 
generations  to  fathom  its  depths,  gather  the  unseen  pearls  at  the 
bottom,  and  report  all  the  glories  of  the  invisible. 

It  is  easy  to  believe  there  is  a  thousand-fold  more  in  Christianity 
than  has  been  produced  or  discovered.  It  is  any  thing  but  small  or 
effete ;  its  magnitude  has  never  been  measured ;  its  volume  of  power 
has  never  been  calculated ;  its  range  of  influence  has  never  been 
surmised.  To  those  who,  through  spiritual  curiosity  or  intellectual 
aspiration,  covet  a  knowledge  of  the  new  in  religion,  it  is  enough  to 
say,  that  it  is  not  necessary  to  seek  a  new  religion  so  long  as  there  is 
so  much  that  is  new  in  Christianity.  The  suspicion  that  Christianity 
has  nothing  new  to  offer  mankind ;  that,  because  its  book  of  revela- 
tions is  complete,  a  knowledge  of  new  truths  is  impossible, — can  only 
be  maintained  by  those  who  fancy  they  have  exhausted  the  meaning 


THE  ANTIQUITY  OF  RELIGION.  559 

of  religion,  or  reached  the  bottom  of  the  great  ocean  of  thought  with 
their  measuring  lines  of  inquiry.  If  it  is  imagined  that  the  world 
will  outgrow  the  doctrines  of  monotheism,  providence,  incarnation, 
Messiahship,  crucifixion,  atonement,  regenei'ation,  prayer,  resurrec- 
tion, and  immortality,  it  must  be  on  the  supposition  that  it  will  ad- 
vance beyond  present  interpretations  of  them  ;  for,  until  the  doctrines 
themselves  are  exhaustively  understood,  they  must  remain  as  subjects 
of  thought  and  investigation.  Going  beyond  an  interpretation  is  not 
the  same  as  going  beyond  the  truth  to  which  the  interpretation 
is  fastened. 

The  spirit  of  change  is  in  the  world.  Death  is  the  prophecy  of 
birth.  In  keeping  with  this  order  of  things,  governments  have  passed 
through  all  varieties,  from  despotism  to  democracy ;  institutions  have 
appeared  aud  departed,  being  succeeded  by  purer  forms,  as  the  feudal 
system  gave  place  to  enlarged  freedom  in  Europe ;  philosophies,  too, 
rise,  make  their  obeisance,  aud  die  ;  and  all  religions  are  undergoing 
modifications,  presaging  their  extinction.  Will  Christianity  be  an 
exception  to  this  order?     Will  its  old  truths  survive  age? 

The  natural  tendency  of  Christianity,  amid  the  environment  of 
change,  is  to  perpetuity.  Error,  sin,  physical  forms,  may  perish,  but 
truth  is  immortal.  Truth,  philosophical  or  ethical,  husbands  its 
vitality  for  future  conflicts,  and  comes  out  of  the  depths  of  the  ages, 
scarred  by  opposition,  but  ready  to  inflict  a  paralytic  stroke  upon 
error;  and  it  must  attain,  by  virtue  of  its  nature,  the  highest  place  as 
a  governing  element  among  the  forces  of  progress.  The  decadence 
of  Christianity  will  be  the  decadence  of  truth,  a  result  that  can  not 
be  contemplated  with  composure.  The  relation  of  Christianity  to 
truth,  or  the  assumption  that  Christianity  is  truth,  is  involved  in  the 
preliminary  consideration  of  the  subject,  justifying  the  statement  that 
the  fortunes  of  the  one  are  the  fortunes  of  the  other. 

Religion,  or  the  idea  of  religion,  is  old;  the  great  question  is,  is 
there  any  thing  new  in  it  ?  Is  the  old  consistent  with  the  new  ?  Is 
the  old  svfficientt     Is  it  exhaustive? 

Religion  is  old;  this  is  its  glory.  It  bears  the  imprint  of  the 
Almighty  upon  it ;  it  dates  from  the  beginning ;  its  ark  is  fringed 
with  the  leaves  of  Paradise  ;  its  music  is  that  of  the  early  morning ; 
and  its  message  is  embalmed  in  the  innocence  and  purity  of  the  first 
day.  Creation  and  Religion  are  the  twin  products  of  Eternal  Power 
and  Wisdom.  The  one  carries  us  into  the  region  of  the  other ;  both 
exhibit  the  marks  of  the  same  paternity.  Recently,  a  few  travelers 
entered  an  immense  cavern,  unlighted  by  sun  or  candle ;  it  was  dark, 
deep,  and  wide ;  soon  a  red  light  was  kindled,  and  it  illuminated  floor 
and  roof,  showing  the  broken  forms  of  stalagmite  and  stalactite,  and 


660  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

making  visible  what  was  unknown  to  the  outer  Avorld.  Religion  is 
the  inextinguishable  torch,  the  ever-burning  light,  that  illuminates 
the  retreating  Past,  that  gives  us  the  key  to  history,  indicates  the 
plan  of  creation,  and  writes  out  the  secret  of  the  universe  and  the 
story  of  its  beginning. 

But  is  religion  nothing  more  than  a  mausoleum?  Is  it  the  tomb 
of  truths?  .the  alcove  of  ancient  dust?  or  is  it  a  modern,  vital  force,  as 
quickening  iu'its  influence  to-day  as  when  it  first  chanted  the  glory 
of  God  ?  Is  it  not  the  only  genuine  Janus,  looking  into  the  past  and 
future  at  the  same  time?  Surely,  the  old  alone  does  not  constitute 
all  of  religion ;  but,  like  a  speck  of  gold  in  the  sand,  it  must  be  the 
sign  of  larger  treasures  and  more  inexhaustible  riches.  New  wonders 
eclipsing  the  old,  new  truths  explanatory  of  the  old,  new  prospects 
surpassing  even  prophetic  visions,  are  all  possible  under  the  reign  of 
a  religion  that  opens  its  doors  wide  to  the  advance  of  mortals.  Sat- 
isfaction with  the  old  has  blinded  the  vision  to  the  new,  and  impeded 
the  march  to  conquests  over  error. 

Underneath  the  form  of  a  verbal  religion,  there  are  things  new  to 
philosophy,  new  to  theology,  new  to  human  wisdom,  that  must  be 
brought  forth  and  declared  as  the  central  and  inspiring  truths  of  God. 
We  have  been  coasting  along  the  shore,  content  Avith  bays  and  rivers, 
and  picking  up  a  few  shells;  we  must  "launch  out  into  the  deep," 
where  Omnipotence  has  room  for  its  displays,  and  where  storms  turn 
out  to  be  the  amusement  of  an  hour.  He  falls  into  error,  who  fancies 
that  Religion  has  expressed  itself  in  every  possible  form,  or  that 
Revelation  is  insusceptible  of  other  interpretations  than  those  predi- 
cated at  Nice  or  framed  by  Athanasius. 

Revealed  religion,  as  a  historic  system  of  moral  truths,  has  ob- 
served the  general  law  of  development,  being  in  this  respect  in  per- 
fect harmony  with  the  theory  of  the  universe  as  a  development; 
and  under  a  similar  law  of  evolution  it  will  continue  to  expand  until 
its  mission  shall  be  fully  accomplished.  If  we  study  the  evolutionary 
aspects  of  religion  we  shall  see  that  it  has  developed  in  proportion 
to  the  intellectual  capacity  of  the  race,  the  light  shining  more 
brightly  as  man  confessed  his  need  of  it,  until  it  burst  forth  in 
a  blaze  of  supernatural  splendor  that  time  has  not  been  able  to  ex- 
tinguish. "The  light  brightens,"  says  Newman  Smyth,  "as  the 
world  is  prepared  for  its  shining."  In  distinct  phrase.  Revelation  has 
been  progressive,  not  given  in  a  lump,  but  rather  by  piece-meal, 
given  as  a  panorama  with  ever-changing  scenes,  suited  first  to  child- 
hood, then  to  manhood,  and  finally  to  age.  From  Abraham  to  the 
Messiah  religion  is  a  clear  development  under  divine  auspices  of 
monotheistic  and  Messianic  truth,  reaching  an  apparently  fixed  con- 


THE  PROGRESSIVE  HISTORY  OF  RELIGION.  561 

dition  in  the  judicial  proclamations  of  the  Master.  In  the  patriarch's 
time  how  crude  every  religious  idea — an  altar,  a  sacrifice,  a 
worshiper?  Abraham  felt  that  this  was  not  all  of  religion,  but  it 
was  the  best  possible  in  the  primitive  condition  of  society.  Whether 
it  is  said  that  religion  keeps  pace  with  society,  or  is  the  pioneer  of 
civilization,  they  seem  to  occupy  contiguous  positions,  and  are 
adapted  to  each  other,  all  history  certifying  to  their  relative  interac- 
tion. In  primitive  times,  a  primitive  religion — in  later  times  an 
advanced  religion.  From  the  tabernacle  to  the  temple ;  from  Elijah's 
musings  under  the  juniper-tree  to  the  full-voiced  preaching  of  Peter 
on  Pentecost ;  from  the  angels  who  saved  Lot  to  those  who  ministered 
to  the  tempted  Christ ;  from  Solomon  in  all  his  glory  to  Christ  in  his 
transfiguration  ;  from  the  raising  of  the  Shunammite's  son  to  the  resur- 
rection of  Lazarus ;  from  the  sacrifice  of  David  on  Moriah  to  that 
of  the  world's  Victim  on  Calvary  ;  was  a  series  of  advancing  steps  in 
religious  unfolding,  of  new  developments  all  the  way,  of  changes  in 
the  very  structure,  spirit,  and  design  of  religion,  a  complete  remodel- 
ing of  the  old,  a  final  crowning  of  the  new.  Until  its  culmination 
in  the  great  Teacher,  religion  was  in  outward  appearance  as  changeful 
as  the  kaleidoscope,  a  marvel  of  surprises,  adapting  itself  to  the 
changed  conditions  of  man,  and  all  tending  to  and  preparing  the  way 
for  its  final  incarnation.  Sinai,  with  its  terrific  splendors,  is  a  mon- 
umental mile-post  in  religion ;  Carmel,  with  Elijah's  victory,  signifies 
another  measured  advance  ;  Solomon  in  Jerusalem,  Jonah  in  Nineveh, 
Daniel  in  Babylon,  each  unrolled  the  scroll  which  contained  secret 
things  from  the  foundation  of  the  world.  By  its  prophets,  true  and 
false  ;  by  its  kings,  loyal  and  disloyal ;  by  its  phalanx  of  teachers  in 
the  motherhood  and  fatherhood  of  Israel,  religion  sent  out,  as  from 
a  sun,  myriad  rays  of  light,  giving  the  world  in  a  regular  order  of 
development,  monotheism,  sacrificial  worship,  temples,  a  priesthood, 
songs,  incarnation,  resurrection,  immortality,  and  judgment;  and 
these  not  as  experimental  or  speculative  ideas,  but  as  primary,  funda- 
mental, essential  facts,  teachings  and  certainties. 

Treating  of  the  progressive  method  of  Revelation,  Newman  Smyth 
aflSrms  that  "  the  general  formative  truths  of  the  Old  Testament 
were  progressive  forces  in  early  history,"  and  that  they  were  adapted 
to  the  moral  education  of  the  race.  With  this  thought  as  a  starting- 
point  he  specifically  discloses  the  "pedagogical  intent"  of  the  Judaic 
system  and  shows  a  "  plain  progress  of  doctrine  in  the  Bible  from 
without  inward,  from  external  restraints  to  inward  principles,  from 
law  to  love."  Waiving  the  educational  purpose  of  the  Judaic  admin- 
istration, it  is  patent  to  all  who  examine  it  that  it  is  a  gradually  de- 
veloping system   of  truth,  glorious  in   its   advancement,   and   more 


562  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

glorious  in  its  culmination  in  the  new  administration  of  the  Spirit. 
Dr.  Smyth  sees  the  educational  purpose  in  the  law  of  sacrifices,  and 
the  law  of  the  Sabbath,  while  also  he  as  readily  discovers  a  develop- 
ment of  the  monotheistic  conception,  the  hope  of  immortality,  and 
the  idea  of  atonement.  In  his  view  the  development  of  revelation  is 
a  development  within  limitations ;  not  all  of  truth  has  been  revealed ; 
not  too  much  or  too  little,  but  enough  for  pedagogical  and  proba- 
tionary purposes. 

Agreeing  that  Revelation  is  circumscribed  by  limitation,  it  must 
be  remembered  that  mankind  in  their  discoveries,  researches,  and  in- 
terpretations, have  not  reached  the  limits.  Much  of  Revelation  is 
still  unknown  ;  it  is  an  undiscovered  and  an  undeveloped  region.  As 
there  is  a  development  within  limitations,  so  should  there  be  a  develop- 
ment as  far  as  limitation.  But  even  the  limits  are  unknown.  While 
religious  truth  grows  larger  under  development,  and  requires  two  dis- 
pensations to  exhibit  it  fully,  Christianity  must  not  be  regarded  as  a 
mere  development.  The  development  of  truth  is  the  process  of  its 
unfolding ;  truth  itself  is  more  than  the  process,  it  is  not  in  its  nature 
a  development.  It  is  a  revelation,  and  development  is  a  method  of  rev- 
elation. It  is  a  supernatural  thing  unfolding  by  a  particular  method, 
which  must  ever  be  distinguished  from  the  thing  itself 

As  Christianity  appears  in  the  Bible  in  larger  forms  or  newer 
types  as  it  is  developed,  so  in  its  historical  growth  it  has  passed 
through  a  variety  of  forms,  the  more  prominent  of  which  are  Gnos- 
ticism, Mysticism,  Roman  Catholicism,  Oriental  Sectarianism,  and 
Protestantism,  each  a  progressive  type,  each  just  what  might  be  ex- 
pected of  a  religion  in  process  of  unfolding.  Biblically,  Christianity 
developed  from  obscurity  toward  transparency,  or  from  a  few  to  many 
truths  ;  historically,  it  has  been  affected  by  its  environment,  absorb- 
ing errors,  and  suffering  therefrom,  so  that  its  development,  as 
spiritual  truth,  has  been  impeded  by  the  compromising  presence  of 
false  interpretations  and  interpolated  doctrines.  In  this  error-impress- 
ing form  or  Christianity  obscured  by  theological  interpretations,  it 
stands  out  before  the  world  at  the  present  time,  misunderstood  from 
necessity,  and  sometimes  rejected  because  it  seems  irreconcilable  with 
itself.  The  next  advance  must  be  a  development  from  error  toward 
truth,  its  independence  from  the  creed-maker,  and  an  exact  por- 
traiture of  its  legitimate  character.  Just  as  truth  is  developed  in  the 
Scriptures,  so  must  it  be  developed  in  history  and  in  practical  life. 

Has  religion  lost  its  progressive  character?  Has  it  reached  its 
growth  ?  Has  its  development  been  arrested,  and  are  we  shut  up  to 
the  familiar  forms  of  truth,  the  tabulated  series  of  doctrines,  and  to 
a  revelation  marked  by  distinct  limitations  clearly  pointed  out  by  tlie 


THE  NEW  IN  THE  OLD.  563 

theologians?  Or  will  development  go  on  as  long  as  man  develops? 
Will  it  progress  as  he  progresses?  To  suppose  otherwise  implies  a 
misunderstanding  both  of  man  and  religion,  for  both  as  they  appear 
to  us  are  undeveloped,  a  long  future  being  required  to  fully  mature 
the  one  and  unfold  the  other. 

In  what  respect  will  religion  appear  new?  However  ancient  in 
form,  it  will  always  exhibit  new  phases  in  the  developments  of  Chris- 
tianity, producing  advanced  conditions  of  society,  satisfying  the  most 
complex  aspiration  for  truth,  and  even  ministering  to  that  devout 
curiosity  which  sometimes  casts  its  innocent  spell  over  believing  and 
inquiring  souls.  Down  m  the  old  is  the  quiet,  sleeping  spirit  of  the  new. 
It  is  a  palpable  error  into  which  many  fall,  that  the  old  truths  of  re- 
ligion are  fully  understood,  and  that  their  power  has  been  fully  tested, 
and  that  a  definite  conclusion  as  to  their  value  may  be  pronounced. 
The  conceited  advocate  sometimes  deludes  himself  with  the  belief  that 
because  he  is  familiar  with  certain  truths,  or  rather  with  the  manner 
in  which  they  are  uttered,  he  is  also  familiar  with  their  nature,  he 
knows  their  origin,  and  is  capable  of  answering  any  question  respect- 
ing them,  when  a  little  examination  would  convince  him  that  he 
really  knows  nothing  about  them.  The  sage  of  Athens  inhaled  the 
atmosphere,  but  knew  nothing  of  oxygen — not  any  more,  at  least, 
than  the  insect  that  floated  over  the  Acropolis.  The  Norwegian 
slaked  his  thirst  with  water,  and  dipped  his  oar  in  the  cold  stream, 
but  was  ignorant  of  the  latent  force  of  steam.  In  the  days  of  Queen 
Elizabeth  lightning  flashed  in  every  storm,  as  it  did  in  the  later  day 
of  Morse,  but  what  did  she  know  of  the  power  of  electricity?  Who 
knew  that  sunlight  would  stamp  the  picture  of  a  face  upon  glass,  or 
a  metallic  plate,  until  Daguerre  said  so?  How  long  were  mankind 
familiar  with  water,  light,  air,  gravitation,  cystallization,  chemical 
afiinity,  polarization,  yet  knew  nothing  about  them,  were  ignorant  of 
the  forces  and  possibilities  in  them  !  How  much  of  nature  still  re- 
mains i7icognito!  Who  declaims  on  the  uses  of  the  thistle,  or  the 
beauty  of  the  dandelion,  or  the  virtue  of  dogberry  ?  Yet  there  lurks 
in  every  poison  a  medicine,  in  every  fruit  a  food,  in  the  most  worth- 
less member  of  the  vegetable  kingdom  a  specific  use,  and  all  nature 
is  but  a  store-house  of  beauties,  uses,  virtues,  and  forces  that  must 
have  final  recognition,  application,  and  relation  to  civilization. 

May  it  not  be  so  with  respect  to  higher  things?  May  it  not  be 
that,  as  new  powers  and  new  laws  were  found  in,  or  in  association 
with,  the  old  forms  of  matter  with  which  men  were  long  familiar,  so 
in  the  oldest  forms  of  religion,  especially  in  Christianity,  may  be 
found  new  truths,  new  moral  distinctions,  new  ethical  forces,  and  new 
spiritual  possibilities,  not  suspected  even  by  those  who  live  within  the 


564  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

shadow  of  altars,  and  are  acquainted  with  the  historic  forms  of  re- 
ligion ?  That  the  new  is  in  the  old  we  are  fully  persuaded,  and  that 
Christianity,  as  taught  and  understood  and  applied,  is  still  a  folded 
germ,  ready  to  sprout  and  grow  under  congenial  conditions  into  some- 
thing different  from  what  it  is,  we  must  believe.  Is  any  one  ready 
to  assert  that  the  great  problems  of  inspiration,  prophecy,  miracle, 
regeneration,  spiritual  dynamics,  incarnation,  Providence,  and  immor- 
tality, have  received  adequate  treatment  at  the  hands  of  the  Christian 
teacher,  or  are  competently  explained,  or  have  been  exhibited  in  their 
true  character  and  in  all  their  relations  ?  So  long  as  Paul's  cloak  (II 
Timothy,  iv,  13)  is  considered  inconsistent  with  inspiration  ;  so  long 
as  Jonah's  prophecy  concerning  the  downfall  of  Nineveh  is  quoted 
against  the  infallibility  of  prophecy ;  so  long  as  Pentecostal  influence 
is  interpreted  as  moral  enthusiasm  generated  by  a  moral  purpose  in 
human  hearts ;  so  long  as  miracle  is  reduced  to  legerdemain ;  so  long 
as  immortality  is  poetized  as  a  dream,  or  a  doubt,  or  a  perhaps,  or  a 
possibility,  there  will  be  need  of  re-investigation,  yea,  deeper  investi- 
gation, of  the  commonest  bulwarks  of  our  holy  religion. 

A  great  question  like  that  of  the  government  of  the  world,  or  all 
that  is  involved  in  providence;  a  great  duty  like  that  of  prayer,  or 
all  that  is  involved  in  fellowship  with  God ;  a  great  doctrine  like  that 
of  regeneration,  or  all  that  is  involved  in  relationship  to  God ;  a  great 
fact  like  depravity,  or  heredity,  or  all  that  is  involved  in  the  lapses 
of  human  history  ;  and  a  great  hope  like  that  of  atonement,  resurrec- 
tion, and  immortality,  or  all  that  is  involved  in  human  destiny,  can 
not  be  wrapped  in  superstition,  or  given  out  in  fragmentary  form,  or 
settled  by  incomplete  statement,  or  passed  over  with  apologetic  silence. 
"More  light"  is  reason's  cry;  "more  light"  is  the  heart's  agony. 
The  solution  of  these  questions  is  in  the  truth  given ;  the  light  is  in 
the  darkness ;  the  new  is  in  the  old. 

In  these  oldest  questions  the  newest  discoveries  must  yet  be  made. 
We  say  nothing  of  schools  of  theology,  with  their  conflicting  inter- 
pretations ;  nothing  of  private  and  speculative  beliefs  in  outside 
circles ;  nothing  of  skepticism  touching  religion  in  general ;  but,  so 
long  as  religion  itself  as  a  system  of  truth  is  a  complex  inconsistency, 
or  an  architectural  absurdity,  or  its  disciples  are  ignorant  of  the  na- 
ture of  the  truths  that  enter  into  its  composition,  there  will  be  the 
necessity  for  repeated  exploration,  adoption  of  new  definitions,  and 
ventures  on  higher  achievements. 

It  is  significant  that  the  Bible  is  composed  of  an  Old  Testament, 
embracing  the  old  laws,  old  forms  of  worship,  the  old  spirit,  and  a 
New  Testament,  breathing  a  new  spirit  into  the  world,  presenting  a 
new  character,  a  new  model,  a  new  worship,  and  a  new  life  to  men. 


THE  CENTRAL  FIGURE  UNINTERPRETED.  565 

It  is  the  pledge  of  the  new  in  Christianity,  or,  rather,  that  Chris- 
tianity is  the  new  in  religion,  and  will  forever  remain  so.  Of  all 
that  is  obscure  in  religion,  taxing  human  wisdom  beyond  its  ability 
to  interpret  correctly,  is  the  great  Personage  who  is  its  inspiration, 
and  who  is  the  center  of  Christianity — Jesus  Christ.  Understand  him, 
and  miracle,  spiritual  energy,  and  immortal  existence,  have  an  easy 
explanation.  Christianity  is  illuminated  in  the  person  of  its  Founder, 
and  is  obscure  only  as  he  is  enigmatical.  Who  fully  comprehends 
him?  Have  not  all  read  of  his  incarnate  birth,  his  benevolent 
deeds,  his  marvelous  life,  his  elevation  upon  the  cross,  and  his  resur- 
rection from  the  dead.^  Yet  the  realities  of  his  history  rise  like 
mountains  that  have  never  been  scaled;  his  words  are  more  than 
Austerlitz  battles  that  shake  errors  to  their  foundations ;  his  deeds 
more  than  the  thunderbolts  of  a  brigade  of  gods,  yet  few  there 
be  who  comprehend  their  import.  Who  has  grasped  all  there  is  of 
that  character  ?  Who  has  found  the  key  to  the  supernatural  in  him  ? 
Who  has  touched  the  umbilical  cord  that  connects  the  human  with 
the  divine  and  makes  him  what  he  is?  The  tremendous  fact  is  that 
Jesus  Christ  is  yet  the  newest  character  of  history,  possessed  of  ele- 
ments never  yet  analyzed,  exerting  a  power  never  yet  comprehended, 
planning  a  purpose  appalling  to  genius,  and  accomplishing  an  end 
that,  when  understood,  will  link  his  fame  to  the  stars.  After  eighteen 
centuries  of  study,  comparison,  and  inquiry,  mankind  see  in  him  a 
grandeur  that  words  can  not  express,  and  a  loftiness  that  human 
■wisdom  can  not  measure.  The  great  central  figure  of  Christianity  is 
still  an  uninterpreted  or  a  misinterpreted  character,  obscure  because 
sublime,  distant  from  the  human  sphere  because  divine. 

Now,  it  must  not  be  assumed  that  religious  problems,  from  their 
very  nature,  must  remain  unsolved,  and  that  Christ,  from  his  nature, 
must  be  out  of  human  reach — this  is  an  indirect  apology  for  our  ig- 
norance. A  reverent  spirit  must  acknowledge  the  limitations  of  finite 
knowledge,  but  these  limitations  may  be  artificial,  the  result  of 
moral  infirmity,  to  be  removed  so  soon  as  man's  disability  is  over- 
come. Christianity  is  more  than  a  moral  influence;  it  is  an 
intellectual  force.  In  it  is  the  secret  of  holiness,  and  the  key  to 
knowledge,  and  under  its  inspiration  all  mysteries  should  dissolve,  all 
questions  should  be  answered,  all  doubts  be  overthrown,  and  mankind 
know  the  truth  as  it  is  revealed  in  Christ.  Christianity  is  divine 
wisdom ;  and,  studied,  comprehended,  known,  all  problems  will 
have  an  adequate  solution.  Hence,  in  the  old  of  Christianity  is  the 
new  of  religion — new  solutions,  new  principles,  new  powers,  new 
certainties. 

Christianity  is  the  representative  term  of  the  occult  in  the  spiritual 


566  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

sphere,  the  sign-word  of  nujsteries  of  a  very  high  and  complex  order.  Among 
the  Greeks  the  Eleusiniau  mysteries,  half  religious  and  half  philosoph- 
ical, involved  more  properly  the  processes  of  vegetation,  and  the  deifi- 
cation of  nature's  powers  and  methods.  The  Greek  disciple  confined 
his  study  to  the  material.  The  disciple  of  Christianity  has  a  wider 
field,  and  begins  at  a  higher  altitude.  Indeed,  the  material  is  not  at 
all  to  be  explained  by  the  material.  Nature  will  not  explain  itself,  and 
a  deification  of  nature's  energies  removes  the  problem  to  the  back- 
ground without  throwing  any  light  upon  it.  Mysteries  abound  both 
in  nature  and  in  that  which  is  above  nature,  and  a  religion,  sinking 
its  roots  deep  in  the  one  or  the  other,  or  in  both,  as  Christianity  does, 
will  necessarily  present  a  mysterious  side  to  the  world.  Mystery  is 
the  scientific  side  of  nature  ;  much  more  the  philosophical  side  of  re- 
ligion. Eobert  Hall  has  said  that  "a  revelation  without  mystery  is  a 
temple  without  a  god."  The  sky  has  its  milky  way;  Christianity, 
its  constellations  of  surpassing  beauty.  If  it  is  the  province  of 
religion  to  deal  with  fundamental  or  primary  truths,  then  must  it 
deal  with  things  hard  to  be  understood,  and  even  revelation  itself 
may  need  interpretation  or  a  hyper-revelation.  But  a  religion  that 
would  reject  the  supernatural  and  confine  itself  to  the  natural  would 
not  be  a  religion  at  all ;  it  might  be  philosophy,  but  nothing  more. 
The  essence  of  a  comprehending  religion  is  the  supernatural,  as  the 
essence  of  philosophy  is  th^  natural.  From  the  one  to  the  other  is  the 
distance  from  the  tangible  to  the  intangible,  from  the  seen  to  the 
unseen.  By  virtue  of  its  remoteness,  its  intangibility,  its  eternal  per- 
spective, the  supernatural  is  a  cloud-land,  mapped  off"  only  in  outline, 
with  the  great  landscapes  of  truth  intervening,  unexplored,  undefined, 
and  unknown  ;  and  the  more  of  the  supernatural  in  religion,  the 
larger  its  mysteries  and  the  more  numerous  its  problems. 

Now,  it  is  in  keeping  with  fact  to  assert  that  Christianity  is  the 
only  religion  that  has  joined  itself  completely  to  the  supernatural ; 
or,  being  still  more  exact,  that  out  of  the  supernatural  has  issued  but 
one  religion,  namely,  Christianity.  It  has  attempted  a  materializa- 
tion of  itself  in  the  religion  of  the  New  Testament,  through  the  great 
Teacher,  and  in  the  many-voiced  truths  of  the  entire  volume.  As  a 
consequence  Christianity  partakes  of  the  mystery  of  the  supernatural, 
and  is  an  open  field  for  the  discovery  of  new  forms  of  truth.  Possi- 
bly, within  the  circle  of  the  supernatural,  there  are  truths  concerning 
which  the  human  mind  must  forever  remain  in  ignorance,  or  know 
them  imperfectly  at  best ;  and  yet  of  this  we  are  not  quite  certain. 
At  all  events  the  supernatural  is  as  legitimate  a  field  for  inquiry  and 
exploration  as  the  psychological,  biological,  chemical,  and  physiolog- 
ical, and   must  yield  some   of  its  contents  as  it  is  invaded  and  in- 


THE  PARABLE  OF  THE  SUPERNATURAL.  567 

spected.  If  there  is  a  supernatural  at  all,  it  can  not  be  fenced  from 
observation  or  buried  out  of  sight.  Especially  may  the  minor  mys- 
teries, the  superficial  truths  of  Christianity,  be  explored  throughout 
their  borders,  and  be  relieved  of  any  superstitious  complexion  piety 
may  have  given  them.  The  Master  was  continually  teaching  truths 
in  parables,  astonishing  the  Jews,  and  purposely  throwing  over  them 
the  veil  of  obscurity,  yet  to  the  disciples  they  were  made  transparent ; 
and  when  asked  why  he  spoke  in  parables  the  Master  replied,  "Unto 
you  it  is  given  to  know  the  mystery  of  the  kingdom  of  God,"  but  not 
"  unto  them  that  are  without,"  implying  that  the  key  to  knowledge 
is  discipleship.  Christianity  is  the  parable  of  the  supernatural,  to  be  in- 
terpreted by  and  through  the  experience  of  discipleship,  and  to  be  revealed 
in  proportion  to  the  spiritual  capacity  of  the  recipient.  Intimacy 
with  the  supernatural,  acquaintance  with  the  profound  truths  of  God, 
is  a  part  of  the  programme  by  which  spiritual  mysteries  may  be  resolved 
into  realities.  We  do  not,  therefore,  concede  the  necessary  obscurity  of 
the  spiritual,  for,  as  Audubon  drew  birds  to  his  hand,  so  the  spiritual 
mind  will  draw  the  supei'natural,to  itself,  extract  its  meaning,  measure 
its  power,  compass  its  relations  to  time  and  space,  and  discern  the 
eternity  of  things  supernatural. 

Spiritual  knowledge,  or  an  advance  into  the  supernatural,  is  as 
possible  as  it  is  imperative  ;  an  opening  in  the  clouds  and  a  discern- 
ment of  what  is  beyond,  or  an  upheaval  of  truth,  freed  from  gross- 
ness,  and  transparent  as  light,  may  be  expected,  as  the  ages  come 
and  go.  Is  the  soul  forever  to  remain  a  mystery  ?  Is  the  ego,  self- 
. conscious,  to  be  self-ignorant?  The  inside  must  be  as  visible  as  the 
outside,  spirit  must  be  comprehended  as  well  as  matter,  as  the  condi- 
tion of  comprehending  the  significance  of  the  divine  utterances  respect- 
ing immortality  and  the  future  life.  Science  is  the  material  phase 
of  world-life;  religion  is  the  spiritual  phase.  Shall  one  reveal  its 
secrets  and  the  other  withhold  them  ?  Shall  physiology  be  triumph- 
ant, and  psychology  confess  defeat  ?  Soul-life  must  reveal  itself,  or 
be  revealed  by  religion. 

Atoning  influence  is  a  theological  mystery,  which  must  succumb 
to  the  reverent  inquiry  of  souls,  steeped  in  love  divine  ;  and,  as  its 
power  is  understood,  so  will  it  be  coveted  and  appropriated.  It  is 
not  difiicult  to  show  that  the  idea  of  atonement  is  not  inconsistent 
with  nature,  or  with  the  universal  order  of  things,  for  nature  is  an 
atoning  system  ;  and  if  the  basis  of  nature  and  religion  is  atonement, 
it  may  be  preached  without  prejudice.  More  than  an  agreement, 
however,  between  the  truths  of  Christianity  and  the  facts  of  nature 
must  be  pointed  out ;  for  the  method  by  which  religious  truth  is  ap- 
plied to  men  is  not  always  paralleled  by  the  course  of  nature.     The 


568  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

fact  of  atonement  has  its  vindication  in  nature  ;  the  application  of 
atonement  stands  unrepresented  in  nature.  Here  is  need  of  a  new 
revelation,  or  a  new  discovery. 

The  doctrine  of  the  resurrection,  comforting  as  it  is  understood, 
but  absurd  as  it  is  sometimes  taught,  needs  to  be  redeemed  from 
vagueness  and  crudeuess,  and  clothed  with  celestial  charms,  while  the 
hope  of  immortality  must  be  transformed  in  the  presence  of  faith  into 
a  certainty  of  the  future. 

The  greatest  mystery  of  religion  is  God.  Inaccessible,  invisible, 
yet  omnipresent  and  all-loving,  it  is  the  world's  anxiety  to  know 
more  about  him,  and,  according  to  the  Scriptures,  it  is  God's  anxiety 
to  be  fully  known.  This  double  anxiety  will  eventuate  in  new  rev- 
elations of  God,  the  shadows  of  the  Infinite  being  succeeded  by  the 
open  presence  of  the  Everlasting  Substance  in  the  world.  This  ad- 
ditional light,  however,  will  not  dawn  through  the  medium  of  a  new 
Bible,  but  by  the  illumination  of  existing  truth  through  human  re- 
search and  divine  agency,  or  the  mutual  approach  of  God  and  man 
in  the  devout  study  of  the  Word. 

With  progress  iu  these  directions,  all  other  subjects  will  receive 
elucidation ;  angelic  life  will  no  longer  be  dark  and  impenetrable  ; 
miraculous  force  will  be  seen  to  be  spiritual,  not  material ;  regenerat- 
ing force  will  be  recognized  as  superhuman,  not  natural;  inspiration 
will  appear  as  a  supernatural  influence  ;  providence  will  be  inter- 
preted as  the  personal  supervision  of  the  supernatural ;  prayer  will 
be  esteemed  a  supernatural  instrument,  and  man  wnll  make  the  nat- 
ural his  foot-stool  and  the  supernatural  his  dwelling-place. 

The  revelation  of  the  supernatural  through  intellectual  sympathy, 
and  by  contact  with  spiritual  sources  of  truth,  belongs  to  the  possibil- 
ities of  religion.  The  order  of  revelation  and  advancement  will  be 
gradual  and  rapid — rapid  enough  to  startle  the  world  out  of  its  leth- 
argy, and  graduated  according  to  the  receptivity  and  sympathy  of 
the  race. 

Progress  in  religion,  or  development  in  spiritual  knowledge,  may 
be  at  the  expense  of  old-time  beliefs,  and  involve  the  sacrifice  of  cer- 
tain creed-forms  of  truth  ;  but  the  eager,  truth-seeking  mind,  unfet- 
tered by  antiquity,  authority,  or  forms,  alone  will  find  the  new 
contents  of  Christianity.  The  investigator  must  not  be  a  bondman, 
except  to  truth  ali'eady  known.  For  him  aspiration  is  inspiration, 
and  let  him  fly  with  the  freedom  of  God. 

Conquest  in  the  highest  sphere  will  be  followed  by  achievement  in 
the  lower  ;  that  is,  the  supernatural,  not  only  vindicated,  but  also 
disclosed,  exposed,  and  explained,  the  natural  will  yield  up  its  con- 
tents, and  declare  mystery  to  be  a  fable  of  the  past.     The  realm  of 


THE  THREAD  OF  THESEUS.  569 

Greek  thought  was  the  material ;  even  the  gods,  according  to  the 
Greek,  were  natural  forces  deified.  To  his  mind  the  spiritual  is  in 
an  eternal  eclipse.  In  our  day  the  supernatural  is  the  chief  factor 
at  bottom  of  every  thing,  explanatory  of  all  existence,  the  secret  of 
all  force,  the  ultimatum  of  transcendentalism  no  less  than  Christianity. 
Deriving  all  things  by  a  true  Christian  philosophy  from  the  om- 
nipotence of  the  supernatural,  the  solution  of  the  mystery  of  the 
physical  universe,  not  yet  wrought  out,  must  soon  be  proposed. 
Wlaat  with  Moses,  and  the  nebular  hypothesis  and  evolution,  and  the 
spectroscope,  and  a  thousand  other  sources  of  knowledge  yet  to  be 
opened,  the  mystery  of  the  creative  art  will  be  disclosed,  and  the  fiat 
of  the  Almighty  will  have  its  sublime  vindication,  not  alone  in  the 
sincerity  of  a  cherished  faith,  but  in  the  results  of  scientific  and  re- 
ligious achievement.  How  far  Christianity  may  contribute  to  the 
discovery  of  the  secret  of  the  physical  universe  ;  whether  the  Biblical 
writers  furnish  any  clue  to  the  origin  of  things  or  their  final  des- 
tiny; whether  cosmical  systems,  physical  laws,  mathematical  facts, 
scientific  orders  are  foreshadowed  to  any  degree  Jn  Revelation ;  or 
whether  the  Book  is  exclusively  a  revelation  of  spiritual  truth,  car- 
rying along  in  its  stream  of  light  not  one  grain  of  physical  dust,  are' 
questions  that  have  been  discussed  by  all  schools  of  thinkers  with 
varying  opinions  and  conclusions.  The  one  opinion  that  the  Bible  is 
a  revelation  of  scientific  truth  is  as  untenable  an  extreme  as  the 
other,  that  it  is  entirely  barren  of  such  truth.  One  looks  in  vain 
for  zoology,  botany,  chemistry,  biology,  psychology,  physiology,  me- 
teorology, and  the  other  sciences  as  such  in  the  Book ;  for  that  mat- 
ter, it  is  a  question  if  certain  theologies  may  be  found  there ;  but  there 
are  scientific  intimations,  scattered  through  the  Book,  which  have  a 
certain  value,  and  possibly,  like  Theseus's  thread,  may  lead  the  savants 
out  of  Dsedalus's  labyrinth  of  difficulties  into  the  open  fields  of  knowl- 
edge and  safety.  Some  stress  must  be  placed  upon  these  scientific 
allusions,  as  little  things  have  been  the  preludes  to  great  discoveries. 
A  piece  of  glass  suggested  the  telescope  ;  a  falling  apple  pointed  to 
the  law  of  gravitation  ;  Franklin's  kite  taught  the  tamableness  of 
lightning ;  the  boiling  tea-kettle  was  the  forerunner  of  the  steamship 
and  locomotive.  A  partial  or  obscure  revelation  of  scientific  facts 
is  consistent  with  a  full  revelation  of  spiritual  truths ;  and  the  Bible 
is  made  up  after  this  fashion,  containing  scientific  hints,  not  even 
yet  fully  discerned,  and  revealing  great  spiritual  truths,  not  yet  ade- 
quately realized.  Is  the  earth  globular?  So  recent  science  has 
demonstrated,  but  Isaiah,  twenty -three  centuries  ago,  spoke  of  "  the 
circle  of  the  earth  " — a  scientific  hint  of  its  sphericity  that  science 
has  been  slow   to   recognize,   but   which  it  has  at  last  accepted  as 


670  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

prophetically  true.  Has  air  weight  ?  Torricelli  established  that  fact, 
but  loug  before  his  day  Job  annouuced  that  God  made  "the  weight 
for  the  winds" — another  scientific  hint  that  slept  for  ages,  waiting 
for  confirmation  by  discovery.  Of  the  ancient  theories  concerning 
the  earth  one  was  that  it  is  a  plain,  another  that  it  is  a  triangle, 
another  that  it  is  a  seven-storied  house,  another  that  it  rests  on 
the  back  of  a  tortoise ;  no  intelligible,  and  certainly  no  correct,  view 
of  its  place  in  the  planetary  system  being  taken.  But  Job,  quite  as 
astronomical  in  vision  as  Herschel  by  study,  proclaimed  that  God 
"hangeth  the  earth  upon  nothing,"  relieving  it  of  gross  relations,  and 
suggesting  the  reign  of  an  invisible  law  in  the  universe  of  worlds. 
What  shall  be  said  of  Moses,  whose  cosmogony,  chronology,  and 
scientific  oi'der  of  the  creative  processes  and  results  have  occasioned 
more  investigation  than  Darwinism  or  any  modern  scientific  propo- 
sition ?  Is  Moses  in  error  touching  any  point  ?  Archbishop 
Usher's  chronology,  long  acccepted  by  the  Church,  conveys  the  im- 
pression that  Moses  taught  that  the  earth  was  created  six  thousand 
years  ago ;  but  it  is  found  that,  according  to  Moses,  the  creation  of 
the  earth  occurred  "in  the  beginning,"  which  may  mean  millions  of 
years  ago  thus  harmonizing  with  the  most  radical  conjectures  of  geolo- 
gists. Does  geology  establish  the  order  of  creation  by  the  strata  of  the 
earth's  crust?  That  order  is  Mosaic  throughout.  Likewise  the 
astronomy  of  Moses,  in  its  intent  if  not  in  its  terms,  is  strictly  scien- 
tific, and  a  key  to  a  correct  astronomy  and  geology.  Time  demon- 
strates INIoses  to  the  letter.  This  is  all  the  more  striking,  since  the 
scientific  teaching  of  the  days  of  Moses  was  at  variance  with  all  mod- 
ern conclusions,  and  since  modern  science  itself  turns  out  to  be  lame 
only  where  it  is  contrary  to  Moses,  Job,  and  Isaiah.  Respecting 
the  destiny  of  the  globe  Peter  especially  declares  that  it  shall  sufier 
conflagration  and  be  reduced  to  a  cinder,  and,  corroborating  this 
possibility,  science  has  already  shown  that  the  earth  in  its  gases  and 
solids  is  one  vast  combustible  store-house,  ready  for  the  match  of  the 
world's  destroyer.  Surely  Christianity  has  something  to  ofier  to  the 
consideration  of  thinking  men  besides  spiritual  truths ;  it  is  a  scientific 
hint-booh,  a  key  to  science,  the  study  o*^  which  wiU  lead  to  scien- 
tific truth. 

This  obviates  the  objection  made  to  its  scientific  character,  that  a 
revelation  of  physical  facts,  laws,  and  systems,  will  prevent  research, 
that  man,  ever  prone  to  intellectual  inertia,  will  not  examine,,  in- 
quire, search  for  laws  and  orders  if  they  are  revealed  to  him,  for  the 
scientific  allusions  in  the  Bible  are  incomplete  revelations;  they  are 
hints  only,  keys,  fore-glimpses  requiring  searching  and  examining 
just  as  much  as  if  they  were  not  there. 


SCIENTIFIC  INFORMATION  OF  BIBLE  WRITERS.        ~)tl 

It  is  sometimes  alleged  that  the  scientific  language  of  the  Bible 
is  unscientific,  but  this  grows  out  of  the  fact  that  the  nomenclature 
of  Bible  times  was  not  scientific,  and  that  inspiration  employed  lan- 
guage that  could  be  understood  by  the  people  to  whom  it  was  ad- 
dressed ;  and,  further,  English  translators  have  been  as  careless  in 
their  work  as  the  Jews  were  incorrect  in  their  conceptions.  In  order 
to  eliminate  the  scientific  spirit  of  Christianity  from  Revelation— a 
task  undertaken  to  accommodate  the  querulous  spirit  of  material- 
ism—Dr.  J.  H.  Mcllvaine  insists  that  the  Hebrew  writers  were 
totally  uninformed  in  science,  and  that  the  Bible,  therefore,  is  unre- 
liable in  its  scientific  allusions  and  statements.  He  holds  that  the 
geocentric  system  of  the  physical  universe  is  fairly  maintained  in  the 
Bible;  that  the  sacred  writers  "conceived  of  the  earth  as  a  solid,  im- 
movable body,  with  a  plane  or  perhaps  a  slightly  convex  surface ;" 
that,  in  their  minds,  the  sky  was  likewise  a  "solid  substance;"  that 
also  above  the  firmament  or  solid  sky  there  was  a  great  body  of  water, 
from  which  rains  descended,  just  as  under  the  earth  there  are  waters 
from  which  issue  springs,  rivers,  and  wells ;  that  in  small  zoological 
matters  Moses  is  in  error,  as  when  he  speaks  of  the  coney  and  hare 
as  ruminants  when  they  are  rodents;  and  thus  he  lays  the  founda- 
tion for  a  suspicious  attack  on  the  scientific  elements  of  revealed  re- 
ligion. To  this  it  may  be  replied  that,  as  has  been  shown,  the 
scientific  allusions  to  the  air's  weight,  the  sphericity  of  the  earth,  and 
the  chronology  of  the  earth's  creation,  are  precisely  and  scientifically 
correct;  that,  while  the  Bible  writers  may  have  not  been  learned 
scientists,  and  spoke  in  an  uninspired  way,  just  as  the  people  would 
speak,  yet,  when  they  wrote  a  scientific  hint  by  inspiration,  it  was 
infallibly  reliable;  that  these  same  Bible  writers  must  not  be  loaded 
down  with  the  errors  of  translators ;  that  our  inferences  of  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  Bible  writers  may  not  be  sufliiciently  supported  by  the 
facts;  and  that  apologies  for  the  supposed  deficiencies  in  scientific 
knowledge  of  the  sacred  writers  not  only  discredit  the  scientific 
spirit  of  the  book,  but  the  entire  book,  for  it  at  once  compels  a  dis- 
crimination between  the  scientific  and  spiritual,  which  the  majority 
of  mankind  will  not  undertake  to  make.  The  overthrow  of  the  scien- 
tific  in  Christianity  opens  the  gate  to  the  invaders  of  the  spiritual  in 
Christianity. 

Superficial  reviewers  of  the  scientific  revelations  of  the  Bible  reach 
unfavorable  conclusions ;  but  a  close  student  of  the  same  will  be  sur- 
prised at  certain  underlying  facts  or  principles,  fundamental  to  the 
Bible,  and  distinguishing  it  from  all  other  pretended  religious  docu- 
ments and  revelations.  The  absence  of  mythological  conceptions,  and 
of  religious  and  scientific  myths,  prevalent  in  the  early  ages,  from 


572  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

the  Pentateuch,  is  a  remarkable  fact,  to  be  accounted  for  on  no  other 
ground  than  inspiration.  Why  no  gods,  no  myths,  no  centaurs,  no 
half-human  and  half-animal  creatures  in  Genesis?  The  earth  comes 
from  the  hand  of  a  Creator,  a  personal  Being,  not  from  gods;  and 
is  peopled,  not  with  gods,  or  half-human  creatures,  but  with  animals 
and  men.     The  science  of  Genesis  is  not  mythological. 

Again,  the  "  optical  accuracy"  of  the  Old  Testament  writers  is  an 
unmistakable  evidence  of  the  scientific  verity  of  the  Bible.  Newman 
Smyth  and  Prof.  Dawson  employ  this  fact  in  support  of  the  scientific 
virtue  of  Christianity,  insisting  that,  with  few  exceptions,  the  scien- 
tific references,  if  taken  literally,  have  been  or  will  be  confirmed  by 
modern  investigation.  The  first  chapter  of  Genesis  Dr.  Smyth  calls 
a  ' '  religious  and  scientific  primer,"  or,  as  we  term  it,  a  pedagogical 
manual  of  creation,  revealing  in  narrative  form  the  creative  process, 
or  world-building  by  development. 

Creation  was  not  an  instantaneous  act,  but  a  development,  even 
according  to  Moses.  The  theory  of  development  originated  with 
Moses,  from  whom  Darwin  borrowed  it.  Dr.  Smyth  assumes  that  the 
alphabet  of  science  is  in  revelation.     So  we  believe. 

If,  then,  Christianity  is  accepted  as  a  scientific  hint,  what  new  dis- 
coveries may  yet  be  made  in  the  regions  of  matter  under  the  pilot- 
age of  religion  !  The  faith  is  thrilling  that  religion  may  yet  be  the 
torch,  not  alone  through  the  spiritual  realm,  but  for  the  guidance  of 
the  explorers  throughout  the  visible  universe.  The  modern  spirit  is 
opposed  to  such  guidance ;  the  lines  between  religion  and  science  are 
being  carefully  drawn,  the  light  of  one  being  considered  useless  in 
the  other;  but  it  remains,  and  will  forever  remain,  that  true  science 
is  the  auxiliary  of  religion,  and  true  religion  is  the  auxiliary  of  science. 
The  cessation  of  conflict  between  them  is  not  in  their  separation,  as 
has  been  proclaimed,  but  in  their  unity ;  not  in  their  divorce,  but  in 
their  marriage.  If  truth  has  two  faces,  the  one  is  spiritual  and  the 
other  physical ;  they  do  not  contradict;  they  are  not  in  opposition; 
they  look  in  the  same  direction ;  they  may  boast  of  the  same  divine  line- 
age ;  they  are  one.  Like  parallel  lines,  they  run  along  side  by  side ; 
only  the  physical  must  end,  while  the  spiritual  must  go  on  forever. 

In  still  another  realm  the  new  in  Christianity  will  have  demon- 
stration. Its  profoundest  effect  will  be  on  exhibition  in  man,  and  to 
man  must  one  look  to  discover  its  possibility.  Christianity,  in  ex- 
panding forms  of  truth,  in  the  application  of  its  oldest  teachings  to 
social  conditions,  in  the  flood-tide  of  light  it  pours  upon  supernatural- 
ism,  and  in  its  graduated  disposition  of  physical  problems,  will  ever 
claim  attention;  but  its  greatest  work  will  be  on  man  himself 
Christianity  is  for  man,  his  enlightenment  in  duty,  his  understanding 


THE  SUMMUM  BONUM  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  573 

of  truth,  the  molding  of  his  character  into  a  divine  likeness,  the  de- 
velopment of  his  moral  possibilities  into  genuine  qualities,  the  reclama- 
tion of  the  waste  of  the  soul  by  the  fertilizing  processes  of  the  Holy- 
Spirit,  the  impartation  of  immortal  energy  to  his  awakened  powers, 
his  establishment  on  a  fixed-moral  basis,  and  the  security  of  his  future 
beyond  the  fear  of  loss  by  apostasy. 

All  truth  is  for  man,  to  make  him  what  he  ought  to  be,  what  he 
can  be,  to  make  him  a  new  man,  and,  therefore,  a  new  subject  for 
his  own  contemplation.  In  its  ordered  operations  religion  works  by 
different  methods,  producing  results  somewhat  uniform  in  appearance, 
but  with  marked  diversity  in  the  underlying  stratum  of  soul-life. 
To  all  the  same  Spirit  is  given,  but  there  are  manifold  operations 
productive  of  manifold  results,  bearing  a  common  likeness,  and  yet 
exhibiting  a  distinct  functional  end  or  object.  To  one,  Paul  says,  is 
given  the  word  of  wisdom  ;  to  another,  faith  ;  to  another,  the  working 
of  miracles ;  to  another,  prophecy ;  to  another,  discerning  of  spirits. 
It  is  the  self-same  Spirit  that  worketh  in  all,  but  the  products  are 
distinct,  and  original  in  certain  moral  peculiarities.  By  this  process 
Christianity  is  precipitating  upon  the  world  new  men  and  women, 
lifting  them  above  the  common  level  of  others,  endowing  them  with 
new  and  unanticipated  functions,  and  inspiriting  them  with  a  new 
and  divine  mission.  We  are  too  slow  in  perceiving  the  outcome  of 
the  religious  operation,  too  dull  in  inquiring  into  the  nature  of  the 
regenerating  accomplishment,  and  permit  the  Christian  to  pass  before 
us  almost  unnoticed  Avhen  he  carries  in  his  soul  the  new  design  of 
the  Master's  workmanship,  eveu  the  ideal  of  God  respecting  man. 
We  pause  over  the  conversion  of  Paul,  so  dramatic  in  its  scenes ;  we 
read  with  vivid  interest  the  life-work  of  George  Miiller,  or  Madame 
Guyon,  or  Fletcher,  or  Zwingli,  the  principal  feature  of  which  is  the 
divine  halo  that  encircles  it ;  but  forget  that  in  the  converted  miner, 
or  in  the  evangelized  Creole,  or  in  the  reorganized  neighbor,  there  has 
been  felt  the  moral  power  of  the  universe,  and  that  whoever  is  con- 
verted is  a  "new  creature."  By  the  mouth  of  Ezekiel  the  Lord 
promised  to  "put  a  new  spirit  within"  man;  and,  according  to  Paul, 
such  a  man  is  new ;  new,  in  the  sense  that  he  is  different  from  his 
former  self,  and  new  in  that  he  is  different  from  others.  Not  new 
truths  alone  then,  not  new  forms  of  religion,  not  new  developments 
of  supernaturalism,  not  new  explanations  of  physical  facts,  will  alone 
issue  from  and  through  Christianity ;  but  7iew  men,  in  whom  religion 
will  have  its  brightest  displays,  and  exhibit  the  extreme  of  its  power. 
The  fact  of  creation  is  in  matter ;  the  doctrine  of  providence  is  in 
events;  the  summuvi  honum  of  Christianity  is  in  man. 

If  Christianity  is  the  source  or  fund  of  things  new  as  well  as  old, 


574  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

it  is  evident  that  a  pursuit  of  the  new  is  legitimate ;  if  the  new  is 
necessary  to  the  completion  and  development  of  the  old,  it  is  clear 
that  a  knowledge  of  the  new  is  essential.  What  is  it  that  stimulates 
discovery,  exploration,  invention,  like  the  hope  of  finding  something 
hitherto  unknown  ?  Over  the  old  half-truths,  disordered  facts,  con- 
flicting principles,  ideas,  and  achievements,  the  sluggish  world  falls 
asleep,  and  is  only  aroused  by  necessity  or  inspiration.  Given  some 
new  field  of  research,  a  prospect  of  overthrowing  an  error,  or  estab- 
lishing the  truth,  a  hint  of  new  methods,  new  systems,  new  laws,  new 
forces,  a  supposition  that  more  lies  beyond  and  can  be  found,  and 
men  will  toil  and  sacrifice,  suffer  and  die,  in  their  searchings  and 
achievements.  A  new  asteroid  thrills  every  astronomer ;  a  new  flower 
charms  the  botanist ;  the  north  pole  draws  the  navigator ;  a  new  dis- 
covery in  physics  leads  to  multiplied  inventions;  and  a  new  law 
sometimes  changes  the  face  of  civilization.  If  in  all  departments  of 
life — physics,  science,  history,  social  movements — the  quickening  in- 
fluence of  the  new  is  felt,  and  operates  as  a  stimulating  motive,  what 
must  be  its  effect  in  the  higher  spheres  of  knowledge  and  research? 
Indeed,  should  we  not  expect  that  it  would  conduct  to  greater  ven- 
tures, and  inspire  to  the  greatest  possible  intellectual  stretches  in 
fields  practically  illimitable,  aud  where  the  results  are  so  intimately 
blended  with  man's  noblest  well-being  and  destiny?  In  this  view 
Christianity,  with  its  prophetic  new  truths,  is  the  religion  of  inspiration, 
not  alone  "given  by  inspiration,"  but  prompting  the  intellectual  en- 
ergies of  man  to  endeavors,  inquiries,  and  attainments  impossible 
without  it. 

Again,  the  observing  student  is  profoundly  impressed  with  the  in- 
coherent teachings  of  philosophy,  science,  and  external  religion,  con- 
cerning fundamental  religious  truths ;  in  other  words,  a  conflict  of 
ideas  is  raging  over  these  truths.  What  is  truth  ?  may  well  be  asked. 
The  antagonism  of  conflicting  systems  has  resulted  in  agnosticism,  as 
fatal  to  religion  as  skepticism  and  atheism  combined.  Disagreement 
concerning  truths  is  proof  that  all  of  truth  has  not  been  obtained, 
and  unity  is  impossible  except  as  new  truth,  or  the  remainder  of 
truth,  is  sought  and  found.  What  shall  reconcile  science  and  relig- 
ion? More  truth,  we  answer,  which  means  new  truth.  What  shall 
reconcile  philosophy  and  religion?  More  truth.  What  shall  recon- 
cile Christianity  and  Mohammedanism?  More  truth.  The  cure  for 
difference  is  truth — new  truth.  On  truths  as  now  known,  whether 
speculative  as  in  philosophy,  fragmentary  as  in  science,  superstitious 
as  in  religion,  unity  between  conflicting  systems  is  out  of  the  question. 
On  old  truths  conflict  is  as  inevitable  in  the  future  as  it  is  now.  On 
the  new  in  all  departments  of  knowledge,  as  a  basis  of  unity,  sciences, 


RELIGION  AN  UNDEVELOPED  GIANT.  575 

philosophies,  and  religions  will  approach  for  conference,  negotiation, 
and  the  establishment  of  friendly  relations.  It  can  not  be  otherwise. 
Old  truth  is  insufficient,  as  a  basis  of  unity,  because  of  its  incom- 
pleteness ;  new  truth,  embracing  all  there  is  to  be  known,  removing 
the  shadows  from  the  contents  of  revelation,  and  bringing  forward 
the  supernatural  in  right  relations  to  the  natural,  must  be  sufficient 
as  a  basis  of  unity  for  science,  philosophy,  and  religion.  Christianity 
is,  therefore,  the  bond  of  unity  among  the  irreconcilable  so-called 
truths  of  religion,  science,  and  philosophy. 

Another  fact  must  not  be  omitted  in  these  calculations.  Chris- 
tianity is  not  exerting  its  full  working  power ;  its  resources,  especially 
its  reserve  forces,  are  not  employed  in  redeeming  the  world.  It  is 
not  true  that  it  is  accomplishing  its  purpose,  with  its  mysteries  still 
mysterious,  with  the  world  ignorant  of  what  is  in  it,  with  its  greatest 
truths  slumbering  within  reach  of  man.  Religion  is  an  undeveloped 
giant,  and  is  working  with  the  disadvantages  of  infancy.  Perhaps, 
with  these  drawbacks,  it  will  finally  be  able  to  save  the  world,  but 
all  must  agree  that  under  the  present  methods  redemption  is  a  slow 
process,  and  the  highest  efficiency  of  Christianity  is  yet  to  be  demon- 
strated. Christianity  is  redemptive  in  its  aim,  redemptive  in  its 
work,  redemptive  in  its  spirit;  hut  an  unworked  Christiamty  will  not 
redeem  any  thing.  Its  past  is  a  history  of  redemption,  of  the  shak- 
ing of  the  nations  by  its  power,  as  in  the  time  of  Constantine,  and 
then  of  a  long  lapse  into  darkness  and  barbarism ;  of  revival  again 
and  reverses,  of  controversy,  antagonism,  uncertainty,  and  infidelity ; 
meanwhile  the  world  slowly  rising  because  of  its  undergirding  by  re- 
ligion. In  spite  of  fanaticism,  superstition,  and  great  misunderstand- 
ings ;  in  spite  of  theological  diflferences  and  false  interpretations  of 
doctrine,  Christianity  is  a  saving  power ;  it  is  the  instrument  of  re- 
demption, and  has  demonstrated  its  capacity  for  conquest.  The  in- 
ternal weights  removed,  the  differences  canceled  in  the  unity  of 
knowledge,  and  Christianity  apprehended  in  its  length,  depth,  and 
breadth,  all  the  sooner  will  its  world-wide  and  exceptional  task  be 
accomplished.  The  new  in  Christianity,  as  the  source  of  internal 
unity,  is  indispensable  to  the  largest  and  speediest  success. 

To  the  acquisition  of  the  new,  however,  there  are  obstacles  steadily 
persistent  in  their  assertion,  and  penalties  that  threaten  every  pursuer 
after  that  which  is  hidden  from  the  common  observation.  Forward 
movements  in  religious  thought  are  too  much  under  ban,  and  pro- 
hibition of  a  new  idea  Jias  been  carried  to  an  extreme.  The  new  in 
Christianity  will  not  be  the  product  of  another  revelation,  but  of 
illumination  of  the  revehtion  given.  The  new  is  at  hand ;  it  is  here  in 
Revelation,  to  be  sought  out  and  proclaimed  by  those  who  have  a 


576  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

genius  for  finding  things,  and  who  are  under  a  promised  inspiration 
in  search  of  truth ;  it  is  within  reach  of  the  mind  that  is  in  Christ. 
Through  the  faith  that  overcometh  all  things,  there  may  be  progress 
in  the  acquisition  of  spiritual  knowledge  such  as  has  not  been  antici- 
pated. Not  through  a  new  revelation,  therefore,  is  the  new  to  be 
had,  but  through  new  labors,  guided  by  the  divine  Spirit,  and  ex- 
pended on  the  rough  material  of  the  old. 

To  this  kind  of  effort  there  is  the  obstacle  of  an  innocent  sectarian- 
ism, which  forbids  a  change  of  base,  or  a  new  formula  of  belief,  in 
the  fear  that  the  whole  superstructure  will  fall  if  a  single  stone  be 
removed.  The  prejudice  that  attaches  to  one  form  of  truth  is  the 
root  of  a  vigorous  defense  of  it,  and,  so  far,  so  good  ;  but  it  is  in  the 
way  of  a  broad  vision,  and  militates  against  enlargement.  Education, 
ancestral  iuflueuce,  the  utterances  of  creeds,  and  the  strength  of 
Christian  organizations,  oppose  any  very  liberal  inquiry  in  new  direc- 
tions, as  unnecessary,  speculative,  and  injurious ;  and  earnest  souls 
step  cautiously,  and  walk,  like  the  gods,  with  feet  shod  with  wool. 
Excommunication  is  sometimes  the  result  of  too  much  boldness  in 
attempted  discovery.  Over  a  peccadillo  in  expression,  a  conflict  has 
ensued,  that  has  resulted  in  estrangement  of  advocate  and  opponent, 
and  almost  rent  the  respective  organizations  to  which  they  belonged. 
The  cry  of  heresy  has  sounded  in  the  ear  of  the  independent  investi- 
gator, fettering  his  movements,  padlocking  his  speech,  and  severing 
his  ecclesiastical  relations :  yet,  in  spite  of  derision,  he  has  modestly 
gone  on  in  his  work  for  the  truth.  Nor  can  it  be  said  that  Koman 
Catholicism  is  alone  guilty  in  this  respect ;  for  our  beloved  Protestant- 
ism has  its  spies,  hei'esy  hunters,  and  defenders  of  the  old  faiths,  inno- 
cent souls  who  mean  to  contend  for  the  truth  as  it  has  been  delivered 
to  them.  However  righteous  the  opposition  to  error,  and  justifiable 
the  proclamations  of  truth  in  the  narrowest  aspects,  it  is  apparent 
that  ignorance,  prejudice,  passion,  sectarianism,  and  superstition, 
rather  impede  than  assist  in  discovery  and  interpretation. 

Even  more  obstructive  than  these  is  that  spirit  of  contentment 
with  revealed  truth  as  a  mysterious  system  which  has  cast  its  spell  over 
Christendom,  disturbed  only  now  and  then  by  an  attempt  to  shake  it 
off.  The  many  seem  unaware  that  the  word  mystery  is  a  reproach ; 
and,  blindly  accepting  the  leadership  of  those  as  confirmed  in  the 
faith  as  themselves,  they  dream  of  no  increase  of  knowledge,  and  are 
ready  to  frown  upon  any  masculine  attempt  to  resist  the  reign  of 
mystery.  The  enchantment  of  ignorance  must  be  broken,  the  spell 
of  satisfaction  must  be  disturbed,  and  Christian  spirits  must  have 
the  right  of  way  into  obscurity,  darkness,  and  speculation,  that  they 
may  overshadow  it  with   light  and  victory.     As  David,  when  trans- 


TRADITIONS  AND  CERTAINTIES.  577 

porting  the  ark  of  God  from  Kirjath-jearim,  set  it  upon  a  new  cart, 
so  Christianity  may  ride .  on  new  wheels,  over  new  roads,  into  new 
regions,  causing  the  race  to  shout  over  its  new  revelations,  mid  rejoice 
in  its  brighter  achievements. 


CHAPTER  XXVII. 

qi^HE    ESCHATOLOGY    OK    CHRISTIANITY. 

WK  ALGER  says:  "The  Hereafter  is  the  image  flung  by  the 
,  Now.  Heaven  and  hell  are  the  upward  and  downward  echoes 
of  the  earth."  Rivaling  Elijah's  translation,  is  the  Greek  account 
of  the  destiny  of  Empedocles,  who,  "  after  a  sacred  festival,  was 
drawn  up  to  heaven  in  a  splendor  of  celestial  effulgence."  According 
to  the  New  Zealanders,  the  souls  of  nobles  are  immortal,  but  the 
Cookees  perish  utterly.  To  the  Indians  of  the  Orouoco,  the  Great 
Spirit,  on  his  departure  from  them,  said,  "Ye  shall  never  die,  but 
shall  shed  your  skins."  A  philosopher  once  reported:  "  Strange  that 
the  barrel-organ,  man,  should  terminate  every  tune  with  the  strain 
of  immortality  !"  Another  thinker  says,  "The  very  nerves  and  sinews 
of  religion  is  hope  of  immortality." 

That  there  is  a  future  life  for  man,  is  a  concession,  if  not  an 
affirmation,  of  all  mythologies,  superstitions,  and  religions.  Without 
inquiring  into  the  origin  of  the  universal  conviction,  it  is  important 
to  study  it  as  one  of  the  cherished  hopes  of  humanity — what  it  really 
means,  what  it  excludes  and  includes,  and  what  is  its  philosophic  and 
theologic  value.  The  range  of  the  problem  is  quite  as  extensive  as 
any  in  theology  or  philosophy,  and  quite  as  embarrassing  as  any,  if 
studied  only  philosophically,  historically,  or  even  religiously.  The 
whole  field  of  eschatology  is  cloudy,  distant,  and  unspeakably  mys- 
terious. Of  beliefs,  traditions,  concessions,  guesses,  hopes,  there  are 
an  abundance ;  of  facts,  experiences,  probabilities,  certainties, ,  the 
number  is  much  less.  Profound  is  our  embarrassment,  since  our  in- 
dividual interests,  as  well  as  those  of  the  race,  are  involved  in  it.  As 
to  the  creative  process,  as  to  the  essence  of  being,  as  to  the  nature 
of  matter,  as  to  the  destiny  of  matter,  we  may  waive  the  desire  for 
knowledge ;  for,  desirable  as  such  knowledge  may  be,  it  is  not  so  im- 
portant that  we  everlastingly  perish  without  it.  This  is  true  of  the 
majority  of  problems,  both  in  religion  and  philosophy.  Personal  in- 
terests are  not  at  stake  in  our  knowledge  of  chemical  affinity, 
or  gravitation,  or  the   ecliptic,  or  in  the  questions  why  Jupiter  is 

37 


578  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

attended  with  moons,  and  Saturn  is  enveloped  with  belts ;  but  they  are 
promoted  or  damaged,  as  the  eschatological  outlook  is  definite  or 
vague,  positive  or  ambiguous,  authoritative  or  conjectural.  The 
future !  the  future !  is  the  cry  of  every  earnest  spirit,  the  hope  of 
every  honest  mind.  To  be  or  not  to  be  hereafter,  is  of  more  value 
than  to  be  or  not  to  be  here ;  the  Hereafter  is  of  more  consequence  than 
the  Here. 

Faith,  anxious  with  desire,  and  pathetic  with  hope,  is  intoxicated 
with  delight  whenever  she  remembers  that  no  religion,  however  de- 
based or  ignorant,  has  ever  stared  vacantly  and  blindly  into  the  future. 
The  glazed  eyes  of  paganism  are  fixed  on  Elysian  glories.  The  per- 
turbed vision  of  false  religions  sees  open  doors  beyond  the  grave. 
The  howl  of  Tartarus  roars  in  the  ears  of  mythology,  and  the  melody 
of  Hades  awakens  joy  in  the  breast  of  Mohammedan  and  Hebrew. 
Defined  or  undefined,  all  religions  peer  beyond  the  gates  of  the 
eternal,  and  all  souls  shout  across  the  abyss  of  ages,  we  live.  But 
man's  acutest  instinct,  his  intensest  hope,  his  profoundest  desire,  in  a 
matter  of  so  great  moment,  is  an  insufl[icient  foundation ;  it  may  be 
confirmatory  of  faith,  but  the  origin  of  faith  must  not  be  grounded 
alone  in  hopes  and  desires.  Questioning  such  hopes,  Plato  affirms 
immortality;  but  Epicurus  rejects  it,  and  advances  j^lausible  proofs 
against  it.  Philosophy,  compelled  to  deal  with  the  psychological 
proof  alone,  has  reported  a  confused  mass  of  affirmative  and  negative 
accounts,  and,  being  unsettled  in  its  conclusions,  it  can  settle  nothing 
for  inquirer  or  traveler. 

In  this  dilemma,  driven  out  of  ourselves,  and  away  from  the 
oracles  of  philosophy,  and  looking  with  suspicion  on  the  data  used  by 
religions  in  general,  the  only  thing  to  do  is  to  turn  to  a  religion  that 
speaks  with  authority,  and  reveals  what  man  can  not  discover.  The 
true  and  final  source  of  information  is  revelation.  If  the  future  state 
can  not  be  rationally,  that  is,  scientifically,  demonstrated,  and  if 
Christianity  is  a  divine  religion,  it  belongs  to  it  to  make  known  the 
truth  touching  the  future,  with  all  the  clearness  and  authority  with 
which  it  proclaims  the  truths  pertaining  to  redemption.  If  eternity 
is  a  myth,  what  is  redemption  but  a  myth  also?  If  it  fail  on  so  vital 
a  subject  as  the  future,  suspicion  must  rest  upon  the  religion  in  every 
other  aspect  and  nindertaking.  If  it  is  a  revelation,  it  must  certify 
to  truths  in  which  men  have  a  vital,  personal  interest,  especially  if 
they  can  not  discover  them  themselves,  and  will  never  know  them 
unless  they  are  revealed.  In  this  study,  we  feel  perfectly  helpless  with- 
out outside  aid,  without  a  revelation.  Like  fishes  in  the  Mammoth 
Cave,  we  have  no  eyes  for  the  beyond.  The  light  must  shine  upon 
us,  or  we  shall  not  see  at  all.     Dependent  for  information  on  revela- 


FAITH  IN  THE  FUTURE  LIFE  AUTHORIZED.  579 

tion,  and  Christianity  proclaimiug-  itself  to  be  the  religion  of  revela- 
tion, the  heart  turns  to  it  with  a  quiet  joy,  anxious  to  accept  its 
teachings,  and  ready  to  embi'ace  the  truth,  if  it  is  made  known  therein. 
It  is  not  denied  that  the  great  doctrine  of  the  future  life  impreg- 
nates other  religions,  but  it  is  so  associated  with  legends  and  supersti- 
tious accounts,  and  the  rewards  and  retributions  foreshadowed  are  so 
rationally  improbable,  that  the  disclosures  can  not  be  accepted  as 
truths,  much  less  the  superstitions  accompanying  them.  The  Homeric 
theology  is  just  as  reliable  on  this  subject  as  Brahminism  and  Bud- 
dhism. The  old  Persian  faith,  and  even  the  dreary  Egyptian  doctrine, 
are  as  authentic  and  as  valuable  in  this  particular  as  the  teaching  of 
Confucius  and  the  dreams  of  Mohammed.  Verily,  the  leading 
thought  of  these  religions  loses  its  character  in  the  midst  of  the  errors 
that  encrust  it,  and  calls  piteously  for  help  from  a  religion  whose 
basis  is  inspiration,  and  Avhose  sole  content  is  truth.  The  vindication 
of  the  doctrine  of  the  future  life,  as  espoused  by  other  religions,  is 
contingent  on  the  verity  of  the  one  religion  now  under  consideration. 
If  immortality  is  not  a  revealed  truth,  then  it  can  not  be  a  philo- 
sophical, rational,  or  religious  trUth  ;  but,  if  revealed,  it  is  philosoph- 
ical, rational,  and  religious.  That  religion  that  authorizes  faith  in 
another  life  must  be  soconsistent  in  all  its  teachings,  and  so  primary 
m  its  truths,  that,  whileone  truth  may  be  tested  by  experience, 
another  demonstrated  by  observation,  another  established  by  philo- 
sophic processes,  another  vindicated  by  history,  others  may  be  taken 
as  revelations.  Such  truths,  multiplied  and  compatible,  Christianity 
contains,  and  submits  them  to  all  the  tests  required.  Its  experiential 
truths,  or  the  hidden  contents  of  the  religious  consciousness,  have 
been  analyzed  and  verified  in  multiplied  thousands  of  cases;  its  his- 
torical truths  are  open  to  the  inspection  of  sacred  and  profane  eyes, 
and  seek  the  light  to  show  their  transparency;  its  philosophic  truths, 
containing  the  mysteries  of  the  ages,  unfold  their  meaning  to  those 
en  rapiwH  with  truth  itself;  its  revealed  truths,  calm  in  conscious 
potentiality,  and  rich  with  divine  splendors,  are  only  the  consumma- 
tion of  the  philosophic,  historic,  and  experiential,  and  challenge  error 
to  immediate  conflict  for  sovereignty.  Christianity  turns  not  back 
when  it  gets  beyond  the  depths  of  the  human  mind.  It  reveals  when 
man  can  not  see  for  himself;  it  makes  known  when  he  can  not  dem- 
onstrate ;  it  speaks  when  he  must  be  silent.  A  valuable  religion, 
indeed,  is  that  which  travels  along  the  beaten  paths  of  philosophy, 
history,  and  experience,  and  weaves  its  story  out  of  the  fruitful 
materials  of  these  fields;  but  more  valuable  that  religion,  which,  over- 
leaping the  boundaries  of  time  and  sense,  and  rising  above  earth- 
thoughts,  can  pluck  fruit  from  the  trees  on  the  shores  of  that  other 


580  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

land,  too  distant  for  mortal  sight,  and  drop  it  into  our  hands  as 
readily  as  it  does  the  other.  Christianity  has  its  time-side,  its  philos- 
ophy, history,  and  experience,  and  its  eternal-side,  or  the  other  life. 
It  does  open  doors,  whose  hinges  human  hands  have  vainly  endeavored 
to  remove ;  it  does  fore-glimpse  the  eternal  world,  not  one  of  whose 
gates  stood  more  than  ajar  until  the  Son  of  God  commanded  them  to 
be  lifted  up.  With  Christianity  as  our  guide  into  the  future  realm, 
superstition  will  be  succeeded  by  knowledge,  a  beclouded  faith 
will  be  transformed  into  a  rational  affii-mation,  and  probability  will 
emerge  into  certainty. 

Let  it  be  primarily  observed  that  the  revelation  of  the  future  life  is 
authentic  and  to  be  accepted  without  dispute  ;  second,  it  is  free  from 
superstition,  such  as  haunts  the  old  religious,  and  may,  therefore,  be 
taken  in  its  fullness ;  third,  it  is  in  harmony  with  itself,  all  the 
truths  of  Christianity  mutually  agreeing,  and  addressing  the  reason  as 
a  whole  or  as  one  truth.  This  is  a  decisive  test  of  the  value  of  any 
truth,  and  of  the  value  of  any  system  of  truth — the  inter-harmony  of 
the  whole  or  the  proportion  of  its  parts. 

Conceding  authenticity,  sufficiency,  and  harmony  to  revelation,  the 
eschatology  of  Christianity  is  under  the  limitations  that  belong  to  the 
entire  system  and  to  all  parts  of  it ;  that  is,  as  revelation  in  its  whole- 
ness is  an  indistinct  presentation  of  truth,  so  its  teachings  concerning 
the  future  partake  of  the  general  limitation,  indistinctness,  and  char- 
acter of  the  whole.  Revelation  is  light;  it  is  darkness  also.  The 
revelation  of  spiritual  facts,  such  as  atonement,  regeneration,  the  bap- 
tism of  the  Holy  Ghost,  is  incomplete  and  question-awakening; 
results,  not  processes ;  facts,  not  explanations,  are  revealed.  Incarna- 
tion is  a  fact,  but  shrouded  in  mystery ;  miracle-power  is  on  exhibi- 
tion in  Christ,  but  explanation  of  it  is  not  given ;  divine  sovereignty 
and  human  freedom,  supposed  by  some  theologians  to  be  incompati- 
ble, are  taught  in  the  Scriptures  without  any  attempt  at  reconcilia- 
tion ;  how  Christ  can  be  divine  and  yet  the  subject  of  temptation 
are  facts  also,  but  mysteriously  perplexing  to  those  who  are  troubled 
with  the  difficulty.  In  like  manner  the  eschatology  of  the  Scriptures, 
authentic  and  sufficient,  is  the  region  of  light  and  darkness ;  the 
shadows  of  mystery  fall  upon  us  as  we  enter  it.*  It  is  only  a  partial 
revelation  of  facts,  conditions,  estate,  and  life.  The  limitations,  how- 
ever, have  respect  to  those  conditions  concerning  which  curiosity 
would  prompt  us  to  inquire,  but  a  knowledge  of  which  is  not  neces- 
sary to  our  inspiration  or  salvation.  Frequently,  the  contents  of 
revelation  are  overlooked  in  the  belief  that  the  truth  is  only  incom- 
pletely set  forth,  and  is  by  virtue  of  these  limitations  unreliable  and 
without  value ;  but,  instead  of  settling  into  a  suspicion  that  too  little 


A  TORNADO  OF  HETERODOX  BELIEFS.  581 

is  revealed,  one  will  find  as  he  goes  forward  in  his  searching  after 
truth  that  more  is  revealed  than  has  been  imagined,  careful  study 
being  required  to  bring  out  what  is  in  revelation.  If  the  statue  is 
in  the  block  of  marble,  so  is  the  truth  in  the  volume  of  inspiration. 
If  beauty  is  in  the  Apollo  Belvidere,  so  is  the  truth  in  revelation. 
The  duty  to  "search  the  Scriptures"  rests  upon  the  fact  that  they 
contain  the  words  of  this  life  and  of  that  which  is  to  come. 

In  accurately  determining  the  eschatological  truth  of  Christianity, 
as  distinguished  frox-n  similar  teachings  in  the  old  religious,  we  shall 
be  embarrassed  by  the  historic  interpretations  of  the  Church,  which 
are  the  inheritance  of  mankind,  but  which  interfere  at  least  slightly 
with  independent  investigation.  By  this  it  is  not  insinuated  that  such 
interpretations  are  erroneous,  and  that  the  Church  is  an  unsafe  guide 
in  these  things,  and  yet  Christian  faith  has  a  dogmatic  environment 
that  sometimes  has  been  permitted  to  overshadow  and  eclipse  the  faith 
itself.  Of  the  presence  and  power  of  dogmatism  we  should  certainly 
beware.  The  dictum  of  Roman  Catholicism  is  a  leaven  from  which 
the  honest  thinker  must  separate  himself.  But  dogmatism  is  not 
confined  to  a  corrupt  form  of  Christianity,  Protestantism  sharing 
the  tendency  if  not  exhibiting  the  very  spirit  it  condemns  in  such  re- 
ligions as  it  opposes.  In  Roman  Catholicism  the  seeker  runs  into 
purgatory ;  in  Protestantism  he  confronts  flesh  and  blood  resurrec- 
tions, intermediate  abodes  for  the  dead,  and  semi-physical  conditions 
in  the  future  state  that  are  quite  as  Quixotic  as  any  thing  he  finds  in 
mythology ;  in  corrupt  forms  of  Christianity  he  hears  of  soul-sleep- 
ing, annihilation,  the  Swedenborgian  idea  of  the  resurrection,  a  mixed 
or  a  progressive  heaven,  and  the  hope  of  a  final  abandonment  of  heU. 
Evidently,  the  Church,  including  the  heterodox  and  evangelical 
branches,  is  at  variance  with  itself  in  its  teachings  respecting  the  con- 
dition of  the  dead,  and  the  final  disposition  of  souls.  Nor  is  there 
any  seeming  prospect  of  reconciliation  of  conceptions  so  divergent,  or 
of  unity  of  view  touching  these  supreme  subjects  ;  on  the  contrary, 
the  antagonism  has  but  commenced,  a  tornado  of  heterodox  beliefs  is 
sweeping  the  world,  and  will  continue  its  destructive  work  until  old 
faiths  have  expired,  and  the  truth  of  the  Gospel  has  been  confirmed. 
The  spirit  of  inquiry  is  almost  wild,  but  in  its  very  recklessness  it  will 
go  fiir  toward  the  settlement  of  things,  which  means  the  extinction 
of  error,  and  the  afiirmation  of  truth.  We  are  called  upon,  therefore, 
to  separate' between  the  deliverances  of  Christianity  and  the  utter- 
ances of  creeds,  councils,  and  man-made  forms  or  expositions  of  truth, 
as  the  condition  of  rescuing  the  eschatology  of  Christianity  from  the 
superstitions  of  Christendom.  If,  however,  the  variant  conceptions 
of  Christendom    seem    rooted  in  the   Gospel,    or  may  be  traced  to 


582  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

Christianity,  is  it  certain  that  it  is  uniform  in  its  revelations  ?  Why 
this  piebald  product  if  the  Gospel  is  unmistakably  clear  in  its  teach- 
ings, if  it  is  a  revelation?  It  must  be  remembered  that  the  escha- 
tology  of  Christianity  is  not  on  the  surface,  but  in  the  depths ;  nor  is 
it  always  clothed  with  the  strait-jacket  of  literalism,  but  often  ap- 
pears in  the  beautiful  robes  of  allegorical  forms ;  and  seldom  is  it 
discoursed  or  discussed,  but  hinted,  hyperboled,  reflected,  and  im- 
bedded out  of  sight.  Hence,  the  need  of  searching.  Here,  then,  is 
our  guide,  or  rather  our  dictum;  not  the  Church,  but  Christianity; 
not  theories,  creeds,  but  the  profound  revelations  of  the  divine  Word. 

What  does  Christian  eschatology  include  ?  We  answer :  I.  The 
Immortality  of  the  Soul ;  II.  An  Intermediate  State ;  HI.  The  Resur- 
rection of  the  Dead ;  IV.  The  Second  Coming  of  Christ;  V.  The  Final 
Judgment ;  VI.  Heaven ;  VII.  Hell.  And  w'hatsoever  is  more  than 
these  may  be  regarded  as  non-essential,  or  as  explanatory  of  the  seven 
great  truths  involved  in  eschatology.  If  the  Scriptures  reveal  on  these 
seven  subjects  any  light  at  all,  it  ought  to  be  followed ;  if  the  light 
is  sufficient  for  the  purposes  of  religion,  there  ought  to  be  uniformity 
of  faith,  and  the  joy  that  comes  from  the  ascertainment  of  truth. 
To  the  consideration  of  these  momentous  subjects  we  at  once  address 
ourselves. 

The  foundation-truth  of  eschatology  is  the  immortality  of  the  soul. 
The  existence  of  another,  or  the  eternal  world,  so-called,  is  not  im- 
plicit wnth  the  idea  of  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  but  the  immortal- 
ity of  the  soul  presupposes  the  existence  of  an  immortal  world.  It 
is  not  enough  that  God's  eternity  be  demonstrated  or  revealed  ;  it  is 
not  enough  that  the  angels  are  immortal ;  it  must  be  shown  that  man 
is  immortal.  Will  he  live  after  he  is  dead  ?  Does  Julius  Caesar  still 
live?  Is  Nero  still  a  conscious  being?  Does  Paul  see,  talk,  remem- 
ber, know?  and  will  he  forever  live?  Is  Luther  only  a  memory  in  this 
world,  or  a  person  in  the  other  world?  Is  Charles  Sumner  an  intel- 
lectual giant  in  another  sphere?  To  such  questions  what  is  the  an- 
swer? Who  will  undertake  to  answer?  Assuming  that  Christianity 
heroically  reveals  the  answer,  is  it  sustained  by  outside  proof?  May 
the  doctrine  of  the  immortality  of  the  soul  refer  to  philosophy  for 
vindication?  If,  after  the  revelation  of  the  doctrine,  no  rational 
ground  for  faith  in  it  can  be  discovered,  and  it  must  be  accepted,  if 
at  all,  only  and  wholly  because  it  is  revealed,  faith  itself  may  stagger  at 
the  duty  required  of  it,  and  fall  beneath  the  burden  imposed  upon  it. 
If  reason,  or  the  philosophic  sen.se,  does  not  support  the  doctrine  after  \ 
it  has  been  declared,  then  it  is  in  jeopardy.  The  philosophic  sense  ) 
may  not  discover  the  truth,  but  it  may  confirm  the  revelation  of  it.  ' 
That  the  doctrine   is   rational  per  se;  that  its   philosophic  basis  is  as 


THE  PROBABILITY  OF  IMMORTALITY.  583 

impregnable  as  the  philosophic  basis  of  any  other  doctrine  requiring 
revelation  to  bring  it  from  darkness ;  that  its  philosophic  verity  is  un- 
impeachable, because  its  divine  verity  is  the  subject-matter  of  revela- 
tion, we  devoutly  believe  and  urge  others  to  believe.  The  philosophic 
grounds  for  faith  in  immortality  may  now  be  stated. 

The  intrinsic  difference  between  soul  and  body  constitutes  a  con- 
firmatory proof  of  the  Christian  doctrine  of  the  immortality  of  the 
one  and  the  mortality  of  the  other.  The  difference  is  not  superficial, 
as  it  is  the  difference  of  essence,  whereby  one  can  not  be  immortal, 
but  the  other  may  be.  No  one  thinks  of  attributing  immortality  to 
the  body  ;  many  do  think  of  attributing  it  to  thft  soul  and  are  unem- 
barrassed in  so  doing  by  any  rational  objection.  Only  a  confused 
philosophy  will  confound  matter  and  spirit.  Unfortunately,  the  at- 
tempt to  blot  out  the  differentia  of  soul  and  body,  or  to  identify  the 
two  substances,  has  recently  been  made  by  Bain  in  England  and 
Hiickel  in  Germany,  but  the  attempt  has  been  unsuccessful.  With- 
out elaborating  the  differences  between  matter  and  spirit,  but  only  re- 
minding the  reader  of  them,  it  is  certain  that  one  is  justified  in 
believing  in  the  antecedent  probability  of  immortality.  It  is  not  im- 
proper to  frame  probabilities  from  facts,  or  to  invent  inferences  when 
they  are  in  harmony  with  revelations.  Immortality  is  not,  however, 
an  invented  inference^  but  occupies  on  philosophic  grounds  the  rank 
of  a  probability,  and  on  Christian  grounds  the  high  position  of  a  cer- 
tainty. We  re-affirm  that  no  one  espouses  immortality  for  the  body. 
Its  final  resolution  into  the  common  mold  is  apparent  from  its  consti- 
tution; but  it  is  philosophically  absurd  to  predicate  mortality  of  the 
soul  upon  the  same  ground  as  it  is  predicated  of  the  body.  If  the 
soul  is  wanting  in  immortality,  it  lacks  it  for  a  reason  that  the  body 
does  not  lack  it.  In  other  words,  in  our  predicating  we  must  have 
two  bases ;  in  our  reasonings  and  conclusions  we  must  have  two  sets 
of  premises.  This  grows  out  of  the  essential  difference  of  the  two 
entities  with  which  we  are  dealing ;  and,  while  this  does  not  establish 
immortality  for  the  soul,  it  wevents  the_affirmatin2i.  of  its  mortality. _ 
To  predicate  mortality  of  two  unlike  entities,  one  must  find  two  un- 
like conditions  of  mortality,  which  has  not  yet  been  done ;  and  the 
improbability  of  finding  the  other  or  unknown  condition  of  mortality 
becomes  greater  as  the  difference  between  the  two  entities  becomes 
more  apparent  and  irreconcilable.  So  far  forth  as  mortality  is  a  con- 
dition of  the  body,  it  is  not  a  condition  of  the  soul.  In  proportion 
as  they  approach  a  common  likeness,  or  may  be  referred  to  a  common 
origin,  the  probability  of  the  immortality  of  one  diminishes;  but  in 
proportion  as  they  are  unlike  in  constituent  elements  and  diflTerent  in 
origin,   the   probability  of  immortality  increases.     It  is  at  this  point 


584  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY, 

that  Christianity  adds  immensely  to  the  presumption  of  the  soul's  im- 
mortality, on  the  ground  of  its  difference  from  the  body,  pointedly 
affirming  that  the  soul  is  the  breath  of  the  divine  life,  and  will  return 
to  God,  while  the  body,  dust-made,  will  return  again  to  the  dust. 

The  philosophic  questionings  of  the  philosophers  are  not  of  inferior 
consequence  in  a  discussion  w'hose  end  is  truth.  Such  questionings 
are  the  gleanings  of  the  teachings  of  human  nature,  or  the  bountiful 
harvest  from  instincts,  intuitions,  and  religious  sentiments ;  or,  viewed 
in  another  form,  they  are  the  deep  soundings  of  consciousness,  show- 
ing the  drift  of  natural  faith  and  fear.  Cato  mused  over  his  soul  as 
the  painter  muses  ofer  the  product  of  his  art.  Plato  and  Socrates  do 
not  soliloquize ;  they  dare  affirm  what  they  believe.  ' '  Catch  me 
when  I  am  gone,  if  you  can,"  was  the  defiant  assurance  of  Socrates's 
faith  in  the  future  before  he  drank  the  hemlock.  Seneca,  Cicero, 
Epictetus,  and  Marcus  Aurelius,  no  less  than  Hegel,  Descartes,  Leib- 
nitz, Cousin,  and  Lotze,  discovered  a  satisfactory  ground  for  faith  in 
a  future  state,  and  join  philosophic  testimony  to  the  revealed  truth 
of  this  doctrine.  If  there  can  be  faith  in  immortality  without  revelation, 
it  is  evident  that  there  can  be  such  a  faith  with  it.  If  such  a  faith 
Socrates  triumphantly  held,  it  was  because  there  was  a  philosophic 
basis  for  it — he  could  hold  it  on  no  other  ground.  The  ground  of 
his  faith  was  in  himself  Every  man  is  tJie  proclamation  of  his  own  im- 
mortality; every  soul  has  the  warrant  of  its  eternal  existence  written 
on  its  very  face.  If  immortal,  it  must  say  so,  or  by  its  silence  deny 
its  own  condition.  AVe  place  infinite  stress  upon  the  verdict  of  the 
soul,  even  if  it  is  not  as  disinterested  testimony  as  we  might  desire. 
The  testimony  of  the  soul,  being  in  harmony  with  the  teachings  of 
Christianity,  must  be  the  testimony  of  truth,  even  if  without  Chris- 
tianity such  testimony  may  be  discredited. 

Another  probability  of  immortality  arises  from  the  necessities  and 
capabilities  of  the  soul,  or  the  demand  of  another  world  for  the  full  ex- 
pansion of  soul-life.  Continuous  existence  will  insure  ample  oppor- 
tunity for  the  development  of  capabilities,  supposed  to  be  exhaust- 
less,  and  for  the  refinement  of  those  virtues  that  constitute  the  image 
of  God  after  which  man  was  created.  His  time-life  is  a  brief  period  of 
distress,  misfortune,  humiliation,  and  embarrassment ;  he  goes  through 
the  world  consciously  undeveloped,  a  giant  sunken  into  the  propor- 
tions of  a  dwarf,  with  no  opportunity  of  becoming  what  is  possible. 
Man  is  not  the  great  creature  foreshadowed  in  his  creation.  The 
diamond  has  turned  to  carbon  ;  the  stai-  is  an  orbitless  comet.  The 
intellectual  imperfection  of  man,  coupled  with  the  painful  fact  of  his 
moral  apostasy,  speaks  loudly  for  a  life  of  unclouded  days,  and  a 
world  of  unsullied  purity,  in  which  he,  breathing  its  atmosphere,  and 


RECENT  SCIENTIFIC  CONCEPTIONS.  585 

conforming  to  its  order,  may  celebrate  his  possibilities  by  transform- 
ing them  into  powers,  and  employing  them  in  achievements  all  too 
great  for  dwarfs  here,  but  what  might  be  expected  of  free  and  holy 
spirits  there.  Immortality  is  the  antithesis  of  ruin,  and  restoration 
to  greatness  in  another  life  is  the  only  atonement  for  wreckage  in 
this  world. 

Recently,  a  new  conception  of  life  has  been  advanced  by  Prof. 
Weisman,  a  German  scientist,  which,  if  correct,  may  be  used  as  a 
scientific  argument  for  immortality  that  materialists  can  not  ignore  or 
invalidate.  He  asserts  tlyit  life  in  its  very  nature  is  unending,  and 
that  death  in  no  sense  is  uatural  to  life.  Death  occurs  as  an  acci- 
dent to  life,  and  not  as  the  inherent  product  of  life.  The  proof  ad- 
duced is  in  the  history  of  the  protozoan,  which  dies  only  as  it  is  killed, 
or  suffers  accident.  The  division  of  the  protozoan  by  which  two  in- 
dividuals are  produced  occurs  without  any  cessation  of  life,  and  life 
only  ceases  as  it  is  interfered  with  by  au  outside  force.  Left  to  itself 
it  will  continue  forever.  In  this  view  of  the  case,  even  physical  life 
seems  to  be  immortal ;  but,  as  it  is  environed  by  death-producing 
causes,  it  perishes.  If,  then,  physical  life  is  immortal  in  itself,  surely 
soul-life  is  immortal,  and,  unless  an  outside  cause  inflicts  death  upon 
it,  it  will  continue  forever.  It  is  not  in  the  nature  of  life  to  die  ; 
and,  as  soul-life  can  not  be  destroyed  by  a  physical  cause,  physical 
death,  or  the  death  of  the  body,  does  not  affect  the  life  of  the  soul. 
The  death  of  the  soul  can  only  be  effected  by  a  cause  equal  to  the 
soul  or  supei-ior  to  it;  a  divine  power  only  can  destroy  it.  This 
practically  and  in  a  new  way  furnishes  ground  for  scientific  faith  in 
immortality.  The  position  of  the  German  philosopher  is  scientifically 
correct,  and  the  inference  is  in  harmony  with  the  Scriptures. 

The  especial  character  of  the  soul  may  be  referred  to  in  proof  of 
its  immortality,  an  argument  that  is  of  philosophic  weight,  if  of  any 
weight  at  all.  What  the  soul  is,  or  in  what  it  differs  from  matter, 
has  engaged  the  thought  of  all  the  schools,  both  philosophic  and 
theologic,  with  varying  conclusions,  and  an  approximate  settlement 
of  the  subject.  Hermann  Lotze  does  not  find  a  ground  of  belief  in 
the  soul  in  the  fact  of  its  apparent  freedom  of  action,  or  that  its 
substantiality  is  different  from  that  of  matter  because  psychical  pro- 
cesses are  apparently  different  from  physical  processes ;  but  he  does 
discover  the  character  of  the  soul  in  the  iinity  of  conscio^isness,  a  some- 
thing that  can  not  be  predicated  of  matter  or  physical  life.  Estab- 
lishing its  character  by  this  phenomenal  mark  of  a  single  and  identical 
consciousness,  he  proceeds  to  define  the  soul  by  its  activity,  that  is, 
by  its  manifestation.  "The  soul  is  what  it  does;"  "every  soul  is 
what  it  shows  itself  to  be,  unity  whose  life  is  in   definite  ideas,  feel- 


586  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

ings,  and  efforts;"  "to  a  certain  extent  the  soul  shows  itself  to  be  an 
independent  center  of  actions  and  reactions ;"  so  says  Lotze.  This  is 
a  key  to  the  study  of  its  character ;.  and,  inasmuch  as  it  differs  in  the 
fact  of  its  consciousness  from  matter,  Lotze  affirms  that  it  is  a  "pre- 
mundane  substance,"  and  "  that  in  no  changes  of  the  world,  whatever 
they  may  be,  can  either  an  origin  or  an  end  be  ascribed  to  it."  This 
is  immortality,  or  a  supplement  of  Prof  Weisman's  conclusion,  that 
the  death  of  the  body  can  not  affect  the  soul. 

The  common  grounds,  outside  of  the  instructions  of  religion,  for 
a  belief  in  immortality  are  semi-philosophic^,  and  of  historical  value ; 
as  proofs  they  are  circumstantial  rather  than  direct  and  conclusive. 
The  existence  of  faith  in  immortality,  on  the  account  of  its  genesis  and 
universality,  is  given  an  importance  none  too  large  in  polemical  dis- 
cussions of  the  subject ;  for  whether  religion  originated  such  faith 
or  has  maintained  it,  or  whether  it  is  a  natural  instinct,  the  fact  re- 
mains that  faith  in  immortality  is  world-wide  and  supreme  in  the 
thoughts  of  men.  The  universality  of  belief  in  a  futui'e  life  can 
not  be  dismissed  as  the  product  of  authority  or  the  result  of  edu- 
cation alone.  It  is  grounded  in  man  himself.  If  it  is  supposed  that  the 
natural  love  of  life  and  the  horror  of  annihilation  have  joined  in  the 
production  of  faith  in  another  existence,  it  must  be  admitted  that 
these  are  powerful  incentives,  and  tlijey  show  that  such  faith  has  its 
roots  deep  in  humanity,  and  must  not  be  ruthlessly  plucked  up  and 
destroyed.  Again,  the  effect  of  this  faith  on  man  himself  in  pro- 
moting self-development,  self-purity,  and  in  restraining  the  vicious  ten- 
dency, is  an  incidental  proof  of  a  second  life  of  no  mean  value.  The 
sense  of  responsibility  gains  in  force  as  it  is  impressed  upon  men  that 
they  must  give  an  account  to  God,  and  they  regulate  themselves 
and  order  their  lives  in  harmony  Avith  righteousness  as  they  under- 
stand that  the  next  life  will  be  determined  by  the  facts  of  this  life. 
Even  the  analogies  of  nature,  sometimes  used  as  arguments,  are  not 
to  be  despised,  since  it  is  more  comforting  than  if  they  were  on  the 
other  side,  or  opposed  in  their  suggestions  to  the  idea  of  immortality. 
If  nature  by  any  of  its  processes  counterfeits  immortality,  or  attempts, 
its  realization,  it  helps  one  to  go  farther  and  suspect  an  actual  im- 
mortality in  another  sphere.  Suggestions  from  history,  nature,  sci- 
ence, psychology,  and  astronomy  are  eagerly  appropriated  by  believers 
in  immortality  and  turned  into  arguments  in  favor  of  the  belief;  and 
these  taken  in  connection  with  fundamental  and  philosophical  truths 
impress  man  most  profoundly  with  the  conviction  that  another  life 
succeeds  the  present. 

To  this  rational,  historic,  and   philosophic   conclusion  more  than 
one  objection  has  been  raised,  aud  the  inspiring  hope  of  immortality 


SPECIAL  PLEADING  OF  STRAUSS.  587 

has  been  bartered  for  a  contrary  hypothesis.  Goethe  expressed  his 
belief  in  the  future  as  follows:  "The  conviction  of  continuous  exist- 
ence suggests  itself  to  me  from  the  conception  of  activity  ;  for  if  I 
am  unceasingly  active  to  my  very  end,  nature  is  bound  to  assign  to  me 
another  form  of  being,  if  the  present  one  is  no  longer  capable  of  ful- 
filling the  requirements  of  my  spirit."  Acknowledging  the  beauty 
of  this  sentiment,  Strauss  assails  it  as  only  the  special  form  of  the 
common  belief,  and  ridicules  the  idea  that  "nature  is  bound  to  as- 
sio-n  "  any  body  another  form  of  being.  He  also  declares  that  Goethe 
had  "  lived  out  his  life"  and  needed  no  other  world  for  his  develop- 
ment, striking  in  this  conclusion  at  the  common  supposition  of  the  infinite 
capacity  for  development  of  the  human  soul.  Admitting  that  Schil- 
ler died  before  his  full  development,  he  yields  so  far  as  to  say  that 
if  another  life  is  needed  for  those  who  have  not  reached  their  maxi- 
mum, they  also  must  perish  when  the  maximum  is  attained,  and 
that  a  "life  extending  interminably"  can  not  be  inferred  from  the 
premises,  or  from  what  he  hesitatingly  allows.  Most  manifestly  his 
argument  is  reactionary  in  its  assumption  and  concession.  The  as- 
sumption that  Goethe  had  exhausted  himself  can  not  be  explained, 
except  on  the  ground  of  special  pleading,  for  the  mind  testifies  to 
itself  of  an  ever-widening  consciousness  ;  and  if  Strauss  ever  had  the 
feeling  of  Victor  Hugo,  that  God  is  in  him,  he  would  be  ready  to 
believe  that  he  had  scarcely  begun  to  develop  in  this  life.  Said  the 
Frenchman:  "I  feel  in  myself  the  future  life.  I  feel  I  have  not 
said  the  thousandth  part  of  what  is  in  me.  When  I  go  down  to 
the  grave  I  can  say,  like  so  many  others,  '  I  have  finished  my  day's 
work,'  but  I  can  not  say,  '  I  have  finished  my  life.'  My  day's  work 
will  begin  again  the  next  morning."  The  future  is  in  us,  unending  de- 
velopment is  before  us.  No  human  being  can  say  of  another,  nor  of 
himself,  that  he  has  exhausted  his  capacity  and  developed  all  his  pos- 
sibilities to  their  full  proportion  of  growth  and  fruitfulness,  and  that 
henceforth,  should  he  live  longer,  he  could  not  advance  beyond  his 
present  achievement.  This  assumes  a  complete  knowledge  of  the  hu- 
man mind  and  the  discovery  of  certain  fixed  limitations  that  even  an 
eternal  existence  will  not  remove.  Strauss  pronouncing  Goethe  com- 
plete, finished,  exhausted  !  He  did  not  know  him ;  Strauss  never  knew 
himself. 

The  concession  that  Schiller  could  develop  more  with  a  continued 
life,  and  that,  therefore,  there  may  be  another  life,  is  a  surrender 
to  the  advocates  of  immortality,  for  all  that  they  philosophically 
claim  is  that  the  soul  enters  upon  a  second  life,  which  in  its  very 
nature  is  eternal,  and  that  the  soul  attains  its  full  development  in  it. 
Given  a  life  suited  to  the  development  of  the  soul,  and  the  prob- 


588  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

ability  of  immortality  is  assured,  for  in  such  a  life  the  soul  will  de- 
velop into  an  immortal  condition,  even  if  it  were  not  inherently  im- 
mortal before  its  entrance  into  the  eternal  state.  The  eternal  world 
will  breathe  its  eternity  into  newly  admitted  souls  and  adapt  them 
to  its  unending  duration.  Given  existence  at  all  after  death,  and  eternal 
existence  ensues.  The  belief  in  immortality  has  been  suspected 
of  including  by  the  arguments  it  employs  entirely  too  much,  or 
more  than  it  originally  intended,  for  it  is  alleged  that  the  argument 
that  makes  out  the  immortality  of  man  will  also  establish  the  immor- 
tality of  brutes.  Annihilation  is  unknown  to  science;  matter  is 
immortal. 

If  matter  in  some  form  must  ever  exist,  then  it  is  not  incredible 
that  soul  in  some  form  will  exist,  nor  is  it  at  all  incredible  that- 
brutes,  as  such,  or  in  other  forms,  will  occupy  the  eternal  spaces 
and  spheres.  It  is  no  argument  against  the  one  that  it  proves  the 
other  also.  Both  brutes  and  men  co-exist  here ;  analogy  might  sug- 
gest their  co-existence  there.  However,  we  can  not  permit  ourselves 
to  avow  faith  in  the  immortality  of  brutes,  but,  giving  full  force  to 
the  objection,  it  is  evident  it  does  not  invalidate  or  even  touch  the 
question  of  man's  immortality.  Brutes  may  or  may  not  be  immortal, 
we  are  not  concerned.  That  which  is  of  interest  is  to  know  if  man 
is  immortal. 

Of  even  less  weight  is  the  scientific  objection  that  the  universe  is 
the  representative  of  a  fixed  amount  of  energy,  and  that  its  contin- 
uance in  any  form  is  contingent  on  the  retention  and  activity  of  the 
total  energy.  The  soul  is  the  source  of  the  highest  energy,  and  con- 
tributes its  possession  to  the  great  mass  of  the  universe.  Now,  it  is 
claimed  if  the  soul  is  taken  from  the  physical  universe  and^contrib- 
utes  its  energy  to  another  universe,  the  equilibrium  of  the  physical 
universe  is  disturbed,  and  its  existence  is  in  peril.  Immortality  is, 
therefore,  a  menace  to  the  peace  and  welfare  of  the  universe. 
Scientists  are  not  prone  to  consider  all  the  facts ;  they  are  specialists, 
and  notice  only  what  is  within  their  departments.  The  physical  system 
is  only  one-half  the  universe ;  the  other  half  is  the  spiritual  uni- 
verse. The  whole  universe  is  a  double-faced  system,  being  physical 
on  one  side  and  spiritual  on  the  other,  but  correlated  and  inter- 
penetrating, the  energy  of  one  passing  into  the  other,  and  each  under 
control  of  the  other.  The  passage  of  energy  from  the  physical  to  the 
spiritual  results  in  no  loss  of  energy  or  disturbance  of  the  equilibrium, 
since  there  returns  from  the  spiritual  to  the  physical  a  counter-current 
of  influence  that  makes  for  order  and  stability.  The  passage  of  souls 
is  equated  by  the  transmission  of  spiritual  energy  in  another  form. 

Our  speculations  must  cease.    Going  outside  of  Revelation,  we  find 


SCANTY  INTIMATIONS  OF  JUDAISM.  589 

the  belief  in  immortality  supported  by  the  old  religions,  by  the  difference 
between  soul  and  body,  by  the  character  and  aspirations  of  the  soul  for 
something  beyond,  by  the  necessity  of  another  life  for  development,  by  the 
tender  musings  of  philosophy  in  its  robust  periods  of  thought,  by  scientific 
discoveries  touching  the  question  of  life  and  death,  by  the  common  historical 
grounds  of  universal  faith,  aivd  tJie  analogies  of  nature,  and  is  not  over- 
thrown or  even  shaken  by  objections,  scientific,  philosophic,  or  superstitious, 
arrayed  against  it.  The  issue  of  this  survey  is  the  probability  of  itn- 
mortality. 

The  certainty  of  immortality,  or  the  positive  assurance  of  another 
life,  is  derived  from  Revelation.  Given  Revelation,  and  the  forego- 
ing arguments,  hints,  and  suppositions,  are  confirmations  of  the  great 
truth,  and  appear  relevant  in  a  discussion  of  it.  The  outside  adum- 
brations of  immortality  are  fulfilled  by  the  inside  revelations  of  it, 
which  we  are  ready  to  examine.  Christianity,  as  understood,  is  the 
religion  of  the  New  Testament ;  but  a  larger  view  includes  the  Old 
Testament,  in  which  are  found  the  germs  or  roots  of  religious  ideas, 
that  assume  a  developed  form  in  the  new  economy  of  Christ.  Both 
the  patriarchal  and  prophetic  dispensations  related  to  a  future  religion, 
and  prepared  the  way  for  it  by  forecasting  its  contents  and  losing 
themselves  in  its  loftier  manifestation.  The  eschatology  of  the  new 
had  its  antecedent  signs  in  the  old  religion,  or,  as  it  is  conceded, 
the  Gospel  brought  immortality  to  light  from  the  darkness  of  the 
Judaic  administration.  It  is  an  extreme  to  assume  that  the  ancient 
Judaic  faith  was  barren  of  immortal  hope,  and  that  patriarchs, 
judges,  kings,  and  prophets  walked  in  the  deepest  shadows,  without 
a  single  ray  of  light  illuminating  their  pathway.  They  lived  in  the 
twilight  age  of  the  world,  when  truth  was  obscurely  presented,  but 
they  discovered  it  in  its  obscurity  ;  they  had  eyes  and  could  see ;  they 
had  intelligence  and  could  know ;  and  they  were  awake  to  all  that  has 
ever  concerned  man,  and  studied  his  destiny  with  an  interest  as  pro- 
found as  that  which  animates  those  who  walk  in  the  clearer  light  of 
the  Gospel.  At  the  same  time,  the  Old  Testament  is  not  a  manual 
on  immortality,  nor  does  it  excite  in  the  student  that  anticipation  of 
another  existence,  which  it  is  the  business  of  a  final  religion  to  inspire ; 
it  awakens  hope,  but  it  does  not  reveal  knowledge ;  it  suggests  faith, 
but  permits  doubt  to  accompany  it ;  it  makes  immortality  probable, 
but  not  certain.  Prof.  Tayler  Lewis  finds  in  Judaism  a  number  of 
"scanty  intimations"  of  a  future  life,  over  which  the  "veil  of  a 
solemn  reserve"  has  been  thrown,  because,  in  the  age  of  its  glory, 
"there  was  danger  of  more  evil  thoughts  coming  out  of  the  doctrine 
than  good  ones."  In  his  judgment,  the  obscure  doctrine  had  a 
"  higher  moral  power"  than  a  clearer  doctine  could  have  had,  inasmuch 


690  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

as,  in  its  reserved  form,  it  did  not  excite  the  fancy  or  lead  to  super- 
stition. This  is  not  a  satisfactory  reason,  for,  if  valid,  the  doctrine 
ought  not  to  be  revealed  in  the  New  Testament,  since  it  has  led  to 
the  most  extravagant  conceptions,  and  to  just  such  dangerous  opinions 
and  heresies  as  he  imagines  it  would  have  produced  in  the  days  of 
Greek  and  Roman  ascendency.  The  "  reserve"  in  the  Old  Testament 
is  in  accordance  with  the  evolutionary  plan  of  revelation,  divine 
truth  being  made  known  as  the  world  progressed  in  intelligence,  and 
as  the  religious  need  of  men  required  additions  to  their  knowledge  of 
divine  things.  The  old  economy,  having  an  educational  function,  and 
intended  to  fore-shadow  the  brilliant  disclosures  of  the  new,  stepped 
forward  slowly,  and  revealed  its  hints  and  aspirations,  only  to  retire 
when  the  actual  truth  swallowed  up  all  hints  and  ap})aritions  in  itself. 
Speaking  of  the  "void  left  in  the  Jewish  mind,"  Dean  Stanley  ob- 
serves that,  "the  future  life  was  not  denied  or  contradicted,  but  it 
was  overlooked  or  set  aside,  overshadowed  by  the  consciousness  of  the 
living,  actual  presence  of  God  himself"  The  idea  of  Judaism  was 
monotheism,  and  eschatology  was  an  incidental  factor  of  it.  This 
explanation  is  drawn  from  the  spirit  and  purposes  of  Judaism,  as 
contained  in  and  revealed  by  its  history  from  the  days  of  Abraham 
until  the  advent  of  Christ,  and  is  unobjectionable. 

In  the  New  Testament,  the  doctrine  of  the  future  life  occupies  no 
obscui-e  place,  but  is  as  prominent  in  the  teachings  of  the  Savior  and 
his  apostles  as  the  pillars  of  the  Parthenon  in  Greek  civilization. 
Immortality  in  parables ;  immortality  in  histories ;  immortality  in 
biographies ;  immortality  in  laws  ;  immortality  in  rewards  and  pun- 
ishments ;  immortality  in  ethics ;  immortality  in  epistles,  visions, 
doctrines,  counsels ;  immortality  in  Churches,  elderships,  magistracies, 
and  governments;  immortality  in  conduct,  life,  labors,  and  death- 
scenes;  immortality  at  the  grave,  and  written  on  the  tomb-stone  of 
the  ages — Christianity  is  full  of  it,  and  breathes  it  into  the  world. 
The  proverb  passed  from  lip  to  lip  in  the  early  Church  that  Christ 
had  "abolished  death"  and  John  wrote  from  Patmos  that  Christ 
held  the  keys  of  death,  hell,  and  the  grave.  It  was  Christ  who  re- 
minded the  thief  of  Paradise,  and  who,  in  one  of  his  parables,  spoke 
of  "Abraham's  bosom"  as  the  abode  of  the  righteous,  and  of  geheuTia 
as  the  abode  of  the  ungodly ;  it  was  Christ  who  declared  to  his  disci- 
ples, "I  go  to  prepare  a  place  for  you,  .  .  .  and  I  will  come 
again  and  receive  you  unto  myself;"  and  who  also  said  that,  in  the 
great  day,  he  would  banish  from  his  presence  those  who  had  not  be- 
lieved in  him  ;  it  was  Christ  who  declared  that  the  righteous  shall  go 
into  life  eternal,  but  the  ungodly  into  everlasting  punishment.  He 
"brought  immortality  to  light,"  and  his  apostles  proclaimed  it  wher- 


IMMORTALITY  AN  ENDOWMENT.  591 

ever  they  went,  recorded  it  in  all  their  epistles,  and  left  it  as  the 
inheritance  of  the  Church  for  the  ages  to  come.  It  is  true  we  write 
under  the  spell  of  our  faith  in  the  doctrine,  and,  if  this  is  a  disquali- 
fication for  impartial  searching,  we  can  not  help  it;  we  desire  the 
doctrine  to  be  true ;  we  believe  it  is  true,  first  from  philosophy,  second 
from  revelation.  Believing  it  i,o  be  true,  it  has  magnetized  us,  and 
led  us  to  appropriate  in  its  support  every  argument,  every  fact, 
every  allusion,  found  in  history,  science,  religions,  philosophy,  and 
Christianity,  and  nothing  is  clearer  to  our  vision  than  that  man  is 
immortal. 

What  is  his  title  to  immortality  ?  The  only  being  who  is  essen- 
tially immortal  is  God;  the  angels  are  immortal  by  endowment.  ,It 
is  as  possible  for  God  to  deprive  them  of  it  as  it  was  possible  for  him 
to  confer  it,  Man  is  immortal  by  the  same  voluntary  power  and 
goodness;  his  immortality  is  an  endowment — it  is  the  gift  of  God. 
It  is  possible  for  God  to  extinguish  the  immortality  of  any  of  his 
subjects;  the  soul  can  be  annihilated,  just  as  angels  might  be  destroyed 
forever.  As  an  abstract  proposition,  this  is  perfectly  defensible;  as 
an  event  that  has  occurred,  or  will  ever  occur,  it  is  without  proof. 
Immortality  guaranteed  by  creation,  or  in  any  other  Avay,  it  must 
ever  remain  ;  annihilation  will  never  be  enforced  against  a  human 
soul.  At  this  point  thinkers  divide,  some  contending  that  annihila- 
tion will  be  the  portion  of  the  wicked,  while  immortality  will  be  the 
reward  of  the  righteous.  Certainly  a  forfeiture  of  immortality  would 
be  an  incalculable  and  irreparable  loss,  so  great  that  it  is  a  question 
if  an  unforgiven  soul  would  not  prefer  eternal  existence  in  hell  to 
absolute  non-existence  forever.  The  preference  in  the  matter,  how- 
ever, is  not  urged  as  an  agument  against  it ;  the  possibility  of  anni- 
hilation is  not  urged  as  an  argument  in  favor  of  it. 

Others  contend  that  immortality  is  not  a  natural  endowment,  but 
the  special  gift  of  Christ  to  all  who  believe  in  him,  so  that  unsaved 
men  are  not  immortal,  and  perish  forever  because  they  are  not  im- 
mortal. This  depends  upon  our  knowledge  of  antecedent  facts 
involved  in  the  creation  of  man  and  his  loss  of  life  by  sin.  When 
Adam  was  created,  he  received  the  spirit  of  immortality,  being  made 
in  the  image  of  God  ;  when  he  transgressed  the  first  prohibition  ever 
given  from  the  throne,  he  lost  divine  favor,  but  not  immortality. 
Holiness,  not  immortality,  was  involved  in  the  fall ;  the  recovery, 
therefore,  is  a  recovery  to  righteousness  only.  This  is  a  brief  state- 
ment, but  it  comprehends  all  the  facts.  It  does  not  admit  annihila- 
tion, since  the  question  of  existence  is  not  involved.  It  does  not 
admit  the  idea  of  immortality  as  a  gift,  since  it  was  not  affected  by 
the  fall.     Sin  or  no  sin,  death  or  no  death,  the  soul  is  immortal. 


592  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

Besides,  the  condemned  angels  are  not  doomed  to  annihilation, 
but  to  conscious  punishment  and  degradation,  which  imjdies  continued 
living.  By  analogy,  we  reason  that  the  punishment  of  unpardoned 
souls  is  not  the  loss  of  immortality,  or  annihilation.  To  accept  the 
other  view  requires  us  to  distinguish  some  souls  as  mortal  and  others 
as  immortal,  or  two  kinds  of  souls,  .whereas  all  souls  are  alike  in 
their  origin  and  constituent  facts,  the  final  difference  between  them 
being  moral,  and  not  constitutional.  The  thought  of  mox'tal  souls  is 
in  harmony  with  false  and  skeptical  science,  and  it  is  in  the  direction 
of  a  false  and  perverted  religion.  The  distinction  between  soul  and 
body  can  not  be  maintained  if  immortality  be  regarded  a  gift,  and 
that  the  wicked  naturally  go  into  annihilation.  Immortality  is  the 
inalienable  fact  of  every  soul,  and  it  will  be  an  abuse  of  the  divine 
power  for  any  cause  now  known  or  conceivable  to  quench  or  modify  it. 

Not  the  most  serious,  but  the  most  uncertain,  problem  of  escha- 
tology,  and  of  commanding  proportions,  is  that  of  the  resurrection 
of  the  dead.  It  is  a  theological  problem,  since  it  is  associated  with 
final  religious  events  ;  it  is  metaphysical,  as  it  involves  philosophical 
conditions,  relations,  and  suppositions;  it  is  less  important  than 
others,  since  an  understanding  of  it  is  in  no  sense  a  condition  of  sal- 
vation ;  and  one  can  not  be  accused  of  heresy  in  holding  to  any  par- 
ticular view  of  it,  since  many  views  obtain,  in  the  Christian  Church, 
not  one  of  which  is  regarded  standard  or  the  fixed  view  of  believers. 
The  most  that  can  be  said  respecting  it  is,  that  it  is  a  revealed  doc- 
trine of  the  Scriptures ;  the  best  doctrinal  exposition  of  it  is  that  given 
by  Paul;  and  the  clearest  idea  one  gets  of  it  has  not  yet  satisfied 
the  Church  at  large  that  it  is  the  true  and  only  idea  to  be  adopted. 
Theologians,  philosophers,  all,  are  in  a  cloud,  or  in  the  sea,  respect- 
ing the  great  doctrine. 

As  to  the  fact  of  a  resurrection,  there  are  few  who  doubt  that  it 
is  contemplated  in  the  Scriptures,  and  that  it  is  intimately  related  to 
the  consummation  of  Christianity,  even  those  who,  like  Hymenseus, 
charge  that  it  has  taken  place,  agreeing  that  it  occupies  a  position 
in  the  history  of  the  new  religion.  The  agitation  rages  over  the 
character  of  the  resurrection,  and  the  time  when  it  shall  occur.  It  is 
not  asked.  Will  there  be  a  resurrection  ?  It  is  asked.  What  kind  of  a 
resurrection  will  there  be?  Summarily,  What  is  the  resurrection^ 
Are  we  certain  we  understand  it?  Misunderstandings  certainly  do 
exist,  and  have  always  existed,  respecting  the  doctrine,  Paul  himself 
having  been  interpreted  differently,  and  confusion  being  the  total 
result.  Certain  interpretations  have  been  dominant  in  the  circles  of 
Christian  thought,  but  not  one  is  considered  supreme  in  itself,  or  su-. 
perior  to  others,  or  satisfactory  to  the  majority. 


THEORIES  OF  THE  RESURRECTION.  593 

Preliminarily,  the  theories  of  the  resurrection  must  have  recogni- 
tion, inasmuch  as  they  are  held  and  advocated  by  thoughtful  minds, 
and  possibly  one  of  them  may  satisfactorily  explain  the  fact  of  the 
resurrection ;  or,  in  the  combination  of  two  or  more,  a  pathway  fo  the 
actual  fact  of  which  we  are  in  search  may  be  opened. 

I.  The  common  or  the  most  widely  accepted  interpretation  of  the 
doctrine  is,  that  the  natural  body  which  suffers  death  will  be  raised 
by  the  power  of  God  from  the  grave,  be  fitted  by  virtue  of  spiritual 
processes  for  the  eternal  condition,  and  be  reunited  to  the  soul  as  its 
partner  forever.  It  is  not  difficult  to  build  around  this  interpretation 
a  great  many  passages  of  Scripture,  and  to  offer  defensible  arguments 
in  its  behalf;  but  the  drift  of  metaphysical  thought  is  in  other  direc- 
tions.    This  is  known  as  the  "literal"  theory. 

II.  Origen,  he  of  the  third  century,  advanced  the  idea  that  the 
identical  natural  body  will  not  rise,  but  a  body  composed  of  natural 
properties,  and  exactly  resembling  the  old  body,  will  appear  as  the 
resurrection-body,  produced  by  the  power  of  the  soul  to  organize  for  itself 
a  body  suited  to  the  various  spheres  of  its  existence.  This  implies  the 
creation  of  a  new  body. 

III.  The  Germ  theory,  or  that  advocated  by  Samuel  Drew,  is  in 
substance  that,  in  the  human  body,  there  is  a  "certain  principle  of 
future  being,"  which  "shall  form  the  rudiments  of  our  future  bodies." 
It  is  indestructible.     The  old  is  the  nucleus  of  the  new  body. 

IV.  Still  another  is  Swedenborg's  conception  that  the  soul  is  clothed 
with  a  spiritual  body,  which,  at  the  death  of  the  natural  body,  enters 
the  spiritual  body,  where  it  abides  forever.  The  resurrection  is  the 
rising  of  the  soul  at  death  with  its  spiritual  body  into  the  eternal  state. 

V.  Again,  it  has  been  suggested  that  the  resurrection  is  the  rising 
of  souls  out  of  hades  on  the  great  and  notable  day  of  the  Lord,  when 
they  shall  appear  before  him  to  render  an  account  of  their  earth-life 
and  receive  judgment.  Mr.  Alger  supports  the  theory,  and  turns  some 
Scripture  in  its  behalf. 

VI.  An  evohdional  resurrection  has  been  surmised  from  Paul's 
illustration  of  the  seed  producing  its  kind ;  so  the  resurrection-body 
will  be  after  the  pattern,  though  not  of  the  substance,  of  the 
natural  body. 

VII.  The  resurrection-body,  Bishop  R.  S.  Foster  supposes,  will  be 
a  "  suitable  body,"  devised  by  the  Creator  for  the  soul ;  it  will  not  be 
a  "reproduction  of  the  old  body." 

That  these  so-called  resurrections  have  a  Scriptural  basis,  and  that 
they  may  be  vindicated  by  intensely  and  cogently  rational  arguments, 
is  clear  to  one  who  listens  to  their  advocates ;  but,  after  listening  to 
all,  we  inquire,  which  is  the  correct  theory?   or  are  they  all  correct? 


594  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

The  seven  theories,  apparently  different,  are  not  altogether  mutually 
opposed ;  one  is  not  exclusive  of  all  the  others.  The  literal  theory, 
the  germ  theory,  and  the  evolution  theory  are  not  so  far  apart  as  to 
be  radically  antagonistic ;  but,  agreeing  as  to  the  relation  of  the 
natural  body  to  the  resurrection-body,  they  should  harmonize  on  lesser 
features,  and  vindicate  the  resurrection  from  the  single  stand-point 
of  the  transformation  ot  the  natural  into  a  spiritual  body.  The 
theories  of  Origen,  Swedenborg,  and  Bishop  Foster  should  coalesce, 
each  conceding  unimportant  points,  and  uniting  on  the  main  point 
of  the  appearance  of  a  spiritual  body  as  the  resurrection-body.  The 
theory  of  Alger  stands  alone.  We  have,  therefore,  but  three  theories 
of  the  resurrection:  (a)  That  theory  that  involves  the  natural  body, 
more  or  less,  in  the  event  of  the  resurrection  ;  (6)  That  theory  that 
eliminates  the  natural  body,  and  involves  a  spiritual  body,  in  the  event 
of  the  resurrection  ;  (c)  That  theory  that  eliminates  both  a  natural 
and  spiritual  body  from  the  resurrection,  involving  only  the  deliver- 
ance of  souls  from  the  intermediate  world,  as  the  condition  of  entrance 
into  final  everlasting  abodes.  Prizing  distinctions  as  stepping-stones 
to  truth,  we  once  more  charactei'ize  the  theories  as  (a)  natural,  (6) 
spiritual,  (c)  soulical.  The  natural  or  literal  resurrection  has  been 
supported  by  Bishop  C.  Kingsley,  Bishop  D.  \V.  Clark,  and  recently 
by  Dr.  R.  J.  Cooke  in  a  masterly  exposition  ;  the  spiritual  or  anti- 
natural  resurrection  is  ably  maintained  by  Swedenborg,  Bishop  Foster, 
Dr.  Newman  Smyth,  and  others;  the  soulical  resurrection  has  coun- 
tenance from  W.  R.  Alger  and  others  of  mixed  faith. 

The  arguments,  both  rational  and  Scriptural,  employed  in  the 
defense  of  these  theories,  and  the  manner  in  which  objections  to 
them  are  removed  or  answered,  would  furnish  a  chapter  of  inter- 
esting reading ;  we  can  not  more  than  notice  a  few,  in  order  to 
indicate  the  general  support  that  each  receives.  As  to  the  natural 
resurrection,  Dr.  Cooke  insists  that  there  can  be  no  other  than  the 
literal  reproduction  of  the  "material  fleshly"  body;  any  other  kind 
of  a  body  would  not  be  a  resurrection-body.  A  created  body,  or  a 
body  resembling  the  natural  body,  or  a  body  evolved  from  the  natural 
body,  can  not  be  the  resurrection-body ;  that  is,  the  resurrection  is  the 
standing  again  of  the  natural  body.  This  is  not  an  ambiguous  statement, 
nor  a  double-faced  definition  ;  but  it  is  very  like  the  definition  of 
baptism  urged  in  some  quarters,  that  it  is  immersion,  and  nothing 
else ;  resurrection  is  the  reappearance  of  the  natural  body,  and  no 
other  kind  of  a  body  can  be  substituted.  The  definition  of  the 
word  is,  then,  regarded  as  a  support  of  the  natural  theory.  Bishop 
Foster  does  not  accept  the  definition  or  its  application.  "The  word 
resurrection,"   he   says,    "is  strained  when   it   is  insisted   that   it  is 


RESURRECTION  OF  THE  INDIVIDUAL.  595 

equivalent  to  the  statement  that  the  exact  body  is  to  be  restored." 
Quoting  again  :  ' '  The  resurrection  is  the  standing  again  of  the  person 
in  a  body,  or  after  his  severance  from  the  gross  body."  Substantially, 
Dr.  Newman  Smyth  agrees  with  this  conception,  for  he  says:  "Our 
resurrection  shall  not  be  .  .  .  simply  a  setting  free  from  the 
bonds  of  the  flesh  of  a  finer  spiritualized  form,  ...  but  it  shall 
be  .  .  .  the  assimilation  by  the  living  energy  or  soul  of  these 
bodies  ...  of  the  material  of  the  unseen  universe,"  or  "  the 
gathering,  around  the  vitalizing  principle,  of  the  materials  of  a  more 
spiritual  body  from  the  heavenly  places."  Paul  alludes  to  the  ques- 
tion that  some  will  urge,  "  With  what  body  do  they  come?"  implying 
that  it  was  an  undecided  problem  in  his  day  as  to  what  the  resurrec- 
tion-body will  be.  At  the  same  time,  the  apostle  does  assure  his 
readers  that  Jesus  Christ  will  "change  these  vile  bodies,  and  fashion 
them  like  unto  his  own  glorious  body,"  apparently  implying  that  the 
natural  body  is  the  subject  of  the  resurrection. 

Again,  it  is  urged  that,  as  the  body  is  united  with  the  soul  in 
this  life,  so  must  it  be  united  with  the  soul  in  the  next  life,  to  share 
either  the  rewards  or  punishments  that  may  finally  be  decreed  by  the 
unerring  wisdom  and  faultless  justice  of  the  great  Judge.  Growing 
out  of  this  thought  is  that  other,  that  before  the  resurrection  the  soul 
only  is  immortal,  but  after  the  resurrection  man — body  and  soul — is 
immortal.  For  the  natural  theory,  the  three  supports  are,  the  defini- 
tion of  the  word,  Scriptural  passages  in  apparent  harmony  with  it,  and 
the  necessity  of  a  literal  resurrection  to  restore  man  to  his  complete- 
ness, and  to  involve  all  there  is  of  him  here  in  the  awards  of  all  that 
may  be  possible  in  a  future  life.  The  threefold  argument  is  plausible, 
and,  in  the  absence  of  rebutting  testimony,  is  well-nigh  conclusive ; 
but  it  is  not  certain  that  it  is  unimpeachable. 

The  definition  itself  needs  reconstruction.  Etyraologically,  it  is 
not  certain  that  it  refers  to  the  natural  body.  The  application  of  it 
to  the  natural  body  for  nearly  fifteen  centuries  has  led  many  to  believe 
that  any  other  application  is  indefensible,  and  that  a  denial  of  the  inter- 
pretation will  be  fatal  to  the  integrity  of  Christianity  as  a  system  of 
truth.  The  "resurrection  of  the  body"  is  not  a  Scriptural  phrase; 
the  "  resurrection  of  the  dead"  is  Scriptural.  The  former  phrase,  ex- 
pressive, perhaps,  of  the  belief  of  the  early  Christians,  was  not  coined 
or  embalmed  in  creed-form  until  the  fourth  century ;  nevertheless,  it 
probably  represents  the  Christian  idea.  Little  allusion  is  made  in  the 
Scriptures  to  the  resurrection  of  the  body;  frequent  allusion  is  made 
to  the  resurrectim  of  the  individual,  or  the  resurrection  of  personality. 
For  example,  the  Savior  says  (John  vi,  54),  "and  I  will  raise  him  up 
at  the  last  day."    It  is  a  question  if  the  resurrection  of  the  body  is 


596  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

equivalent  to  the  resurrection  of  the  person,  and  it  is  equally  a  ques- 
tion if  the  arguments  employed  in  the  defense  of  the  one  are  not  as 
available  for  the  defense  of  the  other. 

Scripturally,  the  believer  in  the  natural  theory  must  not  be  over- 
confident that  all  the  apostles,  including  the  Master  himself,  are  on 
his  side,  for  Paul  says:  "Flesh  and  blood  can  not  inherit  the  king- 
dom of  God;  neither  doth  corruption  inherit  incorruption."  One 
would  conclude,  from  reading  the  advocates  of  the  three  great  theo- 
ries, that  Paul  favored  all  of  them,  for  he  is  quoted,  explained,  and 
referred  to  by  all,  as  the  unanswerable  defender  of  their  faith. 

Likewise,  the  arguments  touching  the  natural  theory  are  not  all 
on  one  side,  nor  are  those  framed  with  special  reference  to  it  exhaust- 
ively complete,  or  inwardly  satisfactory.  It  is  clear  that  the  body  is 
not  necessary  to  conscious  existence  hereafter ;  it  is  not  so  clear  that  it 
is  necessary  to  a  perfect  existence  hereafter.  Respecting  the  material- 
istic view.  Dr.  Newman  Smyth  observes:  "The  body  which  shall  be 
is  not  fashioned  of  matter  of  the  same  kind  as  these  earthly  bodies. 
It  is  not  of  the  earth  earthy.  The  earthliness  in  which  the  seed  is 
buried  does  not  appear  in  the  flower.  .  .  .  Our  science  leaves  us 
no  tenable  support  for  it.  Any  proper  physiological  conception  of  the 
human  body  precludes  it.  Is  it  necessary  for  any  one,  at  this  late 
day,  to  spend  time  in  clearing  the  simplicity  of  the  Biblical  doctrine 
of  the  resurrection  of  the  dead  from  the  cumbersome  additions  of  the 
traditional  teaching  of  the  resurrection  of  the  flesh  ?"  This  is  in  the 
right  direction.  If  the  conditions  of  the  future  life  are  different 
from  those  of  the  present  life ;  if  the  employments  of  spirits  are  dif- 
ferent from  the  employments  of  mortals ;  if  the  resources,  agencies, 
and  objects  of  the  immortal  life  are  different  from  such  as  obtain  in 
our  time-life, — it  is  incredible  that  the  natural  body,  even  glorified, 
can  have  any  functions  or  prerogatives  in  the  other  life.  Plotinus 
rejoiced  that  his  soul  was  not  to  be  tied  to  an  immortal  body. 

Dr.  Cooke  traces  the  "  hyper-spiritualistic  "  ideas  of  the  resurrec- 
tion, which  have  more  or  less  infected  Christian  belief  from  the  days 
of  Origen,  to  the  influence  of  Gnostic  philosophy,  which  looked  upon 
matter  as  inferior  to  the  soul,  and  as  the  residence  of  evil ;  and  a  class 
of  Christian  thinkers  appropriating  the  philosophy  gradually  and 
philosophically  ign,ored  a  material  resurrection.  While  the  Gnostic 
principle  is  antagonistic  to  the  resurrection  of  the  natural  body,  it 
must  not  be  forgotten  that  it  contributed  toward  relieving  Christian- 
ity of  certain  phases  of  materialism  that  are  incompatible  with  its 
character,  and  would  be  fatal  in  these  days  to  its  progress  as  a  spir- 
itual religion,  Christianity  is  a  spiritual  religion ;  nearly  all  its  doc- 
trines are  spiritual ;  and  so  far  forth  as  any  doctrine  is  reduced  to  a 


RESURRECTION  OF  THE  SPIRITUAL  BODY.  597 

material  form  and  urged  as  such,  it  compromises  the  religion  and 
mantles  its  spiritual  character.  Immersion  is  a  materialistic  phase 
of  baptism,  which  the  Church  will  finally  outgrow  ;  transubstantiation 
and  cousubstautiation  are  materialistic  interpretations  of  the  Eucha- 
rist ;  the  pre-millennial  reign  of  Christ  on  earth  is  a  matei-ialistic  con- 
ception of  Christ's  spiritual  government  in  the  world ;  atid  the  natural 
resurrection  is  a  viaterialistic  type  of  the  spiritual  resurrection  that  occurs 
at  the  end  of  the  world.  In  this  materialistic  age  we  must  abandon  ma- 
terialistic ideas  of  religion. 

As  to  the  soulical  theory,  taking  it  out  of  its  order  in  the  discus- 
sion, since  it  can  not  be  amplified  or  vindicated,  it  is  almost  enough 
to  say  that  it  is  not  at  all  contained  in  the  word  resurrection.  It  im- 
plies a  resurrection  of  souls,  Avhereas  the  resurrection  of  the  New  Tes- 
tament involves  a  resurrection  of  bodies.  It  is  true,  as  Mr.  Alger 
shows,  that  the  author  of  the  Epistle  to  the  Hebrews  speaks  of  "  the 
spirits  of  just  men  made  perfect  in  the  heavenly  Jerusalem,"  but  the 
word  spirit  may  mean  the  conscious  life  or  the  whole  personality,  as 
found  after  the  resurrection,  or  it  may  mean  the  spiritual  body  of  the 
soul  in  its  perfected  form,  as  it  appears  in  th^  heavenly  Jerusalem. 
If  it  has  any  reference  whatever  to  the  resurrection,  it  must  imply 
the  spiritual  body,  which  is  the  subject  of  resurrection,  and  not  the 
spiritual  being  after  the  resurrection.  A  resurrection  of  souls  from 
the  under-world,  or  the  intermediate  abode,  doubtless  will  take  place ; 
but  it  is  straining  the  word,"  perverting  the  Scriptures,  and  invalidat- 
ing nearly  all  the  arguments  used  for  either  a  natural  or  spiritual 
resurrection,  to  apply  it  to  the  deliverance  of  souls  from  hades.  This 
is  not  a  resurrection  at  all. 

The  spiritual  theory  is  in  its  very  terms  antagonistic  to  the  natu- 
ral theory.  It  may  be  objectionable,  but  it  can  not  be  abruptly  dis- 
missed as  incompatible  with  the  idea  of  resurrection.  The  word  itself 
will  allow  either  the  natural  or  spiritual  thoory,  and  the  arguments 
for  one  are  as  indisputably  strong  as  those  for  the  other.  With  many 
it  is  a  question  of  choice  which  to  adopt,  one  being  as  plausible  as 
the  other  ;  with  others  it  is  a  question  of  conviction,  the  spiritual 
being  the  preferred  view.  In  general  terms  the  resurrection  is  in- 
tended to  be  a  deliverance  of  the  soul  from  the  reign  of  matter,  or  the 
extinction  of  its  bondage  to  corruption.  Death  alone,  or  the  separa- 
tion of  soul  and  body,  does  not  accomplish  this  end,  for  full  deliver- 
ance from  evil  also  implies  complete  equipment  for  good.  Disembodi- 
ment must  be  followed  by  re-embodiment,  or  one  body,  mortal  and 
corruptible,  must  be  exchanged  for  another  body,  immortal  and  in- 
corruptible. The  decisive  argument  in  favor  of  the  spiritual  body  is 
Scriptural.     Without  a  Scriptural  basis  the  theory  would  be  not  only 


698  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

untenable,  but  revolutionary  and  infidelic.  Its  ground  is  in  the 
Scriptures,  both  in  the  Old  and  New  Testaments.  The  resurrection 
is  alluded  to  more  positively  in  the  Old  Testament  than  the  doctrine 
of  immortality,  and  is  a  powerful  argument  in  its  favor.  Job  declares 
that  in  his  flesh  he  shall  see  God ;  David  asserts  his  flesh  shall  rest  in 
hope;  Isaiah  announces,  "Thy  dead  men  shall  live,  (together  with) 
my  dead  body  shall  they  arise  ;"  Ezekiel  prophecies  the  resurrection 
of  the  body  by  the  resurrection  of  the  dry  bones  in  the  valley  ;  and 
Daniel  decrees  that  "many  of  them  that  sleep  in  the  dust  of  the 
earth  shall  awake,  some  to  everlasting  life,  and  some  to  shame  and 
everlasting  contempt."  Now,  without  controversy,  the  resurrection 
in  the  Old  Testament  is  materialistic  or  natural,  but  it  is  on  that  ac- 
count no  proof  of  the  materialistic  type  of  the  actual  resurrection. 
Mr.  Alger  finds  a  materialistic  resurrection  in  Zoroastrianism,  which 
he  affirms  gave  birth  to  the  Jewish  doctrine,  and  the  Jewish  became 
in  turn  the  mother  of  the  Christian  idea,  or  materialistic  conception 
of  the  resurrection  in  the  Christian  Church.  For  this  opinion  we 
care  nothing,  because  it  does  not  settle  the  question  of  the  character 
of  the  resurrection  body.  To  say  that  a  Christian  doctrine  has  its 
roots  in  Jewish  teaching,  and  that  Jewish  teaching  borrowed  itself 
from  Persian  sages,  does  not  invalidate  it ;  it  may  be  a  true  doctrine, 
whatever  its  source. 

It  is  all-important  to  know,  hoAvever,  what  is  the  significance  of 
the  flesh-and-blood  resurrection  of  the  Jewish  economy.  Is  it  per  se 
the  resurrection  of  the  new  religion,  or  only  the  materialistic  type  of 
a  spiritual  event  to  occur  at  the  end  of  the  world  ?  The  atonement 
of  the  old  economy  was  materialistic ;  the  atonement  of  the  new  is 
spiritualistic.  The  religion  of  the  old  was  ceremonial,  physical,  legal ; 
the  religion  of  the  new,  spiritual  altogether.  The  resurrection  of  the 
old  was  materialistic,  the  resurrection  of  the  new  is  spiritual.  The  old 
idea  was  glorious,  but  it  has  lost  its  glory  in  the  "  glory  that  excell- 
eth."  So  the  analogy  of  faith  teaches  and  requires.  The  New  Tes- 
tament doctrine  of  the  resurrection  is  the  fulfillment  or  development 
of  the  Old  Testament  doctrine ;  bu*  if  the  one  resurrection  is  the  same 
as  the  other,  there  is  no  develf)pment,  there  is  repetition.  Is  the 
New  Testament,  in  its  monotheism,  atonement,  and  spirituality,  a  de- 
velopment of  the  Old  Testament,  but  as  touching  the  resurrection,  is 
it  but  a  repetition  ?  Because  Christ  and  the  apostles  used  the  same 
words  for  the  new  resurrection  as  were  used  by  the  Jews  for  the  old 
idea  of  it.  Dr.  Cooke  argues  that  they  must  have  meant  the  same 
resurrection.  This  is  very  inconclusive,  and  violates  the  relations  of 
the  old  to  the  new.  The  word  Sabbath  in  the  Old  does  not  signify 
the  day  that  it  represents  in  the  New,  except  when  so  mentioned. 


INTERPRETATIONS  OF  PAUL.  599 

The  word  sacrifice  in  the  Old  has  a  difFerent  application  in  the  New. 
The  word  atonement  in  the  Old  Testament  means  one  kind  of  sacri- 
fice— in  the  New  Testament  another  kind  of  sacrifice.  Likewise  the 
word  resurrection  in  the  Old  Testament  means  a  difFerent  event  in  the 
New  Testament.     To  the  New  Testament  let  us  turn. 

Paul  intimates  what  the  resurrection  body  will  be  when  he  says, 
^'For  in  this  we  groan,  earnestly  desiring  to  be  clothed  upon  with 
our  house,  which  is  from  heaven."  If  the  natural  body  can  be  spoken 
of  as  "our  earthly  house  of  this  tabernacle,"  the  spiritual  body  can 
be  spoken  of  as  "our  house  which  is  from  heaven."  The  natural 
resurrection  body  is  the  "earthly  house;"  the  spiritual  resurrection 
body  is  the  "  heavenly  house."  That  is,  it  is  a  heavenly  and  not  the 
earthly  body.  This  is  conclusive.  Again,  when  brought  before  the 
Sanhedrin,  Paul  opened  his  defense  with  the  exclamation,  "Of  the 
hope  and  resurrection  of  the  dead  I  am  called  in  question."  He  af- 
firms the  resurrection  of  the  dead,  but  who  are  the  dead  ?  When  it 
was  reported  that  "  General  Grant  is  dead,"  it  was  meant  that  he  had 
separated  from  his  body.  He  is  dead — not  his  body.  "  The  dead" 
are  the  living  individuals ;  they  are  not  putrefying  bodies.  The 
dead  —  that  is,  the  conscious  individuals  —  shall  stand  in  living 
bodies  again  ;  in  this  life  they  stood  in  corruptible  bodies  ;  in  the 
next  they  stand  in  incorruptible  bodies.  So  seems  to  say  the  great 
apostle. 

Dr.  R.  J.  Cooke  assumes  that  the  Greeks  understood  Paul  on  Mars' 
Hill  to  pi-each  a  "  literal  corpse  resurrection,"  and  hence  were  infuriated 
and  disgusted  ;  but  this  does  not  establish  that  he  did  preach  it.  It  es- 
tablishes that  they  construed  the  spiritual  resurrection  into  a  gross, 
carnal  resurrection,  just  what  Dr.  Cooke  has  done,  just  what  the  nat- 
uralists and  materialists  do,  and  are  led  to  renounce  it,  just  what  the 
natural  mind  is  prone  to  do  whenever  the  Gospel  is  preached.  It  is 
easy  to  paraphrase  the  spiritual  into  the  physical,  and  to  speak  of  the 
incorruptible  as  the  corruptible.  Reducing  the  spiritual  teaching  to  a 
physical  idea,  it  becomes  foolishness  to  the  natural  mind,  and  even  a 
stumbling-block  to  the  fleshly  and  the  ungodly.  It  by  no  means 
solves  the  problem,  or  throws  any  daylight  upon  it,  to  be  told 
that  the  Greeks  understood  Paul  to  mean  a  particular  thing ;  the 
question  is  not  what  the  Greeks  thought  he  meant,  but  what  did  he 
mean  ?  That  he  employed  Jewish  terms  when  he  addressed  the  Jews, 
and  Greek  terms  when  he  addressed  the  Greeks,  only  proves  that  he 
undertook  to  represent  the  great  doctrine  in  the  language  of  the  peo- 
ple whom  he  addressed,  without  graduating  the  truth  to  their  precon- 
ceived ideas  of  it,  or  conforming  the  doctrine  to  any  existing  notion 
by  running  it  in  the  language-mold  of  the  people.     Employing  their 


600  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

language,  the  doctrine  was  not  their  doctrine.  Sameness  of  language 
is  not  equivalent  to  sameness  of  doctrine. 

The  fundamental  chapter  on  the  resurrection  of  the  dead  is  that 
which  composes  a  part  of  Paul's  First  Epistle  to  the  Corinthians.  It 
is  singular  that  this  chapter  has  been  so  often  perverted  in  the  inter- 
est of  the  theory  of  a  natural  resurrection,  while  the  whole  is  unmis- 
takably a  revelation  of  the  spiritual  resurrection,  "  There  is  a  natural 
body  and  there  is  a  spiritual  body,"  Here  the  existence  of  the  two 
kinds  of  bodies  is  affirmed.  "  It  is  sown  a  natural  body,  it  is  raised  a 
spiritual  body,"  Evidently  the  sowing  is  not  the  resurrection ;  the 
raising  is  the  resurrection.  Now,  if  a  spiritual  body  is  raised,  then 
the  resurrection  relates  to  a  spiritual  body.  The  natural  body  is 
sown,  but  it  is  not  raised.  In  keeping  with  this  distinction  Paul  af- 
firms that  "  as  we  have  borne  the  image  of  the  earthy,"  or  natural, 
"  we  shall  also  bear  the  image  of  the  heavenly,"  or  spiritual.  This 
distinction  is  also  illustrated  by  the  sowing  of  grain  and  the  product 
thereof  as  follows:  "That  which  thou  sowest,  thou  sowest  not  that 
body  that  shall  be;"  that  is,  the  natural  body  shall  not  be  the  future 
body;  "  but  God  giveth  it  a  body  as  it  hath  pleased  him,  and  to 
every  seed  his  own  body,"  The  revelation  is  that  God  will  give  to  the 
soul  such  a  body  as  shall  please  him,  which  can  not  be  the  natural  body, 
because  "thou  sowest  not  that  body  that  shall  be,"  but  it  will  be  a 
"  spiritual  body,"  of  which  Paul  speaks. 

Paul's  seed-thought  is  pregnant  with  another  suggestion.  The 
seed  is  planted ;  the  hull  dies ;  the  vitalizing  principle  re-appears  in 
the  grain.  The  seed  is  man,  physical  and  spiritual,  or  body  and 
soul ;  the  hull  is  the  body  ;  the  soul  is  the  immortal  principle  that 
re-appears  after  the  dissolution  of  the  body,  waiting  until  the  resur- 
rection for  the  spiritual  body,  or  to  become  the  perfect  grain ;  that 
is  the  perfect  man  again.  To  us  the  apostolic  argument  is  transpar- 
ent, elaborate,  and  unanswerable  in  its  revelation  of  the  resurrection- 
body  as  spiritual  and  incorruptible. 

The  Lord's  resurrection  might  be  studied,  and  a  conclusion  in 
harmony  with  the  Pauline  revelation  be  drawn ;  but  we  have  not 
space  to  analyze  that  event.  Bishop  Foster  concedes  too  much  when 
he  asserts  that  Christ's  body  is  not  a  pattern  of  our  resurrection ; 
for,  while  it  may  not  be  a  pattern,  it  sustains  the  spiritual  quite  as 
freely  as  the  natural  theory,  and  should  not  be  eliminated  from  the 
discussign.  At  one  time  ,  Christ's  body  seems  natural,  human ;  at 
another,  spiritual,  immortal.  He  assumed  a  natural  appearance  to 
convince  his  disciples  that  he  was  alive  again  ;  and  a  spiritual  appear- 
ance, to  suggest  to  them  the  resurrection-body.  The  true  resurrection- 
body  manifested  itself  in  spiritual  phenomena  which  they  recognized ; 


SCIENTIFIC  VERIFICATION.  601 

but,  as  their  chief  concern  was  to  be  assured  of  his  power  over  death, 
the  spiritual  body  worked  temporarily  through  the  natural  body, 
which,  as  an  exception  to  the  general  order,  may  possibly  have  as- 
cended on  high  and  become  assimilated  with  the  spiritual  body,  to 
reign  with  it  forever. 

The  most  satisfactory  revelation  from  Christ  touching  the  resur- 
rection life  appears  in  his  conversation  with  the  Sadducees,  who, 
disbelieving  in  the  resurrection,  propounded  to  him  a  question  which 
they  imagined  would  confuse  him.  His  answer  we  give  (Matt,  xxii, 
30)  :  ' '  For  in  the  resurrection  they  neither  marry  nor  are  given  in 
marriage,  but  are  as  the  angels  of  God  in  heaven."  The  resurrection-body 
is  as  an  angel-body,  which  is  spiritual,  heavenly.  "As  touching  the 
resurrection  of  the  dead,"  he  says,  "  God  is  not  the  God  of  the  dead,  but 
of  the  living  ;"  that  is,  the  resurrection  relates  to  the  living  souls,  and 
not  to  the  bodies  in  the  graves.  He  is  not  the  keeper  of  dust,  but  he 
is  the  preserver  of  souls,  and  giveth  each  a  body  as  it  pleaseth  him. 

Accepting  the  spiritual  theory  on  Scriptural  grounds,  it  may  be 
enforced  on  rational  or  scientific  grounds,  but  their  elaboration  is  un- 
necessary. Evidently,  the  scientific  spirit  is  antagonistic  to  a  physical 
resurrection.  Reason  is  against  it;  faith  only  can  conquer  reason, 
because  it  must  if  the  natural  theory  is  accepted.  No  such  embar- 
rassment environs  the  acceptance  of  the  spiritual  theory.  Reason 
pronounces  it  tenable ;  revelation  assures  us  that  it  is  certain.  A 
' '  spiritual  body "  for  the  soul  is  not  an  unscientific  thought,  since 
such  a  body  is  in  essential  sympathy  with  the  soul,  as  indeed  it  is  of 
the  same  eternal  constitution.  A  belief  in  the  spiritual  body  is  as 
rational  as  a  belief  in  the  soul.  One  agrees  with  the  other.  Again, 
the  necessity  of  the  spiritual  body  is  a  scientific  necessity.  The  law 
of  continuity,  which  has  its  fittest  illustration  in  life,  requires  the  as- 
sociation of  the  spirit-body  and  the  soul,  as  co-partners  in  the  life  of 
the  soul  from  its  beginning  through  all  eternity.  When  the  natural 
body  falls,  the  continuity  of  life  is  broken  and  paralyzed ;  but,  inas- 
much as  the  continuity  of  real  life  is  not  a  physical  resultant,  nor 
dependent  on  physical  conditions,  it  is  secured  by  conscious  spiritual 
existence  in  another  world.  The  spiritual  body  takes  the  place  of  the 
natural,  and  secures  continuity ;  it  secures  it  by  anticipation  of  the 
spiritual  body  ;  it  secures  it  by  an  actual  realization  or  possession  of 
the  spiritual  body. 

With  the  manner  in  which  the  spiritual  body  is  provided,  whether 
the  soul  organizes  it  out  of  its  own  materials,  or  transforms  the  sur- 
rounding elements  of  the  spiritual  world  into  a  suitable  body,  or  whether 
God  prepares  one  independently  of  the  soul's  agency  and  activity, 
or  whether  it  abides  with  the  soul  in  this  life  as  an  undeveloped  or 


602  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

unused  body,  and  remains  quiescent  until  the  great  day,  when  it  as- 
sumes an  active  relation  to  the  soul,  we  have  nothing  to  do.  The 
Jad  of  a  spiritual  body  is  all  that  must  engage  our  attention.  That 
the  resurrection,  or  the  standing  again  of  the  soul  in  a  spiritual  body, 
will  occur  at  the  end  of  the  world  we  sincerely  believe.  We  must, 
thei'efore,  repudiate  every  theory  that  holds  that  the  resurrection  takes 
place  at  death,  and  every  theory  that  has  not  for  the  subject  of  the 
resurrection  some  kind  of  a  body.  Touching  the  doctrine  we  follow 
no  teachers,  save  Christ  and  the  apostles;  touching  revelations,  no  docu- 
ment has  any  authority  save  the  New  Testament;  and,  touching  theories, 
they  all  vanish  in  the  presence  of  the  monumental  representation  of  the  great 
truth  made  by  the  apostle  Paid. 

Between  death  and  the  resurrection  a  period  of  unknown  length 
elapses,  during  which  disembodied  souls  are  in  a  state  of  conscious 
existence,  and  engaged  in  occupations  either  congenial  or  otherwise, 
patiently  waiting  for  the  re-embodiment  which  the  resurrection  will 
confer.  Where  are  the  disembodied  souls  during  this  period?  Are 
the  righteous  in  heaven,  and  the  wicked  in  hell ;  or,  do  they  occupy 
an  intermediate  place,  which  is  neither  heaven  nor  hell,  except  in  spirit 
and  indications  ?     This  is  the  next  problem. 

Prior  to  the  study  of  the  problem,  the  existence  of  an  "unseen 
universe,"  or  a  world  back  of,  different  from,  and  productive  of  the 
visible  universe,  must  be  noted.  The  immortality  of  the  soul  and  the 
resurrection  of  the  dead  conjoin  in  the  affirmation  of  another  universe. 
The  New  Testament  is  the  testimony  to  its  existence.  It  is  a  sphere 
of  angels,  fallen  and  unfallen,  of  spirits  redeemed  and  punishable, 
and  it  is  the  theater  of  God's  infinite  enterprises  of  grace,  wisdom, 
and  power.  In  that  universe  he  dwells,  and  it  will  endure  forever. 
"The  things  which  are  seen  are  temporal,  but  the  things  which  are 
not  seen  are  eternal."  Out  of  it  come  the  angels  who  minister  to 
the  heirs  of  salvation  ;  out  of  it  come  the  devils  who  seek  a  dwelling- 
place  in  men ;  out  of  it  came  the  Son  of  God,  and  into  it  he  returned ; 
out  of  it  came  the  voice  that  was  heard  at  the  baptism  of  the  Savior, 
and  from  it  comes  the  Spirit  that  reproves  the  world  of  its  iniquity ; 
into  it  looked  the  dying  Stephen  and  the  holy  martyrs,  and  the  race 
in  its  swift  march  to  the  tomb  gazes  wistfully  toward  it.  That  unseen 
universe  embraces  heaven  and  hell ;  the  intermediate  world,  if  there 
is  any,  and  the  final  world,  of  which  no  doubt  can  exist. 

Not  a  few  theologians  hold  to  the  idea  of  an  immediate  entrance 
at  death  of  the  sanctified  soul  into  the  highest  heaven,  and  of  the  un- 
repentant soul  into  the  deepest  hell.  Nor  can  it  be  denied  that  some 
passages  of  Scripture  easily  and  naturally  incline  to  that  view  of  the 
future  state.     To  the  doctrine  of  an  Intermediate  World  there  are 


ERRORS  IN  THEOLOGY.  603 

some  objections  that,  though  not  necessarily  fatal  to  it,  must  be  re- 
moved, or  explained,  before  it  can  be  fully  accepted  by  all  the  read- 
ers of  the  Scriptures.  The  doctrine  itself  is  the  foundation  of  many 
errors  in  theology,  or  the  root  of  heresies  and  fancies  not  at  all  com- 
patible with  an  intelligent  Christianity.  Granted  an  intermediate 
world,  and  the  Roman  Catholic  may  plausibly  preach  his  doctrine  of 
purgatory;  the  Spiritualist  may  proclaim  his  idea  of  progression 
and  moral  discipline  and  preparation  in  the  future  life;  the  Univer- 
salist  can  apparently  prove  the  final  salvation  of  all  mankind  if  he  is 
allowed  an  intermediate,  half-way  place  of  preparation ;  the  New 
Theology  can  flourish  its  dogma  of  a  second  probation,  and  transfer 
Gospel  conditions  to  the  disembodied  life  of  man  ;  and  so  the  most 
pernicious  errors  are  possible  from  the  assumption  of  an  intermediate 
world.  Let  it  be  understood  that  the  soul  at  death  ascends  to  heaven 
or  descends  to  hell,  and  there  is  no  room  for  any  of  these  errgrs. 
This  would  be  a  great  gain  to  theology.  But,  in  investigating  a 
truth,  the  probability  that  error  may  spring  out  of  an  interpretation, 
or  theology  may  be  more  or  less  affected  by  it,  can  have  no  positive 
influence  on  the  honest  seeker  after  the  truth.  No  doctrine  of  the  New 
Testament  has  failed  to  awaken  criticism,  or  suggest  objections,  or 
produce  positive  errors  in  interpretation.  From  the  doctrine  of  the 
Incarnation  have  emerged  Monophysitism  and  Eutychianism  ;  from 
the  Eucharist,  transubstantiation  and  consubstantiation ;  from  the  Fore- 
knowledge of  God,  predestination,  denial  of  human  freedom,  and  de- 
nial of  contingencies ;  from  the  Atonement,  election  and  reprobation  ; 
from  the  Trinity,  Unitarianism,  Swedenborgism,  and  infidelity.  Ob- 
jections to  doctrines  revealed,  and  to  be  known  by  revelation  only,  are 
of  little  weight  with  minds  who  discern  the  truth  of  revelation. 

It  may  be  made  against  the  doctrine  of  the  intermediate  world 
that  it  partakes  of  the  materialistic  spirit  of  the  Homeric  theology 
and  the  Judaic  revelations.  The  ancient  Jew,  while  intending  to  be 
spiritual,  was  practically  a  materialist,  and  clothed  truth  in  physical 
forms.  By  him  the  future  was  conceived  under  material  aspects,  from 
which  he  could  scarcely  deliver  himself,  even  when  the  spiritual  view 
was  exclusively  enforced.  To  him  sheol  was  as  literal  a  place  as  the 
grave ;  the  one  for  the  body,  the  other  for  the  soul ;  and  the  one  re- 
mained in  its  place  so  long,  and  no  longer,  as  the  other  in  its  place. 
Both  the  grave  and  sheol  are  intermediate  abodes,  from  which  both 
body  and  soul  will  be  delivered.  Naturally  enough,  this  view  found 
its  way  into  the  theology  of  the  Christian  Church,  and  even  Christ 
and  the  apostles  in  their  teachings  employed  the  terms  that  repre- 
sented the  Jewish  thought,  and  gave  countenance  to  it.  It  is  certain, 
also,  that  the  Homeric  theology  contributed  its  terms  and  teachings 


604  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

to  Christianity  to  such  a  degree  that  it  has  been  surmised  that  the 
under-world  idea  is  Greek  or  pre-Christian,  and  not  definitely  the 
product  of  inspiration.  Both  the  Jews  and  the  Greeks  had  an  es- 
schatology  of  their  own,  different  in  important  particulars,  and  yet 
agreeing  in  those  things  that  constitute  the  essential  ideas  of  a  the- 
ologic  view  of  the  future.  Both  pointed  out  the  immortality  of  man ; 
both  indicated  the  happiness  of  the  good  and  the  wretchedness  of'the 
ungodly  in  the  next  life ;  both  foreshadowed  an  intermediate  world 
of  disembodied  spirits;  and  both  prophesied  final  rewards  and  retri- 
butions through  a  judicial  process  at  an  eternal  tribunal.  This  shows 
that  the  truth  had  been  partly  revealed  even  to  Homer  as  well  as  to 
Moses;  but  Christianity  was  needed  to  bring  these  partly  revealed 
truths  to  light.  Hence,  a  similarity  of  teaching  between  Christ  and 
Homer,  and  between  Christ  and  the  prophets.  From  the  materialism 
of  .the  Greek  and  the  Hebrew  conception  of  the  future  state  Jesus 
immediately  separated  himself,  emphasizing  the  spiritual  character  of 
future  rewards  and  punishments,  and  dissolving  the  connection  be- 
tween sheol  and  the  grave.  In  Christianity  the  grave  disappears ; 
sheol  is  transformed  into  hades;  and  hades  fades  finally  into  a  fixed 
eternity.  This  is  the  progress  of  thought  in  the  Scriptures,  or  a 
passing  from  materialistic  views  under  the  old  dispensation  to  the  ex- 
clusively spiritual  under  the  new.  It  can  not  be  maintained,  there- 
fore, against  the  Christian  idea  of  an  intermediate  abode,  that  it  is 
essentially  Homeric  and  Jewish,  and  therefore  ought  to  be  abandoned ; 
for  it  is  Homeric  and  Jewish  preliminarily  only,  and  not  essentially. 

Sometimes  it  is  suggested  that  the  Intei^mediate  World  in  its  social 
conditions  and  relations  can  not  be  different  from  this  world,  for  it 
seems  to  be  the  abode  of  joy  and  sorrow,  and  of  mixed  phenomena  of 
life  ;  but  if  so  there  is  no  necessity  for  such  a  world.  If  the  world- 
life  there  is  a  reproduction  or  continuance  of  the  world-life  here,  it 
must  be  a  life  of  alternate  hopes  and  fears,  of  liabilities  and  surprises, 
of  progress  and  discovery,  without  any  positive  settlement  of  those 
religious  questions  that  engage  the  anxious  thought  of  the  race  here. 
Such  a  view  arises  from  a  misapprehension  of  the  intermediate  world, 
which  is  represented  in  an  entirely  different  aspect  in  the  Scriptures. 
It  is  nowhere  declared  to  be  a  reproduction  of  this  life.  It  is  ev- 
erywhere represented  to  be  the  beginning  of  heaven  to  the  righteous 
and  the  dawn  of  hell  to  the  wricked;  it  is  heaven  to  the  one  and 
hell  to  the  other. 

The  positive  Scriptural  arguments  for  the  intermediate  world  are 
almost  complete.  The  Old  Testament  scarcely  gets  beyond  the  inter- 
mediate world  ;  this  is  in  harmony  with  its  character  as  an  incipient  reve- 
lation.    When    Saul    disturbed    Samuel,   the   old  prophet  shouted, 


THE  INTERMEDIATE  WORLD.  605 

•'Why  hast  thou  disquieted  me  in  hringing  me  upf"  The  meauing 
may  be  that  he  was  in  a  state  of  satisfaction  in  the  under-world,  and 
did  not  wish  to  be  connected  again  with  earthly  scenes  or  events. 
The  word  sheol,  used  sixty-five  times  in  the  Old  Testament,  can  have 
no  other  meaning  than  that  of  the  intermediate  abode  of  souls  wait- 
ing for  the  resurrection.  It  has  been  displaced  in  the  New  Testa- 
ment by  the  word  hades,  which  it  is  impossible  to  believe  refers  to  any 
other  than  an  intermediate  place  of  the  dead.  David  says  (Acts 
ii,  27),  "Thou  wilt  not  leave  my  soul  in  hades;"  here  he  looks 
to  a  deliverance  from  the  intermediate  abode.  Paul  asks  (I  Cor. 
XV,  55),  "  O,  hades,  where  is  thy  victory?"  Victory  over,  or  rescue 
from  the  under-world,  is  the  meaning.  John  represents  Christ  (Rev- 
elation i,  18)  as  saying,  "  I  am  alive  for  evermore  ;  and  have  the 
keys  of  hades  and  of  death."  He  proposes  to  unlock  the  gates  of 
the  intermediate  world  and  bid  all  come  forth.  The  final  disposition 
of  hades  is  thus  (Revelation  xx,  14)  indicated  :  "And  death  and 
hades  were  cast  into  the  lake  of  fire."     This  is  extinction  of  hades. 

The  intermediate  world  must  necessarily  consist  of  two  depart- 
ments, the  one  for  the  righteous,  the  other  for  the  wicked.  So  we 
find  it  in  the  Scriptures,  Paradise  standing  for  the  former  and  Ge- 
henna for  the  latter.  Dr.  L.  T.  Townsend  speaks  of  the  one  as 
Paradise-Hades,  and  of  the  other  as  Gehenna-Hades,  a  division 
clearly  justified  by  the  New  Testament.  Jesus  (John  xiv,  2)  said 
unto  the  disciples,  "I  go  to  prepare  a  place  for  you,"  intimating 
that  the  final  heaven  is  not  yet  ready  for  saints,  and  possibly  will 
not  be  ready  until  the  resurrection.  Peter  (Acts  ii,  34)  said  in  his 
Pentecostal  sermon,  "For  David  is  not  ascended  into  the  heavens," 
intimating  a  waiting  for  the  heavenly  life.  To  the  thief  on  the 
cross  Jesus  said,  "To-day  shalt  thou  be  with  me  in  Paradise,"  or 
hades ;  and  in  his  parable  of  the  rich  man  and  Lazarus  he  pictures 
the  latter  in  Abraham's  bosom  and  the  former  in  gehenna  in  torment. 
"Abraham's  bosom  "  can  only  be  understood  as  a  temporary  resting- 
place  of  the  saved,  while  gehenna  is  the  temporary  abode  of  the  un- 
forgiven.  In  that  wonderful  description  of  the  judgment-scene 
(Matt.  XXV,  31-46),  we  read  of  final  rewards  and  punishments, 
but  it  does  not  take  place  until  the  end  of  the  world,  or  "  u'hen  the 
Son  'of  man  shall  come  in  his  glory."  According  to  this  scene,  heaven 
and  hell  will  not  be  opened  until  after  the  judgment  at  the  end  of  the 
world.  This  is  more  decisive  than  any  thing  else  in  the  New  Testa- 
ment that  in  their  disembodied  state  the  dead  are  in  an  interme- 
diate world. 

Less  elaborate,  but  hardly  less  explicit,  are  other  passages  relat- 
ing to  the  temporary  character  of  gehenna  and  the  final  passage  of 


606  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

its  inhabitants  into  lower  conditions  of  suffering  and  punishment. 
Peter- (II  Peter  ii,  4)  writes,  "For  if  God  sjmred  not  the  angels 
that  sinned,  but  cast  them  down  to  hades,  and  delivered  them  into 
chains  of  darkness,  to  be  reserved  unto  judgment,"  etc. ;  and  Jude, 
sixth  verse,  rehearses  the  same  fact;  both  implying  that  the  fallen 
angels  and  wicked  spirits  are  held  like  prisoners  for  judgment,  and 
will  be  brought  forth  from  the  prison-house,  or  gehenna,  at  the  last 
day  to  receive  sentence  of  punishment  that  will  never  be  revoked, 
and  to  be  suffered  in  hell  or  the  deeper  abode  prepared  for  the  devil 
and  his  angels. 

The  revelation  of  an  intermediate  abode  is  satisfactory ;  the  neces- 
sity of  such  an  abode  is  involved  in  the  revelations  themselves.  The 
relation  of  the  resurrection  to  hades  is  conspicuous ;  the  one  involves 
the  other.  The  disembodied  soul,  waiting  for  its  spiritual .  body,  re- 
mains in  hades,  until  clothed  with  its  house  from  heaven,  a  building 
of  God,  and  enters  its  final  abode  when  so  clothed  and  prepared. 
If  the  disembodied  soul,  represented  as  "  naked,"  is  fitted  for  heaven, 
and  has  ^been  there  since  death  dissolved  its  connection  with  the 
body,  there  is  no  need  of  the  resurrection;  but  if  the  disembodied 
soul  is  in  an  imperfect  state,  and  must  be  clothed  with  a  spiritual 
body  before  it  can  enter  heaven  or  hell,  its  occupancy  of  an  interme- 
diate abode,  or  waiting-place,  is  a  necessity. 

Moreover,  the  Judgment-day  presupposes  an  Intermediate  World. 
If  souls  at  death  enter  their  final  abode  the  necessity  of  the  judgment 
at  the  last  day  is  overruled ;  but  if  they  remain  in  Avaiting  for  a 
spiritual  body  and  for  judgment  the  necessity  of  final  judicial  decrees 
is  apparent.  Whatever  may  have  been  the  views  of  the  Christian 
Church  touching  these  matters,  certain  it  is  that  an  intermediate 
world  exists,  and  man's  relation  to  it  is  as  has  been  indicated  above. 

In  a  previous  paragraph  incidental  reference  is  made  to  the  theory 
of  a  second  probation,  or  probation  in  the  next  life.  We  pronounced 
it  an  error,  and  shall  now  assign  the  reason  therefor.  Neither  in  the 
Jewish  nor  in  the  Christian  Church  has  the  thought  of  another  pro- 
bation been  regarded  otherwise  thaii  as  heretical,  as  contrary  to  the 
fundamental  revelations,  and,  therefore,  to  be  rejected  and  denounced. 
In  both  the  Jewish  and  the  Christian  Church  there  have  been,  as 
there  are  now,  those  who  for  one  reason  and  another  feigned  to  fore- 
see, as  they  glanced  futureward,  renewed  chances  of  escape  from  the 
consequences  of  sin,  and  additional  opportunities  of  salvation.  Uni- 
versalism  has  pressed  this  feature  of  eschatology  with  enthusiasm,  but 
not  with  ability,  upon  the  attention  of  the  public  mind.  In  these 
days  such  thinkei's  as  Canon  Farrar,  Dr.  Dorner,  Newman  Smyth, 
Henry  Ward  Beecher,  and  others  of  Protestant  and  orthodox  tenden- 


A  SECOND  PROBATION  UNNECESSARY.  607 

cies,  have  espoused  the  theory,  and  are  setting  it  forth  with  that 
skill  that  characterizes  their  theological  work  in  general,  and  creating 
a  suspicion  that  it  may  possibly  be  well-founded  in  the  Scriptures. 
It  is  not,  as  a  dogma  of  Universalism,  that  it  deserves  notice;  but, 
as  a  theory  of  Protestant  thinkers,  it  can  not  be  ignored. 

It  is  alleged  in  its  favor  that  infants,  dying  as  such,  have  not 
passed  through  a  probation,  and,  inasmuch  as  probation  is  related  to 
character,  they  must  undergo  its  liabilities  and  discipline  in  the  next 
life.  This  is  pure  speculation ;  it  is  not  revelation.  It  is  faulty  in 
that  it  requires  the  intermediate  world  to  be  essentially  in  its  moral 
conditions  what  the  present  world  is,  for  probation  involves  just 
such  conditions  as  environ  human  life  here.  The  intermediate 
world  is  nowhere  represented  as  a  probationary  world.  This  remark 
also  applies  to  the  suggestion  that  the  heathen  have  not  had  a  Gos- 
pel chance  in  this  life,  and  it  must  be  afforded  them  in  the  next  life. 
No  one  is  on  probation  there,  either  infants  because  they  were  taken 
from  probation  here,  or  heathen  because  the  Gospel  idea  of  probation 
was  unknown  to  them.  Paul  shows  that  the  heathen,  ignorant  of 
the  Gospel  here,  shall  not  be  judged  by  it  there.  No  Gospel  probation 
here,  no  Gospel  responsibility  there  ;  this  is  the  Gospel.  The  Apostle 
Peter  (I  Peter  iii,  18-20)  is  considered  by  Farrar,  Dorner,  and  others, 
as  a  second  probationist,  whereas  in  the  passage  referred  to  it  is  evi- 
dent that  even  if  another  probation  should  be  granted  to  the  ante- 
diluvians it  would  avail  nothing  in  their  behalf,  and  would  result  in 
no  improved  chance  of  salvation.  Let  it  be  granted  that  Christ 
preached  the  Gospel  in  the  intermediate  world,  and  that  it  was  heard 
throughout  hades  by  all  the  inhabitants  thereof;  what  avails  it?  He 
never  went  there  but  once  on  such  a  mission,  and  it  failed ;  he  has 
not  instituted  a  ministry  to  jDroclaim  the  Gospel  in  his  name  to  the 
intermediate  world;  the  Gospel  he  preached  was  one  of  comfort  to 
the  righteous,  and  of  condemnation  to  the  wicked,  and  no  change 
was  produced  in  that  world  by  his  temporary  ministry.  If  the  pas- 
sage is  of  worth  in  this  connection  it  proves  that  a  second  probation 
to  the  ungodly  will  be  as  ineffectual  as  the  first,  and  hence  there  is 
no  sound  reason  for  another  probation. 

Consulting  the  Scriptures,  which  bear  directly  upon  the  subject, 
they  are  clear  in  their  repudiation  of  a  theory  that  in  its  ethical  as- 
peats  can  not  promote  human  welfare  or  the  prospects  of  eternal 
salvation.  Paul  (11  Cor.  v,  10)  affirms  that  "we  must  all 
appear  before  the  judgment-seat  of  Christ,  that  every  one  may  re- 
ceive the  things  done  in  his  body,  according  to  that  he  hath  done, 
whether  it  be  good  or  bad."  The  decisions  of  the  judgment-day  will 
be  based  on  the/rsi  probation,  and  not  on  any  subsequent  probation, 


608  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

if  there  is  any.  In  that  judgment-scene  recorded  by  Matthew  (xxv, 
31-45)  the  decisions  are  based  wholly  on  the  events  of  this  life,  and 
no  reference  is  made  to  an  intermediate  probation.  These  alone  are 
sufficient  to  dispose  of  the  heresy  of  another  probation.  The  inter- 
mediate world  is  not  probationary  like  the  present  world,  but  it 
is  a  type  of  the  eternal  world  into  which  all  finally  go.  It  is 
not  like  the  present,  but  like  the  eternal,  world.  It  is  the  eternal 
world. 

Closely  associated  with  the  doctrines  of  this  chapter  thus  far 
considered  are  others  of  no  little  importance  and  bound  up  in  the 
miscellany  of  the  "last  things."  We  refer  to  the  Millennium,  the 
Second  Coming  of  Christ,  and  the  expiration  or  consummation  of  the 
Christian  dispensation. 

That  there  will  be  another  advent  of  the  Lord,  most,  though  not 
all,  Bible  interpreters  concede.  Among  the  majority  of  believers,  the 
certainty  of  a  second  advent  is  no  more  held  in  suspense  than  the 
fact  of  a  first  advent.  Indeed,  from  a  priori  considerations,  there 
were  more  improbabilities  of  the  first  advent  happening  as  recorded, 
than  that  a  second  advent  should  take  place  in  the  manner  and  for 
the  purpose  specified  in  Holy  Writ.  But,  while  most  accept  that  in- 
terpretation which  allows  a  second  visitation  of  our  Lord  to  the  earth, 
all  are  not  agreed  as  to  the  time,  manner,  significance,  or  purpose  of 
the  event,  and  therefore  it  can  hardly  be  expected  of  us  to  furnish 
an  interpretation  which  will  reconcile  all  differences  and  unite  all  in 
one  opinion.  Still,  we  venture  to  lay  before  our  readers  an  under- 
standing of  the  Word  which  seems  to  contain  less  difficulties  than  any 
other,  and,  on  the  whole,  that  which  satisfies  us. 

It  might  be  remarked  in  passing,  that  there  are  those  who  have 
eliminated  all  Second  Adventism  from  their  creed,  on  the  ad  captan- 
dum  ground  that  the  Scriptures  do  not  indicate  the  thought  of  Christ's 
return  to  the  earth  in  the  future,  for  any  purpose  whatever.  There 
are  others  who  construe  the  Scriptures  bearing  in  this  direction  in  a 
figurative  sense,  denying  the  personal  reappearing  of  our  Lord,  and 
contending  that  his  spiritual  presence  is  a  sufficient  fulfillment  of  the 
prophetic  advent.  Contrary  to  this  position,  Swedenborg  has  taught 
that  Christ  is  to  come  again  into  the  world  in  his  Word,  as  he  once 
came  in  the  flesh.  But  the  word-coming  of  the  Lord— no  less  than 
his  spirit-coming — fails  to  satisfy  believers  in  a  personal  advent ;  and 
it  is  questionable  if  any  other  than  a  literal,  visible,  bodily,  personal 
coming  of  the  Lord  is  a  coming  at  all.  A  spiritual,  or  word-coming, 
can  not  be  any  thing  more  than  a  qualified,  representative  coming, 
which  is  very  different  from  a  personal  coming. 

Much,  perhaps  the  greater,  interest  centers  in  the  chronological 


THE  THEORY  OF  PRE-MILLENNIANISM.  609 

aspects  of  the  question,  and  this  because  all  correlative  questions  are 
dependent  upon  the  settlement  of  its  chronology. 

Respecting  the  chronological  phase  of  the  subject,  two  theories 
have  prevailed  in  the  Church  since  the  apostolic  age,  each  eloquently 
advocated  by  peerless  men.  The  theory  of  pre-millennianism,  or  the 
advent  of  the  Lord  prior  to  the  millennium,  and  for  the  purpose  of 
introducing  it,  is  very  ancient,  and  has  for  long  periods  of  time  been 
in  the  ascendant  in  the  conception  of  Christian  people.  Having  the 
right  of  way  in  the  realm  of  Christian  thought,  its  authority  has  not 
been  strongly  disputed  and  has  been  almost  silently  accepted  as  the 
only  possible  construction  of  the  Scriptures,  by  the  Church  at  large. 
Singularly  enough,  the  theory  has  been  traced  back  to  the  Jews,  who, 
taught  by  the  prophets,  entertained  a  belief  in  the  future  glory  of 
the  earth,  and,  along  with  it,  the  cognate  doctrine  of  the  millennium. 
Among  the  early  Christian  fathers,  Justin  Martyr,  Irenseus,  and  Ter- 
tullian  held  to  Chiliasm  with  a  firm  grasp,  and  suggested  the  thought 
that  Christ  would  have  a  residence  at  Jerusalem  and  reign  over  the 
earth.  Chiliasm  bore  in  the  earliest  times  a  materialistic  stamp, 
growing  out  of  the  disposition  of  the  fathers  to  read  the  Scriptural 
representation  of  the  Advent  in  a  strictly  literal  manner.  They  did 
not  hold  to  a  spiritual-coming  or  a  word-coming  of  the  Lord,  but  to 
a  personal  coming,  and  affixed  the  time  for  his  appearance  at  some 
point  this  side  of  the  millennium.  While  later  Christian  thought  has 
stripped  the  doctrine  of  its  materialism,  such  modern  men  as  Christ- 
lieb,  Lange,  Olshausen,  Van  Oosterzee,  Chalmers,  Alford,  Home, 
Trench,  Ellicott,  Mcllvaine,  Bedell,  and  Winthrop,  adhere  to  the  ad- 
ventism  of  their  fathers,  and  join  in  support  of  a  pre-millennial  faith. 
John  and  Charles  Wesley  have  been  likewise  summoned  as  witnesses 
to  the  Scriptural  soundness  of  the  theory  of  pre-millennianism.  With 
this  array  of  authorities,  ancient  and  modern,  supporting,  and  with 
this  chandelier  of  lights  illuminating  the  theory  of  pre-millennianism, 
it  may  seem  presumptuous  to  contend  for  another  view,  or  assume  the 
possibility  of  another  construction. 

On  the  other  hand,  there  is  the  theory  of  post-millennianism,  or 
the  return  of  the  Lord  after  the  millennium,  at  the  close  of  the 
world's  history,  and  for  purposes  entirely  disconnected  with  the  mil- 
lennial state. 

It  is  the  statement  of  Dr.  Nast  that  post-millennianism  is  popular 
in  the  Methodist  Episcopal  Church  ;  and,  excepting  a  few  honored 
names,  our  standard  writers  are  on  this  side  of  the  question.  Dr. 
Whedon  says,  "The  millennium  first,  and  then  the  second  advent." 
Dr.  Raymond  holds  the  same  conclusion.  Bishop  Merrill  likewise 
contends  for  it  in  a  masterly  monograph. 


610  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

Without  further  stating  the  differences  between  these  theories,  or 
invoking  the  approval  of  Christian  authorities,  we  propose  to  examine 
the  relation  of  the  advent  to  the  millennium,  which  will  involve  two 
questions:  1st.  What  is  the  Millennium?  2d.  What  is  the  Advent? 
If  these  questions  can  be  answered  satisfactorily,  or  rather,  if  we  can 
read  the  Gospel  between  the  lines,  it  will  require  but  a  moment  to 
assign  the  advent  its  chronological  place  in  the  history  of  time. 

1st.  What  is  the  Millennium  ?  The  answer  to  this  primary  ques- 
tion involves  a  few  intermediate  considerations,  such  as  those  respect- 
ing its  manner  of  introduction,  the  signs  accompanying  it,  and  its 
duration.  It  may  be  well  to  remember  that  the  word  "millennium," 
like  the  word  "sacrament,"  and  other  Church  words,  is  not  in  the 
Scriptures ;  but,  unlike  those  other  words,  it  rests  upon  a  single  pas- 
sage for  its  authorized  use.  Etymologically,  the  word  is  derived 
from  mille,  a  thousand,  and  annus,  a  year ;  and,  when  taken  together, 
it  signifies  a  thousand  years.  It  implies  simply  a  definite  duration, 
without  involving  the  events  or  conditions  of  the  period  ;  and  yet, 
because  John  in  the  Apocalypse  alludes  to  a  millennial  bondage  of 
Satan,  and  a  millennial  reign  of  martyrs,  the  fascinating  doctrine  of  a 
millennium,  in  which  Christ  will  personally  reign  on  earth,  has  been 
constructed  and  popularized  in  every  conceivable  form.  But  if  it 
can  not  be  supported  by  parallel  passages,  as  no  one  will  pretend  it 
can  be,  he  must  not  be  subjected  to  criticism  who  says  that  such  a 
millennium  is  a  fiction.  To  this  conclusion  the  post-millennialist  is 
logically  carried. 

But,  waiving  any  etymological  exception,  what  is  the  millennium 
in  the  apocalyptic  sense  ?  For,  without  controversy,  the  millennium 
of  John,  the  thousand-year  period  of  the  exile  of  Patmos,  is  regarded 
as  the  most  definite  of  any  of  his  statements  on  the  subject.  Turn  to 
the  twentieth  chapter  of  Revelation,  the  only  millennial  chapter  in 
the  Book,  and  these  particulars  are  noted :  1.  Satan  is  confined  in  the 
bottomless  pit  for  a  thousand  years ;  2.  Beheaded  ones  live  again  and 
reign  with  Christ  a  thousand  years.  Study  the  chapter  as  closely  as 
one  will,  and  these  are  the  net  particulars,  the  only  allusions  in  it 
touching  the  millennial  state. 

We  will  be  pardoned  if  we  express  surprise  at  the  omission  of 
certain  statements  which  should  have  been  made,  if  the  personal 
reign  of  Christ  on  earth  were  involved  in  the  millennium.  It  is  not 
stated  that  Christ  reigns  on  earth,  nor  that  he  descends  to  the  earth, 
nor  that  the  beheaded  ones,  now  alive  again,  who  reign  with  Christ, 
reign  on  the  earth.  The  most  liberal,  and  at  the  same  time  the  most 
literal,  rendering  of  the  enigmatical  chapter  foreshadows  the  resurrec- 
tion of  the  martyrs  in  advance  of  the  general  resurrection  of  the  race, 


EARTH-SIDE  OF  THE  MILLENNIUM.  611 

and  that  they  reign  with  Christ,  where  Christ  is,  a  thousand  years 
longer  than  the  other  pious  dead.  Christ  is  in  heaven,  and  has  been 
reigning  there  since  his  ascension ;  and  that  class  of  worshipers,  be- 
headed for  the  testimony  of  Jesus,  enter  sooner  upon  the  eternal 
reward  than  the  majority  of  Christ's  followers.  This  is  the  first  resur- 
rection, and  blessed  is  he  who  has  a  part  in  it,  because  it  is  in  ad- 
vance of  the  general  resurrection.  Christ  does  not  reign  with  risen 
martyrs  on  earth,  but  the  risen  maHyrs  reign  with  Christ  in  heaven. 
Thus  the  millennium  of  John  has  a  heaven-side  to  it. 

The  earth-side  of  the  millennium  has  respect  to  the  bondage  of 
Satan,  and  in  this  we  are  greatly  interested.  In  fact,  we  are  to  deal 
only  with  the  millennium  as  it  afiects  the  earth  or  human  condition 
upon  it.  Satan  is  in  chains  ;  the  earth  has  unexpected,  uninterrupted 
rest  from  his  reign.  Sin  measurably  disappears,  it  being  under 
Heaven's  ban.  What  is  left  of  it  is  the  utterance  of  unexpelled,  in- 
nate depravity,  the  moving  of  the  pent-up  sinful  tendencies  of  the 
soul,  like  the  fires  of  an  active  volcano.  But  these  fires  will  at  last 
subside,  and  every  crater  will  be  cold.  There  can  be  sin  without 
Satan,  but  the  great  instigator  of  sin,  the  great  leader  of  the  world's 
mischief  and  the  great  progenitor  of  the  world's  sorrow  will  be  ab- 
sent, unrepresented,  save  by  Christ-abandoned  souls ;  sinful  enter- 
prises will  lag,  sins  themselves  will  decay ;  tribes  of  men  will  covet 
the  best  civilization,  and  the  hemispheres  will  echo  with  the  voice  of 
love — a  grand  opportunity  for  extending  the  sway  of  the  Gospel. 

It  wiU  be  extended  ;  the  hindrances  will  disappear  before  the  her- 
alds of  the  cross ;  nations  will  be  born  in  a  day ;  peace  will  be  univer- 
sal ;  skepticism  will  retire  to  a  cave  ;  Bacchus  will  seek  some  other 
planet  to  ply  his  vocation  of  ruin  ;  heathen  idols  will  fall  from  their 
shrines  ;  heathen  temples  will  be  vacated  forever ;  Christendom  will 
embrace  the  whole  earth ;  all  hearts  will  pulsate  with  Christian  joy, 
and  all  lips  tremble  with  Christian  praise.  Such  a  period  of  moral 
supremacy,  of  the  authority  of  moral  law,  the  prevalence  of  Gospel 
influence,  and  the  disarmament  of  Satanic  rule  will  come  and  con- 
tinue for  a  long  period.  If  this  is  the  millennium  of  the  Apocalypse, 
as  it  seems  to  be,  then  is  it  in  harmony  with  the  millennium  of  the 
entire  Bible,  and  equally  in  harmony  with  the  post-millennianism  of 
some  of  the  ablest  thinkers  of  the  day. 

To  make  sure,  however,  what  this  millennium  is,  let  it  be  an- 
alyzed. 1.  It  signifies  a  political  millennium.  By  this  we  mean  the 
disappearance  of  all  obnoxious  and  despotic  forms  of  government,  and 
the  substitution  of  all  noble  and  conserving  exhibitions  of  civil  power. 
Monarchies,  aristocracies,  nobilities,  tyrannies  of  every  sort  shall  sub- 
side, and  a  democratic  form  of  government  will  obtain  everywhere. 


612  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

This  is  not  a  dream,  for  a  millennium  that  would  not  regenerate  civil 
authority,  and  give  to  the  nations  the  most  approved  forms  of  govern- 
ment, would  be  sadly  deficient  in  its  influence  on  rulers  and  public 
men.  Besides,  the  tendency  of  every  enlightened  government  is 
toward  a  repviblic,  and  the  world  anticipates  the  subsidence  of  all  op- 
pression and  all  tyranny.     The  millennium  must  be  political. 

2.  There  will  be  a  scientific  millennium.  By  this  we  mean  the 
spread  of  knowledge  and  the  reign  of  truth  among  all  peoples.  Ig- 
norance must  vanish.  The  mind  of  man  must  expand,  and  mystery 
must  no  longer  be  the  apologetic  word  for  ignorance.  The  laws  of 
nature  must  be  known,  and  the  flag-stafi"  of  light  must  be  planted  on 
the  highest  summit  of  truth.  The  world  must  not  ask  a  question  in 
the  realm  of  the  Finite  which  it  can  not  answer.  Science  is  to  have 
a  millennium,  a  great  perpetual  triumph  in  its  own  field  of  existence. 
Astronomy,  geology,  philosophy,  chemistry,  putting  off  their  swad- 
dling clothes,  will  become  giants  and  tread  the  earth  in  conscious 
power,  subduing  all  intractable  things  to  themselves,  or,  like  new- 
made  suns,  career  through  the  heavens  and  illuminate  the  world. 

3.  It  implies  a  religions  millennium.  Of  this  we  have  spoken, 
but  let  us  not  forget  that  the  Gospel  will  not  be  surpassed  in  the 
broadness  of  its  triumphs  by  either  government  or  science.  It  will  be 
preached  everywhere,  believed  everywhere,  and  reign  everywhere, 
changing  the  moral  complexion  of  the  race,  touching  the  dead  heart 
of  humanity  into  life,  and  breathing  into  the  souls  of  men  the  im- 
pulses of  heaven.  The  Gospel  will  be  supreme  in  the  world,  and  the 
promises  of  the  prophets  will  be  realized  in  the  regeneration  of  the 
family  of  man.  We  can  not  over-state  the  extent  or  comprehend  the 
glory  of  the  triumph  of  the  Gospel  in  the  period  of  its  unresisting 
progress. 

What  is  the  relation  of  this  millennium  to  the  others  ?  These 
three  millenniums  are  one,  and  are  to  occur  simultaneously.  One  can 
not  exist  without  the  other.  They  are  not  independent,  but  co-exist- 
ent, millenniums.  We  have  been  in  the  habit  of  emphasizing  the  re- 
ligious aspect  of  the  millennium,  and  regarding  other  conditions, 
political  and  scientific,  as  incidental,  or  the  outgrowth  of  the  Gospel 
reign ;  but  certain  it  is  that  if  not  synchronous  in  their  existence,  the 
millenniums  are  so  related  that  they  can  not  be  far  apart.  Each  as- 
sists the  other,  and  each  shares  the  glories  of  all.  It  is  trinity  in 
unity,  applied  to  the  millennium. 

Guided  solely  by  the  apocalyptic  chapter,  we  should  say  that  this 
three-fold  millennium  compasses  in  its  duration  the  period  of  a  thou- 
sand years.  We  are  sorry  to  say  it ;  we  prefer  to  say  it  will  have 
no  end,  and  that  it  wiU  continue  until  Gabriel  shall  announce  the 


THE  ULTIMATE  MILLENNIUM.  613 

termination  of  time.  But  John  plainly  intimates  a  limited  millen- 
nium, which,  we  think,  is  in  accordance  with  the  duration  of  the 
Bible  millennium  in  general  and  with  post-milleunianism  in  particular. 

Accepting  a  millennial  condition  limited  to  a  thousand  years,  the 
decisive  question  now  is,  What  has  the  Second  Advent  to  do  with 
such  a  millennium  ?  Is  not  such  a  millennium,  transcendently  glori- 
ous as  it  must  be,  possible  without  the  intervention  of  Christ's  per- 
sonal presence  on  earth  ?  Are  the  two  inseparable  ?  Let  us  give  heed 
to  the  reasons  that  may  be  urged  against  the  necessity  of  the  advent 
at  this  juncture  of  the  world's  history. 

Such  a  millennium  as  we  have  described,  consisting  of  perfect 
forms  of  civil  government,  of  the  dawn  of  universal  science,  of  Gos- 
pel successes  and  illuminations,  is  the  ultimate  'purpose  of  the  Gospel. 
This  new  condition  of  earth-life  is  just  what  the  Gospel  promises  shall 
exist  and  what  it  proposes  to  secure.  The  triune  millennium  will  be 
launched  upon  the  open  sea  of  human  life  by  the  Gospel,  and  will  be 
a  result  of  the  Gospel.  Nowhere  is  it  stated  that  it  is  to  be  intro- 
duced by  the  appearing  of  the  Lord,  or  by  his  reign  upon  the  earth, 
but  rather  by  the  aggressive  and  assimilating  power  of  the  Gospel. 
Micah  says:  "But  in  the  last  day  it  shall  come  to  pass  that  the 
mountain  of  the  house  of  the  Lord  shall  be  established  in  the  tops  of 
the  mountains,  and  it  shall  be  exalted  above  the  hills ;  and  the  peo- 
ple shall  flow  unto  it."  The  prophet  here  alludes  to  the  universal 
triumph  of  the  Gospel  through  the  Church.  Jeremiah  says:  "  And 
they  shall  teach  no  more  every  man  his  neighbor  and  every  man  his 
brother,  saying,  Know  the  Lord  ;  for  they  shall  all  know  me,  from 
the  least  of  them  unto  the  greatest  of  them,  saith  the  Lord."  Here  is 
universal  knowledge  of  God  through  the  Gospel.  Habakkuk  says  : 
"  For  the  earth  shall  be  filled  with  the  knowledge  of  the  glory  of  the 
Lord,  as  the  waters  cover  the  sea."  This  is  always  interpreted  to  sig- 
nify the  triumph  of  Christianity  in  the  earth.  But  it  is  needless,  in 
support  of  this  opinion,  to  quote  from  a  Book  with  which  all  are 
familiar. 

If  these  millennial  conditions  can  not  be  produced  by  the  Gospel, 
or  if  it  does  not  tend  to  establish  them,  then  its  mission  is  a  failure, 
or  its  mission  is  not  what  we  have  assigned  it.  If  the  ultimate  of  the 
Gospel  is  not  the  millennium,  it  is  something  else.  What  is  it?  It 
must  be  something  short  of  it,  for  it  can  not  be  any  thing  beyond  it, 
or  any  thing  that  will  parallel  it.  Conceiving  that  the  ultimate  of  the 
Gospel  is  any  thing  less  than  a  millennial  condition,  its  mission  is 
tentative,  insignificant ;  its  hold  upon  us  must  be  feeble,  and  our  hold 
upon  it  exceedingly  light. 

But  it  must  appear  to  all  that,  finally  realized  or  not,  the  ten- 


614  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

dencies  of  the  Gospel  are  in  the  direction  of  the  millennium,  and  it 
is  preparing  the  world  for  a  better  condition.  Prophets  sing  of  an 
age  of  peace,  apostles  tell  it  is  forthcoming,  and  Christ  saw  triumph 
from  afar.  It  can  not  be  denied  that  the  Gospel,  as  an  operating 
factor  in  the  world's  progress,  has  changed  governments,  and  is  in  its 
very  constitution  opposed  to  oligarchies,  despotisms,  monarchies,  and 
all  forms  of  power  which  oppress  men.  The  Gospel  is  the  Guy 
Fawkes  under  tyranny,  and  as  it  explodes  doubtful  forms  of  govern- 
ment, and  its  teachings  are  incorporated  in  the  civil  life  of  man, 
democracy  must  prevail.  It  wUl  prevail.  France  has  yielded  to  the 
millennial  impulse  already,  Spain  is  in  perpetual  ferment  on  account 
of  it,  and  Europe  is  on  the  verge  of  a  continental  republic. 

In  the  realm  of  science,  its  effect  is  no  less  significant.  It  tella 
of  light  chasing  away  darkness,  of  midnights  sinking  out  of  sight  in 
the  meridian  glare  of  perpetual  day.  It  tells  of  the  dawn  of  knowl- 
edge, prophesying  the  period  of  emancipated  intellects  and  the  wide- 
spread reign  of  truth. 

Keligiously,  its  power  has  always  been  supreme.  It  melts  the 
chains  of  sin,  and  then  transforms  the  sinner  into  a  believer  and  the 
transgressor  into  a  worshiper.  It  molds  unmolded  characters,  and 
saves  unsaved  souls.     These  are  its  tendencies  and  these  its  works. 

Now,  if  the  millennium  be  the  ultimate  of  the  Gospel,  then  must 
it  be  reached  by  the  Gospel,  or  it  is  attempting  an  achievement  on 
an  insufficient  basis,  and  contemplating  a  result  which,  however  much 
it  may  promote,  it  can  not  realize,  in  which  case  it  must  be  set  down 
as  a  failure. 

Still  greater  and  more  shameful  must  be  the  failure,  if  the  millen- 
nium is  the  ultimate  of  the  Gospel,  and  Gospel  agencies  are  suffi- 
cient to  produce  it,  and  yet  some  other  agency  must  finally  be 
employed. to  precipitate  it  on  the  world.  We  can  not  resist  the  con- 
viction that  the  Gospel  has  inherent  power  to  accomplish  its  own 
purposes,  that  it  gravitates  toward  success,  and  that  Omnipotence  alone 
can  turn  it  back  from  its  appointed  destiny.  This  is  different  from, 
it  is  not  even  kindred  to,  that  transcendentalism  of  Germany  which 
allows  to  truth  a  self-propagating  and  self-operating  power,  and  that  it 
is  independent  o'f  external  agency  for  its  triumph.  The  Gospel  will 
not  propagate  itself;  it  must  be  preached.  But  its  agencies,  we  are 
constrained  to  say,  when  set  in  motion,  are  directed  by  an  inspiring 
hand,  one  certainly  sufficient  to  accomplish  its  ultimate  purposes. 

How  has  it  been  in  the  past?  We  are  prone  to  attribute  the  dis- 
appearance of  great  evils,  such  as  slavery,  feudalism,  barbarous  pun- 
ishments, to  the  commanding  power  of  the  Gospel.  Will  it  not  do 
as  much  for  the  world  in  the  future  as  it  has  in  the  past?     Has  it  lost 


GRADUAL  INTRODUCTION  OF  THE  MILLENNIUM.       615 

its  power  to  cope  with  evil,  its  skill  and  cunning  in  extinguishing  vice, 
or  may  we  not  rightfully  expect  that  its  long  experience  and  struggle 
with  gigantic  evils  has  prepared  it  for  broader  aggression  and  wider 
triumphs?  If  so,  if  the  Gospel  will  measure  up  to  our  expectations 
in  the  future,  if  the  edge  of  its  sword  is  all  the  keener  for  the  con- 
flicts it  has  engaged  in,  and  is  wielded  by  more  skillful  hands  in  the 
future, — the  long  delayed  millennium  will  arrive,  and  turn  the  noise 
of  a  sinful  world  into  the  echoes  of  the  Redeemer's  worship. 

We  do  not  understand  from  the  Scripture  that  the  millennium  is 
to  be  introduced  on  short  notice  ;  that  the  world,  retiring  in  wicked- 
ness at  night,  will  awake  the  next  morning  in  the  blaze  of  a  millennial 
day.  Such  a  thing  might  happen,  inasmuch  as  great  Scriptural  events 
have  happened  as  suddenly,  as  the  destruction  of  Sodom,  and,  per- 
haps, the  flood,  and  it  is  taught  that  the  general  resurrection  and  the 
second  coming  of  Christ  will  likely  break  upon  the  world  as  a  sur- 
prise, though  not  without  antecedent  signs.  But  it  is  not  probable 
that  the  millennium  will  astonish  the  world  by  a  sudden  revolution 
in  its  condition,  or  its  introduction  be  distinguished  by  unexpected 
phenomena,  by  the  sudden  collapse  of  error  and  the  elevation  of 
truth.  Introduced  by  the  Gospel,  it  will  dawn  as  the  rising  of  the 
sun,  gradually  folding  up  the  curtains  of  the  long  night  of  darkness, 
and  flooding  the  earth  with  its  beams  of  glory.  Every  thing  will 
point  in  the  direction  of  a  new  day ;  but  it  may  be  difficult  to  tell 
just  when  it  has  begun,  and  the  world  may  enjoy  it  a  score  of  years 
before  it  is  aware  of  its  presence.  This  silent  leavening  power  of  the 
Gospel,  this  quiet  approach  of  the  millennium,  will  be  in  keeping 
-with  Gospel  methods,  and  in  harmony  with  its  ultimate  design. 

In  contrast  with  this  moral  quietude  of  the  millennium,  note  the 
noisy,  earth-rejoicing  and  heaven-shouting  manner  of  the  second 
coming  of  Christ.  He  comes  to  disturb  the  existing  order,  introduce 
confusion  in  mundane  affairs,  and,  by  the  suddenness  of  his  coming 
and  its  judicial  purpose,  frustrates  the  first  condition  of  the  millen- 
nium, which  is  that  of  peace  and  glory. 

Now,  if  the  millennium  of  the  Apocalypse  is  the  ultimate  of 
the  Gospel;  if  it  can  be  produced  by  Gospel  agencies;  and  if  it 
is  not  a  revolution,  but  the  moral  product  of  the  Gospel, — the  con- 
clusion is  irresistible  that,  as. yet,  there  is  no  necessity  for  connecting 
Christ's  next  advent  with  it. 

To  be  added  to  these  considerations  is  this,  that  in  this  millennial 
chapter  of  John  there  is  not  the  slightest  allusion  to  Christ's  personal 
coming  in  connection  with  the  events  described.  John  does  not  say 
that  Christ  will  come  at  that  time.  He  does  not  even  say  that  the 
chaining  of  Satan  is  by  Christ,  but  by  an  appointed  angel  from  heaven. 


616  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

The  reigning  of  martyrs  is  witli  Christ  after  the  resurrection,  and,  it 
may  be  inferred,  after  their  ascension  into  the  upper  kingdom  of 
Christ.  They  go  to  him — he  does  not  go  to  them ;  so  that  the  mys- 
terious connection  of  Christ's  second  coming  with  the  millennium  of 
the  Apocalypse  is  the  gratuitous  work  of  the  imaginative  theologian, 
rather  than  the  utterances  of  the  inspired  writer. 

This  enigmatical  millennial  chapter  suggests  a  problem,  which,  if 
satisfactorily  solved,  will  be  decisive  of  the  validity  of  pre-millennian- 
ism.  Does  it  not  plainly  intimate  what  shall  occur  at  the  expiration 
of  the  thousand  years  of  universal  peace  and  of  the  reign  of  right- 
eousness ?  We  are  in  no  doubt  as  to  the  certainty  that  the  millennium 
expires ;  we  are  in  less  doubt  as  to  what  follows  it.  Satan  is  unchained, 
and  roams  again  through  the  earth,  devouring,  desolating,  as  before, 
and  involving  the  nations  in  battle.  Satan's  authority  is  regained, 
and  Satan's  kingdom  has  recognition.  We  dislike  to  concede  such  a 
lapse  from  the  millennium,  but  John  teaches  it,  and  we  must  account 
for  it,  if  we  can. 

How  explain  this  disappearance  of  the  millennium?  If  the  Gos- 
pel introduces  the  millennium  gradually,  we  can  conceive  of  its  decline 
gradually,  or,  for  that  matter,  speedily ;  for  it  is  not  an  uncommon 
thing  for  the  Gospel  to  lose  its  grip  on  the  nations,  and  for  countries 
once  Gospelized  to  relapse  into  heathenism.  What  is  Asia  Minor 
to-day  ?  Few  are  the  Christian  Churches  within  its  borders.  Yet 
Paul  planted  the  Cross  in  its  cities,  and  John  addressed  seven 
Churches  there  seventeen  hundred  years  ago.  The  Gospel  has  almost 
disappeared,  and  with  it  its  influence.  Has  it  not  also  lost  its  influ- 
ence at  Jerusalem,  where  the  apostles  received  the  Holy  Ghost,  and 
from  which  they  went  forth  to  conquer  the  world  for  the  Master? 
The  whole  Roman  Empire  was  once  won  to  Christ,  but,  after  Con- 
stantine,  it  was  well-nigh  lost  to  him.  Great  apostasies  may  succeed 
great  triumphs,  great  defeats  supplant  great  victories.  The  millen- 
nium, introduced  and  fostered  by  the  Gospel,  may  be  succeeded  by 
apostasies,  far  reaching  and  universal,  blotting  out  all  remaining 
Gospel  influence  in  the  earth.  The  Gospel  reign  ebbs  and  flows, 
rises  and  falls,  in  this  world,  and  it  may  suffer  an  eclipse,  a  decline, 
after  a  thousand  years  of  joyful  triumph.  Like  a  candle  which  has 
burnt  itself  out,  the  millennium  expires.  The  explanation  is  not 
embarrassing,  and  all  may  accept  it  as  definite. 

But,  on  the  supposition  that  Christ  comes  in  person  to  set  up  a 
millennial  kingdom,  the  post-millennial  apostasy  can  not  be  easily  ex- 
plained. He  reigns  a  thousand  years — what  then  ?  Does  he  leave  the 
world  again,  ascend  to  heaven,  and,  without  a  struggle,  permit  Satan 
to  resume  ?    Or  does  he  have  a  struggle  with  the  arch-fiend,  who  drives 


PURPOSE  OF  THE  SECOND  COMING.  617 

him  off  the  field  and  raises  his  banner  in  triumph  in  spite  of  Christ's 
power?  We  can  not  think  so.  If  Christ  retires  from  the  earth  at 
the  close  of  the  millennial  period,  then  must  he  come  again  at  the 
end  of  the  world  to  close  up  its  history,  in  which  case  he  would  have 
a  third  advent,  which  no  one  will  recognize  as  taught  in  the  Word. 
He  can  not  come  to  establish  a  millennium  and  then  permit  it  to  fail 
in  his  hands,  nor  can  he  come  before  the  end  without  coming  again 
at  the  end  of  the  world,  which  involves  too  much  adventism. 

The  conviction  grows  on  us  that  when  he  comes  it  will  not  be 
for  the  purpose  of  establishing  a  millennial  kingdom  on  earth,  or  to 
conserve  any  millennial  purpose  whatever. 

What,  then,  is  the  object  of  Christ's  second  coming  ?  Negatively 
considered,  the  purpose  of  the  next  advent  is  not  to  assist  the  Gos- 
pel in  evangelizing  the  world ;  it  has  no  reference  to  the  spread  of 
the  Gospel.  His  first  advent  had  this  in  view,  and  contemplated 
victory  without  the  intervention  of  a  second  advent.  He  came  as  a 
Savior ;  he  was  the  incarnate  God,  offering  to  men  in  his  own  person 
the  fruits  of  redemption.  He  does  not  come  again  to  repeat  his  first 
work.  His  second  errand  has  reference  to  objects  distinct  from 
those  which  engaged  his  attention  when  he  sojourned  among  the 
Hebrews.  In  so  far  as  the  Gospel  kingdom  may  be  vindicated  by 
Christ  at  his  second  appearing,  the  two  advents  will  be  related;  but 
he  comes  not  to  organize  redemption,  but  to  gather  its  harvest,  and 
deliver  the  mediatorial  throne  to  the  Father.  His  first  coming  was 
the  introduction  of  his  kingdom;  his  second  coming  will  witness  its 
termination. 

Keeping  in  mind  a  discrimination  warranted  by  the  Scripture, 
the  fogs  which  have  gathered  about  the  subject  will  rise  and  be  gone, 
and  we  shall  have  no  difficulty  in  understanding  the  order  of  the  events 
of  the  future :  1.  The  Gospel  and  the  millennium  are  associated  to- 
gether in  the  inspired  volume,  the  one  as  instrumental  cause,  the 
other  as  processional  effect.  2.  The  second  Advent  and  the  events 
connected  with  the  closing  of  the  world's  history,  such  as  resurrection, 
conflagration,  and  judgment,  are  associated  together  as  occurring  al- 
most simultaneously,  or,  at  least,  not  far  apart.  Looking  beyond  the 
millennium,  after  its  traces  have  disappeared,  and  its  blessings  have 
been  submerged  in  the  vices  of  an  apostate  race,  when  sin  seems  to 
have  usurped  authority  in  the  earth,  we  see  coming  in  glory  the  Son 
of  God  to  administer  on  the  affairs  of  the  world  and  deliver  it  over 
to  the  Father  for  final  disposition. 

If  this  is  the  object  of  his  coming,  the  Scriptures  must  certainly 
foreshadow  it,  and  to  them  let  us  at  once  turn. 

Concerning  the  resurrection,  Paul,  the  best  sacred  eschatological 


618  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

writer,  in  his  first  Corinthian  epistle  says  :  ' '  But  every  man  in  his  own 
order ;  Christ  the  first  fruits,  afterward  they  that  are  Christ's  at  his 
coming."  Here  is  resurrection  at  his  coming.  In  his  letter  to  the 
Philippians  he  says :  "  For  our  conversation  is  in  heaven,  from  whence 
also  we  look  for  the  Savior,  the  Lord  Jesus  Christ,  who  shall  change 
our  vile  body  that  it  may  be  fashioned  like  unto  his  glorious  body." 
Here  is  resurrection  again  in  connection  with  his  coming;  and,  with- 
out multiplying  references,  it  must  be  clear  that  one  object  of 
Christ's  coming  is  to  raise  the  dead. 

After  the  resurrection,  what  then  ?  Again  confiding  in  the  apos- 
tle of  the  Gentiles,  we  hear  him  say,  as  he  addresses  Timothy:  "I 
charge  thee,  therefore,  before  God,  and  the  Lord  Jesus  Christ  who 
shall  judge  the  quick  and  the  dead  at  his  appearing."  He  affirms  that 
judgment  takes  place  at  the  second  coming — no  millennium  here. 
Again,  it  is  recorded:  "For  the  Son  of  man  shall  come  in  the  glory 
of  his  father  with  his  angels,  and  then  he  shall  reward  every  man  ac- 
cording to  his  works."  Here  are  the  two  events.  Advent  and  Judg- 
ment, connected  in  the  same  passage.  Paul  likewise  asserts  that 
"  when  the  Lord  Jesus  shall  be  revealed  from  heaven  with  his  mighty 
angels,  in  flaming  fire,  taking  vengeance  on  them  that  know  not  God, 
and  that  obey  not  the  Gospel  of  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ ;  when  he 
shall  come  to  be  glorified  in  his  saints  in  that  day."  Here  it  is  af- 
firmed that  when  Christ  shall  come  he  will  punish  the  wicked  and 
glorify  the  obedient.     This  is  not  millennium — this  is  judgment. 

In  close  connection  with  these  events,  Peter  tells  us  that  the  con- 
flagration of  the  world,  a  terrific  catastrophe,  is  to  occur  and  close 
up  earth's  history. 

Now,  if  Christ's  second  coming  shall  occur  simultaneously  with  res- 
urrection, judgment,  and  conflagration,  as  it  undoubtedly  will,  accord- 
ing to  the  above  Scriptures;  and  if  it  is  established  that  these  three 
great  events  occur  at  the  end  of  the  world,  the  post-millennial  feature 
of  the  advent  is  sustained.  Matthew  (xiii,  36-43),  besides  other 
writers,  teaches  that  resurrection  and  conflagration  are  among  the 
events  of  the  last  day,  and  that  Christ's  return  to  the  earth  is  to  ac- 
complish these  changes  in  its  history. 

Therefore,  the  second  advent  ivill  occur  at  the  end  of  the  world — 
not  before  the  millennium ;  but,  perhaps,  ages  after  it.  Pre-millen- 
nianism  is  the  dream  of  piety ;  post-millennianism  one  of  the  ' '  cer- 
tainties of  religion." 

The  end  of  the  world  !  The  end  of  time,  of  the  intermediate 
world,  and  the  dawn  of  the  resurrection  life,  the  judgment-day,  and 
the  opening  of  the  heavens  and  the  hells !  What  a  period  !  What 
events !     What  a  future  !     The  Judgment !     Our  time-life  reviewed ; 


FINAL  JUDICIAL  DECISIONS.  619 

our  eternal  choices  ratified ;  humau  character  evolving  into  eternal 
destiny.  In  the  face  of  the  Scriptures  declaring  that  the  Judgment 
shall  occur  at  the  end  of  the  world,  it  is  supreme  folly  to  insist  that 
it  is  revealed  at  death,  for  while  eternal  destiny  is  shaped  by  this  life, 
and  it  is  irrevocably  fixed  at  death,  the  judicial  sentence  will  not  be 
heard  until  the  great  day  of  the  Lord,  the  day  of  reckoning  with  the 
universe.  Then  all  shall  know  that  the  Lord  is  King  and  the  Judge 
of  all  mankind. 

Heaven  !  The  soul,  clothed  with  a  spiritual  body,  its  house  from 
heaven,  builded  by  God,  enters  to  go  out  no  more  forever.  Angels 
are  there ;  the  good  of  the  ages  past  are  in  the  fadeless  mansions ; 
there  is  the  fruit  of  the  tree  of  life  ;  on  golden-paved  streets  the  saints 
forever  walk ;  no  trouble  disturbs  the  endless  peace  of  the  soul,  and 
no  discord  is  heard  in  the  endless  songs  of  the  redeemed.  Yonder  is 
the  great  throne,  white  with  the  light  of  Him  who  made  the  universe ; 
and  sitting  on  it  is  the  form  of  One  who  once  was  nailed  to  the  Cross. 
Redemption  is  complete  ;  heaven  is  gained. 

Hell !  The  word  is  crowded  with  all  the  repulsive  words  of  all 
the  languages  of  men.  It  means  darkness,  obloquy,  banishment,  fail- 
ure, tears,  sorrow  forever. 

These  are  the  doctrines  of  Christian  eschatology.  They  are  con-^ 
sistent  in  themselves,  in  harmony  with  the  highest  human  interests, 
calculated  to  hold  men  in  check,  and  inspire  them  with  awe  and  a 
love  of  right.  In  these  revelations  Christianity  proves  itself  to  be 
from  God. 


CHAPTER   XXVIII. 

THE    DYNAIVIICS    OK    CHRISTIANITY. 

JAMES  WATT  told  George  III.  that  he  was  dealing  with  some- 
thing that  kings  coveted.  Pressed  for  an  explanation  of  his  state- 
ment, he  answered  with  one  word — power.  Steam  power  is  great; 
the  power  of  gravitation  is  greater;  but  the  power  of  Christianity, 
or  the  secret  force  of  religion,  is  greatest.  This  is  the  power  that 
kings  should  covet,  for  it  is  the  safety  of  thrones  ;  the  power  that  all 
men  should  seek,  for  it  is  the  salvation  of  character. 

The  reappearance  of  Christianity  from  age  to  age,  since  its  Founder 
was  crucified,  is  not  only  a  historic  fact,  but  is  also  significant  of  cer- 
tain indwelling  forces,  or  sources  of  perpetuity,  the  consideration  of 
which  must  necessarily  be  included  in  any  just  estimate  of  its  nature 


620  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

and  history.  There  have  been  times  when  the  death-knell  of  the 
Christian  religion  has  been  sounded,  but  invariably  it  has  revived  and 
survived,  and  gone  on  its  way  as  insensible  to  the  attempts  made  upon 
its  life  as  though  they  had  not  been  made.  Fires,  persecutions,  legis- 
lative obstacles  have  threatened  the  extinction  of  the  apparently  helpless 
cause,  and  united  in  an  endeavor  to  overthrow  it,  but  the  fires  are 
extinct,  and  its  enemies  have  been  consumed  by  their  own  flames. 

In  this  chapter  we  shall  not  trace  its  historic  career,  or  seek  to 
explain  it  as  a  historic  movement ;  but  it  is  our  purpose  to  discover, 
if  possible,  its  inherent  power,  or  those  internal  elements  which  con- 
stitute it  the  vitalizing  and  imperishable  product  it  appears  to  be.  If, 
as  Gibbon  undertakes  to  prove,  the  causes  of  its  historic  successes, 
the  recognition  of  which  can  not  be  avoided,  are  largely  external,  or 
may  be  credited  to  the  enthusiasm  of  believers,  then  it  must  be  re- 
garded as  a  religion  of  sentiment  only,  or  superstition. 

Allowing  that  ecclesiastical  machinery  may  have  something  to  do 
with  the  propagation  of  religion,  and  that  it  often  attracts  when  the 
truth  is  apparently  powerless,  it  is  clear  that  unless  religion  itself  is 
in  a  sense  self-propagating,  all  the  machinery  in  the  world  can  not 
preserve  it  from  ultimate  decay.  The  motive  forces  of  religion  are 
«o  far  from  being  meclianical  that,  without  any  mechanism  tvhatever,  it 
will  live  and  assert  itself.  If  the  Church  were  not  in  existence,  and 
no  organization  espoused  Christianity  as  the  end  of  its  being,  Chris- 
tianity would  still  possess  all  that  inherently  belongs  to  it,  and  it  is 
in  its  inherent  charactenstics,  and  not  in  its  mechanical  relations,  that 
its  power  may  be  detected. 

It  may  be  a  little  circuitous,  but  evidently  in  the  right  direc- 
tion, to  suggest  that  there  is  in  Christianity  the  absence  of  what  other 
religions  have  regarded  as  essential,  which  they  finally  outgrew,  or 
which  was  the  cause  of  their  decline.  The  old  Greek  paganism  was 
a  stiff"  kind  of  philosophy  after  all,  with  little  of  spiritual  elevation  in 
it.  Love  of  nature,  or  natural  religion,  was  the  basis  of  the  religious 
cultus  in  Athens.  The  personification  of  nature's  forces  was  in  regu- 
lar order  both  religious  and  philosophical ;  but  when  the  philosophical 
personification  ceased  the  religious  deification  ceased  also.  Their  le- 
gends, fables,  histories,  and  worships  were  the  outgrowth  of  a  philo- 
sophical desire  to  recognize  in  nature  the  source  of  all  things,  or  a 
self-begetting  principle  in  the  universe  ;  hence  the  forces  were  clothed, 
deified,  and  received  the  homage  of  the  people.  Instead  of  personi- 
fying that  which  is  the  proper  subject  of  deification,  namely,  per- 
sonality, they  personified  that  which  in  no  sense  is  the  exponent  of 
being.  Non-being  can  not  be  the  figure  of  being  ;  hence  its  personi- 
fication was  a  piece  of  philosophical  absurdity,  which  in  due  time  was 


TEE  SPINAL  CORD  OF  FALSE  RELIGIONS.  621 

exposed,  and  the  religion  based  upon  it  declined.  The  form  of  relig- 
ion, however,  long  obtained  after  its  vitality  had  been  exhausted  and 
its  inconsistency  was  made  manifest. 

Not  to  nature  did  the  Roman  go  for  his  religion.  Less  philosoph- 
ical than  the  Greek,  he  was  more  religious,  and  in  the  absence  of 
divine  direction  he  turned  to  humanity  for  the  ideal  statue  of  wor- 
ship, as  the  Greek  had  turned  to  nature.  He  fell  to  worshiping  de- 
ceased ancestors,  and  in  his  long  communion  with  their  virtues  he 
transfigured  the  departed  and  gloried  in  the  invisible.  The  Greek 
worshiped  nature ;  the  Roman  humanity.  The  Greek  adored  the 
visible ;  the  Roman  the  invisible.  The  Greek  personified  force ;  the 
Roman  deified  human  spirits.  The  religion  of  the  Greek  was  the  re- 
ligion of  beauty  and  power ;  the  religion  of  the  Roman  was  the  re- 
ligion of  human  sentiment  and  dreamy  spiritualism.  Both  were 
without  vitalizing  properties ;  neither  was  a  biological  religion ;  both 
decayed. 

Equally,  the  spinal  cord  of  the  Oriental  religions  is  as  defective  in 
strength  and  as  feeble  in  sensibility  as  were  the  paganisms  of  ancient 
Greece  and  Rome.  Brahminism  still  preaches  the  doctrine  of  the 
transmigration  of  souls  ;  Buddhism  shouts  nirvana  as  the  end  of  ex- 
istence ;  and  Mohammedanism  loads  itself  with  sensual  and  supersti- 
tious conceptions  of  the  future  life.  Meanwhile  the  evidences  of  in- 
ternal decay  and  the  absence  of  the  biological  principle  are  patent  to 
the  students  of  these  religions,  which  in  the  future  will  be  regarded 
as  relics  of  religious  history,  having  disappeared  as  active  religious 
forces  from  the  world. 

Whether  personified  force,  or  ancestral  worship,  or  transmigration, 
or  nirvana,  or  a  lustful  heaven  be  the  spinal  doctrine  of  religion,  en- 
forced by  political,  social,  or  military  power,  Christianity  embraced 
none  of  them,  and  is  incompatible  with  all  of  them.  The  deification 
of  nature  is  blasphemy  ;  its  forces  are  the  forces  of  Him  who  made 
the  worlds  ;  its  laws  are  those  of  the  Supreme  Law-giver.  Personifi- 
cation signifies  the  idealizing  of  character,  not  the  idealizing  of  force ; 
and  Christianity  proposes,  as  a  subject  of  idealizing,  the  personal 
character  of  Jesus  Christ,  the  express  image  of  God.  Such  an  ideal- 
izing no  other  religion  ever  attempted.  More  repugnant  in  a  theo- 
logical sense  is  the  Roman  idea  of  religion,  or  the  worship  of  the 
departed.  Not  even  the  angels  receive  worship.  John  fell  down  in 
adoration  before  a  communicating  spirit,  but  was  rebuked  for  his 
idolatry,  and  commanded  to  worship  God.  As  to  transmigration  and 
nirvana,  they  ai-e  the  offspring  of  diseased  imaginations  and  perverted 
beliefs,  having  no  foundation  either  in  reason  or  revelation.  In  its 
conceptions   of  the    future  life    Mohammedanism    is  a   fountain  of 


622  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

iniquity  to  be  sealed  by  the  religion  it  has  sought  to  extinguish.  Chris- 
tianity repudiates  all  religions  grounded  in  philosophical  absurdities, 
rooted  in  metaphysical  errors,  springing  from  superstitious  soils,  or 
bursting  forth  from  the  fires  of  sensuality.  What  it  is  not,  and  es- 
pecially what  it  has  not  in  common  with  other  religions,  it  is  impor- 
tant to  know,  and  may  be  ascertained  by  quiet  inquiry. 

Freeing  it  from  things  common  to  other  religions,  we  are  prepared 
to  consider  the  "  thing-in-itself,"  or  Christiauity  in  its  simplicities 
rather  than  its  complexities,  in  its  principles  rather  than  its  details 
of  operation,  in  its  magnitude  and  wholeness  rather  than  in  its  parts. 

I.  Christianity  is  the  substance  of  religious  truth.  When  Hegel 
calls  it  "absolute  religion,"  he  means  that  its  essence  is  absolute 
truth.  By  substance  or  essence  we  mean  the  underlying  basis,  the 
essentia  of  religion,  without  which  religion  is  impossible,  and  with 
which  religion  is  power.  Physical  objects  have  their  substance  in 
oxygen,  hydrogen,  nitrogen,  and  carbon,  the  four  primordial  ele- 
ments, with  the  addition  of  some  of  the  other  elements  in  small  pro- 
portions. The  four  are  the  essential  elements,  and  constitute  physical 
substance.  So  Religion,  dropping  its  specific  name  for  the  moment, 
must  have  its  substance  in  imperishable  truth,  or  truths,  such  as 
divine  personality,  providence,  theistic  administration,  soteriological 
principles,  and  eschatological  facts.  These  are  the  essentials  of  rehgion. 
Some  of  them  may  be  found  in  all  religions,  but  in  curious  combina- 
tions, in  contradictory  relations,  in  traditional  masks,  and  in  unrecog- 
nizable forms,  and  so  without  vital  influence  or  sovereign  power. 
They  are  like  the  wheat  in  the  mummy-case,  vital  during  the  ages, 
but  without  growth  until  rescued  and  given  the  sunlight  and  a  true 
soil.  In  Christianity,  religious  concepts  are  rescued  from  non-devel- 
opment, and  appear  in  all  their  vitality  and  sovereignty,  as  the 
substance  of  truth. 

In  addition  to  the  essentials  of  religion,  there  are  other  ideas,  re- 
lated to  the  primary  truths,  as  the  sixty-six  elements  are  related  to 
the  four  principal  elements  of  oxygen,  hydrogen,  nitrogen,  and  car- 
bon. In  Religion,  monotheism  is  a  basal  idea,  reflecting  an  intelli- 
gent conception  ;  that  is,  it  differs  from  the  Mohammedan  idea  of  the 
unity  of  God,  which  is  a  by-word  of  religion  rather  than  its  power, 
and  from  the  Jewish  conception,  which,  incipiently  correct,  had  its 
fullest  and  stateliest  manifestation  in  the  dispensation  of  Christ.  The 
early  Jewish  monotheism  was  exclusive  as  a  religious  faith,  Jahveh 
being  the  God  of  the  Jews  only.  In  the  progress  of  the  ages,  or 
with  the  arrival  of  Christ,  the  Jewish  conception  was  enlarged,  so 
that  Jahveh  was  the  God  of  all  nations ;  the  exclusive  faith  was  suc- 
ceeded by  a  universal  conception  of  the  common  fatherhood  of  God. 


•  CRYSTALLIZATION  OF  RELIGIOUS  TRUTH.  623 

It  was  a  great  reach  in  religion  to  step  over  the  primordial  bounds 
of  belief;  but  Hebrewism  was  always  insensibly,  and  yet  gradually 
and  surely,  making  advances  toward  a  higher  order  of  things ;  but, 
when  prepared  for  the  consummation  in  the  highest  truth,  it  unfor- 
tunately collapsed,  and  is  still  defunct. 

In  like  manner,  the  ideas  of  government,  law,  providence,  atone- 
ment by  sacrifice,  and  the  future  life,  initial  and  germinal  in  the 
elder  Hebrewism,  became,  under  the  cultivating  and  manipulating 
influence  of  Christianity,  forceful  ideas  in  the  religious  realm,  and 
the  very  substance  of  a  definite  and  final  religion.  If  Christianity, 
with  its  inherited,  transformed,  and  revealed  truths,  is  not  the  "abso- 
lute religion,"  and  has  not  the  substance  and  essentia  of  truth,  the 
world  is  without,  and  must  be  ever  without,  such  a  religion. 

H.  In  its  exponential  character,  Christianity  is  the  incorporation 
and  crystallization  of  religious  truth.  Substance  alone,  however  essential 
to  being,  to  truth,  to  reality,  is  insufficient ;  truth  must  have  objective 
form,  visibility,  reality.  Religion,  as  an  invisible  truth,  must  emerge 
into  religions,  or  into  a  particular  religion,  chosen  for  the  expression 
of  the  substance-idea;  and  this  has  happened  in  Christianity.  It 
stands  as  the  re-embodiment  of  invisible  truth,  as  Judaism  was  its 
original  embodiment.  For  instance,  in  the  latter,  God  dwelt  in  light 
inaccessible ;  in  the  former,  he  comes  to  the  front,  manifesting  his 
personality  in  a  tangible  form,  voicing  his  will  that  the  world  may 
hear  him,  teaching  truth  that  the  world  may  know  it,  and  promising 
salvation  that  the  world  may  be  of  "good  cheer."  In  Christianity, 
religion  passes  from  substance  into  form,  or  substance  identifies  itself 
with  form,  the  invisible  rushing  into  the  visible, — a  unique  rela- 
tion unknown  to  other  religions.  In  other  religions,  substance  and 
form  are  entirely  incongruous ;  they  are  paired  merely,  not  fitted  to 
each  other.  Christianity  is  the  form  of  the  essentia  of  the  divine 
substance  of  truth,  as  Jesus  Christ  was  the  form  and  image  of  God. 
Philosophically,  it  is  the  religion  of  substance  and  form,  with  an  in- 
dissoluble expression  in  Jesus,  the  Teacher  and  Savior. 

What  the  contents  of  the  form  are,  it  is  needless  to  recapitulate, 
since  our  readers  are  supposed  to  understand  what  are  the  general 
doctrines  of  religion  ;  and  yet,  all  along  from  incarnation  to  ascen- 
sion, including  miracles,  prophecy,  atonement,  forgiveness,  regenera- 
tion, sanctification,  heaven,  hell — all  that  he  taught,  or  left  to  be 
taught  by  his  apostles — there  is  the  outcropping  of  the  invisible  sub- 
stance of  truth.  Variety  in  form,  (hat  is,  in  teaching,  is  consistent 
with  unity  in  substance;  the  form,  complex  or  simple,  is  the 
product  of  the  substance.  Divine  ideas  of  law,  providence,  and  re- 
demption, hidden  in  the  substance,  composing  the  substance,  become 


624  PHILOSOPHY  AISD  CHRISTIANITY. 

concrete  in  the  form,  or  the  masterpieces  of  Christianity.  Knowledge 
of  divine  realities,  divine  programs,  divine  ideas,  the  world  obtains 
alone  through  the  exponential  office  of  Christianity.  It  is  the  only 
religion  in  which  the  divine  is  transparently  and  exclusively  on  ex- 
hibition, the  only  religion  that  rises  above  or  sinks  behind  phenom- 
ena, the  only  religion  that  manifests  the  spiritual  thi'ough  the 
empirical,  the  only  religion  that  makes  the  unknowable  knowable. 
The  process  of  the  revelation  of  substance  in  form,  or  the  essentia  of 
truth  in  religion,  is  divine;  it  is  enough  that  such  process  takes 
place ;  it  is  enough  that  the  result  is  known.  This,  in  part,  is  the 
secret  of  its  power ;  it  is,  in  part,  the  power  itself. 

III.  The  evolutionary  spirit  in  Christianity  is  the  sign  of  its  vitality, 
and  the  guarantee  of  its  propagating  efficiency.  The  scientific  word 
"evolution"  is  here  employed  to  express  the  continuous  development 
of  religious  truth  from  its  incipient  character  in  Hebrewism  to  its  com- 
pleted state  in  the  apostolic  dispensation.  That  Christianity  is  the 
religion  of  revelation  hy  evolution,  that  is,  by  gradual  unfoldings,  is  a 
cardinal  doctrine  of  the  book  called  the  Bible.  There  is  no  religion 
so  evolutionary  as  Christianity ;  thei  e  is  no  religion  that  is  evolution- 
ary, save  Christianity  ;  for,  while  other  religions  appeared  at  once  in 
a  completed  form,  like  Minerva  from  the  brain  of  Jupiter,  and  have 
from  the  first  declined  and  are  declining,  Christianity  was,  in  a  sense, 
a  growth  from  a  previous  stock,  and  is  in  process  of  development 
still,  with  the  promise  and  potency  of  growth  that  insures  its  indefi- 
nite expansion  in  the  future.  Evolution  has  fewer  illustrations  of 
itself,  as  a  law,  in  nature  than  in  Christianity,  for  nature  has  its  limits, 
and  evolution  stops.  Nature  is  what  it  was  ages  ago.  Nature's  laws 
are  those  imposed  upon,  or  incorporated  with,  the  huge  physical 
frame-work  called  the  universe  at  the  beginning.  Nature  knows  no 
change  of  law,  no  progress  of  forms,  and  repeats  its  phenomena 
■within  well-defined  and  well-known  limits.  In  the  zoological  de- 
partment of  nature,  the  stability  of  species  very  early  arrested  or 
abruptly  terminated  any  tendency  to  evolution,  and  has  been  a 
stumbling-block  in  the  path  of  the  evolutionist  ever  since.  Nature 
is  not  the  playground  of  evolution.  History  is  evolutional ;  race-life 
is  evolutional ;  Christianity  is  evolutional.  Nature-evolution  is  only 
a  figure  of  the  greater  truth-evolution  embodied  in  Christianity.  It 
is  conceded  that,  laying  aside  the  subject  of  the  authorship  of  the 
sacred  books  containing  the  oracles  of  God,  and  even  forgetting  their 
contents,  the  great  book  grew  like  a  mammoth  tree,  requiring  at  least 
three  thousand  years  for  its  completion.  From  Genesis  to  the  Apoc- 
alypse is  the  path  that  truth,  in  its  evolutionary  stages,  made  for 
itself.     This  striking  historic   development  is  eclipsed  by  the  evolu- 


JEWISH  REVELATIONS  OF  GOD.  625 

tiomiry  development  of  the  truths  themselves,  which,  faintly  adum- 
brated in  the  earlier  worships  and  teachings,  emerge  into  settled  facts 
and  doctrines,  and  become  the  axioms  of  the  Christian  faith.  This 
process  is  so  marked,  and  the  truths  that  have  passed  through  the 
chrysalis  state  into  vital  and  sovereign  forms  are  so  many,  that  it  will 
repay  the  effort  made  to  glance  at  them. 

The  allusion  in  a  preceding  paragraph  to  the  growth  of  the  mono- 
theistic idea  may  be  quoted  with  force  in  this  connection.  The  first 
Jewish  ideas  of  God  were  remote  from  the  completed  Christian  idea, 
to  which  they  bear  only  the  faintest  resemblance.  The  first  Penta- 
teuchal  representation  of  God  is  that  of  the  Creator,  or  a  being  of 
indefinite  and  illimitable  power.  Such  representation,  however  nec- 
essary to  religion,  was  preliminary  to  the  riper  disclosures  of  the 
Mosaic  administration,  and  inferior  to  the  hypothecated  evidences  of 
the  divine  existence  as  furnished  by  Paul  to  the  philosophers  of 
Athens.  The  revelation  of  a  Creator  was  first  in  the  order  of  evolu- 
tionary revelations ;  as  a  starting-point  it  was  simple,  but  the  Creator 
stands  before  us  in  the  majestic  utterance  of  inspiration,  like  a  distant 
mechanician,  or  worker  of  matter.  Another  revelation  is  needed,  to 
relieve  the  first  of  its  distant  and  frigid  aspects.  He  comes  forth  as 
the  Ruler,  both  in  heaven  and  in  earth,  having  all  authority,  as  he 
had  all  power  as  Creator.  The  idea  of  rulership  is  suggestive  of  gov- 
ernment, law,  dominion,  and  subjects,  the  latter  involving  relation- 
ship. As  Ruler,  he  is  still  afar  off",  and  another  revelation  is  required. 
It  is  given,  and  God  approaches  in  the  form  of  a  Father.  Tp  the 
patriarchal  mind  he  was  a  local  deity,  as  Jupiter  to  the  Greeks,  and 
Diana  to  the  Ephesiaus.  The  idea  that  he  is  the  tvorld's  Father  was 
a  late  growth.  From  local  limitations  it  swung  loose,  taking  to  itself 
an  international  complexion,  and  resulting  in  the  proclamation  that 
he  is  the  God  of  gods,  or  above  every  other  in  heaven  and  earth. 
This  was  progress,  but  there  was  more  to  follow.  The  growth  did  not 
stop  with  the  extinction  of  localized  or  national  relations.  He  must 
be  the  world's  Creator,  the  world's  Ruler,  the  world's  Father,  com- 
municating with  all  his  children,  which  signifies  progress  in  revelation. 
To  the  multitudes,  the  early  God  of  the  Scriptures  communicated 
nothing ;  to  the  Gentile  nation,  nothing ;  to  the  Jews  something,  but 
only  through  their  leaders  or  the  priesthood.  To  the  great  majority 
of  his  children,  even  after  they  accepted  him  as  the  Father,  he  appeared 
distant  as  ever,  distrustful  of  individual  relationship,  and  cold  as  an 
ice  figure.  He  had  an  austere  bearing,  and  remained  away  from  his 
creatures,  or  spoke  to  them  only  with  the  voice  of  thunder. 

In  the  new  dispensation  God  is  Creator,  Ruler,  Father ;  but  in 
Jesus  Christ  there  is  a  Mediator  by  whom  the  individual's  approach 

40 


626  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

to  God  is  secured,  and  the  distance  between  the  Creator  and  the 
creature  is  completely  bridged.  An  immense  advance  this,  but  not 
equal  to  the  still  later  steps  of  the  new  dispensation.  To  the  Jewish 
mind  God  embodied  the  idea  of  inexorable  justice,  without  a  break 
or  flaw  in  his  holy  disposition,  without  the  first  element  of  compassion 
for  his  morally  infirm  subject.  That  he  was  paternal  in  his  care  was 
not  denied,  but  for  a  violated  law  there  remained  only  the  penalty. 
Nature  established  no  bureau  of  pardon,  and  Sinai  only  gleamed  with 
fire.  Authority,  obedience,  penalty — these  were  the  awful  words  of  a 
dispensation  that  they  accepted  as  divine,  and  under  which  they  grew 
into  a  disciplined  and  vigorous  people.  While  in  the  new  dispensa- 
tion these  words  are  not  replaced  by  others,  they  lose  their  harsher 
features,  and  are  accompanied  by  such  words  as  repentance,  pardon, 
mercy,  and  salvation. 

The  change  or  growth  in  human  conceptions  was  even  greater 
than  in  the  nomenclature  of  the  dispensations.  God  himself,  in  a  sense, 
was  growing  all  the  time ;  that  is,  the  human  conception  under  revela- 
tion of  the  truth  was  a  development  toward  the  reality  of  God.  So 
long  as  he  manifested  himself  in  angel-form,  or  came  in  thunder  and 
flame,  or  lingered  unseen  over  the  mercy-seat,  or  bivouacked  in  a 
moving  cloud,  it  was  difficult  to  apprehend  any  thing  more  than  that 
he  was  an  invisible  guide,  friendly  to  men.  Even  the  names  of  his 
attributes  as  they  were  pronounced  were  almost  unmeaning  words, 
scarcely  symbolical  of  his  mysterious  qualities  and  virtues.  Through 
the  ages  the  race  walked  amid  these  shadows,  and  was  locked  up  with 
these  ambiguous  voices  and  words.  With  the  dawn  of  Christianity 
God  comes  forth  as  a  Spirit,  not  more  bodiless  than  space  and  time, 
uttering  Avords  that  have  a  meaning,  scattering  truths  that  abound 
with  life,  and  shouting  to  the  race  to  approach  the  throne. 

In  this  quiet  but  eflfectual  way,  by  this  evolutionary  process  of  the 
growth  of  the  divine  idea  of  God  in  the  human  mind  under  the  in- 
fluence of  spiritual  teaching,  not  the  Jew  only,  but  mankind  have 
inherited  an  approximate  understanding  of  the  character,  relations, 
and  purposes  of  the  Supreme  Being.  Our  present  knowledge,  how- 
ever in  advance  of  the  earlier  revelations,  is  still  inadequate,  because 
incomplete.  Agnosticism,  science,  philosophy,  are  quarreling  over 
such  knowledge.  Other  evolutions  in  knowledge  through  a  larger 
discernment  of  revealed  truth  may  therefore  be  anticipated,  until 
agnosticism  will  have  no  room  for  its  feet,  until  science  will  proclaim 
the  divine  being  with  as  much  assurance  as  Christianity  has  always 
proclaimed  him,  and  until  philosophy  will  concede  all  that  religion 
demands.  God  will  develop  more  and  more  before  our  eyes  in  the 
mirror  of  the  Scriptures,  and  in  his  handiwork  in  the  universe. 


EVOLUTION  OF  MESSIAHISM.  627 

The  evolutionary  process  in  the  Scriptures  is  very  apparent  in  the 
growth  of  the  Messianic  idea  which  they  contain.  This  is  so  plain  that 
a  lengthy  tracing  is  unnecessary,  but  it  is  as  marvelous  as  it  is 
plain.  Beginning  with  the  promise  in  Eden  that  the  seed  of  the 
woman  shall  bruise  the  head  of  the  serpent,  the  idea  successively 
appears  in  all  the  sacrifices  of  Israel's  migratory  life,  in  all  the  re- 
ligious institutions  of  the  national  period,  in  the  gloom  and  sunshine 
of  every  prophetical  announcement,  and  had  exact  fulfillment  at  last 
in  Jesus  of  Nazareth.  To  the  earliest  Jew,  as  to  the  latest,  the  idea 
itself  wore  a  cloudy  dress,  and  was  dimmed  still  more  by  the  romance 
that  enveloped  the  political  hope  of  the  nation ;  to  one,  as  to  the 
other,  the  spiritual  content  of  the  idea  of  Messiahship  was  unseen  or 
unappreciated,  and  upon  the  national  life  it  was  evidently  powerless. 
The  poetical  and  political  Messiahship  of  the  Jew  was  all-powerful; 
the  spiritual  Messiahship  came  forth  like  a  root  out  of  dry  ground, 
and  he  would  have  returned  it  to  the  ground.  Notwithstanding  the 
insensibility  of  the  Jewish  mind  to  spiritual  ideas,  the  Messianic  idea 
enlarged  with  the  growth  of  the  national  idea,  and  ripened  in  the 
mildew  of  the  old  faith  and  bore  fruit  before  their  eyes  in  a  personal 
and  divine  Messiah.  Looking  back  over  the  route  of  the  idea  in 
Jewish  history,  it  is  not  difficult  to  follow  it  through  all  its  wander- 
ings ;  it  left  its  track  in  the  wilderness ;  it  was  engraven  over  the 
doors  of  temple  and  synagogue ;  it  was  written  in  the  heart  of  the 
Pharisaic  nation ;  it  conducted  itself  step  by  step  through  the  cen- 
turies, until  it  made  a  royal  assertion  of  its  meaning  on  Calvary.  Its 
consummation  was  a  personal  manifestation  ;  its  spiritual  content  found 
a  dwelling-place  in  the  heart  of  the  Son  of  Man. 

The  Messianic  idea,  as  such,  or  amplified  in  the  personal  charac- 
ter of  Jesus  Christ,  is  traveling  still ;  the  Messianic  plan  is  on  the 
march ;  the  Messianic  hope  is  still  evolutionary,  having  in  it  the 
talismanic  purpose  of  progress,  and  will  develop  more  and  more,  un- 
til all  generations  shall  discern  its  content  and  appropriate  its  power. 
Messiahism  is  a  divine  growth.  Its  purpose  is  not  yet  fulfilled  ;  it  is 
still  misunderstood ;  it  must  be  understood  and  it  will  be,  for  the 
eternal  years  of  God  are  before  it  for  development  and  sovereignty. 

The  eschatology  of  Christianity  is  under  the  same  law  of  develop- 
ment, exhibiting  it  in  even  more  marked  aspects  than  the  theistic 
and  Messianic  ideas  previously  considered.  The  door  to  speculation 
is  open  in  this  region  of  truth.  If  clear  revelation  or  specific  teach- 
ing is  needed  at  all,  it  is  needed  here ;  if  the  motives  used  from  the 
thought  of  the  future  life  are  to  be  effectual,  the  teachings  of  religion 
respecting  it  should  be  definite,  and  free  from  possibility  of  miscon- 
struction.    In   the   absence  of  positive  and   unequivocal  knowledge, 


628  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

other  religions  took  up  superstitious  conjecture,  and  loaded  themselves 
with  visionary  and  degrading  conceptions  of  the  future  state.  The 
religion  of  the  Bible  does  not  plunge  immediately  into  the  depths  of 
the  subject,  or  enlighten  the  truth-seeker  with  early  and  satisfactory 
announcements  concerning  the  life  beyond,  but  proceeds  slowly  and 
cautiously  with  its  hints,  turning  them  gradually  into  probabilities, 
and  finally  opening  out  into  well-assured  certainties.  Important  as  a 
knowledge  of  the  future  life  seems  to  be,  the  Hebrew  religion  ad- 
vances hesitatingly,  enshrouding  even  its  final  testimony  with  a 
sacred  vagueness  that  allures  the  soul  on,  and  forever  excites  its 
curiosity  to  know  more.  With  the  Old  Testament  alone  it  has  been 
supposed  that  one  would  find  it  difiicult  to  pilot  himself  safely  into 
the  eternities.  He  might,  indeed,  drift  into  the  protected  harbor  of 
the  Beyond,  but  his  voyage  would  not  be  under  intelligent  guidance, 
or  have  any  more  inspiration  than  that  of  a  sacred  dream.  He  needs 
to  know  something  more  than  that  he  must  go  into  eternity.  He 
needs  to  know  that  definitely ;  and,  while  not  sharing  the  view  of 
Edward  Beecher,  that  the  Old  Testament  does  not  establish  immor- 
tality, and  that  the  ancient  Jew  had  no  hope  at  all,  we  confess  that 
the  fore-gleams  of  it  in  the  old  dispensation  are  rare  and  feeble,  and 
yet,  taken  together,  give  ground  for  faith. 

The  doctrine  of  the  immortality  of  the  soul  is  as  fundamental  to 
character  as  it  is  to  religion.  If  a  fact  at  all,  it  is  a  tremendous 
fact,  and  religion  should  echo  it  in  the  depths  of  consciousness  until 
the  soul,  catching  the  inspiration  of  the  thought,  will  feel  the  thrill 
of  its  immortal  being.  Judaism,  paving  the  way  for  a  more  explicit 
affirmation  of  the  doctrine,  is  eclipsed  by  Christianity,  which  brought 
life  and  immortality  to  light.  In  the  ancient  Hebrew  faith  the  doc- 
trine of  immortality  was  as  black  as  the  robes  of  a  funeral  priest ;  if 
seen  at  all,  it  was  seen  by  twilight ;  in  the  new  faith  it  is  a  full-orbed 
sun,  illuminating  human  history,  and  pointing  to  the  everlasting  des- 
tiny of  the  human  race.  As  in  the  Old  Testament  the  existence  of 
God  is  not  demonstrated,  but  assumed  from  the  beginning  and  all 
through  the  oracles,  interpenetrating  them  with  its  spirit,  so  in  the 
New  Testament  immortality  is  not  logically  established,  but  assumed 
and  expanded  as  if  known,  and  on  the  assumption  of  its  truth  are 
built  the  certainties  of  future  rewards  and  punishments.  In  this 
way  the  doctrine,  vaguely  taught  in  Hebrewism,  has  come  to  light, 
clearly  and  sufficiently,  in  Christianity. 

Concerning  the  general  resurrection,  there  is  the  same  uncertainty 
in  the  Old  Testament  as  envelops  other  eschatological  truth.  It  is 
unsatisfactory,  and  creates  an  uneasiness,  and  sometimes  a  suspicion 
that  the  early  Hebrew  faith  was  devoid  of  the  doctrine  of  the  resur- 


MAGIC  WORDS  IN  THE  NEW  TESTAMENT.  G29 

rection.  More  is  wanted  than  the  reader  finds  in  the  dusty  pages  of 
patriarchal  history,  or  in  the  unrolled  parchments  of  the  prophets. 
If  Christianity  settles  any  eschatological  problem  with  emphatic  as- 
surance, it  is  this  of  the  resurrection,  which  carries  with  it  the  sov- 
ereign proof  of  immortality.  The  resurrection  of  Christ  is  the  corner- 
stone of  Christianity,  employed  always  by  the  Apostle  Paul  in  proof 
of  Christ's  divine  character,  and  upon  the  truth  of  which  Christ  himself 
based  tlie  future  of  his  religion.  Establishing  the  resurrection  of  Christ, 
the  final  resurrection  of  mankind  Paul  demonstrates  in  syllogistic 
form,  insisting  upon  it  not  more  because  it  may  be  demonstrated  than 
that  it  has  been  revealed.  It  is  both  a  demonstration  and  a  revela- 
tion, and  the  Church  has  accepted  it  with  an  irresistible  persuasion 
of  its  verity.  The  distance  from  Abraham  to  Paul  is  great,  but  it 
has  been  traveled,  and  the  shout  of  the  last  day  re-echoes  in  the  ear 
of  humanity.  Out  of  the  tomb  of  Machpelah  sprang  no  flower  of 
of  hope,  or  at  least  it  sent  no  fragrauce  down  the  ages ;  but  Paul's 
death-cry  shook  the  sleeping  forms  of  the  dead,  and  with  his  dying 
hand  he  wrote  resurrection  on  the  gateway  of  their  tombs. 

The  doctrine  of  the  resurrection  is  a  mystery ;  the  fact  of  resur- 
rection is  one  of  the  accepted  as  it  is  one  of  the  revealed  doctrines 
of  Christianity.  Of  the  event  itself,  its  real  character,  process,  and 
purpose,  we  need  to  know  more,  and  through  evolutionary  processes 
it  will  doubtless  be  better  understood  in  the  days  to  come  than  now. 

As  to  the  doctrines  of  rewards  and  retributions,  or  heaven  and 
hell,  the  same  evolutionary  process  of  revelation  is  observable.  From 
dimness,  suspicion,  and  wonder,  we  grope  into  transparent  concep- 
tions, and  industrious  statements  of  truth.  Judging  by  the  record, 
it  is  not  evident  that  Cain  had  any  knowledge  of  another  life,  much 
less  any  suspicion  of  hell ;  but  Felix,  under  the  preaching  of  Paul, 
which  was  a  revelation  of  judgment  to  the  sensual  governor,  trembled. 
From  Cain  to  Felix  is  a  long  path,  but  it  marks  the  unfolding  of 
truth,  and  its  power  on  the  conscience.  Jacob  dies,  but  the  death-bed 
scene,  beautiful  and  pathetic,  has  in  it  no  supernatural  glimmer,  while 
Stephen  sees  the  heavens  open,  and  Jesus  sitting  at  the  right  hand 
of  God.  From  Jacob  to  Stephen  is  a  dusty  march,  but  visions  of 
eternal  glory  break  upon  the  traveler  at  the  end.  In  the  Old  Testa- 
ment sheol  casts  its  shadow  over  the  mortal,  and  finally  overtakes  and 
overwhelms  him;  in  the  New  Testament  hades,  gehenna,  paradise, 
heaven,  hell,  are  the  magic  words  that  inspire  hope  or  thrill  with 
horror.  Two  definite  termini  of  life  are  marked  out,  the  one  enticing, 
the  other  forbidding,  the  one  perennial  in  its  joyousness,  the  other 
unending  in  its  gloom  ;  and  to  these  Christianity  is  ever  pointing  in 
its  promises,  appeals,  invitations,  and  threatenings.     Respecting  the 


630  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

termini  Christendom  is  not  in  doubt.  Some  may  be  in  doubt  re- 
specting the  exact  character  of  the  double-headed  future  as  revealed 
by  Christianity ;  but  that  thei'e  is  such  a  future  is  the  unequivocal 
testimony  of  Christianity. 

In  like  manner  we  might  pursue  the  development  of  every  Chris- 
tian doctrine,  from  its  incipient  state  through  manifold  stages,  to  its 
final  exhibition  in  a  completed  form  in  Christianity  ;  but  this  is  un- 
necessary. 

One  or  two  questions  closely  associated  with  the  evolutionary 
character  of  Christianity  requix-e  a  moment's  consideration.  We  have 
traced  the  evolution  of  truth  in  the  Old  Testament,  but  not  in  the  New 
Testament ;  but  it  is  susceptible  of  proof  that  the  evolutionary  process 
in  the  latter  is  even  more  direct,  positive,  and  assuring  than  in  the 
former.  No  more  attractive  or  intelligent  theme  is  propounded  by 
Christianity  than  the  progress  of  doctrine  in  the  New  Testament,  or 
the  growth  of  truth  in  the  inspired  forms  of  the  New  Testament. 
The  assumption  of  immortality,  the  ground-idea  of  all  eschatology, 
is  so  illustrated  by  the  Savior,  and  so  enforced  by  apostolic  argument, 
that  naught  remains  but  to  proclaim  the  last  words  of  our  religion 
as  the  truth  of  demonstration  and  revelation. 

Christianity  is  still  an  evolutionary  system  of  truth,  or  is  yet  un- 
der the  law  of  evolution,  and  ever  will  be,  in  its  growth  and  influ- 
ence. Many  of  its  truths  are  still  beyond  us.  Like  Hebrew  poetry, 
the  spell  is  upon  us  when  we  read  them,  but  the  key  to  their  secret 
seems  to  be  lost.  That  key  the  future  must  find.  Take  the  doctrine 
of  the  second  coming  of  Christ,  a  thrilling,  moving,  helpful,  but,  at 
the  same  time,  a  much  misunderstood  and  perverted  doctrine.  Res- 
urrection, too,  needs  illumination.  The  whole  field  of  eschatology  needs 
to  he  plowed  again.  It  will  be.  Lost  keys  will  be  found;  hidden 
meanings  will  be  uncovered ;  and  truth,  stately  and  transparent, 
will  be  welcomed  as  it  is  recognized.  Physical  science,  questioned  as 
to  the  origin  of  the  universe,  and  the  descent  of  man,  quietly  replies 
that  if  its  explanation  is  not  valid  it  will  furnish  an  explanation  here- 
after that  will  be  accepted.  Physical  science,  compelled  at  times  to 
confess  its  failure,  promises  success  in  the  future.  It  is  scientific,  there- 
fore, to  promise  success  hereafter.  In  this  spirit,  but  with  a  basis 
for  faith  in  the  evolutionary  history  of  doctrinal  Christianity,  one  may 
expect  that  the  future  will  disclose  many  of  the  secrets  of  truth,  and 
that  future  ages  will  be  witnesses  of  truths  and  sharers  of  revela- 
tions now  either  unapprehended  or  unknown.  Supernaturalism  is 
exhaustless,  and,  given  the  ages  for  its  development,  it  will  stand  out 
clearer  than  ever,  and  supreme  in  its  dominion  over  the  thoughts  of 
men.      The  secret   propagating   power,    or  the  dynamical  element  of 


CHRISTIANITY  A  GEOMETRIC  IDEAL.  631 

Christianity  consists,  therefore,  in  its  evolutionary  character,  in  its  exhaust- 
less  tendency  to  development,  in  its  supernaturalism,  which  eschews 
the  common  conditions  of  time  and  space,  and  in  its  inheritance  of 
all  that  is  divine. 

IV.  In  the  conception  of  Christianity  as  a  geometric  ideal,  or  the  per- 
fect illustration  of  the  mathematical  spirit,  is  also  the  key  to  the  discov- 
ery of  its  dynamical  character  and  power.  We  shall  speak  guardedly 
here,  since  we  may  be  misunderstood.  Physical  science  in  its  generic 
content  is  mathematical ;  it  embraces  geometry,  algebra,  and  arithmetic. 
Upon  these,  or  by  the  aid  of  these,  chemistry,  astronomy,  physiology, 
botany,  and  geology  are  built ;  that  is,  the  laws,  principles,  and  conclu- 
sions discovered  or  established  by  science,  are  established  by  mathe- 
matical methods  and  in  harmony  with  mathematical  principles.  Both 
botany  and  crystallography  are  mathematical  sciences  ;  that  is,  botan- 
ical forms  are  geometric,  and  the  laws  of  growth,  of  symmetry,  of 
proportion,  observed  in  trees  and  crystals,  are  mathematical  laws.  The 
formation  of  the  topaz  and  the  sapphire,  the  phyllolactic  arrangement 
of  leaves  on  a  tree,  the  elliptical  orbits  of  planets,  the  laws  of  reflection 
and  refraction  of  light,  the  mathematical  proportion  of  gases  in  liquids 
and  solids,  demonstrate  the  spirit  and  authority  of  the  geometric 
principle  in  nature.  The  physical  universe  is  an  epitome  of  mathe- 
matical principles. 

Is  the  geometric  principle  purely  physical,  or  limited  in  its  application 
to  physical  objects?  Is  it  the  property  of  physical  science  only,  or  will 
it  explain,  support,  and  defend  religious  truth?  Is  physical  truth 
the  attempted  realization  of  a  geometric  ideal,  and  does  revealed  truth 
fall  short  of  it?  In  other  words,  may  Christianity  be  vindicated  from 
a  mathematical  standpoint?  The  elder  theologians,  or  those  known 
as  the  fathers,  were  averse  to  any  thing  like  a  demonstration  of  divine 
truth,  and  denied  the  application  of  the  mathematical  test  to  the 
dogmas  of  Christianity.  Again  and  again  has  it  been  asserted,  with  a 
painful  and  pitiful  regularity,  that  the  evidence  of  Christianity  is 
moral,  and  not  mathematical,  and  that,  therefore,  the  certainties  of 
religion  are  moral  and  not  demonstrated  realities.  In  this  day  of 
physical  science  and  philosophic  inquiry,  the  mathematical  test  is  be- 
ing applied  with  unsparing  energy  and  frightful  haste  to  all  kinds  of 
truth,  so  that  some  have  trembled  for  the  result.  To  such  a  test 
Christianity  must  submit  itself,  as  the  condition  of  its  acceptance,  and 
as  the  surer  condition  of  its  triumph,  for  nature  is  only  an  approxi- 
mation to  a  geometric  ideal,  while  Christianity  is  its  perfect  embodi- 
ment or  illustration. 

We  have  waited  too  long  for  the  acknowledgment  of  the  relation 
of  religious  truth  to  the  geometric  spirit,  or   the   evolution  of  the 


632  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

geometric  ideal  La  Christianity,  and,  therefore,  the  mathematical  dem- 
onstration of  its  certainty  ;  but  the  time  is  at  hand  to  proclaim  it.  It 
is  a  singular  fact  that  materialists  and  evolutionists  deride  the  notion 
of  the  algebraic  principle  in  matter,  the  only  explanation  of  their 
derision  being  the  discovered  relation  of  that  principle  to  Christianity. 
Geometry  is  the  key  to  the  universe  and  the  key  to  Christianity. 
According  to  the  materialist,  physical  forms  are  the  result  of  environ- 
ment ;  according  to  a  strict  knowledge  of  fact,  it  is  the  result  of 
mathematical  law.  Mathematical  law  is  suggestive  of  supervising  in- 
telligence, and  in  its  remote  bearings  presupposes  the  theistic  princi- 
ple ;  hence  the  virulence  with  which  the  geometric  idea  of  nature  is 
persecuted.  The  geometric  idea  of  nature  is  also  the  geometric  idea  of 
Christianity,  as  we  shall  now  see.  Spiritual  truth  is  as  geometric  to  the 
core  as  any  natural  truth ;  and  both  stand  or  fall  by  this  supreme  test. 

The  most  perplexing  doctrine  of  the  Scriptures — the  Trinity — is  an 
ample  illustration  of  the  geometrical  idea  in  Christianity.  It  in- 
cludes three  things  :  (a)  Substance  ;  (6)  Form  ;  (c)  Influence.  The 
Father  is  the  Substance,  or  invisible  essence;  the  Son  is  the  Form, 
the  express  image,  of  the  Substance ;  the  Spirit  is  the  Influence,  or 
procession  from  the  Father  through  the  Son,  or  from  the  Substance 
through  the  Form.  Precisely  these  three,  and  no  more,  co-exist  in 
every  created  thing  ;  the  Trinity  is  the  geometric  figure  of  the  uni- 
verse.. Here  is  a  geranium.  Its  substance  is  the  gases  of  which  it  is 
composed,  and  which  is,  therefore,  invisible ;  its  form  is  that  which 
we  see ;  its  influence  is  its  fragrance,  delighting  the  sense,  or  its 
beauty,  addressing  the  aesthetic  element  in  man,  or  its  uses,  appealing 
to  the  needs  of  man.  Instead  of  a  dogmatic  or  theologic  conception 
of  three  persons  in  one,  compelling  men  to  exclaim  as  did  the  great 
Webster,  "  I  do  not  understand  the  arithmetic  of  heaven,"  reveal  it 
in  its  geometric  character,  and  its  truth  will  be  conceded. 

To  other  doctrines  the  same  observation  will  apply,  and  the  same 
mathematical  principle  will  aid  in  determining  their  validity.  God  is 
infinite,  omnipresent,  without  body  or  parts ;  but,  mysterious  as  is 
this  statement  as  a  theologic  utterance,  it  evolves  into  a  clearly  ex- 
pressed reality  under  the  pilotage  of  the  geometric  ideal.  Time  and 
space  are  bodiless  conditions,  omnipresent,  and  really  infinite  to  the 
human  mind  ;  they  are  the  geometrical  figures  of  a  bodiless  and  in- 
finite omnipresence.  Equally  representative  of  the  divine  being  in 
his  bodiless  condition  is  oxygen,  a  substance  without  parts,  and  as 
universal  as  air  and  matter.  As  to  the  unity  of  God,  scientists  are 
engaged  in  rehearsing  the  great  fact  that  the  universe  is  a  unit,  and 
matter  is  reducible  to  a  single  atom,  forgetting  that  the  unity  of  the 
universe  is  the  mathematical  figure  of  the  unity  of  God.     On  such 


THE  COUNTERPART  OF  NATURE.  633 

geometric  pedestals  the  existence,  character,  and  attributes  of  God  may 
stand,  natural  truth  being  the  figure  of  spiritual  truth. 

In  like  manner  the  Incarnation,  an  apparition  in  religion,  may  be 
reduced  to  a  simple  geometric  ideal,  having  its  illustration  in  the  in- 
carnation of  gases  in  solids,  such  as  trees,  rocks,  flowers,  mountains, 
and  seas.      The  visible  is  the  incarnation  of  the  invisible. 

Atonement,  or  antidote  for  sin,  has  its  counterpart  in  the  antidotes 
of  nature  for  poison,  disease,  accident,  and  pain  ;  and  resurrection  is 
typed  by  the  day  succeeding  the  night. 

In  the  facts,  forms,  laws,  and  principles  of  nature  are  the  adum- 
brations of  spiritual  truth,  or,  to  express  the  thought  less  metaphys- 
ically, Christianity  is  tlie  counterpart  of  tiature.  The  laws  of  one  are 
the  laws  of  the  other  ;  he  who  understands  one  must  understand  the 
other,  for  the  one  is  the  figure  of  the  other.  Christianity  is  natural 
religion,  or  the  religion  of  nature  in  its  geometric  ideal.  The  secret 
thinkfer  now  holds  that  religious  truth  can  be  demonstrated  by  mathe- 
matics, or  that  the  evidence  of  such  truth  is  as  mathematical,  as  pos- 
itive, as  certain  as  the  evidence  of  scientific  truth.  Cousin  speaks  of 
thought  as  having  a  geometric  form,  implying  that  the  root  of  psy- 
chology is  geometry.  Poetry  is  a  mathematical  product.  Intellectu- 
ality IS  geometry  in  motion.  Dante's  "  Inferno"  is  a  species  of  mathe- 
matics. Relying  upon  the  geometric  character  of  Christianity  as 
explained,  the  conclusion  is  justified  that  the  dynamic  force  of  nature 
is  the  dynamic  force  of  religion,  or  that  the  life  of  the  higher  is  also 
the  life  of  the  lower.  Its  dynamical  character,  however,  is  not  fully 
manifested  in  its  analogy  to  natural  force.  In  fact,  its  highest  force 
is  of  a  higher  kind. 

V.  A  truer  conception  of  the  real  character  of  Christianity  as  a 
religious  force  arises  from  a  study  of  the  benevolent  spirit  which  seems 
hidden  in  all  its  truths.  Christianity  is  the  incarnation  of  benevo- 
lence in  its  teachings,  in  its  projects,  and  in  the  methods  by  which  it 
communicates  itself  to  the  world.  Its  great  principle  is  love,  the 
power  of  which  can  not  be  estimated.  Taken  in  its  lowest  form,  as 
charity,  it  represents  the  relieving  and  helping  power  of  religion, 
■which  has  stimulated  the  establishment  of  asylums,  hospitals,  and 
alms-houses,  and  led  to  prison  reform,  the  abolition  of  slavery,  and 
the  mitigation  of  the  evils  of  poverty.  Not  that  charity  had  no  ex- 
istence in  the  world  until  the  Master  taught  it,  but  it  found  an  ad- 
vanced expression  in  his  teachings,  and  an  exhibition  of  it  in  his  life 
and  self-sacrifice  that  has  ever  since  made  the  word  beautiful,  and  the 
thing  itself  sacred.  In  the  same  spirit  it  offers  liberty  to  mankind  ; 
freedom  from  oppression,  liberty  to  worship  God;  freedom  from 
slavery.     It  is  emancipation  as  well  as  love  ;  it  is  the  religion  of  char- 


634  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

ity  and  the  religion  of  liberty.  These  two  are  words  of  power.  Love 
and  liberty  are  stronger  than  a  pair  of  steam-engines.  Preach  these,  and 
religion  triumphs.  These  the  needy,  suffering  world  can  appreciate, 
while  the  metaphysical  content  of  religious  truth  is  overlooked,  and 
its  power  unfelt.  Mathematical  it  is — this  is  the  guaranty  of  its  or- 
derly working,  and  the  pledge  of  its  perpetuity ;  benevolent  it  is — this 
will  arrest  attention,  and  draw  the  needy  world  to  its  embrace. 

VI.  In  a  most  emphatic  sense  Christianity  is  a  biological  religion,  or 
the  religion  of  life.  It  is  the  only  life-imparting  religion  ;  its  highest 
force  is  biological.  In  the  preceding  pages  of  this  volume  Christian- 
ity has  been  discussed  as  a  system  of  truth,  and  its  power  has  been 
represented  as  the  power  of  truth.  We  are  now  compelled  to  draw 
a  distinction  between  truth  and  life,  or  allow  that  life  is  one  of^the 
contents  of  truth,  or  truth  is  one  of  the  contents  of  life.  Is  there 
any  difference  between  truth  and  life?  The  dynamical  character  of 
truth  must  be  conceded ;  it  has  power,  the  power  of  knowledge';  but 
is  there  not  something  in  religion  besides  its  truth?  Truth  may  be 
the  instrument  of  life,  but  is  it  life  ?  Is  truth  a  biological  force,  or 
is  the  biological  force  of  Christianity  something  else  ?  Truth-power 
and  spirit-power,  however  related  in  the  accomplishment  of  redemp- 
tion, are  different ;  both  belong  to  Christianity,  but  the  latter  is  the 
sovereign  and  final  power.  By  spirit-power  we  mean  the  power  of 
the  divine  Spirit  working  in  the  human  heart  for  its  salvation,  as 
truth  alone  can  not  work.  Truth  enlightens  ;  the  Spirit  kindles  the 
soul  into  a  living  fire.  Truth  points  out  the  way  to  life;  the  Spirit  im- 
parts life.  The  Spirit-force  of  Christianity  is  the  life-force  of  religion, 
and  this  is  its  greatest  power. 

We  must  also  distinguish  the  truth  respecting  power  from  power 
itself.  The  atoning  force  of  Christianity  is  one  with  its  spirit-force, 
for  without  atonement  salvation  is  impossible.  But  the  truth  of 
atonement  is  not  the  power  of  atonement,  or  the  fact  is  not  its  power. 
Atonement-truth  is  not  atonement-power;  back  of  the  truth  is  the 
power  which  is  spiritual,  or  the  power  of  God  in  Jesus  Christ,  mani- 
fested by  the  Spirit.  The  supreme  dynamical  elements  of  Christianity 
are  not,  therefore,  its  revealed  truths,  but  its  spiritual  forces  in  Atone- 
ment and  Spirit-presence,  for  in  these  alone  are  its  life-giving  ten- 
dencies and  its  life-imparting  agencies.  It  is  a  biological  religion, 
not  because  of  its  truth,  but  because  of  the  spirit  of  God  operating 
through  and  by  the  truth  upon  the  hearts  of  the  children  of  men. 

VII.  Christianity  is  the  religion  of  realities,  having  power  in  propor- 
tion as  it  is  inherently  real.  Philosophy  may  be  reduced  to  a  catena 
of  abstractions  on  subjects  the  illumination  of  which  may  be  found  in 
religion.     Physical  science  is  compelled  to  deal  with  abstractions,  and 


THE  RANGE  OF  THE  DIVINE  PLAN.  635 

to  deal  with  them  as  if  they  were  true.  In  geography  the  equator  is 
treated  as  a  definite  something,  whereas  it  is  defined  as  an  imaginary 
line ;  so  it  is.  The  lines  of  longitude  and  latitude  are  imaginary,  but 
geography  treats  them  as  if  they  have  an  absolute  existence.  Geometry 
begins  with  a  point,  an  indefinable  nothing  that  has  the  appearance  of 
being  something.  Higher  mathematics  even  presumes  to  make  use 
of  the  following  most  extraordinary  imaginary  fact :  The  mercury  in  a 
thermometer,  it  is  agreed,  must  be  above  zero,  below  it,  or  at  zero ; 
but  it  may  be  necessary  to  suppose  it  is  somewhere  else  than  at  any 
of  these  points.  Impossible  that  it  be  anywhere  else,  yet  science 
works  with  the  mercury  at  an  impossible  place,  and  treats  the  imag- 
inary fact  as  if  it  were  a  reality.  Nothing;  like  this  or  equal  to  it  ob- 
tains in  Christianity.  It  is  without  abstractions,  imaginary  facts,  im- 
possibilities. It  works  from  realities,  many  of  them  supernatural,  but 
realities  full  of  power.  Abstractions  may  be  useful;  realities  are 
powerful.  Theism,  incarnation,  inspiration,  regeneration,  and  resur- 
rection are  not  abstractions ;  they  are  realities  ;  hence  they  are  powers. 

VIII.  Christianity  is  a  plan.  To  say  that  it  is  a  "  plan  of  salvation  " 
would  be  speaking  theologically  ;  it  is  such  a  plan,  but  it  is  more. 
It  is  not  the  plan  of  history,  as  known  to  us;  it  is  not  the  plan  of 
the  Church,  as  manifested  in  its  purpose  ;  it  is  tlie  plan  of  God  for 
the  universe  of  matter  and  men,  for  earth  and  heaven,  for  time  and 
eternity.  It  is  broad,  deep,  high,  divine,  eternal.  It  comprehends 
all  things  ;  it  includes  all  history  ;  it  touches  the  springs  of  causation, 
and  turns  the  wheel  of  universal  destiny ;  it  organizes  the  enterprises 
of  grace,  and  makes  a  kingdom  for  the  reign  of  truth ;  it  originated 
"with  God,  and  is  adapted  to  man ;  it  is  the  power  of  God,  and, 
therefore,  the  power  of  the  universe. 

If  this  conception  of  Christianity  be  correct,  its  power  is  no  longer 
a  mystery.  If  it  is  substance  ;  if  it  is  evolutional ;  if  it  is  geometric ; 
if  it  is  reality ;  if  it  is  the  only  plan  of  God  for  this  world  and  all 
world's, — its  future  is  as  God's. 


636  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 


CHAPTER  XXIX. 

THE    IVIAGNETlSPvl    OK    CHRISTIANITY. 

CERTAIN  citizens  of  Thessalonica,  in  describing  the  effect  of 
apostolic  preaching,  said  unto  the  rulers  that  it  had  "turned  the 
world  upside  down,"  than  which  a  more  accurate  concession  to  the 
radical  power  of  Christianity  never  was  rendered.  No  more  potent 
influence  has  the  world  felt  than  that  which  the  Galilean  teacher  has 
exerted.  Wherever  his  Gospel  has  been  declared,  the  effect, 
whether  instantaneous  or  gradual,  has  gone  out  into  all  conditions, 
and  has  been  as  permanent  as  it  has  been  impressive.  In  heathen  or 
civilized  lands,  the  results  of  Christian  truth  have  been  the  same — 
governments  have  been  reconstructed,  religions  dethroned,  evils  dis- 
turbed, checked,  and  rooted  out,  and  a  new  order  of  civil  and  social 
life  has  been  introduced  and  fostered.  In  conflict  with  pagan  relig- 
ions, tumults,  uproars,  and  excitements  have  sometimes  occurred,  and 
prejudiced  historians  have  not  been  slow  to  attribute  to  it  a  seditious 
tendency,  provoking  revolutions,  strifes,  political  commotions,  and 
unnecessary  frictions  and  antagonisms  in  the  social  machinery  of  the 
world.  Without  controversy,  it  has  the  peculiar  faculty  of  develop- 
ing a  strange  enthusiasm  for  salvation ;  it  has  a  genius  for  effecting 
large  reforms,  a  spirit  that  promotes  the  philanthropies,  a  propelling 
power  that  aids  the  moralities ;  it  does  inflame  the  public  mind  against 
caste,  slavery,  intemperance,  polygamy,  idolatry,  mammon,  murder, 
Sal)bath-breaking,  theft,  inhumanity,  infidelity,  and  atheism  ;  and  wher- 
ever it  lifts  its  voice  it  agitates,  disturbs,  and  awakens  the  evil-doers, 
and  unites  in  organized  effort  the  energies  of  the  virtuous  and  the 
good  against  the  influence  of  the  wicked  and  the  reign  of  the  ungodly. 

What  is  the  agitative  force  of  Christianity  ?  What  is  its  magnet- 
ism ?  Is  it  a  visible,  tangible  somewhat,  or  the  occult  influence  of 
the  supernatural  and  invisible?  Is  its  power  the  result  of  mechan- 
ism ?  or  is  Christianity  a  vital  force,  pushing  itself  to  the  surface,  and 
overturning  as  it  goes  the  lawless  organisms  and  impure  agencies  and 
institutions  of  the  world  ? 

Replying  in  a  general  way,  it  is  clear  that  the  exciting  power  of 
Christianity  is  not  in  the  methods  employed  for  its  propagation,  or  in 
the  use  of  any  carnal  or  secular  force  whatever.  In  this  it  differs  from 
all  religions  that  preceded  it,  and  from  those  that  still  exist  and  op- 
pose its   progress.     Scanning   the   history   of  Mohammedanism,    the 


THE  GLORY  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  637 

student  is  pained  on  account  of  the  methods  which  it  adopted  for  its 
extension,  and  the  excess  of  violence  to  which  it  resorted.  The  re- 
ligion of  the  prophet  was,  and  is,  the  religion  of  the  sword.  Whole 
countries  have  been  thrown  into  consternation  by  the  presence  of 
priests,  who  were  the  advance  guards  of  a  bloodthirsty  and  fanatical 
army,  bent  quite  as  much  on  religious  persecution  as  on  political 
power  and  territorial  aggrandizement.  Empires  have  been  devastated 
by  the  soldiers  of  that  faith,  which  advanced,  never  by  the  voluntary 
recognition  of  its  inherent  adaptations  on  the  part  of  peoples,  but  by 
military  processes,  and  thrived  only  in  soil  nourished  by  blood.  A 
religion  of  terror,  it  excited  the  fears  by  suppressing  the  hopes  of 
millions  whom  it  forced  into  obedience  and  punished  into  loyalty. 

The  record  of  Christianity  is  not  a  record  of  blood.  We  do  not 
disguise  the  fact  that,  at  important  epochs  in  its  history  it  has  worn  a 
military  complexion  and  essayed  its  tasks  through  the  aid  of  force, 
as  under  the  brilliant  administration  of  Constantine,  and  later  under 
the  gigantic  imposition  of  the  Papacy ;  but  the  dashing  Christianity 
of  the  fourth  century  lost  its  spirituality  by  contact  with  the  secular 
power,  and  the  cruel  Christianity  of  Hildebrand  and  his  successors  is 
paying  the  penalty  of  its  apostasy  by  a  slow  and  marked  decay. 

Outside  of  the  barbarism  of  method,  and  independent  of  the 
ecclesiastical  structures  reared  for  its  safety,  Christianity,  in  a  spirit 
of  peace,  has  agitated,  shaken,  and  surprised  the  world  out  of  its 
stupor  more  than  all  things  else,  the  surprise  being  all  the  greater  as 
its  methods  have  been  unwarlike  and  apparently  inadequate.  It  is 
not  new  to  compare  Christianity  with  light,  working  silently  in  ex- 
pelling darkness,  or  with  leaven,  permeating  civilization  by  a  slow 
and  graduated  process,  or  with  salt,  preserving  the  world  from  moral 
decay.  It  is  the  glory  of  Christianity  that  it  is  light,  it  is  leaven,  it 
is  salt,  but  it  is  more.  It  is  fire,  it  is  a  hammer,  it  is  wind,  it  is  res- 
urrection. It  is  not  the  hiding  of  power  merely,  like  electricity  in 
the  cloud,  or  like  an  army  sleeping  ;  but  it  is  power  at  work,  like 
electricity  shooting  athwart  the  sky,  setting  fire  to  the  stars,  and 
shaking  planets  in  their  orbits ;  it  is  like  Napoleon's  army  at  the 
Pyramids,  or  like  Barak's  in  Esdraelon,  accomplishing  its  task  under 
the  inspiration  of  the  past  and  the  future.  It  is  the  religion  of  active 
force,  guided  by  the  spirit  that  originated  it,  and  for  the  conservation 
of  spiritual  ends.  Gibbon,  who  was  somewhat  elaborate  in  his  anal- 
ysis of  the  causes  of  the  progress  of  Christianity,  discerned  not  the 
motive  power  of  the  religion  itself  He  saw  in  the  zeal  of  the  early 
Christians,  the  simple  ecclesiastical  plans  of  the  Church,  and  the 
miraculous  claims  of  the  apostles  and  fathers,  a  source  of  enthusiasm, 
communicating  itself  to  multitudes,  and  resulting  in  the  multiplication 


638  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

of  Christian  societies;  but  he  failed  to  explain  the  origin  of  the 
Church,  and  why  there  are  Christians  at  all.  While  Gibbon's  resume 
is  a  partial  explanation  of  the  spread  of  Christianity,  it  does  not  re- 
veal the  spirit,  the  essence-power,  of  Christianity  ;  it  does  not  exhibit 
the  agitating,  overturning,  progressive,  and  magnetic  elements  of  the 
new  religion.     To  these  let  us  now  devote  attention. 

In  its  doctrinal  character  lies  its  secret  propelling  force.  A  doctrine 
is  a  principle  or  truth  fundamental  to  the  system  to  which  it  is  ac- 
credited. A  religion  of  doctrines  is  a  religion  of  primary  principles, 
indicating  its  character,  temper,  tone,  strength,  and  possibility  of  suc- 
cess. A  continent  made  up  of  rivers,  prairies,  and  plains  would  be 
inhabitable ;  but  it  would  be  wanting  in  the  solidity,  variety,  and 
grandeur  that  mountain  chains  would  give  it.  A  religion  of  specu- 
lations, or  commonplace  truths,  might  be  accepted  in  the  absence  of 
any  thing  better;  but  it  would  be  inferior  to  a  religion  of  revealed 
truths.  Dogmatic  Christianity,  or  the  religion  of  doctrinal  truth,  is 
a  primary  necessity.  A  religion  without  revealed  truths  would  be 
like  astronomy  without  stars,  botany  without  plants,  and  geology 
without  rocks.  Christianity  is  a  revelation  of  truth  ;  it  is  a  mount- 
ain chain  of  doctrine;  it  has  its  AUeghenies,  Rocky,  and  Sierra 
Nevada  ranges  in  the  great  doctrinal  teachings  that  are  so  prominent 
in  it;  they  hold  it  together,  weave  it  into  form,  combine  to  give  it 
sublimity,  and  are  the  sources  of  its  power.  From  their  altitudes  a 
vision  of  God,  man,  life,  being,  and  eternity  may  be  taken,  and  in 
the  atmosphere  that  sweeps  around  the  summits  the  soul  learns  to  be 
still,  and  takes  its  first  lessons  of  life.  In  a  very  pronounced  way, 
Paul  exhibited  religion  in  its  doctrinal  form  in  Thessalonica  and  Asia 
Minor,  and  idols  fell  from  their  pedestals,  and  the  niches  of  temples 
soon  emptied  their  statues  in  the  dust.  Exhibited  doctriually  any- 
where, it  strikes  at  evil,  whether  moral,  social,  political,  or  commer- 
cial, arresting  attention,  provoking  inquiry,  and  leading  to  changes  in 
the  manner  of  the  public  and  the  individual  life. 

What  specific  doctrinal  truths  have  an  arresting  and  agitating 
power?  In  his  summation  of  "  causes"  Gibbon  announces  the  escha- 
tological  elements  of  Christianity  as  supreme,  asserting  that  the  doc- 
trines of  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  of  the  millennium,  and  of  the 
end  of  the  world,  were  potent  factors  in  arousing  the  fears  and  se- 
curing the  faith  of  the  multitudes,  to  whom  they  were  presented.  It 
is  undoubtedly  true  that  Christian  eschatology,  unfolded  in  its  breadth 
of  meaning,  will  awaken  inquiry,  reverence,  reformation,  and  wor- 
ship ;  and  if  the  apostles  and  Christian  fathers  urged  with  vehement 
interest  the  consideration  of  the  great  truths  of  resurrection,  immor- 
tality,   and  judgment,    it   was   because    pagan   religions    had    only 


THE  FORCE  OF  GOSPEL  MOTIVES.  639 

obscurely  and  indefinitely,  if  at  all,  reminded  their  subjects  of  them, 
and  because  a  knowledge  of  such  truths  was  imperative,  and  to  be 
acquired  only  by  revelation.  With  faith  in  immortality  the  Greek 
sages  loaded  it  with  a  mythology  quite  as  dreary  and  repulsive  as 
superstition  had  ever  invested  it ;  and  the  old  religions  were  too  sens- 
ual or  material  in  their  horoscope  of  the  future  life  to  satisfy  reason 
or  justify  faith.  No  distinct  answer  to  the  problem  of  life  after 
death  had  been  given  by  philosophy  or  religion,  except  as  it  was  in- 
volved in  mythology  or  superstition.  Into  that  night  of  intellectual 
darkness  Christianity  shone  like  a  new  sun,  clearing  up  the  mid- 
night scenes  of  paganism,  and  extinguishing  even  the  twilight  of 
Judaism  in  the  broader  and  fuller  revelation  of  the  Gospel  of  the 
Son  of  God. 

The  doctrines  of  the  pre-existence  of  souls,  of  transmigration,  of 
incarnations,  of  Tartarus,  of  the  river  Styx,  and  of  the  abode  of  the 
gods  surrendered  to  the  clearer  teachings  of  immortality,  resurrection, 
hades,  final  judgment,  and  ultimate  heaven  and  hell,  as  they  fell 
from  Christ  and  those  who  went  forth  as  heralds  of  the  truth.  Sheol 
was  supplanted  by  hades,  hades  was  divided  into  gehemui  and  Para- 
dise, and  beyond  both  were  seen  the  open  gates  to  final  destiny.  The 
"last  things"  of  religion  in  the  hands  of  the  apostles  stood  out  as 
the  bas-relief  teachings  of  religion,  which  had  immediate  recognition, 
and  which  impressed  men  with  fear  if  sinful,  and  with  hope  if  godly. 
Christianity  was  a  clearing-up  religion  in  the  field  of  eschatology ;  it 
reaped  the  truth  and  plucked  up  error  by  the  roots. 

That  it  excited  all  classes  to  inquiry,  and  satisfied  both  the  reason  and 
the  faith,  is  not  surprising  ;  that  it  does  not  excite  a  deeper  demonstra- 
tion of  interest  now  than  then  is  surprising.  In  the  passage  of  the 
centuries  Christianity  has  not  abandoned  its  eschatological  truths,  but 
rather  insists  upon  them  as  truths  underlying  a  correct  religious  faith, 
and  as  all-important  motives  to  a  religious  life.  If  it  threw  the  shad- 
ows of  the  last  day,  the  gloom  and  terror  of  the  grave,  and  the  cer- 
tainties of  judgment,  over  the  souls  of  men  in  early  times,  it  does  so 
now ;  if  Felix  and  the  Philippian  jailer  trembled  in  the  presence  of 
Paul  as  he  reasoned  of  eternal  things,  so  now  rulers  quake  in  view 
of  judgment ;  if  Paul's  sermon  at  Athens,  Peter's  on  Pentecost,  and 
Christ's  parables  relating  to  the  judgment-day  and  its  final  decrees, 
impressed  multitudes  in  their  day,  the  same  truths  have  the  same 
power  to-day.  Such  truths  compel  men  to  pause  in  their  career  of 
ungodliness,  insincerity,  and  degradation ;  such  truths  are  the  mag- 
nets of  Christianity,  influencing  men  to  reflection,  repentance,  and  a 
new  life ;  such  truths  will  turn  the  world  upside  down. 

Christianity  did  not  depend  alone  upon  the  spell  of  the  future  for 


640  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

its  power.  It  had  other  resources,  it  had  another  mission,  and  so 
intent  on  present  achievement  was  it  that  the  thought  of  the  future 
was  often  lost  in  immediate  undertakings  and  revelations.  Neither 
philosophy  nor  the  pagan  religions  had  sufficiently  represented  the 
infirmities,  weaknesses,  and  moral  disabilities  of  the  race,  nor,  ac- 
knowledging the  power  of  evil,  were  they  able  to  invent  a  satisfac- 
tory explanation  of  its  origin,  or  acquaint  mankind  by  what  means  it 
might  be  overcome.  In  its  own  way  Christianity  undertook  to  throw 
light  upon  the  dark  subject,  explaining  the  introduction  of  evil  into 
our  world,  its  transmission  under  laws  of  heredity  from  generation 
to  generation,  its  fatal  influence  on  the  body  and  the  soul,  and  the 
impossibility  of  its  extinction  by  human  or  natural  agency.  At  the 
same  time,  revealing  iniquity  in  all  its  hideousuess,  it  proposed  an 
adequate  method  for  its  suspension  and  final  extinction. 

The  appalling  fact  of  evil,  as  a  universal  burden,  has  never  been 
denied  either  by  philosophy  or  paganism;  but  its  appalling  nature 
has  never  been  declared  by  either,  and  a  gracious  remedy  never  fore- 
shadowed until  the  dawn  of  Christianity.  The  root  of  evil  is  in  mat- 
ter, thought  the  philosopher.  Natural  evil  was  the  subject  of  dis- 
cussion and  the  object  of  assault.  Christianity,  however,  declares 
itself  the  antagonist  of  moral  evil,  which  has  its  root  in  voluntary 
disobedience  of  right.  Remove  moral  evil,  and  natural  evil  will  cease 
to  disturb  or  annoy.  Philosoj)hy  bombarded  natural  conditions;  Chris- 
tianity assails  moral  conditions.  Philosophy  condemns  God's  physical 
government;  Christianity  condemns  man's  moral  life. 

A  modern  type  of  transcendentalism  apologizes  for  sin  in  affirm- 
ing that  it  is  not  criminal ;  it  affirms  that  it  is  a  misfortune,  a  blun- 
der, a  mistake ;  it  is  this,  and  it  is  more.  Transcendentalism,  or 
Unitarianism,  needs  enlightenment  quite  as  much  as  philosophy  or 
paganism.  Out  of  the  shadow  of  darkness  Christianity  conducts 
the  inquirer  into  a  region  of  knowledge,  in  which  the  natui'e  of  sin 
is  exposed,  its  ruinous  tendencies  exhibited,  its  dreadful  penalties, 
both  natural  and  judicial,  announced,  and  the  antidote  for  the  poison 
prescribed.  Teach  the  doctrine  of  human  sinfulness,  as  it  is  portrayed 
in  the  Testaments ;  represent  human  helplessness  as  it  appears  on  the 
pages  of  the  Gospel ;  declare  the  doom  of  the  obdurate  and  unfor- 
given,  as  the  same  Gospel  warrants ;  and  then  preach  the  hope  of 
deliverance  through  Jesus  Christ,  as  he  has  authorized  in  his 
own  words,  and  a  city  like  Athens,  a  ruler  like  Agrippa,  an  officer 
like  the  centurion,  a  bigot  like  Sosthenes,  and  a  worldling  like 
Dionysius,  will  weep,  repent,  and  rejoice,  or,  alarmed  and  impenitent, 
will  become  enraged,  and  sink  all  the  deeper  in  sensuality  and  despair. 
Either  truth  of  the  Gospel — human  infirmity  or  divine  rescue,   or 


MAGNETIC  POWER  OF  THEISTIC  TRUTH.  641 

both — will  excite  the  emotions  of  the  multitude,  and  arouse  from  sleep 
the  nations  that  hear  the  Gospel. 

These  double-edge  truths  are  the  magnets  of  Christianity.  This 
is  the  practical  side  of  the  Gospel,  and  it  is  as  effectual  in  awakening 
the  world  as  the  eschatological  previously  noted.  What  the  Gospel 
can  do  for  men  here  interests  them  quite  as  much  as  what  it  proposes 
to  do  with  them  hereafter.  The  present  helpfulness  of  Christianity  is 
as  attractive  as  the  promise  of  future  deliverance  from  eternal  con- 
demnation. Present  deliverance  is  the  condition  of  future  deliver- 
ance.    Insisting  upon  its  present  adaptations,  men  are  drawn  to  it. 

The  theistic  element  of  Christianity  constitutes  a  prominent 
doctrinal  characteristic,  and  in  apostolic  times  it  was  especially  con- 
tagious of  disorder,  excitement,  and  revolution.  In  its  teachings  re- 
specting God,  perhaps,  it  antagonized  the  old  religions  more  violently 
than  by  its  eschatology  or  atonement,  for  monotheism  and  polytheism  can 
not  co-exist  in  the  same  religion,  or  enter  into  the  same  civilization 
and  social  conditions.  Polytheism,  though  in  a  state  of  decline,  had 
yet  its  advocates  and  altars  in  the  days  of  Paul ;  and  where  it 
did  not  obtain  there  idolatry  of  another  type  was  in  vogue.  The 
condition  of  the  introduction  of  Christianity,  as  emphasized  by  the 
Christian  leaders,  was  the  subsidence  of  polytheism  and  idolatry.  Be- 
tween the  two  religions  there  could  be  no  fraternity,  not  even  the 
look  of  recognition.  God,  not  gods;  Jehovah,  not  Jupiter,  was  the 
cry  of  the  apostles  wherever  they  went.  Diana  of  the  Ephesians 
must  retire  ;  Neptune  and  Minerva  must  be  dethroned ;  and  Pluto 
must  surrender  the  keys  to  the  lower  world.  In  its  theism  Christianity 
was  not  a  compromise  with  polytheism,  but  rather  a  challenge,  like 
that  of  Elijah  on  Carmel,  to  all  religions  to  prove  themselves  or  sink 
into  nothingness.  This  attitude  of  the  teachers  of  Christianity  pro- 
voked the  opposition  of  all  classes ;  business  men,  polytheists,  rulers, 
priests,  the  whole  city  and  the  whole  country,  arose  in  indignation 
against  the  enemies  of  their  religion  and  their  faith.  The  theistic 
idea  is  magnetic,  and  in  proportion  as  it  settles  down  upon  the  heart 
of  humanity,  it  draws  it  upward  toward  God.  The  existence  of  God 
is  a  fundamental  truth,  necessary  not  more  to  religion  than  philosophy. 
When  proclaimed  it  requires  from  men  more  than  honest  reverence ; 
it  imposes  the  obligation  of  immediate  repentance,  correct  habits,  pure 
feelings,  holy  worship ;  it  arouses  the  thought  of  dependence  and  re- 
sponsibility, and  has  a  restraining  effect  on  the  disposition  to  wicked- 
ness and  profligacy.  In  the  presence  of  the  great  truth,  false  religions 
withered  away ;  the  violent  were  restrained ;  and  nations  were  dis- 
turbed. Christian  theism  promotes  the  reign  of  conscience  in  morals, 
and  the  reign  of  God  in  the  soul. 

41 


642  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

The  Biblical  representation  of  a  personal  God  contains  the  cor- 
related idea  of  divine  providence,  or  the  rule  of  God  in  the  affairs 
of  men.  On  this  point  the  world  has  always  needed  instruction,  and 
needs  it  now  quite  as  much  as  at  any  time  in  the  past,  for  the  ma- 
terialist is  undertaking  to  banish  the  divine  administration  from  the 
universe.  Ancient  philosophy  removed  God  from  any  friendly  in- 
terest in  human  affairs ;  modern  philosophy  predicates  a  universe  so 
constructed  as  to  manage  itself,  not  only  doing  away  with  the  mirac- 
ulous, but  precluding  the  intervention  of  God  by  the  ordinary  ave- 
nues of  fixed  law ;  in  other  words,  the  universe  is  independent  of 
God.  Such  a  view  is  cold  and  comfortless,  and  contrary  to  the 
teaching  of  Him  who  knoweth  our  frame,  and  numbereth  our  steps. 
The  fatherhood  of  God,  the  protection  of  human  life  and  the  supply 
of  its  wants,  the  guidance  of  human  steps  and  the  ordering  of  human 
ways,  the  unseen  leading  of  individuals  into  positions  of  usefulness, 
and  the  conservation  of  individual  happiness,  ai-e  among  the  benefi- 
cent results  that  follow  the  providential  administration  of  God. 

The  doctrine  of  divine  providence,  special  and  general,  as  taught 
in  the  Scriptures  and  illustrated  in  the  lives  of  the  eminent  saints 
and  heroes  of  the  Church,  is  magnetic  in  its  power  over  the  hearts 
of  the  children  of  men,  and  insures  Christianity  a  welcome  when  it 
is  understood. 

The  core  of  Christianity  i^  the  three-fold  doctrine  of  monotheism,  in- 
volving providential  relations  to  man,  of  atonement,  involving  human  sin- 
fulness and  divine  rescue,  and  of  the  future  life,  involving  an  eternal 
heaven  and  an  eternal  Jiell.  On  this  three-fold  basis  Christianity  in  its 
doctrinal  character  rests,  challeuging  the  world  to  overthrow  it,  and 
agitating  and  attracting  mankind  as  they  comprehend  its  signifi- 
cance, and  discern  that  the  highest  self-interest  requires  personal  ac- 
ceptance of  it.  Doctrhmlly,  it  does  not  appeal  merely  to  the  fears  of 
men;  it  enlightens  the  judgment  and  extinguishes  errors,  preparing  tlie 
mind  for  a  ratiorval  study  of  truth ;  it  dethrones  idols  and  enthrones  a 
personal  Creator,  giving  one  an  imide  view  of  tJie  divine  government, 
and  pointing  out  the  necessity  of  harmony  with  tJie  divine  will;  it  reveals 
human  helplessness  to  an  alarming  degree,  creating  a  desire  for  rescue, 
and  then  provides  an  available  remedy  for  sin,  urging  all  to  appropriate 
it  as  soon  as  presented;  and,  to  enforce  the  duty  of  volitional  surrender  to 
God,  and  the  necessity  of  a  new  life,  it  points  oid  the  fearful  guilt  of 
delay  ai^d  the  aivful  consequences  of  rejection,  at  tJie  same  time  enticing 
the  soul  into  immediate  obedience  by  the  promise  of  rewards,  as  fasci- 
nating as  they  are  wonderfid,  and  as  divine  as  they  are  imperishahle. 
The  three-fold  doctrine  of  Christianity  is  the  great  magnet  of  the  new 
religion. 


INFLUENCE  OF  THE  PERSONAL  CHRIST.  G43 

Even  more  powerful  than  doctrine  is  the  personic  element  in  the 
foundation  of  Christianity,  or  the  character,  offices,  and  influence  of 
the  Master  himself.  Truth  sometimes  seems  cold  and  distant,  but 
personality  is  a  center  of  interest,  inquiry,  and  enthusiasm.  Chris- 
tianity is  more  than  a  system  of  truths,  it  is  the  divine  personality 
crystallized  in  humanity,  chiefly  in  Jesus  Christ.  Mankind  are 
prone  to  judge  of  systems  of  religion  by  their  authors  or  founders, 
inquiring  into  their  parentage,  education,  physical  appearance  and 
habits,  social  connections,  worldly  advantages,  and  secular  positions, 
and  especially  are  they  anxious  to  know  the  origin  of  the  religious 
idea  which  dominates  in  their  lives,  and  to  which  they  are  striving 
to  give  outward  reality.  This  is  natural,  and  every  religion  should 
satisfy  the  demand  for  historical  explanation.  Christianity  came  forth, 
not  with  a  fabled  character  as  its  founder,  or  with  a  hermit  as  its 
introducer,  but  as  the  outgrowth  of  one  who  dwelt  among  men,  but 
surpassed  them  in  the  perfection  of  his  human  qualities,  and  in  the 
possession  of  powers  not  less  than  superhuman  and  supernatural. 
The  story  of  his  birth  is  weird-like  and  of  rare  celebrity  ;  the  obscur- 
ity of  his  life  in  Nazareth,  and  its  relation  to  his  after-work,  have 
not  been  fully  explained  by  historian  or  theologian ;  the  brief  public 
career  that  followed,  filled  with  deeds  that  still  live  in  the  memory  of 
the  world,  and  illuminated  with  teachings  that  constitute  the  life- 
blood  of  the  best  civilizations,  is  calculated  to  excite  the  thoughtful 
and  arouse  even  the  stupid  ;  while  the  melancholy  fate  that  overtook 
him,  and  the  sufferings  with  which  he  sealed  his  mission,  still  touch 
the  heart  and  force  the  flow  of  tears. 

The  results  of  his  presence  in  the  world  are  as  potent  as  the  facts 
of  his  history.  Living,  he  was  the  attractive  source  of  the  religion- 
ists of  his  age,  shaking  the  foundations  of  old  faiths  to  the  ground, 
and  subverting  false  social  orders  and  customs,  as  easily  as  light  ex- 
pels darkness  ;  preached,  he  became  the  disorganizing  element  in  all 
communities,  robbing  paganism  of  its  charms,  and  disarming  all  re- 
ligions of  their  power  of  propagation ;  crucified  and  RISEN,  he  has 
become  the  corner-stone  of  civilization  and  the  inspiration  of  the  world's 
progress  toward  an  ideal  condition  of  morality,  industry,  and  happi- 
ness. Christ  is  in  every  thing,  the  omnipresent  factor  of  history,  the 
omnipotent  force  of  the  ages,  the  guiding  spirit  of  the  race.  Litera- 
ture teems  with  thought  concerning  Christ,  either  to  acknowledge  his 
authority  and  enlarge  his  influence,  or  to  criticise  his  claims  and 
deny  his  place  in  religion ;  without  him,  modern  art  would  be  barren 
and  uninteresting ;  without  his  teachings,  civilization  would  degener- 
ate into  barbarism  ;  without  Christ,  society  would  decay.  No  other 
religion  has  such  a  Founder;  no  other  a  comparable  personic  force 


644  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

behind  it  or  in  it.  Supreme  moral  excellence,  immaculate  purity, 
unquestioned  veracity,  transparent  humility,  universal  benevolence, 
sympathetic  helpfulness,  boundless  faith,  illimitable  knowledge,  and 
infinite  affection,  are  the  personal  adornments  of  Jesus  Christ. 

The  sinlessness  of  the  Son  of  Man  is  a  proof  that  he  was  more 
than  man;  or,  as  Horace  Bushuell  phrases  it,  "the  character  of 
Jesus  forbids  his  possible  classification  with  men."  Whether  he  main- 
tained his  sinlessness  by  miraculous  means,  or  by  inherent  love  of 
righteousness ;  whether  the  theory  of  his  perfection  is  a  theory  only, 
without  justification  in  the  presence  of  his  full  history,  or  to  be  main- 
tained until  positive  proof  to  the  contrary  is  furnished,  are  questions 
that  thinking  men  sometimes  discuss.  Mr.  Hennel,  in  asserting  that 
Jesus  is  an  "imperfectly  known  character,"  insinuates  that  if  all  the 
facts  of  his  life  were  known  it  might  be  found  morally  defective 
where  we  least  suspect  it;  but  Paul  says  he  "knew  no  sin."  Some- 
times it  is  declared  that,  even  if  his  external  life  was  blameless,  we 
have  no  means  of  knowing  what  his  internal  life  was,  and  that  it  may 
have  been  imperfect.  This  is  only  a  supposition,  without  force  or 
value  beside  the  testimony  of  those  Avho  were  eye-witnesses  of  his 
majesty,  and  the  companions  of  his  life.  The  supreme  fact  of  his 
sinlessness  gives  him  supreme  power  as  a  teacher  and  exemplar  of 
his  religion. 

The  Messianic  character  of  Jesus  Christ  is  also  a  magnetic  element 
in  his  history.  As  the  Son  of  Mau  he  was  perfect ;  as  the  Son  of 
God,  he  was  the  Messiah,  establishing  the  kingdom  of  God,  or  the 
eternal  rule  of  religion  in  men.  In  the  one  aspect  he  is  an  ex- 
ample, in  the  other  an  authority ;  in  the  one  a  teacher,  in  the  other 
a  king.  A  new  moral  government,  with  new  laws,  new  aims,  new 
plans,  and  new  results,  is  contemplated  by  the  presence  of  the  Mes- 
siah. This  means  the  overthrow  of  old  moral  governments,  or  their 
transformation  into  the  new;  it  means  a  radical  change  in  the  moral 
life  of  the  world,  and  a  conformity  to  the  new  standard  of  conduct  as 
set  forth  by  the  exemplar  himself;  it  means  regeneration,  sanctifica- 
tion,  and  eternal  glory.  In  himself  different  from  all  men,  his  mis- 
sion was  no  less  different  from  that  of  all  teachers  of  religion.  He  is 
the  promised  Messiah,  and,  therefore,  the  hope  of  man.  Without 
him,  as  perfect  man,  Christianity  can  not  be ;  without  his  mission  or 
Messiahship,  Christianity  can  not  redeem  or  triumph.  The  root  of 
Christianity  is,  not  theism  or  eschatology,  but  Christ.  From  the 
region  of  theistic  thinking  have  issued  polytheism  and  mythology ; 
from  eschatology  have  come  the  brood  of  pagan  futures  that  have 
paralyzed  the  races;  from  Christ  comes  Christianity,  with  its  light 
and  power.     Singularly  enough,  Gibbon  does  not  discover  the  rela- 


MISSIONARY  CHARACTER  OF  THE  CHURCH.  645 

tion  of  Christ  to  the  great  system  of  religion,  or  that  he  is  its  inspir- 
ing character,  or  the  vital  influence  which  the  world  everywhere  is 
feeling.  To  overlook  Christ  is  to  overlook  the  essentials  of  Chris- 
tianity.    He  is  the  magnet  of  magnets,  the  only  source  of  power. 

The  great  purpose  of  his  religion  is  conquest,  not  conquest  in  the 
political  or  military  sense,  but  in  the  sense  of  universal  supremacy  as 
a  religion  ;  and  this  purpose,  not  common  to  religions,  it  seeks  to 
promote  through  efficient  organized  agencies.  To  trust  to  the  inher- 
ent leavening  power  of  truth,  without  co-operating  instrumentalities 
for  the  spread  of  trutli,  is  folly  indeed,  for  the  ungodly  world  does 
not  mean  that  truth  shall  prevail.  To  overcome  its  opposition,  truth 
must  organize  its  forces,  and  array  them  in  human  instrumentalities. 
The  human  mind  takes  not  kindly  to  abstractions.  Abstract  thought 
is  powerless  over  the  multitudes.  An  abstract  philosophy  will  not 
extend  beyond  the  circle  of  the  philosophers.  An  abstract  religion  is 
equally  powerless;  it 'must  concrete  itself  in  visible  forms,  and  em- 
ploy visible  agencies  for  its  work.  An  abstract  ship  is  one  that  exists 
in  the  mind  of  the  builder — a  concrete  ship  is  one  that  rides  the  seas. 
The  Christian  religion  is  both  abstract  and  concrete ;  abstract  in  its 
great  doctrinal  structure,  concrete  in  its  supernatural  Founder,  in  its 
institutions  and  instrumentalities. 

The  Christian  Church  is  the  exponent  of  the  Christian  religion, 
organized  not  merely  to  gather  in  one  those  who  receive  a  common 
faith,  but  more  particularly  for  the  vindication  of  the  oracles  of  God, 
and  the  extension  of  Christianity  by  systematic  and  organized  means. 
It  was  intended  to  be  more  than  a  brotherhood,  or  close  corporation 
of  similarly  affected  souls  ;  it  was  established  as  an  aggressive  force, 
for  the  purpose  of  invading  the  haunts  of  sin,  and  crushing  out  by 
methods  singular  and  effective  all  the  Protean  forms  of  error,  and  en- 
riching the  world  with  its  possessions  of  truth,  wisdom,  and  salvation. 
With  this  end  before  it,  the  Church  could  not  be  in  any  community 
a  merely  latent  influence,  or  a  quiet  and  accommodating  organiza- 
tion ;  it  must  be  a  correcting,  reforming,  stimulating,  consuming  in- 
fluence, putting  itself  at  the  head  of  all  social  changes,  demanding 
just  legislation  on  all  vital  subjects,  and  resisting  by  positive  efforts  the 
encroachments  of  vice,  until  it  is  stripped  of  its  power  to  do  harm. 
Such  is  the  mission  of  the  Church,  but  in  executing  it,  it  necessarily 
comes  into  antagonism  with  all  that  is  opposed  to  Christianity,  and 
creates  consternation,  hatred,  hostility,  and  persecution. 

In  its  missionary  character  the  Church  is  an  exciting  instrumen- 
tality, a  disturber  of  old  foundations  of  misbelief,  of  the  false  se- 
curity of  the  world,  and  bears  the  odium  that  attaches  to  Christianity 
itself     The  Church  is  not  Christianity,  but  the  two  are  inseparable 


646  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

in  their  fortunes,  and  the  latter  succeeds,  if  at  all,  only  through  the 
aggressions  of  the  former.  Gibbon  recognized  the  Church  as  the 
propagating  instrumentality  of  Christianity,  and  perceived  that  through 
its  councils  and  the  devotion  of  its  members  it  was  a  compact  force 
hard  to  resist,  and  its  success  could  not  be  stayed.  The  Church  is 
not  a  secret  organization,  nor  dependent  on  secret  methods  for  the  ac- 
complishment of  her  task  ;  the  doors  of  her  temples  are  wide  open, 
and,  entering,  we  may  inspect  her  altars,  listen  to  her  teachings,  catch 
the  melody  of  her  songs,  and  see  her  in  her  beauty  and  glory.  Her 
agencies  are  as  simple  as  her  institutions,  and  her  customs  as  vener- 
able as  they  are  attractive.  See  how  sacredly  she  keeps  the  Sabbath, 
and  how  she  enforces  the  hebdomadal  rest  on  natural  as  well  as  spir- 
itual grounds !  Witness  the  tender  observance  of  the  Eucharistic 
feast,  and  how  carefully  she  guards  the  memory  of  Christ  by  the 
monumental  sacrament ;  follow  the  living  ministry  as  they  go  forth 
into  all  lands,  declaring  the  same  Gospel  to  all  peoples,  and  thrilling 
an  unsaved  world  with  the  tidings  of  redemption  ;  listen  to  the  ten 
thousand  sougs  in  the  home  and  the  sanctuary,  bearing  religious  truth 
to  human  hearts,  and  proclaiming  the  graciousness  of  Him  who  sits 
on  the  throne ;  observe  the  Sunday-schools  gathering  in  the  unnumbered 
children  of  earth,  and  teaching  them  the  lofty  ideal  of  life  in  Jesus 
Christ;  listen  to  the  pious  prayer  of  Christendom  from  prayer-meet- 
ing and  family  altar  for  baptism  of  strength  and  victory  in  conflict 
with  evil  ;  examine  the  benevolent  movements  of  the  Christian  Church, 
having  in  view  the  publication  of  the  Gospel  among  the  nations,  and 
the  redemption  of  all  peoples ;  and  the  conclusion  must  be  that  the 
Church  is  the  best  organized  agency  for  the  spread  of  Christianity 
that  can  be  devised.  Its  purpose  known,  wherever  it  commences  its 
work,  evil  arrays  itself  against  it ;  the  result  is  public  commotion,  and 
the  display  of  the  magnetizing  power  of  Christianity.  The  Church 
is  the  magnetic  instrument  of  the  new  religion. 

The  internal  claim  of  Christianity,  or  its  assumption  of  a  divirie  origin, 
is  pregnant  with  enthusiastic  influence.  Almost  all  religions  trace 
themselves  to  God,  or,  at  all  events,  to  superhuman  authorization. 
None,  we  believe,  claims  a  purely  human  origin,  for  that  would  at 
once  invalidate  its  right  to  authority.  To  satisfy  the  higher  wants  of 
man,  ever  expressing  themselves  in  religious  acts,  there  must  be  in 
religion  something  that  man  can  not  himself  originate  or  suggest.  All 
religions,  the  spurious  as  well  as  the  genuine,  recognize  the  funda- 
mental necessity  of  a  superhuman  element,  growing  out  of  human 
conditions.  Hence  Greece  and  Rome  ascribed  a  divine  source  to  their 
religions.  Paganism,  receiving  religious  instruction  from  priests,  sup- 
posed them  to  be  related  to  supernatural  beings,  or  to  be  superhuman 


THE  UNITY  OF  BIBLICAL  REVELATIONS.  647 

beings  themselves.  The  Christian  religion,  overleaping  all  interme- 
diary agencies,  ascends  higher  than  any  other,  centering  itself  in  the 
authenticated  will  of  God  as  revealed  in  Jesus  Christ.  Its  initial 
claim  is  not  that  it  is  god-like,  but  that  it  is  from  God. 

From  the  initial  claim  grow  others  as  imperious  in  nature,  and 
really  accessory  to  its  vindication.  If  divine,  it  follows  that  it  must 
be  the  only  religion  for  man,  and  can  in  no  sense  fraternize  with  lower 
religions,  or  allow  them  the  least  room  in  this  world.  It  pushes  out 
in  every  direction  with  the  avowed  purpose  to  crush  out  of  existence 
all  other  religions  ;  it  means  "disintegration  and  absorption"  of  all 
others.  Intolerant  in  its  aims,  the  claim  has  providential  proportions  ; 
the  purpose  is  really  majestic,  and  grows  sublime  as  it  becomes  des- 
potic ;  but  its  execution  is  attended  with  serious  difficulties  and  many 
apparent  uncertainties.  As  it  rises  to  view,  crushing  out  other  faiths, 
or  absorbing  them,  as  the  sun  extinguishes  lesser  lights,  and  marches 
on,  conforming  this  world  to  the  moral  idea  of  God,  it  awakens  the 
enthusiasm  of  the  race,  and  nations  join  the  upward  movement  with 
the  glee  of  conquerors.  Such  a  religion  can  not  be  narrow  ;  its  pur- 
pose relieves  it  of  a  single  restricted  view  ;  it  is  ocean-broad,  sky- 
deep,  infinite  as  God.  A  religion  with  such  a  claim,  enforced  con- 
tinually by  providential  interpositions,  and  heralded  by  inspiring 
agencies,  is  calculated  to  arrest  attention,  and  dra\\»  the  thought  of 
men  to  itself. 

Authoritative  and  uncompromising  as  Christianity  is,  it  displays 
credentials  of  origin,  character,  and  purpose  that  sometimes  mock 
human  wisdom,  and  certainly  compel  careful  investigation  and  cool 
judgment  in  determining  their  integral  value.  The  origin,  growth, 
structure,  and  unity  of  the  documentary  records  of  Christianity,  or 
the  harmony  of  Biblical  truth,  constitute  a  marvelous  fact  in  the  his- 
tory of  the  development  of  religious  truth.  It  is  noteworthy  that  a 
book  written  by  more  than  forty  authors,  at  periods  remote  by  cen- 
turies from  one  another,  and  under  circumstances  opposed  to  consec- 
utive and  harmonious  work,  should  yet  be  pervaded  by  one  spirit, 
and  combine  in  the  presentation  of  one  truth.  The  sixty-six  books  of 
the  Bible  are  one — one  in  the  idea  of  right,  one  in  the  idea  of  religion,  one 
in  atonement,  or  method  of  redemption,  one  in  resurrection,  one  in  the 
standard  of  eternal  judgment.  Such  a  unity  of  ideas,  coupled  with  a 
oneness  of  purpose,  is  most  astounding,  compelling  recognition  from 
the  devout  and  explanation  from  the  unbelieving.  The  Christian  re- 
ligion has  but  one  book ;  the  Christian  religion  is  the  revelation  of  a 
single  idea,  with  manifold  branches,  and  a  many-sided  development. 

Gazing  at  the  one  truth,  its  manifoldness  is  at  once  apparent. 
Monotheism,  the  single  element  of  the   earliest  patriarchal  theology, 


648  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

rings  on  the  ear  like  a  note  from  Paradise ;  the  Hebrew  cosmogony, 
or  a  revelation  of  the  scientific  order  of  world-building,  stands  out  as 
a  stately,  divine  panorama  of  facts  ;  the  origin  of  man  and  the  intro- 
duction of  evil,  as  narrated  by  Moses,  constitute  two  chapters  found 
nowhere  outside  of  Revelation ;  the  record  of  the  deluge  and  of  the 
multiplication  of  tongues  must  be  added  to  the  pages  of  revealed  Bib- 
lical science;  Sinaitic  thunder  is  still  heard  by  mankind,  and  the 
mountain  summit  rules  in  the  justice  of  all  civilizations  ;  the  pious 
odes  of  David  continue  to  reverberate  their  mysterious  echoes  of  ex- 
perience into  human  hearts ;  the  Son  ot  God  still  atones  and  still  for- 
gives sin  ;  the  Church  flourishes  throughout  the  world  as  it  never 
did,  even  when  apostles  proclaimed  Christ,  and  kings  protected  the 
sacred  name  from  reproach ;  mankind  are  catching  the  rays  of  John's 
apocalyptic  vision,  and  dreaming  of  the  dawn  of  a  so-called  millen- 
nial day  ;  and  Christendom  marches  on  with  swift  tread  and  jubilant 
feet  to  the  music  of  the  Gospel.  Running  parallel  with  the  science, 
the  law,  the  poetry  of  the  divine  religion,  are  the  monotheism,  the 
atonement,  the  music,  and  the  millennium  of  Revelation.  The  two, 
the  lower  and  the  upper  strata  of  religious  truth,  are  one  in  their  im- 
port, and  signify  the  moral  education,  the  spiritual  development,  and 
the  final  redemption  of  the  race. 

What  are  the  credentials  of  Christianity  ?  Just  what  we  have  men- 
tioned :  its  science,  its  law,  its  monotheism,  its  atonement,  its  music, 
its  millennium.  These  are  magnets  of  wonderful  power ;  these  are 
"  evidences  "  that  convince. 

Among  the  evidences  usually  quoted  in  support  of  the  integrity 
of  divine  revelation,  the  strongest  are  supposed  to  be  prophecy  and 
miracle,  the  first  being  proof  of  supernatural  wisdom  in  the  -prophet, 
and  the  second  certifying  to  the  supernatural  power  of  the  performer. 
These  two  pillars  of  Christianity  appear  sufiicient  to  support  it ;  but 
evidences  so  supernatural  in  themselves,  and  so  exclusively  relied  on 
by  theologians,  have  -created  a  suspicion  of  their  genuineness  by  their 
very  character,  and  by  the  difficulties  which  attend  an  examination 
of  them.  As  to  prophecy,  it  is  a  demonstration  of  the  inspiration  of 
the  prophet ;  as  to  particular  prophecies,  it  is  difficult  to  ascertain 
when  some  of  them  were  uttered,  the  meaning  of  not  a  few  is  ambig- 
uous, or  susceptible  of  a  variety  of  interpretations,  the  usual  applica- 
tion of  some  of  them  to  certain  events  is  considered  strained  and 
unwarranted,  and  the  prophetic  spirit,  the  genesis  of  the  impulse,  is 
involved  in  the  thickest  mystery.  These  objections  to  the  prophetic 
credential  unbelievers  have  urged  with  vehemence  and  apparent 
plausibility. 

Miracle  likewise  suffers  repudiation   at  the  hands   of  those  who 


PREJUDICES  OF  EMINENT  MEN.  649 

reject  Christianity.  To  deny  the  possibility  of  divine  intervention  in 
physical  affairs  is  easy  enough  ;  to  relegate  authenticated  instances  of 
such  intervention  to  mythology  is  a  cheap  and  ignorant  way  of  dis- 
posing of  them.  To  say  with  Hume  that  a  miracle  is  contrary  to 
experience,  means  nothing  ;  to  study  it,  as  does  Huxley,  from  the 
stand-point  of  the  naturalist,  is  as  reasonable  as  to  study  regeneration 
from  that  stand-point.  To  charge  that  miracle  is  a  disturbance  of  the 
"order  of  nature,"  an  order  supposed  to  be  fixed  and  unchangeable, 
is  a  play  of  words,  for  believers  in  miracles  make  no  such  claim,  and, 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  order  of  nature,  as  Mozley  shows,  is  not  dis- 
turbed by  miraculous  interposition.  Nature  proceeded  in  its  accus- 
tomed order  after  a  miracle  had  been  performed,  as  though  insensible 
to  the  interposition  that  had  taken  place.  If  the  sun  stayed  a  little 
its  march  in  behalf  of  Joshua,  it  soon  resumed  its  stately  move- 
ment, the  inhabitants  of  the  earth  unaware  that  any  thing  had  hap- 
pened. Gibbon  assails  the  credibility  of  prophecy  and  miracle  by  the 
statement  that  some  eminent  men  of  the  early  Christian  centuries 
were  unaffected  by  them,  as  if  that  demonstrated  any  thing  more 
than  their  own  blindness  and  skepticism.  Some  "  eminent  men  "  re- 
ject the  evidences  now,  but  the  Gospel  goes  on  in  spite  of  such 
rejection,  and  will  never  lose  its  power.  "Eminent  men"  once  de- 
nounced Harvey's  discovery  of  the  circulation  of  the  blood,  and  Jen- 
ner's  theory  and  practice  of  vaccination,  and  Galileo's  idea  of  the 
rotation  of  the  earth,  and  Copernicus's  solar  system ;  but  it  only 
established  how  perverse  is  ignorance,  and  how  ruinous  is  prejudice. 
However,  Gibbon  concedes  that  the  miracle  had  much  to  do  with  the 
introduction  of  Christianity,  as  it  fed  the  appetite  for  the  marvelous, 
and  held  the  ignorant  masses  in  fear,  the  two  conditions  of  the  reign 
of  superstition. 

Indispensable  as  prophecy  and  miracle  are  to  Christianity,  there 
are  other  evidences  in  its  favor  quite  as  forceful,  cei'tainly  as  complete, 
and  more  adapted  to  win  modern  thought,  that  its  advocates  should 
hasten  to  employ,  and  substitute,  if  necessary,  for  the  antiquated 
proofs  of  other  days.  If  the  scientific  world  proposes  to  test  the  in- 
tegrity of  revelation  by  its  scientific  statements  and  anticipations  ;  if 
it  is  insisted  that  the  purity  of  revealed  truth  must  be  determined 
by  the  character  of  its  ethical  system  or  supernaturalistic  morality ; 
if  it  is  urged  that,  as  a  religion,  it  can  stand  only  as  the  character  of 
Christ  is  relieved  of  all  moral  impeachment;  if  it  is  asserted  that,  as 
a  religion,  its  monotheism  and  system  of  atonement  must  submit  to 
the  closest  investigation  ;  and  if,  as  a  religion,  it  must  be  judged  by 
its  history,  and  by  what  it  still  proposes  to  accomplish,— it  may  joy- 
fully accept  such  tests,  and  present  its  science,  its  laws,  its  doctrines. 


650  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

its  Founder,  its  history,  and  its  projects,  as  the  credentials  of  its 
divine  character,  and  as  affirmative  indications  of  its  future  ascend- 
ency. Not  alone  by  miracle  and  prophecy,  but  by  the  truths  of  Reve- 
lation in  their  modern  aspects  and  relatiom,  must  the  religion  of  Revela- 
tion be  interpreted,  as  the  condition  of  its  progress  in  these  times, 
and  of  its  victory  over  skepticism. 

If  Christianity,  in  its  apostolic  order,  phases,  and  works,  is  in- 
competent to  satisfy  the  requirements  of  the  reason,  and  fails  to  mag- 
netize the  world,  let  an  appeal  be  made  to  nineteenth  century  Chris- 
tianity, freed  as  it  is  from  the  miraculous,  but  abundant  in  proofs  of 
the  divine  genius  that  still  animates  it,  and  of  the  Providence  that 
still  guards  its  hopeful  and  expanding  life.  If  the  old  credentials  no 
longer  excite  man's  interest,  if  the  past  no  longer  stirs  the  anxious 
heart,  the  new  proofs  can  not  fail  to  arouse  the  sluggish  spirit  of  the 
unbelieving,  as  well  as  to  quicken  the  trembling  faith  of  the  followers 
of  Christ.  There  are  in  Christianity  besides  those  mentioned  other 
sources  of  enthusiasm,  other  instruments  of  power;  but  it  is  needless 
to  refer  to  them,  as  it  is  apparent  that  Christianity  is  practically  ex- 
haustless  in  its  influence,  and  without  bounds  in  its  range  of  power. 

Has  Christianity  lost  its  magnetism  ?  That  depotisms,  paganisms, 
mythologies,  social  structures,  inhuman  legislation,  and  public  vices 
have  felt  its  restraining  hand  and  surrendered  to  its  presence,  is  true 
as  applied  to  the  past ;  what  is  its  present  power,  and  what  is  its  hope 
of  the  future  ?  It  is  not  uncommon  in  these  days  to  hear  that  Chris- 
tianity is  obsolete,  that  it  has  lost  its  power  over  the  intellectual 
classes,  and  that  its  chief  supporters  are  the  priests,  women,  and 
children.  He  who  settles  into  this  conclusion,  and  will  not  open 
his  eyes  to  all  the  facts,  is  like  the  man  who,  denying  the  ex- 
istence of  Jupiter's  moons,  refused  to  look  through  the  telescope  lest 
he  might  observe  them.  The  mathematical  progress  of  Christianity 
in  these  times — its  undermining  of  great  evils,  its  purification  of  pub- 
lic sentiment  touching  public  conditions,  and  its  stimulating  effect  on 
aU  the  philanthropies,  to  say  nothing  of  the  increasing  number  of  its 
adherents  and  their  high  social  standing — contradict  the  assumption 
that  it  has  lost  its  hold  upon  the  intellect  and  conscience  of  man. 
Were  it  mei-ely  a  historic  religion,  without  adaptation  to  modern  con- 
ditions ;  or  did  it  array  itself  in  any  wise  against  the  highest  physical, 
intellectual,  social,  and  religious  welfare  of  man  ;  or  did  it  result  in 
superstition,  fanaticism,  or  mental  or  moral  stagnation, — resistance  of 
it  would  be  justifiable.  It  is  magnetic,  because  it  is  theistic,  scientific, 
ethical,  and  eschatological ;  it  is  magnetic,  because  it  is  adapted  to  man;  it 
is  magnetic,  because  it  is  from  God. 

As  a  divine  religion,  the  decadence  of  its  exciting  power  is  not  a 


TRUTH  THE  GREAT  AGITATOR.  651 

possibility.  Its  mission  is  to  arouse  the  sleeping  world  out  of  its 
dream  of  security ;  to  interrogate  governments  as  to  their  legislation, 
and  peoples  as  to  their  moral  habits ;  to  question  the  family  as  to  its 
unity  and  purity  ;  to  test  the  Church  by  suffering  and  discipline ;  and 
to  administer  rebuke  to  all  who  will  not  obey  the  Gospel  of  the  Son 
of  God.  In  the  execution  of  its  projects,  it  will  clash  with  selfish 
interests,  political  prejudices,  secret  vices,  and  an  independent  spirit, 
resulting  in  disturbance  and  antagonism.  The  power  of  Christianity 
may  be  measured  by  the  antagonism  it  develops,  as  well  as  by  the 
graciousness  it  exhibits.  Let  the  doctrines  of  monotheism,  incarna- 
tion, atonement,  regeneration,  resurrection,  immortality,  and  future 
retribution  be  declared,  and  aft  agnostic  storm  ensues  ;  let  the  duties  of 
worship,  faith,  prayer,  benevolence,  and  the  forgiving  spirit  be  an- 
nounced, and  resistance  is  raised ;  let  the  ministry  hold  up  the  Son 
of  God  as  the  Teacher,  the  Model,  and  the  Judge,  and  infidelity  croaks 
and  seeks  revenge ;  let  the  virtues  of  patience,  humility,  veracity, 
temperance,  and  peace  be  taught,  and  war  breaks  out  and  sin  riots 
in  the  sun ;  let  an  assault  be  made  on  the  heathen  world,  with  no 
other  purpose  than  to  lift  it  up  into  the  light,  and  false  religions  will 
contend,  dictate,  squirm,  and  die  in  maddened  haste  and  rebellion; 
let  Messiahship,  miracle,  and,  prophecy  be  vindicated,  and  the  flood- 
gates of  rationalism  will  open  wide,  and  vainly  essay  to  stem  the  ris- 
ing tide  of  truth ;  let  the  sacreduess  of  the  Sabbath  and  the  sanctity 
of  the  moral  law  be  urged,  and  ranting  defenders  of  personal  liberty 
will  be  multiplied  ;  let  evil  be  restrained  and  condemned,  and  evil- 
doers will  go  insane  with  rage  over  restriction.  In  the  work  it  under- 
takes to-day,  Christianity  will  meet  with  opposition  as  hateful  in 
spirit,  as  agnostic  in  character,  and  as  revengeful  in  purpose,  as  that 
that  confronted  it  in  Paul's  time,  or  in  any  subsequent  period  of  its 
history.  Opposition,  however,  awakens  its  energies,  stimulates  its 
magnetic  power,  and  leads  to  spiritual  achievement. 

It  is  not  enough  that  Christianity  be  true  ;  it  must  have  the 
power  of  persuasion,  of  contagion,  of  generating  and  perpetuating 
moral  enthusiasm  for  the  sake  of  truth.  In  the  exercise  of  this  power 
it  is  not  unlikely  that  fanatical  outbreaks  and  superstitious  movements 
may  occur,  as  in  the  past  the  Crusades,  papal  extravagances,  and  sec- 
tarian institutions  appeared  as  its  fruit ;  but  in  the  future  its  power 
should  be  the  internal  heat  of  truth,  confined  in  its  expression  and 
development  to  the  accomplishment  of  its  specific  mission  in  the 
world.  Instead  of  relaxing  its  hold  upon  the  intellect,  it  must  tighten 
its  grasp ;  instead  of  polishing  the  social  virtues,  it  must  purify  them  ; 
instead  of  coquetting  with  "eminent  men,"  it  must  elevate  them  to 
its  height  of  vision  ;  instead   of  submitting  to  governments,  it  must 


652  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

teach  them  their  responsibility  to  God ;  instead  of  withholding  its 
purposes,  it  must  publish  them  to  the  ends  of  the  earth,  shaking  it 
into  loyalty,  reverence,  and  harmony  with  God.  The  Christianity 
that  captured  the  Roman  Empire  has  the  power  to  dictate  religion  to 
all  nations,  as  it  has  the  purpose  to  save  them.  If  the  zeal  of  its  first 
disciples  carried  it  to  the  isles  of  the  sea,  and  planted  its  banners  on 
three  continents,  the  zeal  of  Christ's  followers  to-day,  with  the  multi- 
plied agencies  of  a  Christian  civilization  in  their  hands,  and  with  a 
sense  of  ever-widening  responsibility  to  Gospelize  the  nations  speedily, 
should  introduce  the  millennial  condition,  and  give  victory  to  all  of 
Christ's  dearest  hopes  and  divinest  aims.  Let  Christianity  become 
epidemic.  * 


CHAPTER  XXX. 

THE    PSE^UDODOX    IN    CHRISTIANITY. 

STRAUSS  characterizes  the  resurrection  of  Jesus  Christ  as  a  histor- 
ical humbug,  and  his  ascension  as  a  symbol,  or  a  mere  "satire." 
Renan  traces  the  story  of  the  resurrection  to  Mary  Magdalene,  reject- 
ing all  the  evidences  of  its  credibility.  Hiickel  repudiates  the  Bib- 
lical notion  of  a  personal  God  as  a  piece  of  ecclesiastical  fiction. 
Biichner  boldly  declares  that  "  Christianity  has  but  injured  the 
spiritual  and  material  progress  of  mankind,"  and  Schopenhauer  pro- 
nounces it  a  "pessimist  religion."  Of  all  religions,  Christianity  is 
the  worst,  because  its  falsehoods  are  the  greatest,  its  misrepresenta- 
tions the  most  fascinating,  and  its  direct  influence  the  most  baneful. 
It  is  pessimistic,  satirical,  symbolical,  fictitious,  irrational,  and  op- 
pressive. The  sum  of  skeptical  critscism  is  that  Christianity,  in  its 
constituent  elements,  is  a  tissue  of  falsehoods,  some  so  deftly  and  ob- 
scurely presented  as  to  escape  the  detection  even  of  those  who  are 
anxious  to  know  the  truth,  while  others  are  so  transparently  self-in- 
consistent and  self-refutatory  that  one  is  amazed  at  the  honorable  re- 
ception accorded  them.  Its  greatest  so-called  truths,  as  its  theism,  its 
incarnation,  its  atonement,  its  resurrection,  its  immortality,  its  heaven 
and  hell,  are  its  greatest  deceptions.  Christianity  is  thus  set  forth  as 
a  monstrous  error,  having  originated  in  the  pious  imagination  of 
Christ's  followers,  but  perpetuated  in  after  ages  by  the  ecclesiastical 
organization  known  as  the  Church  in  the  face  of  the  exposure  of  its 
stupendous  falsehood.  The  false  in  Christianity  is,  therefore,  the  sub- 
ject of  our  inquiry. 

It  embraces  not  only  the  errors  of  creeds,  but  also  the  essential 


ERRORS  IN  RELIGIONS  AND  PHILOSOPHIES.  653 

weaknesses  of  organic  or  revealed  Christianity.  It  embraces  not  only 
the  frailties  of  Christian  organizations,  but  also  the  imperfections  of 
Christian  believers,  which  are  persistently  quoted  as  an  embarrass- 
ment to  its  acceptance,  and  as  evidence  of  its  darkening  and  degrad- 
ing influence  in  the  world.  Christianity  is  not  only  bad  ;  it  is  also 
fake.  Christianity  may  be  viewed  as  orthodox,  or,  as  it  is  popularly 
accepted,  as  a  system  of  revealed  truth  ;  SiS  heterodox,  or  a  variation  from 
the  orthodox  ;  and  as  pseudodox,  or  essentially  and  internally  false, 
and  therefore  a  variation  from  both  of  the  preceding. 

It  is  not  at  all  diflicult  to  point  out  defects  in  human  religions,  or 
errors  in  systems  of  philosophy.  The  Assyrian  religions,  embodying 
certain  revealed  truths,  or  truths  that  seem  as  sacred  as  any  in  the 
Hebrew  Scriptures,  were  yet  preliminary,  and  inadequate  to  the  ac- 
complishment of  their  purpose.  Absorbing  mythological  notions — 
the  tendency  of  human  religious— they  easily  glided  into  fanaticism 
or  superstition,  and  rather  degraded  than  elevated  their  subjects. 
Brahminisra,  more  stately  in  form,  was  less  free  from  mysticism, 
mythology,  and  erratic  suggestion.  Buddhism,  protesting  against 
pure  Brahminism,  and  advancing  in  its  teachings,  was  as  religiously 
enervating  as  the  religion  it  opposed.  Mohammedanism,  superior  to 
both,  because  including  in  its  category  of  doctrines  certain  divinely 
accepted  Christian  tenets,  renders  itself  obnoxious  to  the  Christian 
world,  by  its  surplusage  of  irrational  and  superstitious  revelations.  In 
all  religions  of  human  origin  the  pessimistic,  the  irrational,  the  un- 
philosophical,  the  pseudodox  abound. 

Likewise  every  philosophical  system  from  Plato  to  Spencer  par- 
takes of  the  general  debility  of  human  speculation,  and  is  religiously 
both  pessimistic  and  pseudodox.  Blemishes  in  human  religions,  weak- 
nesses in  human  institutions,  insufficiency  in  human  philosophies, 
errors  in  all,  we  are  not  surprised  to  find ;  but  will  a  religion  not 
human  in  origin  exhibit  similar  weaknesses,  and  be  equally  irrational 
and  unphilosophical  ?  Is  Christianity  a  system  of  pseudo  elements? 
Is  it  a  crude,  narrow,  speculative  religion,  inadequate  on  account  of 
limitation,  insufficient  from  want  of  power?  Or  is  it  so  manifestly 
perfect  in  its  doctrinal  structure,  so  transparently  pure  in  its  spiritual 
influence,  so  obviously  divine  in  its  origin,  and  so  magically  om- 
nipotent in  its  energies,  that  criticism  is  absurd,  and  questioning  en- 
tirely wrong? 

For  a  religion  so  notably  high-born  as  Christianity  no  exemption 
from  inspection  is  claimed,  and  assertion  of  perfection  should  not  be 
made  unless  it  can  be  demonstrated.  Investigation  is  in  order  to  sat- 
isfy its  friends,  and  a  necessity  to  answer  the  objections  with  which 
skeptical  thought  has  assailed  it. 


654  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

Much  confusion  has  arisen  in  the  public  mind  from  the  failure  to 
recognize  the  radical  difference  between  Gospel  Christianity  and  The- 
ologic  Christianity,  the  former  consisting  of  the  essentia  of  the  New 
Testament,  while  the  latter  is  the  human  presentation  of  it.  The 
one  is  absolute  truth,  the  other  absolute  belief;  and  so  far  forth  as 
truth  and  belief  may  be  radically  different,  so  far  may  original  Chris- 
tianity and  formulated  Christianity  be  radically  different.  It  is  clear 
that  what  passes  for  Christianity  may  be  something  else  entirely,  just 
as  the  Ptolemaic  teaching  passed  for  centuries  as  true  astronomy. 

It  must  also  be  taken  into  the  account  that  the  difference  between 
the  several  types  of  Christianity  is  as  great  as  the  difference  between 
any  single  type  and  Christianity  itself.  Papal  Christianity  is  a  single 
type ;  Protestant  Christianity  is  a  different  type  ;  and  quite  possibly 
the  objections  urged  against  the  one  will  not  at  all  apply  to  the  other. 
The  iconoclast  who  assails  theologic  Christianity  might  be  brought  to 
acknowledge  the  beauty  and  to  discern  the  truth  of  original  Chris- 
tianity;  and  the  scientist  who  attacks  Papal  Christianity,  as  did  Prof. 
Draper,  might  be  disposed  to  look  with  favor  upon  some  Protestant 
form  of  religion.  It  is  imperative  that  these  distinctions  be  kept  in 
mind,  for  the  Gospel  idea  has  been  jeopardized  in  the  confused  as- 
saults upon  theologic  and  Papal  representations  of  it.  If  all  the 
Christianities — Gospel,  Theologic,  Papal,  Oriental,  and  Protestant — 
were  in  perfect  harmony  in  spirit,  working  by  different  methods  for 
a  common  end,  differing  only  slightly  in  form,  and  none  whatever  in 
structural  elements,  room  for  criticism  would  be  indeed  small ;  but 
the  differences  among  them  strengthen  the  suspicion  that  Christianity 
itself,  at  its  very  roots,  is  a  multiplex  religion,  sending  forth  a  variety 
of  branches,  bearing  an  endless  variety  of  fruit,  without  unity  of  na- 
ture or  the  possession  of  common  qualities.  The  nmnber  of  Christian 
religions  is  a  standing  reproof  of  the  Christian  religion.  History  reveals 
a  sectarian  Christianity  in  opposition  to  original  Christianity,  the 
Roman  hierarchy  pointing  to  the  former  as  an  evidence  of  its  depar- 
ture from  the  truth. 

Is  the  conglomerate  religion  known  as  Christianity  identical  with 
the  revelations  of  the  New  Testament  ?  What  explanation  can  Prot- 
estantism, Roman  Catholicism,  and  Oriental  Sectarianism  give  of 
themselves  as  offshoots  of  Christianity?  That  Christianity  in  its  de- 
velopment has  assumed  these  historic  forms,  and  that  they  are  mu- 
tually antagonistic  will  not  be  denied  ;  but  one  should  be  slow  to 
infer  any  thing  to  the  prejudice  of  Christianity  on  that  account.  The 
educational  idea  has  produced  Voltaire,  Calvin,  Shakespeare,  Pollock, 
Latimer,  Diderot,  George  Eliot,  Byron,  Ingersoll ;  but  with  all  its 
variety  of  product  the  idea  is  right  per  se,  and  should  be  encouraged. 


IMPERFECTION  OF  THEOLOGIC  STRUCTURES.  655 

From  the  bosom  of  democracy  have  come  treason,  secession,  slavery, 
socialism,  as  well  as  the  ripest  fruit  of  the  highest  civilization  ;  dem- 
ocracy is  nevertheless  politically  sound. 

Carefully  distinguishing  between  what  Christianity  is,  and  what 
has  seemed  to  grow  out  of  it,  or  what  has  been  erected  in  its  holy 
name,  the  suspicion  raised  against  the  true  religion  subsides.  Theologic 
Christianity  is  the  product  of  Church  councils  or  theologians ;  Papal 
Christianity  is  the  product  of  a  single  ecclesiastical  organization ;  Ori- 
ental Christianity  is  the  blossom  of  Eastern  sectarianism ;  Protestant 
Christianity  is  the  exponent  of  a  revised  and  progressive  order  of  re- 
ligious faith.  On  these  broad  historic  divisions  no  argument  against 
the  unity  of  Scriptural  Christianity  can  be  maintained. 

If,  however,  we  should  consider  these  four-fold  divisions  as  con- 
stituting ecclesiastical  Christianity  in  contradistinction  to  original  or 
New  Testament  Christianity,  and  should  seek  the  marks  of  difference 
between  them,  we  might  find  in  the  former  an  exaggeration  of  non- 
essential particulars,  and  possibly  an  omission  of  fundamental  truths 
that  would  justify  the  charge  of  the  false  in  what  passes  for  the  Chris- 
tian religion.  Remembering  that  theologic  structures  are  the  work 
of  human  builders,  such  a  result  might  also  be  expected.  Even  in 
framing  a  revealed  religion  into  form,  the  imperfection  of  human 
handiwork  will  be  visible,  and  religion  may  possibly  suffer  by  its  pas- 
sage into  a  human  structure.  Imperfect  as  the  instrumental  mani- 
festation may  be,  it  is  nevertheless  indispensable,  both  to  faith  and 
an  intellectual  understanding  of  its  contents.  Dogmatic  Christianity 
is  as  necessary  as  experiential  Christianity.  Religion  without  truths 
is  like  a  science  without  laws;  and  Christianity  without  the  New 
Testament  would  be  like  physiology  without  the  human  body  as  its 
content  and  illustration. 

Over  Dogmatic  Christianity  the  great  historic  controversies  were 
waged,  and  necessarily  so,  for  they  were  the  violent  and  persistent 
seekings  after  exact  truth.  Certain  schools,  interpreting  the  Gospel 
by  cast-iron  rules,  issued  certain  documentary  declarations  of  truth  ; 
and  pulpit,  press,  song-book,  and  prayer-circle  have  reflected  these 
declarations,  and  fastened  them  upon  the  public  mind.  In  this  way 
theologic  truth  found  a  lodgment  in  human  thought,  and  insensibly 
was  substituted  for  Gospel  truth.  One  school  proclaims  the  sover- 
eignty of  God ;  another  the  freedom  of  man ;  another  declares  both 
to  be  compatible,  while  a  fourth  discovers  them  to  be  irreconcilable. 
Theology  is  thus  reduced  to  fractions  instead  of  wholes,  and  Chris- 
tianity seems  divided  against  itself  Unitarianism  exalts  one  truth 
to  the  exclusion  of  other  essential  truths,  while  Trinitarianism  offends 
the   mathematical  spirit  of  certain   precise  theologies.     Rationalism 


656  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

accepts  truths  that  may  be  rationally  discerned,  while  Pauline  followers 
appropriate  those  that  are  "spiritually  discerned."  Universalism  re- 
moves the  bars  to  the  heavenly  life,  while  evangelical  Christianity  re- 
quires a  soul-fitness  for  the  enjoyment  of  the  delectable  abode.  Touching 
the  great  doctrinal  truths  of  religion,  as  espoused  by  theology,  there 
is  no  uniformity  of  belief,  and  hence  no  bond  of  union.  Must  the- 
ology continue  to  dress  like  an  Ishmaelite  ?  So  long  as  the  theolog- 
ical spirit,  or  the  school-idea  of  religion  is  dominant,  the  Gospel  idea 
of  Christianity  will  be  superseded,  or  at  the  least  fail  of  the  exalted 
recognition  it  deserves. 

In  another  aspect  theologic  Christianity  is  at  war  with  itself. 
Concerning  the  ordinances  of  the  Church,  there  is  as  much  division  as 
concerning  the  doctrines  of  the  Gospel,  while  the  strife  for  their  ob- 
serj^auce  is  even  greater.  For  example,  the  Christian  rite  of  bap- 
tism has  been  the  innocent  cause  of  much  controversy  and  the  source 
of  feuds  and  alienations  in  Christian  circles.  While  one  ecclesiastical 
body  concedes  the  validity  of  three  forms  of  baptism,  another  recog- 
nizes the  Scriptural  character  of  but  one,  and  goes  so  far  as  sub- 
stantially to  unchristianize  all  other  bodies  not  in  harmony  with  it. 
Is  the  Gospel  ambiguous  in  its  teachings,  contradictory  in  its  exam- 
ples ?  Or  is  the  theologic  spirit  in  the  ascendency  in  Church  life  ? 
Concerning  abstract  truth  one  can  imagine  a  ground  for  speculation, 
discussion,  difference;  but  that  an  ordinance  should  provoke  diflfer- 
ence  is  a  mystery.  Yet  as  it  was  a  breach  of  etiquette  at  Ems  that 
brought  on  the  Franco-Prussian  war,  so  whether  immersion  is  only  a 
mode  of  baptism,  or  the  only  baptism,  has  convulsed  Churches,  na- 
tions, continents.  The  same  spirit  appears  in  the  interpretation  of 
the  Eucharist,  one  ecclesiastical  body  insisting  on  the  doctrine  of  con- 
substantiation,  another  shouting  transubstantiation,  another  rejecting 
both,  and  interpreting  the  sacrament  as  a  monumental  institution  with 
moral  purposes  in  view.  One  might  suppose  that  in  a  matter  of  so 
little  positive  value  there  would  be  no  diflTerence  of  opinion  ;  but  it 
was  great  enough  to  divide  Luther  and  Zwingli,  and  it  is  a  dividing 
line  between  Protestantism  on  the  one  hand  and  Roman  Catholicism 
on  the  other.  Over  the  small  matters  of  whether  the  Psalms  should 
be  sung  or  omitted  at  public  worship,  whether  one  should  stand  or 
kneel  when  one  prays,  whether  a  musical  instrument  should  be  intro- 
duced into  a  church,  or  be  cast  out  as  offensive  to  pure  devotion,  a 
spirit  of  antagonism  has  been  developed,  and  the  spirit  of  amity, 
unity,  and  progress  has  been  suspended.  If  these  were  questions  of 
taste,  expediency,  or  ecclesiastical  mathematics  they  would  not  have 
mention  here,  but  in  the  conflicts  they  excited  an  appeal  was  made 
to  the  Word  of  God,  the  use  of  an  organ  or  a  song,  or  a  form  of  wor- 


EXTRAVAGANT  ESTIMATE  OF  LITTLE  THINGS.        657 

ship  becoming  a  profound  theological  question.  Christianity  itself 
was  invoked  to  decide. 

The  origin,  organization,  and  purposes  of  the  Christian  ministry 
have  also  passed  into  the  theological  arena  for  settlement,  and  must 
be  determined  by  Christian  dialecticians  according  to  exegetical  rules 
and  the  genius  of  the  interpretative  spirit.  This  were  well  if  the  design 
were  the  protection  of  the  sacred  order  from  imposition ;  but  one  ec- 
clesiastical body  ordains  that  the  Christian  ministry,  outside  of  the 
alleged  line  of  apostolical  succession,  is  illegitimate,  and  its  pulpits  are 
not  open  to  such  uncalled  and  unrobed  shepherds  of  the  flock.  Even 
this  narrow  and  self-centered  conception,  wrung  from  supposed  Scrip- 
ture, is  the  basis  of  a  Churchly  organization,  just  as  the  doctrine  of 
election,  equally  untenable,  is  the  basis  of  another,  and  as  baptism 
by  immersion  is  the  corner-stone  of  still  another.  We  are  not  writ- 
ing in  defense  of  a  particular  doctrine  of  belief,  or  of  a  particular 
method  of  ordinance-observing,  or  of  a  single  method  of  worship, 
but  showing  how  in  the  hands  of  devout  men  Christianity  has  been 
distorted,  and  even  prostituted,  in  support  of  doctrines,  methods,  and 
ceremonies  quite  incongruous  to  its  spirit  and  design.  If  the  world 
must  judge  of  Christianity  wholly  by  its  theologic  aspects,  it  is  not 
surprising  that  criticisms  have  arisen  and  are  multiplying  ;  indeed,  the 
theologic  spirit  will  provoke  the  critical  spirit.  If  we  must  decide  as 
to  the  nature  of  Christianity  by  the  result  of  the  attempts  of  Chris- 
tian men  to  pry  into  the  secret  councils  of  the  Almighty  on  the 
one  hand,  or  by  the  quantity  of  water  used  in  an  ordinance  on  the 
other,  then  it  must  appear  too  large  on  the  one  hand  and  entirely 
too  small  on  the  other,  as  a  religion  for  this  world.  If  baptisteries, 
genuflections,  clerical  robes,  mathematical  reprobations,  and  sacra- 
mental superstitions  are  the  outward  signs  of  the  inward  religion,  or 
the  essential  contents  of  religion,  then  it  can  hardly  hope  for  a  long 
future  among  a  civilized  people.  The  religious  mind  demands  more 
than  the  externalism  of  religion.  Yet  the  history  of  Church  con- 
troversies reveals  the  deplorable  fact  that  small  matters,  the  anise 
and  the  cumin,  have  provoked  as  violent  an  agitation,  and  led  to  as 
unreasoning  a  division,  both  of  religious  sentiment  and  organization, 
as  the  weightier  matters  of  Christianity.  In  a  sense,  therefore,  the- 
ologic Christianity  has  been  the  source  of  the  pseudodox  in  religion, 
as  it  has  exalted  out  of  all  proportion  those  docrines  and  ceremonies 
which  are  by  comparison  with  others  non-essential  to  the  purposes  of 
religion ;  and  by  such  exaltation  it  has  given  a  false  coloring  to  true 
Christianity  and  occasioned  a  grievous  misunderstanding  of  its  char- 
acter and  objects. 

To  even  greater  lengths  of  absurd  interpretation  has  Papal  Chris- 
42 


658  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

tianity  gone  in  its  appropriation  of  the  Gospel,  presenting  it  in  a  form 
scarcely  recognizable  by  those  supposed  to  be  familiar  with  the  teach- 
ings of  its  Founder.  In  addition  to  its  exegetical  work,  it  imposes 
traditional  teaching  upon  its  followers,  and  occasionally  exercises  the 
right  of  revealing  doctrines  not  at  all  contained  in  the  Word  of  God. 
By  a  varying  exegesis,  by  old  traditions,  by  new  revelations,  Papal 
Christianity  poses  as  a  religion  as  different  from  original  Christian- 
ity as  evolution  is  different  from  the  Mosaic  creation.  According  to 
its  canons  the  Church  is  the  true  interpreter  of  the  Bible  ;  the  right 
of  private  judgment  respecting  revealed  truth  is  forbidden  ;  and  new 
truth  must  be  received  with  the  same  unquestioning  faith  as  old 
truth.  This  prepares  the  way  for  false  teaching,  fanaticism,  intol- 
erance, and  organized  assault  upon  opposing  faiths. 

The  history  of  Roman  Catholicism  is  in  conformity  to  this  antici- 
pation. By  virtue  of  its  prerogative  to  interpret  the  Bible  and  to 
add  to  it,  it  has  produced  such  doctrines  as  auricular  confession,  the 
Immaculate  Conception,  prayers  for  the  dead,  purgatory  and  deliver- 
ance therefrom,  priestly  absolution,  and  the  infallibility  of  the  Pope. 
The  last  is  the  extreme  of  Papal  claims,  the  highest  notch  of  ab- 
surd pretensions  on  the  part  of  religion.  The  Papacy  itself,  with  its 
alleged  foundation  in  the  assumed  primacy  of  St.  Peter,  and  its  at- 
tempted exercise  of  divine  rights  from  Hildebrand  to  Leo  XIII.,  is 
a  standing  demonstration  of  the  hypocrisy  of  Christianity,  or  the 
monstrous  stupidity  of  Roman  Catholicism.  The  sovereign  claim  of 
the  Papacy  to  temporal  power,  by  which  it  would  appoint  and  depose 
rulers,  frame  the  form  of  governments,  dictate  laws,  and  compel  the 
subjection  of  nations  to  the  Church,  is  a  misrepresentation  of  the 
radical  idea  of  Christianity,  or  Christianity  is  defective  in  its  first 
principles.  The  equally  supercilious  claim  of  the  Papacy  to  enforce 
its  spiritual  doctrines  on  believers  and  unbelievers  by  the  threat  of 
excommunication  in  this  life  and  etei'nal  torment  after  death,  is  preg- 
nant with  mischief  as  a  doctrine,  and  has  wrought  dismay  throughout 
the  world.  What  persecution  has  it  not  authorized  ?  Who  kindled 
the  martyr's  fires?  Who  established  the  Inquisition  ?  Who"  inaugu- 
rated the  massacre  of  St.  Bartholomew?  The  record  of  that  organiza- 
tion against  so-called  heresy  and  liberty  of  thought ;  against  civil 
government,  popular  education,  and  scientific  research  ;  against  the 
rights  of  conscience,  and  the  rights  of  religion  in  general,  is  such  as 
to  make  one  tremble  as  one  reads  it,  to  make  the  Christian  heart 
thankful  that  its  power  is  broken,  to  make  humanity  ashamed  that 
in  some  sense  it  still  stands  for  Christianity. 

Is  Protestant  Christianity  a  pseudo-religion  in  any  respect  ?  Does 
it  also  partake  of  the  liabilities  of  the  preceding  types,  or  is  it  a 


THE  TAINT  OF  ROMAN  CATHOLICISM.  659 

model  exponent  of  Gospel  elements?  Considering  its  origin,  and 
that  uninspired  men  molded  it  into  its  present  shape,  and  that  the  best 
religious  minds  differ  from  one  another  in  exegetical  construction,  it 
is  not  surprising  that  even  Protestantism  is  burdened  with  weaknesses, 
and  supports  errors  which  in  the  future  it  will  abandon. 

In  breaking  away  from  the  dominion  of  the  Roman  Catholic 
power,  Luther  naturally  broke  away  from  the  human  authority  it  ex- 
ercised, and  held  to  many  of  the  doctrines  it  presumed  to  teach. 
While  the  Reformation  anchored  itself  in  the  thought  of  personal 
liberty,  at  the  same  time  it  inherited  from  the  Church  the  spirit  of 
its  truths,  many  of  which  were  Scriptural,  and  others  only  traditional, 
or  additional  to  the  old  revelations.  The  inheritance  was  inevitable, 
both  because  Catholic  teaching  was  not  erroneous  in  every  particular, 
and  the  dissolution  of  Luther's  relation  to  the  old  Church  had  quite 
as  much  reference  to  authority  as  to  doctrine.  Similar  instances, 
with  similar  results,  have  occurred  elsewhere.  John  Wesley  trans- 
ferred to  Methodism  many  of  the  teachings  of  the  Church  of  England, 
whose  moral  reformation  he  strenuously  sought  to  accomplish,  but 
whose  doctrinal  character  was  in  great  part  unobjectionable.  Luther 
could  not  forget  all  that  the  mother  Church  had  taught  him  ;  hence, 
it  was  natural  that  even  by  those  things  which  he  repudiated  he  was 
insensibly  affected  in  his  feelings  and  beliefs.  From  palpable  errors 
in  doctrine,  and  detected  or  authorized  evils  in  practice,  he  separated 
himself  by  a  distance  too  great  to  be  retraced ;  but  in  matters  con- 
cerning which  there  was  room  for  doubt,  he  was  somewhat  under  the 
discipline  of  the  old  life.  In  its  early  stages  Protestantism  showed 
the  taint  of  Catholicism,  and  it  is  questionable  if  the  Christian  Church 
is  yet  entirely  free  from  that  pestilential  influence.  To  be  sure,  none  of 
the  open  absurdities  of  the  corrupt  religion,  such  as  auricular  confes- 
sion, the  legend  of  St.  Peter,  or  the  infallibility  of  the  Pope,  has 
taken  root  in  the  advanced  faith ;  but  certain  superstitions  made 
sacred  by  age  still  attach  to  it,  whose  origin  is  rather  papistical  than 
inherent.  For  instance,  the  dogma  of  "baptismal  regeneration," 
and  the  doctrine  of  consubstantiation,  are  relics,  so  to  speak,  of  the 
days  when  the  one  religion  broke  from  the  other.  The  observance 
of  special  days,  as  Palm  Sunday,  Easter,  and  Whitsuntide,  not  at  all 
objectionable,  is  of  Roman  Catholic  origin,  and  here  mentioned  as  an 
illustration  of  the  influence  of  the  one  faith  on  the  other.  The  in- 
•  tolerance  that  has  characterized  the  history  of  the  Papal  Church  is 
reproduced  in  the  disposition  of  certain  Protestant  bodies  to  ostracize 
all  Christians  from  the  fold  of  Christ  who  have  not  become  members 
thereof  by  their  prescribed  methods,  and  the  acceptance  of  their  form 
of  faith.     The  custom  of  Lent,  and  the  clothing  of  ministers  in  robes 


660  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIAMTY. 

for  the  duties  of  public  worship,  have  been  transmitted  to  Protestant- 
ism. While  in  essentials  Protestantism  has  been  successful  in  its 
separation  from  Latin  Christianity,  and  the  divergence  is  constantly 
growing  wider,  the  influence  of  the  latter  upon  the  former  is  not  en- 
tirely extinct;  on  the  contrary,  it  is  believed  by  many  that  that  in- 
fluence is  too  potent  in  our  religious  customs  and  forms  of  worship. 
Perhaps  this  relationship  of  custom,  doctrine,  and  form,  so  objection- 
able now,  may  serve  in  the  future  as  the  basis  of  a  union  of  the  two 
antagonistic  types  of  Christianity,  and  so  justify  what  is  now  under- 
stood to  be  the  infection  of  Romanism  in  the  Christian  world. 

By  virtue  of  the  antagonism  of  these  types  of  religion,  Christianity 
is  unfairly  represented ;  it  is  supposed  to  be  self-contradictory ;  it 
stands  out  as  divided  against  itself,  which  can  only  be  true  of  error. 
The  union  of  these  rival  religions,  which  can  only  take  place  by  the 
abandonment  of  traditional  teaching  and  superstitious  dogma  on  the 
part  of  Roman  Catholicism,  and  a  pledge  of  fraternity  on  the  ground 
of  oneness  in  faith  touching  the  essentials  of  truth  on  the  part  of 
Protestantism,  will  do  much  toward  correcting  the  popular  misunder- 
standing of  what  Christianity  is  and  what  it  proposes.  Until  the  two 
factions  come  together  in  the  spirit  of  harmony,  each  will  pursue  its 
way  as  if  it  were  a  different  religion,  and  as  if  Christianity  were  also 
a  different  religion  from  what  it  is,  endangering  both  them  and  it. 

The  exhibition  of  the  defects  of  Theologic,  Papal,  and  Protestant 
Christianity  must  now  end,  its  purpose  doubtless  being  apparent  to 
the  reader.  Christianity  is  known  to  the  world  by  the  forms  it  has 
assumed,  the  fact  being  forgotten  that  the  form  may  be  false,  while 
the  original  may  be  true.  Theologic  Christianity  may  be  an  error; 
Papal  Christianity  may  be  inherently  a  superstition ;  Protestant  Chris- 
tianity may  be  a  borrowed  and  approximately  correct  religion  ;  while 
original  Christianity  is  essentially  and  eternally  true.  The  pseudodox 
of  Christianity  is  the  pseudodox  of  its  various  types,  while  the  anti- 
type of  religion,  or  Christianity,  is  invulnerable  in  its  constitution, 
and  without  a  discoverable  error  of  fact  or  teaching.  Herbert  Spencer 
refers  to  the  "Hebrew  religion,"  meaning  the  entire  Biblical  sys- 
tem, as  a  "pseudo-religion,"  but  Gospel  Christianity,  as  distinguished 
from  its  types,  we  shall  see  is  entirely  destitute  of  pseudo  elements. 
Separating  it  from  the  types  by  which  it  is  known,  it  may  be  studied 
in  its  original  character  and  contents,  the  only  Avay,  indeed,  by  which 
to  discover  its  weaknesses,  if  there  are  any,  and  its  excellences,  if  at 
all  inherent  or  prominent.  Is  it  in  itself  a  superstition,  or  a  truth? 
Does  it  abound  in  falsehoods,  crudities,  obsolete  elements?  Is  it 
crowded  with  ambiguities,  moral  impossibilities,  spiritual  delusions? 
Is  it  a  mystical  rhapsody,  an   ideal  hallelujah,  a  sentimental  touch- 


THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  SPIRIT  SUBORDINATE.  661 

stone?  Is  it  religious  magic?  These  questions  reach  in  all  directions, 
bringing  into  the  discussion  the  truths,  the  personages,  the  institu- 
tions, and  the  projects  of  the  New  Testament;  for  Christianity  includes 
them  all,  and  stands  or  falls  with  them. 

What  is  original,  or  Gospel  Christianity?  On  opening  the  Bible, 
two  religions  at  once  are  discovered,  the  one  commonly  called  the 
Jewish,  the  other  commonly  known  as  the  apostolic  religion  ;  yet  are 
they  so  related  that  the  best  elements  of  the  one  are  reproduced  in 
the  other,  and  both  constitute  the  single  religion  which  passes  by  the 
name  of  Christianity.  Original  Christianity  is  that,  therefore,  which, 
beginning  with  patriarchs,  lawgivers,  and  prophets,  was  completed  by 
Jesus  Christ  and  his  apostles ;  or,  with  Jesus  Christ  as  its  corner- 
stone, it  is  that  religion  which,  including  all  truths  made  dimly  known 
before  his  advent  and  by  revelation,  unfolded  all  essential  truth  from 
himself  and  by  revelation,  through  chosen  apostles,  evangelists,  and 
teachers.  Christianity  is  the  truth,  or  the  religion  of  the  whole  Bible, 
in  other  words.  It  is  this  religion  that  is  pronounced  mythical  by 
Strauss,  and  "pseudo"  by  Spencer. 

In  this  investigation  of  Biblical  Christianity,  it  is  important  to 
keep  before  us  only  its  fundamental  truths,  for  these  determine  its 
character,  and  are  the  proofs  of  its  divine  origin.  The  attempt  has 
been  made  to  turn  the  incidental  communism  of  the  apostles,  the 
single  instance  of  feet  washing,  and  the  custom  of  the  "holy  kiss," 
into  an  argument  against  the  Christian  religion  ;  as  well  employ  the 
fact  of  the  existence  of  insects  against  the  existence  of  God.  Chris- 
tianity is  not  to  be  judged  by  the  religious  customs,  the  social  states, 
the  political  ideas,  or  the  domestic  habits  and  private  beliefs  of  the 
apostles  ;  it  is  a  system  of  religion,  founded  on  revealed  tnith,  by  which 
alone  it  can  be  judged,  and  any  other  judgment  of  it  is  irrelevant 
and  superficial. 

Is  Christianity  philosophically  false  f  No  believer  in  the  Scriptures 
will  assert  that  they  reveal  a  complete  philosophical  system,  or  that 
a  philosophical  system  is  at  all  conspicuous  in  the  sacred  volume ;  but 
it  is  claimed  that  the  philosophical  revelations  of  the  Scriptures  are 
unqualifiedly  and  inherently  true.  We  have  nothing  to  do  with  the 
incompleteness  of  such  revelations ;  it  is  only  important  that  they  are 
true.  In  pagan  and  other  religions,  the  philosophical  spirit  is  dominant, 
while  the  religious  spirit  is  secondary;  in  Christianity,  the  religious 
spirit  is  supreme,  and  the  philosophical  spirit  is  subordinate.  Without 
exception,  the  Hindu  religions,  the  Druidic  worship,  the  Persian 
faith,  the  Egyptian  rituals,  and  the  Grecian  and  Roman  mythologies, 
abound  in  philosophic  speculation  concerning  matter,  the  creation 
of  the  world,  and  providential  government,  all  seeming  more  anxious 


662  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

to  solve  these  problems  than  to  determine  man's  relation  to  God  and 
the  conditions  of  a  future  life.  In  all,  speculation  is  the  rule  ;  in 
Christianity,  revelation  is  a  fact.  As  philosophic  speculations,  the 
old  religions  are  a  failure ;  as  a  philosophic  revelation,  Christianity  is 
unquestionably  true. 

The  origin  of  the  universe  is  rather  a  philosophic  than  a  religious 
problem,  yet  do  the  Scriptures  reveal  it  so  definitely  that  the  purest 
philosophy  is  compelled  to  bow  to  its  truthfulness.  Strauss  sees 
"  childishness"  in  the  first  chapter  of  Genesis,  and  reproaches  Moses 
with  ignorance  of  the  Copernican  theory ;  but  for  all  that  the  Mosaic 
astronomy,  the  Mosaic  geology,  and  the  Mosaic  cosmogony,  have  sur- 
vived all  other  astronomies,  geologies,  and  cosmogonies,  and  show  no 
signs  of  decay  and  no  disposition  to  retire.  Materialistic  evolution, 
finding  Moses  disputing  its  authority,  began  an  assault  upon  his  his- 
tory of  creation,  but  expired  before  it  finished  its  task;  while  theistic 
evolution  supported  Moses,  and  shouted  the  verity  of  his  records. 
Dr.  McCosh,  as  a  Christian  evolutionist,  sees  no  inherent  inconsistency 
in  the  Mosaic  account,  and  no  incompatibility  in  it  with  a  true  idea 
of  evolution. 

Such  philosophical  problems  as  the  origin  of  man,  the  origin  of 
languages,  the  nature  of  the  soul,  and  the  existence  of  God,  as  pro- 
found as  they  are  dignified,  and  as  absorbingly  interesting  as  they 
are  comprehensive,  the  Scriptures  determine  with  an  exactness  that 
astonishes  the  philosopher  and  with  a  fullness  almost  suflScient.  That 
man  is  physical  and  spiritual,  or  earthly  in  body  and  divine  in  soul, 
the  Scriptures  teach ;  and  what  philosophy  has  eclipsed  the  teaching  ? 
Interpreting  man  thus,  he  is  understood;  by  any  other  theory,  he  is 
a  greater  mystery  than  ever.  The  Bible  does  not  reveal  the  origin 
of  language,  except  as  the  natural  property  of  humanity;  but  it 
does  reveal  the  origin  of  the  diversity  of  tongues.  The  linguistic 
faculty  is  as  native  to  man  as  memory  or  imagination ;  speech  is  as 
natural  as  walking  or  seeing.  But  the  diversity  of  languages  is  the 
enigma  of  the  etymologists ;  yet  it  ought  not  to  be.  The  diversity  is 
a  "confusion,"  a  barrier  to  unity,  the  result  of  violated  law,  and  the 
penalty  of  outraged  justice.  The  philosophical  fact  has  a  moral  hue, 
as  every  philosophical  fact  is  more  or  less  surrounded  by  a  religious 
halo.  Incomplete  are  these  philosophical  revelations,  but,  as  hints  or 
guides  to  truth,  they  are  correct.  In  not  a  single  instance  is  a  false- 
hood apparent.  Even  if  the  miraculous  is  sometimes  invoked,  as  an 
explanation  of  an  event,  as  the  standing  still  of  the  sun,  or  the 
dividing  of  the  waters  of  the  Ked  Sea,  the  philosophical  spirit  is  not 
at  all  offended,  for  a  miracle  is  a  philosophical  possibility,  on  the  supposi- 
tion that  there  is  a  divine  sovereign,  and  really  the  tempoi'ary  proof  of 


A  DEVELOPMENT  AND  A  REVELATION.  663 

his  dominion  in  the  natural  world.  Miracle  is  philosophically  consis- 
tent with  Christianity,  which  characterizes  the  creative  act  as  miracu- 
lous, and  which  reveals  redemption  as  the  supernatural  purpose  and 
power  of  God.  In  its  facts,  in  its  miracles,  in  its  projects,  it  is  phil- 
osophically self-consistent,  and  absurd  only  to  those  whose  infidelity 
is  of  a  cast  that  resists  truth,  whether  rational  in  form  or  not. 
Christianity  is  philosophically  true. 

Is  it  doctrbmily  true  f  Even  in  its  doctrinal  aspects,  it  may  seem 
short  of  completeness;  but,  as  a  theological  revelation,  it  is  far  in 
advance  of  itself  as  a  philosophical  revelation.  Touching  many 
things — as  the  nature  of  God,  the  process  of  regeneration,  the  abstract 
idea  of  immortality,  and  the  method  of  the  resurrection — the  curious 
may  ask  questions,  to  which  satisfactory  answers  are  not  returned  by 
the  sacred  writers ;  but,  if  the  revelation  on  these  subjects  is  not  full, 
it  is  not  false.  Christianity  is  a  revelation  of  truths,  but  not  an  ex- 
planation of  truths.  Revelation  is  not  explanation.  Revelation  per- 
tains to  facts ;  explanation  pertains  to  processes,  analyses,  unfoldings, 
and  developments.  Revealing  facts,  it  withholds  explanation.  The 
mystery  of  Christianity  is  not  so  much  the  mystery  of  its  facts,  or  the 
mystery  of  what  it  reveals,  as  it  is  the  unknowableness  of  what  is  not 
revealed.  Revelation,  so  far  as  it  goes,  is  not  mysterious ;  it  is  the 
unrevealed  that  is  mysterious  and  unknown.  Often  the  charge  of 
mystery  in  religion  belongs  only  to  the  unrevealed,  and  not  to  the 
revealed.     What  is  revealed,  however,  is  not  false. 

The  crucial  point  relates  to  the  content  of  revelation.  What 
truth  is  revealed  ?  According  to  Dr.  W.  Robertson  Smith,  the  truth 
of  the  Bible  is  rather  a  natural  development  than  a  revelation,  an 
unfolding  from  simple,  uncertain,  and  yet  prophetic,  forms  in  the 
earlier  history  of  the  Hebrew  people,  to  the  complete  and  stately 
proportions  of  New  Testament  doctrinal  declarations.  It  is  not  in- 
cumbent upon  us  even  to  attempt  to  determine  if  Biblical  truth  is 
revealed  or  naturally  developed  truth,  only  so  far  as  the  claim  of 
revelation  is  inseparable  from  the  claim  of  truth.  For,  if  the  truth 
of  the  Bible  can  not  be  naturally  developed  truth,  it  must  be  revealed 
truth,  or  it  is  not  truth.  In  the  very  nature  of  things,  incarnation, 
the  root-thought  of  Christianity,  can  not  be  an  outgrowth  of  previous 
truth,  except  as  the  fulfillment  of  prophetic  truth  ;  but  the  actual 
fact  of  incarnation  is  not  a  development,  but  a  revelation.  Likewise, 
the  atonement  can  not  be  a  mere  development  of  previous  and  similar 
truths;  the  fact  had  no  predecessor,  and  the  fact  is  the  essence  of 
revelation.  The  resurrection  is  not  a  developed  truth,  but  a  revela- 
tion. Some  truths  of  the  Bible  may  be  accounted  for  by  a  process 
of  development  from  previous  seed-truths ;  but  other  truths  are  the 


664  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

product  of  revelation,  and,  while  it  is  valuable  to  rescue  the  devel- 
oped truths  from  the  imputation  of  being  contradictory  or  false,  it  is 
especially  required  of  us  to  deliver  revealed  truths  from  the  slightest 
suspicion  of  inherent  antagonism. 

In  the  general,  it  may  be  assumed  that  doctrinal  truth,  whether 
developed  or  r/evealed,  involving  God,  the  divine  government,  the 
soul,  and  eternal  destiny,  is  absolutely  free  of  inherent  weakness  and 
error.  In  its  monotheism,  in  its  incarnate  basis,  in  its  Messianic 
features,  in  its  redemptive  plan,  and  in  its  eschatological  forecastings, 
it  is  invulnerable  on  the  ground  of  error.  Whatever  the  rationalist 
may  affirm  of  the  Old  Testament,  and  whatever  changes  in  interpre- 
tation the  new  school  of  Biblical  critics  may  require,  the  Old  Testa- 
ment will  remain  unimpaired  as  the  volume  of  truth.  Mansel  may 
apply  rationalistic  rules  to  revealed  truth,  and  Strauss  may  insist  that, 
by  such  rules,  the  whole  superstructure  is  overthrown  ;  but,  while  it 
changes  color  by  the  rationalizing  process,  it  does  not  lose  its  sub- 
stance or  change  its  nature.  Truth,  even  in  apostolic  hands,  suffered 
somewhat  by  their  inability  to  comprehend  it.  Let  it  be  admitted 
that  the  apostles  were  mistaken  in  their  views  respecting  the  second 
coming  of  the  Lord ;  it  does  not  prove  that  the  doctrine  of  the 
second  advent  is  false.  Strauss  makes  the  mistaken  apprehension  of 
the  apostles  a  ground  of  objection  to  the  doctrine  itself;  but,  as  usual, 
he  fails  to  discriminate  between  the  truth  itself  and  the  apostolic  un- 
derstanding of  it.  Equally  ignorant  were  the  disciples  of  the  spiritual 
nature  of  Christ's  kingdom  ;  hence,  they  clamored  for  the  restoration 
under  divine  leadership  of  the  old  Israelitic  kingdom  ;  but  this  mis- 
take does  not  make  against  the  spirituality  of  the  religion  of  Christ. 
In  the  New  Testament,  side  by  side,  are  mistaken  notions  of  Jews, 
Greeks,  Romans,  disciples,  and  apostles,  and  the  truths  of  which  the 
mistaken  notions  are  entertained.  The  notions  may  be  false ;  the 
truths  themselves  are  still  unassailable. 

Contradictory  doctrines  are  supposed  to  be  taught  in  the  Biblical 
documents,  and  are  explained  on  the  ground  that  Biblical  truth  is  a 
development,  which,  in  its  various  stages  of  unfolding,  and  affected 
by  its  environment,  occasionally  reversed  itself  and  even  turned  a 
somersault,  but,  recovering  itself,  went  on,  and  in  its  final  form  ap- 
pears substantially  and  honestly  correct.  A  developed  truth  may 
exhibit  the  scars  of  the  developing  process ;  a  revealed  truth  can  not 
be  self-contradictory.  Self-contradiction  is  destructive  of  the  idea  of 
revelation.  Such  ideas  as  the  sovereignty  of  God  and  the  freedom 
of  the  human  will ;  the  omniscience  of  the  Deity  and  the  doctrine  of 
foreordination ;  the  goodness  of  God  and  the  reign  of  evil ;  divine 
knowledge  and  human  prayer ;  personality,  or  human  identity,  and 


EXPLANA  TION  OF  ALLEGED  CONTRADICTIONS.        665 

regeneration,  faith,  and  rationalism, — are  supposed  to  be  among  the 
contradictory  teachings  of  Christianity.  Because  of  apparent  irrecon- 
cilable elements  in  such  and  similar  truths,  Schleiermacher  proposed 
the  Compromise  Theology,  or  the  suggestion  that,  by  mutual  conces- 
sions on  both  sides,  the  truth  would  be  found  in  a  moderate  opinion  of 
the  great  mysteries.  Truth,  however,  is  positive  or  negative ;  it  is  not  a 
compromise  between  mysteries.  Tholuck  struck  the  key-note  of  a  settle- 
ment when  he  said  that,  "  truth  is  not  in  the  middle,  but  at  the  bottom." 
It  is  always  at  the  bottom,  at  the  foundation  of  things.  The  founda- 
tion can  not  be  true  and  false ;  contradiction  is  impossible ;  mystery 
is  possible.  If,  then,  these  truths  are  apparently  antagonistic  and  can 
not  be  reconciled,  it  is  a  proof  that  they  have  not  been  clearly  revealed  ; 
they  are  revealed  so  far  that  we  know  them  to  be  truths,  but  so 
dimly  revealed  are  some  of  them  that,  like  cathartic  and  emetic, 
they  pull  in  contrary  directions.  In  such  a  dilemma,  no  one  would 
be  justified  in  proclaiming  either  truth  to  be  false ;  he  would  be  justi- 
fied in  saying  he  did  not  quite  understand  them. 

By  a  like  process  other  doctrines  or  teachings  are  brought  into 
conflict,  and  the  unity  of  Christian  truth  is  sought  to  be  disturbed. 
Consciousness  after  death  and  soul-sleeping ;  eternal  punishment  and 
annihilation  of  the  wicked ;  one  probation  only,  and  a  renewed 
chance  hereafter;  baptismal  regeneration  and  the  "new  birth;"  Uni- 
tarianism  and  Trinitarianism ;  Predestination  and  Universalism ; 
Prescience  and  Contingency, — these,  supposed  to  be  supported  by  the 
Scriptures,  are  submitted  as  evidences  that  the  Scriptures  themselves 
furnish  the  proof  against  their  own  inspiration,  and  that  they  do  not 
reveal  truths. 

To  this  presentation  of  contradictory  ideas  in  the  New  Testament 
the  reply  may  be  brief  but  definite,  and  in  substance  the  reply  to  the 
apostolic  misunderstanding  of  truth.  What  the  truth  is,  and  what 
the  human  understanding  of  the  truth  is,  are  ttvo  different  facts  ever  to 
be  remembered  in  the  study  of  Christianity.  More  than  once  the 
Bible  has  been  employed  in  defense  of  polygamy,  slavery,  war,  in- 
temperance, and  Sabbath-breaking,  when,  without  controversy,  its 
unit  idea  is  monogamy,  freedom,  peace,  temperance.  Sabbath-keep- 
ing, and  salvation.  More  than  once  has  it  been  turned  to  the  de- 
fense of  two  Sabbaths,  two  resurrections,  two  or  three  regenerations, 
three  or  four  forms  of  Church  governments,  a  multitude  of  Church 
worships,  and  many  ecclesiastic  creeds.  The  Bible  is  quoted  by  every 
body  to  sustain  every  thing,  as  if  it  were  on  all  sides  of  all  questions, 
showing  the  wealth  of  its  revelations,  but  the  almost  universal  mis- 
understanding of  its  truths.  The  apostles  misunderstood  and  pre- 
pared ascension  robes  ;  the  Athenians  misunderstood  and  laughed  at 


666  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

Paul ;  the  Pharisees  misunderstood  and  crucified  Christ ;  the  Papacy 
misunderstood,  and  what  errors  flowed  ;  Pusey  misunderstood,  and 
Sacramentarianism  followed ;  Calvin  misunderstood,  and  predestina- 
tion sat  on  a  pedestal  at  the  front  door  of  the  Church,  smiling  at  the 
few,  frowning  upon  the  many  ;  Socinus  misunderstood,  and  the  Uni- 
tarian germ  grew ;  Orson  Pratt  misunderstood,  and  polygamy  flour- 
ished ;  Luther  misunderstood,  and  consubstantiation  ruled  at  the 
altar,  and  converted  the  Eucharist  into  a  semi-cannibalistic  feast. 
The  misunderstandings  respecting  the  Scriptures  are  the  misunder- 
standings of  men  ;  the  supposed  contradictions  of  the  Scriptures  are 
the  contradictions  of  the  human  mind  in  its  effort  to  explore  myste- 
ries not  revealed  ;  and  the  errors  of  Christianity  are  the  errors  of  the- 
ology. The  truths  of  Christianity,  separated  from  the  errors  of  theol- 
ogy, are  truths  still;  and,  even  allowing  a  want  of  harmony  among 
its  mysteries,  its  revealed  facts  can  still  resist  the  imputation  of 
being  false. 

Is  Christianity  religiously  false  ?  The  estimate  that  forgets  that 
Christianity  is  a  religion,  and  not  a  philosophy  or  a  theology,  is  nar- 
row, and  falls  short  of  a  true  appreciation  of  its  internal  spirit.  Even 
if  true  in  its  philosophic  revelations,  and  harmonious  as  a  theologic 
system,  it  is  of  little  value  if  it  is  false  in  its  religious  teachings 
and  revelations.  True  as  a  religion,  if  proven  false  as  a  philosophy, 
no  great  harm  is  done ;  but  prove  it  false  as  a  religion  and  true  as  a 
philosophy,  and  the  world  sinks  hopelessly  in  darkness. 

As  a  revelation  of  religious  truth,  complaint  has  been  made  that 
it  is  utterly  unsatisfactory,  even  if  trustworthy,  by  reason  of  the  re- 
serve it  maintains  respecting  the  problems  in  which  the  human  mind 
has  the  highest  interest.  It  reveals  some  things,  but  is  silent  touch- 
ing other  things  equally  important.  It  veils  the  truth  quite  as  often 
as  it  exposes  it.  It  pretends  to  make  known,  but  withholds  at  the 
critical  point  of  interest.  This  is  an  old  complaint  with  a  good  foun- 
dation ;  that  is,  it  is  true  that  Christianity  is  far  from  being  a  com- 
plete revelation  of  truth.  Touching  spiritual  processes,  the  nature  of 
God,  the  ministry  of  evil,  the  state  of  the  dead,  and  even  the  final 
condition  of  the  race,  there  is  not  a  revelation  such  as  satisfies  the 
curious,  or  knowledge  such  as  can  dispense  with  faith.  The  reason 
for  the  silence  of  the  Scriptures  on  these  subjects,  as  given  by  Dr.  A. 
P.  Peabody,  namely,  that  it  is  because  of  the  poverty  of  human  lan- 
guage to  express  the  divine  thoughts,  and  that  they  are  "  beyond  the 
range  of  any  teaching  of  which  we  are  susceptible,"  we  regard  in- 
sufficient; for  the  human  mind  is  capable  of  a  much  larger  under- 
standing of  truth  than  it  is  possible  to  possess  under  the  present  lim- 
itations of  revelation.     We   can  know  more  if  permitted  to  know. 


JOHN  AND  PHILO.  667 

The  limitation  of  revelation  is  not  so  much  owing  to  the  imbecility 
of  the  human  mind  as  to  the  wisdom  of  the  divine  Mind,  which 
must  regard  further  knowledge  as  unnecessary  to  the  purposes  of  the 
present  life. 

Not  a  few  critics  have  been  disturbed  by  the  apparently  borrowed 
character  of  many  New  Testament  truths,  such  as  the  Logos  of  John, 
the  Law-Gospel  of  Paul,  and  the  Rabbinical  traditions  of  Christ, 
compromising,  as  they  allege,  the  inspirational  character  of  the  truth, 
and  so  implicating  it  in  hypocrisy.  Speaking  of  John's  Gospel,  Mr. 
Alger  says:  "There  is  scarcely  a  single  superhuman  predicate  of 
Christ  which  may  not  be  paralleled  with  striking  closeness "  from  the 
"extant  works"  of  Philo,  a  "Platonic  Jewish  philosopher."  It  is 
true  that  Philo  employs  such  Avords  as  "  Logos"  and  the  "first-begot- 
ten "  in  his  writings,  and  it  seems  as  if  John  had  appropriated  them, 
but  the  appropriation  of  phrases,  popular  words,  proverbs,  and  teach- 
ings in  no  sense  affects  the  question  of  the  inspiration  of  John's  Gos- 
pel, or  of  the  New  Testament.  Paul  resorts  to  Jewish  idioms  to 
express  Christian  ideas,  and  Christ  turns  to  the  Greek  language  for 
the  most  striking  words  to  convey  the  truths  that  constitute  the  sub- 
stance of  religious  teaching ;  but  because  philosophers,  poets,  mystics, 
Gnostics,  Jews,  and  Greeks  furnished  words,  phrases,  and  even  sen- 
tences for  the  conveyance  of  Christian  truth,  it  does  not  follow  that 
Christianity  is  derived  from  Philo,  Plato,  Homer,  or  others,  who  may 
have  coined  the  word  thus  appropriated.  The  doctrine  of  inspiration 
is  compatible  with  the  use  of  any  word  that  properly  expresses  the 
truth,  whether  the  word  be  pagan  or  otherwise. 

If  it  is  meant  that  the  doctrines  of  the  New  Testament  are  pla- 
giarized from  the  philosophers,  and,  therefore,  can  not  pose  any 
longer  as  revealed  truths,  a  more  serious  aspect  envelops  the  inquiry. 
Such  a  supposition  is  likely  to  arise  from  a  superficial  comparison  be- 
tween Philo  and  John  ;  but  when  it  is  remembered  that  John's  aim 
in  part  was  to  counteract  the  prevailing  Gnosticism  of  the  age,  and 
in  part  to  exalt  Christ  to  his  true  position  as  the  Son  of  God,  the  use 
of  terms  and  ideas  prevalent  in  philosophical  circles  is  at  once  ex- 
plained. But  to  assume  that  John's  Logos  is  Philo's  Logos  is  an  in- 
excusable assumption ;  to  assume  that  incarnation,  atonement,  regen- 
eration, resurrection,  and  immortality  are  borrowed  doctrines,  can 
safely  be  met  by  denial  or  a  demand  for  proof.  As  the  ark  of  the 
tabernacle  was  carried  about  in  carts,  so  divine  thoughts  were  con- 
veyed in  human  vehicles  wherever- found,  and  without  loss  of  their 
original  character. 

Strauss  intimates  that  many  of  the  so-caUed  virtues  of  Christian- 
ity belonged  to  previous  religions  and  philosophies,  as  compassion  to 


668  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

Buddhism,  and  assistance  of  enemies  to  Stoicism,  as  if  it  made  some- 
what against  Christianity  as  an  original  religion,  to  find  it  inculcating 
the  same.  None  but  a  dotard  Avill  claim  an  entire  destitution  of  moral 
principle  in  other  religions  ;  they  had  a  mission  ;  they  taught  some 
truths  and  illustrated  some  virtues  ;  but  it  is  the  glory  of  Christianity 
that  it  magnified  the  obscure  virtues  of  other  religions,  and  added 
truths  of  which  they  had  no  types  or  foreshadowings.  The  virtues  of 
Christianity,  however,  are  not  borrowed  virtues;  they  are  such  as 
human  nature  in  its  best  mood  authorizes,  or  such  as  spring  directly 
from  the  teachings  of  Christ.  It  is  remarkable  that  if  the  Christian 
virtues  are  culled  from  other  religions,  only  the  true  and  exalted  vir- 
tues were  selected,  for  suicide,  falsehood,  murder,  theft,  and  even 
parricide  are  justifiable  under  certain  conditions  in  other  religions. 
The  omission  of  such  virtues  from  the  Christian  religion  is  proof  of 
the  inspiring  influence  that  guided  in  the  selection  of  those  which 
it  inculcates. 

It  has  been  observed,  too,  that  what  are  regarded  as  honorable 
worldly  virtues  are  not  enumerated  among  religions  virtues  in  the  New 
Testament,  Renan  points  out  that  heaven  is  not  promised  as  the  re- 
ward of  military  glory,  and  that  religion  has  been  impeached  for  its 
alleged  silence  touching  the  virtue  of  patriotism  and  the  glory  of 
political  fidelity.  Christianity  is  a  religion  ;  its  virtues  are  religious; 
it  does  not  exalt  worldly  achievements,  or  those  earthly  conditions  and 
honors  to  which  the  ambitious  aspire.  It  is  a  misapprehension,  how- 
ever, that  it  does  not  enjoin  faithfulness  in  civil  life  and  loyalty  to  civil 
government,  for  Christ  said,  "  Render  to  Caesar  the  things  that  are 
Csesar's,"  and  Paul  ordered  obedience  to  the  powers  that  be.  Worldly 
duties,  however  well  performed,  can  not  be  substituted  for  religious 
duties,  and  the  woi-ldly  spirit  can  not  stand  for  the  religious  spirit ;  this 
is  the  lesson  of  the  New  Testament. 

Strauss  has  a  routine  way  of  disposing  of  the  truths  of  Biblical 
Christianity,  as  if  they  were  literally  false. '  The  "so-called"  fall  of 
man  he  pronounces  a  "  didactic  poem  ;"  the  ascension  of  our  Lord  is  a 
symbolical  representation  of  an  idea,  but  to  speak  of  it  as  an  "  ac- 
tual occurence  is  to  aflTront  educated  people  at  this  time  of  day ;"  and 
all  the  so-called  truths  of  the  religion  are  symbols  of  ideas  which  ad- 
mit of  a  "  moral  application."  Even  if  the  Gospel,  as  a  whole,  is 
pure  symbol,  it  represents  something,  which  must  be  literally  true. 
If  the  symbol  is  not  the  truth,  the  truth  is  back  of  it,  or  the  symbol 
itself  is  false. 

Admitting  that  the  Gospel  is  a  symbol,  the  next  step  is  to  find 
the  truth  which  it  symbolizes,  but  Strauss  goes  not  so  far  back.  He 
denounces  the  truth,  and  thinks  to  reduce  the  Gospel  to  a  shadow  by 


MYSTICISM  AND  AMBIGUITY.  669 

reducing  it  to  a  symbol ;  but  in  the  name  of  honesty  we  demand  to 
know  what  it  symbolizes  if  not  the  very  truth  he  denounces.  The 
idea  of  a  symbol  is  that  it  is  a  representative  of  something,  but 
if  the  existence  of  the  something  is  denied,  then  it  is  a  solecism  to 
use  the  word  symbol  at  all.  Strauss  is  driven  into  a  corner  by  his 
jugglery  of  words. 

Christianity  is  the  religion  of  mysticism,  it  is  affirmed,  and,  there- 
fore, unreal  in  its  contents.  Let  it  be  said  that  it  is  a  religion  of 
spiritual  forces,  acting  on  the  spiritual  nature  of  man,  and  the  origin 
of  the  suspicion  of  its  mystical  character  is  revealed.  It  is  invisible 
force  which  the  natural  mind  can  not  comprehend;  it  is  by  experi- 
ence a  renovation  of  the  consciousness  which  unspiritual  minds  do  not 
realize,  and,  therefore,  it  is  pronounced  whimsical  and  erroneous.  In 
the  days  of  Plotinus  Christianity  took  the  form  of  mysticism,  but 
it  is  as  improper  to  brand  it  a  mystical  religion  on  that  account  as  it 
would  be  to  define  it  a  system  of  rationalism  because  Cousin,  a  Chris- 
tian believer,  was  a  rationalist.  There  is  no  more  mysticism  in 
Christianity  proper  than  in  the  transcendentalism  of  Emerson  or  the 
evolution  of  Spencer. 

Is  not  Christianity  an  ambiguous  system  of  religion  ?  If  so,  am- 
biguity may  be  found  in  its  teachings,  purposes,  and  agencies,  the 
search  for  which  must  be  immediately  made.  Ambiguity  implies 
want  of  clearness,  and  allows  double  interpretations,  which  signify 
uncertain  meaning  and  possible  contradictions.  Not  a  little  effox-t 
will  be  required  to  establish  such  a  charge  against  the  teachings  of 
Christ  and  his  apostles.  The  doctrine  of  the  Trinity,  more  mysteri- 
ous than  any  other  in  the  New  Testament,  and  apparently  based  on 
a  violated  mathematical  principle,  is  free  from  ambiguity,  except  in 
ambiguous  minds.  It  has  no  double  meaning;  it  does  not  mean  one 
of  several  repugnant  alternatives.  It  implies  the  mystery  of  relation, 
but  is  not  a  self-contradiction.  Neither  the  atonement,  nor  the  res- 
urrection of  Christ,  can  be  overthrown  on  the  score  of  ambiguous 
meaning.  Even  the  incarnation,  with  its  unnatural  process,  is  un- 
ambiguous ;  it  is  overwhelming  because  of  its  magnitude.  Running 
through  the  category  of  doctrine  we  would  find  that,  mysterious  as 
some  teachings  are,  they  are  unlike  the  pagan  oracles,  whose  answers 
admitted  of  every  possible  construction,  and  whose  glory  was  their 
obscurity  of  form. 

As  to  its  purposes,  Christianity  is  as  transparent  as  day.  To  re- 
deem the  world  from  sin  is  its  supreme  object.  Unambiguous  in 
doctrine,  unambiguous  in  purpose,  it  is  equally  unambiguous  in  its 
resources  and  agencies.  Said  the  Master  to  his  disciples:  "All  power 
is  given  unto  me  in  heaven  and  in  earth  ;"  "go  ye,  therefore,  and  teach 


670  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

all  nations."  Heavenly  and  earthly  power  join  in  the  prosecution 
of  the  purposes  of  Christianity.  There  is  no  ambiguity  here.  Is  not 
Christianity  optimistic,  Utopian,  dreamy,  a  self -deceived,  and  deceiving, 
system  of  religion  ?  Is  it  not  a  visionary,  fanatical,  superstitious  sys- 
tem, and  doomed  to  defeat?  That  its  undertaking  is  superhuman, 
requiring  resources  that  are  inexhaustible,  a  patience  that  knows  no 
intermission,  and  a  hope  that  is  everlasting,  can  not  be  doubted ;  but 
what  would  be  fanaticism  in  other  religions  is  reality  in  Christianity. 
It  is  not  the  religion  of  false  hopes,  but  of  prospective  triumph 
through  the  aid  of  the  higher  powers.  It  is  the  outlook  of  Christian- 
ity that  answers  all  insinuations  of  utopianism,  and  turns  slowly  into 
history  the  impossible. 

T}ie  pseudodox  in  Christianity  is  yet  to  be  found.  It  is  not  in  its 
phibsopkical  revelations;  it  is  not  in  its  doctrinal  revelations;  it  is  not 
in  its  religious  revelations ;  it  is  not  in  Moses,  Paul,  Christ ;  it  is  not  in 
the  Old  Testament,  and  it  is  not  in  the  New  Testament ;  if  anywhere,  it 
is  in  the  forms  of  Christianity,  which  will  do  well  to  take  heed  to 
themselves,  and  return  to  the  fountain-head  for  healing,  purification, 
and  blessing. 


CHAPTER  XXXI. 


<rHE  DIAONOSTIC  OK  CHRISTIANITY,  OR  EXPERIENCE? 
THE   RHILOSOPHIO  TEST  OE  RELIGION. 

WHEN  the  Emperor  Trajan  was  passing  through  Antioch,  Ig- 
natius seized  the  opportunity  of  advocating  in  his  presence 
the  Christian  religion,  well  knoAving  that  it  would  end  in  his  martyr- 
dom. He  explained  his  title — Theophorus — as  meaning  a  person  "who 
has  Christ  in  his  heart,"  and,  when  pressed  for  a  more  definite 
statement,  confessed  in  specific  terms  that  he  carried  the  Deity  with 
him,  or  partook  of  his  nature  and  life.  For  this  strange  confession 
the  holy  man  was  condemned  to  the  amphitheater  of  wild  beasts  in 
Eome,  and  joyfully  suffered  a  martyr's  death  in  expectation  of  a  mar- 
tyr's crown. 

The  religion  of  Ignatius  is  the  religion  of  Christianity — the  re- 
ligion of  experience,  or  the  new  reality  of  consciousness,  a  study  of 
which  involves  an  inquiry  into  its  origin,  processes  of  development, 
contents,  or  categories  of  facts  and  laws,  and  relation  to  character 
and  destiny.  That  Christianity,  either  as  a  truth,  or  as  a  life-impart- 
ing power,  may  be  incorporated  with  individual  history,  becoming  its 


COMMON  TESTS  OF  RELIGION.  671 

inspiration,  regeneration,  sanctification,  or  its  guiding  and  redemptive 
source,  the  Scriptures  certainly  teach,  and  teach  it  as  the  vital  and 
final  test  of  the  truth  of  religion. 

To  make  clear  this  statement,  as  well  as  to  enforce  it,  we  must 
distinguish  between  the  tests  applied  to  other  religions  and  philoso- 
phies, and  this  exceptional  and  sufficient  test  of  Christianity.  The 
common  test  of  religions  is  their  history  in  their  relation  to  civil 
government,  domestic  life,  individual  pursuits,  and  literary  achieve- 
ments of  the  people  adopting  them,  together  with  the  moral  life  pro- 
duced by  them.  The  historic  test  is  the  time-test  of  all  things,  of 
nature  as  well  as  religion,  of  God  as  well  as  man.  In  its  light  we 
may  read  of  Brahminism  and  Platonism,  of  theocracy  and  democracy, 
of  civilization  and  barbarism,  of  skepticism  and  Mohammedanism,  of 
all  religions,  all  philosophies,  all  beings,  all  things.  To  this  primor- 
dial test  Christianity  must  likewise  submit.  Its  history  of  facts,  re- 
lations, incidents,  truths,  and  effects ;  its  prophecies,  miracles,  methods 
of  growth,  and  plans  of  conquest ;  its  adaptations,  powers,  promises, 
and  certainties,  make  an  argument  of  irresistible  strength  in  its  own 
defense.  Tested  by  history  Christianity  is  a  surviving  and  fulfilling 
religion. 

Another  common  test  of  religions  is  the  character  and  number  of 
their  followers.  If  the  cultured  classes  accept  a  form  of  religion  ; 
if  the  thinkers  of  the  age,  scientists,  poets,  historians,  and  philos- 
ophers, may  be  quoted  as  the  friends  of  a  particular  religious  faith  ; 
if  kings  and  queens  are  its  honest  promoters  and  defenders,  then  it 
may  boast  of  an  influential,  though  by  no  means  a  conclusive,  argu- 
ment. On  this  estimable  ground  Christianity  may  appeal  with  great 
confidence  for  the  world's  favor.  Its  followers  are  not  only  numerous 
and  increasing  every  day,  but  they  are  also  from  the  best  classes  and 
the  highest  ranks  in  human  society.  Christianity  is  the  religion  of 
the  school,  as  well  as  the  street ;  it  is  the  religion  of  culture,  as  well 
as  ignorance ;  in  palaces  as  in  hamlets,  in  the  homes  of  luxury  as  in 
the  dwelling-places  of  poverty,  are  those  equally  ready  to  die  for  Im- 
manuel.     The  martyr-spirit  is  still  in  the  Church  and  the  world. 

A  more  specific  test  of  the  vitality  of  religion,  to  which  all  relig- 
ions prefer  more  or  less  to  appeal,  is  the  supernatural  character  of 
their  teachers,  or  teachings ;  that  is,  the  religion  must  appear  to  be 
supernatural.  Never  has  a  religion  gone  forth  as  purely,  or  exclus- 
ively, of  human  origin.  In  a  sense  it  must  appear  to  be  from  God ; 
it  must  expose  a  supernatural  stamp.  For  this  reason  every  religion, 
however  incongruous  in  its  teachings,  abounds  with  the  marvelous, 
the  naturally  impossible,  the  miraculous ;  the  sicpernatural  is  essential 
to  religion.     If  the  religion  is  essentially  false,  absurdities,  crudities, 


672  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

superstitions,  and  hypocrisies  are  employed  to  meet  the  demand  for 
the  supernatural;  it  must  introduce  the  supernatural  in  form  or  by 
pretense,  or  perish.  As  might  be  expected,  while  the  historic  test  is 
exposing  the  hollowness  of  the  supernatural  claim  of  many  religions, 
the  supernatural  character  of  Christianity  is  becoming  more  luminous 
with  the  passage  of  the  centuries ;  as  others  expire,  it  survives  and 
unfolds.  Claiming  to  be  strictly  supernatural  in  its  Founder,  teach- 
ings, mission,  and  results,  it  is  demonstrating  itself  with  the  lapse  of 
time,  and  stands  or  falls  as  this  claim  is  maintained. 

Neither  history,  social  support,  nor  supernatural  claim,  nor  all  to- 
gether, furnish  unanswerable  testimony  to  the  truth  of  Christianity. 
To  such  proofs  other  religions  resort ;  such  proofs  Christianity  em- 
ploys ;  but  they  now  begin  to  diverge,  Christianity  employing  a  proof 
not  possible  to  other  religions,  and  standing  alone  in  its  appeal  to 
it.  The  proof  of  experience  is  the  philosojyhic  proof  of  Christianity. 
When  a  German  thinker  assumes  that  religion  ' '  is  nothing  more  nor 
less  than  a  belief  in  conflict  with  experience,"  he  exhibits  an  ignorance 
both  of  what  religion  is  as  a  system  of  truth,  and  of  what  it  is  by  ex- 
perience. When  Spencer  alleges  that  the  "  subject-matter"  of  religion 
is  that  which  passes  the  "sphere  of  experience,"  he  exhibits  the  same 
ignorance.  When  Hume  objected  to  a  miracle  on  the  alleged  ground 
that  it  is  contrary  to  experience,  he  was  ignorant  of  what  he  was 
saying,  and  misunderstood  both  miracle  and  experience.  His  argu- 
ment, refuted  as  often  as  it  has  been  repeated,  is  valuable  only  for 
the  single  thought  that  experience  is  a  test  of  particular  truths,  or, 
comprehending  more  than  Hume  intended,  the  test  of  religion.  If 
the  test  of  miracle  is  experience,  then  the  religion  which  miracle  sup- 
ports may  also  be  tested  by  experience. 

The  experience-philosophy  of  modern  times  can  not  object  to  the 
application  of  its  particular  dogma  to  ascertain  the  validity  or  sound- 
ness of  religious  truth,  or  religion.  A  philosophic  treatment  of  relig- 
ion requires  that  it  be  submitted  to  the  philosophic  test  of  human 
experience.  Galen,  the  physician,  regarded  experience  as  the  source 
of  knowledge.  In  accord  with  the  physician,  we  affirm  that  an  ex- 
perience of  Christianity  is  the  key  to  a  knowledge  of  it,  and  the 
means  of  its  verification,  and  that  if  it  is  impossible  to  experience  it 
its  claim  to  a  supernatural  origin  is  invalidated.  If  its  addresses  to 
the  soul  awaken  no  response ;  if  its  attempted  reconstruction  of  char- 
acter turns  out  to  be  superficial  and  delusive ;  if  it  does  not  become 
a  fact  of  consciousness ;  then  it  must  surrender  its  claims,  and  yield 
to  other  religions.     By  the  one  test  it  rises  or  falls. 

Before  deciding  upon  the  nature  of  religious  experience,  or  deter- 
mining the  categories  of  religious  consciousness,   it  is  important  to 


OBJECTIVE  AND  SUBJECTIVE  EXPERIENCE.  673 

understand  what  it  is  that  experience  proposes  to  test  and  establish. 
Without  reviewing  religions,  it  is  evident  that  ' '  natural  religion," 
and  the  "religion  of  humanity,"  justify  themselves  partly  on  the 
ground  of  their  alleged  harmony  with  experience,  and  that,  if  the 
test  of  experience  is  supreme,  they  must  be  accepted  as  genuine  re- 
ligions. So  far  as  natural  religion  is  based  upon  the  facts  of  nature, 
such  as  the  unity  of  the  universe,  the  laws  governing  planetary  motion 
and  life,  the  correlation  of  forces,  and  the  conservation  of  energy,  it 
is  a  legitimate  religion ;  and,  so  far  as  the  religion  of  humanity  is  in 
harmony  with  the  highest  intuitions  of  the  soul,  it  is  a  legitimate  re- 
ligion. It  is  not  clear,  however,  that  natural  religion  is  within  the 
sphere  of  experience,  or  that  even  the  so-called  religion  of  humanity, 
which  may  include  aesthetics  and  morality,  enters  into  consciousness, 
and  becomes  the  subject-matter  of  the  inner  life.  The  facts  of  natural 
religion  are  within  the  scope  of  observation,  or  objective  experience. 
They  lie  outside  the  inner  life,  and  are  foreign  to  a  subjective  experience. 
Christianity  belongs  to  the  subjective  realm,  addresses  the  spirit  of" 
man,  and  takes  root  in  the  invisible  life  within.  Natural  truth  may 
be  tested  by  objective  experience;  supernatural  truth,  by  subjective 
experience  ;  and  one  is  as  reliable  as  the  other.  If  the  fact  of  gravi- 
tation may  be  tested  by  the  ol^ective  experience,  or  objective  mind, 
the  fact  of  regeneration  may  be  tested  by  the  subjective  experience, 
or  subjective  mind.  As  the  highest  experience  is  subjective,  so  the 
highest  truth  which  it  tests  must  be  supernatural.  The  province  of 
experience,  as  a  test  of  truth,  natural  and  supernatural,  is,  therefore, 
clearly  defined,  and  its  application  to  Christianity  in  its  supernatural 
character  is  certainly  admissible. 

As  a  system  of  religious  truth,  Christianity  may  be  tested  by  ex- 
perience. This  does  not  mean  that  every  truth  of  the  Bible  may  be 
subject  to  the  same  test,  for  the  scientific  order  of  creation,  as  given 
by  Moses,  the  miracle  at  the  Red  Sea,  the  fall  of  Jericho  at  the  sound 
of  horns,  and  the  victory  of  Elijah  on  Carmel,  are  not  within  the 
range  either  of  our  objective  or  subjective  experience ;  they  may  be 
vindicated,  however,  by  other  and  adequate  tests.  But  the  religious 
truths  of  Christianity  may  be  comprehended,  tested,  and  sustained  by 
subjective  experience ;  in  other  words,  revealed  religion  may  be  vin- 
dicated by  the  subjective,  as  natural  religion  is  vindicated  by  the  ob- 
jective, experience. 

Nor  is  it  meant  that  Christianity,  in  its  wholeness  as  truth,  may 
not  be  defended  and  maintained  by  other  methods  than  that  from  ex- 
perience. Either  of  two  methods  of  reasoning,  or  both,  have  been 
and  may  be  employed  in  the  investigation  and  development  of  relig- 
ious truth,  and  in  a  rational  exposition  of  Christianity  they  can   not 

43 


674  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

be  ignored.  Inductive  reasoning,  or  that  method  which  Bacon  ap- 
plied in  the  investigation  of  physical  facts,  and  which  led  him  from 
particular  facts  to  universal  truths,  and  deductive  reasoning,  which 
implies  the  application  of  a  universal  principle  to  a  particular  fact, 
may  be  employed  in  the  ascertainment  of  the  fundamental  truths  of 
Christianity.  By  these  methods,  explanations,  defenses,  and  vindica- 
tions without  number  of  revealed  religion  are  possible. 

While  Christianity  is  a  truth,  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that,  ac- 
cording to  its  own  teaching,  it  is  a  revealed  truth,  and  therefore  is 
not  a  first  or  primary  truth.  Some  of  the  truths  of  revealed  religion, 
as  the  monotheistic  idea,  are  primary ;  but  Messianic  truth  is  not 
primary,  it  is  revealed.  As  Christianity  is  a  revealed  system  of  truth, 
the  usual  criteria  of  truth,  in  reasoning  or  otherwise,  can  not  be  ap- 
plied to  it.  Leibnitz  insists  that  a  characteristic  of  fundamental 
truth  is  its  necessity.  Necessity  looks  out  of  a  mathematical  axiom ; 
but  internal  necessity  does  not  belong  to  Christian  truth.  Self-evi- 
dence is  another  supreme  characteristic;  but  many  truths  of  Chris- 
tianity are  not  self-evident.  They  require  illumination,  analogy, 
explanation,  before  they  can  be  believed,  and  even  then  many  reject 
them.  The  ball  is  round — this  is  self-evident  so  soon  as  one  observes 
it.  Immortality  is  not  a  self-evident  truth,  nor  atonement,  nor  incar- 
nation. They  need  to  be  demonstrated  or  revealed.  According  to 
Dr.  McCosh,  " iiniversality  is  the  tertiary  test"  of  fundamental  truth. 
All  men  believe  in  such  truth.  Revealed  religion  can  not  bear  this 
test;  it  is  not  a  summary  of  fundamental  or  first  truths.  By  these 
criteria  Christianity  is  not  to  be  judged.  It  is  a  revelation;  induc- 
tively and  deductively,  it  may  be  vindicated,  but  its  supreme  test  or 
criterion  is  experience. 

The  test  of  revelation  or  supernatural  truth  is  its  involution  in 
experience.  Truth  is  clear  only  as  it  is  apprehended  by  the  conscious- 
ness. An  intellectual  perception  of  truth  is  incomplete,  being  prelim- 
inary to  further  unfoldings  and  analyses ;  but  one  may  be^deluded  by 
the  belief  that  a  mathematical  or  intellectual  study  of  supernatural 
truth  is  all  that  is  required.  A  skeptic  may  apply  intellectual  tests, 
with  mathematical  precision,  to  such  truth,  and  seem  to  detect  error  in 
its  substance  and  to  its  very  center.  He  may  be  in  the  neighborhood 
of  truth,  and  not  find  it,  as  one  may  sail  over  the  ocean,  ignorant  of 
the  pearls  in  its  depths.  Supernatural  truth  takes  a  concrete  form 
in  the  Scriptures,  but  they  must  be  searched,  studied,  analyzed,  if  the 
truth  be  found.  The  truth  is  there,  but  hidden  like  law  in  matter ; 
it  is  there,  but  flashes  as  a  mystery,  and  requires  searching;  it  is 
there,  but  like  oxygen  in  the  atmosphere,  and  ages  may  come 
and  go  before  it  is  known.     Abbe  Winkleman,  in  his  exhortation  to 


A  TRUTH  AND  A  LIFE.  675 

students  of  art  to  study  the  Apollo  Belvidere  as  a  model  of  beauty, 
observed  that  at  first  they  might  not  discover  any  beauty  in  it ;  but 
they  must  study  it  again  and  again,  "  for,"  he  said,  "  I  tell  you  there 
is  beauty  there."  The  traveler  stands  in  the  presence  of  the  pyramid 
of  Cheops,  disappointed  at  first  with  its  apparent  want  of  magnitude ; 
but,  as  he  walks  around  it,  enters  its  labyrinthine  passages,  and  ascends 
to  the  summit,  he  is  overwhelmed  with  its  proportions,  and  pronounces 
it  the  greatest  architectural  pile  of  man.  Thus  Christianity,  as  a  sys- 
tem of  truth,  does  not  impress  the  soul  at  first  as  supernatural ;  or,  if 
supernatural  touches  are  felt,  they  are  not  comprehended ;  the  whole 
is  seen  in  diminished  aspects ;  but,  as  one  becomes  receptive  and  sym- 
pathetic, en  rappoH  with  truth,  it  unfolds,  enlarges,  and  begins  to 
carry  him  beyond  himself,  until  he  gazes  upon  things  not  possible  to 
describe,  and  is  finally  lost  in  the  mysteries  of  the  eternal. 

In  its  process  of  development  the  greatest  truths  are  glimpsed, 
appreciated,  and  determined,  as  Monotheism,  Providence,  Messiaship, 
Eegeueration,  Responsibility,  and  the  Future  Life.  They  stand  as 
the  central  facts  of  religion,  and  are  appropriated  by  the  intellectual 
investigator  as  the  key  to  all  else  that  may  be  found.  Revealing 
truth,  Christianity  emphasizes  itself  as  an  intellectual  religion;  it 
satisfies  the  aspiration  of  mind  for  truth ;  it  quickens  intellectual  in- 
quiry, and  leads  human  thought  through  the  mazes  of  mystery  and 
obscurity  into  the  clear  sunlight  of  the  highest  truth.  An  intellectual 
religion,  or  a  religion  that  conducts  the  mind  to  truth,  or  flashes  the 
truth  upon  the  mind,  must  be  true ;  a  religion  that  reveals  God,  Avith 
all  that  belongs  to  the  one  great  idea  of  God,  must  be  from  God ;  a 
religion  that  reveals  a  Messiah,  with  all  that  grows  out  of  Messiah- 
ship,  must  be  divine  ;  a  religion  that  is  new  to  man,  pointing  out  the 
way  of  restoration  to  intellectual  greatness,  can  not  be  of  man,  but 
must  have  an  eternal  or  supernatural  source.  Such  a  religion  is 
Christianity. 

/  An  intellectual  or  truth -revealing  religion,  however  valuable,  is 
not  altogether  sufilcient.  An  experience  of  religion  involves  more 
than  an  intellectual  knowledge  of  religion ;  that  is,  there  is  a  diflfer- 
ence  between  an  intellectual  and  a  spiritual  apprehension  of  the 
truth.  Christianity  is  not  only  truth  ;  it  is  also  life.  As  truth,  it 
appeals  to  the  mind ;  as  life,  it  quickens  the  soul.  As  truth,  it  is 
light;  as  life,  it  is  power.  Embracing  religious  truth,  the  mind  is 
enlarged,  and  reaches  at  once  into  the  infinities ;  receiving  supernatu- 
ral life,  the  soul  opens  its  gaze  upon  God,  and  expands  into  God  as 
the  ages  roll  and  eternity  dawns.  The  former  is  a  necessary  experi- 
ence ;  the  latter  is  the  greater  experience,  as  life  is  better  than  light. 
A  more  prominent  contrast  arises  between  the  exclusive  nature  of 


676  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

Christianity  as  an  intellectual  religion  and  its  exclusive  nature  as  a 
spiritual  religion.  As  an  intellectual  religion  it  does  not  include 
itself  as  a  spiritual  religion ;  as  a  spiritual  religion  it  does  include 
itself  as  an  intellectual  religion.  One  may  accept  Christianity  in 
the  intellectual,  and  not  in  the  spiritual  sense  ;  but  if  one  accept  it 
in  the  spiritual,  he  must  also  in  the  intellectual  sense.  The  intellectual 
does  not  include  the  spiritual ;  the  spiritual  includes  the  intellectual. 

A  spiritual  experience  of  truth,  or  a  deep,  inviolable  instinct  of 
religion,  Christianity  begets,  and  demonstrates  itself  by  its  spiritually 
begetting  power.  Other  religions  may  inspire  intellectual  reverence 
for  truth,  but  they  are  incapable  of  negotiating  spiritual  relations 
with  God.  Philosophy  asserts  truth  to  be  the  objective  end  of  its 
pursuit ;  but  of  spiritual  truth  it  has  no  conception,  and  really  denies 
its  existence.  As  explained  by  the  modern  philosophic  teacher,  re- 
ligious experience  is  a  refined  state  of  the  emotional  life,  or  a  regu- 
lation of  the  sentiments  by  certain  religious  principles,  which  may  be 
pronounced  mystical,  fanatical,  or  superstitious,  as  the  investigator  is 
inclined.  Intellectual  experience  or  intellectual  perception  of  truth  is 
granted;  emotional  experience,  or  the  emotional  assent  to  religious 
truth,  is  possible  ;  but  spiritual  experience,  or  the  sympathetic  union 
of  the  soul  with  truth  by  which  it  is  regenerated  and  sanctified,  is 
held  to  be  an  assumption,  requiring  proof. 

Is  spiritual  experience  a  fiction  or  a  reality?  This  is  a  root- 
question,  determining  the  validity  of  Christianity  as  a  spiritual  relig- 
ion. The  genuineness  of  so-called  spiritual  experience  is  sometimes 
questioned  on  the  supposition  that  it  is  exclusively  emotional  in  its 
character,  and  that  vacillation  and  superficiality,  characteristics  of 
an  emotional  religion,  are  not  the  appropriate  signs  of  a  supernatural 
religion.  Matthew  Arnold  pronounces  the  spiritual  state  as  exclu- 
sively moral  in  character,  but  intensified  by  emotion  in  action.  It  is 
granted  that  Christianity  is  an  emotional  religion,  but  it  is  believed 
that  that  which  belongs  to  it  as  an  emotional  religion  invalidates  its 
claim  as  a  spiritual  religion.  The  two  are  held  to  be  incompatible ; 
they  can  not  co-exist  in  the  same  soul  at  the  same  time.  As  an 
emotional  religion,  Christianity  is  trustworthy,  because  the  emotional 
nature  of  man  is  trustworthy.  The  spirit  of  fear  that  seizes  one  when 
in  danger  and  leads  to  an  escape  from  it,  is  not  a  disadvantageous 
spirit ;  the  spirit  of  hope  that  leads  one  on  through  reverses  until 
one  wins  again,  is  a  most  helpful  spirit.  In  their  relation  to  charac- 
ter, the  emotions  are  fundamental,  and  if  religion  works  in  and  by 
the  emotions,  or  interacts  with  the  emotional  nature,  it  has  quite  as 
strong  a  hold  upon  man  as  when  it  interacts  with  his  intellectual 
nature.     Without  the  emotional  nature  man  would  be  as  cold  as  a 


PURIFICATION  OF  SPIRITUAL  LIFE.  677 

marble  statue,  and  without  religion  the  emotional  nature  would  in- 
volve man  in  moral  anarchy.  Buckle  has  said  that  "the  emotions 
are  as  much  a  part  of  us  as  the  understanding ;  they  are  as  truthful, 
they  are  as  likely  to  be  right.  They  have  their  logic  and  their 
method  of  inference." 

Now,  if  Christianity  works  itself  into  the  emotions,  eliminating 
all  carnal  tendency,  and  subjects  them  to  spiritual  discipline  and 
transformation,  a  government  of  self-control  is  at  once  installed  over 
the  life,  the  advantages  of  which  can  not  be  computed.  What  is 
life  ?  Is  it  thinking,  or  feeling,  or  both  ?  What  is  thought  but  a 
state  of  consciousness?  What  is  sensation  but  an  expression  of  con- 
sciousness ?  Christianity,  as  thought,  finds  its  way  into  the  thinking 
of  men,  and  is  an  intellectual  religion ;  Christianity,  as  life,  finds  its 
way  into  the  sensibilities  of  men,  and  is  an  emotional  religion.  Per- 
haps its  greatest  work  is  on  the  emotional  nature,  which,  even  more 
than  the  intellectual,  is  in  need  of  repair  and  purification.  It  touches 
first  the  springs  of  life,  and  careers  through  the  hopes  and  fears,  the 
desires  and  affections,  the  appetites  and  lusts  of  men,  casting  out, 
restraining,  refining,  and  regulating,  until  the  emotions  are  as  obedi- 
ent to  spiritual  law  as  the  restless  seas  to  physical  law.  Religion, 
says  Julius  Muller,  is  affectionate  communion  with  God.  It  is  the 
alliance  of  the  affections  or  the  emotional  life,  purified  and  renewed, 
with  God !  The  sources  of  life  are  corrupt,  the  thinking,  feeling,  and 
acting  of  men  bearing  witness  to  the  corruption.  Christianity  strikes 
for  the  center  of  being,  involving  radical  changes  in  the  intellectual 
and  emotional  natures,  bringing  the  one  into  harmony  with  truth, 
and  the  other  into  sympathy  with  purity. 

Spiritual  experience,  involving  both  the  intellectual  and  emotional, 
is  higher  than  the  one  and  deeper  than  the  other;  it  is  more  pro- 
found than  intellectual  conviction  and  more  permanent  than  emo- 
tional assertion.  It  is  a  transformation  of  the  inner  life,  of  which 
thought  and  feeling  are  reliable  exponents ;  it  is  more  than  knowl- 
edge, it  is  more  than  emotion  ;  it  is  the  essence  of  life,  of  which 
spirit-power  is  the  best  exponent.  Adequately  to  understand  spiritual 
experience,  its  categories  or  the  contents  of  spiritual  life  must  be 
enumerated  and  so  placed  that  it  will  stand  as  a  separate  experience, 
both  from  the  intellectual  and  emotional  states  which  religion  super- 
induces. Truth  apprehended  spiritually  appears  differently  from  the 
same  truth  apprehended  intellectually  or  emotionally.  In  the  latter, 
the  forms  of  truth  only  are  perceived  ;  in  the  former,  the  essence  of 
truth  is  cognized  and  appropriated. 

The  foundation  of  experience  is  consciousness.  By  consciousness 
we  mean,  using  Leibnitz's  suggestion,  the  central  monad,  or  the  unit 


678  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

of  being  with  psychical  predicates,  or  the  permanent  sensation  of 
life.  Within  the  life-center,  or  upon  the  psychical  unit,  a  spiritual 
work  is  excited  and  performed,  resulting  in  the  spiritual  intensity  of 
being  and  the  purification  of  the  life-ground.  As  the  spiritual  work 
is^within  the  realm  of  life,  so  its  first  recognition  will  be  by  the  life 
itself,  or  consciousness.  The  source  of  spiritual  knowledge  is  not  in- 
tellectual inquiry  or  emotional  states,  but  the  introspective  search 
of  consciousness,  the  affidavit  of  life  to  life.  Sir  William  Hamilton 
defines  consciousness  as  a  "comprehensive  term  for  the  complement 
of  our  cognitional  energies."  Dr.  James  Rush  employs  consciousness 
as  "a  term  to  signify  the  knowledge  which  the  mind  has  of  its  own 
operations."  Dr.  Porter  says,  "  Natural  consciousness  is  the  power 
which  the  mind  naturally  and  necessarily  possesses  of  knowing  its 
own  acts  and  states."  Consciousness  is  the  region  of  spiritual  life, 
and  the  source  of  spiritual  knowledge.  As  it  embraces  the  whole 
life,  it  also  embraces  changes  in  the  life,  and  an  apperception  of  the 
changes  as  and  when  they  are  wrought.  The  first  revelations  of 
spiritual  life  are  to  consciousness ;  afterward,  to  the  various  mental 
faculties  and  the  various  emotional  conditions  of  being. 

The  degree  of  revelation  of  spiritual  life  to  consciousness  can  not 
be  fully  stated.  The  Roman  Catholic  Church  holds  that  the  soul  is 
not  conscious  of  spiritual  regeneration,  which  it  teaches  is  effected  by 
the  manipulation  of  the  priesthood,  and  must  be  accepted  by  faith  on 
the  part  of  the  subject.  This  is  the  doctrine  of  unconscious  spiritual  ex- 
perience, which  so  infuriated  Luther  that  it  not  only  drove  him  from 
the  old  Church,  but  also  led  him  to  proclaim  the  doctrine  of  a  con- 
scious salvation  and  a  conscious  union  with  Christ.  The  recognition 
of  spiritual  life  by  the  consciousness  is  the  testimony  to  its  existence, 
and  an  absolute  necessity  in  the  nature  of  the  work  involved.  All 
the  contents  of  consciousness  may  not  be  recognized  by  the  under- 
standing, but  so  radical  a  work  as  the  regeneration  of  the  conscious- 
ness can  not  occur  without  the  consent  of  the  understanding,  and 
■without  the  knowledge  of  the  subject  in  whom  the  work  is  wrought. 
Experience  is  the  outgrowth  of  consciousness,  as  consciousness  is  the 
ground  of  experience.  Schleiermacher  taught  that  "  religion  is  not  a 
system  of  dogmas,  but  an  inward  experience,"  which  is  the  same  thing 
as  saying  it  is  the  experience  of  consciousness. 

This  goes  to  the  roots  of  being ;  this  gets  into  the  depths  of  life. 
Behind  consciousness,  one  can  not  go;  as  far  back  as  consciousness, 
religion  must  go,  or  its  work  is  superficial.  The  sinfulness  of  human 
nature,  or  the  recognition  of  an  internal  evil  principle,  in  man  is 
one  of  the  categories  of  religious  experience.  To  establish  the  fact 
of  the  reign  of  evil  in  the  world,  it  is  not  difficult;  but  to  establish 


RECOGNITION  OF  SIN  AND  ATONEMENT.  679 

the  reign  of  evil  in  personal  life,  some  proof  is  required.  Prior  to 
his  departure,  the  Master  assured  his  disciples  that,  after  his  separa- 
tion from  them,  the  Spirit  would  come  and  "  reprove  the  world  of 
sin,"  conveying  the  idea  that,  through  the  Spirit's  ministry,  sin  would 
be  fully  recognized.  To  "reprove"  means  to  lay  bare,  expose,  dem- 
onstrate. The  Master  meant  that  the  Spirit  would  demonstrate  to 
human  consciousness  the  fact,  nature,  processes,  and  effects  of  sin, 
and  powerfully  incline  the  mind  to  its  contrary,  holiness.  Philosophy 
failed  in  its  knowledge  of  the  nature  of  sin.  In  ancient  times  it 
knew  not  what  sin  is,  and  in  modern  times  it  apprehends  not  the 
nature  of  the  world's  irregularity.  Falsehood,  jealousy,  revenge, 
murder,  suicide — these  philosophy  has  sanctioned,  because  evil  as  evil 
was  not  properly  discovered.  To  assume  that  evil  is  the  friction  be- 
tween matter  and  spirit,  or  that  it  emerges  from  the  struggling  char- 
acter of  spirit,  is  not  fully  to  define  it.  A  demonstration  to  the 
consciousness  of  what  sin  is  in  essence,  in  its  relation  to  God,  in  its 
bearing  on  the  divine  government,  and  in  its  efiect  on  character,  is 
required  if  it  be  understood  ;  and  Christianity  furnishes  the  demon- 
stration in  the  offices  of  the  Holy  Spirit  aud  the  revelations  of  the 
Sacred  Word.  In  this  respect,  Paul  eclipses  Plato,  and  John  Wesley 
reveals  more  than  Emerson.  Religious  experience,  or  the  passage 
into  spiritual  life,  involves  the  full  recognition  of  the  character  of 
sin,  with  its  consequences  and  relations. 

To  the  problem  of  sin  is  annexed  the  problem  of  atonement  or 
redemption,  aud  a  demonstration  of  the  one  is  accompanied  by  a 
revelation  of  the  other.  Spiritual  recognition  of  sinfulness  is  followed 
by  a  spiritual  recognition  of  atonement.  Christianity  reveals  both 
the  fact  of  sin  and  the  remedy  for  it.  One's  spiritual  eyes  opened, 
the  Cross  is  as  quickly  discerned  as  the  Pit.  The  dreadful  thought 
of  ruin  is  succeeded  by  the  exhilerating  hope  of  recovery.  First  ap- 
prehending the  atonement  as  a  historic  fact,  the  consciousness  admits 
it  into  personal  relations,  and  feels  its  uplifting  power.  From  that  mo- 
ment the  atonement  is  no  longer  a  historical  event,  but  a  personal  fact; 
no  longer  an  external  achievement,  but  an  internal  experience.  The 
transformation  of  the  external  fact  into  internal  character,  or  a  his- 
toric event  taking  root  in  human  consciousness,  or  truth  converted 
into  life,  is  a  most  wonderful  event  in  human  experience.  It  is  the 
crisis  of  eternity  respecting  the  individual,  or  the  crisis  of  the  indi- 
vidual respecting  eternity.  Yet  atonement  is  a  category  of  spiritual 
experience. 

The  full  accomplishment  of  the  redemptive  agency  of  Christianity 
terminates  in  the  holiness  of  the  subjects  in  whom  it  has  unrestricted 
operation.     Holiness  is  the  chief  characteristic  of  the  Christian,  as  it  is  the 


680  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

central  idea  of  revelation,  and  the  exalted  grace  of  Deity.  It  is  the  out- 
come of  Christianity.  Constantine  clothed  himself  in  a  white  garment 
for  baptism,  and  in  his  last  years  slept  on  a  white  bed,  in  token  of 
the  holiness  which  religion  required,  and  to  which  he  sincerely 
aspired.  Keligion  is  holiness;  holiness  is  religion.  Christianity  is  the 
one  only  as  it  is  the  other.  In  that  mystical  spirit  for  which  the 
Pythagoreans  were  famous,  they  symbolized  righteousness  by  the 
number  three,  some  say  by  the  number  five,  and  others  by  the  num- 
ber nine,  intending  that,  whatever  number  was  used  as  the  symbol, 
it  should  represent  the  idea  of  completeness,  harmony,  and  unity. 
Righteousness  is  spiritual  harmony  with  spiritual  things;  it  is  the 
ground  of  spiritual  unity  in  the  universe ;  it  is  the  source  of  com- 
pleteness in  mankind. 

It  is  regretted  that  the  theological  schools  do  not  agree  touching 
righteousness  as  a  fact  of  experience,  for  one  insists  upon  the  doctrine 
of  "imputed  righteousness,"  as  contrary  to  the  idea  of  inherent 
righteousness,  and  another,  more  rationally  and  Scripturally,  upon 
the  doctrine  of  "imparted  righteousness,"  or  an  inwrought  experience 
of  holiness  as  the  condition  of  final  salvation.  A  unity  of  view  on 
the  basis  of  experience  is  certainly  desired.  Imputed  righteousness  is 
an  object  of  faith ;  imparted  righteousness  the  subject-matter  of  ex- 
perience. Both  are  consistent;  the  former  may  exist  without  the 
latter ;  the  latter  can  not  exist  without  the  foi'mer ;  hence,  it  is  more 
comprehensive  and  just  as  personal  on  one  side  as  it  is  divine  on  the 
other.  A  personal  divine  righteousness  or  holiness,  the  glowing  factor 
of  the  divine  nature,  concreted  in  human  personality,  is  the  possible 
heritage  of  a  believer  in  Jesus  Christ.  This  is  the  consummation  of 
religion,  the  flower  of  experience. 

In  this  connection,  the  following  question  seems  to  be  relevant: 
Is  the  supernatural  element  in  experience  the  root  or  the  crown  of 
the  moral  life  ?  Does  religious  experience  originate  in  a  supernatural 
impulse?  or,  springing  out  of  a  religious  germ  within  man,  does  it 
terminate  in  its  development  in  a  supernatural  character?  Dr.  Mar- 
tineau  assumes  that  the  supernatural  is  the  crown  of  the  religious 
life ;  we  assume  that  it  is  the  root  of  all  religious  experience.  With- 
out a  supernatural  beginning,  religious  experience  is  wholly  impossi- 
ble;  without  the  root,  there  can  be  no  crown.  The  attempt  to  sepa- 
rate root  and  crown,  or  distinguish  between  the  religious  elements  in 
the  initial  stages  of  experience  and  the  consummation  in  holiness,  is 
likely  to  involve  one  in  a  misunderstanding  of  the  whole  subject,  as 
it  is  an  attempt  to  separate  similars  and  disjoin  the  essential  extremes 
of  a  developed  religious  life.  The  inception  of  experience  is  the 
prophecy  of  its  fulfillment;  the  beginning  is  the  root  of  the  develop- 


THE  CHRISTIAN  A  NEW  INCARNATION.  681 

ment ;  and  the  consummation  is  the  completion  of  what  existed  in  the 
earliest  stages  of  experience.  The  beginning  is  holiness  in  an  embry- 
onic state;  the  consummation  is  holiness  completed.  The  root  is 
holiness ;  the  crown  is  holiness.  Holiness,  root  mid  crown,  is  a  category 
of  experience. 

As  the  play  of  Hamlet  is  impossible  without  Hamlet,  so  Chris- 
tianity is  impossible  without  Christ.  Christianity  is  Christ.  Any 
consideration  of  the  one  presupposes  the  consideration  of  the  other, 
and  any  religious  experience,  rooted  in  or  related  to  the  one,  bears  a 
corresponding  relation  to  the  other.  One  of  the  categories  of  experi- 
ence must  be  Messiahship,  the  spiritual  center  of  religion.  Without 
Christ,  incarnation,  atonement,  resurrection,  immortality,  are  fables; 
with  him,  they  are  living  truths,  to  be  preached  to  all  men.  The 
vitality  of  religious  experience  wholly  depends  on  its  connection  with 
Christ,  as  all  religious  truth  depends  upon  him  as  the  truth.  Intel- 
lectual opinions,  beliefs,  creeds,  superstitions,  are  possible  without 
Christ;  but  experience  of  truth  is  only  possible  as  Christ  is  experi- 
enced. The  experience  of  Christianity  is  the  experience  of  Christ,  or 
the  reproduction  of  his  life  in  the  soul.  It  is  the  spiritual  procreation 
in  man  of  what  is  in  Christ,  or  of  what  Christ  is  in  nature.  The 
Christian  is  a  new  incarnation  of  Jesus  Christ.  He  is  God  manifest 
again  in  the  flesh.  In  this  highest  sense,  Christianity  is  the  life  of 
the  world,  imparting  to  it  the  God-given  life  of  its  Founder,  and 
building  it  up  in  his  likeness,  so  that  the  angels  in  heaven  and 
human  beings  on  earth  may  appear  to  be,  and  are,  the  children  of 
one  Father. 

Into  this  experience  are  crowded  thoughts  of  the  future  life,  in- 
volving the  immortality  of  the  soul,  the  resurrection  of  the  body, 
and  final  rewards  and  punishments.  Heaven  and  hell  arise  before 
the  spiritual  vision  as  the  final  facts  of  religion  ;  they  are  the  last 
truths,  as  creation,  sinfulness,  atonement,  regeneration,  and  holiness 
are  the  first  in  the  system  of  religion.  Heaven  with  its  glories  and 
hell  with  its  horrors  are  apprehended  in  their  vividness,  and  affect  the 
religious  life  in  the  growing  stages  of  spiritual  experience.  Experi- 
ence is  the  cure  of  skepticism  touching  the  final  truths  of  religion. 
No  doubt  clouds  the  eye  as  it  gazes  into  the  future.  Spiritual  ex- 
perience is  a  demonstration  of  the  truth  of  all  the  Scriptures  teach 
as  to  the  final  disposition  of  the  righteous  and  the  wicked,  and  the 
divine  government  never  appears  so  firm  and  so  holy  as  when  it  moves 
forward  to  the  execution  of  its  plans  respecting  the  future  of  its  sub- 
jects. One  of  the  categories  of  religious  experience  is  a  clear-sighted 
view,  according  to  the  Scriptures,  of  the  justice  and  holiness  of  the 
divine  administration  in  its   settlement  of  human  affairs,  awakening 


682  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

the  sense  of  responsibility  and  inspiring  carefulness  in  life,  as  but  few 
other  truths  are  able  to  do. 

Spiritual  experience  is  so  comprehensive,  both  in  its  truth-con- 
tents and  in  its  relation  to  Christ,  that  an  exhaustive  list  of  its  cate- 
gories must  not  be  undertaken  ;  we,  therefore,  stop  with  those  given. 
To  such  experience  belong  all  there  is  of  Christianity  in  its  theistic. 
Messianic,  redemptive,  and  eschatological  revelations,  which  become 
the  root  and  ground  of  the  Christian  life.  The  complete  Christian 
life  is  Christianity  completed  in  the  life.  Alexander  Bain  attributes 
character  to  pigment ;  we  attribute  Christian  character  to  Christian- 
ity. Herbert  Spencer  makes  "complete  living"  possible  as  it  conforms 
to  naturalistic  standards  and  laws ;  we  see  that  it  is  possible  only  as 
it  is  a  supernaturalistic  development  of  a  supernaturalistic  principle 
of  life  implanted  by  Him  who  is  Life  and  hath  promised  it  to  all  who 
desire  it. 

The  perplexing  part  of  the  subject  is  the  process  by  which  Chris- 
tianity is  reduced  to  a  spiritual  experience.  Intellectual  assent  to 
Christianity,  or  an  intellectual  perception  of  its  truth,  is  less  mys- 
terious than  the  spiritual  appropriation  of  truth ;  indeed,  it  is  a  ques- 
tion if  the  former  is  a  mystery  at  all.  Intellectual  changes,  involving 
reversal  of  sentiments  or  adoption  of  new  truths,  are  psychological 
facts  within  the  range  of  analysis.  A  change  from  atheism  to  theism, 
or  from  Unitarianism  to  Trinitarianism,  is  or  may  be  purely  intel- 
lectual, important  enough  to  be  worthy  of  notice,  but  not  profound 
enough  to  stand  for  Christian  experience.  An  intellectual  regenera- 
tion may  be  accomplished  through  psychological  laws,  with  which  we 
are  familiar;  spiritual  regeneration  is  more  than  a  psychological  change, 
and  can  not  be  explained  as  yet  even  by  spiritual  laws  known  to  us. 
A  Buddhist  may  pass  over  to  Christianity  by  the  intellectual  process, 
but  he  is  not  a  Christian  except  in  name.  The  spiritual  process  is 
independent,  different,  and  unknown. 

Intellectual  changes  are  vital,  but  as  perilous  as  they  are  vital. 
As  an  intellectual  view  of  Christianity  is  incomplete,  so  an  intellectual 
regeneration,  or  change  in  religious  sentiments,  is  incomplete  and  un- 
satisfying ;  and,  without  spiritual  experience,  Christianity  will  seem 
to  him  who  accepts  it  on  intellectual  grounds  only,  as  incompetent  to 
fulfill  its  promises,  and  he  turns  against  it.  Honestly  accepting  it 
'  through  an  intellectual  process,  he  has  honestly  abandoned  it  by  a 
similar  process.  The  intellectual  root  does  not  hold — he  needs  spirit- 
ual grappling-hooks.  A  sentimental  religion  or  an  intellectual  ex- 
perience may  be  beautiful,  but  it  is  not  life-imparting ;  it  may  be 
magnetic,  but  it  is  not  powerful ;  it  is  not  a  dynamical,  but  a  me- 
chanical, religion.     Christianity  is  life,  not  truth  only. 


BIOGENESIS  A  CHRISTIAN  DOCTRINE.  6SS 

The  impartation  of  the  vitalistic  principle  is  one  of  the  secrets  of 
religion,  and  its  enjoyment  is  one  of  the  experiences  of  human  his- 
tory. On  the  supposition  that  the  soul  is  in  a  state  of  spiritual  death, 
as  the  sacred  writers  represent,  it  is  a  mystery  that  by  any  process  at 
all  it  can  pass  into  a  state  of  spiritual  life.  How  can  the  non-living 
become  living?  It  is  a  scientific  as  well  as  religious  teaching,  nei- 
ther science  nor  religion  having  answered  it.  Prof.  Tyndall  has  urged 
that  under  the  operation  of  the  laws  of  crystallography  all  vegetable 
and  animal  life  may  be  produced ;  but  so  bald  a  proposition  has 
been  overthrown  by  experiment.  Crystals  are  not  known  to  grow 
into  vegetables  or  animals.  So  under  no  laws,  physical  or  psycho- 
logical, thus  far  discovered,  is  it  possible  to  explain  the  initial  ap- 
pearance of  religious  life  in  man.  To  attribute  it  to  an  evolutionary 
process  or  natural  development  would  please  Herbert  Spencer,  but 
the  religious  life  had  a  beginning,  in  which  evolution  played  no  part. 
The  religious  foundations  are  divine — not  natural  and  evolutionary. 
Religious  teachings,  religious  customs,  and  religious  temples  may  re- 
sult from  the  domination  of  the  religious  idea;  but  religious  life  is 
not  evolved  from  the  religious  concept,  or  from  any  thing  human. 
Religious  life  is  the  antecedent  or  normal  condition  of  the  soul,  to  be 
explained  by  no  preliminary  natural  condition  or  force.  It  is  prelim- 
inary ;  it  is  first.  Evolution  never  produces  the  first ;  it  may  account 
for  the  second.  It  can  not  explain  the  beginning  of  the  world,  or  of 
religion ;  it  may  trace  its  development,  but  nothing  more. 

Only  two  theories  of  spiritual  life  are  possible — the  theory  of 
spontaneous  regeneration  and  the  theory  of  biogenesis,  or  the  intro- 
duction of  life  from  antecedent  and  external  spiritual  life.  As  the 
theory  of  spontaneous  generation,  as  applied  to  physical  things,  has 
been  abandcmed  and  pronounced  unscientific,  so  the  theory  of  spon- 
taneous regeneration,  or  spiritual  life  springing  out  of  spiritual  death 
by  the  action  of  the  latter,  is  repugnant  on  scientific  ns  well  as  re- 
ligious grounds,  and  must  be  abandoned.  Henry  Drummond  pro- 
nounces it  an  "impossible  Gospel."  Life  from  life  is  the  only 
explanation  of  life.  Spiritual  life  in  man  points  to  its  antecedent 
in  God.  Regeneration  is  a  biogenetic  fact.  Regeneration  is  a  new 
generation,  not  a  development  of  nature.  As  the  lower  order  can 
not  pass  into  the  upper,  the  inorganic  into  the  organic,  unless  the 
upper  breathes  into  the  lower,  unless  the  organic  touches  the  inor- 
ganic, so  the  natural  never  becomes  the  spiritual  unless  the  spiritual 
touches  the  natural,  imparting  its  life  to  it,  and  assimilating  it  into 
its  own  likeness.  This  is  the  law  of  biogenesis — this  is  regeneration 
or  the  law  of  spiritual  life. 

If,   then,   the  religious  life   is   not   the   evolution    of  a   natural 


684  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

existing  principle  in  man,  it  can  not  be  the  product  of  an  evolutionary 
force  without  him.  He  did  not  catch  the  religious  idea  from  his  en- 
vironment, nor  did  he  find  it  in  the  forces  of  nature.  Neither  in 
himself,  nor  in  nature,  does  he  discover  it.  The  religious  source  is 
elsewhere ;  the  religious  life  is  not  derivative  from  a  human  or  natural 
root,  but  is  from  outside  and  beyond  the  human  and  the  natural. 

The  mystery  of  spiritual  change  lies  in  the  fact  that  it  is  not  the 
result  of  voluntary  mental  action,  but  of  the  energy  of  a  force  quite 
independent  of  the  mind  or  the  individual.  In  intellectual  changes  man 
is  active ;  in  spiritual  changes  he  is  passive.  In  the  one  he  works ;  in  the 
other  another  works. 

As  an  objection  to  spiritual  experience  it  is  alleged  that  character 
is  indestructible,  and  does  not  admit  of  change,  and,  therefore,  the 
representation  of  change  must  be  understood  in  an  allegorical,  and 
not  in  a  literal,  sense.  The  indestructibility  of  character  is  an  ad- 
mitted fact,  and  regeneration  not  only  respects  it,  but  also  aims  both 
to  conserve  and  perfect  it.  Regeneration  is  a  transformation  of  in- 
destructible character,  effected  through  the  operation  of  the  divine 
spirit  without  extinguishing  a  single  faculty  or  destroying  a  single 
function  of  the  soul.  The  young  man  of  Nain  is  dead ;  Jesus  Christ 
speaks  the  body  back  into  life,  not  by  destroying  the  body,  but  by 
imparting  to  it  that  which  it  had  before  death.  Regeneration  is  a 
similar  act  with  reference  to  the  soul ;  it  is  rebuilding  what  is  in  ruins ; 
it  is  repairing  the  damaged  walls  of  the  spiritual  palace ;  it  is  perfect- 
ing the  imperfect.  The  blind  eye  is  opened,  a  restoration  to  normal 
functions;  diseased  conditions  are  banished,  and  health  is  stamped  upon 
the  whole  system.  The  work  is  beneficent,  normal,  healthful,  re- 
demptive. ,     1  . 

The  fact  of  an  internal  transformation  of  elemental  character  is 
fully  taught  in  the  Scriptures,  and  the  instrument  by  which  it  is  ef- 
fected is  as  clearly  revealed,  but  the  generic  process  of  change  is  so 
hidden  that  it  can  not  even  be  inferred.  Nor  is  an  explanation  need- 
ful either  to  faith  or  satisfaction.  God  reveals  results,  not  processes. 
Botanical  mysteries  are  as  conspicuous  as  spiritual  mysteries,  and  preg- 
nant with  similar  lessons.  The  revivification  of  nature  after  the  Win- 
ter's cold  has  passed  over  it  is  a  sublime  spectacle,  adumbrating  a 
similar  fact  in  the  spiritual  hemisphere,  of  which  it  is  the  truthful 
counterpart.  Sun-heat  and  sun-light  are  poured  into  apparently  life- 
less and  denuded  forests,  which  in  brief  time  exhibit  all  the  signs  of 
life  again,  clothing  themselves  with  their  accustomed  foliage,  and  min- 
istering to  the  earth  as  the  earth  has  ministered  to  them.  Even  this 
familiar  re-blooming  the  materialist  must  recognize  without  an  adequate 
knowledge  of  the  process  that  effected  it.     Likewise  the  divine  influ- 


A  KNOWLEDGE  OF  GOD  SCRIPTURALLY  AFFIRMED.     685 

ence  is  p«ured  into  a  spiritually  lifeless  soul,  in  which  germinates  a 
new  life,  whose  peculiar  manifestations  are  moral  beauty,  superhu- 
man strength,  divine  impulses,  and  gaspings  after  holiness.  In  the 
new  condition  the  soul  reaches  after  the  divine  nature  as  the 
divine  nature  reaches  after  it,  and  one  merges  into  the  other,  so  that, 
as  Peter  affirms,  the  soul  partakes  of  the  divine  nature.  The  fact 
is  patent,  the  process  is  unknown. 

This  is  not  mysticism.  The  doctrine  of  spiritual  experience  has 
been  misunderstood  by  the  materialistic  thinker  as  a  reproduction  of 
the  mysticism  of  the  Neo-Platonists,  or  the  fanaticism  of  the  school- 
men, with  which  neither  intellectually  nor  religiously  is  it  at  all 
connected  or  related.  The  mystery  of  the  spiritual  process,  and  con- 
sequently the  mystery  of  spiritual  experience,  is  acknowledged  ;  but 
mystery  is  not  mysticism,  mystery  is  not  fanaticism.  Plotiiius  is  not 
the  best  exponent  of  Christianity ;  Thomas  Aquinas  is  not  the  truest 
interpreter  of  the  doctrine  of  experience. 

The  secret  of  regeneration  is  the  secret  of  the  soul.  The  soul  is 
an  unknown  quantity,  refusing  to  be  interviewed  to  any  great  length ; 
it  will  not  turn  "  informer,"  and  tell  all  it  knows.  God  is  even  more 
inexplicable.  The  two  come  in  sweet  contact;  the  Highest  over- 
shadows the  Lowest,  and  the  latter  is  born  into  the  former.  A  di- 
vine operation,  this  ;  it  is  more  than  an  intellectual  throe ;  it  is  the 
divine  sweeping  over  the  soul,  like  the  eagle  over  its  nest,  and  at  last 
settling  down  upon  it  as  its  own,  and  warming  it  with  its  own  life. 
The  soul  is  the  nest  of  God. 

To  produce  this  change  philosophy  is  utterly  incompetent ;  it  may 
introduce  and  produce  intellectual  regeneration.  Plato  addresses  the 
mind  ;  Paul  reaches  the  heart.  The  one  transforms  the  thinking ;  the 
other  transfigures  the  life.  Great  is  intellectual  purification  ;  greater 
is  spiritual  sanctification. 

The  ground  of  these  statements  is,  besides  the  experience  itself, 
the  teaching  of  the  Scriptures,  to  which  one  must  always  turn  for 
final  truth  respecting  religion.  Mr.  Spencer  declares  God  unknow- 
able and  unthinkable,  and  religious  experience,  predicated  on  a 
knowledge  of  God,  impossible.  What  saith  the  Scriptures?  John 
says:  "Beloved,  let  us  love  one  another,  for  love  is  of  God;  and 
every  one  that  loveth  is  born  of  God  and  knoweth  God."  "  He  that 
believeth  on  the  Son  of  God  hath  the  witness  in  himself,"  says  John 
also;  and  to  the  agnostic  Jews  Jesus  said:  "  If  any  man  will  do  his 
will,  he  shall  know  of  the  doctrine,  whether  it  be  of  God,  or  whether 
I  speak  of  myself."  In  these  passages  it  is  clearly  evident  that  a 
knowledge  of  God,  grounded  in  relationship  to  God,  is  affirmed  as  the 
substance  of  religious  experience.     The  anticipations  of  Christianity 


686  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

include  a  revelation  of  God  to  believing  souls,  and  such  a  <revelatioii 
as  will  constitute  a  fundamental  experience.  In  harmony  with  these 
passages  are  others  quite  as  explicit  in  their  teaching,  and  significant 
of  the  same  inference,  but  it  is  not  necessary  to  quote  them.  No 
one  will  deny  that  the  doctrine  of  experience  is  the  doctrine  of 
Christianity. 

Mr.  Lewis  teaches  that  "mathematics  is  an  empirical  science." 
Christianity  is  an  empirical  religion,  justified  and  established  as  truly 
by  experiment,  observation,  induction,  and  deduction  as  mathematics 
or  any  physical  science.  It  is  the  religion  of  experience,  and  expe- 
rience is  as  authoritative  as  an  axiomatic  truth.  Respecting  the  reli- 
ability of  experience,  Leibnitz  says:  "If  our  immediate  internal  ex- 
perience could  possibly  deceive  us,  there  could  no  longer  be  for  us 
any  truth  of  fact ;  nay,  nor  any  truth  of  reason."  Experience  is  the 
positive  test  of  truth  ;  truth  is  not  the  test  of  experience.  The  stand- 
ard of  philosophy  is  alleged  truth  ;  the  standard  of  Christianity  is 
positive  experience.  The  clash  is  between  truth  and  experience. 
Philosophy  precipitates  a  collision ;  Christianity  seeks  a  harmony. 
Truth  must  conform  to  experience,  not  experience  to  truth.  Truth 
is  truth  only  as  it  is  one  with  afiii'mative  experience  ;  that  is,  all 
truth  is  empirical.  The  test  of  experience  is  supreme,  final.  With 
alleged  truths  materialism  may  make  war ;  in  the  presence  of  posi- 
tive experiences  it  is  powerless,  it  is  harmless. 

As  the  religion  of  truth  and  life  Christianity  is  without  a  rival. 
As  a  religion  of  truth  it  opens  doors  hitherto  closed  to  the  unsandled 
feet  of  sages  ;  it  reveals  God  as  Plato  never  apprehended  him  ;  it  de- 
fines world-building  as  the  materialist  has  never  conceived  it ;  it  points 
back  to  the  beginning,  and  its  last  rays  carry  one  to  the  end  and  be- 
yond.    A  truth-religion  it  is. 

As  a  religion  of  life  all  men  need  it,  for  all  are  dead  in  trespasses 
and  sin.  Its  words  sound  in  every  cavern  of  despair,  and  its  flower 
of  hope  blooms  over  the  door  of  eveyy  sepulcher.  My  words,  says  the 
Savior,  "are  spirit  and  life." 

Christianity  is  the  real  of  the  soul. 


A  DIFFERENCE  OF  REALM.  687 


CHAPTER  XXXII. 

COIvI^rlON      GROUNDS     OK'     PHILOSOPHY     AND 
CHRISTIANITY. 

THE  conception  of  Heinrich  Lang  that  the  realm  of  religion  is 
distinct  from  the  realm  of  science  is  beautiful  in  outline,  but  as 
he  regards  the  contents  of  the  scientific  realm  as  richer  and  vastly 
more  important  than  the  contents  of  the  religious  realm,  and  that 
they  have  nothing  in  common,  one  will  wonder  to  what  extent  the 
conception  of  difference  is  true,  and  will  desire  to  analyze  it  before 
accepting  it.  It  is  like  saying  that  England  and  China,  because  dis- 
tinct as  countries,  are  without  mutual  interests,  and  that  the  stronger 
may  wage  war  against  the  latter  at  its  option  and  for  its  own  benefit. 

It  is  this  conception  of  difference  that  has  led  to  irreconcilable 
antagonism  between  the  theologic  and  philosophic  interpretations  of 
truth  in  its  physical,  ethical,  and  religious  aspects  and  relations.  A 
survey  of  the  field  we  have  traversed  shows  two  giants  in  hostile  or 
strained  relations,  two  movements  of  thought  opposed  in  their  meth- 
ods of  research  and  discovery,  and  two  investigating  systems  at 
variance  on  points  of  vital  worth.  That  this  is  an  unnatural  atti- 
tude is  self-evident;  the  strife  is  very  like  the  "  War  of  the  Roses" 
in  England  or  the  war  of  the  North  and  South  in  America  ;  it  is 
the  strife  of  truth  with  truth,  brother  with  brother. 

Anciently,  religion  was  a  philosophical  principle,  and  philosophy 
was  a  religious  principle.  Pantheism  was  as  philosophical  as  it  was 
religious,  and  as  religious  as  it  was  philosophical.  All  the  earlier  relig- 
ions, save  the  Jewish,  partook  of  a  philosophical  spirit,  and,  inquiring 
most  profoundly  into  the  nature  of  things,  framed  expositions,  how- 
ever superstitious  and  erroneous,  that  for  ages  satisfied  the  intellectual 
life  of  the  races  who  received  them.  Such  religions,  not  fulfilling 
the  idea  of  religion,  immediately  sought  the  aid  of  philosophy,  but  in 
their  philosophical  work  they  were  as  ineffectual  as  in  their  more  ap- 
propriate religious  work.  Thus  the  blind  led  the  blind,  with  the 
usual  fatal  result. 

The  Judaic  religion  proposed  from  the  first  to  stand  on  an  inde- 
pendent basis,  and  taught  truth,  not  by  rationalistic  processes,  not  in 
the  form  of  speculation,  not  as  an  inquiry,  but  as  exact  truth,  so  far 
as  the  human  mind,  in  the  days  of  its  authority,  was  able  to  appre- 
hend it.     Never  was  the  strait  so  great  that  any  of  its  law-givers  or 


688  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

prophets  degenerated  into  philosophical  discourse,  but  they  always  set 
forth  Judaic  truth  as  religious  in  content  and  purpose.  To  a  still 
greater  extent  Christianity  stood  out  as  a  bas-relief  religion,  with  na- 
ture as  its  background,  asserting  religious  truths  for  religious  pur- 
poses, as  though  it  had  nothing  else  in  view ;  it  avoided  the  circum- 
locutions of  philosophy,  the  demonstrations  of  mathematics,  and  the 
licensed  prodigality  of  poetic  symbolization.  Intended  as  a  revelation, 
it  took  the  shortest  route  to  the  truth,  and  made  it  known  quickly. 

If  credit  must  be  given,  it  belongs  to  the  Bible  religions  thatt 
they  drew  the  line  between  religion  and  philosophy,  assigning  each  a 
special  sphere,  bounded  by  walls  that  can  not  be  broken  down,  and 
affirming  the  authority  of  each  in  its  sphere.  This  was  necessary, 
since  the  old  religions  united  the  two  in  unnatural  bonds,  and  with- 
out benefit  to  either.  It  was  a  union  of  iron  and  clay,  and  had  to  be 
dissolved,  the  result  being  on  the  one  hand  an  independent  philos- 
ophy, and  on  the  other  an  independent  religion.  Developing  its 
genetic  elements  in  their  natural  order,  it  is  not  strange  that  Chris- 
tianity appears  as  the  exclusive  religion  of  the  supernatural,  while 
philosophy,  pursuing  its  independent  course,  arrays  the  natural  against 
it.  In  the  one  miracles,  Messiahship,  faith,  repentance,  regeneration, 
ethical  laws,  prophecy,  prayer,  immortality,  and  resurrection  challenge 
investigation,  and  are  urged  in  opposition  to  the  findings  of  philoso- 
phy ;  in  the  other,  pessimism,  evolution,  natural  selection,  atheism, 
mechanism,  atomism,  and  all  such  are  urged  as  the  essentials  of  phi- 
losophy, without  regard  to  the  demands  of  religion.  One  concerns 
itself  with  things  spiritual,  ethical,  immortal ;  the  other  with  things 
physical,  psychological,  sociological,  and  temporal.  The  dividing  line 
is  distinct. 

Christianity  meant  that  it  should  be  drawn,  though  it  seemed  like 
the  drawing  of  a  sword  to  declai^e  the  division,  but  unintentionally 
hostility  has  been  the  result.  It  meant  that  truth  should  be  appre- 
hended from  the  double  stand-point;  that  at  first  the  natural  should 
be  interpreted  by  natural  methods,  and  the  supernatural  by  supernat- 
ural methods  ;  that  afterward  the  natural  should  be  interpreted  by 
the  supernatural,  and  the  supernatural  by  the  natural,  to  the  end  that 
it  would  appear  that  all  things  are  one,  and  God  is  over  all.  The, 
program  of  Christianity  is  broad  and  comprehensive,  looking  to  unity 
through  methods  diverse  and  even  antagonistic,  purposing  to  provoke 
harmony  between  the  ego  and  the  non-ego,  and  allowing  to  philoso- 
phy the  widest  rang^  of  thought,  yet  going  beyond  it  in  its  province 
of  revelation.  This  purpose,  misunderstood  or  not  discerned  at  all, 
has  been  made  responsible  for  the  actual  variance  between  the  two 
systems  of  thought,  and  many  like  Lang  divide  them  inseparably. 


INDICATIONS  OF  A  TRUCE.  689 

His  conception  of  difference  is  the  real  cause  of  hostility  ;  the  Bible's 
conception  of  difference  is  the  basis  of  final  unity  and  harmony. 

The  more  specific  alienation  has  occurred  within  the  last  fifty 
years,  during  which  science  has  made  prodigious  progress  in  its  proper 
field  of  discovery,  being  emboldened,  as  it  explained  some  things  in 
a  new  yet  hypothetical  way,  to  declare  that  it  could  explain  all  things 
in  a  similar  way,  or  at  least  differently  from  religion.  Its  apparent 
preliminary  successes  deepened  its  unintended  prejudice  toward  religious 
truth  and  the  religious  method.  In  advance  it  announced  the  down- 
fall of  religion ;  not  that  it  had  grounds  for  the  announcement,  but, 
in  a  self-confident,  partisan  spirit,  it  was  ready  to  believe  that  it  could 
undermine  the  solid  truths  of  religion  as  easily  as  a  few  workmen 
had  pared  down  the  rocky  cliffs  of  England's  coast.  Upon  the  task, 
so  serious,  and  so  herculean  as  well,  it  entered,  demolishing  some 
presuppositions  of  theology,  compelling  a  restatement  of  some  beliefs, 
and  a  remodeling  of  some  definitions,  and,  in  a  way,  threatened  the 
bulwarks  of  Christianity.  Under  the  circumstances,  the  fears  of  the 
ignorant  were  aroused ;  the  attention  of  Christian  thinkers  was  se- 
cured ;  original  inquiries  were  re-asked ;  and  a  battle,  without  the 
spirit  of  compromise  on  either  side,  began,  which  has  raged  with  an 
arbitrariness  that  promised  an  endless  contest. 

The  conflict  continues,  but  indications  of  a  truce  are  visible,  and 
the  preliminaries  of  an  agreement  have  been  discussed.  There  are 
leaders  on  both  sides,  who,  recognizing  the  suicidal  result  of  the 
struggle,  are  quite  willing  to  concede  some  things  heretofore  regarded 
as  fundamental,  but  now  ascertained  to  be  incidental,  and  who  be- 
lieve that,  however  necessary  the  conflict  in  itself,  the  important  ends 
aimed  at  have  already  been  secured.  So  soon  as  a  willingness  to 
consult  upon  the  situation  is  manifest,  there  is  hope  of  reconciliation ; 
but  it  is  no  easy  task  to  bring  together  in  amicable  relations  two  such 
colossal  belligerents ;  but  he  renders  service  to  both  sides  who,  instead 
of  inflaming  the  relations,  contributes  by  wise  words  to  a  peaceful 
settlement  of  the  matters  at  issue.  Peace  is  absolutely  necessary  to 
both.  The  "peace  relation,"  as  Rudolf  Schmid  calls  it,  is  the  condi- 
tion of  further  truth-development. 

In  suggesting  the  possibility  of  reconciliation  between  philosophy 
and  Christianity,  we  do  not  mean  that  either  side  shall  compromise 
itself  by  unfounded  concessions  to  the  other,  or  by  any  experience  of 
self-stultification,  or  by  an  abandonment  of  any  essential  principle, 
discovery,  or  truth,  for  such  compromise  is  not  at  all  necessary. 
Whatever  truth  the  one  may  have  discovered,  it  will  be  of  benefit  to 
the  other  to  know  it.  Instead  of  compromise  of  truths,  let  there  be 
unyielding  independence.     Nor  is  it  necessary  to  harmonious  relations 

44 


690  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

that  the  two  abandon  their  distinctive  peculiarities,  forming  an  en- 
tirely different  system  out  of  materials  common  to  both,  for  philos- 
ophy is  functional  in  the  natural  sphere,  and  Christianity  is  functional 
in  the  spiritual  sphere.  Any  suggestion  that  proposes  to  weaken 
either,  or  compromise  their  character,  or  alter  their  functions,  or  blot 
them  out  as  integral  systems,  can  not  be  the  basis  of  an  enduring 
reconciliation,  or  even  of  temporary  mutual  sympathy.  Nor  is  the 
proposed  reconciliation  to  grow  out  of  a  mere  correction  of  mutual 
misunderstandings,  for  these  give  way  on  other  grounds ;  but  the 
basis  of  harmony  lies  deeper,  rather  in  an  understanding  offundamentak 
than  in  an  overthrow  of  misconceptions  and  superstitions.  No  one  is 
prepared  to  say  that  either  science  or  religion  is  overthrown ;  no  one 
can  rationally  believe  that  either  will  be  overthrown  ;  and  no  one  re- 
ligiously desires  the  overthrow  of  either.  To  secure  friendly  recogni- 
tion of  the  inner  merits  of  each ;  to  allow  both  as  wide  a  sphere  as 
they  can  occupy ;  and,  at  the  same  time,  to  unite  them  in  a  common 
pursuit,  or  to  make  one  tributary  to  the  other  in  the  carrying  on  of 
its  special  work,  is  a  result  devoutly  desired  by  many  on  both  sides. 
What  basis  of  mediation  is,  therefore,  possible?  The  short  answer 
is,  not  a  basis  of  disagreements,  which  must  forever  keep  them  apart, 
but  a  basis  of  agreements  or  common  possessions.  The  secret  of 
Paul's  missionary  triumphs  was  his  observance  of  this  general  rule — 
as,  at  Athens,  in  order  to  win  the  pagan  mind  to  a  consideration  of 
the  truths  of  Christianity,  he  pointed  to  the  agreement  of  certain 
pagan  teachings  with  these  fundamental  truths,  and  did  not  assail 
their  errors.  He  avoided  arraying  the  religions  against  each  other, 
but  insisted  with  tremendous  force  upon  their  agreements,  capturing 
their  assent  if  it  did  not  result  in  their  conversion.  The  "  unknown 
God  "  of  Athens  is  the  known  God  of  Christianity,  said  the  apostle, 
and  they  listened  without  prejudice.  So  elsewhere  he  did  not  widen 
the  breach  between  Judaism  and  Christianity  by  contrasts  and  ex- 
posure of  disagreements,  but  referred  to  truths  common  to  both,  and 
attempted  thus  to  unite  them.  Even  when  he  must  speak  of  symbols 
or  ceremonies  that  had  passed  away,  he  was  careful  to  point  out  their 
fulfillment  in  Christian  usages  and  teachings,  showing  their  preserva- 
tion in  a  transposed  form  and  in  new  relations  in  the  new  religion. 
In  this  manner,  philosophy  and  Christianity  may  be  harmonized,  or 
the  differences  between  them  overshadowed  by  the  larger  agreements; 
not  entirely  harmonized,  we  confess,  for  there  are  some  differences 
that  are  essential  and  must  remain  ;  but  the  agreements  are  so  many 
that,  if  emphasized,  held  up  to  the  gaze  of  both  sides,  the  result  will 
be  a  higher  mutual  appreciation,  and  a  shortening  of  the  distance 
between  them. 


HA L  L  UCINA  TIONS  OF  SCIENCE.  691 

The  first  agreement  we  propose  relates,  not  to  the  contents  of 
either  religion  or  philosophy,  but  to  a  willingness  on  both  sides  that 
such  contents  may  be  investigated,  tested,  proved.  The  scientist  may 
smile  at  this  basis,  since  he  may  fancy  that  the  trouble  all  along  has 
grown  out  of  the  alleged  refusal  of  religious  truth,  having  clothed 
itself  in  mystery,  to  undergo  critical  inspection,  while  scientific  truth 
has  been  open-hearted  and  always  ready  for  examination.  It  is  at 
this  point  we  must  pause.  The  claim  of  science  that  its  truths  are 
self-transparent  is  a  trifle  delusive,  and  the  charge  against  religion  is 
not  exactly  in  accordance  with  the  facts.  Not  a  little  parade  has 
been  made  over  certain  discoveries  in  the  scientific  field,  but  it  is  not 
certain  that  science  has  desired  a  close  investigation  of  its  discoveries. 
It  has  really  forbidden  a  re-examination  by  the  boldness  of  its  an- 
nouncements, ridiculing  a  want  of  faith  in  them,  and  imposing 
acceptance  of  them  by  its  ipse  dixit  There  was  a  time  when  it  was 
imprudent,  a  sign  of  ignorance,  to  question  any  of  the  supposed  facts 
of  science,  and  to  revolt  against  any  of  its  deductions  was  revolution 
against  knowledge.  In  this  way  science  repressed,  not  investigation 
generally,  but  investigation  of  its  own  doings,  which  prepared  it  for 
crime  against  the  truth,  and  which  it  frequently  committed.  In  this 
independent  mood,  it  announced  facts  that  later  investigation  has  de- 
stroyed ;  it  framed  systems  that  mature  reflection  has  overthrown  ;  it 
inaugurated  sciences  that  recent  facts  have  canceled.  Early  geology 
with  its  eighty  anti-Biblical  theories  was  a  false  science.  Hackel's 
twenty -two  animalic  stages  preceding  the  appearance  of  man,  Darwin- 
ism in  its  prostituted  forms,  natural  selection,  the  nebular  hypothesis, 
an  immense  antiquity  for  man,  and  such  theories,  were  supposed  to 
rest  upon  inviolable  facts,  but  they  were  the  presuppositions  of  science, 
without  value  except  as  presuppositions.  The  hallucination  of  science 
was  seen  in  its  purpose  to  put  these  forward  as  discovered  facts  or 
truths,  which  the  Christian  thinker  resisted.  He  demanded  that 
science,  as  to  its  methods  and  results,  should  be  investigated ;  that  it 
should  be  responsible  to  truth  for  its  deliverances ;  and  that,  until  its 
reputation  for  veracity  should  be  established,  it  should  be  without  the 
ipse  dixit  in  the  realm  of  nature. 

This  put  a  check  on  high-handed  burglary  of  facts,  on  scientific 
iconoclasm  of  religious  truth.  Darwinism  has  been  investigated,  and 
"natural  selection"  is  exceedingly  modest,  even  as  a  theory;  evolu- 
tion contracts  with  new  data,  and  is  on  trial  for  its  life ;  the  distance 
from  the  organic  to  the  inorganic  has  never  been  shortened ;  the  pre- 
historic man,  back  of  sixty  centuries  ago,  has  not  been  found ;  the 
mechanical  view  of  the  universe  requires  a  theistic  undergirding  to  be 
at  all  tenable ;  and  finally  science  has  taken  off"  its  shoes,  for  it  has 


692  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

learned  that  the  universe  is  holy  ground.  In  compelling  science  to 
submit  to  investigation,  many  errors  have  been  corrected  or  are  in 
process  of  correction,  many  facts  appear  in  their  true  proportion,  the- 
ories pass  at  their  true  value,  and  rarely  is  any  scientific  statement 
fully  accepted  without  the  accompanying  demonstration.  The  gain  to 
truth,  to  religion,  to  science  itself,  has  been  incalculable. 

On  the  other  hand,  Christianity,  at  first  guarding  its  sacred  truths 
from  profane  touch,  has  at  last  submitted  them  all  to  critical,  histor- 
ical, scientific,  and  philosophical  tests,  which  has  resulted  in  great 
gain  to  itself,  and  demonstrated  the  intimate  relation  of  natural  and 
supernatural  truth.  In  honest  guardianship  of  religious  truth,  the 
early  Christian  thinker  construed  all  outside  attempts  at  investigation 
of  it  as  irreverent  in  spirit  and  infidelic  in  purpose,  and  felt  justified 
in  rebuking  it.  The  thought  of  applying  natural  tests  to  supernatural 
things  was,  in  his  judgment,  a  proof  of  a  depraved  impulse,  which 
should  be  suppressed,  aud  he  suppressed  it. 

Further  objection  to  a  rigid  scientific  examination  of  religious 
truth  was  made  on  the  ground  that  the  method  of  examination  ap- 
peared to  be  incongruous,  and,  therefore,  the  result  could  not  be 
exact  or  reliable.  As  well  attempt  to  test  the  law  of  chemical  affinity 
by  the  hydraulic  ram  as  to  test  supernatural  truth  by  a  natural  prin- 
ciple ;  so  thought  the  pietistic  believer.  If  Christianity,  as  a  religion, 
is  to  be  investigated,  it  should  be  investigated,  not  by  a  philosophic 
or  scientific  method,  but  by  a  religious  method.  Matter  is  the  test 
of  matter ;  mind  the  test  of  mind ;  science  the  proof  of  science ;  re- 
ligion the  proof  of  religion, — thus  reasoned  the  religionist.  From  the 
objection  of  Christian  thought  to  the  supposed  unnatural  method  of 
investigation,  the  conclusion  was  drawn  that  there  must  be  something 
in  Christianity  that  can  not  bear  investigation ;  hence,  a  reaction 
against  Christianity  was  the  result. 

In  the  refusal  of  the  pietist  to  open  the  doors  of  the  temple  of 
truth  to  the  world,  he  placed  religion  on  the  defensive ;  he  seemed  to 
shield  it  at  a  time  when  it  ought  to  be  known ;  he  guarded  mysteries 
that  needed  no  protection  ;  and  in  objecting  to  the  scientific  method 
he  objected  to  the  ouly  method  the  profane  mind  can  or  will  apply 
to  truth.  This  was  not  merely  a  breach  of  propriety,  but  the  position 
was  false ;  false  scientifically,  false  religiously.  To  the  philosophical 
mind,  the  scientific  method  is  the  only  method  ;  he  knows  nothing  of 
the  supernatural  method,  and  should  not  be  asked  to  bow  to  it.  The 
chief  objection  that  philosophy  proposes  to  the  religious  system  is  the 
method  it  requires  for  its  examination ;  and,  on  the  other  side,  the 
chief  objection  that  religion  proposes  to  philosophy  is  the  method  it 
has  adopted  for  the  discovery  of  truth.     Philosophy  says  to  religion, 


THE  TWO  BIBLICAL  METHODS.  693 

3'our  method  is  false ;  religion  retorts,  your  method  is  not  sound.  Re- 
duced to  final  terms,  it  is  a  conflict  over  jnethod,  arising  from  a  misun- 
derstanding of  the  functions,  claims,  and  agencies  of  the  contestants. 

Evidently,  Christianity  may  propose  its  method  of  expression  and 
its  method  of  vindication.  It  has  done  both,  and  on  examination  it  will 
be  found  that  it  is  friendly  to  any  or  all  methods,  natural  or  supernat- 
ural, which  guarantee  the  discovery  of  truth.  Peter  exhorts  the  Chris- 
tian to  be  ready  to  give  a  reason  for  the  hope  that  is  in  him  ;  this  is  the 
rationalistw  or  philosophical  method.  Under  certain  conditions,  the 
Master  said,  the  disciple  might  know  whether  the  doctrine  he  taught 
is  divine  or  not;  this  is  the  siipernaturalistic  m-  experimental  method. 
The  indorsement  of  both  methods  by  the  Gospel  should  end  the  con- 
flict and  lead  to  the  highest  truth. 

To  what  extent  the  two  methods  may  be  applied  to  Biblical  truth 
must  be  determined  in  part  by  the  specific  character  of  the  truth 
itself,  and  its  relation  to  the  entire  system.  It  will  be  going  too  far 
to  assure  the  scientific  investigator  that  he  will  be  able  to  demonstrate 
the  integrity  of  every  spiritual  truth  by  the  scientific  method,  but  he 
may  apply  the  method  so  often  as  to  persuade  himself  of  the  truth  of 
Christianity  as  a  whole.  To  the  historical  data  of  the  Biblical  docu- 
ments he  may  apply  the  rules  of  historical  criticism  ;  to  the  scientific 
hints  therein  found  he  may  apply  scientific  proofs.;  to  the  poetical 
products  of  inspiration  he  may  apply  the  laws  of  prosody ;  for  the 
verbal  frame-work  of  the  documents  the  laws  of  language  may  be 
consulted ;  and  for  the  general  structure  of  the  volume  of  Truth  the 
usual  analytic  and  synthetic  rules  may  be  employed. 

Possibly  this  is  all  that  philosoj)hy  can  fairly  undertake  or  succeed 
in  accomplishing,  for  the  mysteries  of  the  spiritual  side  of  Christian- 
ity can  neither  be  explored  or  explained  by  any  of  the  above  rules 
or  principles.  Incarnation,  regeneration,  atonement,  miracle,  prophecy, 
immortality,  and  resurrection  are  beyond  these  scientific  rules ;  but 
if  there  are  any  other  rules  by  which  even  these  truths  may  be  ana- 
lyzed, no  objection  should  interpose.  All  that  is  required  is  the  rule. 
Investigate  to  the  remotest  bounds  of  the  truth-area,  but  the  rule  of 
investigation  must  first  be  known.  There  should  be  no  ecclesiastical 
barrier  to  the  scientific  pursuit  of  mystery  ;  hunt  it  down,  expose  its 
content,  tell  its  hidden  life,  and  reveal  its  hidden  glory  ;  and  if  any 
barrier  at  last  is  found,  it  will  arise  from  the  truth  itself.  An  open 
door  to  science;  an  open  door  to  religion:  this  shall  be  the  common  law. 
On  this  basis  there  can  be  progress. 

The  corollary  from  this  general  position  is  that  philosophy  must 
recognize  the  appropriate  sphere  of  religion,  and  religion  must  recog- 
nize the  appropriate   sphere  of  philosophy.     Philosophy   is   a  hemi- 


694  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

sphere ;  Christianity  is,  under  certain  qualifications,  a  hemisphere 
also  ;  it  requires  both  to  make  the  globe.  Hitherto  philosophy  ranged 
throughout  the  universe  of  being  and  becoming,  intrenching  at  times 
on  the  particular  domain  of  religious  truth.  If,  however,  there  are 
limits  to  religious  thought,  there  are  limits  to  philosophical  thought 
also.  Granted  that  the  physical  realm,  with  all  the  problems  it  can 
suggest,  belongs  to  the  philosopher,  it  must  be  granted  that  the  spir- 
itual realm,  with  all  the  problems  it  can  suggest,  belongs  to  the 
Christian  thinker.  If  the  spheres  are  distinct,  they  must  be  recog- 
nized, and  the  laborers  confined  to  one  or  the  other  ;  and  limited  to 
the  laws  and  methods  appropriate  to  the  sphere.  With  such  recog- 
nition collision  will  be  avoided  and  peace  will  be  assured. 

In  military  phrase,  these,  however,  are  only  the  preliminary  con- 
ditions of  a  truce  ;  they  are  not  the  basis  of  an  enduring  friendship. 
Philosophy  anci  Christianity,  mutually  repugnant  on  the  ground  of 
difference,  may  be  drawn  together  in  defense  of  common  interests, 
and  mutually  support  each  other  in  the  presence  of  a  common  danger ; 
that  is,  mediation  is  possible  on  the  basis  of  agreements.  One  who  looks 
over  the  field  of  conflict  can  not  fail  to  see  that,  distinct  as  the 
belligerents  are,  occupying  separate  spheres  as  they  do,  and  pursuing 
certain  definite  aims  peculiar  to  their  spheres,  they  have  common  in- 
terests, and  are  so  related  to  fundamental  truths  that  they  can  not 
afford  to  be  divided.  Thei'e  are  errors,  theories,  and  misbeliefs  to 
which  philosophy  is  as  constitutionally  opposed  as  Christianity,  and 
both  are  striving  to  circumvent,  curtail,  and  extinguish  them.  In  this 
category  we  include  that  latest  form  of  intellectual  mischief-making 
known  as  agnosticism,  or  the  apologetic  system  of  ignorance  now  of- 
fered as  a  substitute  for  all  philosophical  speculation.  In  its  content 
it  is  old  Pyrrhonism  reproduced,  implying  now,  as  anciently,  a  denial 
of  knowledge  and  of  the  possibility  of  knowledge.  It  does  not  deny 
truth,  but  affirms  that  we  know  nothing  about  it.  Man  is  a  know- 
nothing  from  necessity,  by  virtue  of  the  limitation  of  his  faculties, 
and  must  forever  dwell  in  darkness.  His  intellectual  aspirations  are 
the  mockeries  of  his  nature.  Blindness,  uncertainty,  the  fatalism  of 
ignorance,  must  paralyze  all  his  attempts  at  inquiry.  The  hope  of 
emancipation  from  such  a  thralldom  is  delusive,  or  at  the  most  senti- 
mental ;  emancipation  can  not  be  realized.  The  agnostic  is  the  apos- 
tle of  midnight. 

Now,  it  is  important  to  consider  the  relation  of  philosophy  to 
agnosticism,  especially  to  inquire  if  its  tendency  is  to  this  extreme 
form  of  unbelief,  or  if  it  is  not  essentially  and  radically  opposed  to  it. 
In  determining  this  relation  we  meet  with  embarrassment  in  the  fact 
that  some  philosophers  are  agnostics,  and  philosophy  itself  has  veered 


ALLIANCE  OF  PHILOSOPHY  WITH  AGNOSTICISM.       695 

toward  a  general  agnosticism.  When  it  is  recalled  that  philosophy 
has  denied  the  possibility  of  knowing  God,  since  he  is  indiscernible, 
and  that  he  is  unthinkable,  since  he  is  entirely  beyond  the  condi- 
tioned ;  that  anthropdtaiorphic  conceptions  of  the  supernatural  are  not 
tolerated  in  some  philosophic  circles,  and  therefore  the  supernatural  is 
banished  from  thoughtful  inquiry  ;  that  the  essence  of  being  confess- 
edly eJudes  all  successful  searching  ;  that  matter  still  refuses  to  dis- 
close all  its  secrets  ;  that  man  is  self-ignorant,  and  hopelessly  so  ;  and 
that  some  of  the  great  questions  of  history  are  still  unsettled,  it  is 
easy  to  believe  that  philosophy  has  been  coquetting  with  agnosticism. 
Verily,  it  is  only  another  instance  of  Saul  seeking  the  witch  of  Endor 
for  information,  the  result  being  the  report  of  things  not  pleasant 
to  hear. 

The  alliance  of  philosophy  with  agnosticism  is  proof  of  degeneracy, 
but  it  can  not  last  long ;  it  is  an  illegitimate  alliance,  and  will  dis- 
solve of  its  own  accord.  For  a  true  philosophy  is  based  on  the  oppo- 
site platform,  having  for  its  purpose  the  elimination  of  the  unknown, 
or,  what  is  the  same  thing,  the  solution  of  all  mysteries  and  the  reign 
of  all  knowledge.  Hence  its  penetrating  spirit,  its  inquisitorial  en- 
ergy ;  hence  its  goal  must  be  universal  knowledge,  not  universal 
ignorance.  It  proposes  to  lay  bare  all  truth,  to  illuminate  all  dark- 
ness, to  conduct  mankind  out  of  Plato's  cave,  to  gild  every  peak  with 
sunlight,  and  to  dissolve  the  nebulse  of  history  into  related  events  and 
a  systematic  order  of  development.  It  proposes  to  knock  at  the  door 
of  iiature  until  it  shall  be  opened,  and  to  seek  her  gems  until  they 
shall  be  found.  It  proposes  to  look  up  into  the  face  of  the  Infinite 
Intelligence,  and  inquire  with  immortal  calmness  concerning  the  origin 
and  substance  of  being,  and  its  relation  to  non-being.  Its  purpose  is 
as  broad  as  "being"  and  "  becoming,"  which  includes  all  things. 

This  is  not  the  goal  of  agnosticism.  The  two  are  irreconcilably 
opposed ;  there  is  no  common  ground  where  they  may  meet ;  there 
is  no  bond  of  union  between  them.  Already  the  different  directions 
they  are  taking  are  apparent  in  the  different  results  they  are  an- 
nouncing. 

Philosophy  is  on  the  track  of  truth,  scenting  the  highest  laws, 
gathering  the  most  resourceful  facts,  and  widening  the  sphere  of 
knowledge,  to  be  sure  in  a  crude  way,  and  often  adopting  palpable 
errors  and  rejectable  conclusions,  but  constantly  addiug  to  the  sum 
of  the  world's  knowledge,  and  ministering  to  the  intellectual  wants 
of  the  race.  Agnosticism  is  a  contracting,  enervating  spirit;  its  pulse 
is  slow,  its  step  tardy,  its  walk  backwards.  There  is  no  elasticity  in 
it.     It  beats  a  funeral  march  in  our  ears. 

In  proportion  as  philosophy   and   agnosticism  are  essentially  op- 


696  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

posed,  philosophy  and  Christianity  are  essentially  agreed  touching  the 
limits  of  human  knowledge  and  the  province  of  human  thought. 
Christianity  is  the  revelation  of  man's  right  to  the  domain  of  knowl- 
edge, going  so  far  in  that  direction  as  to  aiii  him  by  supernatural 
fore-glimpses  of  those  truths  he  can  not  discover  by  the  scientific  pro- 
cess, and  so  laying  at  his  feet  those  facts,  laws,  systems,  and  princi- 
ples necessary  to  his  happiness  and  advancement.  It  is  not  the  re- 
ligion of  ignorance,  but  prima  facie  a  revelation,  and  therefore  the 
source  of  knowledge.  It  adds  to  its  value  also  that  it  purports  to  be 
a  revelation  of  those  truths  of  which  the  agnostic  confesses  he  knows 
nothing,  and  can  learn  nothing  from  any  source  open  to  him,  and  in 
which  the  philosopher  is  most  profoundly  concerned.  The  existence 
of  God,  the  reign  of  providence,  the  origin  of  the  worlds,  the  char- 
acter of  man,  and  the  destiny  of  all  things,  while  enigmatical  sub- 
jects to  the  agnostic,  are  the  common  truths  of  revelation,  the  exposi- 
tion of  which  belongs  equally  to  the  sphere  of  philosophy.  At  this 
vital  truth-point  agnosticism  separates  from  Christianity  and  philos- 
ophy, and  philosophy  and  Christianity  unite.  Agnosticism  is  the  foe 
of  hotli — of  philosophy  as  a  truth-huiiter,  of  Christianity  as  a  truth- 
reveakr.  Forgetting  their  differences  in  the  broader  purpose  to  de- 
fend common  interests,  and  agreeing  that  truth  must  be  protected  at 
all  hazards;  the  two,  though  differently  equipped  for  the  task,  will 
seek  to  serve  the  same  end,  and  share  the  glory  of  a  common 
victory.  A  cold  observer  may  pronounce  this  the  selfish  basis  of 
union — a  union  prompted  by  the  instinct  of  self-preservation  ;  a  union 
without  an  inner  bond ;  but  a  formal  union,  perhaps,  is  the  pre-con- 
dition of  absolute  organic  union,  and  at  all  events  the  pre-condition 
of  a  suspension  of  hostilities.  Both  are  in  danger  from  a  common 
foe,  both  must  provide  for  the  common  defense. 

The  idea  of  common  defense  is  relieved  of  its  selfish  character  by 
the  identity  of  many  of  their  truths,  a  number  of  which  are  as  vital 
to  the  existence  of  one  as  to  the  other.  Take  that  refined  form  of 
philosophic  speculation  known  as  idealism,  which  in  its  functional  re- 
lations is  closely  allied  to  certain  Biblical  truths,  and  can  not  be 
easily  separated  from  them.  Interpreting  matter  as  non-existent,  the 
result  is  contempt  for  nature;  but,  while  Christianity  emphasizes  its 
reality,  it  equally  emphasizes  its  perishability,  and  ever  strives  to 
wean  human  affection  from  it.  The  result  is  the  same  in  both  cases — 
contempt.  Philosophy  goes  off  into  hyperbole,  but  the  hyperbolic  is 
the  shadow  of  the  truth  of  religion.  The  one  raises  the  question  if 
matter  exists ;  the  other  treats  it  as  existing ;  but  both  lift  being 
above  it,  and  are  substantially  at  one  at  this  point.  It  should  not  be 
forgotten  that  the  materialists,  pricking  hyperbole  to  its  center,  are 


OTHER  POINTS  OF  CONTACT.  697 

exalting  matter  to  a  high  position  of  responsibility,  even  endowing 
it  with  the  power  of  procreation,  and  with  the  potency  of  all  life.  It 
looks  as  if  the  deification  of  matter  will  be  proposed  as  the  opposite 
pole  of  idealism.  To  this  exaltation  of  matter,  or  raising  gods  out 
of  the  dust,  Christianity  will  unite  with  idealism  in  protesting,  and 
will  raise  up  barriers  against  the  surging  tides  of  materialism. 

Nor  is  this  the  only  point  of  contact  between  them.  Respecting 
natural  evil,  or  the  evil  environment  of  man,  the  two  are  not  suffi- 
ciently far  apart  to  provoke  remark.  Tribulation,  affliction,  disease, 
and  death,  the  idealist  looks  upon  as  the  conditions  of  moral  devel- 
opment ;  Emerson  interprets  moral  evil  in  this  way ;  and  Christianity 
is  not  in  disagreement  with  the  interpretation.  Without  using  the 
word  "probation,"  idealism  interprets  life  as  a  probation,  attaching 
moral  significance  to  every  trial,  and  relieving  moral  friction  of  its 
edge  by  assigning  it  a  disciplinary  function.  To  both,  therefore, 
pessimism  is  unknown.  Both  interpret  alike,  leaving  the  religion  of 
melancholy  to  Schopenhauer  and  his  followers,  The  spirit  of  ideal- 
ism is  the  spirit  of  Christianity.  The  latter  is  ideal  in  its  inmost 
function  and  character;  it  is  spiritual,  supra-sensible,  holding  the  ma- 
terial at  arm's  length,  and  centering  all  in  God.  If  the  former  has  not 
gone  up  to  such  heights,  it  is  looking  in  that  direction ;  they  can  not 
fall  out  by  the  way  ;  they  are  friends. 

The  theistic  notion,  or  the  problem  of  the  Unconditioned,  is  the 
enigma  of  metaphysics,  and  the  summit-truth  of  inspired  revelation. 
Agreement  touching  this  greatest  truth  must  result  in  the  extinction 
of  disagreement  touching  all  lower  or  subsidiary  truth.  Interpreta- 
tions of  natural  phenomena,  containing  the  germs  of  atheism,  have 
been  framed  by  the  Hiickel  school  of  investigators,  but  the  majority 
of  philosophic  thinkers  prefer  to  be  in  harmony  with  the  theistic  hy- 
pothesis, and  express  dissatisfaction  with  their  proposed  expulsion  from 
the  ranks  of  believers.  Philosophy  must  break  with  atheism  or  mon- 
otheism ;  it  can  not  serve  both,  nor  can  it  be  indifferent  to  either. 
It  leans  to  the  monotheistic  idea  even  when  confessing  that  it  is  un- 
explainable  and  unthinkable. 

More  than  once  Mr.  Darwin  grieved  that  his  theory  was  construed 
into  a  support  of  atheism,  for  in  the  early  stages  of  his  career  he  had  not 
lost  faith  in  the  existence  of  a  personal  God.  In  his  "  Origin  of  Species  " 
heaflSrms  that  the  views  therein  expressed  should  not  "  shock  the  relig- 
ious feelings,"  as  the  development  idea  is  in  perfect  harmony  with  the 
theistic  hypothesis.  As  to  "natural  selection,"  K.  E.  von  Baer  con- 
demns it  is  as  "scientifically  indefensible,  but  not  anti-religious." 
Oskar  Peschel  vindicates  Darwinism  from  anti-religious  tendencies, 
holding  that  creation  by  development  is  nobler  than  creation  as  an 


698  PHILOSOPHY  AlsD  CHRISTIANITY. 

instantaneous  product  by  catastrophic  power.  Among  the  living 
thinkers  may  be  mentioned  Herbert  Spencer,  who  insists  that,  so  far 
as  his  evolutional  teachings  have  any  theological  bearing  or  value,  he 
has  been  misunderstood,  for  he  spurns  all  atheistic  sentiment.  He 
holds  to  the  existence  of  an  absolute  Intelligence,  without  personality 
in  the  anthropomorphic  sense,  but  as  a  conscious,  self-governed,  eter- 
nal power,  to  whom  the  universe  is  responsible.  He  further  conceives 
of  the  divine  Intelligence  without  conditional  relations,  and  so  com- 
pletely infinite  in  all  functions  as  to  eclipse  any  finite  conception,  so 
that  it  is  impossible  that  man  should  know  any  thing  of  him  beyond 
the  mere  fact  of  his  existence.  The  Christian  thinker  just  here  dis- 
covers the  need  of  a  revelation  from  God  to  supplement  human 
knowledge,  and  points  to  the  Bible  as  such  revelation ;  but  Spencer 
holds  that  the  revelation  compromises  itself  by  its  anthropomorphic 
conceptions,  which  is  an  objection  to  finite  conceptions  altogether,  for 
all  thought  is  necessarily  and  vitally  anthropomorphic.  Truth  is  vis- 
ible only  to  anthropomorphic  eyes,  and  a  revelation  of  God  not  an- 
thropomorphic would  be  unintelligible.  The  position  of  Spencer  is 
that  of  the  Athenians,  who  believed  in  God  without  knowing  any  thing 
about  him.  If  the  so-called  revelation  of  the  Infinite  is  valuable  at 
all,  it  is  valuable  as  an  accommodation  to  finite  thought,  but  must 
not  be  taken  as  an  actual  representation,  or  as  containing  a  positive 
enumeration  of  the  qualities  of  the  Infinite.  He  is  too  great  to  be 
known ;  he  is  not  small  enough  to  be  even  apprehended.  With  the 
theory  of  the  divine  greatness  we  are  in  entire  sympathy,  it  being  but 
an  echo  of  the 'Biblical  truth  that  he  is  "past  finding  out,"  he  is  "un- 
searchable," he  is  eternal,  all-wise,  immortal,  and  invisible.  Spencer's 
supreme  exaltation  of  the  Infinite  is  not' equal  to  the  lofty  revelation 
of  the  eternal  throne  and  its  holy  occupant.  Spencer  is  not  the  peer 
of  Isaiah,  or  of  Habbakuk,  or  of  Job,  or  John.  He  says  nothing 
that  they  have  not  forestalled  and  did  not  originate.  He  says  nothing 
new  when  he  writes:  "If  religion  and  science  are  to  be  reconciled, 
the  basis  of  reconciliation  must  be  this  deepest,  widest,  and  most  cer- 
tain of  all  facts — that  the  Power  which  the  universe  manifests  to  us 
is  utterly  inscrutable."  To  this  the  Christian  thinker  assents,  not 
because  Spencer  demands  it,  but  because  it  is  true.  Sir  Wm.  Ham- 
ilton and  Mansel  likewise  assert  the  same  thing,  going  farther,  how- 
ever, than  Spencer  in  requiring  faith  in  the  Infinite. 

Whatever  opinion  one  holds  of  Sj^encer's  basis  of  reconciliation, 
one  will  not  condemn  it  as  intentionally  atheistic,  but  will  concede 
that  it  is  reverent  and  perhaps  useful.  The  weakness  of  the  Spen- 
cerian  theology  is  that  it  embraces  too  much  or  not  enough  as  truth, 
and  it  is  either  too  high  or  too  low,  as  a  working  hypothesis  for  the 


ERROR  IN  METAPHYSICAL  ROBES.  699 

unearthing  of  truth.  It  embraces  too  much  in  that  it  assumes  to  ex- 
plain all  things,  being  and  non-being,  from  the  single  point  of  incom- 
prehensibility, when  it  is  utterly  impossible  to  explain  any  thing 
from  that  stand-point ;  it  embraces  too  little  in  that  it  assumes  that 
its  representation  of  the  Absolute  is  exhaustive,  when  it  is  not  more 
than  inceptional ;  it  is  too  high,  as  a  working  hypothesis — for  no  one 
can  walk  far  on  stilts^its  view  of  God  is  entirely  out  of  the  anthropo- 
morphic range;  it  is  too  low,  for,  abandoning  the  high  level  of  inves- 
tigation, it  prostrates  the  worker  in  the  dust,  requiring  at  his  hands 
a  mechanical  explanation  of  the  universe.  Spencer's  theology  is  a 
perversion  of  the  truth,  or  an  error  dressed  in  metaphysical  robes. 

The  descent  from  evolution  to  rank  materialism  is  rapid  and  pre- 
cipitate, but  the  materialist  may  be  as  honest  in  his  desire  for  the 
truth  as  the  evolutionist,  and  may  have  rendered  not  a  little  service 
to  the  religion  he  is  anxious  to  overthrow.  He  is  not  shy  of  atheism, 
since  he  does  not  apprehend  the  necessity  of  the  divine  presence  in 
the  development  of  the  world,  and  since  nature  is  the  only  Teacher 
he  feels  bound  to  respect.  The  work  of  the  materialist  is  not  irra- 
rational — it  is  his  deduction  that  contradicts  faith.  The  facts  he  fur- 
nishes are  such  as  Christianity  can  appropriate  in  its  own  behalf, 
although  he  has  not  the  remotest  intention  that  it  shall  be  bolstered 
by  any  thing  he  seeks  or  finds.  It  will  surprise  him,  doubtless,  to 
learn  that  he  has  not,  as  yet,  shaken  a  single  stone  in  the  temple  of 
truth,  and  when  he  becomes  fully  aware  that  his  iconoclasm  has  been 
absolutely  harmless,  he  may  see  things  in  their  right  relations,  and 
subscribe  to  that  which  he  can  not  subvert.  The  origin  of  matter, 
or  the  old  problem  of  the  genesis  of  the  universe,  is  his  hobby,  which 
he  rides  in  all  kinds  of  weather  and  in  all  the  fields  of  literature  and 
human  thought.  To  the  facts  he  discovers  w^e  have  not  the  slightest 
objection ;  indeed,  on  the  basis  of  ascertained  facts  we  propose  recon- 
ciliation between  Christianity  and  philosophic  materialism.  As  to 
world-building,  whenever  it  is  proved  that  "fire-mist,"  or  " star-stufl"," 
or  atoms,  were  original  sources,  or  the  beginnings  of  the  universe,  we 
shall  accept  fhem  Avithout  the  slightest  fear  to  Christianity ;  but  pre- 
sumptlom  must  not  be  presented  as  proofs.  On  presumption  alone 
reconciliation  is  out  of  the  question,  since  the  science  of  the  future 
may  overturn  it,  and  presume  some  other  origin.  Let  the  origin  be 
established;  let  materialism  establish  it,  and  Christianity  will  not 
contradict  it.  This  is  not  a  concession  to  materialism,  but  the  proof 
of  the  broad-gauge  character  of  revealed  religion,  which  is  broad 
enough  to  concede  that  creative  power  might  have  exercised  itself  in 
a  thousand  Avays,  whether  atomically,  protoplastically,  germinally,  or 
otherwise.     Reconciliation  is  possible  on  broad-gauge  truth. 


700  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

We  must  keep  in  mind  all  the  time  that  Christianity  locates  the 
creative  influence,  whether  it  acted  instantaneously,  once  for  all,  or 
gradually,  consuming  millions  of  years  in  the  development  of  its  de- 
signs, in  a  personal  God ;  while  philosophy,  somewhat  estranged  from 
the  theistic  hypothesis,  is  disposed  to  confine  itself  to  an  examination 
of  the  modalities  of  creation,  or  the  plan  of  the  universe.  We  frankly 
confess  that  it  is  immaterial  to  the  defense  of  Christianity  what 
method  of  creation  philosophy  may  finally  approve,  as  any  method, 
plan,  or  order,  or  even  a  methodless  method,  can  scarcely  be  detrimental 
to  the  theistic  idea,  or  the  reign  of  God  in  the  universe.  If  Chris- 
tianity goes  to  philosophy  for  the  modality  of  creation,  philosophy 
must  come  to  Christianity  for  a  knowledge  of  the  creative  force — the 
Creator.  To  recognize  the  specific  work  of  each  system  is  to  lay  the 
foundation  for  an  organic  union  of  the  systems,  which  is  fast  ap- 
proaching. 

As  regards  the  antiquity  of  the  worlds,  evolutionists  and  theolo- 
gians have  differed  not  a  little,  the  latter  holding  to  a  limited 
antiquity,  the  former  to  a  practically  endless  one.  In  the  advocacy 
of  their  interpretations  the  theologians  were  all  too  stubborn  and 
without  supporting  facts,  which  they  had  to  acknowledge  in  the  final 
determination  of  the  question.  Science  has  pronounced  against  a  short 
antiquity.  The  Bible  leaves  it  an  open  question,  to  be  ascertained 
in  a  scientific  way,  for  its  great  assertion — "In  the  beginning,  God 
created" — will  allow  the  removal  of  the  creative  period  back  even 
too  far  for  the  searching  gaze  of  scientific  inquiry.  Now,  it  is  of  no 
moment  whether  the  materialist  puts  the  "  beginning"  back  so  far 
that  the  figures  i)ass  beyond  finite  comprehension  or  computation, 
or  brings  it  forward  so  that  it  almost  grazes  the  historic  period  ;  it  is 
immaterial  whether  the  earth  was  created  twenty  millions  of  years 
ago  or  only  one  hundred  thousand  years  ago;  Christianity  can  accept 
any  scientific  interpretation  of  the  "beginning."  It  is  a  curious 
commentary,  however,  on  scientific  vacillation  that,  having  an- 
nounced various  antiquities  for  the  universe,  stretching  out  into  the 
numerical  infinities,  it  has  recently  reduced  the  age  of  the  earth  to 
the  brief  period  of  three  million  years!  We  accept  this  reduction 
with  a  sense  of  relief,  but  with  the  understanding  that  should  the 
figures  be  changed  hereafter,  either  increasing  or  still  further  reducing 
the  antiquity,  the  "age"  will  be  in  perfect  harmony  with  Moses.  On 
the  pledge  not  to  disturb  the  "figures"  of  philosophy  the  two  systems 
certainly  can  agree  to  suspend  hostilities ;  we  go  further,  and  say 
that  even  fraternal  relations  may  be  established  between  them. 

If  the  friendship  thus  suggested  appear  a  trifle  cold  and  distant, 
or  not  more  than   formal,  the  two  systems  will  throw  off  all  social 


OPPOSITE  INFERENCES  FROM  THE  SAME  FACTS.      701 

reserve  and  rejoice  together  on  another  ground,  namely,  on  the  doc- 
trine of  the  unity  of  nature.  On  the  hypothesis  of  a  world-unity 
Christianity  enforces  its  doctrine  of  monotheism  ;  the  unity  of  the 
universe  is  proof  of  the  unity  of  God.  Nature  manifests  the  pres- 
ence of  a  single  mind,  the  evolution  of  a  single  plan,  and  the  reign 
of  a  single  will  or  j)ower.  Theology  approvingly  quotes  this  unity. 
Does  science  contradict  it?  Before  modern  materialism  lifted  its 
sepulchral  voice  against  Christian  theism,  scientific  thought  was  unani- 
mous in  the  declaration  that  nature  is  a  panorama  of  unity.  Hum- 
boldt avowed  it  with  convincing  proofs,  and  regarded  it  as  the  key  to 
scientific  generalization.  The  German  materialists,  especially  Hiickel 
and  Biichner,  proclaim  it,  founding  upon  it  the  religion  of  nature,  as 
the  substitute  for  the  religion  of  revelation.  Christianity  suggests 
monotheism  ;  materialism  adopts  monism.  What  is  the  difference  ? 
Both  are  intensely  perceptive  of  that  spirit  of  unity  that  pervades 
the  universe,  recognizing  but  one  order  of  development  in  its  history, 
and  the  single  law  of  continuity  in  its  progress.  They  are  brothers 
in  defense  of  the  great  family  truth.  They  can  not  divide  on  this 
ground  ;  but  the  inferences  they  draw  are  diflTerent,  repugnant,  an- 
tagonistic. Again  and  again  has  the  proof  appeared  that  the  conflict 
between  the  opposing  systems  is  the  conflict  of  inference.  Honest  in- 
vestigation is  securing  an  agreement  touching  the  facts  ;  but  to  infer 
correctly  from  the  facts  involves  reason,  intelligence,  skill,  and  a 
devout  purpose.  St.  George  Mivart  agreed  with  Darwin  as  to  facts; 
he  differed  with  him  as  to  the  inferences.  The  inference-maker 
speculates,  reasons,  turns  prejudice  into  an  argument,  foresees  con- 
clusions before  they  logically  appear,  and  at  last  tortures  facts  out 
of  complexion,  character,  and  relation,  to  justify  the  result  he  pre- 
fers. Often  facts  are  made  to  do  the  bidding  of  the  inference-maker 
when  he  should  in  homage  submit  to  the  decree  of  fact. 

An  instance  of  perversion  of  fact  in  support  of  inference  is  at 
hand.  Christianity,  detecting  the  physical  unity  of  the  universe, 
rises  to  the  conception  of  one  God,  as  the  logical  teaching  of  the 
fact;  materialism,  honoring  the  fact  by  recognizing  its  existence,  dis- 
honors it  by  attributing  to  the  universe  a  self-producing  and  self- 
sustaining  power;  it  does  not  rise  out  of  the  fact  itself  to  any 
thing  beyond.  The  fact  is  the  all  in  all.  Strauss  says:  "We  de- 
mand the  same  piety  for  our  cosmos  that  the  devout  of  old  demanded 
for  his  God."  No  greater  homage  shall  be  paid  to  the  personal  God 
than  to  the  cosmic  God.  Christianity  runs  on  the  track  of  facts  to 
personality ;  materialism  on  the  same  track  to  cosmical  character. 
The  facts  are  the  same — the  inferences  are  opposite  poles.  On  the 
common  ground  of  unity  both  may  stand ;  on  facts,  laws,  and  princi- 


702  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

pies,  they  harmonize ;  the  agreement  of  inference  must  be  left  to 
time.  They  are  the  husbandmen  of  the  same  fields,  and  are  equally- 
interested  in  the  products  of  those  fields ;  and,  diverse  as  are  their 
methods  of  plowing  them,  they  reaj)  the  same  ground-facts,  upon 
which  they  will  finally  pronounce  the  same  value. 

A  closer  agreement  is  still  possible,  even  on  the  basis  of  funda- 
mental truth.  "The  fundamental  truth  of  all  philosophy,"  says 
Herbei't  Spencer,  "is  the  persistence  of  force."  Modern  science 
means  by  this  doctrine  that  the  total  quantity  of  energy  in  the  uni- 
verse, however  employed,  and  however  manifested,  neither  increases 
nor  diminishes,  but  remains  the  same  forever.  Spencer  declares  this 
to  be  fundamental  to  philosophy.  Though  not  fundamental  to  re- 
ligion, religion  has  no  reason  for  suspecting  its  unsoundness,  and  will 
grant  it  a  place  among  the  dogmas  of  science,  so  soon  as  science  itself 
demonstrates  it  to  be  a  verity.  When  Spencer  said  reconciliation  be- 
tween religion  and  science  is  possible  on  the  basis  of  the  inscrutabil- 
ity of  the  supreme  power,  religion  accepted  it ;  and  now,  when  he 
says  persistence  of  force  is  fundamental  to  philosophy,  religion  accepts 
the  truth,  as  not  at  all  dangerous  to  itself,  or  harmful  to  any  projects 
it  has  in  view.  As  yet  we  have  not  asked  philosophy  to  accept  what 
is  fundamental  to  religion,  but  in  the  best  of  temper  religion  accepts 
what  is  fundamental  to  philosophy. 

Equally  safe  footincj  is  found  for  both  antagonists  in  a  common 
viexo  of  man,  a  subject  that  has  hitherto  divided  them  beyond  all 
supposable  hope  of  reconciliation.  Time  and  again  theories  of  de- 
scent, laws  of  heredity,  and  morphological  ideas  of  the  race  have 
been  declared  and  so  supported  by  facts,  as  absolutely  and  entirely 
to  render  incredible  the  Scriptural  account  of  man.  He  is  a  de- 
scendant of  the  animal  kingdom  ;  he  is  the  product  of  evolutionary 
forces ;  his  ancestry  were  gibbons,  chimpanzees,  and  gorillas.  If  the 
philosopher  insists  on  this  ancestral  history  of  man,  the  Christian 
thinker  must  bid  him  adieu,  for  it  is  not  fundamental  to  anthrojjol- 
ogy.  In  the  extemporaneous  period  of  the  evolution  theory  some 
unique  statements — the  temporary  hallucinations  of  enthusiastic  sci- 
entists— were  undoubtedly  made ;  but  the  sober,  thoughtful,  scientific 
evolution  of  to-day  is  reconsidering  the  grounds  of  its  faith,  and 
recasting  the  terms  of  its  theory,  and  at  all  events  it  is  not  as  demon- 
strative as  it  was  in  the  beginning. 

It  is  a  significant  fact  that  the  Pentateuch  furnishes  in  immediate 
succession  two  apparently  contradictory  accounts  of  the  appearance  of 
man,  the  first  assigning  him  the  last  place,  and  the  second  the  first 
place,  in  the  creative  series.  Over  this  historic  dilemma  the  evolu- 
tionists have  perplexed    themselves  not  a  little,  regarding  it  as  an 


AGREEMENT  ON  FACTS.  703 

inner  contradiction,  irreconcilable  on  any  hypothesis  whatever. 
The  accounts,  however,  as  we  have  heretofore  seen,  are  one,  related 
in  inverse  order  for  a  special  purpose.  In  the  first  account  the  regular 
scientific  order  of  creation  is  given,  man  being  reserved  to  the  last,  not 
because  he  was  the  masterpiece,  but  because  the  earth  was  not  in 
scientific  readiness  for  him ;  while  in  the  second  account  he  is  placed 
at  the  head,  not  because  he  was  first,  but  because  he  was  best  It  is  as 
if  one  writing  the  history  of  the  Christian  Church  should  begin  with 
apostolic  times  and  carry  it  down  to  the  present  day,  or  beginning  now 
should  write  backward  to  the  apostles ;  the  history  would  be  the  same. 
The  fact  of  man's  creation  is  not  disturbed  by  the  order  of  the  account. 

This,  however,  is  the  dividing  line  between  theology  and  evolu- 
tion. The  evolutionist  magnifies  the  order  of  the  creation ;  the  theologian 
magnifies  the  fact  of  creation ;  the  one  dwells  on  the  system  or  method  of 
the  creative  work,  the  other  on  its  results.  Both  may  be  justified  in 
their  positions,  but  it  must  be  clear  that  the  facts  themselves  take 
precedence  of  the  order  of  facts ;  that  is,  it  is  proper  first  to  consider 
what  the  facts  are,  and  then  to  establish  the  order  of  their  succession. 
Theology  precedes  evolution.  In  one  account  in  Genesis  man's  rela- 
tionship to  the  world  is  announced ;  in  the  other  his  independence 
of  the  world  is  as  clearly  set  forth.  As  the  last  in  the  series,  he  is  in 
the  line  of  animalic  succession  ;  as  the  first,  he  begins  a  line,  not  of 
animals,  bid  of  rational  intelligences.  As  he  is  the  end  of  one  so  he 
is  the  beginning  of  another  line. 

The  evolutionist,  appropriating  the  first  account,  heralds  the  idea 
of  descent,  which  is  a  phase  of  truth ;  but,  ignoring  the  second  ac- 
count, he  is  ignorant  of  the  true  character  of  man,  and  reminds  us 
of  the  eagle  with  one  wing,  or  a  boat  with  a  single  oar. 

The  double  account,  favorable  to  evolutionist  and  theologian,  may 
be  accepted  as  common  ground,  or  as  the  basis  of  a  general  agree- 
ment. It  is  not  conceded  that  the  first  account  is  suggestive 
of  materialistic  Darwinism,  but  no  principle  of  interpretation  is  com- 
promised, no  fact  is  in  jeopardy,  by  allowing  that  it  is  evolutionary 
in  the  historic  sense,  that  the  creation  of  man  belongs  to  a  series  of 
creations,  whether  by  development  or  otherwise  is  immaterial,  terminat- 
ing in  the  finished  work  of  God.  Christianity  will  accept  evolution 
as  a  historic  fact,  even  if  it  can  not  accept  the  scientific  interpreta- 
tion of  the  historic  fact.  Here  agreement  is  possible  again  on  the 
basis  of  facts ;  the  disagreement  pertains  to  inferences. 

If  evolution  has  any  standing  at  all  in  the  realm  of  thought,  it 
ought  to  have  a  standing  in  history,  religion,  and  physical  order  and 
government.  We  have  already  indicated  faith  in  evolution  as  a  his- 
toric feature  of  world-life,  as  the  only  explanation  of  history.     It  is 


704  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

not  without  its  disadvantages  as  a  "  workiag  hypothesis,"  for  historic 
movements  sometimes  resemble  the  flow  and  ebb  of  tides,  or  the  mo- 
tion of  a  swing,  forward  and  backward,  with  no  perceptible  progress. 
The  Dark  Ages  illustrate  the  historic  motion  without  advance.  This 
makes  against  the  scientific  view  of  evolution,  whose  germinal  idea  is 
progress,  but  not  against  the  historic  law  of  evolution,  which  allows 
for  the  play  of  regressional  forces,  and  so  for  backslidings  in  history. 
In  such  an  emergency  the  evolutionist  may  find  room  for  lapses  in 
the  historic  movement  in  his  collateral  theory  of  "struggle,"  which 
implies  retreats  as  well  as  advances ;  but  the  theory  of  struggle  is  a 
temporary  expedient,  a  plank  in  a  storm,  and  does  not  insure  safety. 

In  the  historic,  but  not  scientific  sense,  Christianity  is  an  illus- 
tration of  evolution.  According  to  its  own  account,  four  thousand 
years  of  preparation  passed  av.ay  before  the  incarnate  Teacher  ap- 
peared ;  the  Messianic  thought  itself  is  a  development,  and  the 
Messiah  in  the  human  sense  was  the  product  of  the  evolutional  forces 
of  history.  As,  however,  this  statement  may  be  misconstrued,  the 
Messiah  must  be  lifted  out  of  the  evolutional  program,  and  the 
historic  preparation  for  his  appearance  only  be  considered  evolutional. 

History  itself,  under  the  manipulation  of  a  providential  spu'it,  is 
an  evolution,  having  for  its  end  the  elevation  of  the  race,  and  is 
slowly  accomplishing  it. 

Man's  lordship  over  nature  is  evolutionary,  implying  a  slow  con- 
quest of  its  forces,  a  slow  discovery  of  its  laws,  nevertheless  a  con- 
quest, a  discovery,  a  triumph  in  the  world  of  matter. 

Nature  itself,  or,  rising  higher,  the  universe  is  an  evolution  from 
primary  stages  and  conditions  to  its  full  form  and  magnificence  as 
we  now  behold  it.  Christianity  can  not  consent  to  the  theory  of  a 
self-originating,  or  self-subsisting  world,  but  it  can  consent  to  an 
evolved  universe,  evolved  by  law  even  from  atomic  sources,  provided 
the  existence  of  atoms  is  credited  to  the  divine  Being.  Thus  Chris- 
tianity is  evolutionary  in  its  history,  in  its  interpretations  of  the  cos- 
mos, and  of  time  itself,  Avith  all  its  wondrous  products,  forces,  and 
issues.  With  this  conviction,  we  can  not  agree  with  Dr.  B.  F. 
TeflTt  that  evolution  is  ''wicked"  "atheistic,"  a  "denial  or  abandon- 
ment of  revelation."  This  is  an  extravagant  arraignment  of  a  the- 
ory which,  while  scientifically  inaccurate,  is  historically  sustained,  and 
can  not  be  overthrown  by  religious  denunciation  of  it.  Such  denun- 
ciation estops  union,  quenches  the  spirit  of  fraternity,  and  violates 
the  canons  of  truth.  On  the  basis  of  a  limited,  historic  evolution,  the 
two  antagonists  may  harmonize,  adjusting  the  theories  of  the  one  to 
the  dogmas  of  the  othei,  thereby  all  the  sooner  arriving  at  the  truth. 
If  evolution  is  an  attempted  revolution  against  truth,  it  is  wicked, 


THE  TELEOLOGICAL  GROUND  OF  RECONCILIATION.     705 

and  there  can  be  no  reconciliation ;  but  it  is  difficult  to  see  an  op- 
portunity for  conflict  on  the  historic  basis  as  here  presented. 

Thus,  whether  philosophy  be  considered  in  its  most  ideal  aspects, 
or  in  the  lowest  form  of  scientific  materialism,  it  may  harmonize 
through  the  medium  of  its  facts  with  Christianity,  as  also  a  system 
of  facts. 

In  still  other  particulars  an  agreement  between  philosophy  and 
Christianity  is  possible.  The  doctrine  of  teleology  is  scientific ;  it  is 
also  theological;  it  may,  therefore,  be  presented  as  a  basis  of  peace 
between  metaphysic  and  religion.  The  materialist  is  expending  his 
phosphorus  in  an  attempt  to  eliminate  the  proofs  of  design  from  the 
realm  of  nature  and,  as  usual  in  such  cases,  he  has  fore-announced 
the  accomplishment  of  his  work  ;  he  has  eliminated  the  idea  of  de- 
sign from  his  thought !  That  is  all.  This  is  not  a  surprise,  for  the 
teleological  idea  is  subversive  of  materialistic  science.  Many  of  the 
German  philosophers  are  hostile  to  the  idea ;  but  the  idea  is  uncon- 
querable, and  will  ever  occupy  a  place  in  the  category  of  scientific 
truths.  The  Duke  of  Argyll  indorses  it  as  an  irreproachable  proof 
of  the  divine  personality.  It  is  a  scientific  idea ;  theology  appropri- 
ates it  because  it  is  scientific.  The  doctrine  of  the  unity  of  nature, 
or  the  "  uuitarianism  "  of  nature,  points  with  unerring  finger  to  the 
doctrine  of  teleology.  The  evolution  of  nature,  or  its  development 
according  to  plan,  is  implicit  with  the  doctrine  of  teleology. 

Still  stronger  support  is  underneath  the  idea.  Nature  is  a  sup- 
posed causal  series  ;  scientifically  speaking,  it  proceeded  in  its  develop- 
ment after  a  fixed  order  of  antecedents  and  consequents,  otherwise 
known-  as  the  product  of  causality.  Causality  is  the  sign  of  teleology. 
Cause  is  the  anticipation  of  effect.  Admit  the  one  and  the  other  ap- 
pears. Materialism  striking  at  one  strikes  at  the  other ;  and,  as  it  can 
not  break  the  bond  between  them,  it  has  rejected  both  causality  and 
teleology  from  its  vocabulary. 

The  better  philosophy,  recoiling  from  the  consequences  of  these 
eliminative  attempts,  approves  the  law  of  causality  in  nature  and  the 
reign  of  the  teleological  idea.  K.  E.  von  Baer,  uninfluenced  by  relig- 
ious conceptions,  points  out  that  nature  is  striving  after  an  end,  and 
almost  endows  it  with  a  hidden  purpose  of  its  own.  This  is  scientific 
teleology  of  a  refined  and  wholesome  cast,  on  the  basis  of  which  the 
Christian  thinker  can  make  peace  with  the  philosophical  thinker.  As 
teleology  is  fundamental  to  Christianity,  and  apparently  fundamental 
to  philosophy,  there  is  no  reason  for  further  conflict  between  them. 

Lastly,  the  two  may  agree  on  the  ethical  basis.  A  system  of 
morality,  embodying  correct  ethical  distinctions,  and  adapted  to  pro- 
mote  the   happiness  of  all  races,  is  demanded  both  by  religion  and 

45 


706  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

science,  and  it  is  not  surprising  that  certain  ethical  schemes  have  been 
formulated  and  recommended  by  both.  The  contention  is  as  to  the 
authority  of  the  ethical  scheme.  If,  as  is  claimed  by  the  theologian, 
the  Biblical  scheme  is  of  supernatural  origin,  its  code  of  laws  enacted 
by  a  personal  Law-giver,  to  whom  a  personal  account  must  be  ren- 
dered, its  authority  will  be  supreme  and  final ;  but  if  the  ethical  sys- 
tem is  without  supernatural  force,  and  is  the  growth  of  man's  ideas 
and  expedients,  an  attempted  adjustment  of  his  relations  to  environ- 
ments, as  Herbert  Spencer  is  inclined  to  think,  then  the  system  is  not 
authoritative  and  man  is  not  responsible.  More  than  one  investigator 
has  discovered  that  an  evolutionary  morality  is  changeable,  and  not 
necessarily  progressive ;  therefore,  it  may  be  no  better  in  a  thousand 
years  than  at  the  beginning.  Mivart  demands  an  authoritative  moral- 
ity; we  demand  a,  fixed,  unchangeable  ethical  system,  for  scientific  moral- 
ity makes  it  uncertain  whether  there  are  such  things  as  right  and 
wrong ;  that  is,  it  abolishes  moral  distinctions,  or  recognizes  them  only 
as  products  of  relations. 

That  conduct  may  be  scientifically  regulated  we  believe,  but 
scientific  regulation  is  implicit  with  ethical  regulation.  Scientific  mo- 
rality must  agree  with  supernatural  ethics.  The  agreement  is  slowly 
taking  place  in  that  the  scientific  thinker  is  beginning  to  discern  the 
scientific  character  of  supernatural  ethics,  and  that  the  attempt  to 
regulate  the  world  without  primordial  ethical  distinctions  is  absurd 
and  impossible.  Human  natui-e  echoes  the  virtue  of  supernatural 
ethics.  Among  nations  unblessed  with  Christian  teaching,  the  strong 
and  imperative  ethical  ideas  of  the  New  Testament  have  prevailed 
because  they  are  identical  with  the  demands  of  human  nature.-  The 
ancient  Persians  punished  falsehood  Avith  extreme  severity.  Seneca 
eulogized  many  virtues  of  the  Christian  religion.  Mohammed  ex- 
tolled the  practical  duties  of  hospitality,  repentance,  and  forgiveness. 
The  common,  thought  of  man  is  in  harmony  ivith  the  higher  moral  thought 
of  the  Neiv  Testament.  Scientific  moralists,  recognizing  the  priority 
of  the  ethical  system  of  the  sacred  writers,  and  that  it  is  founded  on 
human  nature,  as  well  as  in  divine  revelation,  will  not  much  longer 
either  dispute  its  authenticity  or  deny  its  supremacy  in  the  regulation 
of  human  conduct. 

In  closing  this  chapter,  reference  may  be  made  to  the  reciprocal 
relations  existing  between  Christianity  and  philosophy. 

1.  Religion  is  necessary  to  Philosophy.  The  philosophical  thinker 
is  dependent  on  religion  for  data.  He  may  not  think  so,  but  he  can 
not  solve  any  great  problem  without  invading  the  circle  of  religion 
for  facts.  He  can  not  interpret  nature  without  the  aid  of  Christian- 
ity ;  he  can  not  explain  conscience,  volition,  mental  operations,  or  hu- 


IRRECONCILABLE  VIEWS  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  707 

man  experiences,  without  the  aid  of  some  of  the  truths  of  the  Chris- 
tian religion.     He  needs  religion. 

2.  Philosophy  is  necessary  to  Religion.  Clement  intimated  that 
philosophy  "guided  the  Greeks  toward  Christ."  It  is  a  schoolmaster 
teaching  primary  truth,  and  pointing  to  its  richer  development  in 
religion.  Philosophy  is  thought ;  religion  is  truth ;  and  as  thought 
is  related  to  truth,  so  philosophy  is  related  to  religion. 

TJie  conclusion  is  that  one  is  not  independent  of  the  other;  each  needs 
the  other.  Plato  said  philosophy  is  the  love  of  God.  Christianity  is  also 
the  loye  of  God.  Philosophy  is  Christianity;  Christianity  is  philosophy. 
Laetantius  must  not  again  say  philosophy  is  "empty  and  fake;"  Bl'ichner, 
Hdclcel,  Spencer,  and  Huxley  must  not  again  deride  religious  truth  and 
sport  leiih  immortal  things.  God  is  tJie  philosophic  center;  God  is  the 
spirit  of  revealed  religion. 


CHAPTER  XXXIII. 

^HE    PROSPECTUS    OK    THE    FUTURE    OK    CHRIS- 
TI  AMITY. 

HABAKKUK  wrote:  "For  the  earth  shall  be  filled  with  the 
knowledge  of  the  glory  of  the  Lord,  as  the  waters  cover  the 
sea."  Leroux,  the  French  thinker,  declared  that  Christianity  is  a 
"  natural  stage  in  the  progressive  development  of  man,"  and  will  be 
superseded  by  a  superior  religion,  just  as  it  has  superseded  inferior 
religions.  The  one  pronounces  the  prophetic  triumph  of  Christianity ; 
the  other  assumes  its  natural  dissolution.  As  the  two  views  are 
irreconcilable,  it  Avill  be  interesting  to  inquire  which  view  is  correct, 
or  at  least  to  search  the  ground  on  which  the  views  rest,  that  an  in- 
telligent conception  of  the  future  of  religion  may  be  entertained.  If 
Christianity  is  a  mere  development  from  preceding  religions,  and  sub- 
ject to  the  general  law  of  evolution,  which  would  require  its  disap- 
pearance in  a  larger  and  richer  form  of  religion,  it  will  be  well  to 
know  it ;  but  if  it  has  a  law  of  its  own  which  will  insure  its  per- 
petuity, universality,  and  supremacy,  it  is  equally  important  that  we 
understand  it. 

Geologists  tell  us  that  in  some  parts  of  the  world  there  is  a  grad- 
ual elevation  of  land  through  the  operation  of  forces  beneath,  and 
that  the  tendency  of  such  activity  is  to  equilibrium  of  geographical 
conditions.  The  Christian  thinker  is  inclined  to  the  belief  that  a 
moral  upheaval  of  the  world  is  going  on   through   the  operation  of 


708  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

moral  forces  from  above,  and  that  the  design  of  it  is  the  moral  sta- 
bility and  salvation  of  the  race.  No  well-informed  reader  of  the 
Bible  will  dispute  that  in  its  prophetical  outlines  the  future  of  the 
new  religion  is  represented  as  triumphant  in  its  influence  and  unassail- 
able in  its  authority.  Habakkuk  is  one  of  many  who  foresee  the  dawn 
of  a  day  when  the  Gospel  shall  reign  throughout  the  world. 

Yet  prophecy  is  only  a  starting-point.  The  promise  of  Christianity 
to  succeed  in  enthroning  itself  in  the  world  as  the  only  religion  for 
man,  is  matched  by  its  potency  to  fulfill  its  promise.  The  promise  is 
inspiring  because  it  can  be  believed ;  the  potency  is  assuring  because 
it  is  supernatural,  and,  therefore,  sufficient.  Without  the  potency, 
the  promise  were  nothing.  Without  the  promise,  the  potency  would 
seem  to  be  acting  aimlessly.  The  ground  of  all  faith,  therefore,  is 
in  the  promise  and  potency  of  Christianity. 

To  assume  a  triumph  on  the  ground  of  promise  and  potency  is  to 
assume  some  things  by  no  means  inconsequential  or  irrelevant.  Such 
a  triumph  as  is  foreshadowed  implies  more  than  a  temporary  exalta- 
tion of  the  Christian  religion,  and  more  than  its  political  recognition 
in  the  world.  Its  great  triumph  will  be  permanent ;  it  will  not  be 
succeeded  by  a  collapse.  Once  in  authority  it  never  will  surrender 
it,  unless  the  race  return  to  the  rule  of  the  Dragon.  It  will  be  the 
religion  of  the  world ;  a  religion  that  shall  have  overcome  all  other 
religions;  a  religion  universal,  because  it  will  meet  universal  demands; 
a  religion  whose  triumph  can  not  easily  be  disturbed.  This  is  a  broad 
outlook,  but  none  too  generous,  if  the  triumph  is  worth  antici- 
pating, or  shall  be  worth  celebrating  when  it  is  realized.  In  this 
prevision  of  its  future  conquest  we  must  be  governed  less  by  specu- 
lative inquiry  than  by  those  logical  indications  which  warrant  the 
inference  of  faith  and  the  inspiration  of  prophecy. 

The  prophetic  conception,  however  pleasant  to  the  Christian 
thinker,  and  however  inspiring  to  activity  in  the  people  of  God,  is 
not  accepted  in  certain  outside  circles  as  any  thing  more  than  a  hal- 
lucination, or  at  the  most  as  the  generating  cause  of  the  religious 
enthusiasm  in  the  world.  But  aside  from  its  prophetic  cast,  it  is 
difficult  to  see  what  can  properly  make  against  the  conception  itself, 
which,  if  it  shall  actualize  in  future  history,  will  turn  the  earth  into 
paradise,  and  every  man  into  a  son  of  God.  If  the  conception  mean 
sobriety,  justice,  philanthropy,  temperance,  honesty,  veracity,  virtue, 
order,  law,  civilization,  everlasting  progress,  and  the  reign  of  super- 
natural sentiment,  surely  he  is  in  league  with  the  archfiend  who  can 
object  to  it.  In  its  outAvard  form,  in  its  lowest  aspect,  the  triumph  must 
mean  this  much,  or  it  can  mean  nothing.  In  its  narrower  phases, 
and  including  aU  that  it  contemplates  by  the  reign  of  the  Spirit,  it 


THE  IDEA  OF  UNIVERSALITY.  709 

means  ennobled  manhood,  a  spiritual  race,  a  divine  family  on  earth,  to 
which  only  demons  can  object.     The  conception  itself  is  invulnerable. 

Escaping  one  gauntlet,  it  must,  however,  run  another.  Such 
words  as  "impracticable,"  "impossible,"  "revolutionary,"  "Utopian," 
and  "fanatical,"  are  applied  to  it,  and  the  methods  which  it  proposes  for 
its  execution  are  pronounced  hopelessly  incompetent  and  injudicious. 
We  shall  not  shrink  from  looking  at  the  proposition  of  the  Gospel 
from  the  stand-point  of  the  objector,  and  consider  just  what  he  says, 
what  he  means,  and  what  weight  belongs  to  what  he  alleges. 

Is  it  true  that  the  proposition  to  conform  the  world  to  Gospel 
ideals  is  Utopian,  extravagant,  delusive,  and  destructive  of  the  prac- 
tical ends  and  responsibilities  of  life  ?  The  triumph  of  the  Divine  re- 
ligion is  implicit  with  the  triumph  of  one  ideal,  or  one  system  of  ideals. 
It  admits  of  no  contradictory  ideas  ;  it  refuses  admission  to  foreign  ele- 
ments, except  by  that  process  of  transformation  which  identifies  them 
with  itself;  it  stands  alone  in  its  greatness,  is  imperious  in  its  author- 
ity, and  bows  all  other  ideas  out  of  existence.  Irrational  as  this  seems 
to  be,  it  is  the  most  positively  scientific  procedure  which  religion  has 
adopted.  In  the-  natural  world  one  system  of  laws  is  in  authority, 
ruling  everywhere,  and  conserving  the  order  and  stability  of  the 
whole.  Two  systems  would  result  in  interminable  confusion  and  dis- 
astrous collision.  Gravitation  is  universal,  ruling  the  small  and  the 
great,  and  is  of  one  kind  or  knows  but  one  law.  So  far  as  crystal- 
lization obtains  in  nature,  it  constitutes  a  harmonious  idea,  because  it 
is  the  same  everywhere,  and  operates  according  to  one  law.  Of  veg- 
etable growth  the  laws  are  the  same,  whether  observed  in  China,  Bra- 
zil, or  California.  Chemical  affinity  is  not  one  thing  in  the  Eastern 
and  another  in  the  Western  Hemisphere.  If  Christianity  conceives 
of  a  universal  conquest,  or  its  supremacy  in  the  hemispheres,  she 
caught  the  idea  from  Nature,  whose  underlying  thought  is  unity  for- 
ever. As  there  is  but  one  natural  government,  so  Christianity  fore- 
shadows but  one  spiritual  government,  co-extensive  with  the  race,  co- 
eternal  with  God.  If  the  lower  thought  of  the  unity,  universality, 
and  supremacy  of  the  natural  government  is  stupendous  and  affect- 
ing, what  may  not  be  said  in  eulogy  of  the  higher  thought  of  the 
unity,  universality,  and  dominion  of  the  spiritual  government  of  God? 
The  higher  is  no  more  Utopian  than  the  lower. 

It  will  assist  the  reader  properly  to  estimate  the  prophetic  idea  of 
Christianity  by  reminding  him  that  it  is  original,  deep-seated,  and 
constitutional,  and  that  the  program  of  the  Church  is  in  strict  accord- 
ance with  it.  The  idea  of  universality  is  a  part  of  the  productive 
endowment  of  the  new  religion.  It  is  an  underived,  and  therefore 
independent  and  untrammeled  idea ;  it  is  not  germane  to  other  relig- 


710  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

ions,  and  is,  therefore,  without  ancestral  antecedents  or  affiliations; 
it  is  not  an  after-thought,  but  a  primary  fore-thought,  of  the  sacred 
writers,  and  is,  therefore,  an  inbred  element  of  the  divine  religion. 
Max  Miiller  enumerates  three  missionary  religions,  because  they  are 
active  in  themselves  and  aggressive  in  extension,  but  only  one  antic- 
ipates a  world-wide  reign.  In  a  political  sense  Mohammedanism  is  a 
missionary  religion,  but  it  would  be  truer  to  style  it  a  military  relig- 
ion, for  its  method  of  conquest  is  military,  and  the  changes  it  has 
wrought  have  been  usually  rather  political  than  religious.  It  is  not  a 
religiously  missionary  religion.  Its  triumphs,  too,  far  from  resulting 
in  the  extinction  of  opposing  religious  ideas,  have  been  very  meager 
and  incomplete.  It  triumphed  in  Syria,  but  Judaism  exists  within 
its  borders ;  it  triumphed  in  India,  but  Brahminism  still  disputes  its 
authority ;  it  has  not  triumphed  over  Buddhism  in  the  East  or  Chris- 
tianity in  the  West ;  and  as  for  taking  the  world,  it  has  not  the 
slightest  idea  of  doing  it.  This  is  not  because  it  considers  such  a 
project  undesirable,  but  from  its  stand-point  it  is  impossible,  and  its 
prophets  have  fore-declared  its  final  overthrow  and  the  ascendency  of 
Jesus  of  Nazareth. 

Buddhism  is  a  missionary  religion,  but  it  does  not  avow  for  itself 
universal  authority,  and  is  content  with  dominion  in  Asia. 

None  of  the  old  religions  of  the  East  contemplates  any  extension 
of  authority  or  a  new  lease  of  life,  or  the  subjugation  of  new  lands 
to  its  influence.  Mohammedanism  is  the  religion  of  motion,  as  Mr. 
Maurice  shows,  but  it  is  of  motion,  not  toward  the  aggrandizement 
of  the  world,  but  towaacl  the  center  of  its  own  realm  of  life.  It  is 
active  within,  but  not  without,  its  circle  of  thought ;  Brahminism,  as 
he  also  points  out,  is  the  religion  of  rest,  but  it  is  the  rest  of  death. 
Neither  the  motion  of  the  one  nor  the  inertia  of  the  other  indicates 
future  growth,  elasticity,  or  conquest.  These  and  all  other  Old-world 
religions  were  and  are  exclusive,  confining  all  activity  to  a  single 
people  or  country  or  continent,  and,  so  far  as  they  fail  to  include  all 
peoples,  all  countries,  and  all  continents,  they  must  fail  in  securing 
universal  dominion.  At  the  present  time  all  religions  save  Christian- 
ity have  abandoned  the  expectation  of  a  larger  influence  in  the  world 
than  they  have  already  acquired  ;  they  are  not  preparing  for  extended 
conquests,  because  tliey  do  not  believe  them  possible.  They  are  race 
religions  ;  they  can  not,  therefore,  be  universal. 

Regarding  Christianity  as  only  one  of  a  number  of  religions,  it 
may  seem  to  savor  of  presumption  in  its  teachei's  to  suppose  a  world- 
wide triumph  possible  ;  and  perhaps  it  is  fanatical  to  plan  for  such  a 
conquest.  But  presumptuous  or  not,  fanatical  or  not,  the  Christian 
Church  is  inspired  in  its  plannings  by  the  vision  of  just  such  an  ideal 


RELATION  TO  HEATHENDOM.  711 

triumph,  and  is  putting  forth  in  these  days  a  herculean  effort  to  se- 
cure it.  Impossible  to  other  religions,  Christianity  ventures  to  assume 
such  a  possibility  to  itself.  This  assumption,  it  will  be  allowed,  is  not 
the  result  of  human  designing,  nor  is  it  a  late  scheme  of  certain  re- 
ligious leaders,  who  hope  to  profit  by  the  enthusiasm  it  has  awakened ; 
its  origin  is  in  Christianity  itself. 

Other  religions  derive  impulse  to  activity  from  man ;  Christianity 
obtains  its  authorization  to  take  the  world  from  God.  Other  relig- 
ions depend  for  preservation  upon  human  methods,  often  resorting  to 
carnal  weapons  to  aid  in  propagandism,  and  in  the  end  always  ex- 
hibit the  feebleness  of  human  systems ;  while  Christianity  depends 
upon  its  supernatural  influence  and  its  unaided  power  to  impress  the 
world  that  it  is  from  God.  In  the  former  the  inspiration  to  activity 
is  earthly,  hence  intermittent  and  ineffectual ;  in  the  latter  it  is  heav- 
enly, hence  permanent  and  efficient. 

It  is  sometimes  urged  that  the  introduction  of  a  foreign  religion 
into  lands  regulated  by  a  native  religion,  long  intiienched  in  the  pub- 
lic thought  and  life  of  the  people,  will  be  attended  by  disorder, 
tumult,  and  resistance,  and  be  promotive  rather  of  injury  than  ben- 
efit, and  that  the  proposition  of  Christianity  to  subvert  such  religions 
is  revolutionary,  iron-clad,  and  will  be  destructive  of  the  rights  of  re- 
ligions and  nations.  Granting  that  this  representation  is  correct,  the 
purpose  of  the  new  religion  is  nevertheless  legitimate,  and  its  success 
will  be  its  vindication.  If  these  conflicts  among  the  religions  were 
reduced  to  a  mere  question  of  might,  Christianity  would  be  at  liberty 
to  test  itself  in  foreign  fields,  for  other  religions  have  not  been  care- 
ful to  observe  the  laws  of  neutrality  in  this  respect,  and  are  not  enti- 
tled to  exemption  from  invasion  or  trial.  Mohammedanism  did  not 
^confine  itself  to  the  country  of  its  birth,  or  among  the  people  for 
whom  it  was  designed  ;  but  it  entered  India,  Persia,  Palestine,  and  at 
one  time  threatened  all  Europe,  and  to-day  points  to  a  thousand 
mosques  on  the  continent.  Buddhism,  reaching  out  beyond  home, 
made  its  way  into  China,  and  rooted  itself  in  the  isles.  Surely  Chris- 
tianity may  contend  for  the  balance  of  power  in  this  world  without 
an  infraction  of  the  law  of  reciprocity.  If,  however,  these  conflicts 
may  be  reduced  to  a  question  of  right,  then  Christianity  has  no  favors 
to  ask  and  no  conciliations  to  offer,  but  is  bound  from  its  stand-point 
to  undertake  the  suppression  of  all  other  religious,  or  rather  to  secure 
the  conformity  of  all  peoples,  irrespective  of  former  religious  aflSni- 
ties,  to  its  standard  of  truth  and  justice,  and  its  order  of  righteous- 
ness and  life.  If  its  mission  is  not  so  broad  and  world-wide,  it  may 
be  doubted  if  it  has  any  mission  at  all,  for  it  is  the  only  redemptive 
religion  of  history ;    the  world  needs  it  quite  as  much  as  any  single 


712  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

people,  and  it  cau  not  prove  itself  divine  except  by  being  universal. 
It  is  universal  or  nothing  ;  it  is  for  all  nations  or  it  is  for  none. 

With  the  question  whether  it  can  execute  its  mission  peacefully — 
that  is,  save  the  world  without  a  struggle — or  whether  the  execution 
will  involve  revolution,  disorder,  overturning  of  social  conditions,  and 
new  political  organizations,  it  has  nothing  to  do.  3Iission  and  metJwd 
are  two  things.  The  settlement  of  the  mission  of  religion  is  primary ; 
the  selection  of  method  must  be  left  to  events,  or  to  the  nature  of  re- 
ligion itself.  If  the  spread  of  the  Gospel  can  not  be  accomplished 
without  some  noise  ;  if,  when  Diana  falls  to  the  ground,  a  little  dust 
is  raised  ;  if,  when  King  John  signs  the  Magna  Charia,  he  tears  his 
hair  and  wrings  his  hands  in  .rage;  if  the  sight  of  the  Cross  infuriates 
the  infidel  and  the  heathen,  as  it  will ;  if  rebellions  must  follow  the 
missionary ;  if  the  footfalls  of  the  Christ  in  this  world  shake  the 
thrones  of  lust  and  civil  power  ;  if  progress  must  be  by  the  sword, 
and  divine  covenants  be  proclaimed  with  the  thunder  of  cannon,  and 
enforced  with  the  tnajesty  of  providential  authority,  so  be  it.  Better 
that  the  Gauges  be  turned  into  a  river  of  blood  than  that  India  should 
not  have  the  Gospel ;  better  that  Foochow  be  bombarded  and  the 
Soudan  be  invaded  with  armies  than  that  Christian  civilization  should 
not  progress  in  the  Oriental  world.  jMany  worldly  methods  we  do 
deprecate,  but  the  Gospel  must  find  its  way  into  the  heart  of  the  na- 
tions. Its  mission  is  peace  ;  its  method  may  be  toar.  Its  spirit  is 
love — love  of  order,  love  of  righteousness ;  its  method  may  be  antag- 
onism, frenzy,  disorder. 

A  consideration  of  Gospel  methods  is  imperative  only  so  far  as  to 
distinguish  them  from  other  methods  employed  for  the  realization  of 
the  ends  of  the  Gospel,  for  it  has  sometimes  happened  that  political 
methods,  and  particularly  ecclesiastical  methods,  have  been  at  vari-. 
ance  with  well-defined  Gospel  methods,  and  deserve  reprobation  rather 
than  commendation.  For  instance,  when  St.  Cyril  leads  a  mob  of 
monks  against  Hypatia,  and  quarters  her  body,  and  rejoices  over  the 
bloody  work,  we  can  not  see  that  he  adopted  a  divinely  ordained 
method  for  the  suppression  of  Neo-Platonism.  Again,  when  Constan- 
tine,  ambitious  for  renown,  supported  Christianity  with  the  sword, 
extending  the  reign  of  the  Gospel  by  military  means,  it  is  not  certain 
that  he  was  acquainted  with  the  Gospel  idea  of  its  own  propagation. 
Again,  when  the  Roman  Catholic  Church  ordered  inquisitions  and 
martyrdoms  for  heretics,  so-called,  streaking  its  history  with  human 
blood,  and  exhibiting  more  intolerance  than  pagans  ever  showed 
toward  their  adversaries,  it  is  certain  that  the  Gospel  was  not  ruling  in 
that  Church,  and  that  the  idea  of  religion  was  well-nigh  forgotten  by 
its  priests  and  leaders.     Nor  are  we  quite  sure  that  modern  methods 


ARTIFICIAL  RESULTS  OF  THE  GOSPEL.  713 

are  iu  every  respect  in  harmony  with  the  plainly  prescribed  methods 
of  the  Gospel,  for  violence,  intolerance,  and  iron-cladism  too  much 
characterize  the  modern  Church  to  insure  the  rapidity  of  progress 
possible  to  it,  although  its  superiority  to  the  mediaeval  Church  must 
be  acknowledged,  and  its  conformity  to  the  Gospel  idea  is  approxi- 
mately secured.  The  greatest  victories  of  the  New  Dispensation  have 
been  the  result  of  means  the  most  peaceful,  but  at  the  time  estimated 
as  the  most  inadequate,  illustrating  that  Providence  "hath  chosen 
the  foolish  things  of  the  world  to  confound  the  wise,  the  weak  things 
to  confound  the  mighty,  base  things,  and  things  which  are  not  to  bring 
to  nought  things  that  are,  that  no  flesh  should  glory  in  his  presence." 
God's  methods  are  supreme,  and  will  be  successful. 

If  the  Reformation  under  Luther  was  born  in  a  whirlwind,  its 
leaders  were  calm,  and  the  events  inaugurated  by  it  were  governed 
by  calm-producing  agencies,  which  are  still  in  force,  and  which  are 
diffusing  the  spirit  of  the  religious  revolution  throughout  the  world. 
It  must  be  viewed,  not  merely  as  a  violent  reaction  from  Papal  op- 
pression, but  also  as  a  grand  providential  movement  for  the  recovery 
of  the  world.  The  violence  apparent  in  its  progress  was  the  violence 
of  form,  or  the  extreme  of  enthusiasm,  but  its  spirit  was  orderly, 
peaceful,  and  conservative.  During  Luther's  lifetime,  it  was  to  his 
credit,  and  was  a  sign  of  the  providential  character  of  the  movement, 
that  it  provoked  no  wars,  either  in  its  favor  or  for  its  suppression. 
In  like  manner,  Methodism  inaugurated  the  religious  revolution  of 
the  eighteenth  century  in  England,  accomplishing  its  mighty  task  by 
Gospel  methods ;  but  it  excited  animosity,  and  mobs,  sacrifices,  and 
sufferings  mark  her  path,  and  make  up  no  inconsiderable  portion  of 
her  history.  The  effect  of  a  religious  movement,  however,  must  be 
distinguished  from  its  principles,  which  must  be  studied  in  their 
ethical  contents,  and  determined  to  be  legitimate  or  illegitimate  by 
their  adaptation  to  the  moral  elevation  of  man  or  an  utter  inadequacy 
to  promote  it.  The  effects  of  a  religious  movement  may  be  natural, 
logical,  and  in  the  order  of  the  principles  underlying  it,  or  artificial 
and  antagonistic  to  the  principles  that  govern  it.  The  natural  effect 
is  legitimate,  since  it  is  the  fruit  of  the  principles ;  the  artificial  is  il- 
legitimate, since  it  takes  the  form  of  mobs  and  divers  oppositions. 
The  natural  effect  of  Christianity  is — redemption;  the  artificial  effect 
may  be — a  mob.  Athens  roared  its  ridicule  over  the  preaching  of  Paul ; 
Ephesus  Avent  mad ;  Lystra  stooped  in  the  dust  for  stones ;  but  such 
tumults  were  not  the  intended  or  natural,  and,  therefore,  legitimate, 
effects  of  the  Gospel. 

Distinguishing  Christianity,  so  far  as  its  purposes  are  independent, 
from  the  results  that  sometimes  follow  it,  and  keeping  in  mind  that 


714  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

a  Christian  method  may  not  be  a  Gospel  method  of  propagation,  we 
are  prepared  to  consider  more  fully  just  how  Christianity  projioses  to 
execute  its  purposes  and  secure  a  world-wide  triumj)h. 

First,  its  relation  to  otlmr  religions,  and  its  facility  for  turning 
them  to  account  in  its  own  interest,  deserves  most  carefid  considera- 
tion. The  conquest  of  the  world  implies  the  disappearance  of  all  op- 
posing religions,  for,  so  long  as  a  rival  religion  exists,  it  must  be 
uncertain  which  will  finally  displace  the  other.  Just  what  to  do 
with  other  religions,  or  whether  to  do  any  thing  with  them ;  how  to 
assail  them,  or  whether  they  will  decay  from  internal  maladies,  or  die 
from  old  age;  what  estimate  should  be  placed  upon  them,  and 
whether,  if  permitted  to  exist,  they  can  render  incidental  service  to 
mankind, — are  problems  that  can  not  be  hastily  solved.  In  Christian 
lands,  the  chief  work  of  Christian  people  is  evangelization  of  the 
masses,  or  destruction  of  sin ;  in  heathen  lands,  war  is  made  upon 
religions,  or  time  is  spent  in  proselytism  from  pagan  faiths.  That  the 
latter  is  necessary,  no  one  will  doubt  who  has  visited  heathendom  or 
knows  any  thing  of  pagan  religions;  but,  as  one  studies  the  great 
historical  religions  of  Asia,  one  is  inclined  to  think  that,  in  the  set- 
tlement of  the  relation  of  the  divine  religion  to  these  human  systems 
of  faith,  a  more  excellent  way  might  be  devised. 

It  is  conceded  that  the  Asiatic  religions  are  philosophical  in  their" 
spirit  and  religious  in  their  aims ;  neither  profoundly  philosophical 
nor  safely  ethical,  it  is  true,  but  disposed  both  to  philosophy  and  re- 
ligion. Their  inquii'ies  are  as  broad  and  deep  as  humanity,  but  they 
are  unable  to  answer  them.  Neither  their  philosophers  nor  sages  nor 
priests  can  satisfy  the  thoughtful  mood  of  the  East,  unravel  the  mys- 
tery that  broods  over  life,  disclose  an  effectual  method  of  salvation, 
or  point  out  the  certainties  beyond  the  grave.  They  inquire  with 
outstretched  hands ;  they  are  anxious  for  truth ;  but  the  truth-revealer 
is  not  among  them. 

To  say  that  the  Gospel  will  answer  the  inquiries  of  the  pagan 
world,  is  true ;  but  in  what  form  or  manner  shall  the  Gospel  send  its 
answers  into  those  regions  of  moral  darkness  ?  Shall  it  go  as  a  torch 
shining  upon  their  path,  or  as  a  glistening  bayonet  piercing  the  old 
systems  to  death?  Is  it  by  friction,  attrition,  antagonism — that  is, 
enforced  conformity  to  the  divine  will,  that  the  Eastern  world  will 
learn  what  the  Gospel  is,  and  what  it  requires?  or  is  there  not  a 
better  way,  by  which  to  lift  heathendom  to  the  Gospel  level  ?  Are 
the  old  systems  so  worthless  that  they  should  immediately  be  put  to 
death  and  be  buried  out  of  sight?  or  do  they  not,  even  though  dimly, 
foreshadow  some  of  the  cardinal  truths  of  Christianity,  which  entitle 
them  to  a  place  in  the  Christian  system  ?     The  old  religions,  incom- 


BRAHMINICAL  REGENERATION.  715 

petent,  deficient,  and  eveu  pernicious,  as  they  are,  are  not  wholly 
valueless,  and  have  served  a  purpose  which  the  grateful  thinker  will 
recognize.  Wanting  in  specific  redemptive  power,  they  are,  neverthe- 
less, the  vehicles  of  certain  divine  ideas,  which,  under  the  transforming 
influence  of  the  Gospel,  may  become  potent  and  beautiful,  and  enter 
into  the  very  constitution  and  life  of  the  ncAV  religion.  Students  of 
religions  are  quick  to  discover  verities  common  to  all,  or  teachings  so 
fundamental  that  religion  in  any  form  is  impossible  without  them. 
In  some  religions  the  common  principle  is  theistic,  polytheistic  or 
monotheistic;  in  others  it  is  an  incarnation,  gross  and  crude,  but  the 
germ  of  a  common  faith  ;  so  that  all  religions  are  half-brothers,  or 
cousins,  or  bear  some  relationship  to  one  another. 

It  is  this  relationship,  near  or  remote,  but  at  all  events  funda- 
mental, that  is  the  key  to  fraternity  among  the  religions,  and,  if  one 
absorb  all  the  others,  it  will  amount  to  an  absorption,  rather  than  an 
annihilation,  of  relationship.  The  conquest  of  Christianity  does  not 
imply  the  dissolution  of  the  verities  of  other  religions,  but  their  em- 
phasis, purification,  enlargement,  and  adaptation,  with  other  more 
helpful  truths  not  found  in  them,  to  the  needs  of  men.  After  this 
manner  Paul  proceeded  in  his  attacks  upon  paganism,  acknowledging 
the  resemblance  or  points  of  agreement  between  the  old  religions  and 
that  of  Christ,  and  ignored  the  diiferences  so  long  as  the  truth  would 
permit.  Antagonism  was  not  his  aim ;  reconciliation  and  victory 
were  the  ends  he  sought.  At  Athens  the  basis  of  agreement  was  the 
theistic  idea,  which  he  evolved  into  Christian  monotheism,  and  the 
philosophers  listened  to  him.  In  his  conflicts  with  the  Jews,  he  con- 
tinually referred  to  the  incorporation  of  certain  laws,  truths,  and 
usages  of  the  old  economy  with  the  Christian  dispensation,  winning 
along  that  line  when  open  rupture  would  have  followed  a  direct 
attack.  Brahminism,  without  understanding  the  significance  of  its 
own  teaching,  urges  that  man  must  be  born  again,  that  is,  he  must 
separate  himself  from  the  crowd,  commune  with  the  great  unseen 
Intelligence  of  the  universe,  and  be  filled  with  the  spirit  of  Brahm — 
a  doctrine  in  its  essence  akin  to  the  purer  Christian  doctrine  of  re- 
generation, and  on  the  basis  of  which  reconciliation  between  them  is 
possible.  The  Hindoo,  misapplying  his  principle,  builds  up  a  caste, 
or  creates  a  circle  of  men  pronounced  to  be  better  than  others  because 
they  have  given  themselves  to  spiritual  meditation,  which  is  the 
shadow  of  the  Church  idea,  needing  purification  and  direction.  How 
really  to  be  born  again  the  Hindoo  does  not  know,  except  that  he 
must  strive  to  rise  into  this  caste-experience;  he  must  become  a  mem- 
ber of  the  caste ;  but  Christianity  will  teach  him  that  such  a  birth  is 
from  God,  and  that  the  truest  caste  consists  of  regenerated  and  spir- 


716  PBILOSOPBY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

itual  souls.  At  this  point  the  two  come  in  contact,  and  reconcilia- 
tion, or  the  transformation  of  the  Brahminical  idea  into  the  Christian 
doctrine,  may,  under  certain  educational  rules,  be  accomplished.  In 
like  manner  the  Yiima  of  Hindu  mythology  may  be  transformed  into 
the  Satan  of  Christianity,  and  difference  and  conflict  cease.  The  Chris- 
tianity in  Brahminism  must  be  rescued  from  superstition,  and  the  Brah- 
minism  in  Christianity  must  at  least  be  recognized,  if  the  union  of  the 
two  systems,  that  is,  the  virtual  triumph  of  Christianity,  be  guaranteed. 

Quite  as  striking  is  the  resemblance  of  the  incarnation  idea  of 
Buddhism  to  the  true  incarnation  doctrine  of  Christianity,  on  which 
future  mediation  may  be  predicated  and  a  future  triumph  made  alto- 
gether probable. 

Christianity  does  not  more  clearly  vindicate  the  monotheistic 
principle  than  Mohammedanism.  The  chief  business  of  the  latter  is 
the  proclamation  of  this  principle.  The  coalescence  of  the  two  relig- 
ions on  the  acknowledgment  of  so  fundamental  a  truth  should  not  be 
longer  delayed. 

Without  continuing  the  thought,  it  is  evident  that  in  one  religion 
Christianity  discovers  a  principle  of  regeneration,  in  another  a  doc- 
trine of  incarnation,  and  in  a  third  the  truth  of  monotheism,  on 
which  union  with  them  is  not  impossible,  and  final  victory  over  them 
a  sometime  certainty.  In  this  fraternity  or  union,  Christianity  can 
not  surrender  any  thing  vital  to  itself,  nor  be  lost  in  any  other  re- 
ligion, nor  compromise  with  -superstitions ;  but  it  may  accept  their 
truths,  refine  their  ideas,  and  gradually  disclose  their  fulfillment  in 
itself.  Christianity  is  tJie  fulfillment  of  all  the  tmths  of  paganism,  which 
is  to  be  made  so  clear  to  the  pagan  mind  that  it  will  suffer  no  humili- 
ation in  agreeing  to  it,  and  will  not  long  delay  in  abandoning  the 
one  for  the  other,  just  as  the  shipwrecked  mariner  abandons  his  leaky 
craft  for  the  ship  of  rescue. 

More  important  still,  and  to  be  reiterated  until  time  shall  end, 
the  chief  glory  of  the  triiimph  of  Christianity  will  be  the  universally 
acknowledged  authority  of  its  greatest  principle.  By  virtue  of  its  re- 
demptive element,  which  discriminates  the  new  religion  from  the  old 
faiths,  Christianity  alone  will  succeed,  and  bases  its  future  antici- 
pations on  its  power.  It  is  not  its  monotheism,  or  decalogue,  or  ordi- 
nances, or  priesthood,  or  Sabbaths,  that  either  constitute  it  a  separate 
religion  or  insure  its  dominion  in  the  future;  but. redemption  from 
sin  through-Jesus  Christ  is  its_  radical  doctrine,  its  original  starting- 
point,  and  the  inspiration  of  its  mission  in  this  world.  So  constitu- 
tional is  this  soteriological  element  that  it  should  be  pi'eached,  if 
necessary,  at  the  expense  of  every  other  Gospel  idea.  All  other  ideas 
are  auxiliary,  transient,  incidental,  compared  with  this  idea  of  salva- 


THE  POLITICAL  CONTENT  OF  REDEMPTION.  717 

tion.  But  the  one  idea  includes,  or  is  able  to  carry  with  it,  all  the 
other  ideas  of  the  Gospel  systeru.  Doctrines,  ordinances,  Church 
government  and  usages,  are  easily  regulated  and  placed  if  the  leading 
idea  of  redemption  is  in  authority.  The  future  triumph  of  the  new 
religion  implies'  the  redemption  of  the  world,  or  the  triumph  of  its 
greatest  principle  in  the  children  of  men. 

Let  us  consider  what  is  meant  by  redemption,  or  the  magnitude 
of  the  triumph  of  this  great  principle  in  human  affairs.  The  word 
"redemption"  is  not  a  particular  word  for  a  particular  spiritual  state, 
but  the  key  to  the  largest  results  of  the  influence  of  Christianity  on 
the  human  race.  It  includes  all  that  is  possible  through  Christianity 
within  the  area  of  human  life ;  it  includes  physical,  social,  ethical, 
and  intellectual,  as  well  as  spiritual,  regenerations  and  achievements; 
it  comprehends  in  all  its  aspects  the  constant  elevation  of  man. 

First,  its  influence  xvill  he  more  largely  exercised  in  the  domain  of 
political  government,  dictating  laws  in  the  interest  of  righteousness,  sup- 
pressing evils  of  long  standing  or  of  recent  origin,  and  regulating, 
without  infringement  on  his  natural  rights,  his  political  and  civil  life. 
The  redemption  of  the  governmental  idea  from  oppression,  which  is 
the  same  thing  as  its  conformity  to  the  Gospel  ideal  of  government, 
is  as  imperative  as  the  redemption  of  science  from  fiction,  or  of  medi- 
cine from  quackery.  Under  its  fostering  care  in  its  new  form,  the 
spirit  of  crime  will  disappear,  the  best  civil  institutions  will  prevail 
everywhere,  and  order,  sobriety,  stability,  and  esteem  of  the  public 
good  will  characterize  the  administration  of  authority  in  all  lands. 
History  is  a  record  of  the  struggle  of  the  Gospel  ideal  with  the  gov- 
ernmental notion  in  its  despotic  and  inhuman  forms,  recounting  oc- 
casional victories,  the  gradual  growth  of  humane  ideas,  and  presaging 
the  final  elimination  of  every  political  heresy  and  governmental  tyr- 
anny from  the  activities  of  the  world.  The  Coliseum,  a  relic  of 
pagan  barbarism,  is  not  possible  now.  Slavery  is  well-nigh  a  mem- 
ory. The  humanity  of  the  race  embodied  in  civil  institutions  is  on 
the  increase.  Law  accords  with  righteousness.  Despotisms  are 
crumbling.  The  idea  of  self-government  is  contagious,  wrecking  in 
its  development  the  strongly  built  ideas  of  royalty,  and  pointing  with 
unerring  certainty  to  the  enthronement  of  the  individual  in  his  natu- 
ral rights.  Civilization,  not  what  it  ought  to  be,  is  Christian  in  form, 
and  is  approximating  the  Gospel  idea  in  spirit  and  impulse.  The 
East  dwells  in  the  shadows  of  superstitions,  but  the  West  is  rising 
toward  God.  As  to  the  Gospel  spirit  must  be  attributed  the  im- 
proved changes  in  law,  government,  and  civilization,  so  to  the  same 
spirit  we  look  for  speedy  modifications  in  governmental  forms  which 
shall  place  them  in  harmony  with  God's  idea  of  rulership,  and  lift  up 


718  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

man  to  the  enjoyment  of  every  right  to  which  his  creation  entitles  him. 
In  the  future  progress  of  the  race,  the  redemption  of  government  will 
occupy  no  inconspicuous  relation  to  the  final  purpose  of  Christianity. 

Second,  under  the  influence  of  the  new  religion  the  social  life  of 
7)ian,  as  important  as  his  political,  will  undergo  an  equally  conservative 
transformation.  In  the  apparently  small  matters  of  dress,  etiquette, 
manners,  social  customs,  and  domestic  ideas  and  relationships, 
Christianity  is  revolutionizing  the  world,  and  must  continue  its  reg- 
ulating work  until  all  peoples  conform  to  its  wholesome  hints  and 
suggestions.  In  China,  where  the  paternal  idea  is  venerable  and 
strong,  Confucius  having  insisted  on  its  sacredness,  and  constituted  it 
a  part  of  religion,  there  are  no  such  homes  as  in  England  and  the 
United  States,  where  the  Christian  idea  of  marriage  and  domes- 
tic life  prevails.  In  Mohammedan  lands  polygamy  is  not  only  au- 
thorized by  law,  but  also  solemnized  by  religion,  and  exists  in  its 
most  corrupting  forms,  debilitating  the  domestic  idea,  and  destroying 
the  national  life  of  the  people.  It  is  not  surprising  that  in  such  lands 
woman  is  without  character  as  an  immortal  being ;  she  is  regarded  as 
soulless.  Nor  is  it  surprising  that  the  birth  of  a  girl  produces  sad- 
ness, while  the  birth  of  a  boy  is  the  occasion  of  a  great  demonstration 
of  joy.  In  Christian  lands,  inasmuch  as  polygamy  does  not  prevail, 
woman  is  honored  as  the  equal  of  man,  and  the  birth  of  boy  or  girl 
is  welcomed  with  eager  pride.  Evidently,  it  is  a  part  of  the  mission 
of  Christianity  to  redeem  the  home,  or  the  domestic  institution,  from 
the  vice  of  polygamy,  and  to  elevate  woman  in  the  esteem  of 
mankind. 

The  etiquette  of  pagan  lands  is  as  debasing  as  their  religions  are 
enervating,  and  needs  the  reformatory  touch  of  Christian  teaching. 
Asiatic  dress  is  in  violation  of  the  purest  ethical  standards,  and  needs 
the  Christian  pattern.  In  India  and  Egypt  the  burial  ceremony, 
usually  Mohammedan,  is  repugnant,  without  solemnity,  and  so  dreary 
as  to  deprive  breaking  hearts  of  all  thought  of  a  future  world ;  while 
in  Christian  lands  it  is  beautiful,  tender,  significant.  The  home,  the 
life,  the  tomb,  will  appear  in  their  holier  aspects  under  the  teachings 
of  Him  who  is  the  way,  the  truth,  and  the  life.  Social  regeneration 
unll  he  one  of  the  benefits  of  the  new  religion. 

Third,  Christianity  proposes  to  exert  its  healthfod  influence  on  the 
artistic  sentiment  of  the  race;  in  other  words,  it  proposes  to  purify 
the  fine  arts,  more  particularly  sculpture  and  painting.  There  are 
those  who  object  to  these  arts  from  the  fact,  not  here  questioned, 
that  they  have  fostered  the  licentious  spirit,  and  led  to  the  general 
corruption  and  degradation  of  the  nations  patronizing  them.  It  is 
too  true  that   many  sculptors  and  painters  have  acquired  fame  for 


GOVERNMENT  OF  THE  THINKING  FORCES.  719 

genius  at  the  expense  of  morality  and  purity.  Idolatry  and  corrup- 
tion have  thrived  where  these  arts  have  floui'ished.  Athens  decayed 
in  the  presence  of  its  statues ;  Rome  perished  in  the  flames  of  the 
canvas.  That  the  artistic  idea  is  as  native  to  man  as  the  govern- 
mental or  social  idea  will  not,  perhaps,  be  disputed.  It  has  its  func- 
tions, therefore ;  and  the  religion  renders  mankind  a  service  that 
will  purify  the  idea,  regulate  its  functions,  and  make  it  instrumental 
in  the  public  education  and  elevation.  This  service  Christianity  pro^ 
poses  to  render  the  fine  arts,  under  whose  influence  man's  love  of  the 
beautiful  will  be  idealized  in  actual  forms. 

Thus  far  we  have  grouped  the  future  work  of  Christianity  in  gov- 
ernments, institutions,  homes,  social  customs,  and  artistic  products ; 
it  is  external,  therefore ;  but  it  performs  an  internal  work  more  pro- 
found, because  more  vital,  and  really  the  source  of  all  external  results. 
It  is  related  to  the  thinking  forces,  the  ethical  ideas,  and  the  spiritual 
lives  of  men  quite  as  intirqately  as  it  is  related  to  the  homes,  govern- 
ments, and  arts  of  society. 

Fourth,  in  its  proposed  regulation  of  the  tJwught  of  manhind,  or 
ilie  government  of  the  thinking  forces,  Christianity  undertakes  a  work 
fundamental  in  character  and  permanent  in  result;  it  is,  therefore, 
a  superior  and  supreme  work.  In  its  contests  with  philosophic 
thought,  its  purpose  has  been,  not  the  annihilation,  but  the  purifica- 
tion of  thought,  and  the  harmonization  of  the  various  systems  of 
speculative  inquiry  with  the  idealities  of  Christianity.  When  har- 
monization was  impossible,  the  old  system  disappeared  and  never  re- 
vived. Whatever  truth  was  imbedded  in  such  systems  passed  over 
into  the  religious  category,  but  the  system  from  which  it  was  derived 
perished.  Thus  Christianity  has  rescued  the  vital  principles  of  the 
ancient  systems  from  obscurity,  and  adopted  them  in  the  family  of 
imperishable  truths  which  constitute  the  Gospel  system  of  religion. 

In  its  contests  with  modern  philosophic  thought  its  object  is  the 
same,  but  the  method  is  different.  While  the  aim  is  the  rescue  of 
truth  from  the  incrustation  of  fiction,  it  also  includes  the  annihilation 
of  error,  which  is  intelligently  supported  by  modern  thought.  Ac- 
cording to  the  conception  of  Christianity  materialism,  which  includes 
the  atheistic  tendency  of  psychology,  cosmology,  and  the  various 
phases  of  evolution,  is  a  monstrous  error,  to  be  destroyed  like  any 
Sadducean  heresy  or  contradictory  and  ruinous  opinion.  From  want 
of  internal  force  the  ancient  speculations  perished  ;  but  materialism, 
assuming  a  rational  form,  and  appealing  to  intelligence,  must  be  as- 
sailed, and  its  error  eliminated  from  thought.  Ancient  thought  in- 
quired for  the  truth  ;  modern  thought  denies  the  greatest  truths. 
The  former  sought  the  eternal  cause  of  things;  the  latter  denies  the 


720  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

personification  of  the  eternal  cause.  Hence,  Ciuistianity  not  only 
assumes  the  defensive,  but  is  compelled  to  inaugurate  an  aggressive 
campaign  against  the  offensive  errors  of  modern  thought.  It  must 
conquer  in  this  domain,  or  lose  what  it  has  already  gained.  Thought 
is  the  source  of  life,  activity,  progress,  salvation.  Eight  thought  is 
as  imperative  as  right  conduct ;  it  precedes  and  regulates  the  conduct. 
The  battle  of  the  hour  is,  therefore,  for  supremacy  in  the  realm  of 
thought. 

Fifth,  the  improvement  of  the  moral  life  of  the  world  may  be 
justly  inferred  from  the  presence  of  Christianity  in  it,  for  it  is  re- 
formatory, educational,  and  disciplinary.  Its  cry  is  against  injustice, 
oppression,  and  inhumanity;  its  appeal  is  for  law,  order,  sobriety, 
temperance,  and  righteousness;  its  warnings  and  retributions  are 
urged  in  the  interest  of  progress  and  happiness ;  its  decalogue  encour- 
ages every  virtue  and  condemns  every  vice  ;  its  spirit  promotes  unity, 
hospitality,  veracity,  "  peace  on  earth  and  good  will  to  men."  Under 
its  influence  the  moral  life  of  the  race  is  quickened  and  the  tendencies 
to  evil  restrained. 

Sixth,  its  greatest  influence  on  mankind,  however,  is,  not  govern- 
mental, social,  (Bsthetic,  intellectual,  and  moral,  but  spiritual.  Its  highest 
purpose  is  the  procreation  of  a  spiritual  race  on  the  earth,  the  elim- 
ination of  sin  as  a  dominating  element  in  the  world,  and  the  rehabili- 
tation of  the  old  sin-cursed  globe  in  the  beauty  and  glory  of  Paradise. 
It  means  more  than  a  millennium ;  it  means  the  never-ending  reign 
of  Jesus  Christ  in  the  race  begotten  by  the  spirit  of  his  love.  A  mil- 
lennium ends ;  but  the  spiritual  reign  once  established  will  go  on 
forever.  To  spiritualize  men ;  to  destroy  the  caraal  impulse ;  to  in- 
troduce the  saintly  spirit  in  human  life ;  to  rule  over  the  race  so 
completely  that  birth  by  generation  will  be  equivalent  to  birth  by 
regeneration,  or  the  natural  birth  will  he  also  a  spiritual  biHh;  this  is 
the  ultimate  idea  of  Christianity. 

The  universal  sway  of  Christianity  in  the  world  signifies  the  existence 
of  ideal  political  governments,  tJie  development  of  a  perfect  social  life,  the 
purification  of  the  cesthetic  sentimeyit,  tJie  government  of  the  intellectual  ac- 
tivities of  man,  the  reign  and  elevation  of  perfect  ethical  principles,  and 

THE  SUPREMACY  AND  AUTHORITY  OF  THE  DIVINE  IDEA  OP  LIFE,  OR 
THE  SPIRITUAL  REGENERATION  OF  THE  RACE.      This  is  the  OUtlook  from 

the  observatory  of  the  apostles. 

On  what  grounds  may  an  expectation  of  the  universal  triumph  of 
Christianity  be  based  ?  If  it  is  any  thing  more  than  a  hallucination, 
a  pious  hope,  or  a  devout  and  dreamy  sentiment ;  if  it  is  a  rational 
expectation  grounded  in  the  philosophy  of  things,  or  the  nature  of 
truth,  or  the  trend  of  human  history,  it  will  be  inspiring  to  consider 


HISTORICAL  PROOF  OF  THE  SACRED  RECORDS.        721 

it;  otherwise  it  is  without  value.  The  expectation  of  such  triumph, 
we  are  happy  to  write,  has  a  philosophical  ground,  which  appears  in 
both  a  historical  and  statistical  form,  and  complete  enough  to  be  as- 
suring to  those  who  are  timid  in  faith  or  vacillating  in  hojie. 

The  historical  argument  for  the  final  supremacy  of  Christianity 
can  not  be  overthrown,  unless  history  itself  is  a  delusion  and  with- 
out significance.  The  argument  is  two-fold  in  character,  relating  to 
the  tests  of  Christianity  by  historical  science,  and  to  the  integrity,  and, 
therefore,  the  proofs,  of  Christianity  by  historical  events.  As  a  historic 
system  Christianity  must  submit  to  the  historic  tests  usually  applied 
to  other  systems.  To  this  it  does  not  object;  indeed,  it  covets  a 
historical  investigation  conducted  according  to  the  canons  of  historical 
science.  Such  investigation  has  been  made  by  critics,  rationalists, 
exegetes,  and  theologians,  the  preponderance  of  evidence  being  largely 
in  support  of  the  integrity  of  the  sacred  books.  The  rationalists  of 
Germany  and  Holland,  under  the  leadership  of  Edward  Reuss,  reject 
the  supernatural  character  of  the  Pentateuch,  and  deny  its  authorship 
to  Moses.  Another  class  of  critics,  known  as  Conservatives,  of  whom 
Konig,  of  Germany,  and  Robertson  Smith,  of  Scotland,  are  repre- 
sentatives, accept  the  supernatural  character  of  the  Pentateuch,  and 
attribute  its  important  revelations  to  Moses.  The  contest  thus  far  is 
largely  one  between  radical  and  conservative  critics,  the  one  striking 
at  the  inspiration  and  authorship  of  the  Pentateuch,  the  other  care- 
fully considering  both,  and  modifying,  without  materially  rejecting, 
accepted  views.  The  historical  criticism  raging  around  the  Penta- 
teuch illustrates  the  historical  attack  made  on  all  the  Biblical  records 
and  the  theologic  interpretations  of  the  Church.  Renan  assails  the 
authorship  of  some  of  the  Pauline  epistles.  John's  Gospel,  too,  has 
suflfered  a  severe  but  harmless  examination  from  skeptical  inquirers. 

"While  these  one-sided  investigations  have  been  going  on,  leading 
to  unexpected  discoveries  of  proofe  of  authorship  and  credibility  of 
the  sacred  records,  others,  among  whom  is  George  Rawlinson,  have 
applied  the  historical  tests  in  a  purely  scientific  manner  to  these, 
same  records,  and  have  overwhelmingly  sustained  them  in  spite  of 
the  denials  of  their  radical  opponents.  Laying  down  four  indisput- 
able canons  of  criticism,  Mr.  Rawlinson  applies  them  vigoi'ously  to 
the  Old  Testament,  establishing  in  particular  its  historical  por- 
tions from  geology,  physiology,  ethnology,  and  geography  so  com- 
pletely, that  he  has  not  been  answered.  Respecting  the  Pentateuch, 
he  says  it  is  "a  history  absolutely  and  in  every  respect  true."  The 
same  conclusion  is  aflirmed  with  respect  to  all  the  revelations  of  the 
Old  Testament. 

It  may  also  be  observed  that  the  subversion  of  the  historical  integrity 
46 


722  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

of  the  New  Testament  has  been  found  an  utter  impossibility,  for  as  his- 
torical criticism  has  taken  the  shape  of  science,  and  has  announced 
itself  in  the  terms  of  law,  it  has  been  intelligently  applied  to  his- 
torical truth  ;  and  applied  to  the  historical  contents  of  the  documents 
of  Christianity,  they  have  been  sustained.  The  historical  ground  of 
Christianity  has  been  established.  That  ground  is  the  philosophical 
prophecy  of  its  stability  and  supremacy.  Tested  by  historical  science, 
it  has  had  incarnation  in  historical  events.  In  a  limited  sense  Chris- 
tianity is  the  history  of  manhind.  The  activities  of  the  race,  the  intel- 
lectual inquiries  for  truth,  the  seeking  of  ethical  ideas  and  standards, 
and  the  conflicts  and  struggles  of  all  generations,  are  the  inspira- 
tions of  fundamental  religious  ideas,  which  found  final  expression  in 
Christianity.  History  is  the  manifestation  of  the  religious  idea ;  it  is 
the  result  of  a  religious,  that  is,  a  divine  plan.  The  plan  has  been 
obscure,  is  somewhat  obscure  still ;  the  idea  is  either  unrecognized  or 
undefined ;  nevertheless  history  is  the  evolution  of  Christianity. 

In  its  direct  evolution,  or,  more  particularly,  in  its  specific  rela- 
tion to  mankind  as  a  religion,  the  historic  results  have  been  as  mani- 
fest as  the  spirit  that  produced  them,  and  as  numerous  as  could  well 
be  tabulated.  In  the  apostolic  period  of  Christianity  the  develop- 
ment of  the  religious  life  of  Oriental  nations  was  marked  and  perma- 
nent. In  the  Constantine  period  the  authority  of  the  Christian  idea 
was  extended  over  the  Roman  Empire,  and  superseded  pagan  influ- 
ence forever.  In  the  Papal  period  the  new  religion,  corrupted  by 
traditions,  asserted  itself  with  enthusiasm,  and  acquired  indisputable 
dominion  in  new  lands.  In  passing,  we  write,  given  the  missionary 
zeal  of  Francis  Xavier,  and  Protestantism  will  be  universal  in  a  de- 
cade. In  the  days  of  the  Lutheran  Reformation  the  truth,  separated 
from  error,  waxed  mightily  and  prevailed  in  the  greatest  of  Teutonic 
nations.  In  the  Wesleyan  era  it  saved  England  from  despair,  and 
transferred  a  Christian  civilization  to  the  Western  hemisphere.  If 
its  internal  history  is  the  proof  of  its  inspiration,  its  external  history 
is  the  proof  of  its  supremacy.  Beginning  at  Jerusalem,  it  went  forth 
to  take  the  world,  and  it  is  on  the  march  still,  conquering  wherever 
it  goes,  and  promising  to  overturn  all  things  in  its  way  until  it  shall 
have  delivered  all  kingdoms  unto  the  Father.  The  task  is  difficult, 
the  spectacle  sublime,  the  result  sure.  The  latv  of  evolution  imist  break, 
or  triumph  can  not  be  prevented.  Opposition  is  nothing.  Infidelity  is 
as  the  grain  of  dust  on  a  chariot  wheel. 

If  the  historical  argument  is  of  the  nature  of  a  philosophical 
prophecy  respecting  the  future  of  Chi-istianity,  the  statistical  argument 
is  of  the  nature  of  an  absolute  revelation  confirming  the  prophecies, 
and  indicating   further  fulfillment.      The  statistical   argument  is   a 


THE  STATISTICAL  PROPHECY. 


723 


matliematical  truth,  or  a  revelation  in  philosophic  form,  and,  therefore, 
entitled  to  more  than  ordinary  consideration.  Prophecy  inspires 
hope  ;  history  quickens  faith  ;  revelation  is  of  the  nature  of  knowledge, 
and  answers  expectation.  To  include  the  details  of  the  argument,  or 
the  items  showing  the  relative  progress  of  Protestantism  and  Roman 
Catholicism,  and  the  comparative  growth  of  Christianity  and  Moham- 
medanism, or  of  false  religions  in  general,  is  unnecessary.  It  will  be 
sufficient  if  we  indicate  the  steady  progress  of  Christianity  from  the 
beginning  in  all  its  forms  throughout  the  world,  as  an  evidence  of  its 
persistency  toward  the  consummation,  or  the  attainment  of  final  su- 
premacy. The  following  are  regarded  as  the  approximately  correct 
statistics  of  the  number  of  Christians  in  the  world  at  the  end  of  the 
diflTerent  periods  given : 


First  Century, 
Second    " 
Third 
Fourth     " 
Fifth 

Sixth  " 
Seventh  " 
Eighth  " 
Ninth  " 
Tenth      " 


500,000 
2,000,000 
5,000,000 
10,000,000 
15,000,000 
20,000,000 
25,000,000 
30,000,000 
40,000,000 
50.000.000 


Eleventh  Century, 
Twelfth  " 

Thirteenth  " 
Fourteenth  " 
Fifteenth  " 
Sixteenth  " 
Seventeenth  " 
Eighteenth  " 
1880,  A.  D.     ... 


70,000,000 

80,000,000 

75,000,000 

80,000,000 

100,000,000 

125,000,000 

155,000,000 

200,000,000 

410,900,000 


Under  the  Papal  regime  the  progress  of  Christianity  was  stayed, 
and  came  almost  to  a  stand-still  in  the  thirteenth  century ;  but  under 
Protestant  direction  it  now  controls  the  civilization  and  development 
of  fully  one-third  of  the  populations  of  the  globe. 

This,  however,  is  not  the  strongest  way  of  putting  the  case,  for 
Dr.  Schem  has  figured  it  out  that  in  1876  nearly  seven  hundred 
millions  of  people,  or  quite  one-half  of  the  world's  populations,  were 
under  the  dominion  of  Christian  governments,  showing  a  gratifying 
extension  of  the  governmental  ideas  of  Christianity.  "  One  hundred 
and  eighty-years  ago,"  says  Dr.  D.  Dorchester,  "only  155,000,000 
of  the  earth's  population  were  under  Christian  governments." 

In  an  equally  striking  manner  it  can  be  made  to  appear  that, 
while  the  territorial  area  of  the  globe  is  about  fifty-two  millions  of 
square  miles.  Christian  governments  exercise  legitimate  control  over 
thirty-two  millions  of  square  miles,  showing  that  their  authority  is  on 
the  increase,  and  exceeds  that  of  all  other  religions  combined.  The 
argument  from  statistics  points  to  an  ever-widening  domain  of 
Christian  influence,  and  the  final  supremacy  of  Christianity  as  a 
religion. 

If  any  thing  more  is  needed  to  confirm  this  mathematical  view  of 
the   future,  we  might  draw  on  what  we  are  pleased   to  style  the 


724  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

retributive  argument,  or  the  ai'gument  of  facts  which  portend  the  doom 
of  all  other  religions.  "  Mohammedanism,"  says  Ram  Chandra  Bose, 
"has  proved  a  failure."  It  is  too  late  to  reconstruct  it  or  purify  it; 
it  must  go;  it  will  be  absorbed  and  disappear.  "  Mere  secular  edu- 
cation," says  Dr.  T.  J.  Scott,  "  would  wreck  Brahmiuism  ;"  but  as  it 
would  fail  to  "reconstruct  India  morally,"  he  adds,  "the  Gospel  is 
pulling  down  the  stronghold  of  Brahminism  with  irresistible  effect, 
and  in  its  stead  is  rearing  the  temple  of  God."  Dr.  J.  M.  Thoburn 
rejwrts  of  Parseeism  that,  "  as  a  religious  system,  like  every  thing 
else  Avhich  '  decayeth  and  waxeth  old,'  it  must  soon  vanish  away." 
He  asserts  that  education  alone  will  demolish  it.  Buddhism  is, 
perhaps,  the  most  difficult  religion  to  subvert,  but  Dr.  E.  Wentworth 
observes  that,  "half  the  difficulty  of  a  grand  undertaking  is  accom- 
plished when  we  know  what  we  have  to  contend  with."  The  old  re- 
ligion is  a  mountain  in  our  path,  but  "faith,  prayer,  and  sacrifice 
vanquish  devils  and  overturn  mountains."  Taoism,  according  to  Dr. 
V.  C.  Hart,  ' '  is  sere  and  ready  to  decay.  Its  weird  and  grotesque 
growth  stands  palsied  in  the  presence  of  true  education  and  religion." 
"Shintoism,"  says  Dr.  R.  S.  Maclay,  "has  lost  much  of  its  individu- 
ality and  self-assertion  ;"  and,  "  like  many  other  systems  of  a  similar 
character,  it  is  gradually  moving  to  take  its  place  in  the  silent  cham- 
bers of  the  past."  As  to  Confucianism,  it  can  not  properly  be  enu- 
merated among  the  religions  of  the  East ;  nevertheless,  granting  it  a 
religious  rank,  Dr.  S.  L.  Baldwin  affirms,  that  the  "awakening  in- 
tellect and  conscience  of  China  can  not  be  satisfied  with  the  negative 
character  of  Confucianism."  It  must,  therefore,  finally  be  displaced 
by  a  positive  religion. 

From  these  estimates  of  missionaries,  it  is  evident  that  the  old  re- 
ligions are  enfeebled  by  their  own  corruptions  and  superstitions,  and 
are  on  the  way  to  extinction,  public  education  being  sufficient  in 
many  cases  to  entirely  overthrow  the  nation's  faith  in  them.  Time 
alone  will  visit  with  destruction  these  hoary-headed  faiths ;  but  edu- 
cation and  religion  will  undermine  their  foundations  and  reduce  them 
to  chaos. 

In  the  Vatican  gallery  is  a  prophetic  painting  of  the  fate  of 
paganism.  It  represents  a  broken  column,  prostrate,  partly  covered 
with  sand,  and  partly  hidden  with  rankest  weeds.  Thus  paganism, 
hydra-headed  and  old  as  the  ages,  shall  fall  and  be  buried  out  of  sight. 

The  prospectus  of  Christianity  contains  a  recital  of  the  overthrow 
of  paganism,  the  universal  sway  of  Christian  civilization,  the  sancti- 
fication  of  political  government,  and  the  spiritualization  of  the  human 
race,  or  the  elimination  of  evil  from  the  abodes  of  men. 


THE  RACE  OF  IDEAS.  725 


CHAPTER  XXXIV. 

CHRISTIANITY  A.    PHILOSOPHIC    AND    RELIQIOUS 
F^INALIXY, 

PLATO'S  allusion  in  the  Republic  to  a  "torch-race  on  horseback" 
was  founded  on  a  beautiful  custom  that  obtained  in  the  Panathe- 
naean  festivals,  in  which  the  contestants,  seizing  torches  lighted  from 
the  altars  of  sacrifice,  ran  for  the  prize,  he  securing  it  whose  torch 
did  not  expire  in  the  race. 

Of  another  torch-race,  which  began  in  Plato's  time  and  still  con- 
tinues, we  moderns  are  witnesses.  It  is  the  race  of  ideas,  of  which 
religion  and  philosophy  are  the  representatives;  both  have  drawn 
their  light  from  sacrificial  fires;  and  both  have  run  along  the  path- 
way of  the  centuries,  sometimes  with  fatiguing  steps,  but  usually 
with  a  hopeful  enthusiasm  and  a  belief  in  final  victory.  Perhaps  it 
is  too  early  in  the  race,  long  as  it  has  been  going  on,  to  prepare 
wreaths  for  the  victor,  not  knowing  which  it  shall  be ;  but,  judging 
from  appearances,  relative  achievements,  and  future  prospects,  the 
lamp  of  philosophy,  already  nearly  extinguished,  must  grow  dimmer 
with  the  coming  years,  while  the  light  of  Cliristianity,  like  that  of 
the  sun,  is  as  bright  as  the  day  it  first  shone  upon  the  earth,  with  no 
indications  of  a  decline  and  no  signs  of  extinction.  The  verdict  of 
history  is  in  favor  of  Christianity ;  the  voices  of  prophecy,  of  evolu- 
tion, of  the  impulse  of  progress,  and  of  human  hope,  are  musical 
with  the  strains  of  a  jubilee  over  its  final  vindication  in  the  w'orld. 

To  speak  of  a  final  religion,  or  of  a  stereotyped  religious  idea, 
superseding  all  others  and  governing  all  men  ;  to  speak  of  one  relig- 
ion absorbing  all  others  and  conforming  the  race-life  to  its  ideals, — 
may  savor  of  strong  prejudice  in  its  favor,  but  such  prejudice  is 
rooted  in  the  reason  of  things.  It  is  a  philosophical,  not  a  religious, 
prejudice  that  justifies  the  extreme  faith  here  uttered.  One  school 
of  philosophers,  materialistic  in  their  sense  of  things,  may  pronounce 
such  fjiith  inconsistent  with  the  spirit  of  progress,  which,  while  it  up- 
roots some  things  and  establishes  others,  does  not  point  to  final  settle- 
ment of  any  thing,  or  at  least  to  final  things,  in  this  period  of  the 
world's  history.  It  should  not  be  forgotten  that  the  best  idea  of 
progress  is  a  tendency  to  finality  in  all  things.  A  driftiiig  universe, 
either  of  thought  or  matter,  is  contrary  to  tlie  highest  conception  of 
order,  stability,  and  progress.     A  final  religion,  a  final  philosophy,  a 


726  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

final  Bible,  a  final  God,  a  final  eternity,  are  things  which  the  human 
mind  craves,  and  to  which  progress  tends. 

Again,  the  votaries  of  the  old  religions,  indisposed  to  accept  the 
solution  of  the  supreme  problems  according  to  Christianity,  will  be 
slow  to  embrace  the  idea  of  a  final  religion  for  man,  since  they  under- 
stand that  the  universal,  that  is,  the  final,  element  is  wanting  in  their 
own.  They  prefer  the  present  state  of  conflict  to  the  extinction  of 
their  ancestral  and  traditional  faiths,  and  the  enthronement  of  what 
they  regard  as  a  foreign  religion.  From  their  stand-point,  Christian- 
ity is  as  defective  in  the  universal  element  as  their  own  religions, 
and  they  pretend  to  see  no  benefit  in  the  exchange  of  their  faith  for 
that  of  another  people.  All  talk,  then,  of  a  final  religion  strikes  the 
materialist  and  the  traditionalist  as  the  acme  of  absurdity,  as  the  out- 
burst of  that  bigotry  which  religion  is  always  supposed  to  inspire. 

Nevertheless,  there  is  a  finality  in  the  most  literal,  as  well  as  in 
the  highest  accommodated,  sense  in  both  philosophy  and  religion,  to 
which  we  do  well  to  take  heed.  Gravitation  is  a  finality  in  physics; 
memory  is  a  finality  in  psychology ;  the  circle  is  a  finality  in  mathe- 
matics ;  the  circulation  of  the  blood  is  a  finality  in  physiology.  In 
like  manner,  there  are  certain  religious  finalities,  which  constitute  the 
frame-work  of  Christianity  and  make  it  the  final  religion.  These  we 
shall  proceed  to  emphasize. 

We  affirm,  first,  that  Christianity  is  a  ^philosophic  finality,  or  the 
finality  of  all  philosophic  truth;  but  we  do  not  so  affirm  in  a  dog- 
matic, but  rather  in  a  philosophic,  spirit.  It  is  not  meant  that 
Christianity  will  supersede  a  true  philosophy,  for  the  two  are  as  con- 
sistent as  mathematics  and  astronomy;  but  it  will  extinguish  false 
philosophy  respecting  truth,  and  become  the  end  and  explanation  of 
a  genuine  philosophy  in  its  treatment  of  the  highest  truth.  In  itself, 
it  will  prove  to  be  the  true  philosophy  of  all  truth,  without  assuming 
a  philosophic  form,  or  usurping  the  prerogatives  of  philosophy  as  a 
distinct  realm  of  thought  and  investigation.  In  essence,  Christianity 
is  philosophy ;  in  form,  it  is  religion.  As  to  its  oids,  Christianity  is 
philosophical ;  as  to  Its  ideals,  it  is  religious. 

In  their  methods  of  arriving  at  truth,  secular  philosophy  and 
the  Christian  religion  have  Avidely  differed,  the  method  of  the  one 
being  rationalistic,  the  method  of  the  other  being  supernaturalistic. 
The  ends,  however,  are  the  same.  As  one  may  travel  from  New 
York  to  San  Francisco  by  water  and  another  hj  railroad,  the  dif- 
ference in  these  cases  being  the  method  of  travel  or  the  routes  taken, 
while  the  end  is  the  same,  so  one  may  seek  the  truth  by  the  philo- 
sophical, and  another  by  the  Biblical,  method,  each  having  the  same 
end  in  view.     The  same  truths  are  before  philosopher  and  inspired 


MISAPPLICATION  OF  METHOD.  727 

writer.  One  seeks  to  discover,  the  otlier  proposes  to  reveal.  One 
asks  questions,  the  other  listens  to  answers.  One  is  an  interrogation, 
the  other  is  an  echo.  Philosophy  is  an  anxious  inquirer  after  truth; 
Christianity  is  a  calm  revealer  of  truth.  The  methods  are  exactly 
opposite,  but  the  results,  if  the  one  could  go  as  far  as  the  other,  would 
be  precisely  identical.  Hiickel  would  throw  himself  into  a  rage  to  be 
told  that  the  philosophical  method  must  result  in  the  establishment  of 
supernatural  truth,  but  it  is  difficult  to  account  for  the  glorification  of 
that  method  if  it  breaks  down  when  applied  to  the  highest  truth.  To 
this  Hiickel  might  reply  that  it  is  the  truth  that  breaks  down,  which 
would  be  very  like  an  astronomer  condemning  the  stars  because  his 
telescope  did  not  reveal  them.  If  there  is  any  failure  in  the  applica- 
tion of  the  method  to  the  truth,  it  is  the  failure  of  method,  and  not 
the  failure  of  truth.  All  along  in  these  discussions  we  have  lamented 
the  break-down  of  the  philosophical  method  at  vital  points,  implying 
the  necessity  of  the  purification  of  the  method  whereby  supernatural 
truth  may  be  discerned  and  approved.  Besides,  the  unity  of  truth, 
the  oneness  of  the  natural  and  supernatural,  justifies  the  application 
of  the  philosophical  method  to  the  supernatural,  and  the  supernatural 
method  to  the  natural;  that  is,  an  interchange  of  methods  is  not  at 
all  impossible,  since  the  truths  to  be  ascertained  belong  to  both 
spheres  of  thought  and  inquiry.  The  theologic  thinker  is  quite  will- 
ing to  submit  revealed  truth  to  philosophic  analysis,  but  the  material- 
ist is  quite  unwilling  to  submit  philosophic  truth  to  spiritual  intro- 
spection.    Yet  to  this  one  must  come  as  well  as  the  other. 

In  the  hands  of  its  friends  the  philosophical  method  has  been 
prostituted  to  the  support  of  wretched  theories,  as  Darwin  urged  nat- 
ural selection,  Hiickel  the  mechanical  theory  of  the  universe,  and 
Bain  the  mechanical  process  of  thought,  showing  either  an  awkward 
use  of  the  instrument — reason — or  a  false  report  of  tlie  i-esiilts,  or 
both.  Is  theory  or  fact  the  issue  of  the  philosophic  method  ?  Is 
opinion  to  be  maintained  or  truth  to  be  sought  by  its  use  ?  Hitherto 
scientific  fictions,  heresies,  theories,  opinions,  and  philosophic  falsehoods 
have  been  sustained  by  the  philosophic  method,  just  as  superstitions, 
traditions,  mysticisms,  and  fanaticisms  have  been  apparently  justified  by 
the  religious  or  supernaturalistic  method.  The  time  has  arrived  not 
only  for  the  purification  of  method,  but  its  rescue  from  perversion 
and  its  legitimate  application  to  truth.  A  philosophic  method,  a  ra- 
tionalistic pi'ocess,  must  terminate  in  the  support  of  the  ultimate 
truths  of  Christianity,  otherwise  Christianity  is  vulnerable  at  its 
strongest  point.  Supernatural  truth  is  as  philosophical  as  natural 
truth,  and  the  method  applied  to  the  latter  may  also  be  applied  to 
the  former,  so  far  as  the  method  itself  has  been  developed  or  per- 


728  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

fected.  As  the  algebraic  method  of  to-day  is  an  improvement  over 
such  method  of  yesterday,  so  the  philosophic  method  is  developing, 
and  must  be  adapted  finally  to  test  all  truth,  and  will  establish  the 
highest  truth.  This  is  the  purport  of  that  method,  this  is  its  use  in 
the  realm  of  thought,  and  this  foreshadows  its  relation  to  religion. 

Granting  that  the  philosophic  method  has  been  turned  against 
highest  truth,  it  is  evident  that  such  truth  has  received  its  strongest 
vindication  at  the  hands  of  that  method.  With  its  predilection  for 
atheistic  sentiment,  by  virtue  of  its  method  philosophy  has  been  com- 
pelled to  declare  in  favor  of  the  fundamental  idea  of  God.  We  do 
ncrt  say  it  has  declared  for  God,  but  it  supports  the  idea  of  a  Supreme 
Power  as  a  condition  of  thought,  as  a  condition  of  existence.  Ham- 
ilton, Darwin,  and  Spencer,  of  the  moderns,  and  Socrates  and  Plato, 
of  the  ancients,  demonstrated  the  idea  of  God  as  an  ultimate  fact  of 
philosophy.  In  order  to  save  Darwinism,  evolution,  and  kindred  the- 
ories from  a  total  wreck,  it  has  come  to  pass  that  their  founders  have 
proclaimed  their  compatibility  with  the  theistic  hypothesis.  Foresee- 
ing the  utter  impossibility  of  blotting  out  the  divine  name  from  the 
universe,  the  friends  of  evolution  bolster  it  up  by  assuming  that  it 
was  the  divine  method  by  which  the  Supreme  Power  inaugurated  the 
universe.  Here  is  a  philosophic  theory  transformed  into  a  divine  idea 
for  self-preservation.  Thus  it  may  happen  that,  in  order  to  self-exist- 
ence, nearly  every  philosophic  theory  will  clothe  itself  in  divine  gar- 
ments, and  walk  the  earth  as  a  divine  idea,  sovereign  at  last  in  the 
thought  of  man.  To  this  we  have  no  objection  ;  this  is  what  we  ex- 
pect. The  drift  of  philosophy  is  toward  a  demonstration  of  ultimate 
truth  ;  that  is,  the  philosophic  method,  rescued  from  its  corruptions 
and  misapplications,  is  at  last  reaffirming  the  truths  first  made  known 
by  the  supernaturalistic  method,  and  justifying  them  on  its  grounds 
and  in  its  own  way.  In  natural  order  the  supernaturalistic  method 
preceded  the  philosophic  method  in  the  ascertainment  of  religious 
truth,  but  the  philosophic  method  is  now  that  by  which  religious  truth 
is  confirmed.  The  supernaturalistic  method  fm"  revelation;  the  phil- 
osophic method  for  confirmation.  Confirmation  is  as  valuable  as  rev- 
elation ;  confirmation  is  revelation  ;  the  philosophic  is  the  supernatu- 
ralistic method,  applied  later  in  the  historic  order  for  the  demonstration 
of  revelation.  Hence  it  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  Christianity  is  a 
philosophic  finality,  because  the  philosophic  method  conducts  to  its 
ultimate  truths. 

Again,  Christianity  must  be  accepted  as  a  philosophic  finality,  or 
final  solution  of  all  philosophic  truth,  on  the  ground  that  its  own  truths 
are  essentially  philosophical,  rational,  and  of  the  highest  utility  to  man. 
Christianity  is  a  philosophical  religion ;    it  is  a  philosophy  of  truth 


THE  RATIONALE  OF  DIVINE  TRUTHS.  729 

in  its  fundamentals  and  a  philosophy  of  knowledge  in  its  revela- 
tions. In  makiug  this  statement  we  do  not  forget  the  great  mys- 
teries of  religion,  but  they  are  the  mysteries  of  philosophy  as  well, 
and  without  religious  illumination  must  be  utterably  inexplicable. 
Being,  generation,  life,  matter,  God,  immortality,  and  man  are 
stupendous  mysteries,  taxing  philosophy  beyond  its  ability,  and  re- 
ducing religion  to  a  fabled  mass  but  for  its  supernatural  revelation. 
This  is  our  relief  in  the  investigation  of  these  mysteries,  and  the  only 
relief.  To  dispense  with  the  mysteries  by  calling  them  absurdities 
will  not  do ;  they  are  truths,  a  knowledge  of  which  is  essential  to  hu- 
man welfare,  human  hope,  and  human  faith,  but  such  knowledge  is 
not  attainable  through  philosophy  alone.  Christianity  is  the  key  to 
final  or  ultimate  knowledge  of  these  subjects,  and,  therefore,  superior 
to  philosophy,  which,  aiming  at  such  knowledge  and  anxious  for  it, 
falls  short  of  acquiring  it.  In  this  respect,  while  Christianity  is 
strictly  philosophical,  it  can  not  be  said  that  philosophy  is  strictly  re- 
ligious. The  two  are  /la^-brothers,  both  exhibiting  a  natural  likeness, 
but  only  one  a  supernatural  image.  As  the  supernatural  is  the  end 
of  the  natural,  so  Christianity  is  the  end  of  philosophy. 

Then  it  must  be  remembered  that  the  truths  of  Christianity  are 
not  only  ultimate;  they  are  also  rational.  An  ultimate  truth  is  not 
necessarily  rational  in  the  sense  that  it  may  be  apprehended  as  ra- 
tional ;  it  must  be  rational,  however,  in  its  content  or  essence.  Fre- 
quently not  a  few  of  the  sublime  revelations  of  Christianity  are  ridi- 
culed on  the  ground  of  an  alleged  disharmony  with  reason,  the 
skeptic  failing  to  recognize  the  difference  between  the  rationale  of  the 
truth  he  assails  and  the  rationale  of  his  apprehension  or  assault.  The 
incarnation  has  been  the  subject  of  ridiculous  interpretations,  because 
human  reason  did  not  recognize  the  divine  reason  of  the  truth.  Yet 
incarnation  is  as  rational  as  generation  ;  both  are  great  mysteries. 

The  so-called  irrational  truths  of  the  Bible  are  on  a  par  with  the 
so-called  irrational  truths  of  natural  theology ;  in  many  instances  the 
truths  of  one  sphere  are  the  truths  of  the  other,  and  both  must  be 
allowed  or  both  rejected.  Truth,  natural  or  supernatural,  is  rational. 
Philosophy  appropriates  natural  truth,  discerning  its  rationality,  while 
Christianity  appropriates  supernatural  truth,  pointing  out  its  inner 
consistency  and  beauty.  To  many  minds  the  rational  character  of 
spiritual  truth  is  more  patent  than  the  rational  character  of  natural 
truth,  since  the  latter  reaches  a  limit  and  solves  nothing,  while  the 
former  knows  no  limit  and  solves  every  thing.  Verily,  the  reason 
that  solves  or  discerns  the  highest  truth  is  the  highest  reason.  To 
those  whose  reason  is  spiritualized  or  dominated  by  the  divine  wis- 
dom, and  whose  interior  sense  enables  them  to  penetrate  through  all 


730  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

seeming  irrationality  of  form  to  actual  rationality  of  essence,  and  so 
discern  the  sublimity  of  truth,  a  knowledge  of  infinite  things  is  not 
impossible.  Because  Christianity  is  a  philosophical  ultimate  on  the 
one  hand,  and  a  rational  religion  on  the  other,  it  may  truly  claim  to 
be  a  finality. 

It  might  well  be  observed  that  the  mysteries  of  Christianity,  as 
well  as  its  demonstrable  truths,  are  philosophical  and  rational,  with- 
out reproach  in  the  realm  of  thought,  without  discoverable  weaknesses 
in  their  inner  relations.  That  these  mysteries  amaze  and  often  per- 
plex the  thinker,  we  shall  not  deny  ;  but  a  mystery  is  not  a  contra- 
diction. Neander  says  all  contradictions  are  reconciled  in  Jesus 
Christ.  To  this  may  we  add  that  all  mysteries  are  solved  in  Jesus 
Christ,  because  they  all  emanate  from  him.  One  thing  is  certain  : 
Biblical  truths  do  not  outrage  the  reason  like  Kant's  Antinomies,  nor 
do  they  confound  the  inquirer  like  many  philosophical  theories ;  but 
grow  in  proportion  as  they  are  studied,  and  demonstrate  their  high- 
born character  as  they  are  investigated.  The  atomic  theory  of  crea- 
tion, with  the  divine  element  eliminated,  is  more  mysterious  than  the 
Mosaic  revelation,  while  the  evolutionary  theory  of  the  origin  of  man 
requires  more  faith  than  any  miracle  recorded  in  the  sacred  Gospels. 
Speculative  philosophy  never  had  so  many  embarrassments  to  meet  as 
now,  for  in  the  ancient  period  truth  was  not  in  its  way,  but  in  these 
days,  its  theories,  its  suggestions,  its  teachings,  are  immediately  sub- 
jected to  that  final  test  of  all  things — the  religions  canon.  Unwilling 
to  admit  the  test,  nevertheless  the  test  is  applied,  and  error  is  exposed. 
There  are  no  antinomies  in  Christianity  ;  there  are  mysteries.  There 
is  no  speculation  in  religion  ;  there  is  philosophic  rationality.  Spec- 
ulation assumes  to  be  the  criterion  of  truth,  but  truth  is  the  criterion 
of  speculation. 

The  stones,  the  trees,  the  oceans,  the  mountains  may  test  gravita- 
tion, but  in  a  broader  sense  gravitation  tests  the  whole  earth.  In  a 
narrow  sense  philosophy  may  test  Christianity,  but  in  the  final  ver- 
dict it  will  be  seen  that  Christianity  has  tested  philosophy.  In  the 
fourth  pair  of  his  antimomies  Kant  supports  a  belief  in  God,  and 
then  contradicts  it  by  a  contrary  supposition,  leaving  the  thinker  to 
work  himself  out  of  the  logical  dilemma,  and  creating  a  doubt  as  to 
the  value  of  reason  and  the  integrity  of  knowledge.  In  like  manner, 
in  the  third  pair  of  antinomies,  he  advocates  both  necessity  and  lib- 
erty, requiring  escape  in  order  to  ascertain  the  truth.  In  such  follies 
and  to  such  extremes  of  absurdity  Christianity  does  not  indulge.  It 
is  one  thing  or  the  other.  It  affirms  the  existence  of  God,  and  never 
compromises  the  affirmation.  It  declares  human  liberty,  basing 
thereon   the  doctrine   of  human  responsibility,  and  never  intimates 


THE  INHERENT  LOGIC  OF  TRUTH.  731 

the  reign  of  the  fatalistic  spirit  in  human  affairs.  Kant  proposes  the 
singular  justification  of  his  antinomies  that  they  are  essential  to 
knowledge ;  that  is,  the  knowledge  of  truth  lies  along  the  pathway 
of  these  contrai'ies,  or  within  their  boundaries.  On  no  such  cast-iron 
logical  regulations  is  Christianity  dependent  for  its  settlement  of  the 
questions  of  truth ;  it  has  a  logic  of  its  own  at  once  fascinating,  com- 
plete, irresistible ;  it  is  the  inherent  logic  of  truth.  Its  mysteries  belong 
not  to  the  common  categories  of  thought,  and  are  not  strictly  amena- 
ble to  the  standards  of  Aristotle  and  Bacon.  However,  they  are  not 
inimical  to  philosophic  reason,  since  they  are  rational  in  their  in- 
most contents  and  in  harmony  with  truth  not  mysterious.  Mysterious 
truth  is  not  in  antagonism  with  transparent  truth.  Miracle,  proph- 
ecy, inspiration,  regeneration,  and  redemption,  considered  as  exclu- 
sive religious  truths,  are  as  rational  as  the  more  exclusive  philosoph- 
ical doctrines  of  creation,  providence,  biogenesis,  and  the  -conservation 
of  forces.  To  the  natural  mind,  however,  the  former  seem  like  ab- 
stractions, or  borrowed  and  refined  superstitions,  while  the  latter 
appear  as  concrete  facts  within  the  domain  of  observation,  analysis, 
and  utility.  The  higher  truths  seem  all  but  unreal,  while  the  lower 
advertise  their  reality.  The  conflict  of  the  spiritual  and  the  ma- 
terial is  the  conflict  of  the  apparently  unreal  and  the  real;  the 
antagonism  of  philosophy  and  Christianity  is  the  antagonism  of  lower 
and  higher,  of  sense  and  spirit.  Christianity  is  spirit-philosophy,  of 
which  its  mysteries,  the  greater  realities,  are  the  proofs.  The  rational 
content  of  Christianity  is  the  solution  of  all  philosophic  truth. 

We  dare  also  to  hazard  the  assertion  that  Christianity  is  a  very 
practical  philosophical  scheme,  adapted  both  in  its  spirit  and  purposes 
to  the  present  life,  and,  therefore,  destined  to  be  final.  Who  does 
not  wonder  at  the  endless  stupidities,  the  "insoluble  contradictions," 
and  the  abstruse  vagaries  with  which  the  tomes  of  philosophers  are 
filled?  Much  of  it,  aside  from  its  relation  to  some  exploded  theory, 
is  wholly  useless.  The  wordy  discussions  of  nominalists  and  realists, 
of  idealists  and  sensationalists,  of  evolutionists  and  materialists,  have 
a  place,  doubtless,  in  the  progress  of  thought,  and  are  mile-posts 
along  the  weary  way  to  truth;  but  the  average  man  knows  nothing 
of  their  existence,  could  not  understand  them  if  reported  to  him,  and 
lives  in  another  realm  entirely.  The  "  dirt  philosophy"  of  the  day  is 
not  vital  to  human  history.  Atomism  is  destitute  of  ethical  influence ; 
Herbert  Spencer's  scientific  morality  is  an  unapplied  fiction  ;  Hiickel's 
constructive  ethical  system  is  without  inherent  strength  or  adaptation. 

On  the  other  hand,  Christianity  is  vital  in  its  philosophical  rela- 
tions, or  it  is  nothing;  it  imparts  life  to  human  history  or  infects  it 
with  spiritual  insensibility.     In  its  adaptations  to  man,  in  its  power  to 


732  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

promote  his  welfare,  to  pilot  him  in  darkness,  and  create  in  him  im- 
mortal hope,  its  philosophical  character  is  clearly  revealed.  It  is  a 
phibsophy  of  life;  it  is  a  jMhsophy  of  the  universe;  it  is  a  philosophy 
of  man;  it  is  a  philosophy  of  God.  Of  life,  it  reveals  not  only  the 
origin,  but  also  the  Originat(n- ;  of  the  universe,  it  reveals  the 
primordial,  the  Platonic,  plan  and  its  execution.  Of  man,  it  is  a 
complete  revelation,  both  as  to  his  possibilities  and  certainties.  Its 
laws,  its  promises,  its  truths,  its  mysteries,  whose  edges  wear  an  eternal 
hue,  have  in  them  an  inspiring  force  that  he  feels,  a  guidiug  influence 
that  he  obeys,  a  redemptive  power  to  which  he  submits.  Of  God,  it 
is  decisive,  revealing  him  in  his  unity  and  proclaiming  him  as  the 
world's  Lawgiver,  Benefactor,  and  Deliverer. 

Perhaps  right  here  the  dividing  line  between  Christianity  and 
Philosophy  proper  is  more  conspicuous  than  at  any  other  point. 
Christianity-is  more  philosophical  than  philosophy,  because  it  is  more 
rational,  because  it  is  more  useful.  The  uplifting,  guiding,  redeem- 
ing power  of  the  one  finds  no  counterpart  in  the  other.  The  revela- 
tions of  the  one  are  not  at  all  matched  by  the  conclusions  of  the 
other.  Hackel,  Darwiu,  and  Spencer  have  rendered  no  such  service 
to  the  world  as  Moses,  John,  and  Paul.  It  must  also  be  confessed 
that  Christianity,  for  its  revelatious,  is  in  no  sense  indebted  to  philoso- 
phy ;  it  did  not  borrow  its  truths,  it  originated  them ;  it  does  not 
work  out  its  truths,  it  states  them.  Truth  may  be  the  end  of  philoso- 
phy, but  Christianity  is  the  end  of  truth.  While  Philosophy  has  been 
working  toward  the  end,  Christianity  has  reached  it.  Christianity 
is  truth,  the  end  of  truth,  beyond  which  philosophy  can  not  go,  as  far 
as  which  it  has  not  yet  come.  If  Christianity  is  the  end  of  truth,  it 
must  also  be  the  end  of  philosophy ;  hence,  philosophy  must  finally 
be  absorbed  by  Christianity.  If  ultimate  truth  absorbs  all  related  or 
intermediate  truth,  and  the  highest  truth  includes  the  lowest,  then 
philosophical  truth  at  last  must  be  lost  in  the  broader  truth  of  Chris- 
tianity, which  is  the  same  as  saying  that  Christianity  is  the  final  phi- 
losophy.  As  such  we  proclaim  it.  Final  in  its  truths,  it  must  be  final 
as  a  philosophy  of  truth. 

As  Christianity  is  the  final  philosophy,  so  is  it  the  final  religion. 
It  is  not  only  the  supreme  religion,  it  is  the  only  supernatural  relig- 
ion, and  therefore  the  only  religion.  All  others  in  their  sober  con- 
tents are  mere  adumbrations,  reflections,  or  imitations,  to  be  fulfilled, 
and,  therefore,  to  be  lost  in  that  which  shall  endure  forever.  Except 
among  those  who,  dissatisfied  with  certain  theologic  phases  of  Chris- 
tianity, are  prophesying  great  structural  changes  in  the  religious 
concept,  the  world  is  not  anticipating  a  new  religion,  nor  are  there 
any  signs  of  preparation  for  another.     An  entirely  new  religion,  em- 


THE  CHRISTIANITY  OF  THE  FUTURE.  733 

bodying  the  principal  features  of  all  religions,  and  supplanting  all, 
because  superior  to  all,  is  not  a  possibility.  Such  eclecticism  has 
been  mooted  in  certain  quarters,  but  the  expectation  of  a  religion 
made  up  of  eliminations,  combinations,  and  additions,  is  theoretical. 
Even  should  such  a  religion  appear,  just  so  far  as  it  contained  the 
truth,  it  would  be  nothing  more  than  Christianity  under  a  new  name, 
and  in  a  disguised  form,  aiming  at  the  very  ends  it  proposes,  and  by 
methods,  just  so  far  as  they  would  prove  effectual,  in  harmony  with 
its  agencies  and  revelations.  In  a  sense  not  applicable  to  any  other 
religion  Christianity  is  the  purest  eclecticism,  or  a  revelation  of  the 
absolute  truth  of  all  religions,  and  filled  only  with  the  highest  and 
holiest  inspirations  both  from  earth  and  heaven.  Improvement  on 
the  eclectic  plan  is  impossible.  Hence,  Christianity  is  a  religious 
finality. 

What,  it  may  be  asked,  is  meant  by  religious  finality  ?  It  is  not 
intended  to  mean  that  the  Christianity  of  the  future  will  be  un- 
changed in  its  particulars,  nor  that  its  truths  will  not  seem  larger, 
richer,  fuller,  than  they  do  now,  nor  that  it  will  be  unantagonized  by 
ideas  apparently  religious  and  contrary  to  itself  As  we  have  shown, 
there  is  the  "new  in  Christianity "  that  must  be  brought  to  light; 
there  is  an  unexplored  realm,  a  vast  deep,  of  truth  that  must  be  en- 
tered, and  report  made  of  its  contents.  The  anticipation  of  the  new 
is  an  inspiration  to  faith  and  labor,  but  the  new  will  not  be  inconsist- 
ent with  the  old  ;  it  will  be  more  glorious ;  it  will  be  broader,  higher, 
deeper ;  it  will  be  a  fathomless  ocean.  The  discovery  of  the  hidden 
realms  of  truth  will  be  a  part  of  the  joyous  labor  of  the  future,  re- 
sulting in  the  relief  of  Christianity  from  its  accessories  of  error  and 
superstition,  and  its  enlargement  of  just  such  revelations  which  up  to 
this  time  the  human  mind  has  been  too  timid  to  anticij^ate,  and  too 
sluggish  to  desire.  Man's  ability  to  apprehend  Christianity  in  its 
larger  aspects  is  by  no  means  exhausted.  His  studies  of  its  truths 
have  but  begun.  He  must  search  more  and  more ;  he  must  go  into 
the  depths.  In  his  deep-sea  soundings  he  may  find  pearls  that  the 
fathers  never  saw ;  he  may  bathe  in  waters  that,  unlike  Lethean 
streams,  will  revivify  his  intellectual  aspiration,  and  produce  a  widen- 
ing consciousness  of  existence  that  he  never  before  felt.  Neither 
Eusebius,  nor  Luther,  nor  Knox,  nor  Wesley,  nor  all  the  religious 
teachers  of  the  past  fully  disclosed  the  divine  mysteries  as  taught  in 
the  holy  oracles.  Future  generations  will  have  something  to  do  if 
they  comprehend  the  majesty  and  magnitude  of  the  world   of  truth. 

Speculation,  however,  on  the  probable  developments  of  Christian- 
ity must  cease,  lest  we  forget  the  important  point  that  whatever  the 
development,  and  larger  as  the  Christianity  of  Hhe  future  will  be,  it 


734  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

will  be  the  old  Christianity  of  Christ,  and  John,  and  Paul,  the 
Christianity  we  ourselves  have  received.  In  its  unfolded  character, 
the  old  better  known,  and  the  new  in  strictest  harmony  with  it,  it 
will  be  as  it  is  now,  the  final  announcement  of  God  to  man,  and  ac- 
cepted, where  accepted  at  all,  as  the  only  religion  worth  having  or 
protecting.  For  this  belief  or  anticipation  several  reasons  may  be 
stated. 

First,  Christianity  is  a  religion  of  positive  affirmations.  Emerson 
insists  upon  affirmations,  and  that  they  be  as  strong  and  loud  as  can- 
non balls.  There  is  nothing  so  empty,  so  powerless  as  a  negation  ;  it 
is  a  fuse  without  powder.  Agnosticism  is  the  crater  of  the  extinct 
volcano  of  Pyrrhonism.  In  religion  one  affirmation  is  worth  more  than 
a  thousand  negations,  one  truth  is  more  valuable  than  all  the  errors 
of  the  centuries.  Light,  not  darkness  ;  knowledge,  not  ignorance ; 
certainties,  not  dubieties;  are  wanted  in  the  realm  of  religious  thought. 
Is  it  answered  that  in  nothing  can  man  be  less  positive  in  belief,  less 
sure  that  he  is  correct  in  thought,  than  in  religion  ?  that  he  must  deal 
with  traditions,  superstitions,  legends,  theologies  ?  that  religious  truths 
so-called  are  the  products,  not  of  the  brain,  but  of  the  heart?  and 
that  Christianity,  in  assuming  to  be  supernatural,  deprives  itself  of  a 
rational  basis,  and  must  appeal  to  credulity  for  support  ?  Some  things 
are  not  to  be  denied,  even  though  they  compel  an  abandonment  of 
some  supposed  truths,  and  a  change  of  theological  position.  It  is 
true  that  the  current  of  religious  thought,  following  it  in  its  course 
down  the  ages,  appears  at  times  like  a  muddy  stream,  in  some  places 
more  like  a  stagnant  pool,  and  so  frequently  it  flows  on  like  a  turbid 
.  river.  Of  the  mythological  religions  the  heart  grows  sick  in  recount- 
ing the  oppressions,  the  idolatries,  the  sacrifices,  and  the  benumbing 
influence  which  under  their  reign  were  everywhere  sure  to  exist.  Of 
the  great  historical  religions  in  the  East  more  can  be  said  in  their 
favor  since,  in  a  preliminary  sense,  they  were  related  to  that  which 
followed,  and  to  a  degree  their  old  teachers,  ignorant  of  truth, 
were  yet  stirred  by  the  deepest  religious  impulses,  but  if  they  fore- 
glimpsed  the  necessities  of  the  race  they  were  unable  to  provide  for 
them,  and  so  man,  in  their  hands,  was  as  helpless  as  ever. 

In  Mohammedanism,  a  religion  on  crutches,  a  religion  lame  in  one 
foot  at  least,  we  see  an  advance,  but  only  in  one  direction.  The  truth 
here  gained  is  shrouded  in  superstition  as  distressing  and  in  darkness 
as  dense  as  that  which  preceded  it,  showing  that  the  core  of  a  help- 
ful religion  can  not  be  any  one  of  a  number  of  great  truths,  but  it 
must  be  the  central  truth  of  the  kingdom  of  God. 

The  need  of  another  religion,  without  superstition,  without  an  en- 
ervating aim,  without'a  depressing  effect,  has  its  demonstration  in  the 


THE  AFFIRMATIONS  OF  CHRISTIANITY.  735 

weaknesses  of  the  world's  religions.  Such  religion  is  Christianity. 
Is  tradition  a  weakness  in  religion  ?  Jesus  condemns  tradition.  Is 
fable  a  positive  infirmity  of  religion?  Jesus  says,  "  I  am  the  truth," 
lifting  his  religion  above  fable.  Are  other  religious  barren  of  a  ma- 
jestic purpose?  Jesus  says,  "The  Son  of  Man  is  come  to  seek  and 
to  save  that  which  was  lost."  Neither  Gautama,  nor  Confucius,  nor 
Mohammed  centered  their  activities  in  a  purpose  so  philanthropic  or 
exhibited  a  spirit  so  divine.  Separating  Christianity,  as  Jesus  war- 
rants us  in  doing,  from  superstition,  fable,  mythology,  and  tradition, 
its  superiority  to  all  religions  is  apparent,  and  its  positive  character 
is  the  more  readily  apprehended.  It  deals  neither  with  negations 
nor  superstitions,  but  consists  of  the  most  positive  and  coherent 
affirmations  on  the  sublimest  truths  ever  addressed  to  man.  Its  great 
and  growing  power  lies  just  here.  It  affirms  the  existence  of  God, 
tJie  origin  of  the  worlds,  tJie  creation  of  man,  tJie  moral  degeneracy  of 
the  race,  the  authority  of  supernatural  ethical  distinctions,  the  eternal 
wages  of  sin,  tlie  nature  and  necessity  of  holiness,  the  hope  of  redemp- 
tion in  Jesus  Christ,  the  certainty  of  death,  the  promise  of  resurrection, 
the  final  accountability  of  man  at  the  judgment-seat  of  Christ,  and  the 
eternity  of  the  rewards  and  retributions  pronounced  upon  tlie  last  day. 
On  subjects  so  vital  Christianity  is  transparent;  it  utters  no  un- 
certain sound ;  it  misleads  no  honest  inquirer,  for  if  the  Gospel  be 
hid  it  is  hid  to  them  that  are  lost ;  it  inspires  every  truth-seeker, 
being  truth  itself.  On  many  themes  the  Bible  is  not  as  explicit 
as  curiosity  might  desire,  nor  as  clear  as  some  of  its  teachers 
have  wished;  but  such  themes  are  oftener  scientific  than  religious. 
Religious  truths,  which  concern  human  character  and  are  related 
to  human  happiness  and  destiny,  are  positively,  strongly,  repeatedly 
affirmed,  so  that  the  wise  student  thereof  may  sufficiently  appre- 
hend them.  Affirmed  truth  is  not  necessarily  explained  truth. 
God's  existence  is  affirmed,  but  not  defined.  Regeneration  is  an  af- 
firmed necessity,  but  the  process  by  which  it  is  secured,  except  that 
the  Holy  Spirit  is  the  instrument,  is  not  explained.  Truths,  not  ex- 
planations ;  theorems,  not  solutions ;  affirmations,  not  negations, 
constitute  the  substance  of  the  divine  revelations,  the  strength  and 
frame-work  of  Christianity.  On  this  ground  we  predicate,  not  only 
the  solidity  of  Christianity,  but  also  its  perpetuity  and  finality  as  a 
religion. 

Again,  the  vital  principle  of  Christianity  is  a  guarantee  of  its  fu- 
ture and  its  finality  as  religious  truth.  The  continued  reign  of  a  re- 
ligion is  dependent  upon  the  inherent  vitality  of  its  sovereign  or 
predominant  principle.  External  forces,  usurpation  of  rights,  and 
public  misinstruction,  may  enthrone  a  false  religion  and   perpetuate 


736  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

it  many  centuries;  but  its  decadence  is  certain  and  its  overthrow 
final.  Time  is  long  enough  to  work  its  revenge  on  error.  False  re- 
ligions must  perish,  because  falsehood  is  perishable  in  itself.  Equally- 
uncertain  are  those  religions  whose  great  truths,  drawn  from  divine 
sources,  are  enshrined  in  superstition,  because  superstition  is  doomed. 
Mohammedanism,  with  its  one  underlying  truth,  will  not  be  able  to 
save  itself,  first  because  the  one  truth  of  the  unity  of  God  is  not 
sufficient  for  a  religion,  and,  second,  because,  if  sufficient,  its  incrus- 
tation of  superstition  quenches  its  vitality  and  reduces  its  activity  to 
a  routine  movement  of  blind  and  helpless  faith.  In  time,  therefore, 
it  must  be  a  religion  of  history. 

Monotheism,  as  a  sovereign  principle,  is  fundamental  to  Chris- 
tianity, but  monotheism  alone  is  not  Christianity.  From  the  great 
doctrine  of  the  unity  of  God  issue  many  great  truths,  facts,  and  ele- 
mentary teachings,  all  essential  to  religion,  as  the  ideas  of  authority, 
will,  law,  obedience,  homage,  and  duty.  The  idea  of  God's  sover- 
eignty projects  into  the  world  the  thoughts  of  government,  providence, 
justice,  equity,  force,  order,  and  stability.  However  sovereign  these 
thoughts,  however  essential  to  religion,  they  do  not  constitute  the 
highest^religion.  More  is  wanted  than  sovereignty.  Religion  does  not 
reach  its  highest  altitude  in  law  or  force.  This  was  the  supreme 
weakness  of  Judaism,  as  it  is  the  religious  infirmity  of  Mohammedan- 
ism. The  Judaic  God  was  intensely  personal,  a  ruler;  but  decay 
smote  Judaism  like  drought  the  king's  garden.  The  personality  of 
God  was  sounded  by  Mohammed,  and  it  echoed  over  the  continents, 
and  paganism  turned  pale,  and  atheism  sought  a  cave;  but  it  has 
proved  insufficient. 

For  a  like  reason  Brahminism  has  suffered  an  almost  total  eclipse, 
and  is  bound  to  go  out  in  the  blackest  darkness.  It  is  not  enough 
that  Brahm  is  intelligence  or  light,  since  the  world  has  need  of 
something  more  than  light.  Besides,  the  average  Brahmin,  worship- 
ing Intelligence,  does  not  receive  knowledge,  and  inquiring  for  Light 
he  never  finds  it.  He  worships  emptiness,  and  is  empty  in  return. 
He  waits  at  the  altar  for  revelations,  but  they  never  come.  He  prates 
of  wisdom,  but  he  has  it  not.  He  speaks  of  light,  but  ever  walks  in 
darkness.  Buddhism,  dissatisfied  with  a  distant  or  abstract  light,  in- 
carnates the  divine  intelligence  in  one  of  the  race,  a  child  or  man, 
whom  it  styles  Lama  or  the  priest,  but  from  whom  the  worshiper  re- 
ceives nothing.  With  this  incarnation  Buddhism  stops,  and  the 
Buddhist  stops,  without  relief  from  sin,  inspiration  to  holiness,  or  en- 
couragement to  activity. 

These  are  variations  of  the  monotheistic  principle,  sovereign  in 
the  Eastern  religions,  proving  how  incompetent  any  religion  is  for 


VITAL  PRINCIPLES  OF  THE  FINAL  RELIGION.  737 

the  highest  tasks  without  another  or  the  life-giving  endowment. 
It  is  at  this  point  that  the  great  difference  between  Christianity  and 
the  historical  religions  is  manifest,  a  difference  as  wide  as  that  be- 
tween life  and  death.  Its  vital  principle  is  not  the  sovereignty  of 
God.  While  the  fact  of  the  divine  existence  is  as  prominent  and  as 
potent  in  Christianity  as  in  any  other  religion,  it  is  not  the  supreme 
fact ;  it  is  rather  the  initiatory  step  toward  the  religion  whose  central 
truth  is  something  else.  The  difference  between  the  sovereignty  of 
God  and  the  incarnation  of  God  measures  the  difference  between  the 
divine  and  all  human  religious.  The  latter  are  rooted  in  sovereignty ; 
the  former  begins  with  the  incarnation  of  Jesus  Christ.  Incarnation, 
not  mom)thewn,  is  the  vital  principle  of  Christianity.  Jesus  Christ 
is  the  chief  corner-stone  of  the  new  religion.  Recogniziug  law,  sov- 
ereignty, government,  providence,  justice,  and  force,  as  the  prelimi- 
nary ideas  of  religion,  Christianity  presents  salvation  from  sin, 
atonement  by  Jesus  Christ,  regeneration  by  the  Holy  Ghost,  and 
future  rewardability  on  the  basis  of  the  temporal  life,  as  the  essen- 
tial elements  of  a  better  religion.  Judaism  and  Mohammedanism 
announced  that  the  world  had  a  Creator  and  man  a  Law-giver; 
Christianity,  reiterating  these  announcements,  lifted  up  its  voice  and 
proclaimed  a  Savior.  This  is  new ;  this  is  the  vital  principle  of 
Christianity.  Superseding  all  other  principles,  it  does  not  seem  pos- 
sible that  any  other  can  ever  supersede  it,  and,  therefore,  the  re- 
ligion based  upon  it  must  be  final. 

Furthermore,  the  settlement  of  the  future  of  the  divine  religion 
is  partly  determined  by  the  providential  fact  that  the  greatest  truths 
of  the  historical  religions  find  their  counterparts  in  Christianity.  It 
is  not  important  to  ascertain  just  how  certain  truths  are  common  to 
all  religions,  nor  how  it  happens  that  such  truths,  relieved  of  gross- 
ness  and  incapability,  crystallize  in  strength  and  beauty  in  Chris- 
tianity. He  who  denies  to  Hindooism,  either  in  its  philosophic  or 
religious  utterance  a  trace  of  truth,  needs  the  opening  of  his  eyes, 
for,  deficient  both  as  philosophy  and  religion,  it  is  neverthless  the 
exponent  of  great  religious  ideas,  and  has  wrought  in  man  a  hunger 
for  things  divine  that  must  always  precede  their  attainment.  All  the 
old  religions  excite  an  intolerable  craving,  but  they  do  not  satisfy  it. 
Religions  that  have  stood  like  great  pillars  supporting  the  ages  must 
have  in  them  some  truths  that  Christianity  can  appropriate,  or  which 
are  identical  with  the  truths  of  the  divine  Teftcher.  The  substance 
of  what  is  good  in  them,  the  final  elements  of  the  old  systems,  may 
be  transformed  either  into  primary  or  final  elements  of  the  new  re- 
ligion, and  so  will  be  preserved  forever.  The  sovereignty  of  God,, 
the  authority  of  law,  the  reign  of  providence,  the  manifestations  of 

47 


738  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

the  divine  presence,  all  essential  divine  truths,  must  pass  from  the 
old  into  the  new  in  order  that  the  followers  of  the  old  may  lose 
nothing  essential  in  embracing  the  new.  Many  superstitions,  many 
false  interpretations  of  the  facts  of  life,  many  vagaries  in  traditional 
forms,  corrupted  during  the  lapse  of  time,  they  will  abandon ;  but  of 
the  unity  of  God  and  of  the  facts  of  creation,  providence,  and  gov- 
ernment, they  will  have  all  the  brighter  conception,  since  it  is  the 
province  of  the  new  to  emphasize,  illustrate,  and  enforce  these  ideas 
as  it  was  impossible  for  the  old  to  do.  Christianity  contains  all  the 
essential  truths,  the  sovereign  ideas,  the  vital  teachings  and  principles 
of  the  ancient  faiths,  rescuing  them  from  a  barbarous  environment, 
and  assigning  them  their  true  position  in  the  final  system  of  relig- 
ious truth. 

This  is  not  its  greatest  virtue,  however ;  for  what  better  is  it  than 
they  if  it  is  only  a  conglomeration  or  reproduction  of  the  old  faiths? 
Christianity  has  its  specialties,  doctrines  that  separate  it  from  all 
other,  even  the  most  kindred,  faiths,  and  which  declare  it  to  be  from 
God.  That  other  religious  in  their  primary  elements  resemble  Chris- 
tianity, is  a  sufficient  reason  for  their  absorption  by  the  latter  ;  that 
the  latter  is  unlike  any  other  in  specific  truths,  is  sufficient  ground 
for  its  perpetuity.  Many  religions,  animated  by  common  sovereign 
principles,  can  not  be  as  promotive  of  general  righteousness  as  one 
religion,  containing  all  the  sovereignties,  owing  to  the  frictions  and 
irritations  which  the  many  are  likely  to  provoke,  while  the  one  can 
fight  its  way  along  a  single  line.  Brahminism,  Buddhism,  Moham- 
medanism, Shintoism,  and  Taoism,  are  reproduced  or  preserved  in 
their  essentials  in  Christianity.  The  difference  between  them  and  the 
one  religion  standing  out  against  them  is  that  what  is  vital,  supreme, 
essential  in  these  Eastern  faiths,  must  occupy  a  subordinate  relation 
in  the  Christian  faith,  parting  with  their  authority  as  religions,  and 
sinking  out  of  sight  as  divine  systems.  From  supremacy  to  subordi- 
nation is  a  step  down,  but  it  has  reference,  not  to  annihilation,  but 
solely  to  a  change  of  position  in  the  religious  conflict.  The  truth  of 
the  old  is  a  truth  of  the  new,  but  with  less  influence  in  the  latter 
than  in  the  former.  What  is  absolute  in  the  old  is  relative  in  the 
new  ;  what  is  fundamental  in  the  one,  becomes  auxiliary  in  the  other. 
The  ascendency  of  Christianity  is  the  ascendency  of  its  specialty, 
namely,  the  Incarnation,  and  the  subordination  of  all  other  sovereign- 
ties in  religion.  • 

Too  much  stress  can  not  be  laid  upon  the  fact  that  Christianity  is 
proving  itself  to  be  the  final  religious  answer  of  God  to  man  by  its 
ahmulant  and  exhaustless  revelations.  It  is  a  canon  of  faith  that  the 
inspired  Scriptures  are  sufficient  in  themselves,  as  sources  of  truth, 


THE  WHEEL  WITHIN  A   WHEEL.  739 

and  that  new  revelations  are  unnecessary  and  will  never  be  made. 
This  is  not  startling  to  those  who  reflect  that  the  revelations  already- 
given  contain  within  themselves  new  and  unknown,  but  not  unknow- 
able, truths,  to  be  gradually  unfolded  as  man's  spiritual  preparation 
for  their  apprehension  and  use  is  completed.  Inspired  truth  is  a 
wheel  within  a  wheel ;  one  revelation  is  a  key  to  another  revelation ; 
one  truth  is  the  vestibule  to  the  palace  of  treasures.  As,  ascending 
the  Rocky  Mountains,  the  summit  of  one  peak  enables  the  traveler 
to  discern  still  other  peaks,  higher  and  greater,  that  he  did  not  recog- 
nize or  anticipate  from  the  valleys  below,  so,  ascending  the  mount  of 
revelation,  one  truth  after  another,  not  foreshadowed  by  any  thing 
below,  breaks  upon  the  vision  and  enchants  the  beholder  with  its  celes- 
tial charms,  bidding  him  go  forward  forever.  The  human  race  has  not 
gone  up  to  the  summits,  but  it  is  going.  The  great  ranges  of  truth 
in  the  Scriptures  but  few  men,  explorers,  the  vanguard  of  a  mighty 
host,  have  descried,  ascended,  and  measured.  Occasional  flashes  of 
light  have  suggested  their  existence,  and  the  devout  student  has 
kindled  into  rapturous  enthusiasm  as  he  gazed  upon  the  outlines;  but 
he  hesitates  to  scale  the  dizzy  heights,  or  waits  until  the  divine  Guide 
invites  him  upward. 

This  view  of  Christianity  has  not  received  the  attention  it  deserves, 
and  really  has  encountered  no  little  opposition  from  those  who  are 
the  guardians  of  the  oracles  of  God.  Creed-makers,  with  fine  and 
pious  assumption,  have  hedged  in  Avhat  they  declare  to  be  the  essen- 
tials of  Christianity,  and  have  been  fierce  in  denunciation  of  those 
who  saw  a  little  beyond  the  hedge-line.  More  than  once  the  charge 
of  heresy  has  been  nailed  on  the  student's  door ;  and  not  infrequently 
the  suspicion  of  moral  dishonesty  has  been  raised  against  one  whose 
chief  offense  consisted  in  a  purpose  to  find  out  the  lurking-places  of 
truth;  and  so  investigation  had  been  under  ban,  and  freedom  of 
thought  a  most  perilous  exercise. 

Our  age  is  on  the  eve  of  a  new  departure  in  regard  both  to  the 
importance  of  truth  and  the  right  of  discovery,  or  of  the  use  of  that 
which  may  lead  to  the  truth.  Dissatisfaction  with  antiquated  creed- 
forms  has  led  to  'the  suspicion  that  they  do  not  accurately  report 
Christianity,  and  that  there  is  more  in  the  supernatural  revelations 
than  has  been  imagined  or  declared,  and  hence  inquiry  without  re- 
straint and  without  responsibility  is  legitimate,  and  to  be  encouraged. 
The  disposition  to  break  away  from  the  discipline  and  leadership  of 
the  creed-monger  does  not  imply  a  purpose  to  disown  the  verities  of 
the  new  religion,  but  rather  a  purpose  to  find  out  what  they  are,  and 
not  to  be  satisfied  until  they  can  be  defined  and  apprehended.  We 
are  on  the  borders  of  the  new  revelations  of  Christianity,  revelations 


740  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

which  shall  dissociate  truth  from  superstition,  which  shall  harmonize 
truth  with  the  philosophic  idea  of  it,  which  shall  envelop  the  pro- 
foundest  mystery  with  a  rational  atmosphere,  besides  contributing  to 
the  theological  repository  of  the  Church  new  truths,  which  ages  ago 
were  not  within  the  realm  of  speculation,  but  which  the  present  age 
is  intellectually  and  spiritually  prepared  to  receive,  and  which  are 
necessary  to  the  harmonization  of  truth  with  ifself.  If  our  own  age 
is  unprepared  for  the  reception  of  a  broader  and  deeper  revelation  of 
truth,  then  the  preparation  will  go  on,  age  after  age  seeing  a  little 
farther  into  the  mysteries  of  the  supernatural,  each  finding  what  its 
predecessor  never  dreamed  of,  and  conveying  to  its  successor  the  new 
forces  and  the  new  inspirations  which  it  has  received.  In  all  this 
development  the  spirit  of  Christianity  will  remain  the  same,  for  it  is 
a  development  of  form  only.  It  is  the  struggle  of  Christianity,  not 
only  how  best,  but  how  fully  to  express  itself.  Beaching  full  de- 
velopment of  form,  in  which  its  spirit  will  have  the  freest  activity, 
Christianity  will  then  appear  to  be  the  connecting  link  of  the  ages, 
from  the  sunrise  in  Eden  to  the  days  of  the  great  and  universal  con- 
flagration, and  the  only  truth  from  which  all  error  has  sprung,  and 
to  which  all  truth  has  returned. 

Christianity  may  safely  depend  upon  its  methods  to  secure  its  per- 
petuity, and  to  become  the  only,  that  is,  the  final,  religion  of  man. 
Carnal  weapons  it  does  not  seek  or  employ.  By  availing  itself  of 
the  sword  the  Swiss  reformation  lost  its  glory,  and  Zwingli,  its  pro- 
moter, lost  his  life.  Christianity,  majestic  and  heroic  under  Constan- 
tine,  compromised  itself  by  association  Avith  the  secular  power,  losing 
more  than  it  gained,  and  almost  lost  its  identity  as  a  religion.  Ke- 
sults  gained  by  such  combinations  are  usually  at  the  expense  of  relig- 
ion. To  insure  certain  success,  such  as  it  prophesies  of  itself,  the 
mode  of  conquest  must  be  spiritual.  To  observation  it  may  be  slow, 
but  it  is  solemnly  providential,  and  will  finally  be  irresistible.  It 
wins,  it  does  not  force. 

In  vindication  of  the  proposition  that  Christianity  will  be  the  final 
religion  no  appeal  has  been  made  to  the  prophecies,  which  are  all- 
assuring  and  all-enlightening  on  this  subject,  because  our  ground  of 
faith  is  in  Christianity  itself.  Some  look  to  prophetic  visions;  we 
prefer  to  consult  the  truths  of  the  religion,  study  their  foundations, 
examine  their  adaptations,  and  then  determine  if  the  thought  of  a 
future  triumph  has  a  rational  basis,  if  the  truth  itself  foreshadows  its 
universality.  This  method  of  determination  is  strictly  philosophical. 
Prophecy  begets  songs,  inspirations,  gladness,  faith;  truth  quickens 
thought,  reveals  knowledge,  undergirds  faith  with  reason,  and  gilds 
the  future  with  the  halo  of  millennial  supremacy. 


ITS  RELATION  TO  THE  PRESENT  AQE.  741 


CHAPTER  XXXV. 

PRESENT    TASKS    OK    CHRISTIANITY. 

THE  Gospel  of  Christ  is  true;  it  therefore  has  something  to  do  in 
this  world.  A  true  religion  has  a  mission ;  a  mission  without 
limitations,  since  truth  is  without  bounds ;  a  mission  that  shall  know 
no  end,  since  truth  will  never  cease,  and  will  always  be  a  necessity. 
The  work  of  Christianity,  except  in  its  remote  or  purely  incidental 
effects,  is  in  no  sense  temporary;  nor,  as  we  have  learned,  is  it  con- 
fined to  one  age,  or  people,  or  country.  It  is  the  religion  of  the  ages, 
the  religion  of  all  peoples,  the  religion  of  the  globe.  As  algebra, 
chemistry,  and  geology  are  universal  sciences,  without  national  char- 
acteristics, so  Christianity  is  the  universal  religion,  without  local  or 
national  peculiarities  or  elements. 

Nevertheless,  its  relation  to  the  present  age,  and  the  special  tasks 
imposed  upon  it  as  the  result  of  this  relation,  are  sufficiently  impor- 
tant to  justify  special  elaboration.  In  these  days  of  intellectual  in- 
quiry, of  dissatisfaction  with  old  forms  of  truth,  and  of  agnostic 
tendency,  and  positive  disquietude  in  the  world's  moral  life,  the  reve- 
lations of  Christianity  need  to  be  more  distinctly  emphasized,  its  as- 
surances more  rationally  reiterated,  and  its  absolute  verities  more 
frequently  demonstrated.  The  relation  of  religion  to  society,  civiliza- 
tion, and  government,  its  unavoidable  conflicts  with  scientific  pursuit 
and  philosophic  thought,  and  its  acknowledged  vitalizing  tendencies 
in  the  realm  of  human  activity  and  spiritual  progress,  require  that  it 
recognize  existing  conditions,  present  necessities,  and  the  character 
and  extent  of  current  influences  in  the  world's  development. 

Its  tasks  are  two-fold:  (1)  Tasks  respecting  itself;  (2)  Tasks  re- 
specting philosophy. 

In  submitting  the  work  the  new  Religion  must  do  with  respect  to  it- 
self, it  may  be  suspected  that  the  writer  is  under  the  influence  of  Chris- 
tianity, and  therefore  is  blinded  to  its  deficiencies,  and  disqualified  to 
indicate  the  purification  it  needs,  and  the  enlargement  possible  to  it 
if  redeemed  from  certain  supposed  errors  and  superstitions.  It  is 
true  the  spell  of  religion  is  upon  us;  but  Plato  was  influenced  by 
Socrates,  Locke  by  Descartes,  Hamilton  by  Reid  and  Kant,  and  Spen- 
cer by  Hartley ;  we  are  influenced  by  Jesus  Christ,  and  Paul,  and 
John,  and  by  Christianity  as  a  whole,  but  are  not  ready  to  ac- 
knowledge any  disqualification  on  this  account.     If  we  arc  settled  i:i 


742  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

any  special  opinion,  it  is  that  which  relates  to  the  self-purification, 
enlargement,  and  future  achievements  of  Christianity.  We  are  in- 
terested in  its  future ;  and,  that  it  may  not  disappoint  the  ages,  it  is 
all-important  that  its  present  status  be  understood,  that  present  duties 
be  performed,  and  that  its  present  hindrances  be  eliminated. 

The  attitude  of  Christianity  with  resjiect  to  the  present  age  must 
be  one  of  deep,  extensive,  and  penetrating  observation.  It  must  not  close 
its  eyes  to  modern  life,  or  be  deaf  to  the  demands  of  this  modern  age. 
It  must  not  take  for  granted  that  obstacles  are  retiring  as  it  advances, 
and  rest  in  the  recognition  of  its  own  supernaturalism  as  the  guarantee 
of  its  own  safety.  It  must  discover  its  enemies,  observe  their  critical 
assaults  on  its  foundations,  familiarize  itself  with  their  plans  and  pur- 
poses, and  study  how  to  circumvent  their  schemes,  answer  their  argu- 
ments, and  repair  their  damages.  In  dealing  with  skepticism,  three 
methods  may  be  pursued :  (a)  Ignore  it ;  (b)  Persecute  it ;  (c)  Answer 
it.  To  ignore  honest  doubt,  and  to  fail  to  enlighten  it,  is  high  treason 
against  individual  liberty,  and  is  the  sure  way  to  strengthen  such 
doubt.  To  ignore  dishonest  doubt  is  also  one  of  the  steps  toward 
converting  it  into  an  honest  suspicion  of  the  truth.  Ignoring  doubt, 
honest  or  dishonest,  it  grew  until  it  stalked  into  the  presence  of 
Christian  thought  a  full-grown  and  formidable  giant. 

In  many  instances,  recognition  of  the  skeptical  tendency  has  been 
followed  by  artful  persecution,  or  a  spirit  of  intolerance  guised  in  the 
form  of  truth  has  undertaken  to  demolish  it.  Departure  from  certain 
ecclesiastical  standards  of  faith  has  been  visited  with  excommunication 
and  the  threatened  terrors  of  perdition.  Independent  thinkers, 
anxious  to  separate  truth  from  error,  have  been  characterized  as 
blasphemers  and  heretics,  and  driven  by  ecclesiastical  tormentors  into 
positions  they  did  not  care  to  assume,  and  into  final  abandonment  of 
what  once  they  supposed  was  true.  Intolerance  of  inquiry  is  always 
baneful,  always  prejudicial  to  the  discovery  of  truth. 

The  more  excellent  way  is  to  ascertain  what  is  going  on  in  the 
world,  what  questions  men  are  asking,  what  problems  are  agitating 
the  thinkers,  what  amount  of  truth  there  is  in  agnosticism,  what 
errors  science  claims  to  have  discovered  in  the  Gospels,  what  is  the 
trouble  with  the  world,  and  what  is  the  trouble  with  Christianity. 
Recognition  of  doubts,  inquiries,  false  reasonings,  false  sciences,  false 
religions,  and  a  willingness  to  hear  all  sides  and  patiently  to  consider 
all  claims,  must  now  and  hereafter  characterize  the  advocates  of 
Christianity  as  the  condition  of  its  progress  in  the  circles  of  those  who 
philosophically  reject  it.  It  is  because  Christianity  is  true,  that  we 
insist  on  the  largest  liberty  of  those  xvho  have  rejected  it  to  point  out  its  want 
of  internal  veracity. 


A  SYSTEM  OF  DEFENSE.  743 

There  is  no  need  that  Christianity  make  special  effort  to  save 
itself,  but  there  is  need  that  it  explain  and  purify  itself.  Lamartine 
says,  "God  alone  is  strong  enough  against  God."  If  Christianity  is 
a  divine  religion,  it  can  be  overthrown  only  by  divine  means  and 
divine  agencies.  lutrenched  as  it  is,  and  supported  by  divine  re- 
sources, nevertheless  it  needs  defense,  explanation,  vindication.  Its 
truths  are  peculiar  and  stand  in  peculiar  relations  to  the  world,  and 
in  order  to  be  effectual  in  impressing  the  world,  they  must  be  pre- 
sented in  a  peculiar  way,  and  as  having  peculiar  authority  and  influ- 
ence. Many  of  its  mysteries  are  impenetrable  and  jar  on  the  reason ; 
they  must  be  simplified,  explained,  and  illuminated.  Many  of  its 
truths  require  rationalistic  support  before  they  can  be  accepted,  and 
many  of  the  events  recorded  in  the  Gospels  must  stand  the  test  of 
historical  criticism  before  they  can  be  regarded  as  real  or  true.  The 
•whole  systehi  of  truth  calls  for  a  system  of  defense. 

This,  however,  does  not  imply  that  truth  is  in  danger,  or  that  its 
supporters  must  grow^  frantic  or  become  fanatical  in  upholding  it. 
The  effort  sometimes  made  to  save  God,  or  save  the  Bible,  is  useless. 
God  is  on  the  throne,  and  will  maintain  his  sovereignty ;  the  Bible  is 
a  self-demonstrating  revelation,  and,  differing  from  all  other  books  in 
the  inspirational  origin  of  its  contents,  it  will  take  care  of  itself. 
The  defense  of  Christianity  must  lie  along  the  track  of  its  own  truths. 
The  best  defense  is  to  preach  it ;  the  best  answer  to  skepticism  is  to 
proclaim  the  truth.  But  preaching  the  truth  implies  a  knowledge  of 
the  truth,  and  requires  a  careful  study  as  to  the  best  manner  of  pre- 
senting it.  It  is  a  philosophical  Gospel ;  it  must  at  times  be  preached 
philosophically,  that  is,  the  plrilosophic  base  of  truth  must  sometimes 
be  exposed.  It  is  an  intuitional  Gospel,  that  is,  many  of  its  truths 
harmonize  with  intuitional  conclusions  ;  it  must,  therefore,  be  pro- 
claimed as  an  intuitional  truth.  It  is  a  spiritual  Gospel,  that  is,  its 
highest  truths  are  essentially  supernatural,  and  accomplish  their  effects 
by  supernatural  means ;  it  must,  therefore,  be  proclaimed  as  a  religion 
from  God.  Its  philosophy,  its  rationality,  its  spirituality,  and  its 
supernaturalism  constitute  it  the  religion  that  it  is,  and  are  the  sources 
of  its  power,  and  so  long  as  these  features  are  exhibited  and  urged, 
it  will  stand,  and  overcome  the  oppositions  brought  against  it. 

Ecclesiastical  Christianity  needs  to  save  itself  from  some  things 
that  are  essentially  no  part  of  original  or  Gospel  Christianity,  but  which 
have  gradually  grown  up  with  it,  and  sometimes  have  passed  for  the 
truth  itself,  to  the  great  injury  of  true  religion.  Among  the  excres- 
cences or  natural  outgrowths  of  ecclesiasticism  is  cant,  which,  whether 
regarded  in  its  aristocratic  or  vulgar  sense,  is  a  hindrance  to  the 
rapid  progress  of  truth.     Johnson  says,  "  Clear  your  mind  of  cant." 


744  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

There  is  no  book  so  absolutely  exempt  from  the  spirit  of  cant  as  the 
Bible,  and  no  religion  with  less  of  it  than  Christianity.  The  cant  of 
the  Eastern  or  Oriental  religions  is  their  chief  peculiarity,  which  may 
be  accounted  for  from  their  want  of  truth.  In  the  absence  of  truth, 
cant  or  superstition,  or  both,  is  likely  to  result.  But  a  religion  of 
truth  is  able  both  to  discard  superstition  and  suppress  cant.  Spiritual 
truth  may  be  as  positive  in  content,  as  free  from  superstitious  forms, 
and  as  truly  sincere  and  transparent  in  the  expression  of  its  aims 
and  methods,  as  physical  truth  ;  and  both  may  be  clear  of  all  hypoc- 
risy and  hollowness.  The  truth  of  the  existence  of  God  should  not 
be  molded  into  a  cant-phrase  any  more  than  the  law  of  gravitation. 
Regeneration  is  not  a  cant-word  any  more  than  light  or  heat.  Of 
the  words  and  phrases  of  the  Bible  we  are  not  afraid  or  ashamed, 
for  they  express  great  realities,  and  are  the  very  best  for  the  revela- 
tion of  such  realities.  They  are  inspired  words,  and,  therefore,  truth- 
words.  In  the  selection  of  its  words  or  terms  for  the  expression  of 
ideas,  philosophy  has  been  less  fortunate,  for  it  deals  with  abstractions, 
and  uses  words  in  any  sense,  if  by  so  doing  it  believes  it  may  reduce  the 
abstract  to  a  concrete  conception.  The  word  ' '  idea  "  is  really  a  cant- 
word  in  philosophy,  for  it  means  one  thing  in  Plato,  another  in 
Aristotle,  another  in  Reid,  another  in  Hamilton,  and  another  in 
Cousin.  It  has  no  fixed  or  established  meaning,  and  expresses  an 
abstraction  rather  than  a  reality.  This  is  the  most  refined  kind  of 
cant,  of  which  philosophy  furnishes  abundant  examples.  Kant's 
"antinomies,"  in  which  stock  words  are  used  in  a  double  sense,  are 
the  stately  forms  of  philosophic  cant.  Except  as  its  language  is  evi- 
dently figurative  in  meaning,  the  Bibte  declares  its  truths  in  simple 
speech,  creating  little  confusion  in  the  mind  of  the  reader,  and  is  so 
direct  in  its  revelations  that  it  is  surprising  that  double  or  uncertain 
meanings  have  ever  been  inferred.  In  the  use  of  such  words  as 
"  world,"  "  heaven,"  "  hell,"  and  "  angel, "a  figurative  meaning  is  some- 
times discoverable,  but  in  no  case  is  the  truth  which  these  words  rep- 
resent compromised  or  invalidated. 

Cant  is  the  joint  product  of  abstraction,  ambiguity,  superstition, 
insincerity,  and  irrationality.  It  should  have  no  place  in  religion, 
therefore  ;  but,  unfortunately,  there  is  a  suspicion  that  Christianity  is 
the  religion  of  cant.  This  "cant"  is  of  two  kinds:  («)  What  the 
scientific  world  calls  cant ;  (h)  What  the  common  world  calls  cant. 
The  materialistic  scientist  pronounces  such  words  as  tGod,  eternity, 
incarnation,  atonement,  justification,  regeneration,  faith,  prayer,  res- 
urrection, heaven,  and  hell  as  cant-words,  representing  imaginary 
ideas,  or  alleged  facts  that  have  no  existence.  It  is  easy  to  retort 
that  such  words  as  atoms,  force,  correlation,  mechanism,  matter,  pro- 


RECONCILIA  TION  OF  ALLEGED  CONTRADICTIONS.      745 

toplasm,  law,  oixler,  cause,  and  effect  are  the  cant-words  of  science, 
representing  misconceptions,  or  the  wildest  fancies  of  the  thinkers, 
and  no  more  entitled  to  regard  than  the  ideas  of  mythology.  The 
word  "atom"  is  far  less  intelligible  than  the  word  "creation;"  the 
word  "unknowable"  far  less  satisfactory  than  the  word  "God;"  the 
word  "force"  more  inexpressive  of  a  reality  than  "being."  The 
terms  of  science  are  recondite,  superficial,  experimental,  yet  necessary 
and  useful.  The  scientific  charge  of  cant  in  religion  rebounds  with 
slaughtering  effect  on  science.  Both  religion  and  science  must  have 
a  nomenclature,  a  vocabulary,  expressing  truths,  facts,  laws,  and 
principles  peculiar  to  them,  and  the  words  of  religion,  expressing  its 
realities,  are  not  any  more  objectionable  than  the  words  of  science, 
expressing  its  supposed  facts. 

The  common  charge  of  cant  in  religion  is  one  of  the  subterfuges 
of  the  race,  a  sign  of  indisposition  to  accept  the  truth.  The  average 
man  does  not  rise  to  a  proper  conception  of  what  religion  is,  either 
as  a  system  of  truth  or  as  an  experience  of  realities,  and  such  words 
as  repentance,  faith,  humility,  forgiveness,  and  salvation  sound  to 
him  like  the  phraseology  of  a  new  superstition,  which,  without  exam- 
ination, he  is  inclined  to  reject. 

The  Christian  teacher  must  employ  the  terms  of  religion  as  the 
exponents  of  stupendous  realities,  thereby  silencing  the  suspicion  that 
they  are  empty  forms  of  speech,  and  express  only  the  excited  senti- 
ments and  convictions  of  the  heart. 

It  is  incumbent  on  Christianity  to  reconcile  its  alleged  contradictions 
and  sati^u^its_ respect  for  conmtency.  Truth  is  self-consistent;  divine 
truth  should  be  above  all  suspicion  of  internal  contradiction.  Con- 
sidering the  range  of  Revelation,  the  various  modes  in  which  truth 
has  expressed  itself,  and  the  supernatural  mysteries  with  which  the 
Christian  religion  has  loaded  itself,  it  is  not  surprising  that  discussions 
with  reference  to  the  integrity  of  some  of  its  truths  have  arisen,  and 
that  differences  of  opinion  have  been  established.  Because  of  mys- 
teries that  have  not  been  scientifically  explained,  they  have  been 
scientifically  condemned ;  and  because  of  imperfect  revelations,  the 
whole  has  been  charged  with  imperfection  and  insufficiency.  In  a 
general  way,  it  is  alleged  against  Revelation  that  it  is  faulty  in  its 
scientific  reports  and  allusions,  incorrect  in  its  historical  data  and 
connections,  unsound,  and  therefore  unsafe,  in  its  ethical  teachings 
and  examples,  and  so  at  variance  with  itself  in  the  details  of  its  sote- 
riological  scheme  that  the  claim  of  its  inspiration  is  rendered  worth- 
less. Rev.  R.  Heber  Newton  expresses  the  critical  objection  to  the 
Old  Testament  in  the  following  words:  "The  Old  Testament  histori- 
ans contradict  each  other  in  facts  and  figures,  tell  the  same  story  in 


746  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

different  ways,  locate  the  same  incident  at  different  periods,  ascribe 
the  same  deeds  to  different  men,  quote  statistics  which  are  plainly  ex- 
aggerated, mistake  poetic  legend  for  sober  prose,  report  the  marvelous 
tales  of  tradition  as  literal  history,  and  give  us  statements  which  can 
not  be  read  as  scientific  facts  without  denying  our  latest  and  most 
authoritative  knowledge."  This  broadside  is  a  challenge  to  investiga- 
tion which  the  Christian  thinker  is  bound  to  notice.  Indifferent  to 
the  author  of  the  above  criticism,  the  criticism  itself  must  be  an- 
swered, or  remain  as  a  proof  of  the  weakness  of  the  so-called  revela- 
tions of  the  Old  Testament. 

What  renders  the  allegation  the  more  deserving  of  notice  is  that, 
without  a  thorough  investigation  of  the  historical  contents  of  the 
Pentateuch  in  particular,  the  reader  might  be  led  to  some  of  the  rad- 
ical conclusions  of  Mr.  Newton ;  in  other  words,  the  criticism  is,  in 
certain  respects,  apparenthj  true.  Not  a  few  theologians  have  conceded 
an  inaccuracy  of  statement  in  its  scientific  postul-ates,  which  has 
strengthened  the  suspicion  that  possibly  its  history  is  likewise  inaccu- 
rate, and  that,  if  the  Book  is  infallible  at  all,  it  is  only  in  its  revela- 
tion of  spiritual  truths.  But,  if  its  science  is  a  delusion  and  its  his- 
tory is  admitted  to  be  false,  the  step  to  a  denial  of  the  truth  of  its 
spiritual  revelations  is  a  short  one,  and  many  will  take  it.  Either 
the  Book  as  a  whole  is  true,  or  it  is  false.  Its  scientific  truth  must 
be  as  genuine  and  authoritative  as  its  spiritual ;  the  first  chapter  of 
Genesis  must  stand  or  fall  with  the  first  chapter  of  the  Gospel  ac- 
cording to  John ;  the  Flood  and  the  Resurrection,  Baliel  and  Pente- 
cost, the  Fall  of  Man  and  the  Atonement  of  Jesus  Christ,  must  be 
believed  or  rejected;  the  one  class  of  truths  stand  or  fall  with  the 
other  class  of  truths.  The  science,  the  history,  and  the  inspiration 
and  revelation  of  the  spiritual  truths  of  the  Bible,  can  not  be  sepa- 
rated, the  one  being  pronounced  fallible  and  the  other  infallible. 

No  more  troublous  problem  has  arisen  in  these  days  in  connection 
with  Biblical  interpretation  than  that  which  the  authorship  of  the 
Pentateuch  has  provoked.  A  majority  of  theologians  and  Biblical 
scholars  hold  with  unquestioning  faith  to  the  long-accepted  view  that 
Moses  wrote  the  five  books  bearing  his  name ;  but  schools  within  as 
well  as  without  the  Christian  Church  have  assailed  this  view  with  no 
little  vehemence,  and  propounded  disturbing  questions  to  the  other 
side.  Within  the  Church  such  writers  as  Dr.  G.  T.  Ladd,  of  Yale  Col- 
lege, and  Prof.  C.  A.  Briggs,  of  Union  Theological  Seminary,  have 
seriously  questioned  the  Mosaic  authorship  of  the  Pentateuch,  and 
have  compelled  a  reinvestigation  of  the  proofs.  Prof.  Briggs  holds 
that  the  Pentateuch  is  the  product  of  four  different  writers  ;  that  it  is 
somewhat   legendary    in    its    details,    and    without  the  supernatural 


THE  FIRES  OF  INVESTIGATION.  747 

authority  usually  attributed  to  it.  Robertson  Smith,  of  Scotland,  grants 
that  Moses  wrote  the  Ten  Commandments,  but  is  uncertain  that  he 
wrote  more  of  the  Pentateuch.  Prof.  Ladd,  advancing  a  theory  of 
inspiration,  which  excludes  a  portion  of  the  Bible  as  inspired,  denies 
to  Moses  the  authorship  of  much  of  the  Pentateuch.  Thus  a  direct 
attack  on  the  doctrine  of  inspiration  itself  is  made  within  the  Church, 
the  motive  being,  without  doubt,  the  purification  of  human  views  of 
truth,  and  the  destruction  of  errors  and  superstitions  which  age  has 
made  sacred  and  piety  beautiful.  Here,  then,  are  grave  problems 
for  the  Christian  critic  and  thinker  to  study ;  problems  that  can  not 
be  solved  by  raising  the  cry  of  heresy  against  those  who  propose  them, 
or  by  the  expulsion  from  his  chair  of  a  professor  striving  to  solve 
them,  or  by  quietly  forgetting  that  they  are  related  to  progress  and 
to  the  future.  Truth  is  the  end  of  all  seeking.  The  Bible,  as  the 
book  of  truth,  can  stand  the  fires  of  investigation;  let  them  burn. 

Inasmuch  as  the  scientific  and  historic  accuracy  of  the  Bible  is  in 
question,  and  the  authorship  of  several  Old  Testament  books  is  in  dis- 
pute, the  task  of  explanation,  defense,  and  settlement  of  these  ques- 
tions must  be  undertaken  by  the  Christian  thinker  with  the  same  en- 
thusiasm which  govern  the  so-called  errorists,  and  be  prosecuted  until 
it  shall  be  finished. 

If  Christianity  is  proclaimed  as  a  religion,  standing  beside  other 
religions,  and  taking  its  chances  with  them,  it  is  likely  to  succeed, 
even  if  the  doctrine  of  its  inspiration  must  be  abandoned  ;  but  if  it  is 
proclaimed  as  a  divine  religion,  superior  to  all  others,  and  intended  to 
extinguish  all  others,  then  the  question  of  its  inspiration  is  para- 
mount, and  alleged  conti'adictious  and  inconsistencies  must  be  ex- 
plained and  reconciled. 

The  concession  of  historic  and  scientific  errors  in  the  Bible  must 
be  withdrawn,  but  in  withdrawing  it  the  supposed  errors  must  be 
shown  to  be  distortions  of  the  truth,  or  to  have  arisen  in  a  way  that 
does  not  compromise  the  integrity  of  the  documents  containing  them.  It 
must  not  be  forgotten  that  the  original  manuscripts  of  the  sacred  writers 
are  not  before  us  ;  we  read  copies,  or  translations  of  copies,  the  infal- 
libility of  which  no  one  is  justified  in  asserting.  Errors  of  transla- 
tion, difficult  to  detect  and  equally  difficult  to  correct,  have  rendered 
ambiguous  or  uncertain  some  paragraphs  or  chapters  of  the  Book, 
but  these  are  not  numerous,  and  do  not  affect  or  change  the  accepted 
meaning  of  Revelation.  It  must  be  remembered  also  that  the  orig- 
inal languages  of  the  Bible  were  ancient  and  Oriental,  differing  in 
idioms,  grammatical  construction,  and  provincial  character  from  mod- 
ern languages,  and  especially  from  the  Anglo-Saxon  or  English 
tongue.     Employing  the  Hebrew  and  Greek  in  their  purely  native 


748  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

sense,  it  frequently  happens  that  the  sacred  writers  have  contradicted 
the  Occidental  conception  of  things,  and  the  modern  notions  of  truth. 
To  understand  the  Bible,  therefore,  it  is  necessary  to  understand  the 
languages  in  which  it  was  written. 

Nor  must  it  escape  attention  that  the  customs  and  manners  of  the 
Bible-making  period  were  exclusively  Oriental,  a  knowledge  of  which 
is  absolutely  necessary  to  a  correct  interpretation  of  the  Bible.  In 
their  salutations  and  ordinary  speech,  in  their  dress  and  occupations,  in 
their  etiquette  and  domestic  customs,  in  their  social  ideas  and  habits, 
the  Oriental  nations  differed,  as  they  do  to-day,  from  European  na- 
tions, the  Bible  writers  recognizing  the  Oriental  customs,  and  not  in- 
frequently presenting  the  truth  in  an  Oriental  frame-work.  So  far  as 
it  is  an  Oriental  book,  it  can  be  understood  only  as  Oriental  ideas  are 
understood. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  Bible  is  better  understood  to-day,  in  the 
light  of  archaeology,  geography,  and  Orientalisms,  than  at  any  period 
of  Biblical  study  and  investigation.  As  an  instance  of  progress,  con- 
sider that  until  recently  the  subject  of  the  antiquity  of  man  has  per- 
plexed both  evolutionist  and  theologian,  the  former  having  been 
anxious  to  establish  a  long  antiquity,  while  the  theologian  was  equally 
anxious  to  cut  it  down  to  sixty  centuries.  Geology,  at  first  wild  and 
eccentric,  has  under  discipline  become  sober  and  inquisitive,  and 
practically  settled  the  dispute  in  favor  of  the  theologian.  Dr.  South- 
all  concludes  that  man's  first  appearance  on  the  earth  was  about  6,600 
years  ago  ;  Principal  Dawson  dates  the  appearance  from  6,000  to 
8,000  years  ago ;  and  the  Septuagiut  version  of  the  Scriptures  places 
it  7,290  years  ago.  As  another  instance,  consider  that  recent  inves- 
tigation of  monuments  in  Syria,  Egypt,  and  Mesopotamia  has  dem- 
onstrated the  truthfulness  of  the  Biblical  account  of  the  dispersion  of 
the  races  from  the  plains  of  Shinar  at  the  time  and  in  the  manner 
indicated.  One  more  instance  :  In^del  scholarship  has  regarded  Ur 
of  the  Chaldees  a  mythological  city,  but  the  modern  geographer  has 
identified  its  site  on  the  river  Euphrates,  and  thus  supplied  a  miss- 
ing link  in  the  biography  of  Abraham.  If,  then,  geography,  archae- 
ology, and  the  monumental  and  geological  records  are  establishing 
questionable  facts,  or  solving  the  enigmas  of  the  Bible,  is  it  unreason- 
able to  infer  that  whatever  is  still  in  dispute  may  finally  be  sustained 
or  disposed  of  in  the  same  scientific  and  philosophic  way  ?  One  thing 
is  certain,  and  that  is  that  scientific  research,  when  completed  along  a 
given  line,  has  in  not  a  single  instance  overturned  or  even  shaken  the  Bib- 
lical cLCcount,  hut,  on  the  other  hand,  it  has  triumplmntly  vindicated  and 
explained  it.  The  conclusion  is  that  the  so-called  scientific  errors  of 
the  Bible  are  errors  of  interpretation,  errors  of  ignorance,  errors  of  lim- 


THE  WORK  OF  THE  CREED-BUILDER.  749 

ited  investigation,  and  not  errors  of  fad.  The  duty  of  the  Christian 
thinker  to  submit  the  science  of  the  Bible  to  scientific  research,  and 
the  history  of  the  Bible  to  historical  tests,  is  plain  enough.  In  this 
way  its  scientific  and  historic  character  will  be  established. 

One  of  the  chief  duties  of  Christianity  is  to  dejinejt&elf  with  greater 
perspicuity  and. simplicity.  A  transparent  definition,  not  of  dogma, 
nor  yet  of  single  truths,  but  of  Christianity  as  one  truth,  is  a  demand 
that  must  be  met  if  the  public  mind  shall  be  relieved  of  confusion 
and  embarrassment.  In  the  absence  of  such  a  definition  the  misun- 
derstanding of  what  Christianity  is  or  proposes  to  do  has  been  fruit- 
ful of  strife,  of  wasteful  expenditure  of  energy  in  behalf  of  creeds, 
and  of  serious  resistance  on  the  part  of  many  to  the  just  claims  of 
religion.  Taking  advantage  of  the  misunderstanding,  the  creed-builder 
went  to  work  rearing  an  architectural  frame  in  which  the  simplicities 
of  the  Gospel  have  occupied  an  obscure  place.  The  Athanasian  creed 
is  a  wonderful  structure,  a  fine  specimen  of  theologic  architecture, 
but  has  it  saved  the  world  from  death,  or  is  it  what  the  world  needs? 
The  imposition  of  creed-forms  of  truth,  the  penalties  inflicted  upon 
those  who  could  not  philosophically  accept  them,  the  dissensions  of 
ecclesiastical  bodies  over  them,  and  the  trail  of  the  hei'esy-hunter  in 
the  Christian  circles  of  thought,  have  been  a  disgrace  to  Christendom, 
an  obstacle  to  religious  progress,  and  an  unpardonable  stain  on  the 
pages  of  human  history.  As  Rome  spent  more  time  in  conquering  a 
province  in  Italy  than  was  necessary  after  she  controlled  the  Med- 
iterranean to  subdue  the  whole  earth,  so  the  Christian  Church  has 
consumed  the  ages  in  the  defense  of  peccadilloes  of  expression,  when 
long  ere  this  day  she  might  have  conquered  the  world. 

It  is  not  against  a  creed  per  se  that  we  are  writing,  for  a  formu- 
lated article  of  faith,  embracing  the  fundamental  truths  of  Christian- 
ity, is  proper  enough.  As  in  mathematics,  certain  axioms  are  neces- 
sary ;  as  in  chemistry,  certain  laws  must  be  accepted  ;  as  in  physiology, 
the  existence  of  certain  organs  and  functions  must  be  recognized,  so 
Christianity  may  be  represented  by  certain  truths,  which,  taken  to- 
gether, constitute  the  creed  or  the  axioms  of  religion.  It  makes  not 
against  this  position  to  affirm  that  no  specific  creed  or  articles  of 
faith  are  recorded  in  the  New  Testament,  for  faith  in  the  Lord  Jesus 
Christ  is  required  as  the  condition  of  salvation  ;  and  faith  in  Christ 
includes  all  the  truths  of  Christ,  or  Christianity.  The  objection  to 
the  creed  is  its  elaboration  of  details,  and  its  attempt  to  reduce 
religion,  in  all  of  its  peculiarities  and  mysteries,  to  formal  state- 
ment, belief  in  which  is  regarded  necessary  to  admission  in  the  Chris- 
tian Church,  and  to  the  benefits  of  the  atonement  of  the  Son  of 
God.     By  so  much  as  it  elaborates  beyond  essential  truths,  the  creed 


750  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

becomes  a  burden  to  faith  and  a  stumbling-block  to  inquiring  souls. 
Real  faith  acts  intuitionally.  It  sees  the  truth  in  a  moment ;  it 
needs  no  architectural  or  Gothic  form.  Give  it  the  truth,  not  as  an 
ideality,  or  a  fiction,  or  an  abstraction,  or  as  a  dogmatic  afiirmation, 
but  as  a  reality,  and  in  the  simplest  form,  and  the  mind  will  harmo- 
nize with  it.  In  religion,  as  in  science,  the  fundamentals  are  the 
simplicities.  We  do  not  deny  complexity  to  religion ;  its  truths  reach 
into  the  eternities  ;  but  man  may  spare  himself  the  trouble  of  going 
so  far  for  his  knowledge  of  saving  truth.  The  undertaking  to  define 
the  details  of  all  mysteries,  or  to  project  a  Scheme  of  Faith  which 
should  include  revealed  and  unrevealed  truth,  instead  of  defining 
Christianity  as  the  supernatural  instrument  of  the  world's  salvation, 
has  been  productive  of  serious  misapprehension  and  not  a  little  intel- 
lectual perplexity.  The  world  must  first  be  taught  what  Christianity 
is  not  before  it  will  truly  apprehend  what  Christianity  is;  that  is, 
there  is  quite  as  much  to  unlearn  as  there  is  to  learn.  Men  must 
learn  that  Christianity  is  not  a  system  of  sacraments,  or  a  theory  of 
the  priesthood,  or  a  set  of  dogmas,  or  a  series  of  ethical  truths,  or  the 
constitution  of  ecclesiastical  bodies  ;  but  that  while  sacraments,  priest- 
hoods, dogmas,  truths,  and  laws  are  in  some  sense  the  products  of  re- 
ligion, they  do  not  constitute  the  essential  ideas  of  Christianity. 
On  its  negative  side  Christianity  is  complex ;  on  its  affirmative  side, 
simple.  The  affirmations  of  religion,  the  yeas  of  divine  truth,  are  in 
demand,  and  must  be  given  to  the  world. 

In  the  same  spirit  Chnstianity^jieeds  explicitly  to  set  forth  its  purpose 
iriJJie  ivorld,  to  characterize  its  mission  in  such  terms  that  organized 
resistance  will  diminish,  and  a  glad  welcome  be  accorded  it.  Its  mis- 
sion is  three-fold :  (a)  Moral ;  (h)  Philanthropic  ;  (c)  Spiritual.  Its 
moral  purpose  appears  in  the  re-enacted  Decalogue,  and  in  the  ethics 
of  the  New  Testament.  Unobjectionable  as  is  the  moral  code  of  the 
new  religion,  and  elevating  and  restraining  as  is  its  moral  spirit,  it 
meets  intellectual  criticism  on  the  one  hand  and  practical  rebellion  on 
the  other.  Its  injunction  of  self-denial  is  interpreted  as  ascetic;  its 
virtues  are  alleged  to  be  borrowed  from  the  pagans  ;  its  inelastic  re- 
quirements are  considered  too  ideal  for  practical  life.  Civil  govern- 
ments enact  laws,  violate  treaties,  and  engage  in  war,  in  violation  of 
the  principles  of  equity,  as  taught  in  the  New  Testament ;  while  in- 
dividuals commit  crime  and  trifle  wath  right  as  if  moral  laws  were  not 
in  operation.  This  condition  of  things  Christianity  proposes  to  rem- 
edy by  the  incorporation  of  moral  principles  in  the  constitutions  of 
governments,  and  into  the  beliefs,  habits,  and  activities  of  individuals 
and  communities,  guaranteeing  the  sovereignty  of  man  and  the  reign 
of  the  moral   idea  in  this  world.     To  magnify  the  ethical  principle, 


THE  SPIRITUALITIES  OF  THE  GOSPEL.  751 

and  insist  upon  conformity  to  it,  is  one  of  the  first  duties  of  the  Chris- 
tian worker. 

The  philanthropic  purpose  of  Christianity  is  sufficiently  misunder- 
stood to  provoke  opposition  and  excite  depreciation,  yet  is  it  the 
beautiful  exponent  of  the  graciousness  of  the  divine  scheme.  Our 
religion  looks  with  sympathetic  yearning  upon  the  degradation,  igno- 
rance, and  wretchedness  of  the  human  race,  and  comes  with  pitying 
eye  to  relieve,  and  with  open  hand  to  help  and  rescue.  It  comes 
not  with  the  sword,  but  with  balm  for  wounds  already  made ;  it 
comes  not  as  a  tyrant  to  crush  out  the  remaining  life,  but  as  a  Sa- 
maritan, with  oil  and  money  to  assist  the  unfortunate  world  ;  it  comes 
all-benevolent  in  spirit,  pointing  to  schools,  asylums,  homes,  churches," 
and  is  anxious  to  lift  up  the  fallen  and  make  glad  the  whole  earth. 
To  such  a  mission  what  objection  can  be  raised?  The  skeptical  pro- 
nounce its  benevolence  the  outcropping  of  ecclesiastical  selfishness, 
and  its  works  the  fruit  of  a  culpable  sectarianism  !  This  is  proof 
that  the  philanthropies  of  the  Gospel  are  misunderstood,  and  that  the 
only  cure  for  such  misunderstandings  is  the  wide-spread  sway  of  the 
Gospel. 

The  spiritual  piirpose  of  Christianity  is  its  highest  purpose.  It  pro- 
poses to  deliver  men  from  the  thralldom  of  sin,  to  make  them  saints, 
to  equip  them  with  immortal  functions,  to  make  them  messengers  of 
light  and  children  of  God.  Such  a  purpose  no  other  religion  em- 
bodies in  its  teachings  or  efforts;  it  belongs  exclusively  to  Christian- 
ity. To  the  spiritualities  of  the  Gospel,  the  most  important  of  all, 
the  most  formidable  objections  have  been  raised.  To  the  moralities 
and  philanthropies  of  the  Gospel  the  opposition  will  be  easily  over- 
come; but  the  triumph  of  the  spiritualities  implies  and  will  require 
patience,  discipline,  culture,  intellectual  purification,  enlargement  of 
moral  capacity,  and  the  intensification  of  the  moral  pursuits  of  life. 
The  first  need  of  man  is  spirituality.  Given  the  spiritualities,  and 
the  moralities  and  philanthropies  bloom  ;  given  the  latter,  and  it  is 
not  certain  that  the  former  will  flourish.  The  divine  order  of  devel- 
opment is,  first,  spirituality,  then  morality  and  philanthropy ;  the 
world's  attempted  order  is  the  reverse  ;  hence,  the  failure.  The  true 
order  of  development,  or  the  three-fold  mission  of  Christianity  to 
the  human  race  must  be  explicitly  stated  and  enforced  as  the  condi- 
tion of  moral  and  spiritual  progress ;  otherwise  morality  will  be  sci- 
entific instead  of  spiritual,  and  philanthropy  will  be  philosophical 
instead  of  divine,  or  morality  and  philanthropy  will  be  divorced  from 
religion,  with  no  power  except  that  derived  from  their  own  mechanical 
working,  and  with  no  assurance  of  triumph  except  that  which  the 
general  law  of  evolution  will  inspire. 


752  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

While  it  is  the  duty  of  Christianity  to  take  care  of  itself,  correct 
its  weaknesses,  repair  its  infirmities,  and  eliminate  its  inadequacies, 
it  must  not  forget  its  relations  to  philosopJxic  thought,  and  that  the  task 
growing  out  of  such  relation  is  one  of  magnitude,  and  should  receive 
immediate  attention.  The  adjustment  of  the  differences  between 
Christian  thought  on  the  one  hand  and  the  philosophic  pursuit  on 
the  other,  is  so  necessary  to  the  purity  of  the  one  and  the  freedom 
of  the  other,  that  its  postponement  can  only  result  in  widening  the 
breach  and  possibly  effect  a  permanent  alienation.  From  the  stand- 
point of  Christianity,  certain  views  have  been  entertained  which, 
however  justifiable  in  spirit,  may,  in  their  practical  workings,  have 
impeded  the  work  of  reconciliation.  It  has  been  supposed  that  the 
scientific  thinker  will  finally  discover  the  harmony  of  the  facts  of 
nature  with  the  truths  of  religion,  and  that  this  discovery  will  open 
the  way  to  agreement  and  unity  without  any  special  negotiation  be- 
tween the  parties  concerned.  In  a  sense  this  is  true,  and  doubtless 
reconciliation  will  finally  be  forced  by  the  logic  of  events,  or  the  self- 
evident  harmony  of  all  kinds  of  truth.  Truth  is  a  unit,  however 
many-sided  it  is,  and  it  will  agree  with  itself.  In  mathematics  there 
is  no  conflict  among  the  squares,  triangles,  and  cii'cles ;  without  them 
mathematics  is  impossible  ;  yet  there  is  no  apparent  likeness  or  kin- 
ship among  them.  Nor  can  there  be  any  conflict  among  forces,  laws, 
causes,  doctrines,  cosmogonies,  miracles,  prophecies,  and  spiritual 
facts  when  fully  apprehended,  for,  different  in  form,  presentation,  and 
use,  they  are  not  antagonistic,  but  are  essential  to  a  religion  that  pro- 
fesses to  emanate  from  God,  and  comprehend  the  universe  of  thought 
and  being.  That  there  is  seeming  conflict  now  is  no  evidence  of  an 
inner  irreconcilability  ;  it  is  proof  of  the  perversion  of  truth  so  far 
as  discovered,  or  of  ignorance  of  truth  yet  to  be  known.  If  owing 
entirely  to  the  latter,  the  future  will  take  care  of  it  and  secure  the 
harmony  needed,  for  an  increased  knowledge  of  truth  wUl  certainly 
result  from  additional  investigations,  and  remove  grounds  of  differ- 
ence. If,  however,  the  antagonism  is  owing  to  any  degree  to  a  dis- 
torted view,  or  a  perverted  use,  of  truth,  then  the  duty  of  a  re-exami- 
nation of  our  knowledge  and  of  the  ends  to  which  it  is  applied,  and 
the  motives  that  have  governed  in  the  use  of  it  is  imperative,  or 
truth  itself  must  for  a  time  suffer.  Prejudices,  distortions,  rebufis, 
imperfections,  and  hypocrisies  have  without  doubt  interfered  with  an 
honest  adjustment  of  the  antagonism  between  the  religious  and  intel- 
lectual forces,  but  the  time  has  come  for  a  close  and  fearless  attempt 
at  reconciliation. 

Perhaps  it  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  Christianity,  conscious  of 
its  strength,  or  at  least  satisfied  that  it  can  not  be  overthrown,  has 


THE  CENTRAL  POSITION  IMPREGNABLE.  753 

been  too  indifferent  to  the  nature  of  the  attacks  made  upon  it,  and 
to  the  motives  that  have  impelled  agnosticism  and  materialism  to  join 
their  forces  against  it.  Surely  it  is  time  that  Christian  thought  should 
recognize  the  animus  of  the  opposition  and  strive  to  overcome  it. 

Again,  it  is  assumed  in  certain  Christian  circles  that  philosophic 
thought,  goaded  into  a  false  attitude  by  the  scientific  thinker,  is  re- 
sponsible for  the  antagonism  now  existing  between  itself  and  revealed 
truth,  and  that  it  must  work  out  the  problem  of  reconciliation.  As 
a  historical  fact  this  will  not  be  disputed,  but  it  is  a  question  if 
philosophic  thought,  however  honest  in  its  purpose,  can,  unaided  by 
inspired  truth,  solve  the  difficulty  and  bring  itself  into  right  rela- 
tions with  such  truth.  The  task  is  a  great  one,  too  great,  we  fear, 
for  philosophy.  It  is  asking  the  lower  to  put  itself  in  right  relations 
with  the  higher,  when  perhaps  the  higher  ought  to  put  itself  in  right 
relations  with  the  loiver.  The  stars  can  not  adjust  their  relations  to 
the  sun,  but  the  sun  may  establish  relations  with  the  stars.  Left  to 
itself,  philosophy  runs  into  pessimism,  atheism,  materialism,  and  ag- 
nosticism ;  what  hope  is  there  that,  unaided  by  divine  truth,  it  will 
some  time  grasp  the  theistic  conception  in  its  wholeness,  and  embrace 
Christianity  as  the  final  utterance  of  God?  In  this  dilemma  the 
Christian  thinker  can  not  haughtily  refuse  to  consider  methods  of 
reconciliation  or  initiate  the  steps  to  be  taken  in  order  to  secure  it. 
His  supreme  duty  is  to  advance  toward  philosophic  error,  not  as  a 
Cgesar  to  strike  it,  nor  with  the  threat  of  penalty  if  an  immediate 
surrender  is  not  made,  but  in  the  spirit  of  a  counselor,  setting  forth 
the  truth  in  its  brightest  colors,  and  quietly  shamiug  error  out  of  ex- 
istence. The  cure  for  materialism  is  the  intellectual  and  spiritual 
truth  of  Christianity ;  properly  applied  it  will  not  fail.  Philosophy 
can  not  harmonize  itself  with  revealed  truth ;  Christianity,  under- 
taking the  task  of  harmonization,  can  affect  it.  Instead  of  placing 
the  burden  of  reconciliation  upon  incompetent  philosophic  thought, 
let  Christianity  boldly  assume  it  and  proceed  to  discharge  the  duty 
required.  Herbert  Spencer  concedes  that  the  "central  position"  of 
religion  "  is  impregnable,"  meaning  that  certain  central  facts  or  teach- 
ings addressed  to  the  conscience,  the  intuitions,  and  the  reason  will 
be  recognized  as  authoritative,  and  homage  and  obedience  must  fol- 
low. In  a  larger  sense  we  may  affirm  that,  in  its  central  position,  in 
its  fundamental  truths,  Christianity  is  absolutely  invulnerable,  and  is 
demonstrating  its  stability  of  character  and  permanence  of  conquest 
by  its  progressive  history  and  its  efficient  every-day  work  in  human 
life.  If  religion  is  impregnable,  if  its  truths  can  not  be  overthrown, 
instead  of  relapsing  into  a  quietistic  state,  content  with  the  belief 
that  it  will  finally  subdue  all  things  to  itself,  it  should  be  intensely 


754  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

active  in  the  work  of  illumination,  and  ceaselessly  aggressive  against 
sin,  that  the  holy  and  universal  triumph  may  be  all  the  sooner 
achieved. 

The  Christian  thinker  has  delayed  the  inauguration  of  an  aggress- 
ive campaign  against  the  materialistic  metaphysician  because  of  a 
fancy  that  science  and  philosoj^hy,  by  their  interminable  quarrels, 
wiU  possibly  destroy  each  other,  or  end  the  strife  by  a  willing  surren- 
der to  Christianity.  It  is  well  known  that  the  scientific  theorists  of 
the  age  are  quite  put  out  with  one  another,  and  that  they  differ 
among  themselves  touching  the  great  questions  quite  as  much  as  they 
differ  with  the  theologians.  As  regards  the  age  of  the  world,  the 
nature  of  light,  the  origin  of  matter,  the  essence  of  mind,  and  the 
cause  of  things,  a  discordant  cry  comes  from  laboratory,  hall,  grove, 
and  the  study.  St.  George  Mivart  and  Darwin  can  not  agi-ee ;  Huxley 
and  Tyndall  dispute  ;  the  evolutionists  are  at  war  among  themselves; 
Hackel  is  frantic ;  English  thinkers  tremble  as  they  discover  the 
foundations  of  morality  quaking  under  the  fearful  tread  of  material- 
ists ;  'John  Fiske,  disciple  of  Darwin,  at  last  pronounces  in  favor  of  a 
personal  God ;  and  the  whole  brotherhood  of  scientists  and  philoso- 
phers are  disturbed,  divided,  and  ensnared  in  their  own  dilemmas. 
Confusion  is  on  the  increase  in  the  circles  of  the  materialists,  atom- 
ists,  sensationalists,  atheists,  psychologists,  and  pessimists.  Greedy  in 
their  love  of  facts,  they  hoped  to  be  justified  by  facts  in  turning 
Christianity  out  of  doors  and  banishing  God  from  the  universe  ;  but 
the  facts  have  well-nigh  expelled  the  metaphysicians.  The  furnace 
was  intended  to  destroy  Daniel,  but  it  burned  his  persecutors  ;  the  gal- 
lows was  built  for  Mordecai,  but  Haman  hung  therefrom.  However, 
it  will  not  do  to  trust  entirely  to  the  reactionary  result  of  discovered 
facts,  or  to  the  confusion  and  division  among  the  fact-seekers,  for  a 
final  vindication  of  revealed  truth.  The  truth  itself  must  be  intro- 
duced into  the  conflict,  dividing  the  scientists  more  and  more,  and 
troubling  them  as  mere  theories  have  never  troubled  them.  Hitherto, 
the  bone  of  contention  has  been  theory;  hereafter,  let  it  be  ti-uth. 

Just  what  we  mean  by  reconciliation  may  be  readily  inferred  from 
the  general  discussion  in  preceding  pages  of  the  standing  differences 
between  Christianity  and  philosophy.  They  are  not  at  one  touching 
central  or  fundamental  truths,  such  as  the  existence  of  God,  the 
Mosaic  account  of  creation,  the  inspiration  of  the  Bible,  the  origin 
of  man,  the  origin  or  introduction  of  evil,  the  possibility  of  miracles, 
the  incarnation  of  Jesus  Christ,  the  doctrine  of  atonement,  the  sig- 
nificance of  regeneration,  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  and  all  other 
vital  teachings  of  religion  ;  and  so  long  as  they  are  at  variance,  the 
one  holding  them  as  speculations  or  superstitions,  and  the  other  as 


THE  STAGES  OF  CONFLICT.  755 

revealed  truths,  there  will  be  conflict,  there  will  be  confusion  of  judg- 
ment, there  will  be  loss  of  souls.  As  to  how  these  primary  truths 
shall  be  defended  and  taught  we.  have  indicated  elsewhere,  but  we 
may  here  point  out  the  stages  of  the  conflict,  or  the  work  that  must 
be  performed  before  reconciliation  shall  have  been  fully  established. 
The  stages  of  the  conflict  are  three:  (a.)  Positive  Antagonism; 
(6.)  Transition  Period  ;  (c.)  Reconciliation.  Of  antagonism  the  world 
has  had  enough  ;  philosophy  can  not  desire  more  ;  Christianity  has  had 
all  that  is  necessary.  In  many  quarters  the  antagonism  is  still  going 
on;  the  battle  rages;  the  smoke  rises;  banners  fly  or  fall;  the  slain, 
alas  !  are  many.  But  the  antagonistic  age  is  nearly  ended  ;  the  spirit 
of  virulence  has  almost  spent  its  force ;  a  calmness  of  inquiry  is  on 
the  face  of  the  thinker;  and  prejudice  is  dying  amid  its  worshipers. 

That  we  are  in  the  transition  period,  emerging  into  better  con- 
ditions and  into  final  settlements  of  differences,  let  us  fondly  hope. 
Philosophy  is  less  presumptuous  in  spirit ;  evolution  in  its  early  sci- 
entific form  is  waning ;  materialism  is  losing  its  grip  on  faith  and 
thought ;  the  Absolute  has  appeared  ;  the  face  of  God  shines  through 
the  storm ;  and  the  thick-armored  hosts  of  force  have  halted  and  can 
not  advance. 

The  next  step  is  reconciliation,  which  will  be  not  complete  touch- 
ing details  at  first,  but  gradual,  certain,  satisfactory,  embracing  all 
things  at  last.  When  philosophy  prostrates  itself  before  God,  the 
battle  is  won,  and  won  forever.  The  idea  of  God  once  accepted 
will  make  room  for  every  other  Christian  idea  in  the  realm  of  philo- 
sophic thinking,  and  sway  the  nations  as  completely  as  does  the  sun 
the  planets. 

In  its  relations  with  philosophy  Christianity  must  not  forget  to 
respect  the  ratiotialistic  irrmciple  in  man.  It  often  appeals  to  the  af- 
fectioual  nature,  since  its  own  spirit  is  aflfectional,  but  the  rational 
principle  is  vital  and  to  a  degree  sovereign  in  the  life  of  man.  So 
imperious  is  it  that  it  compels  him  to  reject  what  it  condemns,  and 
to  receive  what  it  approves,  becoming  the  criterion  of  truth  and  the 
arbiter  in  all  disputes  between  truth  and  error.  Nor  is  this  preroga- 
tive of  the  reason  a  mere  conceit  or  presumption ;  it  is  its  endowment 
or  function  which  is  intended  to  protect  the  truth  from  fanaticism, 
superstition,  and  radicalism.  It  is  not  assumed  that  religion  violates 
the  reason,  or  that  revelation  is  irrational  in  content  or  purpose  ;  but 
a  misunderstanding  of  the  function  of  reason  on  the  part  of  religion, 
and  an  alleged  irrationality  in  the  truths  of  religion  on  the  part  of 
reason,  have  produced  painful  and  unnecessary  conflicts,  without  any 
special  compensations,  or  advantage  to  the  truth.  The  rational 
power  of  man  must  be  understood,  and   the  rationality  of  revelation 


756  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

must  also  be  apprehended.  Human  reason  is  not  always  the  sole 
umpire  in  the  settlement  of  differences  between  religious  truth  and 
error,  but  in  many  cases  its  final  decision  is  authoritative,  and  must 
be  respected.  The  ratiorwl  side  of  Christianity  must  be  submitted  to 
the  rationalistic  principle  of  the  thinker  in  order  to  obtain  a  rational 
judgment  in  its  favor.  Channing  says,  "Christianity  is  a  rational 
religion."  The  theologian  has  said  it  is  a  mysterious  religion ;  a 
supernatural  religion ;  a  miracle-sustained  religion  ;  a  prophetic  re- 
ligion ;  a  redemptive  religion ;  all  of  which  is  true,  and,  being 
true,  it  has  appealed  with  force  to  faith,  love,  fear,  instinct,  de- 
sire, and  self-interest  in  the  awakening  of  men  to  spiritual  thought 
and  activity.  We  do  not  question  the  sincerity  or  sufficiency  of  mo- 
tives to  activity  that  take  their  rise  in  the  affectional  or  emotional 
nature,  but  contend  for  a  place  for  the  exercise  of  reason  in  the 
spiritual  life.  The  rationality  of  Gospel  truth  ;  of  supernaturalism 
as  an  idea  ;  of  miracle  as  a  metaphysical  possibility  ;  of  regeneration 
as  a  philosophical  process  ;  of  immortality  as  a  scientific  result,  can 
be  made  to  appear,  along  with  the  usual  theological  defenses  of  the 
same.  The  doctrines  of  Christianity  are  as  ratioual  as  the  laws  of 
the  natural  world,  to  be  studied  from  the  same  stand-point,  and  to  be 
accepted  with  as  little  hesitation  or  misgiving  of  faith.  Christian 
teachers  must  present  religion  to  men  as  tlie  most  rational  idea  in  the  regions 
of  human  thought.  It  is  not  necessary  to  make  it  irrational  in  order  to 
prove  it  supernatural,  or  show  that  it  is  so  mysterious  that  it  can  not 
be  understood  in  order  to  impress  men  that  it  is  divine.  Its  super- 
naturalism  lies  alotuj  the  track  of  the  highest  and  purest  reason.  A  pres- 
entation of  revealed  truth  as  supremely  logical  in  itself  will  destroy 
the  challenge  of  infidelity,  which  heretofore  has  invoked  the  aid  of 
reason  in  its  defense  as  against  the  supposed  irrational  dogmatics  of 
religion.  In  this  way  also  the  sympathy  of  all  truth-seekers  with 
revealed  religion  will  be  secured,  for,  posing  as  a  rational  religion, 
they  can  not  consistently  oppose  it  until,  having  examined  it,  they 
shall  find  that  it  is  not  the  truth  ;  but  investigation  by  rational  meth- 
ods will  result  in  a  rational  judgment  in  its  behalf. 

This  is  what  we  mean  when  we  insist  that  Christianity  shall  re- 
spect the  rationalistic  principle,  or  that  it  shall  appeal  to  the  reason ; 
we  mean  an  appeal  to  the  methods  of  reason  for  the  ascertainment  of 
truth.  Reason,  disciplined  and  schooled  to  close  work,  usually  resorts 
to  one  or  all  of  three  methods  of  expression  in  the  execution  of  its 
tasks :  (a)  The  a  priori  method,  or  reasoning  from  cause  to  effect — a 
mode  of  reasoning  legitimate,  forcible,  and  within  limitations  suffi- 
cient ;  (&)  The  a  posteriori  method,  or  reasoning  from  effect  to  cause — 
a  mode  of  reasoning  regarded   even  stronger  than   the  preceding ; 


METHODS  OF  REASON  APPLIED  TO  CHRISTIANITY.     757 

(c)  Reasoning  from  analogy,  or  the  discovery  of  the  bearing  of  phys- 
ical truth  upon  religious  truth.  With  these  instruments  at  hand  the 
reason  works  vigorously  on  its  great  problems  in  the  lower  realm, 
often  discovering  physical  truth  and  proclaiming  it,  not  in  mere 
joyousness  of  words,  but  with  all  logical  assurance,  and  is  satisfied. 

To  change  the  phrases,  the  reason  works  according  to  the  inductive 
method,  or  the  method  of  physical  science,  reasoning  from  parts  to 
the  whole,  from  particulars  to  generals.  Bacon  introduced  the  in- 
ductive method  into  modern  science,  and  employed  it  as  an  all-suffi- 
cient method  in  his  realm  of  investigation.  The  method  of  deduction, 
or  the  going  from  generals  to  particulars,  is  considered  a  safer  be- 
cause it  is  a  larger  and  more  self-evidencing  method  than  the  former ; 
yet  the  two  taken  together  constitute  the  final  forms  of  rationalistic 
expression. 

Without  question  Christianity  should  appeal  to  these  various 
methods  of  logical  inquiry  for  the  vindication  of  its  truths.  As  a 
religion  of  truth  it  should  not  shrink  from  the  methods  of  truth,  but 
appropriate  them  as  the  methods  by  which  it  shall  be  communicated 
to  the  minds  of  men.  As  to  the  monotheistic  conception,  inasmuch 
as  it  is  a  doctrine  of  revelation,  the  a  priori  method  will  support  it, 
and  when  it  can  be  assumed  as  an  a  'priori  fact,  all  the  other 
truths  of  religion  can  be  assumed,  and  will  be  received.  The 
apriorism  of  Christianity  needs  to  be  enforced  with  the  command- 
ing assurance  that  a  priori  truth  inspires.  In  the  hands  of  the 
theologian  the  monotheistic  idea  has  been  ably  vindicated  by  the 
a  posteriori  method  ;  but  as  philosophic  thought  has  sometimes  ques- 
tioned the  adequacy  of  the  method,  the  other  may  as  surely  be  em- 
ployed in  defense  of  the  same  truth.  To  be  sure,  not  all  of  the 
truths  of  Christianity  can  be  as  clearly  demonstrated  by  one  method 
as  by  the  other,  but  there  is  no  revealed  tndh  that  ivill  not  xjield  to  one  of  the 
methods  of  the  reason.  If  the  a  priori  or  the  a  posteriori  method  fail, 
or  the  thinker  fail  in  using  them,  then,  like  Joseph  Butler,  he  may  resort 
to  the  analogical  method,  and  be  sure  of  some  kind  of  discovery.  All 
that  the  reason  can  legitimately  ask  is  that  its  methods  have  recogni- 
tion in  the  investigation  of  revealed  truth,  and  the  least  that  Chris- 
tianity can  do  is  to  grant  the  request. 

Within  recent  years  Christianity  has  submitted  itself  to  the  lim- 
ited methods  of  rational  investigation,  and  with  advantage  to  itself.  The 
world  begins  to  recognize  that  it  is  a  scientific  as  well  as  spiritual  re- 
ligion, a  philosophical  as  well  as  supernatural  revelation  of  truth  ;  it 
finds  that  it  is  as  rational  as  it  claims  to  be,  and  deserves  intellectual 
homage  as  well  as  the  veneration  of  faith. 

It  belongs  to  Christianity  to   urge  and  encourage  both  science  and 


758  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

philosophy  to  ptish  on  in  their  work  of  iyivestigation,  that  ^nal  results 
may  be  established.  Hitherto  there  has  not  been,  from  the  Christian 
thinker,  the  warmest  welcome  for  the  discoveries  of  science  or  the 
honest  conclusions  of  the  philosophic  inquirer ;  on  the  contrary,  a 
spirit  of  hostility  has  too  frequently  been  manifested  toward  those  who 
were  toiling  in  the  lower  realm  of  matter,  and  were  anxious  to  ascer- 
tain its  laws  and  contents.  The  most  expeditious  way  to  reach  final- 
ities is  to  press  on  through  the  thick  darkness  toward  them.  There 
must  not  be  imposition,  or  hypocrisy,  or  presumption  in  science,  any 
more  than  in  religion.  The  task  of  finding  truth  is  a  serious  one, 
and  the  methods  adopted  must  be  sober,  and  the  results  announced 
must  be  genuine.  The  cure  for  agnosticism,  materialism,  and  pessi- 
mism is  partly  to  compel  the  investigator  to  go  on  in  his  searchings, 
denying  him  rest  until  his  work  is  completed.  The  danger  to  truth  is 
in  unfinished  investigation  of  it.  From  the  constitution  of  things  there 
is  evidently  a  limit  to  the  physical  universe,  which  when  found  will 
distrain  the  thinker  from  further  inquiry.  Spatial  aud  temporal  con- 
ditions environ  it ;  its  history  is  the  history  of  change ;  and  limitation 
is  the  law  of  its  existence.  Predicating  density,  weight,  color,  utility, 
and  relation  of  things,  is  the  same  as  predicating  limitation,  for  these 
are  the  terms  of  limitation.  In  like  manner,  physical  forces,  laws, 
orders,  processes,  and  agencies  operate  within  conceivable,  if  not 
within  defined,  limits,  the  searching  of  which  is  incumbent  upon  the 
philosopher.  We  may  spur  the  philosopher  on,  we  may  shout  him  to 
his  work.  To  the  limits!  To  the  limits!  Go  on,  friend,  until  you 
can  go  no  farther.  "What  then?  From  the  "limit"  to  the  "limit- 
less" is  but  a  single  step,  which  the  thinker  will  then  eagerly  take; 
his  difficulties  will  then  be  solved  in  the  full  revelation  of  truth;  and 
at  last,  with  all  doubts  removed,  all  fears  quenched,  and  all  aspira- 
tions satisfied,  he  will  rejoice  in  the  abundant  visions  of  God.  To 
this  consummation  Christianity  may  contribute  not  a  little  by  its 
quickening  and  encouraging  influence  on  the  minds  of  the  thinkers 
of  the  race. 

Especially  is  it  the  duty  of  Christianity  to  remember  that,  as  it  is 
adapted  to  all  ages  of  the  world,  it  has  special  adaptation  to  the  nine- 
teenth century,  or  the  times  in  which  we  live,  and  should  therefore 
employ  its  resources  and  agencies  to  the  utmost  in  the  spiritual  cul- 
ture and  elevation  of  the  world  of  to-day.  In  its  ethical  teachings,  as 
well  as  in  its  spiritual  ministrations,  and  in  its  philanthropic  spirit  as 
in  its  redemptive  purpose,  it  is  the  religion  the  humanity  of  our  times 
needs.  Without  it  our  governments  become  corrupt,  the  family  in- 
stitution disorganizes,  social  life  falls  to  a  vicious  level,  and  divine 
ideals  are  forgotten.     It  is  a  developing  religion,  developing  the  people 


THE  ETERNAL  ESSENCE  OF  TRUTH.  759 

wlio  receive  it,  and  developing  itself  into  a  richer  form  as  they  receive 
it.  It  is  the  priceless  heritage  of  the  nineteenth  century,  let  it  not 
be  trodden  under  foot ;  it  is  the  light  of  the  world,  let  it  not  be  ex- 
tinguished ;  it  is  the  truth  of  God,  let  it  not  be  buried  or  forgotten. 
Christianity  is  Truth.  Of  all  sacred  or  religious  teachers,  Christ 
was  exceptional  in  this  that  he  was  not  a  truth-seeker;  he  sought  it  not,  because 
he  ivas  the  truth.  The  stars  may  seek  the  light,  the  sun  only  shines. 
Christ  is  truth  ;  he  is  philosophic  and  theologic  truth;  he  is  natural  and 
supernatural  truth;  he  is  ethical  and  eschatological  truth;  he  is  govern- 
mental and  cesthetic  truth;  he  is  personal  and  impersonal  truth;  he  is 
rational  and  spiritual  truth ;  he  is  final  and  absolute  truth  ;  he  is 

VISIBLE  AND  INVISIBLE  TRUTH;  he  is  JUST  AND  HOLY  TRUTH;  he  is 
KNOWN    AND    UNKNOWN     TRUTH  ;     he    is    CREATIVE    AND    UNCREATED 

TRUTH ;  he  is  th^  Alpha  and  Omega  of  truth ;  he  is  the  strength  and 
illumination  of  truth;  he  is  the  crown  and  glory  of  truth;  he  is  the  im- 
mutability,  the  omnipresence,  the  everlasting  goodness,  and  the  eternal 

ESSENCE  OF  TRUTH. 

Christianity  is  Truth.  Its  mission  is  the  propagation  of  truth,  its 
inspiration  is  the  inspiration  of  truth,  its  success  is  the  success  of 
truth.  Let  error  tear  down,  the  truth  must  build  up ;  let  the  one 
agnosticize  the  world,  the  other  must  illuminate  it;  let  the  one  ma- 
terialize the  thought  of  men,  the  other  must  spiritualize  it;  let  the 
one  drive  the  race  into  Plato's  cave,  the  other  must  draw  all  men  into 
Christ's  kingdom;  let  the  one  actualize  an  anarchy  of  letters,  the 
other  must  establish  a  republic  of  immortal  truths. 

Christianity  is  Truth.  Nature  is  at  one  with  its  solemn  proclama- 
tions, and  in  its  development  is  a  re-assertion  of  all  that  religion  un- 
folds or  enforces.  Every  spiritual  truth  has  a  physical  basis,  and 
every  physical  truth  has  a  spiritual  basis.  The  natural  is  the  spiritual, 
the  spiritual  is  the  natural.  The  universe  of  non-being  is  the  adver- 
tisement of  the  universe  of  being.  Nature,  with  its  myriad  voices  of 
power,  wisdom,  and  goodness,  stands  for  God,  and  for  all  that  Chris- 
tianity is,  or  is  doing  in  the  world.  History,  too,  is  the  mirror  of 
the  ideal  purposes  of  religion,  the  pauorama-like  representation  of  di- 
vine ends  in  process  of  fulfillment.  Nations,  governments,  and  civ- 
ilizations are  the  concrete  forms  of  divine  ideals,  imperfectly  wrought 
out,  but  speaking  loudly  in  their  imperfection  of  the  divine  move- 
ments among  men.  Man  himself  is  the  sublimest  proof  of  Christian- 
ity. He  distances  every  opposing  argument,  and  silences  every 
skeptical  suggestion.  He  is  truth  incarnate.  He  is  immortality  on 
foot ;  he  is  God  in  human  form.  Christianity  is  truth  ;  the  truth  of 
nature,  the  truth  of  history,  the  truth  of  humanity,  the  truth  of  THE 

EVERLASTING    GOD. 


760  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CHRISTIANITY. 

Christianity  is  Truth.  Assailed  it  will  be,  but  its  defenders  need 
not  be  afraid  ;  misrepresented  it  will  be,  but  believers  need  not  be 
alarmed ;  struggles  with  error  it  will  have,  but  its  friends  need  not 
sink  into  despair.  "Ye  believe  in  God,  believe  also  in  Me."  The 
hope  of  victory  is  engraved  on  the  brow  of  truth  ;  the  strength  of 
victory  is  in  the  sword  of  truth ;  the  pledge  of  victory  is  from  Him 
who  is  the  author  of  truth.  Sooner  will  the  firmament  fall  than  one 
jot  or  tittle  of  divine  truth  fail  in  its  appointed  task,  or  become  weary 
with  its  solemn  work.  Victory!  The  earth  will  sound  it;  the 
heavens  will  echo  it ;  man  will  sing  it ;  eternity  will  celebrate  it. 
Victory  !     This  is  the  end  of  truth. 

Christianity  is  Tnith.  So  the  patriarchs  believed ;  so  the  law-givers 
declared ;  so  the  prophets  foretold ;  so  the  apostles  proclaimed ;  so 
the  martyrs  assumed;  so  the  sons  of  God  everywhere  have  affirmed. 

Truth  !  Let  the  poets  recognize  its  eternal  beauty ;  let  the  his- 
torians record  its  stately  marches  to  conquest ;  let  the  rulers  remem- 
ber Him  who  judgeth  the  nations  according  to  its  holy  and  unim- 
peachable standards;  let  the  scientists  toil  in  its  sunlight,  and  rejoice 
in  its  abundant  and  ever-increasing  testimonies;  let  the  philoso- 
phers, abandoning  speculation,  embrace  the  wondrous  revelations 
of  the  divine  Master,  offering  to  him  that  meed  of  honor  that  be- 
longs to  the  original  discoverer  and  the  authoritative  teacher;  let  the 
religionists  of  the  world  join  in  praises  to  Him  who  was  the  incarnation 
of  blessed,  immortal  truth,  and  who  ever  liveth  to  enlighten  our  way- 
ward and  ignorant  race  with  the  thoughts,  the  wonders,  the  ideals, 
and  the  achievements  of  the  eternal  King,  unto  Whom  "  be  glory  in 
the  Church  by  Christ  Jesus  throughout  all  ages,  world  without  end." 


INDEX. 


A. 

PAGE. 

Abercrombie, •   •  92 

Abstractions, bd4-brfo 

Powerless, 645 

Accads,  Religion  of 337 

Acropolis, 396 

Addison,  Anglo-Saxon  of     .    .    •  547 

Advent,  The  Second, 608 

Associated  Events, 617 

Disturbing  Features,    ....  615 

Misunderstanding, 664  , 

Object  of 617  ' 

Time  of 618 

Esthetics, 463 

Agassiz,  Prof., 160 

Argument  for  Immortality,  •  189 

Teleological  Position  of  .    .    •  176 

Age,  The  Bronze, 181 

Glacial, 183 

Golden, 493 

Iron, 181 

Stone, 181 

Agesidamus, /    *    '  ^^t 

Agriculture,  Moral  Spirit  of,    •    •  526 

Agnostic,  The 210 

Agnosticism, -l- 

Objection  to 694 

Algebra, J41 

Alemachus, •   :  .^„ 

Alexander, 485,  498 

Alexandrianism,     .    .    •  332,  334,  385 

Alger,  W.  R., 577 

Theory  of  Resurrection,   .  593-597 

Al  Koran,  Science  in 446 

.    .    529 

463,  464 

Conditions  of,    .....-■    467 

Anaxagoras, 79,  105,  136 

Anaximander, Iw 


Altruism, 

Amusements,  Cruel  .    •    • 
Analogy,  Argument  from 


Anaximenes, 


.    .  76,  105 


Andamaners,  The 343 

Angelo,  Michael 548 

An»els 601 

Condemned, 592,  606 

Annihilation,  Doctrine  of    .    .    .  591 

Anselm, ^''  aoJ 

Antediluvians, oU/ 

Antinomies,  Absurd 73U 


PAGE. 

Antinomies,  Kant's 233 

Antioch  of  Pisidia, 383 

In  Syria, 393 

Antisthines, H^ 

Anthropology, 422 

Anthropomorphism,  ....'..    230 

Apes, 173,  179 

Apollo 15,     51 

Apostasy,  Post-millennial    .   •    •    616 

Apostle, 404 

Aquinas,  Thomas 87,  685 

Arabia,  Paul  in, 379,  380 

Arafuras,  The 343 

Arbitration,  Method  of     ....    552 

Arcesilaus, 105,  330 

Architecture,  Church 550 

Pagan, 550 

Argvir,  Duke  of  ...    •  152,  206,  219 

Final  Cause, 298 

The  supernatural, 475 

Aristotle,    ....  26,  82,  83,  105,  207 

Classifications  of 213 

Theory  of  happiness,  ....    325 

Aristophanes, 22 

Armada,  The  Spanish 485 

Arminius,  James 103,  538 

Arnold,  Matthew 353,  545 

Interpretation  of  religion, 

Artists,  Modern 

Arts,  The  fine 

Christian 548 

Pagan 548 

Patrons  of 549 

Purification  of 718,  719 

Ascension,  Christ's 389 

Asia 396 

Minor, 393,  396 

Minor,  Churches  in  .    .    .  403,  616 

Associationalism,  • 204-206 

Relation  to  First  Cause,  .  267,  268 
Assvria,  Philosophy,  ......    337 

Astronomy,    Moral    impressions 

from 296,  297 

Asvlums, 5o6,  633 

Atiianasius, 560 

Creed  of 749 

Atheism, 697 

Athenians,  The 218,  665 

Athens,  Paul  in 396 

761 


549 

547 


762 


INDEX. 


PAGE. 

Atmosphere,  Weight  of   ...    .    570 

Atoms,  Capacity  of 146 

Contents  of 151 

Dance  of 143 

Development  of 150 

Difficulties  of 145 

Epicurus's  explanation  of  .    .    147 

Form  of 151 

Genesis  of 144 

Inertia  of 149,  150 

Kinds  of 146 

Leucippus's  explanation  of   .    148 

Lotze's  view  of 143-147 

Purpose  of 150 

Theory  of 79,  154 

Atonement,     Nature's    teaching 

on 465,  466,  567,  633 

Necessity  of 423 

Philosophic 338 

Eecognized, 679 

Audubon, 128 

Augustine, 377 

Augustus, 357,  514 

B. 

Baalbec, 326,  386 

Babylon, 540 

Bacon,  Francis 88,  106,  558 

Roger 87,  557 

Baer,  K.  E.  Von 280,  697 

Bain,  Alexander    .  100,  126,  141, 

191,  204,  205,  210 

Bancroft, 495 

Baptism,  Christian 656 

Christ's 388 

Barbarian,  The 526 

Barnabas, 393,  404 

Barrow,  Isaac 545 

Bastian,  Dr 155 

Bathybius, 157 

Baur, 369 

Beauty, 472 

"  Becoming,"  The 138 

Beecher,  Edward 628 

Being,  Defined 272 

Problem  of 309,  310 

Beneke 215 

"  Ben  Hur," 546 

Bentham,  Jeremy 100 

Berkeley, 93,  106 

Bhagavad  Gita,    ......  331,  336 

Bible,  Affirmations  in 735 

Anglo-Saxon  in 546 

Contradictions  in  ...    .  664,  665 

Developed, 663 

Errors  in,  explained,   ....    748 

Human  elements  in, 440 

Infallible, 746 

Investigation  of 693 


PAGE. 

Bible,  Languages  of  ...    .  747,  748 
Man's  origin  recorded  in  .  702,  703 

Manuscripts  of 747 

Misunderstandings  of  .    .  665,  666 

Oriental  spirit  of 748 

Pedagogic  character  of    .    .    .    628 

Rationalism  in 729 

Sealed, 544 

Symbolized, 668 

Tested, 673 

Unity  of 647 

Unscientific,    ........    571 

Biogenesis,  Theory  of     .    .    .  160,  683 

Biology,  Christian 454,  455 

Bioplasm, 157,  162 

Births,  Law  of 509 

Blake,  Prof 184 

Bledsoe,  A.  T 487 

Blood,  Harvev's  discovery,  .    .    .    294 

Boehme,  Jacob 88,  106 

Botanv, 427 

Mysteries  of 684 

Bowne,  Prof.  .  103,  111,  141,  219,  223 

Brahm, 736 

Brahminism, 345 

A  failure 442,  736 

Pantheistic 443 

Prophetic 413 

Briggs,  Prof.  C.  A 746 

Brown, 92,  106 

Bruno,  Giordano 456 

Biichner,  Ludwig 170 

Charge  against  Christianity, .    478 

Buddha, 314 

Buddhism, 345 

Evils  of 445 

Its  priesthood, 736 

Burns,  Robert 207 

Bushnell,  Horace 140,  456 

Natural  and  supernatural,     .    475 

View  of  Christ, 644 

Butler,  "  Analogy  "  of  .....    460 

Ethics  of 324 

Byron, 545 

C. 

Calamities, 482 

Caligula, 485 

Calvary,         389 

Calvin,  John 103,  666 

Camel,  Footprint  of 234 

Cant, 743 

Kinds  of 744 

Capellini,  Prof 184 

Caracalla,  Baths  of 504 

Carey,  H.  C 252 

Carlyle,  Thomas 255 

Caro,  M 479 

Carpenter,  Dr.  W.  B.     ...  237,  348 


INDEX. 


763 


Caste, 336 

Castor,   . •   • 

Catholicism,  Roman  ....  581 
Claims  of 

Causation,  Aristotle's  division,  . 

Basis  of 235,  237 

Comte's  denial  of  knowledge 


PAGE. 

508 
313 
654 
658 
235 


PAGE. 

Christ,  Resurrection  of  .   .   .  629,  652 

Sinlessness  of 644 

Uninterpreted, 565 

Christianity,  Absolute  religion, 

.    . 622,  688 

Affirmations  of 734,  735 

Antagonisms  to 651 


of • -^o 

Doctrine  of 31 

Hamilton's  interpretation,  •  260 
Herbart's  interpretation,  •  .  238 
Hume's  rejection  of  ....  •  260 
McCosh's  definition,  ....  238 
Mill's  interpretation  of.  •  101,  236 

Objections  to 240,  244 

Plato's  co-causes, 235 

Relation  to  theory  of  develop- 
ment,     245 

Value  of 244,  246 

Cause,  Efficient 234 

Final 286 

Argument  from  atmosphere,  292 
Argument  from  botany,  .  •  298 
Argument  from  five  senses  295,  296 
Argument  from  function,  290,  291 
Argument  from  nervous  sys- 

■     tern, 295 

Argument  from  the  sciences,  291 
Argument  from  zoology,  .  298,  299 

Bacon's  objection, 303 

Comte's  objection, 302 

Darwin's  Caution, 287 

Development   theory   a   con 

firmation, 

Hartmann's  conception,     .    . 
Hick's  objection,   ....  288, 

Hume's  objection, 

Idea  not  intuitional,    .... 

Janet's  facts, 

Littre's  objection 

Relation  of  efficient  to     .  289 

Spinoza's  objection 

Causer,  the  Infinite 

Causes,  Aristotle's 28b 

Plato's 286 

Celibacy, 509 

Channing,  W.  H ^^    ^ol 

Character,  Sources  of     .    .    .  682,  684 
Chemistry,  Definition  of  ...   •    252 

Cheops,  Pyramid  of 675 

Chiliasm, 609 

China,  Religions  of 447 

Choice,  Alternate 166 

Christ,  Ascension  of 652 

Deity  of 431 

Magnetism  of 643 

Millennial  reign  of 610 

Paul's  relation  to  ...    •       •    438 
Personification  of  .    .    •    -621,  643 


288,  289 


289 
287 
288 
293 
303 
290 
305 
116 


652 
537 
756 
449 
696 


Anthropology  of    ...    .  422,  4L'3 

Apriorism  of 757 

Background  of 328 

Benevolence  of 633 

Biichner's  opinion  of  .  • 
Budding  period  of  " .  .  • 
Channing's  opinion  of     . 

Chronology  of 

Contempt,  A  doctrine  of 

Core  of 642 

Cosmology  of 449 

Credentials  of 648 

Creed  form  of 749,  750 

Decalogue  of 720. 

Defended, 546 

Defensive, 342 

Development  of    .    .  413,  418,  562 

Dogmatic, 638,  655 

Dynamic  elements,    .    •    .  631-633 

Eff-ectsof 636,  638 

Empirical, 686 

Enemies  of 742 

Eschatology  of 424,  579 

Evidences  of 631 

Experience  the  proof  of  •  .  672 
Finalitv,  A  religious  ....  732 
Finality,  A  philosophic  .  726,  728 

Form,  A. 623 

Forms  of 562,  654 

Founder,  The 565 

Gentile, 425 

Geometric, 631 

Historic  periods, 722 

Inherent  logic, 731 

Inspiring  power, 574 

Intellectual, 675,  682 

Jewish, 42.5 

Life,  A  .  .  .  .  533,  534,  634,  6/5 
Limitations  of  .   .    .  410,  415,  416 

Magnetism  of 642,  650 

Material  benefits,  ....  542,  543 

]\Iethods, 637 

Military  support, '1- 

Modern  proofs  of  ...    .  649,  650 

Mysteries  in, 566 

Necessary  truths  of 417 

New  in 563 

Opposed  to  Agnosticism,  .  694-696 

Pj^pal 654 

Philosophic  basis,  412, 439, 448,  455 

Phvsical  basis, 409 

Plan  of o35 


764 


INDEX. 


PAGE. 

Christianity,  Platonized,    ....  332 

Political 542,  668 

Practical 731 

Prophetic  Basis 708 

Province  of 411,  424 

Pseudodox  in 660,  670 

Purpose  of 408,  410 

Rationalism  in 756,  757 

Relation  of  Church  to  ...  .  515 
Relation  of  Greek  Philosophy 

to 308,  340 

Relation  of  Judaism  to    .    .    .  536 

Relation  of  Paul  to 429 

Relation  of  Present  Age  to.741,  742 
Relation  of  Reforms  to  .  .  .  .  550 
Relation  of  Society  to  .    .  507,  515 

Religion  of  Realities 634 

Revelation  the  Source  of  .  .    .  448 
Revelation   of    the  Supernat- 
ural   409,  410 

Root  of 644 

Soteriologv  of 423,  575 

Specialty  of 423 

Sphere  of 688 

Spiritual 434,  596,  597 

Standard,  A 448 

Statistics  of 722,  723 

Stimulating  Property  of  .    .    .  354 

Supreme 355 

Tasks  of  . 741 

Tendencv  to  Universality,  .    .  532 

Triumph  of 708,  709 

Truth,    634 

Undeveloped 558 

Unitarian  Idea  of 414 

Unsystematized, 441 

Utopianism  of 709 

Virtues  of 667,  668 

Chronology,  Usher's 570 

Church,  Controversies  in  .    .  655-657 

Idea  of 533,  645 

Instrument,  An 646 

Interpreter,  Bible 658 

Mission  of 645 

Program  of 709 

Reign  of 515,  516 

Supervision,  Paul's 397 

Church-founder,  The 403 

Churchism,  State 515 

Cicero, 136,  335 

Circumcision, 382 

Civilization,  Asiatic    .    .  496,  505,  540 

Buckle's  Theory  of 312 

Christian 541 

Corner-stone  of   ...••■    .  643 

Draper's  Theory 501 

European 497 

Forces  of 311 

Historic  Development  of  .   .    .  311 


FAGB. 

Civilization,  Model 539 

Unity  of 497,  498 

Clark,  Bishop  D.  W 594 

Prof.  H.  J 155 

Clarke,  James  F 414 

Classification,  Scientific  Objection 

to 165 

Cleanthus, 84 

Clement 283,  707 

Clifi"ord,  Prof 228 

Cocker,  Dr.  B.  F.    .  TOO,  239,  240,  331 

Coincidence,  Doctrine  of 241 

Coleridge, •    ....    64 

Coliseum,  Significance  of  .    .  503,  504 

Colleges,  Christian, 547 

Color, 463 

Comets, 486 

Coming,  The  Second 437 

Common-sense,    Philosophy    of, 

89,  92,  197 

Common-sense,  Objections  to.260,  261 

Comte, 99,  106 

Positivism  of 259,  346 

Communism 499,  517 

Apostolic 661 

Concept,  Analysis  of 353 

Emotional  Content  of  ...    .  350 

Religious 346 

Value  of 353 

Condillac, 91 

Confucius, 331 

Religion  of 724 

Congenitalism, 207 

Conscience,     ....    • 351 

Origin  of 179 

Consciousness,  A  Birth-mark,  .    .  165 

Definitions  of 677,  678 

Mansel's  Objection  to    ....  122 
Mill's  (James)  Idea  of  ...    .  210 

Needle-points  of 120 

Unity  of 585 

Conservatism, 575,  576 

Constant  ine 637 

Consubstantiation 656  666 

Conversion, 363,  573 

Paul's 365 

Philosophic  • 327 

Continuity,  Law  of 278,  279 

Cook,  Joseph 239 

Cooke.  Prof 243 

R.  J 594 

Copernicus, 520 

Cosmolog}',  Jewish 333  , 

Council,  Church 382 

Cousin,  Opinions  of  .    .    .  81,  86,  109 

Plato  defended  by 35 

Rationalism  of 270 

Creation, •   ....  142 

According  to  Law, 152 


INDEX. 


765 


PAGE. 

Creation,  Man's, 521 

Modality  of, 7U0 

Order  of 459 

Creationism,  Theory  of  .  .    .  160,  167 

Creed,  Christian 749 

Creed-maker,  The 739 

Cromwell, 128 

Crystals, 683 

Cudworth, 213,  239 

Ethics  of 324 

D. 

Dalltnger, 155 

Dante, 545 

Infei'no, 633 

Darwin,  Charles 155,  156 

Darwinism, 691,  697 

Davis,  Henry 22 

Davies,  Sir  John, 143 

Dawkins,  Prof 184 

Dawson,  Prof 184,  255 

Dead,  The 599 

Deduction, 674,  757 

Definitions 2,6 

Delphino,  Prof Iq6 

Deity,  The  Unconscious 122 

Democracy, 528 

Democritus 78,  lO-^ 

Descartes 88,  89,  106,  206 

Descent,  Theory  of 171. 

Development,  Theory  of    ...    .  156 

Dickens,  Charles 546 

Diderot, 91 

Diogenes, 108 

Dionysiodorus, 44 

Diseases, 482 

Dispensation,  The  New 626 

Dogmatism,  Theologic 89 

Dorchester,  Dr.  D 723 

Dore,  Gustave 549 

Dorner,  Dr 606 

Doubt,  Philosophic 116 

Draper,  Prof 334 

Physiological  Law  of  Cviliza- 

tion 501 

Drew,  Samuel 593 

Druidism, 661 

Drummond,  Henry  ...    •  .    .    .  155 
Identity  of  Natural  and  Spirit- 
ual   474 

Dryad,  The 136 

Dryden,  John 143 

Dualism, 89 

Dual,  The 552 

Dynamite, 555 


E. 

Earth,  Antiquity  of   . 
Astronomic  Center 


700 
520 


page. 

Earth,  Conflagration  of 452 

Destruction  of 453 

Globular 569 

Subdued    524 

Theories  Respecting 570 

Earthquakes, 486 

Easter, 659 

Eclecticism, 733 

Eden,  Promise  in 627 

Education,   Christianity  the  In- 
spiration of 518,  547 

Nations  leading  in 547 

Oriental 547 

Plato's  Curriculum    .....  510 

Problem  of 509,  510 

Relation  to  False  Religions  .  .  724 

Remedy  for  Evil 49 

System  of 510 

Egypt,  Religions  of 447 

Eleatics,  The 77 

Electricity 131,  292 

Elements,  Chemical    .    .    .    .  131,  157 

Proof  that  they  are  Effects,  .  .  242 

Elisha,  Prayer  ...•••...  277 

Emerson,  R.  W 21,  189,  469 

Emotionalism, 89,  95 

Emotions,  Religious    ....  676,  677 

Empedocles, 70,  105 

Translation  of 577 

Empiricism 89 

Energy,  Amount  of 588 

Tyndall's  Theory  of 239 

Ephesus, 393,  396,  397,  402 

Epicurus, 105 

Philosophy  of 84,  147 

Equivalence,  Doctrine  of  ...    .  242 

Erigena,  Scotus, 87 

Eschatology,  Christian 582 

Development  of 627-629 

Effect  of 638,  639 

Homeric 604 

Jewish 604 

Revision  Necessary 630 

Essenes,  The 499 

Ethics,  Evolutionary 101 

Intuitional 324 

Natural 706 

Origin  of 321 

Supernatural 706 

Etiquette 718 

Eucharist,  The 603 

Europe,  Paul  in 395,  396 

Eutychianism 603 

Evil,  An  Atonement 489 

Apology,  for 640 

Condemned, 640 

Defeated, 490 

Defined, 489 

A  Discipline 487 


766 


INDEX. 


PAGE. 

Evil,     Divine     Perfections     In- 
volved,       487-489 

Future  Possibility  of 492 

Man's  Duty  Respecting    .    .    .  551 
Method  of  Extinction,     .  454,  465 

Mission  of 481 

Moral 486 

Natural 486 

Penalty,  A 487 

Presence  of 315,  479 

Principle  of *    •    •    33 

Product  of  Law, 481 

Relation  to  Hell, 492 

Relation  to  History, 483 

Relation  to  Man,    ....  483-488 

Self-destroying 484 

Teleology  of 304 

Test  of   : 488 

Unrecognized, 679 

Uses  of 478,  479 

Evolution, 89,  101 

Breaks  in  the  Law  of    ...    .  704 

Christianity  an 722 

Condemned, 704 

Defined, 470,  471 

Example  of 624 

In  History, 282 

In  Mind, 201,  202,  320 

In  Nature, 282 

Kinds  of 704 

Relation  to  First  Cause,  268,  269, 

626 

Relation  to  Scriptural  Truth,   .  433 

Evolutionists,    Disagreement 

among 754 

Experience,     Brahminical     Doc- 
trine of 715 

Criterion  of  Truth,    .    .    .  672,  674 

Eschatologv  an 681 

Holiness  an 680,  681 

Misunderstood, 685 

Reliability  of 686 

Religion  an 435 

Processes  of 682 

Schleiermacher's  Opinion    .    .  678 

Spiritual 676-678 

Unconscious 678 

F. 

Fables,  .    .    .37,  41,  55,  57,  326,  735 

Faculties,  Mental 209,  349 

Faith,  Justification  by 538 

Fairbairn,  Prof 428 

Famines, 544 

Faraday, 148 

Farrar,'  Canon 359,  606 

Ferrier,  Prof •    -190 

Feudalism, 529 

Fitche 96,  106 


PAGE. 

Finalities, 726 

Fiske,  John 255 

Theism  of 754 

Force,  Attributes  of   ...    .  250,  251 
Buddhistic  Origin  of  Doctrine 

of 445 

Centripetal 250 

Electricity  the  Content  of    .    .  252 

Ends  of 254 

Internal  250 

Manifestations  of 250 

Modality  of 251 

Persistence  of 252,  702 

Personality  of 253 

Plato's  Definition  of 247 

Relation  to  Matter, 249 

Self-consciousness  of 254 

Transmission  of 249 

Forces,  Classification  of 248 

Conservation  and  Correlation 

of 158 

Cousin's  View  of 540 

Secondary 251 

Foreknowledge,  Divine 603 

Fossils,  Age  of 180,  181,  183 

Foster,  Bishop  R.  S 593,  594 

Fourier, • 473 

Socialism  of 502 

Franklin,  Benjamin 473 

Fundamentals 327 

G. 

Galatia, 403 

Galen, 198,  293,  672 

Gamaliel, 360 

Gautama, 330,331,445 

Gehenna, 590,  605 

Geikie,  Prof 184 

Generation,  Spontaneous,    •  155,  683 
Genesis,  Man's  creation,    .    .  521,  703 

Non-mythological, 572 

Strauss's  opinion  of 662 

Gentiles,  Gospel  among  the  .   .    .  394 

Paul's  mission  to 392 

Rights  of 382 

Gentihsm,  Conflict  with    ....  383 

Geologists,  Labors  of 180 

Geology, 741 

Pentateuchal 451 

Geometry, 20,  152 

Geranium,  Geometric 632 

Geulinex, 90 

Gibbon,  Anglo-Saxon  of    ....  546 
Objections  to  Christianity,  .   •  649 
Progress   of    Christianity    ac- 
counted for, 637,  638 

Gillie,  John 548 

Gnosticism, 337,  401,  562 

John's  attack  on 667 


INDEX. 


767 


PAGE. 

Gnosticism,  Traces  in  eschatology ,  596 

God,  A  priori  conception  of  .   .    .120 

Argument  from  correlation,    .  271 

Author's  position, 270 

Barbarians'  ideas  of,    .    .  343,  348 

Belief  in 119 

Biichner's  objection, 274 

Conceptions  of  an  absolute,    .  272 
Development  of  the  idea,  625,  626 

Existence  assumed, 222 

First  act  of 142 

Geometric  fulfillment,   ....  632 
Hamilton's  alternative  a  proof  125 
Hamilton's  idea  of  the  uncon- 
ditioned,   _. .266 

Hartmann's  idea, 263 

Involved  in  evil, 487 

Key-word  to  truth, 455 

Knowable, 226,  685 

Lotze's  idea, 255 

Necessary, 143 

Personal 226,  273,  285 

Philosophic  idea  of 728 

Schopenhauer's  idea, 262 

Spencer's  interpretation,  .  .    .  698 

Spinoza's  idea, 273 

Testimony  of  Nature,  275,  281,  470 
Testimony  of  Psychology,  276,  277 

Tyndall's  idea, 274 

Goethe, 104,  134,  587 

Good,  Contents  of  the 48 

Gorgias, 80,  105,  456 

Gospel,  Benevolence  of  the  .   •   .  751 

Figurative  in 744 

John's 667 

Millennial  teachings  in    .  613,  614 

Paul's 376 

Philosophical 743 

Reign  ends, 616 

Spiritualities  of 751 

Supreme, 612,  614 

Triumph  prophesied 613 

Gospels,  Fragmentary 427 

Government,  Bad 485 

Christian 541 

Divine 419 

Necessity  of  good 527 

Philosophic  idea  of  .    .    .  313,  314 
Grasshopper,   an   Athenian    em- 
blem,     173 

Grau  Chacos,  The 343 

Gravitation, 148,  297,  473 

Newton  doubted 228 

Gravity,  Spencer's  idea  of  .  .    .    .  248 

Greece,  Birthplace  of  philosophy,  71 

Systems  of  philosophy  in    .    .    72 

Grote, 18,  185 

Associational  principle,    .    .    .  313 
Grotius, 535 


PAGE. 

Grove,  Sir  W.  R 130 

Growth,  Law  of 206 

H. 

Hackel 126,  165 

Animalic  stages  of 173 

Hades,    .    .  54,  335,  339,  597,  604-606 

Hall,  Robert 566 

Hamilton,  Sir  William  .  106,  123,  125 
Doctrine  of  relativity,  .    .  265,  266 

Paralogisms, 267 

Hammond,  Dr 204 

Happiness,  Sources  of 325 

Harmonites,  The 499 

Harris,  Prof.  S 270,  283 

Hartley,  David 100 

Mental  action  explained  .    .    .  202 

Hartmann, 99,  106 

Heaven, 340,  619 

Hegel, 97,  106 

Classification  of 196 

Doctrines  of 265 

Philosophy  of  mind,     ....  195 

Hell, 491,  492  619 

Helvetius, 91 

Helmholtz, 319 

Hennel,  Mr •    • 644 

rieraclitus, •  .  78,  105 

Herbart,     • 106,  140 

Herbert,  Lord 225 

Herder, 348 

Heredity, 479 

Heresv, 576,  739 

Hermon.  Mt 388 

Heterodox,  The 653 

Heterodoxy, 581 

Hilaire,  St.  Geoffroy 149 

Hildebrand, 494,  637 

Hinduism, 737 

Hippias 80 

Historv,  Gibbon's 503 

Product,  A 481 

Providential  development,  A  .  483 

The  test, 535 

Hobbes, 198 

Ethics  of 322 

Indebted  to  Pythagoras,  .  .  .  199 
Interpretation  of  mind,  .  .  .  199 
Interpretation  of  phenomena,.  199 

^Materialism  of 200 

Holiness 679,  680 

Philosophic, 52,  53 

Holsten, 370 

Home,  Christian 552-554 

Pagan 718 

Homer,  Incident  from 277 

Plato's  condemnation  of    .  50,  340 

Sin  not  portrayed  in 454 

Homology,  Argument  from  .  132,  133 


768 


INDEX. 


PAGE. 

Hooker, 343 

Humanity,  Roman  Worship  of   .  621 

Humboldt, 130,  135 

Hume,  David 91,  106,  203 

Theory  of  consciousness,  .  .    .215 
Huxley,  Prof.  .  131,  155-157,  206 

239,  248,  258 

Hydrogen, 132 

Substance-unit 468 

Hypatia 712 

Hypothesis,  Diluvian 451 

Nebular 137,  450 

Restitutionary 451 

Substantial  agreement  .    .  451,  452 
Theistic 450 

I. 

Idea,  Meanings  of 744 

Idealism, 89,  92 

Christian 139 

Decline  of  absolute 98 

Relation  to  First  Cause,  .  263-265 

Weaknesses  of 265 

Ideals,  Geometric 152 

Ideas,  Innate 216,  225,  351 

Pseud 102 

Religious 344 

Identity,  Law  of 163 

Ignatius, 670 

Immanence,  Doctrine  of  divine  .  240 

Immortality, 53,  339,  424 

Argument  for  brutes,    ....  588 

Certainty, 589 

Developed, 588 

Endowment,        591 

Gift, 591 

Goethe's  faith, 587 

Hugo's  faith, 587 

Judaic  Intimations, 589 

Lotze's  idea, 586 

Moral  effect  of  belief  in  .    .    .  586 

Necessity, 584 

Objections 588 

Pagan  doctrine  of 579 

Paul's  idea  of 437 

Personal 582 

Philosophical  .    .    .  ■ 584 

Physical,  impossible,    ....  583 

Probable 583 

Revealed, 578,  579 

Strauss's  unbelief, 587 

Testament,  The  New,  on    .    .  628 

Testament,  The  Old,  on  .  .    .  628 

Incarnation,  Geometric,     ....  633 

Relation  to  the  Universe,    .    .  306 

Value 388 

Vital, 737 

Incarnations,  Brahminical    .   .   .  337 
Buddhistic 716 


PAGB. 

Indians,  The 577 

Individualism, 527 

Induction 674,  757 

Industrialism, 510 

Inertia, 164 

Infinite,  Definition 120 

Related, 121 

Super-rational, 123 

Unrelated 121 

Inquisitions 712 

Inspiration  attacked, 747 

Defined, 219 

Difliculties, 564 

Forms  of ]5 

Institutions,  Benevolent 555 

Social 528 

Intemperance, 551 

Interpretations,  Biblical 559 

Intolerance, 742 

Intuitionalism 121 

Intuitional  Truths,  Criteria  of  .    .  236 
Theistic  argument  from  .  284,  285 

Invention, 543 

Iron,  Knowledge  of 224 

J. 

Jacobi, 95, 106,  216 

Jaeger,  Gustave 188 

Janet,  Explanation  of  Evil,  .    .    .  304 
Final  cause  of  nature   ....  306 

Jerome 357 

Jerusalem,  Schools  of '. 360 

Jew,  Religious  development  of  .  .  627 

John  the  Baptist, 426 

John  of  Salisbury, 87 

Johnson,  743 

Judaism,  Conflict  with  .    .    .  381,  382 

Defense  of 361 

Inadequacy  of 535,  536 

Religious  content  of 687 

Judgment,  Basis  of 608 

Day  of 437,  607 

Scenes, •  ....  605 

Time  of 617,  618 

Jupiter, 37,  477,  645 

Justice,  Plato's  definition  of  .  .  .  464 
Justification,  Doctrine  of  .  .  384,  385 
Justinian, 86 

K. 

Kames,  Lord, 178 

Kant,  Immanuel 93,  94,  106 

Antinomies  of 233 

His  philosophy  criticized,    .   .  264 

King,  T.  Starr 178,  482 

Kingsley,  Bishop  C 594 

Konig 721 

Knowledge,  A  posteriori 257 

Hamilton's  admission,  ....  232 


INDEX. 


769 


Knowledge,  Intuitional .  •   .  215,  217 
Latent 217 

Limitations  of 227,  228 

Necessary, 577 

Object  of  Search, 695 

Possibility  of 212 

Progress  in 230,  231 

Eeflection  a  source  of  .    .    •    -218 

Relational, 118,  126 

Sense-knowledge, 214 

Sources  of 212-223 

Subject-matter  of    ...   •  223-227 
Superficial 223 

L. 

Labor, 517 

Lactantius, 707 

Ladd,  Dr.  G.  T 746 

Laertius,  Diogenes  ....  22,  61,  112 

Lama,  The  Buddhistic 736 

Lamarck, 156 

Lamartine, 743 

La  Mettrie,  , 91 

Lang,  Heinrich, 687 

Language,  Anglo-Saxon 546 

Greek, 529 

Origin  of 662 

Purification  of 529 

Unity  of 529,  530 

Languages, 141 

Primitive 175 

Lao-tzu, •    •    .    •  330,  331 

Laplace, 458 

Law, 225 

Definition, 141 

Force  of 462 

International 517 

Knowledge  of 223 

Laws,  Discovery  of 473 

Relation  of  natural  and  spirit- 
ual      473 

Laycock,  Dr 239 

Leibnitz, 92,  106 

Characteristic  of  truth,    .    .    .  674 

Theory  of  mind 194 

Lent, 660 

Leroux, 225 

Idea  of  Christianity, 707 

Leucippus, 105 

Lewes,  Criticisms  of  ...   .  108,  109 

Lewis,  Prof.  Tayler 589 

Liberia,  Natives  of 519 

Life,  Deathless 585 

Definitions  of 161,  162 

Kinds  of 162 

Nature  of 320 

Possibilities  of 318 

Theories  of 155,  320 

Lindsey,  Prof 340,  536 


Linnaeus, 130 

Littre,  M 303 

Livingstone,  Dr.    • 348 

Locke,  John 90,  106 

Mistakes  of 257,  258 

Philosopliy  condemned,  .    .    .  193 

Sensationalism  of 192 

Value  of  sensationalism,  .  .    .  214 

Loggia,  Raphael's 108 

Logos,  the  word, •    •  667 

Lotze,   Hermann    .  103,  106,  107, 

141,  239,  242 

Lubbock,  Sir  John,    .    .  174,  178,  343 

Lucretius, 74 

Final  cause, 305 

Luther, 538,  544 

Papal  education  of 659 

Personal    salvation    taught 

by 678 

Lyell,  Sir  Charles,  .  174,  181,  182,  185 
Lystra, 394-396 

M. 

Machinery,  Origin  of 543 

Machpelah, 629 

Magic • 337 

Magnetism, 228 

Malebranche, 90,  215 

Mallock,  Theory  of 314 

Malta, 397 

Man,  Ancestry  of 702 

Antiquity  of  .    .  179,  183,  184,  748 

Barbaric  Idea  of 526 

Buddhist  conception  of    •    •    •  446 

Development  of 522 

Dominion  of 524,  525 

Eulogies  of 168 

Exaltation  (Paul's)  of  ....  432 

Fall  of 591 

Flatterer,  A 520 

Freedom  of 491 

Future,  the 519 

Immortal 759 

Lordship  of 312 

Masterpiece,  A 523 

Occupations, 525-527 

Origin  of 170 

Paleolithic 181 

Poor,  the 543 

Primitive 174 

Problem  of 125 

Relation  of  Christianity  to  .    .  523 
Relation  to  animal  kingdom, 

172,  173 

Relation  to  nature,    .   .   .  169,  469 

Religious 349,  350 

Rights  of 507,  508 

Sanctification  of     ....  531,  532 
Scientific  spirit  in  ...    .  530,  531 


49 


770 


INDEX. 


PAGE. 

Man,     .Scriptural     representation 

of 433,  434,  453 

Self-sufficient  .» 534 

Mandeville,  Ethics  of 322 

Manes, 331 

Mansel,    ....  96,  119,  123,  411,  664 

Marriages,  Royal 66 

Martineau,  Dr 680 

Martj^r,  Justin 283 

Chiliasm  of 609 

Martyrdom,  Value  of 389 

Martyrs,  Resurrection  of  .    .  610,  611 

Materialism,  Ancient 73 

Assailed 719 

Ionic 73 

Mathematics, 686 

Matter,  Brahminical  notions  of.    .  444 
Buddhistic  notions  of    .       .    .  445 

Co-eternity  of 32 

Definitions  of 141 

Deification  of 697 

Dynamical  theory  of 248 

Explanation  of 206 

Forms  of 462 

Non-existence  of 124 

Organization  of 33,  159 

Pre-existence  of 136 

Spherical  tendency  of  ...    .  470 

Maupertius, 299 

Maurice,  F.  D 710 

McCosh,  Dr 103,  348,  662 

Criterion  of  Truth, .   .    ...    .    .674 

Mcllvaine,  J.  H 571 

Mediation,  Basis  of 690 

Memory,  Unexplained 205 

Merrill,  Bishop  S.  M 609 

Messiahship, 383,  627 

Method,  Abuse 727 

Biblical 693 

Boundaries  of 692 

Philosophical 309 

Psychological 123 

Supernatural 439 

Methodism, 713 

Mettrie,  De  La 203 

Military,  the 508 

Mill,  James 177,  214 

Mill,  John  S.    .  100,  101,  106,  141,  200 
Interpretation  of  Mind,    .    .    .  201 

Socialism  of 502 

Millennium,  Apocalyptic   .    .    .    .610 

Definition  of 610 

Gradual 615 

Greek  Idea  of 493 

Jewish  Idea  of 493 

Limited 612-616 

Political 611 

Religious 612 

Scientific 612 


PAGE. 

Millennium,  Subsidence  of    .   .   .  616 

Miller,  Hugh 128 

Minark, 248 

Mind,  Attributes  of 229 

Creating  power  of 208 

Definitions  of 209 

Fact  of 190 

Freedom  of 208 

Hamilton's  opinion, 177 

Interpretations  of 192 

Laws  of 206 

Relation  to  Body, 204 

Self-determining  power,   .    .    .  203 

Ministry,  Christian 533 

Ecclesiastical  Differences  Con- 
cerning      657 

Miracles, 387,  403 

Hume's  objection, 237 

Objections, 649 

Missionary  Center, 393 

Missions,  Christian 556 

Mivart,  St.  George 157,  250 

Ethics  of 706 

Mohammed, 354 

Methods  of 637 

Religion  of 446,  447 

Sovereign  Principle  of  .    .  505,  506 

Mohammedanism, 710 

A  Failure, 724 

Moleschott 204 

Monarchy, 514 

Monadism, 93 

IMonism, 135,  171 

Monogamy, 553 

Monophysitism, 603 

IMonopoly, 555 

Monotheism, 334,  347 

Defective 736 

Jewish 622,  625 

Montaigne, 116 

Monuments,  Egyptian  and  Roman.185 
Scriptures  Confirmed  by  .    .    .  748 

Moon,  Size  of 84 

Moralitv,  Christian 555 

Definitions  of 513 

Necessity  of 512 

Pagan 555 

Relative 323 

INIormonism, 553 

Morlot,  M 181 

Morris,  Prof 140,  198 

Mortillet,  M 181 

Moses, 142,  161,  333 

Books  of 746 

Creation  week  of 451 

Errors  of 571 

Geology  of 570 

Sustained, 662 

Motion, 148 


INDEX. 


771 


PAGE.  1 

Motion,  Kinds  of 34 

Suggestive 461 

MuUer,  Julius 677 

Miiller,  Max 710 

Musseus, 137 

Music,  Mill's  Fear 187 

Pythagoras  on 77 

Mysteries,  Christian 568 

Eleusinian 566 

Solved 730 

Mysticism,  Christianity  a  .   .   .   .669 

Swedenborg's 134 

Mythologies, 15, 74,  639 

Overthrown 329 

N. 

Napoleon, 485 

Naturalism,  Ethical 323 

Nature, 127 

Beauty  of 472 

Cause  of 237 

Christianity  the  Counterpart  of.633 
Common  Representation  of_  .129 
Emerson's  idea  of .   -        .  475,  476 

Final  cause  of 306,  477 

Goethe's  idea  of 134 

Greek  interpretation  of  .  .  .  477 
Hiickel's  idea  of  ..••••  •  133 
Idealistic  interpretation, .   .   .139 

Laws  of 473 

Man's  place  in 703 

Mathematical  spirit  of  .  .  138,  631 

Mivart's  idea  of 133 

Moral  lessons  from 475 

Order  of 237 

Personified 620 

Planck's  idea  of 133 

Smith's  (Adam)  idea  of  .  .  .476 
Socrates's  indifierence  to  .   .    .128 

Spinoza's  idea  of  , 138 

Store-house 563 

Swedenborg's  idea  of    ....  134 

Theism  of 701 

Unity  of 130,  471 

Neo-Platonism, 86 

Neptune, 477 

Newcomb,  Prof 303 

Newton,  R.  Heber 745 

Sir  Isaac 148,2.35 

Sir  Isaac,  discovery  of  ...   .  473 

Niebuhr, 516 

Nihilism, 511 

Nile,  the 241 

Nirvana,  Doctrine  of 315 

Nominalism, 24/ 

Novelist,  the 546 

O. 

OCCAMISM, 323 

Oersted, 140 


PAGE. 

Oligarchy, 514 

Olives,  Mt.  of 389 

"  Omne  Vivum  ex  ovo,"   .    .   .    .155 

Ontology,  Problem  of 118 

Oppression,  Social 511 

Ordinances,  Church 656 

Origen, 167,  283 

Theory     of     the     Resurrec- 

•      tion 593,  594 

Owen,  Richard 175,  176,  343 

Oxygen, 131,  191 

Discovery  of 416 

Is  an  effect, 242,  243 

P. 

Paganism,  Claim  of 646 

Fate  of 724 

Fulfilled 716 

Greek 620 

Pangenesis,  Theory  of 156 

Pantheism, 90,  687 

Errors  of 443,  444,  477 

Origin  of 476 

Papacy,  the 658,  666 

Paphos,  Miracle  at 403 

Parables,  the 567 

Park,  Mungo 348 

Parker,,  Theodore 283 

Parmenides, 105 

Parseeism, 724 

Parthenon,  the 504 

Pascal, 456 

Pasteur,  M 155 

Patmos, 590 

Paul,  Ambition, 374,  429 

Apostle,  an 406 

Birthplace  of 357 

Career  of 391 

Chrvsostom's  opinion  of  .    .    .  356 

Cities  visited.  402 

Classical  education 359 

College  life  in  Jerusalem .  360,  361 
Conflict  with  Gentilism,  ...  383 
Conflict  with  Judaism, .  •  381,  382 
Conflict  with  Philosophy,. 384,  385 

Conversion  of 363-368 

Criticisms  of  his  Epistles,  .  .  400 
Damascus,  going  to  .  .  .  365,  366 
Defense  of  Messiahship,  ...  383 

Doctrines  of 384 

Effect  of  his  conversion,  ...  368 

Empiricist,  not  an 358 

Energy  of 374 

Enthusiasm  of 392 

Epistles  of 399-402 

Eschatology  of 435 

Exponent  of  Christianity,  .    .  356 

Farrar's  opinion  of 398 

Greatness  of 405,  406 


772 


INDEX. 


PAGE. 

Paul,  Ideas  of 376 

In  Rome, 397 

Intellectual  temperament,  .   .  373 

Jerusalem,  going  to 397 

Judaic  Spirit, 372,  373 

Luke's  influence  on   .    .    .   .    .  380 
Luther's  opinion  of  his  Epis- 
tles,   400 

Methods  of 690 

Miracle  power  of  ...  .  403,  404 
Missionary  tour,  the  first  .  393,  394 
Missionary  tour,  the  2d.  .  395,  396 
Missionary  tour,  the  third.396,  397 

Monad's  opinion  of 398 

Moral  character  of .  .    .    .  372,  405 

National  Spirit, ,373 

Parental  influence  on    .    .  359,  360 

Persecutor,  the 362 

Peter's  influence  on  .    .    .  379,  380 

Physique  of 358 

Preparation  for  Apostleship,  .  367 

Prophecies  of 407 

Psychological     conversion 

of      364,  370,  371 

Qualifications  for  leadership,  .  375 
Revelations  of    .    .    .  378,  390,  399 
Renan's  criticisms  of  his  Epis- 
tles,   •.    .  401 

Renan's  opinion  of 398 

Scientific    explanation    of    his 

conversion, 369,  370 

Sermon    in    Antioch    in    Pisi- 

dia, 383,  384 

Specific  teaching  of 430 

Stephen's  influence  on .   .  377,  378 

Stvle  of 399 

Theologian,  the 428 

Time  of  his  conversion,  .  366,  367 

Title  of  Apostle, 404 

Trial  in  Csesarea,    ......  397 

Trial  in  Jerusalem, 397 

Visit  to  Athens, 396 

Peabodv,  A.  P 666 

Pentateuch,  Authorship   con- 
tested,   721,  746 

Pentecost, 538 

Perictione, 15 

Peripatetics, 422 

Path  of 21 

Persians,  Religion  of 334 

Personalities, 327 

Personality,  Man's 167 

Peschel,  Oskar  . 697 

Pessimism, 89 

Cure  for 318 

Overbalanced 316 

Relation  to  first  cause, ....  2(52 

Suicidal 317 

Peter  exalted, 404 


PAGE. 

Peter,  Relation  to  Paul,  .   .    .  379,  380 

Petitio  Principii, 191 

Phenomena,  Explanation  of  .    .    .  234 

Philo, 191 

Phrases  of 667 

Philippi,  Miracle  in 403 

Philosophers,  Ancient 105 

Christian 89 

Modern 106 

Philosophy,  Alienation  of  ...    .  689 

Boundaries  of 114,  688 

Breakdo-vyn  of 307 

Confirmation  of  Truth,  .  .  .728 
Conflicts  with  Christianity,    .  755 

Definitions, 112 

Disappearance  in  Christianity,  732 

Divisions  of 110 

Embarrassments  of 730 

Fundamental  truth  of  ...    .  702 

Greek,  a  development 333 

Inspiration  of 16,  334 

Moral 81 

Opposed  to  Agnosticism,  .  694,  696 

Province  of 108 

Pseudodox  in 653 

Reconciliation    of  Christianity 

with 689 

Responsible  for  antagonism,    .  753 

Roman 74 

School-master,  A 707 

Theological  tendency  of  .    .    .  259 

Transition  period  of 755 

Phrenologv, 206 

Pictet,  Ad;)lf 348 

Pietist,  Position  of 692 

Pius  IX.,  Pope 220 

Plato,  Academy  of 20,  21 

Biographies  of 17 

Birth  of 18 

Caste  taught, 57 

Character,  moral 18 

Communism, 59 

Cosmology, 30 

Educational  schemes,  .  .  .49,  50 
Emerson's  opinion  of    ...    .    21 

Esoteric  Philosophy, 23 

Ethics  of 45,  46,  65 

Governmental  Ideas,    .    .    .57,  58 

Ideas,  Doctrine  of 35 

Immortality,  Doctrine  of  39,'^0,  53 
Intemperance  condemned,  .  45,  46 
Knowledge,  Limitations  of  .  .  43 
Knowledge,  sources  of .  .  .  41,  42 
Language,  Philosophical  ...  64 
Lewes's  opinion  of  ....  26,  60 
Logos  defined, .......    44 

Marriage  views  of 58,  66 

Method  of 26 

Mind,  Definition  of 41 


INDEX. 


773 


PAGE 

Plato,  Monotheism  of 28-30 

Motion,  doctrine  of  ....  36,  63 

Mythology, 29 

Originalities  of 32,  63 

Philosophy,  Influence  of  .  .  62,  67 

Physiology  of 37 

Prayer,  Utility  of, 48,  52 

Prometheus,  ' 37 

Proyidence,  Doctrine  of   ...    51 

Psychology  of •  36,  37 

Purgatory  suggested, 55 

Reminiscence,  Doctrine  of  .    .    38 

Republic,  Ideal 58 

Services  to  religion, 68 

Socialism, 56 

Socialism,  objections  to    .    .  66,  67 

Socrates's  pupil, 19 

Socratic  element  in 24 

Soul,  Depravity  of  .    .    .  39,  40,  47 

Soul,  Nature  of 39 

Soul,  Pre-existence  of    ....    38 

Spirituality, 52-55 

Style,  Dialogistic 23 

System  of 21 

Theology  of 27 

Transmigration  taught,     ...    54 

Travels  of 20 

Universals,  Doctrine  of     ...    36 
Universe,  Conception  of  .    .    .    34 

Works  classified, 22-25 

Writer,  A 23,  60,  61 

Plotinus, 86,  596 

Mysticism  of 669 

Pluto, 477,  641 

Pnvx,  The 396,  504,  505 

Pollux, 313 

Polygamy, 509,  603,  666 

Authorized, 718 

Polytheism,  ....  330,  335,  347,  471 

Extinction  of 641 

Taught  by  Greeks, 477 

Porter,  Dr.  Noah 161 

Poseidon, 335 

Positivism, 89,  99 

Post-millennianism, 609 

Pratt,  Orson 666 

Pre- Adamites, 185 

Pre-millennianism, 609 

Privateering, 543 

Probation,  Force  of  I  Peter  iii, 

18-20,   607 

Necessity, 607 

Philosophical 697 

Second 606 

Problems, 113 

Christian, 564 

Prodicus,  .  .    .    .    • 80 

Progress,  Idea  of 725 

Law  of 104 


PAGE. 

Progress,  Political 717 

Properties,  Knowledge  of  .   .   .   .224 

Property,  Rights  of 543 

Prophecy, 3^7 

Value, 648 

Prophets,  Persian 413 

Protagoras, 105 

Protestantism, 654 

Tainted 659 

Protoplasm, 157 

Protozoan, 555 

Prout,  Dr 131 

Providence,  Doctrine  of 335 

Magnetism  of 642 

Methods, 551 

Scriptural  representations,.420-422 

Psalms,  Singing  of 656 

Pseudodox,  the 653 

Psychology,  Relation  to  philoso- 
phy,   Ill 

Purgatory, 581,  658 

Puritanism, 495 

Purposes  divine,  unknowable,  .   .  302 

Pusey 666 

Pyrrho, 85,  116 

Pyrrhonism, 210 

Pythagoras, 77,  105 

Philosophy  of 138 

Philosophy  defined, 112 

Q. 

Qualifications,  Paul's 375 

Quarantania,  Mount    .    .  •    ...  388 

Quarrels,  Scientific 754 

Quatrefages,  M .174 

Quotations,  Poetic 89,  143 


Race,  A  perfect 188 

Unity  of  the 554 

Races,  Plurality  of 186 

Raphael, 548 

Rationalism, 89.  100,  664 

Mansel's  objection,  .  270,'  271,  411 

Respected, 755 

Rationalists,  Tubingen  School  of  .  370 

Rawlinson,  George, 721 

Realism,  Ideal 89,  98 

Reason,  The 207 

Defective  methods, 232 

EstaV)lished  methods 756 

Kant's  classification  of  .  .    .  89,  94 

Spontaneous 217 

Theistic  content  of 283 

Reconciliation,  Ground  of  ...    .  699 

Redemption, 717 

Reformation,  German 406 

Leadership  of 713 

Swiss 740 


774 


INDEX. 


PAGE. 

Reformation,  Value  of 544 

Regeiieration, 434 

Baptismal 659 

Brahminical 715 

Error  concerning 678 

Spontaneous 683 

Reid,  Thomas 92,  106 

"  Common-sense,"    .    .    .  260,  261 

Criticisms  of 198 

Interpretation  of  mind,    .    .    .  197 
Eeligion,  Central  position  impreg- 
nable,    .    .    .  753 

Development,  A 561 

Essentials  of 620 

Forces  of 622 

Jewish 661 

Magnetism  of 647 

Natural 463,  673 

Objective 673 

Old 560 

Revealed 560 

Subjective 673 

Words  of 744,  745 

Religions,  Assyrian 653 

Defects  of 726 

Disintegration  of 714 

Foundation  of 351,  646 

Hindu 442 

Historical 734 

Inspiration  of 711 

International 532 

Missionary 710 

Non-evolutionary 624 

Race 710 

Rights  of 711 

Spinal  cord  of 621 

Strauss's  explanation  of    .    .    .  347 

Tests  of 671 

Verities  of 715 

Remains,  Human ]S3 

Reminiscence,  Doctrine  of  .  .    .    .210 

Renan,  Criticism  of  Christianity, .  668 

Paul's  conversion  explained,  .  369 

Resurrection,  Alger's  theory  .  .    .  597 

Cook's  physical 594-597 

In  Nain, 684 

Jesus' 385,  600,  601 

Nature's  suggestions 467 

Necessity  of  .  .    .    .  ' 386 

Old  Testament  Materialistic,  .  598 
Paul's  exposition,    .   435,  436, 

599,  600 

Phvsical  rejected,  ....  595,  596 

Problem  of 592 

Scriptural  language  perverted, 

598,  599 

Seven  theories  of 593 

Spiritual  theory  affirmed  .  597-602 
Spiritual  theory,  scientific  .   .  601 


PAGE. 

Resurrection,  Strauss's  criticism 

Christ's •  652 

Theories  reduced, 594 

Time  of 618 

Vaguely  taught, 568 

Word  defined 594,  595 

XVth  Chap,  of  I  Corinthians,.  600 

Retributions,  Eternal 54 

Reuss,  Prof •  371,  721 

Revelation, 219,  221 

Ambiguity  of 669 

Concerning  God, 222 

Concerning  man's  purification, 222 

Concerning  nature, 222 

Darkness  of .  580 

Evolutional 624,  625 

Exhaustless, 738,  739 

Limits  of 569,  663,  666 

Necessity  of 6  8 

Objection  to 415,  570 

Philosophical 448 

Specialty  of 419 

Stages  of 340 

Review,  International 205 

Revolution,  The  French 485 

Righteousness, 680 

Ritter, 348 

Rome,  Corruptions  in  .  .    .    .  •    .  553 

Pagan 503,  504 

Paul  in 397 

Ross,  Sir  John 348 

Rousseau, •    ....  128 

Rush,  James 678 


Sac'Rificb,  Christian  idea  of  .    .    .  466 

Socrates  s 338 

Sahib,  Nana 510 

Salvation,  Plan  of -432 

Sanctification, 367 

Sanhedrin,  Paul  before 599 

Satan, 610,  616  ,  4  l''f. 

Schaff,  Dr 370 

Schelling, 97,  106 

Schem,  Dr 723 

Schiller, 587 

Schlegel 109 

Idea  of  God, 225 

Schleiermacher,  .    • 96 

Classification  of  Plato's  Works,  22 

Theologv  of 665 

Schliemann,  Dr 181,  308 

Schmid,  Rudolf 177,  689 

Scholasticism, 331 

School,  Concord 103 

Schopenhauer, 98,  106 

Pessimism  of 314 

Schultze,  Max 157 

Schwegler, 24,  99 


INDEX. 


775 


Science,  False  claims  of 691 

Limitations  of 457 

Modern ' 341 

Province  of 116 

Scott,  Sir  Walter 128 

Scotus,  Duns, 87 

Sectarianism,  Oriental 654 

Selection,  Natural 697 

Self,  Belief  in 172 

Knowledge  of 225 

Self-existence, 113 

Seneca, 136,  140,  329 

Eulogizes  Christian  virtues,  .   .  tOU 

Sensation,  Defined 219 

Knowledge  by 258 

Sensationalism, 257 

Aristotle's 258 

Sense,  a  moral 1 '  8 

Sepulcher,  Christ's 388 

Sermon,  Nature's 460 

Paul's  at  Antioch,  ....  383,  384 

Sexes,  Proportion  of 509 

Shaftesbury,  Lord 324 

Shakespeare,  Anglo-Saxon  of   .    .  547 

Philosophy  hint  of 117 

Poetical  mind  of 198 

Shintoism, 345,  724 

Reproduced '38 

Sheol, 546,  603,  605,  629,  639 

Siam,  Living  in 552 

Sin, 454,  433, 


611 
480 
679 
50 
241 
742 


Destroyed 

Original 

Reproved  

Secret 

Sirius, 

Skepticism,  Attacks  on  .   . 

Skulls, 183 

Smith,  Adam 293 

Doctrine  of  Sympathy, .   .    •    -322 
Theory  of  Happiness,  ....  325 

George 337 

W.  Robertson 663 

W.  Roberston,  Authorship  of 

Decalogue, 747 

Smyth,  Newman, 560 

Pedagogical  intent  of  Old  Tes- 

ment, 561 

Theory  of  Resurrection,  .  593,  594 

Socialism, 56-58,  67 

Philosophic -wl^ 

Revolutionary 502 

Society,  Augustus's  scheme,  .    •    -498 

Basesof 493 

Episcopal  scheme 49o 

Hildebrand's  scheme,    ....  494 

Ideal 506,515,516 

Mohammedan  idea  of  .    .  505,  506 
Napoleon's  scheme 497 


Society,  Pagan  idea  of 503 

Plato's  scheme 498,  499 

Political  idea  of 496,  497 

Puritanic  scheme, 495 

Scientific  idea  of    ...   •  500,  501 

Socialistic  idea  of 502 

Socinus, 666 

Sociology,  Herbert  Spencer's   •    •  499 

Socrates,  Daemon  of 48 

Philosophy  of 19,  81,  82 

Somme, Valley  of 181,  182 

Sophists, 80 

Soteriology, 716 

Soul,  the 166,567 

Brahminical  notions  of  .  .    •    •  444 

Immortality  of 63 

Lotze's  definition  of 585 

Resurrection  of 597 

Southall,  Prof 181,  182 

Prof.,  Antiquity  of  man,  .    .    .  748 

Space 461 

Species, 105,  132,  163 

Extinct 181 

Introduction  of 164 

Stability  of 470 

Variety  of 163 

Spectator,  the  London 280 

Spencer,  Herbert 101, 106 

"  Complete  living  "  of  .    .    •    •  682 

Ethics  of 322,  323 

Interpretation  of  mind,    .  201-203 

Non-atheistic, 698 

Opinion  of  Christianity,  .    •    .  660 

Sociology 499,  500 

Theism  of 698,699 

Spinoza 89,  90, 106, 194,  209 

Spirit,  Hellenic 114 

Modern 341 

Spiritualism, 55 

Roman, 621 

Sports,  Gladiatorial 528 

Suppressed, 552 

Stanley,  Dean 590 

Statistics,  Religious 723 

Stewart,  Balfour 235 

Dugald   .       .    .    .92,106,190,209 

Stoicism, ^3 

Contributions  of o39 

Moralitv  of 336,  553 

Strauss,  "  Have  we  a  Religion?"  .  345 

Ignorance  confessed, 177 

Object  of  worship, 701 

Symbolical    interpretation     of 

Bible, 668 

Transcendental  theory,    ...  175 

Strikes, 512 

Struggles,  Life's 484 

Styx,  the  river •  •  639 

Substances,  the  two 583 


776 


INDEX. 


PAGE. 

Succession,  Doctrine  of 241 

Supernatural,  the 566,  567 

Superstition, 352 

Swedenborg, .    .  134,  473 

Second  adventism, 608 

Theory  of  resurrection,    .  593,  594 
Switzerland,  Lake  dwellings  in    .  185 

Sympathy,  doctrine  of 322 

Synoptists,  the 390 

System,  Value  of 441 

T. 

Tait,  Prof 155,  247 

Talleyrand, 61 

Taoism, 345,  724 

Reproduced 738 

Tarsus, 357 

Schools  of 359 

Tartarus, 55,  438,  578,  639 

Tefft,  B.  F 704 

Teleology, .  286 

Astronomy  a  proof 296 

Baer's  Ridicule,  .......  300 

Cook's,  doubt 291 

Duke  of  Argyll's  indorsement,  298 

Gastric  juice, 295 

Hick's  assault, 288 

Oxygen  a  proof, 293 

Physiology  a  proof, 293 

Plato's  trouble, 300 

Premature  conclusions,    .    .    .  301 
Rudimentary      organs     op- 
posed     300,  301 

Schopenhauer's  objection,  .    .  300 

Theological 705 

Various  arguments, 296 

Temptation,  Christ's 388 

Tertullian, 553 

Testament,  New 564 

Ethics  of 750 

Evolution  of 630 

Immortality  taught 590 

Old 564 

Old,  Assault  on 745,  746 

Old,  Immortality  taught  .  589,  590 
Old,  Optical  accuracy  ....  572 
Old,  Scientifically  vindicated,  .  721 

Thales, 74-76,  105 

Theater,  Flavian 552 

Theism,  Argument    from    de- 
sign   280,  281 

Cato's  declaration, 274 

Intuitional, 447 

Law  of  Causation  a  proof,  .  .  278 
Law  of  Continuity  a  proof  ,.278,  279 

Magnetism  of 641 

Philosophic  basis  defective,  .  281 
Mohammedan  doctrine  .  .  .  447 
Triumph  of 450 


PAGE. 

Theodicy,  Basis  of 490 

Range  of 486 

Theodorus, 329 

Theology, 27 

Compromise, 665 

Evils  of 655,  656 

New 603 

Poetic 339,  679 

Scientific 432 

Theophorus, 670 

Theseus,  Temple  of 396 

Thiers,  M 343 

Tholuck, 665 

Thompson,  Sir  William 319 

Thought,  Regulated 719 

Thrasyllus, 22 

Time 461 

Titus, 382 

Townsend,  Dr.  L.  T 605 

Torch-race,  a  .    .• 725 

Torricelli, 570 

Trade,  International    ....  517,  518 

Tradition, 735 

Traducianism, 168 

Trajan, 670 

Transcendency,  Doctrine  of  .    .    .  240 

Transcendentalism, 444 

Transmigration,  Doctrine  of  .    .    .  444 

Transubstantiation, 656 

Trench,  Archbishop    ....  414,  609 

Tribes,  South  African 348 

Trinity, 388 

Developed, 538 

Errors  from 603 

Geometric 632 

Rejected 447 

Truth,  Basis  of 438 

Christianity  is 759,  760 

Criteria  of 674 

Danger  to 758 

Difficulties  in  obtaining    .    .    .211 

Embryonic 537 

Hidden 674,  675 

Intuitional, 216 

Nature  of 440 

Necessity  of 574 

Revealed 221 

Self-dependent 537 

Sources  of 220 

Theistic 417,  418 

Unity  of 752 

Unknowable 416 

Tvndall,  Prof 151,  155,  160 

"  Idea  of  energy, 239 

U. 

Uhlhorn, 553 

Ultimate,  Incognizable 117 

Ultimates, 327 


INDEX. 


777 


PAGE. 

307 

Unconditioned,  the  ....   .  113,  119 

Rejected 271,  272 

Unitarianism, 640,  655 

Unity,  Argument  from 471 

Nature's 467,  468 

Of  the  race, -468 

Universalism, 665 

Universe,  Eternal 124 

Explanation  of 569 

Imperfect, 296 

Materials  of 468 

Produced, 153 

Teleological  character  of  .  279,  280 

468,  469 

Unseen, 602 

Upham, 118 

Ur,  City  of 748 

Utility,  Doctrine  of 513 

Utopia,  Sir  Thomas  More's  .   .   .  499 
Utopianism,  Practical 557 

V. 

Vaccination, 649 

Vatican,  Fine  arts  in, 549 

Vedas,  The 442,  443 

Version,  Revised 546 

Septuagint 748 

Vibrations,  Philosophic 115 

Vico,  .  .   .  ■ -104 

Vinci,  Leonardo  da 548 

Virgil, 514 

Virtue,  Aristotle's  definition  of  .  513 

Vishnu, 443 

Vitalism,  Theory  of    ...   .  160,  683 

Vogt,  Karl 173 

Voltaire, •    .   .  510,  545 

W. 

Wallace,  A.  R 173,  178 

Flints,  Estimating  age  of  .  •   •  181 

Theism  of 274 

Watson,  Richard  .    • 69 

Watt,  James 619 

Weight,  Atomic 132 

Weisman,  Prof 585 


FAOB. 

Wesley,  John 659 

Whedon,  D.  D 480,  609 

Whewell 545 

Whitney,  Prof 174 

Will,  Scopeiihauer's  idea  of  .  .   .  262 

William  of  Occam 87 

Wilson,  Sir  Thomas 558 

Winchell,  Prof.,  Tribes  examined 

by 343 

Winkleman,  Abbe 674,  675 

Wolf 438 

Woman,  Mohammedan   idea  of 

552,  553,  718 

Women,  Community  of 509 

World,  Conflagration  of     ....  618 

Intermediate 602-606 

Phenomenal 456 

Spiritual 474 

Worsade, 182 

Wyman,  Prof 155 

Wythe,  Dr 161 

X. 

Xavier,  Francis 722 

Y. 

Yale  College, 547 

Yama,  the 716 

Yoga,  Philosophy  of 336 

Youth,  Paul's 358-360 

Plato's 18,  19 

Z. 

Zealanders,  New 577 

Zeno, 83,  105 

Ethical  notions  of 513 

The  Stoic 215 

Zenocrates, 17 

Zenophanes, 77,  105 

Zero, 635 

Zerubbabel, 421 

Zeus, 335,  430,  477 

Zoology, 132,  437 

Zoroaster, 329,  331 

Zoroastrianism,  Resurrection  idea 

of 598 

Zwingli, 656,  740 


Fmis. 


''lilllli III?|'ni m^&n^i  Seminary  Librari 


,J    1012  01237   7364 


